LessonsInDeterrenceFromU.S.ForeignPolicyInIraq,1982‐2003

ASeniorEssayby

RachelWilliams

PoliticalScience,YaleCollege

AdvisedbyMatthewKocher,Ph.D.

25April2017

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Introduction

IthasbeenmorethanhalfacenturysinceThomasSchellingdevelopedthebasicprinciplesofdeterrencetheoryinhiscanonicalwork,ArmsandInfluence(1966).ItremainsessentialthattheUnitedStatesunderstandhowtosuccessfullydeteritsenemies,andthefundamentalprinciplesfordoingsohavenotchanged.However,theUSisnolongertryingtodeteranequallypowerfuladversaryinagameofMutuallyAssuredDestruction.Intheunipolarworld,theUSfindsitselfinamuchmorecomplicatedgameinwhichitisnotalwaysclearhowtheUScandeteranenemy,oreveniftheUScandeteranenemy.

TheUS’srecenteffortstocutanucleardealwithIrananditsfranticscrambletokeepNorthKoreafromsuccessfullytestinganICBMshowthattheUSisnotalwayswillingtobetondeterrenceasawaytokeepitsenemiesincheck.Sometimes,whendealingwithanenemy,theUShastochoosebetweenbettingonapolicyofdeterrenceandbettingonsomeotherextremelyriskycourseofaction.TheUShasdonethisinthepast,andwillhavetodoitinthefuture,perhapsverysoon.ItiscriticalthattheUSbetright.Inordertobetright,theUSmusthaveaworkingcommandofdeterrencetheory.

TheUSbetagainstdeterrencewhenitinvadedIraqin2003.TheBushAdministrationarguedthatthe2003invasionwasnecessarybecauseSaddamHusseinwasundeterrable.Wewouldliketothinkthatthisbetreflectedasoundapplicationofdeterrencetheory.However,ifoneweretojudgetheUSforeignpolicyestablishment’sunderstandingofdeterrencetheorybasedonUSforeignpolicyinIraqbetween1982and2003,onewouldconcludethattheUSforeignpolicyestablishmentdidnotunderstandthefundamentalsofdeterrencetheory.

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Idonotmeantosuggestthatpolicymakersdidnot,theoretically,academically,orintellectuallyunderstanddeterrencetheory.Afterall,SchellingdrewfromUSconductinColdWarconflictzonessuchasCuba,Korea,andVietnamtoorderredefinewhateffectiveuseofforcewouldlooklikeinthenuclearage.So,deterrencetheorycanbeseenasaproductoftheUnitedStatesforeignpolicyestablishment’seffortstoadapttraditionalideasabouttheuseofforcetothenuclearera. Rather,ImeanthattheUSfailedinpracticetodemonstrateanunderstandingofdeterrencetheory.Inthisessay,Iwillarguethefollowing:

Between1990and2003,theUSrepeatedlyfailedtodeterandcompelSaddam

Husseininthewayitostensiblywastryingto.TheUSblamedthesefailureson

Saddam,andultimatelycitedthemasevidencethatSaddamwasundeterrable,and

thereforeasjustificationforthe2003invasion.Inreality,therealblameforthese

failureslieswiththeUS,forfailingtoseehowitsownactionstowardsSaddam

between1982and2003underminedthedeterrentandcompellentthreatsand

assurancesneededtosuccessfullydeterandcompelSaddam.Here,letmebeclearaboutwhatIamnotarguinginthisessay.Iamnotarguingthat

iftheUShadrefrainedfromgoingtowarin2003,dealingwithSaddamHusseinwouldhavebeensmoothsailing,orthatfutureeffortstodeterSaddamwouldhavebeensuccessful.IamnotarguingthattheUSshouldnothavegonetowarin2003.Idonottakeuptheissueofwhetherornotgoingtowarwas“right”.Idonottakeupthesecounterfactualandnormativequestions.Forthepurposesofthisessay,IalsorejectallargumentsthattheUSwenttowarforpurelynefariousreasons.

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Inthisessay,IwillsaymanytimesthattheUS’sclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrablewasunjustified.So,whenIsaythisclaimwasunjustified,Idonotmeanthatitwas“wrong”.WhenIsaythisclaimwasunjustified,ImeanthatthefactualrecorddoesnotsupporttheUS’snarrativebehinditsclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrable,andthattheUScametobelievethisclaimbyunsoundreasoning.Iwillproceedwithmyargumentasfollows:

Iwillfirstenumeratethefundamentalconceptsindeterrencetheory(Schelling1966)thatIclaimtheUSfailedtodemonstrateitappreciatedinits1982‐2003relationswithIraq.Iwillthengiveabriefsummaryofthehistoricalargumentthatsupportstheseclaims.

Iwillthenprovidearoadmapforthefullversionofmyargument.ConceptsofdeterrencetheorytheUSdemonstrateditdidnotunderstand

TheUSfailedinpracticetodemonstrateanunderstandingofthefollowingessentialprinciplesindeterrencetheory:

Wordsaren’tenoughtoconvincesomeonethatyourthreatiscredible.Yourownactionsandpatternsofbehaviorwillinfluencehowcredibleanadversaryfindsyourthreat.

Todeteryourenemy,youmustgivehimwhatSchellingreferstoasthe“lastclearchance”toavoidtheconflict.Tosuccessfullycompelyourenemy,youmustnotmakethepsychologicalorsocialcostsofcomplyinggreaterthanthecostsofnotcomplying.

Adeterrentorcompellentthreat,nomatterhowcredible,mustbeaccompaniedbyassurances—assurancesthatbynottakingtheactionfromwhichacountrywishestodeteryou,orbytakingtheactionintowhichacountrywishestocompelyou,youcanaverttheconsequencesthatarebeingthreatened.Theseassurancesarejustasimportantasthe

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threat.Youmustusethecarrotandthestickinordertosuccessfullydeterorcompelsomeone(Schelling1966).TheSupportingHistoricalNarrative

From1982until1990,theUnitedStatessoughtcloserandmoreprofitablerelationswithIraqinthehopesthatapowerful,stableIraqcouldbalancethenewgovernmentinIran.Inpursuitofthoseends,itprovidedmaterialandstrategicaidtoIraqandrespondedtoIraqitransgressionsbyturningablindeyewheneveritcould,confrontingIraqonlywhenitwasforcedtobyinternationaldiplomaticand/ordomesticpoliticalpressure.Furthermore,theseconfrontationscameonlyeverintheformofcensureneverasconcreteaction.

