lessons from cbfm in bangladesh

7/28/2019 Lessons From CBFM in Bangladesh

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Booklet 2004/01

WorldFish Center-Bangladesh and South Asia Office

House 22B, Road 7, Block-F, Banani, Dhaka 1213

Bangladesh

Phone: (+880-2) 8813250, 8814624, 8817300

Fax: (+880-2) 8811151

Email: [email protected]

LESSONS FROMCOMMUNITY BASED FISHERIESMANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESH

COMMUNITY BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PROJECT (CBFM-2)


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Lessons from CBFM Briefing paper

Summary

Inland (floodplain) fisheries remain the mostimportant contributor to fish production inBangladesh. In the past they have beenadministered to generate government revenuewithout due concern for sustainability or poorusers. A possible solution to empowering fishingcommunities, and improving the sustainability ofmanagement is Community Based FisheriesManagement (CBFM). Experience from 19rivers and beels during 1996-2000 and anexpansion to over 100 waterbodies in 2001-2003 is summarised. Some of the main lessonsdrawn are that:

1. CBFM is based on co-managementempowering fishing communities.

2. Development of local fisher-basedorganisations (CBOs) is essential.

3. New institutions can be built with as muchease (or difficulty) as modifying existingones.

4. Local government support for CBOs isimportant for longer term sustainability.

5. Establishing CBFM is a slow process.6. Strong facilitation is necessary.7. External threats are a strong limiting factor

that cannot be overcome in some cases of

powerful political interest in a waterbody.8. Effective well-defined partnerships of NGOs

and government are not easy to establishbut are needed to support new communityinstitutions for fisheries management.

9. The extent of appropriate NGO and DOFsupport after projects end is uncertain, willthey allow CBOs to flourish?

10. It is essential that communities obtain clearuse rights over government fisheries.

11. In jalmohals (including rivers) the leaseneeds to be reserved for the CBO through asupportive government agency, and theCBO needs to make some lease payment.

12. Land administration at district level needsconvincing of the merits of CBFM.

13. Diverse stakeholder interests in floodplainbeels can be brought together where there

are shared interests and concerns overdeclining fisheries.

14. Coordination of CBOs and managementplans in connected waterbodies is promisingbut needs shared trust and compliance.

15. Non-fish aquatic resources need to beincluded in more integrated floodplainmanagement plans.

16. Taking up visible resource managementactions such as fish sanctuaries helpsstrengthen institutional development.

17. CBFM is slightly easier in small fisherieswith clear boundaries.

18. Success was more likely/easier inhomogeneous communities.

19. Scaling up should first expand CBFM toneighbouring waterbodies, and shouldscreen proposed sites to avoid onesdominated by strong influential interests.

Acknowledgements

First thanks go to the 5,000 households whohave participated in the CBFM-1 project for theiractive interest and tolerance of monitoring in this

action research, and to all the over 100,000households in the CBFM-2 working areas. A bigthank you to all of the CBFM-1 and CBFM-2staff of WorldFish Center, who contributed to thesuccess of the many project activities, and whoundertook various surveys. Many staff ofBangladesh Department of Fisheries (DOF),Banchte Sheka, BRAC, CARITAS, Center forRural and Environment Development, andPROSHIKA have contributed to these lessonsand have worked in partnership in CBFM-1.They have been joined by BangladeshEnvironmental Lawyers Association, Center forNatural Resource Studies, FemCom, Gharoni,SDC and Shishuk in CBFM-2. Particular thanks

go to Md. Mokammel Hossain, S.M. NazmulIslam, and Md. Mahbubur Rahman Khan, DOFProject Directors for CBFM-1 and CBFM-2.

Fikret Berkes, Bob Pomeroy and J ock Campbellkindly gave advice at different stages of theprojects.

The CBFM-1 project was supported by the FordFoundation through a series of grants to each ofthe partners mentioned, and we thank DorisCapistrano for designing the project andpartnership.

This document is an output of a project fundedby the UK Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) for the benefit ofdeveloping countries. The views expressed arenot necessarily those of DFID.


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Introduction

This briefing paper is based on: a recent paper by Thompson, Sultana and

Islam (2003) reviewing lessons from theCBFM-1 project,

the experience of the design and the initialtwo years of the CBFM-2 project,

an assessment of scaling up issues for theIntegrated Floodplain Management institutional environments and participatorymethods project, and

experience gained in general from 8 yearsinvolvement with CBFM and fisheries

management in Bangladesh.

The aim is to present concisely lessons fromCommunity Based Fisheries Management(CBFM) project experience that may help whenplanning and undertaking similar initiatives tosupport community management of fisheries inBangladesh or elsewhere. This paper should beread in conjunction with the CBFM workingpaper on impacts of CBFM-1 which describes indetail the CBFM-1 project and assesseschanges and impacts in 15 waterbodies thathave continued into CBFM-2. As the policy

process related to inland fisheries has been wellreviewed and assessed by Huda (2003) inanother working paper from CBFM-2, this is notaddressed here as a specific topic.

Context

Over half of Bangladesh comprises floodplains,and the remaining area of about four millionhectares of floodplain wetlands form a majorcapture fishery (Ali, 1997). These floodplains

are intensively used for agriculture, fishing andother aquatic resources, and are a source oflivelihood for 800 people per km2. Theycontribute about 46% of all fish consumed(Department of Fisheries, 2000). Over 70% ofhouseholds in the floodplains catch fish eitherfor income or food (Minkin et al., 1997;Thompson et al., 1999). The importance ofthese fisheries has been neglected in the past,consequently development policies havefavoured agriculture and there has beenwidespread flood control and drainage.Institutional arrangements for better fishery

management and for stakeholder participationreceived limited attention in the past. From the1980s this changed, at least on a pilot scale,and initiatives to empower fishing communitiesand enable them to take management decisionsthemselves for sustainable use of thesefisheries have moved forward.

In parallel with these changes in fisheriesmanagement, development in related ruralsectors has been undergoing similar changes inemphasis. For example, the maintenance ofremaining wetland areas is now part of the

National Water Policy (Habib, 1999), althoughthere is a risk of continued small-scale projectsdraining smaller wetlands. Moreover participatoryplanning of water management projects has beenpart of government policy and practice for severalyears (FPCO, 1993; MWR, 2001) and local usercommittees are supposed to be establishedwithin water management projects (althoughfarming tends to dominate over other interests).In the environment sector there are also pilot

projects for communitymanagement of wetlands.More generally there is

increasing emphasis, mainlyfrom donors, on improvedgovernance, decentralisationand devolution of power, butreforms have been slow tocome.

Lessons are drawn in the formof a series of key topics orissues, but underlying these isthe diversity of fisheries whichmeans CBFM must be flexiblyadapted and adjusted to fit

local circumstances.

Topics covered and rating as constraints on CBFM

Issues Constraint rating Page

Flexible approaches adaptable toneeds

High Crosscutting

Property rights and leasing High 4Environmental complexity and clustermanagement

High 7Facilitation and NGO strategies High 8External forces and conflict High 14Scaling up High 16Partnership Moderate 9Resource management activities Moderate 11Boundaries, scale and waterbody type Low 6Homogeneity and communitycharacteristics

Low 11

Building on existing institutions Low 15

CBFM or co-management NA 3Poverty and CBFM NA 12Sustainability and exit strategies NA 17

NA not applicable

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CBFM or Co-management?