WhenSaddaminvadedKuwaitonAugust2nd1990,theUScorralledtheinternationalcommunityintoapplyingsanctionsonIraqinthehopesthatthiswouldcompelSaddamtoleaveKuwait.BetweenAugustof1990andJanuaryof1991,PresidentBushthreatenedwarifSaddamdidnotwithdrawfromKuwait.TheUSwenttowarandwon,butcouldnotunderstandhowSaddamcouldhavethoughttheUSwouldaccepthisannexationofKuwait,andmoreover,whySaddamwouldhaverefusedtobackdownunderthreatofwar.

TheUSfailedtoappreciatethatithaddonenothingbutfeedSaddamcarrotsforalmostadecade(1982‐1990),thatithadneverdemonstrateditwaswillingtotakeactionagainstSaddamforanything,andthatthesefactorsunderminedthecredibilityoftheirthreat.TheUSalsofailedtoseethatintheleaduptothewar,PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushraisedSaddam’scostsofbackingdownfromtheconflictandindoingso,deniedSaddamthe“lastclearchance”toavoidconflict.Asaresult,theUSthoughtithaddoneeverything

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anyonewouldreasonablydotodeterandcompelSaddam.Therefore,attheendoftheGulfWartheUSconcludedthatSaddamcouldnotbedeterredormadetocomply,andthattheonlywaytodealwithSaddamwastogetridofhim.

Consequently,theUSdecidedtoleaveinplacethesanctionsregimethatwasoriginallyimposedtodriveSaddamoutofKuwait.FromtheendoftheGulfWaron,theUS’sprimarygoalofthesanctionswastoeffectregimechange.ItwascleartomembersofthesanctionscoalitionandtoSaddamthattheUSwouldnotliftsanctionsorevenpartiallyliftthesanctionsunlessanduntilSaddamHusseinwasnolongerinpower.

Withthispolicy,theUSgaveSaddamnoincentivetoseriouslycomplywithanypartofthesanctions,becausethesanctionswerenotconditionalonSaddam’sbehavior.TheUSprovidedSaddamnoassurancesthatifhecomplied,thesanctionswouldbelifted.TheUSdidjusttheopposite,bymakingitclearthatsanctionswouldstayinplacenomatterwhatSaddamdid.WhereastheUSpolicytowardsIraqduringthe1980shadbeenallcarrot,nostick,theUSpolicyduringthesanctionswasallstick,nocarrot. Inthefirstyearsofhispresidency,PresidentGeorgeW.BusharguedthattheUSneededtoinvadeIraqbecauseSaddamcouldnotbedeterred.Tomakethisargument,BushclaimedthatSaddam’srefusaltocomplyduringthesanctionsperiodshowedthattheUShadtrieddeterrenceonSaddamtonoavailandsoSaddamsimplycouldnotbedeterred.BasedonthisdeeplyflawedreadingofUS‐Iraqihistory,theBushadministrationarguedthattheUSneededtogotowarbecausetherewassimplynootherwaytodealwithSaddam.

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PlanForTheRemainderOfThisEssay

WhereasinthehistoricalnarrativeIpresented,Imovedforwardchronologically,startingintheearly1980sandendingin2003,Iwilldotheoppositeinthefullversionofmyargument.

IwillmoveinthisreverseorderinordertocriticallyexaminetheGeorgeW.BushAdministration’sclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrableandtomoreconvincinglyshowhowandwhyitwasunjustified.Iwilldividemyargumentinthefollowingsections:

StartingClearly:First,Iwillprovideworkingdefinitionsforthetermsdeterrenceandcompellenceandmakeacoupleothernotesaboutterminology.

SectionI:Inthissection,Iwilldiveintomyargument.IwillfirstestablishthattheBushAdministration’scaseforwarrestedontheclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrable.Second,IwillestablishthattheUSsupportedthisclaimbyfurtherclaimingthatSaddamhadbeennon‐compliantforallofthepost‐GulfWarsanctionsperiodandthatthisshoweddeterrencehadbeentriedandfailed.

SectionII:Iwilldiscussthepost‐warsanctionsperiod.Inthisdiscussion,IwillestablishthatwhileSaddamwasnoncompliant,thisnoncompliancedidnotanddoesnotshowthatSaddamwasundeterrable.IwillestablishthatSaddamwasnoncompliantbecausetheUS’sgoalofregimemadeitimpossibleforhimtobothcomplyandsurvive.IwillalsodiscussotherreasonsitisnotjustifiedfortheUStousethistimeperiodasevidencethatdeterrencehadbeentriedandhadfailed.

SectionIII:IwillmovebacktotheGulfWarPeriod,andexaminewhytheUSenteredthepost‐warsanctionsperiodwiththegoalofregimechange.IwillestablishthattheUSdidsobecauseitbelievedthatSaddam’sintransigenceinthepreludetotheGulfWar

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showedthatSaddamcouldnotbedeterredorcompelled.Iwillthenestablishthatthisconclusionwasunjustifiedbecause,contrarytoUSclaimsitdidnotdoeverythingitcouldhavetosuccessfullydeterandcompelSaddaminthepreludetotheGulfWar.

SectionIV:IwillmovebacktothedecadepriortotheGulfWar.IwillestablishthattheUS’sactionstowardsIraqduringthistimeperiodseriouslyunderminedthecredibilityoftheUS’ssubsequentthreatofwar.

Conclusion:Iwilltiethesedifferentsectionstogetherandwrapupanylooseends.Finally,Iwillexplainthatifwewanttosuccessfullynavigatepresentandfutureinternationalcrises,wemustunderstandwhyourbeliefthatSaddamwasundeterrablewasunjustifiedandhow,inspiteofthis,wecametobelieveit.