Confusions and overlapping concepts arecommon when it comes to community basedfisheries management (CBFM) and co-management. This is generally for two reasons.Firstly because co-management can broadly bedefined as an arrangement where managementresponsibility is shared between the governmentand fishing communities (Viswanathan et al.2003, p8); and secondly because CBFM is usedto label a range of institutional arrangementswith varying degrees of community participationin management which might in any case beexpected to vary according to factors such as

environment, scale, property rights, andcommunity structure.

The idea that projects are attempting toestablish some form of pure CBFM in whichthere is no role for government is obviously amisconception, since for most fisheries there isa direct government role since jalmohals arestate property. The vision of co-managementthat can range from an instructive form wheregovernment agencies tell fishers what it hasdecided, to advisory and informative formswhere users inform government of their

decisions for government endorsement (Senand Nielson 1996) is comprehensive. However,this is of limited help in understanding thechanges in institutions and decision making thatare generally now intended by co-management.

Users can only play a role in decision makingover fisheries if there is a space and a capacity

for them to do this. Therefore the intention of co-management was to empower fishers (to agreater or lesser extent) both as an end in itselfand in the expectation of better management.The latter would be through appropriate rulesbeing set based jointly on fishers and scientificknowledge and then complied with by the users.

Empowering co-management (Viswanathan etal. 2003) requires major changes in institutionsand organisations, in information bases, inattitudes among fishers and government. Thisrequires both political will and capacity building.

Therefore CBFM can be seen as a process formoving towards a substantial role for fishers inmanagement of the resources they depend onwithin a framework of government support forthat process. This process has to involve localadaptation to circumstances if it is to beempowering and so cannot by definition follow afixed blueprint or model. Therefore Campbelland Thompson (2002) found that the idea inCBFM-1 of testing alternative models of CBFMwas inappropriate for Bangladesh as there couldbe as many detailed arrangements for CBFM asthere are waterbodies and communities. But

there are a limited number of approaches to thisprocess being followed and they have somefeatures in common.

The figure generalises the expected process fora jalmohal in Bangladesh. Inland fisheries undercompetitive leasing have intermediary managersin the form of leaseholders - local elites who

include fisher leaders, money-lenders,landowners, politicians, andprofessional jalmohal managers. Theapproaches to CBFM have allincreased the role of Department of

Fisheries both in administration andgiving advice and supportingcommunity organisations, and haveinvolved NGOs as intermediaries for afixed project period to take on some ofthe leaseholders roles in the shortterm while they build the fisherscapacity and organisations for CBFMor empowering co-management. Howlong this difficult process will take andwhat role NGOs might or might nothave after funded projects end isuncertain. The non-shaded areas

represent uncertainties, competitionand overlaps between stakeholders.

Possible time path of changing roles in fishery co-management through CBFM100

0Start of CBFM initiative Number of years ?

Time Project end ?

Fishers/User community (CBO)

Leaseholder

%o

ffisherymanagementresponsibilit

Land administration

NGO preference toretain from CBO?

DOF level ofsupport uncertain

NGO-DOF tension

Department of Fisheries

NGO partner

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Property Rights

Property rights in inland fisheries are complexbut critical to an understanding of approaches tocommunity empowerment and fishery co-management in Bangladesh. Confusinglycommon property is often used to refer tothese fisheries. It is important to distinguish thenature of the resource which is a common poolresource where users extract a benefit thatcannot then be enjoyed by others but where it isdifficult to exclude potential users. Propertyrights refer to general recognition that someonecan use a resource the capacity to call on thecollective to stand behind ones claim to a

benefit stream (Bromley 1991).

Seasonally flooded land is mostly privatelyowned and cultivated, but during the monsoonin moderate-to-deeply flooded lands anyonefrom the surrounding villages (including thepoor) can usually fish, provided this does notdamage crops. In the dry season water and fishleft stranded in ditches become the property ofthe ditch owner. Thus in the monsoon theremay effectively be open access fishing in thesewaterbodies with no well defined property rights,but as water becomes less and fish are more

concentrated private rights become clearer.

However, larger permanent waterbodiesincluding rivers and beels (depressions in thedeeper parts of the floodplain) form the morevaluable components of the overall fisheriesand are government property. They are dividedup into about 12,000 jalmohals or fisheryestates. The fishing rights in jalmohals havehistorically been privatised by the Ministry ofLand in return for payments into governmentrevenue. They have been leased out to thehighest bidder for three years, usually this

means they are controlled by wealthy andinfluential lessees who then hire traditionalprofessional fishers to catch fish for them orcharge tolls from those fishers. Again thebalance between control by the leaseholder andfishers authorised by him, and access and useby the many other people living around awaterbody and interested to catch fish for theirsubsistence varies according to the areashistory. In many cases poor people who live inthe area are accepted as having a right to catchsmall fish or other aquatic resources but not ona commercial scale.

The government of Bangladesh has attemptedto direct fishing use rights to those who catchfish. In the 1970s a preference for leasingjalmohals to fisher cooperatives wasestablished, and from 1986 the New FisheriesManagement Policy (NFMP) piloted licensing ofindividual fishers in about 270 jalmohals.However, these policy changes had little impactsince fisher cooperatives tend to be under thepatronage of moneylenders and de factolessees who pay for the lease. Also the decisionon who received licenses was controlled by thecooperatives and therefore indirectly their

patrons (Ahmed et al. 1997).

The policy and history of leasing inland fisheriesin Bangladesh has left the most importantlegacy for undertaking CBFM. Payment ofgovernment revenue (the lease) gives thelessee the right to set local rules on exploitationof the fishery. Because leasing (revenuecollection) ended in most flowing rivers inSeptember 1995, when CBFM-1 tried to work inrivers there was no legitimacy for localmanagement committees to set rules limitingfishing, even when they included local officials.

In the smaller closed beels under CBFM therehad been a history of leaseholders controllingaccess and stocking carps prior to the project,and the fishers organised under the project wereable to continue this practice.

However, the open floodplain beel of Goakhola-Hatiara illustrates an exception there is nojalmohal in this seasonal beel and so no leaseto pay, yet the community was able to agree on,implement and comply with conservationmeasures (dry season fish sanctuaries and aclosed season) that have helped to protect fish

and improve returns from fishing this seems tobe a genuine common property regime wherethe surrounding villages form a distinctcommunity that has access to the fishery andhas adopted new norms limiting access andfishing for sustainable use of the resource.

Lessons on jalmohal leasing and fisheraccess

In the overall leasing policy context, if a jalmohalis not handed over to the beneficiaries under aproject framework then the target fishers cannot

resist outsiders (non target people) from fishingwithin the area. The target people of CBFM are


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poor and voiceless fishers who are dependenton local influentials and moneylenders. If theiraccess rights are established legally, they can

fight to save their resources. Even afterhandover of a jalmohal to DOF for CBFM, somepeople under political cover - former lesseesand some politicians - try to overlook thehandover. In some cases, local administrationhas denied the Ministry of Lands order to handover and instead leased the waterbody to otherpersuaders. For example, access rights to someof the waterbodies proposed for CBFM andagreed at central level went locally to thenational fishers association under NFMP butwhich is lead or directed locally by influentials.Thus policy is not made just at the central level,

but through local application.

Waterbody areas are not constant. During thedry season the area shrinks and during the wetseason it extends beyond the official area.During handover the local authority is supposedto demarcate the official jalmohal area. Forvarious reasons, most of the time theadministration does not do this. Moreover, partsof some jalmohals in the dry season arecultivated by local people or even leased out foragricultural use again by local administration.When monsoon water comes, these farmers

either enclose the area excluding fish or catchfish from their leased/occupied land withoutcontributing to the jalmohal lease. This appearsto be quite widespread and the fisherbeneficiaries consequently lose their potentialincome and became involved in conflict.