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StartingClearly

ExplainingandprovidingworkingdefinitionsofdeterrenceandcompellenceThelogicofmyargumentinthisessayisrootedintheconceptsofdeterrenceand

compellencedevelopedbyThomasSchellinginhiscanonicalworkondeterrencetheory,ArmsandInfluence(1966).Beforedivingin,IwillspendalittletimeexplainingthefundamentalsofdeterrenceandcompellenceasSchellingdescribesthemandspecifyinghowIwillusethosewordsinthisessay.

Theworddeterrenceisoftenusedtomeannucleardeterrence,whereinyoudeteranenemyfromattackingyouwithnuclearweaponsbythreateningtoattackhimwithnuclearweaponsinresponse.

Deterrencecanalsorefernotjusttoonespecificefforttodeteranenemy;deterrencemaybeastandinfor“apolicyofdeterrence”or“astrategyofdeterrence”.Thesedescribeanoverallapproachtodealingwithanenemy.Ifacountryadoptsastrategyofdeterrenceagainstanother,itmeansthatthefirstcountrytriestoinfluencethesecondcountry’sactionsexclusivelythroughdeterrence,ratherthanbymoredirectinvolvement.

Mostgenerallyspeaking,deterrenceisawayofinfluencinganenemy’sactionstoyourownbenefit.Todeteranenemyistogethimtochoose,ofhisownfreewill,tonottakesomespecificactionhewouldotherwisetake,andwhichyoudonotwanthimtotake.

WhenIusetheworddeterrenceinthisessay,Iuseitinthemostgeneralsense,whichencompassesallpossiblemeaningsofthewordasitisusedinInternationalRelations.Inthisessay,deterrencewillrefertoanyefforttodeteranenemyfromtakingaparticularaction.Thisdoesnotexcludebutneitherdoesitautomaticallyconnotenucleardeterrenceordeterrenceasanoverallstrategy.

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Compellenceiscloselyconnectedtodeterrence.Compellence,too,isawayofinfluencinganenemy’sactions.Compellence,however,involvesgettinganenemytotakeanactionratherthantostopanaction.Successfullycompellinganenemycanalsobedescribedasgettinghimtocomplyofhisownfreewill.Deterrenceandcompellenceoverlapwhenthegoalistogetanenemytostopdoingsomethingheiscurrentlydoing.Thiscanbelookedateitherascompellinghimtostopanaction,ordeterringhimfromcontinuinganaction.

Deterrenceandcompellencerequirethesamebasiccomponents:AspecifiedactiontobenottakenortakenAcredible,conditionalthreatAthreatiscredibleiftheenemybelievesthatyouwillreallycarryoutthatthreat.Athreatisconditionaliftheenemybelievesthatyouwillcarryoutthethreatifand

onlyiftheyfailtotake(ornottake)thespecifiedaction.Deterrenceandcompellencemustbeusedtogethertoinfluencethefullscopeofan

enemy’spotentialactions.Therefore,theyaretwosidesofthesamecoin,andwecannottalkingeneralaboutonewithoutimplyingtheother. Forthisreason,theUS’sclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrableisreallyaclaimthatSaddamwasbothundeterrableanduncompellable.

Inthisessay,Ifrequentlyuseversionsoftheword“deter”.Forconcision,Iwilloftenusethewords“deter”“deterrence”“deterrable”“undeterrable”toalsomean“compel”“compellence”“compellable”and“uncompellable”.Generallyspeaking,Iwilluseiterationsoftheword“compel”onlywhenIamspeakingspecificallyofcompellenceandnotalsoof

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deterrence.Forthisreason,iterationsoftheword“deter”mayseemtooccurmorefrequentlyintheessaythandoversionsof“compel”.AFewOtherNotesAboutTerminology

Asthereadermayalreadyhaveobjected,referringto“theUS”asaunitaryactorisproblematic,because,well,theUSisnotaunitaryactor.However,itismucheasiertosay“theUS”didx,yandzthantosay“thepartiesintheUSthathappenedtowintheinternalbattleoverdifferentforeignpolicyoptionsandthereforegottosetforeignpolicyonanygivenday”didx,y,andz.WhenIrefertotheUSasanactor—thatis,whenIsaysomethingtotheeffectof“theUSclaimed”or“theUSdid”,Ireferalmostexclusivelytowhateverpresidentialadministrationwasinpoweratthattime.ThisisbecausethepresidentialadministrationsduringthistimeperiodweremostlyresponsibleforsettingtheUS’spoliciesanddeterminingtheUS’sactionsinIraq.

Finally,forexpediency,IwillsometimesrefertotheUS’sclaimthatSaddamwasundeterrableas“TheClaim”.

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SectionI:

TheBushAdministration’sCaseforthe2003Invasion

TheBushadministration’scaseforwarreliedonTheClaim(thatSaddamwas

undeterrable)TheBushAdministration’sArgumentforWarin2003wasthatinvadingIraqand

overthrowingSaddamHusseinwastheleastbadofexclusivelybadoptionsfordealingwiththecountry.Thisrequiredmakingacompellingcasethatalloftheotherbadoptionswereworsethaninvading.AsformerCIAanalystandMiddleEastexpertKennethPollackexplainedinhis2002book,TheThreateningStorm:TheCaseForInvadingIraq,revampingthecontainmentpolicypursuedduringtheClintonyearswasnotaviableoption,becausethesofewmembersoftheinternationalcommunitywerewillingtoparticipateinsanctionsagainstIraq,afterwitnessingthedevastationthat10yearsofdraconiansanctionshadalreadywroughtonthecountry.Theonlyoptionbesidescontainmentandwarwasdeterrence(211‐242).Ifdeterrencewouldn’twork,warwasthebestoption.Thisiswhysomuchofthepro‐warargumentandrhetoricreliedonthenotionthatSaddamwascategoricallyundeterrable.Andthisiswhythestrongestargumentsagainstthewar,suchasthosemadebytwoprominentIRRealistScholars,StephenM.WaltandJohnJMearsheimer,reliedonevidencethatSaddamwas“eminentlydeterrable”(2003).

ThereisampleevidenceinthespeechesmadeanddocumentsreleasedintheyearandhalforsoprecedingthewarinwhichGeorgeW.Bush,membersofhisadministration,andpro‐waralliesexpressedthisbasicargument:thatSaddamwasundeterrable,sohehad

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togo.Ithinkthisisafairlyuncontroversial,claim,soI’llprovidejustacoupleofexamplesofthis:

Inearly2002,SecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRiceandPresidentGeorgeW.BushreleasedanewNationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnitedStates.Inthisdocument,thestrategyof“pre‐emption”wasfirstarticulated.Inthisdocument,BushandRicewrite:“…weknowfromhistorythatdeterrencecanfail;andweknowfromhistorythatsomeenemiescannotbedeterred”(inEhrenbergetal2010,84).

ItisnowwidelyknownthattheBushAdministrationwasalreadyplottingitsinvasionofIraqatthistime.Forthisreason,thedocumentitselfcanbeseenasanefforttopre‐emptcriticismoftheIraqWarbymakingtheideaseem,whenitwasfinallytrottedoutintotheopen,partofsomecoherentgrandstrategy.Therefore,itisfairtosaythatthisquotereferencesIraqspecifically(thoughnotexplicitly).

Often,theUSexpressedTheClaimbysayingthatSaddamhimselfwas“theproblem”.ThisisconveyedinPresidentBush’sOctober2002SpeechOutliningtheIraqiThreatbytheassertionthat“thefundamentalproblemwithIraqremainsthenatureoftheregimeitself”(inEhrenbergetal2010,89).But,toknowwhetherornotTheClaimwasjustified,wehavetounpackitabit.TounpackTheClaim,wehavetounpacknotonlywhywethoughthewasundeterrable,butalsowhatitwaswewereafraidwecouldnotdeterhimfromdoing.WemustexaminewhatitistheUSfearedSaddammightdobecause,again,deterrenceisalwaysattachedtospecificactions(Schelling1966).Youcannotknowifyouareabletodetersomeonewithoutfirstknowingwhatitisyou’retryingtodetersomeonefrom.

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WhatwasitwewereafraidSaddamwoulddoifwedidn’tgoinandoverthrowhimin2003?Whatweretheactionshemighttakeandworstcasescenarioconsequencesforus?

Manyoffearsbehindour2003invasionwerethesameasthosethatledustowarin1991.

InresponsetoSH’sinvasionofKuwait,PresidentGeorgeH.W.BushwroteNationalSecurityDirective45,thefirstofficialdocumentstatingtheUS’spolicypositiontowardsthesituation.ThedocumentmadeclearthattheUSfearedSaddam’scontrolofKuwaitioilcoulddisrupttheUS’saccesstooilandthatanyadditionalIraqiaggressiontowardsothergulfstatecouldfurtherdisrupttheoilsupply.

TheseconcernsareechoedinthesubsequentNSD54,whichaffirmedtheinterestsandgoalsoutlinedinNSD45(Bush1990),butwhichfinallyauthorizedtheuseofmilitaryforcetodriveIraqoutofKuwait.IntheNSD54,theUSsaid,

“Iraq,byvirtueofitsunprovokedinvasionofKuwait…anditssubsequentbrutaloccupation,isclearlyapowerwithinterestsinimicaltoourown”(Bush1991,1)

AsisexplainedinLawrenceFreedman’sandEfraimKarsh’sauthoritativebookontheGulfWar,SaddaminvadedKuwaitinpartbecauseKuwaitwasexceedingitsOPECproductionquotas,drivingthepriceofoildown,andmakingoilsaleslessprofitableforSaddam,whowasinenormousdebtaftertheIran‐Iraqwar(FreedmanandKarsh1993,19‐41).AswasmadeclearinameetingbetweenUSAmbassadorGlaspieandSaddamHusseinaboutaweekbeforeSaddaminvadedKuwait,theUSfearedthatifSaddamcontrolledKuwait’soil,hewoulddrivethepriceofoilup,threateningtheUS’saccesstocheapoil(HusseinandGlaspieinSifryandCerf1991).

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So,totheUS’smind,anymilitaryaggressionbyIraqagainstanotherGulfOilproducingcountrythreatenedtheUS’soilsupply,presumablyeitherbygivingSaddamcontrolofagreatershareoftheregion’soilresources,orbycreatinginstabilitysufficienttoimpedenormaltraderoutesandprocesses.

Theseconcernshadnotchangedby2003.DickCheneyoutlinedthesameconcernsina2002speechdeliveredtotheVeterans

ofForeignWarsconference,althoughwithanemphasisonhownuclearweaponswouldenhanceSaddam’sabilitytododamage.

Cheneysaid:“Armedwithanarsenaloftheseweaponsofterror(WMD),andseatedatop10percentoftheworld’soilreserves,SaddamHusseincouldthenbeexpectedtoseekdominationoftheentireMiddleEast,takecontrolofagreatportionoftheworld’senergysupplies,directlythreatenAmerica’sfriendsthroughouttheregion,andsubjecttheUnitedStatesoranyothernationtonuclearblackmail”(inEhrenbergetal78).KennethPollack,aformerintelligenceanalystfortheMiddleEastattheCIA,painted

anumberofworstcaseSaddamscenariosthatallrevolvedaroundtheverysamesetofconcernsinhis2002book,TheThreateningStorm:TheCaseForInvadingIraq(273‐275).

HavingestablishedwhattheUSwasconcernedSaddammightdo,andthereforewhattheUSwishedtodeterSaddamfrom,wecanmoveon.

WhatevidencedidtheUShaveinsupportofTheClaim?

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WhydidwethinkSaddamwasundeterrable?WhatevidencedidtheUShavethatthiswastrue?

Beforewecananswerthatquestion,let’sstartbygettinganunderstandingofwhatcallingsomeone“undeterrable”implies.Toassertthatsomeoneiscategoricallyundeterrableistoassertthatsomethinginherenttothatpersonmakeshimnotdeterrable,regardlessofthesituation.