When some jamohals were leased on auction,without assessing the biological productivity ofthe waterbody some influentials bid high just tobeat a competing party. Later they found it wasnot profitable and they did not pay the leasevalue. Then the waterbody may be free from

leasing for years, because nobody wants to takethe lease at such a high rate, and so anyonecan fish. Eventually a bid at a lower price maybe accepted when no other bids are made.

However, there is no such mechanism foradjusting lease rates down to a reasonable levelwhen jalmohals are handed over for CBFM,since the Ministry of Land requires a 25%increase on the last lease rate. When Ministry ofLand placed waterbodies with very high leasesunder CBFM-2, the CBFM beneficiaries realisedthat the lease value was too high for them torepay the lease and make a living from theexiting fishery resources. High leases for some

waterbodies are a disincentive for fishers toinvest in management. They are then notinterested to be involved in the process and they

surrender the waterbody. The motive behindlessees bidding up leases appears sometimesto be so that the lessee can give up the lease onthe basis that he can make no profit, or to arguethat he should not surrender the lease for aproject as an extra year is needed to make aprofit. The waterbody then ends up under nolease and the previous lessee can enjoy thewaterbody through his local power, makingcarefully timed use of the courts wherenecessary to prevent any further leasing at thestart of each leasing year. In such cases thegovernment looses revenue for years. For the

waterbodies under CBFM, the government didnot review objectively the appropriateness oflease values and it is not clear whether locallyfair adjustments in the lease rates can be made.

The contribution of jalmohals to the totalgovernment revenue is now small, but they areof high importance to local officials and elites.Two solutions are suggested from the projectexperience to date:

1. On a project basis to review the waterbodycarefully including the lease rate before

proposing a transfer of responsibility forCBFM. If the lease per ha is very high tomake reducing the rate a condition ofproject support (but this will exclude someexploited fisher communities from possiblesupport and leave some leaseholders toplay the system and keep access).

2. On a national basis to change the system ofrevenue setting for those jalmohals that areadministered by DOF for community basedmanagement. In this way these fishers cangain recognised use rights through leasing

but a fair amount per person and per area isextracted. Fishers are on average poorerthan farmers, yet per hectare jalmohalleases are much higher than for farm land.In these jalmohals lease value should becalculated based on biological productivity.Projects such as CBFM subsidise leasepayment by granting the fisher CBO theamount of the lease to then revolvethemselves by saving enough during theyear from their fishing income to pay thenext years lease. Individually projects havelittle leverage over the land administration,but a future move towards a nationalprogramme could change the system.


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Boundaries, Scale and Waterbody Type

Although it is commonly cited that key factorscontributing to successful co-management andcommon property institutions are smaller welldefined (bounded) fisheries and bounded usercommunities (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994;Agrawal, 2001), the CBFM-1 evidence insupport of this was ambiguous.

CBFM in the more open and unbounded rivers(which also averaged larger numbers of villagesand users) was generally unsuccessful, andtheir scale had a role in this. However, property

rights and other factors were probably moreimportant in this, since almost all the riversbecame effectively open access in 1995 whenleasing ended and so there was no propertyright basis for CBFM. Moreover CBFM wasunsuccessful in two closed beels (Shemulia andKrishnochandrapur Baors) in CBFM-1 despitethe user communities being well defined andlimited, and the beels being clearly bounded.CBFM has also been relatively successful in theopen and unbounded floodplain beels in CBFM-1 and in once case - Ashurar Beel this isdespite it being large (around 400 ha) and

having a heterogeneous user community.

The approach in CBFM-2 of some NGOpartners to address institutional development forlarger waterbodies has been to take a two-tierapproach by forming village committees andfrom these a waterbody committee. It is notclear yet if this is more effective, or the extentthat fishers in the villages are taking decisions.

Different NGOs follow different CommunityBased Organisation (CBO) models. Thesemodels also depend on the type of waterbody

closed beels, open beels, oxbow lakes,floodplains, haors, flowing river, canals, etc (seenext section). Waterbodies are spreadthroughout the country. Each waterbody isdifferent and unique but there are regional andenvironmental similarities. For example, haors,in the northeast and baors in the southwest formspecific types of fishery. In the northeastseasonal flash floods are common and inaddition the area remains under water for 6months a year, with only fishing and migrating towork possible at that time. Therefore, anymanagement options should fit both community

and ecosystem.

The type of fishery is clearly important to theform of institutions and approaches adopted, themost appropriate arrangements for CBFM so farare:

For smaller well defined jalmohalbeels (these may be above or below 8ha in official area, but are generally notmore than about 50 ha in the monsoon)with few outlets a CBO that comprisesall households fishing there for anincome who are organised in groups

which are then represented in amanagement committee. This structuresuits sharing of costs and incomesamong all participants and this type ofbeel is often stocked by the users.

For larger fisheries based on jalmohalbeels with extensive connectedfloodplains, groups of householdsfishing for an income form the basis fora management committee/body that cancollect payments towards the lease. Butcoordination with landowners and

subsistence fishers is also needed, forthis advisory committees of otherstakeholders, local influentials, and localgovernment are useful.

For rivers with no revenue beingcollected no single approach hasdemonstrated special merit so far.Where fishing rights are transferred andrecognised through Ministry of Land-Ministry of Fisheries and Livestockagreement, an organisation based onhouseholds fishing for an income and

mediation through key influentials withbrushpile owners is a promisingapproach.

For floodplains with no jalmohal a CBOthat is a management committeeinvolving all stakeholders (farmers,fishers, ditch owners, landless, etc) ismore appropriate, this should be basedon participatory planning and the roleand capacity of fishers and landless canbe strengthened through NGO support.


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Environmental Complexity and Cluster Management

In CBFM-2 more complex fishery systems are

covered in the form of so called clusters whereseveral waterbodies are connected in thecluster. In each cluster for each waterbody (abeel or section of river defined as a jalmohal)the fishing community is organised into acommunity based organisation (CBO) and thena cluster level committee is formed comprisingrepresentatives of the CBOs from eachwaterbody to coordinate fishery management.This may be a two tier structure (for exampleGoakhola cluster in Narail supported by BanchteSheka). Three tiers may be adopted, forexample where several village based CBOs arerepresented in each waterbody level CBO andthe latter in a cluster committee (Titas cluster inBrahman Baria supported by Proshika). Analternative example is where 3-4 waterbodylevel CBOs are represented in a sub-clustercommittee, and several sub-cluster committeesare represented in a cluster committee (Fatki

Nodi cluster in Magura supported by CNRS). It

is too early to say how these institutions andorganisations will function. There are positiveindications of coordinated conservationmeasures where similar measures have beenadopted in each contiguous waterbody to stopusing harmful gear and to allow fish to movethrough the system to breed.

The reason for coordinated management toaddress common issues in a cluster ofwaterbodies is that a resource such as fish ismobile and can go wherever water is connected.However, initial experience from the 11 clustersof waterbodies under CBFM-2 is that if there ispoor management (for example use of harmfulgears banned by the cluster) in one waterbodythen trust in the entire cluster suffers andconflict can arise between the communities. Theresponse to non-compliance by one communityand potential loss of fish conserved in the dryseason in one beel to other waterbodies, is thateach community wants to enclose the commonresources within their particular area. This risksa cumulative adverse effect. The community ofone beel fencing off their area and improvingmanagement may not affect other connectedwaterbodies if some juvenile fish can still passthrough fences, but if this occurs in a series ofadjacent waterbodies it is likely that migratingadult fish will fail to reach breeding areas.