However,forsomeonetobetheoreticallydeterrable,theonlythingabouthimthatneedstobetrueisthatheisrational.Whilenopersonisperfectlyrationalinthegametheoreticalsenseoftheword,peoplecanbesaidinpracticetoberationalactorsiftheymakecalculateddecisionsintheirownselfinterest,weighingcostsandbenefitsofcertaincoursesofaction.

So,itispossiblethatwhentheUSarguedthatSaddamwasundeterrable,whatitreallymeantwasthathewasfundamentallyirrational.

However,despiteanyclaimstothecontrary,theUnitedStatesgovernmentdidnotbelieveSaddamwasfundamentallyirrational.Inlate1990,arenownedscholarofpoliticalpsychology,JerroldM.Post,wroteapsychologicalprofileofSaddamfortheUSgovernmenttohelpitbetterunderstandSaddam’s“motivations,perceptions,anddecision‐making”.INthatprofile,PostwrotethatSaddamwas“ajudiciouspoliticalcalculator,who[was]bynomeansirrational”andthatSaddamwas“notimpulsive”and“onlyactsafterjudiciousconsideration”(Post1990).

NordidtheUStreatSaddamasifhewasirrational.TheUSmadeaccusationsofSaddamthatareinconsistentwithaviewthatSaddamisirrational.Forexample,boththeClintonandBushadministrationsclaimedthatSaddamexploitedhumanitarianaid

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programsduringthe1990ssanctionsperiodforhisownpersonalgain.MadeleineAlbrightexpressedthisviewwhendefendingtheUS’schoicetomaintainstrictsanctionsonIraqdespitethewidespreadsufferingthesanctionscaused,saying“IthoughtthenandthinknowthatthesufferingsoftheIraqipeoplewereSaddam’sdoing,notours”(Reiff2003)Regardlessofhowtruethisaccusationis,exploitationforpersonalgainisafundamentallyrationalactivity.

GiventhatSaddamwasrational,andthatbyandlargetheUSgovernmentbelievedthis,theUSmusthavemeantsomethingotherthan“Saddamisirrational”whentheymadeTheClaim.

IndulgemeinjustabitoftheorizingasItrytogetatwhytheUSthoughtSaddamwasundeterrable.

AsIhavesaid,deterrenceisaninteractiveprocess.SaythatpartyAwishestodeterpartyBfromsomecourseofaction,C.PartyA’ssuccessindoingsowilldependonhowwellhecanmanipulatesituationalfactorssothattakingactionCbecomesmorecostlytopartyBthannottakingactionC.Therefore,successofdeterrencedependsmuchmoreontheactionsofthepersontryingtodothedeterringthanitdoesontheobjectofdeterrence.We’veestablishedthatitisnonsensicaltoclaimsomeoneiscategoricallyundeterrableunlessyoualsobelieveheisirrational.So,whattheUSmustreallyhavemeantbysayingthatSaddamwasundeterrable,wasthatthey,theUS,couldnotdeterSaddam.

ButwhywouldtheUS,themostpowerfulcountryonearth,thinkthatitcouldnotdeteronelittledictatorintheMiddleEast?

TheUSappearsmostlytohavebasedthisassertiononitsownpastexperiencewithSaddam.USstatementsintherun‐uptothe2003invasionshowthattheUSbelievedithad

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triedandfailedtodeterSaddam.Thisisshownbythefactthatinanefforttogarnersupportforthewar,theUSgovernmenttriedtoshowthatdeterrencehadbeentriedandhadfailed.TheytriedtodothismainlybyshowingthatSaddamhadalongrecordofnoncomplianceandthattheyhadtriedallpossiblemeansofgettinghimtocomply,butthatnonehadworked.

Inathe2002speechDickCheneygaveataVeteransofForeignWarsconference,hespokeatlengthofalltheeffortsthathadbeenmadetodeterandcompelSaddamandofSaddam’schronicrefusaltocomply.SpeakingofSaddam’sagreementsstophisWMDprogramsandsubmittoinspections,Cheneysaid“Saddamhassystematicallybrokeneachoftheseagreements”and“Saddamhasperfectedagameofcheatandretreat;areturnofinspectorswouldbenoassurancewhatsoeverofhiscompliancewithUNresolutions”andthattherewas“nobasisinSH’sconductorhistory”tosuggestthathewouldsuddenlybecomecompliantwithfurthersuchefforts(inEhrenbergetal2010,76‐78). PresidentBushgaveaSeptember12,2002speechtotheUNGeneralAssembly,inwhich,likeallthespeechessenioradministrationofficialsmadeduringthistime,hemadethecaseforwar.TheBushadministrationdistributedtotheassemblymembersa“backgroundpaper”tosupplementthespeech.The21‐pagedocument,titled“ADecadeofDeceptionandDefiance”,isbasicallyabiglistofthewaysinwhichSaddamhadbeennoncompliantwithUNSCresolutionsduringthe1990sdespitetheinternationalcommunity’seffortstomakehimcomply.

Thereismoreevidenceforthe“deterrencehasbeentriedandhasfailed”lineintheJointCongressionalResolutionthatauthorizedPresidentBushtouseforceagainstIraq,whichcanbeseenalsoasaformaldocumentationofthereasonstheBushadministration

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arguedforcewasnecessary.Theactualauthorizationfortheuseofforcecomesonlyafterseveralpagesofjustification,allofwhichciteIraq’spastconduct. Inthedocument,Congresssaid,Iraq“persistsinviolatingresolutionsoftheUNSC”andtherefore“remainsinmaterialandunacceptablebreachofitsinternationalobligations”onalaundrylistofissuesincludingitsceasefirewithKuwait,itsagreementtocooperatewithweaponsinspectors,WMDpossessionanddevelopment,itsvariousansundryhumanrightsviolations,it’sobligationtoreleaseforeigndetaineesandreturnstolenKuwaitproperty.TheresolutionauthorizedforceifIraqdidnot“abandon(s)itsstrategyofdelay,evasionandnoncompliance,andstrictlycomply”withallrelevantSecurityCouncilresolutions.Wordslike“persists”and“remains”showthatIraq’snoncompliancewasapatternofbehavior.Referringtononcomplianceasa“strategy”hasthesameeffect.