Waterbody Complexity

Waterbodies are very diverse and this diversity hasimplications for fisheries management.

Baors are oxbow lakes old river channels that now atbest have limited connections to their parent riversthrough channels in the monsoon season. Many arepartly closed as fisheries by fences or netting so that theycan be stocked. They are mainly concentrated in thesouthwest of the country. (Haque et al 1999).

Haors are extensive low lying and deeply flooded areasof floodplain bounded by natural river levees often nowraised by submersible embankments. They may containseveral beels, some of which are perennial. They cover asignificant part of greater Sylhet and Mymensingh(Agero, 1989).

Beels are usually deeper depressions in the floodplain.Some are open and thus linked through canals to otherwaterbodies, others are closed or separate from otherwaterbodies (oxbow lakes outside the southwest regionare usually called beels). Most hold water year round,some have sited up and are now largely seasonal. Man-made ditches or catch-ponds in the seasonally floodedareas of beels are called pagars orkuas.

Natural canals (khals) link beels to rivers and provide achannel for fish and water movements.

There are three main rivers in Bangladesh: the J amuna-Bramaputra, Ganges-Padma, and Meghna. There arealso many other smaller rivers, tributaries and

distributaries that cover the countryside.

(See Khan et al., 1994, for a description of thesewaterbodies)

Complexity also exists in the wide range ofwaterbody types, different property rights, anddiversity of users (see related sections).

One issue that has been under-represented inCBFM management plans is the role of non-fishnatural resources in floodplain beels. Theincidence of such use varies, but in some areasmany households (both poor and better off)collect plants for human food and/or fodder.Similarly in the south-west collection of snails isimportant. Participatory assessments indicatethat the abundance of such resources hasdeclined while their economic significance topoor households has increased. Communitiesunderstand from their use the complexity ofwetland ecosystems. So in floodplain areas amore integrated approach to management isneeded that takes account of interactionsbetween agriculture and fisheries. For this

management institutions should plan for not onlysustainable fish catches but also balanced useof water and use of other aquatic resources.

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Facilitation and NGO Strategies

Facilitation

The important role of experienced or dedicatedfacilitators in establishing local co-managementhas been stressed, for example by Ostrom(1992). The CBFM experience suggests thatthis is necessary but not sufficient at least inBangladesh fisheries. All of the CBFM-1 beelshad full time NGO facilitators. Only two riversites had full-time facilitators but this was notassociated with better performance. Progresswas better in developing local organisations and

undertaking fishery management actions in oneriver where DOF staff took the initiative. OneNGO (Proshika) did not post full time localorganisers for CBFM-1 and in general madelittle progress in helping fishers to organisecommittees that could coordinate to developmanagement plans and actions at thewaterbody level. This has been considerablyreversed in CBFM-2 where it does employ fulltime project staff (and where some rivers havebeen handed over for the project). However,despite an NGO posting full time facilitators toorganise the concerned communities, CBFM-1

failed in two beels (in one the combination ofNGO and DOF was unable to overcome thecontrol of local interest groups over the fishery).

NGO support

The level of NGO support, as measured intraining courses provided per household andaverage amount of credit disbursed perhousehold per year did not appear to beassociated with progress of CBFM-1. Althoughparticipants in the more successful sites onaverage received more training, fisher

households in several rivers received relativelylarge amounts of credit often to supportpurchase of gear or to support fish processing.

NGO flexibilit y

CBFM is based on partnership in the fieldbetween government and NGOs. But it had notbeen expected that individual NGOs would beas rigid as was found with each adopting its ownapproach and making limited modifications to fitwith local circumstances, and even being unableto coordinate between offices for adjacent

administrative areas. Of course different NGOshave different strategies for their regular

programmes. Different NGOs also have differentapproaches and CBO models for CBFM and thisis both a strength and weakness. Most of themdo not want to change their strategy to adjust tolocal or project needs. For example, someNGOs form multipurpose groups in an area forall purposes and projects. It is then difficult toseparate any CBFM impact.

NGO staff capacity

Moreover, the field staff the facilitators who

are the key to building CBFM - neither have anyauthority to change even any minor aspect ofthe NGO approach nor can they take instantdecisions which may sometimes be needed. Insome cases NGO staff seem to be incapable ofunderstanding the goal of CBFM, this in turnconfuses the participants. The problem is rootedin the limited number of people alreadyexperienced in establishing CBFM, so NGOsrecruit new people to work at the grass rootslevel organising communities, but then there is aneed to develop skills of new staff in work whichis not routine. Additionally in some cases

capable NGO staff are overburdened by workingon micro-credit and community organisation andCBFM; where performance is assessed mainlyon the standard credit management indicatorsthen the main objective of CBFM institutionbuilding suffers.

NGOs and CBOs

Most NGOs usually do not want theirbeneficiaries to become independent quickly.They keep clients tied to them through regularcompulsory savings and by giving loans which

sometimes can only be repaid through the nextloan. For normal programmes this may not be abig issue as there are now often competingNGOs and their clients can move betweenservice and credit providers. But in CBFM thedevelopment of fisher CBOs and typical NGOservices are linked and provided by the sameNGO. So participants have less choice. Theimpression is that the poor are hardly seen to beindependent and the NGOs do not go awayfrom an area for many years. CBFM is in manyways the opposite of what NGOs have nowcome to follow as their normal practice. The

NGOs may have thought that it is a way toexpand work into fisheries and to gain additional


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clients. The focus of CBFM is on building fishercommunity organisations that can themselvesmanage fisheries through interaction with

government. For this greater transparency andtrust is needed between NGOs and CBOs overfund availability and use for CBFM so that CBOcapacity is built. Yet the CBFM partner NGOslack experience in developing and setting freelocal peoples organisations. Hence they did nottake their own initiative to make exit plans fromthe beginning of CBFM (although this is nowinitiated). NGOs appear to see well establishedCBOs with a legal entity as a threat tothemselves, without perceiving the positiveachievement this would be. In any case fisheriesCBOs do not compete with their regular training

and credit services, which can continue to groupmembers who are also members of their ownCBO for fishery management.

In conclusion

Skilled staff dedicated to helpingcommunities organise are needed, whohave as their main target building the

capacity of local managementcommittees for resource management.

NGO staff capacity in developing and

facilitating CBOs needs strengthening. NGOs should not rely on staff with

already high workloads organisingresource management groups as anadditional task, nor should they place astrong emphasis on micro-credit.

NGOs appear to have a comparativeadvantage in community organisationalskills compared with government butstill have limited capacity and vision ofempowering local CBOs.

NGOs have some flexibility comparedwith technical government agencies, butneed to be more flexible within a clearframework where more emphasis is onfeedback and learning.

NGO partners should adjust theirstrategy according to the needs of thebeneficiaries, ecosystem, social system,locality, and changing circumstances.

Partnership

Some of the most important lessons concernpartnerships at a number of levels. Allpartnerships, for example NGO-researchinstitute partnerships, should bringcomplementarities and mutual benefits (IIRR1999). This is the main justification for investingin any partnership, but the inherent differencesbetween partners which make partnershipdesirable are also a basis for inequalities andtensions. Lewis (1998) raised issues concerningpartnerships involving WorldFish Center (then

ICLARM) and other agencies in research onaquaculture in Bangladesh, in particular thetemporary funding-driven nature of partnershipand its use in competing for resources, top-down government agencies, limits topartnership, lack of empowerment of farmers inthe process, and gaps between large and smallNGOs. These issues are also relevant topartnership in promoting CBFM, but somedifferences are of note.

In CBFM-1 each partner had different butrelated expectations. For some NGOs CBFM

offered a new venture moving from aquacultureinto openwater fisheries management, for othersit offered an opportunity to improve the resource

base, knowledge and capabilities of theirexisting groups of fishers: the partnershipoffered access to knowledge and waterbodies.The Department of Fisheries probably expectedto gain power through access and a greater sayin fisheries, which were transferred from theland administration to it for CBFM, and todemonstrate that these fisheries could bemanaged more productively through its support.At the same time, DOF could minimise its risksin this new venture since most development

activities were actually done by NGOs.WorldFish Center expected the research on thepartner approaches and outcomes to support awider strategic objective to determine which co-management models are viable in terms ofequity, efficiency and sustainability, and howthey empower fishing communities; and toinfluence government policy and NGO activities.The fisher communities needed their right toestablish local management rules, which ofcourse limit exploitation of resources, to berecognised and legitimised by government. Allpartners of course also gained funding to

expand their activities.


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At the CBFM-1 project inception workshop therewas heated public argument between DOF staffand NGOs over past experience. Government

staff emphasized the uncertain and fund relatedrole of NGOs compared with themselves, whilealso criticising NGOs that plan for long-termrelations with their clients based on credit.Meanwhile NGOs criticised top-down approachesof government and attempts to control theiractivities. Establishing trust is a slow process.While these remain issues, a general acceptanceof the complementary roles of DOF and NGOsemerged.

One important factor in working as a partnershipwas that in CBFM-1 each organisation received a

separate grant thus maintaining financialindependence, yet accepted mutual dependenceand a division of responsibilities through a set ofmemoranda of agreement between thegovernment, each NGO and WorldFish. Thisleads to another factor that in each site onlyone NGO was active, avoiding any direct conflictsover working methods, and placing smallerNGOs on an equal footing in meetings.Coordination was addressed through centralmonthly coordination meetings rotated amongpartners. In CBFM-1 approximately every fourmonths field meetings at each site were held

where the formal partners and communitydiscussed progress and plans.

The scope for communities to be full partners inthe CBFM-1 project as a whole was limited, butannual workshops where the managementcommittee chairpersons along with local NGOand DOF staff each presented their progress andparticipated in working groups to address issuesand propose solutions resulted in some role forthe fishers in the project direction. The researchcenter also had a role beyond providingindependent advice, as a catalyst and

intermediary or buffer between the governmentand NGOs. This helped avoid conflicts andinstead promoted shared dissemination activitiessuch as newsletters and workshops. On the otherhand, the NGO partners individually did not showflexibility in their approaches and communityorganisation to the extent expected.

After this experience, in how have partnershipsdeveloped in CBFM-2 and what extra lessonsare there?

The government attitude towards involvement ofNGOs for development work remains ratherreluctant. For example, there is an ongoing

debate at the national level in the mass mediawith government seeking to limit the role ofNGOs and particularly to set constraints on

micro-credit interest rates. This feeds through torelations within narrower sectors such as inlandfisheries, despite partnership benefits havingalready been recognised on both sides.Although the CBFM-2 project is supportedthrough one central grant (to WorldFish) andthen grants to each partner, a similar system ofinterlocked MOAs has so far been effective.

However, in the longer term it is partnershipsbetween fishing communities and governmentthat are at the heart of CBFM and co-management. The ownership attitude of the

government officials towards jalmohals stillmeans that the fishers are hesitant andconcerned about the future of their access rightsafter project support. Flexibility in government islimited, as government officers prefer to begiven fixed guidelines and then to implementeverything accordingly. Having diverse partnershelps to broaden perspectives. For example,Department of Fisheries wants the participantsto follow a production oriented strategy andoften equates this with stocking, whereas theNGO staff try to support participants inconservation and sustainable use of natural fish

stocks. NGOs also help communities stockcarps, but only in smaller jalmohals where thefishers have a good chance of catching their fishand so profiting from stocking; or to re-introducelocally rare/lost native species. Neverthelesssome DOF staff do provide support to fishingcommunities by linking them with localadministration when there are outside threats tofishing rights, and by giving technical advice.

The CBFM-2 project did not initially provide anyforum for CBOs to interact with one another orwith DOF. A networking initiative in 2003 was

promising and hopefully will help the fishers inthe medium term develop their own platformwhere they can raise their problems withpoliticians and other decision makers.

Overall having intermediaries (preferablyneutral) as arbitrators and catalysts inpartnership is important and beneficial thisrole has been played by WorldFish betweenDOF and NGOs and by NGOs between DOFand fishery CBOs. But if the catalysts do notleave a situation where partners accept theneed for each other and their complementaryroles, the partnership will be a short livedmarriage of funding convenience.


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Homogeneity and Community Characteristics

There is some evidence that communities thatare homogeneous are more likely to establisheffective community fishery management. Forexample, in Goakhola-Hatiara Beel the entireuser community is Hindu and has no majorfactions, unusually women in these villages fishfor food and the partner NGO (Banchte Sheka)organised groups of women to take a lead inconserving fish. In none of the other CBFM-1sites were women even represented in themanagement committees. It is not an exceptionin terms of community characteristics the

more successful CBFM sites tend to havehomogeneous user communities. For example,in four closed beels where CBFM has beenrelatively successful the users are either allMuslim part-time fishers (two sites) or all Hindutraditional fishers (two sites), and in all four ofthese the members of the groups organised tomanage the fishery have average landholdingsof under 0.2 ha.

However, some traditional Hindu fishingcommunities using the rivers have been unableto cooperate effectively for fishery management.

This is mainly because more powerful Muslimoutsiders use influence to compete for theresource and build brushpiles, and because

there were no specific rights under CBFM-1 forthe traditional fishers to set rules. Also CBFMhas been relatively successful in Ashurar Beel,a large open beel where a diverse communityincluding immigrants and ethnic minoritiesspread across around 20 villages havecooperated to conserve fish stocks with acombination of NGO and Union Parishad (localgovernment) support.

An opposite issue for CBFM is the complexity ofpoor peoples livelihoods. Few households and

people are now truly full time fishers. TraditionalHindu fishers engage in other related and non-related activities, while many people catch fishseasonally for food and/or income. So theremay be social homogeneity yet livelihooddiversity. It is by no means demonstrated yetthat the alternative income generating activitiesthat NGOs have provided to CBFM participantsthrough training and credit have helpedhouseholds become less dependent on fishing,or helped to mitigate the impacts of closedseasons. The NGO support has undoubtedlyhelped participants, but the fit with livelihood

strategies and with changing fishing practicesunder CBFM is still in question and criticalreview and innovations are needed.

Resource Management Act ivit ies

Although actions such as stocking fish, closedseasons and fish sanctuaries might be termedoutcomes of CBFM, they are also important inhelping to establish viable institutions. Withoutany agreement or ability to initiate a visibleaction to improve their fishery, and without anactivity to see, fishery communities maybecome disinterested in the investment of timeneeded in the form of meetings and elections tomake organisations work.

Both institutional development and fisherymanagement actions go hand-in-hand together.

For example, in Arial Khan River a sanctuarywas established through support from the localleaders and a local management committee.However, there was less participation fromfishers in this local management committee andit did not continue at the end of CBFM-1. In this

example it is unclear if a brush-pile basedsanctuary is an appropriate management actionsince catch per unit effort continued to fall in thissite, over fishing probably continued, andaccelerated siltation was reported. In this casethe physical intervention was a focus for localinfluential people but not for fisher participation.