Finally,inhisOctober72002SpeechoutliningtheIraqithreat,PresidentBushemphasizedtotheAmericanpublicthattheUSandinternationalcommunityhadexhaustedallpossibleeffortsshortofwartogetSaddamtocomply.Inalmostliteraryfashion,andtogreatdramaticeffect,Bushdetailedtheseeffortsbyrepeatingthephrase“theworldhastried…”followedbywhateverthingtheworldhadtried.Forexample:

“Theworldhastried…economicsanctions…theworldhastriedlimitedmilitarystrikes…theworldhastriedno‐flyzones”(inEhrenbergetal2010,88).

Bushhammeredthisnarrativerelentlessly,furthersaying,“afterelevenyearsduringwhichwehavetriedcontainment,sanctions,inspections,

evenselectedmilitaryaction,theendresultisthatSaddamHusseinstillhaschemicaland

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biologicalweaponsandisincreasinghiscapabilitiestomakemore”(inEhrenbergetal2010,89)

So,alongtheroadtowar,USpointedtoitspastinteractionswithSaddam,andclaimedithaddoneeverythingitcouldpossiblydotodeterorcompelSaddam,andthatitjustdidn’twork.ThiswastheUS’sreasonforarguingthatdeterrencewouldnotwork.

Letmepauseheretoanticipateanobjection.Sofar,Ihavereliedonthemostpublicoftheadministration’sargumentsforwar.Justbecausetheseverypublicformsofpro‐warargumentreliedonTheClaimdoesn’tmeanthattheBushAdministrationtrulybelievedthatSaddamwasundeterrableandneededtogo.Howarewetoknowthatthisargumentreflectedsomekindoftruebeliefinthegovernment?

TheClaimwasnotpurelyaninventionoftheBushAdministration.TheUSgovernmenthadofficiallyadoptedapolicyofregimechangeforIraqin1998.Furthermore,itwasCongressthatinitiatedthispolicychangebyintroducingandpassingTheIraqiLiberationActof1998”,whichallocatedfundingforIraqiOppositionGroupswhoweretryingtooverthrowSaddamHussein(105thCongress1998).ThefirstpointtonotehereisthatwhilePresidentClintonsignedthisbillintolaw,itwasnotjusthispolicyandsoitdidnotleaveofficewithhim;amajorityofcongressmenandwomensupportedregimechangeasof1998,showingthattheyhadalreadycometobelievethatdealingwithSaddaminsomeotherwaywaseithertoodifficultorsimplyimpossible.WhentheBushAdministrationtookoffice,SecretaryofStateColinPowellmadeaninquirytotheStateDepartmentaskingabouttheoriginsoftheUSregimechangeinIraq(USDS2001January23).

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So,theideathatSaddamwasimpossiblyobstinateandthereforeneededtoberemovedpre‐datedtheBushAdministration.Additionally,itwasapolicyrecognizedbyboththeexecutiveandlegislativebranches,meaningthatithadmuchbroadersupport.And,while,obviously,thereisadifferencebetweenfundingIraqiOppositionGroupsandlaunchingpre‐emptivewar,thereasoningbehindbothofthesepolicieswasthesame.WeknowthatnotalloftheBushAdministration’spublicargumentsforthewarcanbetakenatfacevalue;bynowitiscommonknowledgethatwewereliedtoaboutIraq’spossessionofWMD.However,Ithinkitissafetosaythatthe“Saddamisundeterrableandthereforeneedstogo”claimisnotsimplypropagandainserviceofaformerHalliburtonExecutive’scorporategreed,andsoisatleasthonestenoughtobeworthanalyzing.

Firstofall,itneedstobepointedoutthatitisillogicalandinconsistentwithdeterrencetheorytoclaimthatjustbecausepasteffortsatdeterrencehavefailed,allfutureeffortswillfail.Thisisbecause,again,conductingsuccessfuldeterrenceissocontextuallyandsituatonallydependent.But,let’ssetthatproblemaside.Let’sgivetheUSgovernmentthebenefitofthedoubtandacceptthattotallyillogicaljumpinreasoning.

Let’sfocusontheclaimthatinthepast,theUShaddoneeverythingitpossiblycouldtodeter/compelSaddam(andthatitjustmysteriouslydidn’twork).

Inordertoevaluatethatclaim,wehavetoidentifythehistoricalincidentstheUSpointstoinsupportofit.WhatHistorydidtheUSpointtoasevidenceforTheClaim?

AsisevidentfromtheexcerptsIhavejustdiscussed,mostofthehistoricalevidencetheUSusedcamefromthepost‐GulfwarSanctionsperiod.Therefore,thenextstepIwilltaketowardsdecidingifTheClaimwasjustifiedwillbetoexaminethepostGulf‐War

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sanctionsperiod.Specifically,IwillevaluatetheemergentUSclaimthatSaddam’sconductduringthepost‐warsanctionsperiodshowedapatternofnon‐compliance,andthatthisnon‐complianceshowedthatSaddamwasundeterrable.

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SectionII:

ThePostGulf‐WarSanctionsPeriod

DidSaddam’sconductduringthepost‐warsanctionsperiodshowapatternofnon‐compliance?

WasSaddamHusseinlargelynon‐compliantwiththedemandsmadeintheUNsanctions?Toanswerthisquestion,wefirstneedtoask:whatwerethedemandsarticulatedinthetextoftheUNsanctions?DemandsoftheSanctions

UNSecurityCouncilResolution(UNSCR)661,whichfirstestablishedaninternationalembargoonIraqandfrozeIraqiandKuwaitiassetsabroad,waspassedafewdaysafterSaddaminvadedKuwait(Graham‐Brown1999,56‐57).Atthetime,itwasintendedtocompelSaddamtowithdrawfromKuwait.Duringthecourseofthewar,theUNSCpassedtenotherresolutionsthataffirmeddemandsmadeinUNSCR661andcalledrepeatedlyforIraqtocomply(SifryandCerf1991,137‐156).Afterthewar,theUNSCcontinuedtheinternationalembargothathadbeenstartedunderUNSCR661,butdidsoinordertocompelSaddamtocomplywiththetermsofanewresolution:UNSCR687.

AfewofthedemandsmadeinUNSCR687wereintendedtoformalizetheendthewar;IraqhadtoformallyrecognizeKuwaitisovereignty;IraqandKuwaithadtoagreetoaUN‐drawnborderbetweenthetwocountries;Iraqhadtoreleaseprisonersofwar,accountforanymissingpersons,andreturnstolenpropertytoKuwait.ThecentralandmostsignificantdemandinUNSCR687,however,wasthatIraqdisarm.IraqhadtodestroyallofitsWMD‐‐chemical,biological,andnuclear.Iraqwasalsotosubmittolong‐termweaponsinspectionstomakesureithadnotfailedtodestroyanyofitsWMDandtomakesureitdid

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notcreatenewones.Iraqalsowasnotpermittedtoimportanyweaponsorweaponstechnology,oranydual‐usetechnologyorgoods—thatis,anythingthatcouldbeusedforcivilianpurposesbutcouldalsobeusedformilitarypurposes.DisarmamentwastheprimarygoalofUNSCR687andofficially,oftheentirepost‐warUNsanctionsregime(Graham‐Brown1999,58‐59). Now,havingestablishedthebasicdemandsofthesanctions,wecandiscusswhetherornotSaddamwasnon‐compliantwiththesanctions.WasSaddamNon‐compliantwiththedemandsofthesanctions? Saddamwasnon‐compliantwithmanyofthedemandsregardingKuwaitandtheresolutionoftheGulfWar. AccordingtoUSgovernmentreportwhichwascompiledusingdatafromtheUSDepartmentofStateaswellasindependentsourcessuchasUNSCOMandAmnestyInternational,Saddamneveraccountedforover600prisonersofwarorpersonnelthatotherwisewentMIAduringtheGulfWar.Saddamneverreturned“extensiveKuwaitistatearchivesandmuseumpieces”hehadstolen.Nordidhereturnanallegedlymassive—andmassivelyvaluable—quantityofstolenKuwaitimilitaryequipmentincludingfighterjets,armoredvehiclesandmissiles(USStateDepartment2002,19‐20). Asof1999,SaddamhadrefusedtoformallyrecognizeKuwaitisovereignty(Graham‐Brown1999,66).Moreover,SaddamhaddemonstratedintenttoviolateKuwaitisovereigntyduringthepost‐warsanctionsperiod.In1994,Saddammassedabout70,000troopsontheKuwaitiborder,inanapparentthreattoonceagaininvadethecountry.SaddambackeddownonlywhentheUSengagedinakindofcounter‐buildup(Gordon1994).

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Saddamviolatedtheinternationalembargobyengaginginsmugglingandblackmarketactivities.Ofcourse,thiswasnotsomethingSaddam—oranyone—coulddoalone.NeighboringcountriessuchasJordanandTurkeyhadgreatincentivetohelpSaddamviolatetheinternationalembargobecausetheyhaddependedheavilyontradewithIraqbeforetheGulfWar,sotheembargoonIraqhurtthemtoo.Forexample,IraqhadbeenJordan’ssinglebiggesttradepartnerfortheentiredecadeprecedingthewarandhadreliedonIraqformostofitsoilimports.TheUShadwithdrawnaidtoJordanbecauseJordanwouldnotjointheDesertStormcoalitionagainstIraq.ThisputJordaninaprecariouseconomicpositionandmadeitevenmoredependentonmaintainingsomeofitsnormaltradewithIraq(Graham‐Brown199966‐67).

SaddamalsosubvertedtheUNsanctionsbyillegallysellingoiloutsideoftheUN’sOil‐for‐Foodprogram—a1996dealbetweentheUNandSaddamthatallowedSaddamtosellsomeoilunderUNmonitoringinexchangeforsomehumanitarianreliefforhisstarvingcitizenry(Gordon2010,173‐189),andwhichwillbediscussedingreaterdetaillater.

Saddamwaslargelynon‐compliantwiththedisarmamentprovisionsofthesanctions.

ToverifyIraqicompliance(ornon‐compliance)withthedisarmamentprovisionsinUNSCR687,in1991theUNestablishedaspecialcommission,UNSCOM,chargedwithperformingweaponsinspectionsinIraq.AustralianDiplomatRichardButlerdescribedhisexperienceasdirectorofUNSCOMfrom1997to1999inhisbook,TheGreatestThreat:Iraq,WeaponsofMassDestruction,andtheCrisisofGlobalSecurity.Basedonhisown

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experienceandthatofRolfEkeus,theUNSCOMdirectorfrom1991to1997,Butlerwrotethat“…fromthefirstdaysofUNSCOMIraqsoughttoconcealitsweaponsprogramsandcheatonthedisarmamentprocess”(Butler2000,181)

andthatduringthepost‐GulfWarsanctionsperiod,“Everystepindisarmament,everydiscoveryanddestructionofweaponsandthemeanstomakethem,wasachievedinthefaceofIraqiconcealment,deception,lying,andthreats”(2000,xvi). Throughoutthe1990s,Saddamtriedtothwartweaponsinspectorsbystoringweaponsandmilitaryequipmentanywhereandeverywherethatdidnotappeartobeamilitaryfacility.AccordingtoaUSDepartmentofStatereportonSaddam’s“disinformationandpropaganda”,Iraqhidweaponsin“parks,mosques,hospitals,hotels,crowdedshoppingdistricts,ancientculturalandreligioussites”,soccerstadiumsandmanyothercivilianareas(USDS2003,10). Undertheweaponsinspectionsprogram,Iraqwasrequiredtopresent“declarations”statingwhatkindsofweaponsmaterialsithadandwheretheywerelocated,inordertoallowUNSCOMtoseethattheyweredestroyed.TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAssociationoversawinspectionsfornuclearweapons.A1997reportbytheDirectoroftheIAEAanddirectedtotheSecretaryGeneraloftheUNmadeclearthatIraqrepeatedlyprovideddeclarationsthatweresoobviouslyincompleteastobelaughable(UnitedNations1997,20). Byapplyingconsistentpressure,theinspectionsteamsgotSaddamtodeclaresomewhatmorematerialovertime,andUNSCOMoversawthedestructionofsignificant