By contrast where the majority of the fishingcommunity took part in decision making andconsequent management actions, the activitiespersisted from CBFM-1, formed a focus forfishery management and helped to strengtheninstitutional arrangements that were endorsedby local government (Union Parishad). Thesevisible measures also resulted in voluntarycompliance by most households, even non-participants. This is specially true for fishsanctuaries in the open beels under CBFM-1,such as Ashurar Beel.


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Poverty and CBFM

The Bangladesh strategy for economic growthand poverty reduction (GOB 2003) states: thecapacity of the Department of Fisheries will bestrengthened so that it can play an effective rolein participation and cooperation with localcommunities and the private sector, and hasthe following objectives for inland capturefisheries (Annex 4 Agriculture and RuralDevelopment):

increased production from inland watersthrough better management and improved

aquaculture technology, mitigation of the negative impacts of water

management structures through communitycollaboration,

scaling up of community based floodplainfisheries management to all floodplains.

A recent review of poverty and fisheries foundthat Social and institutional mechanisms whichtake place within and around the fisheries play avery important role in the maintenance,alleviation or aggravation of poverty in fisheries-dependent communities. (Bene 2003). The

traditional focus in considering and measuringpoverty has been on income:

conventional wisdom was that fishers arepoor because they make the resource basepoor i.e. open access results in over-exploitation,

another typical view is that lack ofalternatives (e.g. remoteness, seasonality)leave fishers no alternative, so poverty isnot due to overexploitation,

it is also often observed that fishing is the

activity of last resort or safety valve for thepoor i.e. people who fish forsubsistence are already poor.

12

But poverty is now understood to bemulti-dimensional including:

economic exclusion poorpeople do not get access tofisheries because paying licenses,fees etc; and ownership of gearsthat generate more surplusrequires more capital which is

something the poor do not have. socal marginalization caste,

gender, ethnic origin, etc. lead to

loss of access (e.g. traditional Hindu fishersare under social pressure and many havereportedly emigrated ).

class exploitation poor people haveaccess to fisheries but do not get a fairshare of benefits because they are exploitedby lessees, waterlords, moneylenders, etc.

political disempowerment (poor) fishersare left out of decision making possiblyresulting in direct loss of access, andcertainly resulting in their absence fromdecision making which governs access and

use levels

These dimensions are interlinked for example:enclosure of common fisheries (for agricultureand/or aquaculture) is done by those with localpolitical power and excludes others who cannotafford to do or prevent this, or means thataccess is only through those with politicalpower.

One of the rationales for introducing CBFM wasthat fishers in Bangladesh are poor in terms ofall these dimensions (for example, in terms of

incomes, livelihood assets, access to fishinggrounds, education, social) and lacked a role indecisions about the future of the resources thatthey depend on. The community basedapproach acknowledges the diversity amongfishers, from full-time traditional fishers, toseasonal/part-time fishers and subsistencefishers (who only catch fish for food). It focusedon strengthening the role of full-time fisherswhile maintaining access for subsistence fishingand limiting the power of the rich with fisheryinterests such as moneylenders.

Bangladesh fishers are poor in economic terms.

Very poor Poor Not poor TotalColumn %fish for income 25 19 13 20fish for food 23 40 42 33no fish 52 41 45 46

Total 100 100 100 100Row %fish for income 53 29 18 100fish for food 29 36 35 100no fish 47 26 27 100

Total 42 30 28 100

Very poor = no land, does labouring; poor = up to 1 acre land, ifservice job have thatched house; not poor all others.Source: census of 125,752 households around over 130waterbodies in all regions of Bangladesh for CBFM-2.


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In CBFM-1 the NGO partners targeted poorerfishing households in forming groups. Baselinehousehold surveys in 1996 confirmed that the

NGO participants were more dependent onfishing than other households in the same area,and relatively more were landless. Mostreported incomes of under US$ 85 per person ina year, but this was similar for random samplesof non-participants. Any increases in incomesand assets by 2001 were similar for participantsand non-participants. For example, in Goakhola-Hatiara Beel (Narail) 62% of NGO participantshad tin-roofed houses in 1996 and this rose to93% in 2001, for non-participants it rose from70% to 93% in the same period. Reportedhousehold income rose on average by 37% for

participants, who caught up in the same periodwith non-participants who remained static, butthis was due more to improved incomes fromagriculture and small businesses (supported byNGO training and credit) than from fishing.There was also some reduction in fishingdependence linked with two trends:diversification of income sources by NGOparticipants and reduction in fishing for food bynon-participants.

Self-assessments using anchored scalesindicated statistically significant increases in

perceived levels of participation, influence,decision making, fishery access, and benefitsbetween 1997 and 2001 in those sites withclearer progress in community managementactions essentially the closed and open beelsand one river (see Technical Report on CBFM-1impacts).

Some of these gains which are based on anempowering approach to the multipledimensions of fisher poverty are illustrated bythe traditional Hindu fisher community ofRajdhala Beel (Netrakona). This community was

excluded from the beel by the previousleaseholder before CBFM-1. At the start of

CBFM-1 they organised as a group and gainedaccess through lobbying and project supportagainst the previous leaseholder. During the

gap between CBFM-1 and CBFM-2 a powerfulinfluential tried to get the lease by persuadingthe administration to call for tenders for thelease. The relatively new fisher CBO brought aninjunction against the DC and then sought helpfrom DOF, NGOs and others to delay theoutsiders action, and then to fight and win theircase for an extension of their access intoCBFM-2 (but at the cost of being liable to paythe lease).

Thus CBFM has in some sites (beels and a fewrivers) had a wider benefit of empowering

poorer fishing households within local fisherymanagement institutions.

CBFM can target households dependent oncatching fish for an income, who are generallypoor. This has been done by focusing on thesehouseholds when providing NGO support andusing poverty as a condition of membership ofthe community organisations paying for fishingrights. This has been effective in limiting thedominance of local elites and rich. But it will notend their role and that might even be harmful inthe long term. Under CBFM-2 in some

waterbodies local advisory committees havebeen introduced comprising better offhouseholds, local elected representatives andlocal government representatives. The idea is toestablish links between fisher CBOs and locallypowerful allies where the latter are relativelyaltruistic. For example, making links with thoseleaders who are interested in generaldevelopment for their area to benefit the manyvoters who catch fish for food, but avoidingpoliticians who want to control resources for theprofit of themselves or a small clique offollowers.


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External Forces and Confl ict

An important limiting factor on establishingCBFM is external forces, threats and conflicts.For example, threats from powerful individualsor groups who try to obtain the rights to afishery, or conflicting uses of a wetland, or non-traditional fishers starting to fish. These externalforces and elites do not promote CBFM, but tothe extent that some communities are able toovercome these forces by themselves or inpartnership with other organisations this processcan be part of empowerment. Conversely thelack of any concerted external efforts to capture

the resource in two of the open beels underCBFM-1 (which are complex fisheries with manyusers where it required some effort to establishconsensus on management amongcommunities) doubtless contributed to thesuccess of CBFM there. The opposite elitepressure to take part of the lease in the otheropen beel limited progress and fed divisionsamong the fishers.

Political will and commitment are needed tocounter pressure from elites, but this needspersonal understanding and sacrifice. When

local influentials and local and/or nationalpoliticians are involved in the personal gaingame and play to control fishing rights, it may beimpossible to resolve the problem. Projectexperience shows that even legal documentsand agreements between ministries in favour ofa project and of CBFM do not work in thissituation. Usually fishers, particularly traditionalfishers, are a weak and subordinate section ofsociety and they do not want to be in directconflict with local musclemen, influentials andpoliticians. On the other hand it is also notpossible to include those people in the

management of the waterbodies if the fishersare to benefit and be empowered. The legalcases, threats and lobbying that the powerfulhave shown in the past mean that even if theythen claim to offer to support the fishers it is justa fancy dress costume. In some CBFMwaterbodies these influentials in the name oftheir own group wanted a share of theresources. Some communities formed anadvisory committee where they include some

influentials who are not so harmful and this is apositive solution where the influentials (e.g. UPmembers) are motivated more to gain generalgoodwill and votes than to profit financially. Butthere seems to be no solution in other siteswhere powerful elites dominate and aim tomaximise profits for themselves and theirclients. In these last cases fishers cannot risk anopen confrontation so their only option is to quit,because otherwise the fishers have to bear theburden of paying the lease but the elite groupscatch the fish and the fishers gain nothing.

Conflicts are not only over jalmohal leases.Within the community there are different typesof stakeholders. Everyone has different needsand interests, but they are linked in a floodplainby the connecting water and its seasonalabundance and shortage. Farmers use water toirrigate crops, fishers want water in the dryseason to keep fish in the waterbodies. Whenfishers want fish recruitment in the haor, baor orbeel, farmers often want to drain water out fromthe waterbody so they can plant crops. If thereis a sluice gate then the conflict over its

operation can become worse. Sometimes therich farmers need more water and if there isscarcity of water then violent conflict arises.Similar conflicts can also arise between highland owners and low land owners.

There is scope to build consensus amongdifferent stakeholders who have competingwater use interests but also have sharedinterests due to their livelihood strategy diversity(for example, farmers, fishers, and landless allderiving benefits from catching fish, collectingaquatic plants and cultivation of crops but in

different proportions). Participatory planningprocesses have been developed that can resultin common understanding and communityaction (Sultana and Thompson 2003).

However, conflicts over leases and other directconflicts over power between two parties needto be addressed through a higher authority thatis accepted as legitimate by both parties.


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Building on Existing Institutions

Four closed beels under CBFM-1 where CBFMinstitutions continued during the gap betweenprojects and on into CBFM-2 show that it is justas possible to build new effective institutionsand community based organisations as it is todevelop CBOs based on existing ones.

In Hamil Beel and Dhum Nadi Beel there werealready fisher cooperatives that had controlledthe beels for many years. The two NGOs(respectively Caritas and BRAC) based CBFMon these organisations but then worked to add

poorer fishers who had been excluded and topush out members who were not activelyfishing. The participants in both cases weremore-or-less homogeneous and thecooperatives were not dependent on a singlemoneylender or de facto lessee.

However, they have been prone to newproblems of internal factions that arise whenNGOs promote more transparent andaccountable leadership including elections toexecutive posts. This results in a set of newleaders who see the NGO as their source of

help and power, and a set of old leaders whosee the NGO as a threat and look towards DOFfor support (since they had built goodconnections in the past with government officersin order to retain the lease and later to managelicensing).

15

Experience indicates that it is important for thesustainability of such organisations either thatthe leadership is fixed (which tends toconcentrate power and give an inequitabledistribution of benefits) or that leadership hasthe possibility to rotate sufficiently frequently

through a democratic and transparent process.This can be achieved, for example, by electionsevery 1-2 years, so that power does not becomepolarised with one faction.

The other two closed beels Rajdhala andRuhia Baisha counteract these two casestudies. In these cases the traditional Hindufishing communities before were unable to leasethe waterbodies in the face of lessees who werefinancially and politically more powerful. Neworganisations representing all of the members ofthese fishing communities have been formed,

and the same principles are applied as in thereformed cooperatives. But similar leadership

problems emerged and are probably inevitablewhen there are relatively large costs and returnsfrom stocking fish that are handled by a fewpeople on behalf of all users.

So much for well defined jalmohals, thefloodplains and non-jalmohal fisheries havedifferent institutional issues. One importantissue is linkage with existing institutions in theform of local government i.e. Union Parishad.Inevitably some informal links are needed at thislevel for NGOs to work in an area and for

helping to resolve problems and local conflicts.In CBFM there is no formal project defined rolefor Union Parishads (UP), but in the moresuccessful sites the local UP chairmen havebeen supportive of the CBFM activities either asan informal advisor or as a member of a formaladvisory committee. As CBFM is part of ademocratisation process of changinggovernance of fisheries it makes sense topursue this link with local elected government.But this should avoid the risk of local elitesstepping in to control money in leasedjalmohals. Hence a formalised advisory role in

floodplains and in clusters of waterbodiesseems the most appropriate approach here.

Models developed under CBFM-1

a) Closed beels and

some open beels

non-NGO NGO

Fishers Fishers NGO fishers haveexclusive rightsClosed beels stocked

Management

Committee

DOF NGO

b) Rivers and

non- NGO floodplain beel

Fishers NGO

Fishers Fishers organised by NGOlead management

Other but other stakeholders representedStake- No exclusive rights, committeeholders represents all in deciding on

Management fishing rulesCommittee

Local

Govt

DOF NGO


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Scaling up

CBFM-2 has tried to scale up and replicate thelessons and experiences from a limited numberof first phase waterbodies to about eight timesthe number of waterbodies. However, in aproject context this faces problems. Thewaterbodies are scattered across the countryand there are a limited number of staff to handlemonitoring. Administration and managementtasks seem to grow almost in keeping with thenumber of sites. Moreover, research activitiesalso need more time and skill covering a widernumber of sites. A project may have resources

for field level activities, but systems to manageresearch and monitoring over the manywaterbodies have to be developed. Thisinevitably has trade-offs with the detailedunderstanding and flexible case-study basedapproaches possible with fewer sites. There isthen a tendancy among all partners to follow amore standardised approach to cope withincreased numbers of sites.

At the project level one way of scaling up whilelimiting logistic problems is to work in clusters ofwaterbodies as CBFM-2 has. Individual

scattered locations take relatively more time andreceive less attention to address problems.

The lesson is therefore that the number ofwaterbodies should be increased step by stepand not abruptly. The choice should be toexpand within a region first and then extendCBFM into other areas. Single projects that tryto work in many waterbodies in many regionsare likely to be less effective than projects thatwork in a good number of waterbodies within amore limited region(s). There is also littledemonstration effect so far found in terms of

take up of CBFM by communities or partnerswithout specific funded activities. Yet there isscope to advocate and encourage spontaneousadoption at least in floodplain areas where thereis no issue of jalmohal hand over. Projects havenaturally focused on the project sites, but thereis scope to raise wider awareness of CBFMarrangements the institutional changes andassociated fishery management in neighbouringareas which may then request help in adoptingsimilar management systems.

Scaling up also seems to result in a greater risk

of trying to work in waterbodies that faceproblems in terms of local political influences

and elite pressure to control the resources andwhere legal cases prevent fishers gaining locallyaccess rights. NGOs therefore spend relativelymore time and resources facing local politicsand supporting beneficiaries in legal cases. Itshould not be expected that CBFM will bepossible in all waterbodies, and a realisticscreening of sites before embarking on CBFMinstitution building is needed. Screening shouldfocus on local power, politics, elite andleaseholder interests. High value and locallyhigh profile jalmohals may even be best avoided

because the need for high inputs to overcomepressure to control the fishery by elites and riskof re-capture after a project probably outweighthe potential benefits to the fisher community.Moreover, the benefit to cost ratios ofestablishing different fishery CBOs and CBFMhave not been estimated yet. It may or may notbe worthwhile to try to establish CBFM in allareas. The transaction costs to establish andmaintain CBFM may be high and the timeneeded to meet, guard, etc. means that in somecases fishers lose their opportunity for alternateincome sources and may not gain.

The other aspect to scaling up is at theprogramme to policy levels. CBFM is at presentstill on a pilot basis, although now with manysites under a number of similar projects. Thereare thousands more jalmohals and floodplainareas. There may be limited scope for moreincremental increases in jalmohals handed overto DOF. Although management is to a greatextent by the community, the tasks of DOF doincrease compared with jalmohals leased out bythe district administration in the usual way, andDOF staff numbers are limited. The framework

for CBFM is still set by the land administration/Ministry of Land through its MOUs with Ministryof Fisheries and Livestock and through localhandover and decisions of the districtadministration. This is reasonable for a pilotingthat needs time to demonstrate sustainabilityand a substantial number of waterbodies todemonstrate wide applicability. But a strategicreview and policy change process will beneeded to learn from this experience aftercurrent projects to see how CBO-DOF links andco-management work and assuming that thishas been successful then to decide on how to

adopt and promote this on a larger scale.


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Sustainability and Exit Strategies

The sustainability of the institutionalarrangements and the local fisheries underCBFM in Bangladesh are yet to be determined.In fact the CBFM-1 partners did not have a clearstrategy at the start of the project for the projectend and how to ensure that CBOs would besustainable after the project support, nor wasthere even a specific plan to form CBOs at thatstage, since the project was very much alearning-by-doing process.

It is now clear that establishing sustainable

CBFM in any one waterbody requires muchmore than a 3-year project, at least inBangladesh. In one CBFM-1 beel the NGOphased out support after 7.5 years.

Sustainability issues in inland fisheries havemultiple overlapping levels and aspects that canbe clustered under institutional, socio-distributional, and bio-economic headings.Overall the arrangements and managementsystems should be resilient to external shocks,yet adaptable to changing circumstances ofthreats and opportunities.

What is needed for this?

17

Overall it seems fair to conclude thata CBO is needed to manage eachdefined fishery, and that CBOs needto have a recognised status throughregistration as a legal entity.

Obviously the target groups (fishers)should be sure about their access tothe fishery resource in future(security of use tenure for those

organised under and supporting thenew institutions). It should not beacceptable that after a project is overthe whole management system willcollapse because of a governmentdecision to give the lease to somecompeting group or individual.Therefore government commitmentfor long term security of use rights isneeded. This can be qualified byperiodic independent assessment ofthe CBO and CBFM performance interms of institutions, distribution of

benefits, and trends in the fisheryand waterbody ecology.

The capacity of the CBO needs to beestablished as a sustainable organisation and alegitimate decision making body deciding onaccess and use of the fishery. This requiressufficient funds and fund raising systems thatcan cover likely annual fishery management andorganisation operating costs. Grants forrevolving funds were introduced in CBFM-2 toaddress this gap in CBFM-1. Unity among theusers (typically fishers but potentially includingother stakeholders) should be strong. Theparticipants and CBO should be capable of

managing their own system, for example: keeping record books, managing financial accounts that are

independently checked, having a leadership that is accountable to

the general participants through elections, having sufficient fisheries knowledge, able to collect and use information on the

fishery to take decisions, able to change their rules in a transparent

way based on experience and changingcircumstances, and

able to liaise with other organisationsincluding CBOs and government.

Registering fisheries CBOs

Fisheries Cooperative Societies already have a defined status asthe preferred target for awarding leases to jalmohals of over 8 hathough a competitive tendering process. But the process to set upa new fisher cooperative is controlled and quite expensive to passthrough, and they lack a reputation for transparency. Reformingexisting fisher cooperatives to include all dependent fishers,exclude non-fishers, and operate more openly is a viable optionfor smaller leased jalmohals. It keeps the option of bidding for thelease if policy changes and the fishery is no longer reserved for a

certain community organisation.

In other leased fisheries a multi-purpose cooperative is easier toregister and allows for multiple activities related to floodplain-beelwetland management while retaining the capacity to operate onthe basis of sharing incomes from fishing among members. Butthe fishery cannot extend beyond one Upazila.

In non-leased fisheries such as floodplain systems with nojalmohal, registering a wetland or beel management body underthe social welfare department is more appropriate. This need notbe a membership based body, but the CBO acts in the interests ofthe whole community. In these cases the CBO does not aim topay a lease or to share incomes among members, but rather toestablish conservation and sustainability norms and actions.

Sources: CBFM-2 coordination meeting discussions with allpartners and Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Associationreviews.


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Summary of criteria for CBO success /targets before phasing out NGO support.

Indicator / success criteria BS BRAC Caritas CNRS CRED Proshika No. NGOs*CBO has fund and bank a/c Y Y Y Y Y Y 11CBO is registered/legal status Y Y Y Y Y 10CBO has links with o fficial bodies Y Y Y Y Y 9Regular meetings of CBO Y Y Y Y Y Y 8CBO constitution/bylaws Y Y Y Y Y 6Record keeping (resolutions & a/c) Y Y Y Y 6Diverse fishery conservation Y Y Y Y Y 6Participatory decision making Y Y Y Y 5Democratic executive is elected Y Y 5Conflict resolution capacity Y Y 5Community center built Y Y 4Accountability, transparency, audit Y Y 4Equity, fairness, equal shares Y Y Y 4Leadership capacity developed Y 4Wider community acceptance Y Y Y 3

CBO represented in cluster body Y Y 3Waterbody management plan Y Y 3CBO operates own credit Y Y 3CBO has vision to develop fishery Y Y 3Exchange visits for CBO Y Y 3CBO has bargaining skill Y 2CBO has networking capacity Y 2CBO can monitor fishery resource Y Y 2Links with local elites Y Y 2CBO does social development Y 1Fishers have long term access right Y 1Policy reform for fisher access Y 1Follow up system by NGO Y 1

Technical capacity of CBO Y 1

Knowledge of stocking Y 1Total no of criteria proposed 14 16 9 15 9 14 30Source: presented by respective NGO coordinators in 2003 CBFM-2 retreat. Bold = proposed by +50% ofNGOs.* No. NGOs = number of NGOs proposing each criteria, the other NGOs with less CBFM experience who alsomade exit strategy proposals were ERA, Gharoni, SDC, Shishuk, and SUJON.

Most importantly an ownership feeling shouldcome through participation. The tablesummarises criteria for CBO sustainability thatNGO partners of CBFM-2 identified as targetsfor success in designing their exist strategies.

Linked with institutional sustainability is a fair

system of distributing management costs andbenefits from the fishery. This does notnecessarily mean equal shares, but theevidence is that in a fisher-only CBO with welldefined membership using a closed beel equalshares between participants are appropriate.Distributional sustainability includes provision forlimiting access, for example in different areasand times, and more generally setting rules thatlimit the scope to gain access and take controlby influentials and richer people.

For biological and economic sustainability theissue of high leases unconnected with returnsfrom fishing and the benefits of users needs to

be resolved at a policy level. In addition theevidence so far is that local fish sanctuaries in adeeper part of a waterbody that protect broodfish during the dry season are one of the mostacceptable management measures that appearssustainable in the longer term. Gear restrictionsand seasonal bans on fishing when fish breed

have been planned by communities, but theyare at best partly observed and depend on NGOsupport for alternative incomes. Fish catchesvary considerably between years due to otherenvironmental factors, so immediate boosts inproduction should not be expected.

The sustainability of cluster committees andcoordination between CBOs in linkedwaterbodies is unknown as this has onlyrecently started. But networking among theCBOs appears to be one action that mayencourage sustainability by helping thebeneficiaries in policy dialogue as the networkcan work as a pressure group.

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lessons from cbfm in bangladesh

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