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amountsofWMD‐relatedmaterialandmanufacturingequipment(UnitedNations199720‐23).In1995,SaddamHussein’sson‐in‐lawHusseinKamel,whowasalsoSaddam’sMinisterofIndustry(andthereforeresponsibleforoverseeingIraq’sweaponsprograms),defectedtoJordan.Shortlythereafter,heprovidedtheUNwithinformationaboutanddocumentationofIraqiweaponsprogramsthattheUNhadknownnothingabout(Pollack2002,76‐77).TheserevelationsmadeUNSCOMandtheIAEArealizethattheirinspectorshadbeenevenmorethoroughlydeceivedthantheyhadthought(UnitedNations199720‐22).AftertheKamelrevelations,Saddamcontinuedtodenyinspectorsfullaccesstohisweaponsprograms. SaddamalsoencouragedchronicharassmentofIAEAandUNSCOMinspectors.AfterRichardButlertookoverasdirectorofUNSCOMin1997,theIraqisintensifiedtheirharassmentofUNSCOMweaponsinspectors.Insomecases,thisharassmentwassoaggressivethatitendangeredthelivesofinspectors;forexample,PollackdiscussesanincidentinwhichanIraqiwhowasaccompanyingUNSCOMinspectorsonahelicopterridetoaweaponssight“triedtoseizecontrolofthehelicopterwhileinflight,nearlycausingittocrash”(Pollack2002,88).TheUNSCpassedresolution1134,whichthreatenedrepercussionsifIraqkeptupitsobstructionism.

FarfromencouragingIraqicompliancewiththeinspections,asithadbeenallegedlyintendedtodo,theresolutionendedupmakingSaddamfurious.ItwasshortlyafterthisthatIraqexpelledAmericanmembersoftheUNSCOMinspectionsteam.EventhoughtheAmericaninspectorsweregone,Saddamstillobstructedandevadedinspections.Ultimately,inlate1998,UNSCOMwithdrewallitsinspectors(Graham‐Brown1999,354).Inresponse,IraqeventuallythrewoutallAmericanUNSCOMinspectorsandultimatelyin

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1998didthesametotherestoftheUNSCOMteam,endingtheweaponsinspectionsprogram(Graham‐Brown1999,353‐354).

Weseethatinmanyways,Saddamwasnoncompliantwiththedemandsofthesanctions.Morethantechnicallynon‐compliant,Saddamwasresistanttotheveryspiritofthesanctions.DidSaddam’snoncomplianceshowthathewasundeterrable?

ItseemsfairfortheUStosaySaddamwasnon‐compliantduringthepost‐warsanctionsperiod.

Iwroteearlierinthisessaythatcompellencecanbethoughtofasinducingcompliance.So,thismeansthatafailuretoinducecomplianceconstitutesafailureofcompellence.So,wouldn’titatthisjuncturebefairtosaythat,BecauseSaddamdidnotcomplynomatterwhattheUSdid,hewasnotsuccessfullycompelled,eventhoughtheUSdideverythingitcould,andthattherefore,compellence(andthereforedeterrence)justdoesn’tworkonSaddam?Wouldn’titbefairtosaythatSaddam’sconductduringthesanctionsperiodshowthatheisundeterrable?

Theansweris:no.WhileitislargelytruethatSaddamwasnon‐compliant,itisnottruethattheUSdideverythingitpossiblycouldtocompelSaddamduringthistimeperiod.So,itisnotfairtosaythatSaddamwasundeterrable(uncompellable),becausetheobservedcompellencefailurewastheUS’sfault.

WhiletheUSsharedwiththerestoftheinternationalsanctionscoalitionthegoalofdisarmament,regimechangewasitsmaingoal.

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TheUS’sgoalofregimechangemeantthattheoverallstructureofthesanctionsgaveSaddamnoincentivetocomplywiththeirdictates.Iwillgoaboutexplainingthisbyestablishingthefollowingthings:1)RegimechangewastheUS’smaingoalfromstartofthepost‐warsanctionsperiodandremainedtheUS’smaingoalthroughoutthepost‐warsanctionsperiod2)RegimechangegoalmeanttheUShadnointerestinchangingSaddam’sbehavior,andthereforetheUSwouldgivenorewardforpartialcompliance3)Differentgoalsmeantdifferentdefinitionsofcompliance4)SaddamknewallthisTherefore,Saddamhadnoincentivetocomply,andinfacthadincentiveNOTtocomply.Iwillnowexplainthisinmoredetail.1)RegimechangewastheUS’smaingoalfromstartofthepost‐warsanctionsperiodandremainedtheUS’smaingoalthroughoutthepost‐warsanctionsperiod.

Evidenceforthefirstcomponent—thattheUSenteredthepost‐warsanctionsperiodwiththegoalofregimechange—isthatinearlyMayof1991,abouttwomonthsafterOperationDesertStormhadended,DeputyNationalSecurityAdviserRobertGatesstated:“Saddamisdiscreditedandcannotberedeemed.Hisleadershipwillneverbeacceptedbytheworldcommunity…Allpossiblesanctionswillbemaintaineduntilheisgone…Anyeasingofsanctionswillbeconsideredonlywhenthereisanewgovernment”(Gordon2010,17).

SeveraldocumentsfromtheUSintelligenceapparatusshowthatGates’wordsweren’tjustbluster,buttrulyreflectedUSaims.

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ThefirstsuchdocumentisaCIAreportwritteninMarchof1991,immediatelyaftertheGulfWar,andtitled“Iraq:ImplicationsofInsurrectionandProspectsforSaddam’sSurvival”.ThereportdiscussedatlengththescenariosinwhichSaddammightbeoverthrown,andanalyzedhowlikelyeachofthesescenarioswastoactuallyhappen.Theanalysisconcludedthatregrettably,“Saddam’sinpowerfornow”(CIA1991,2),butthatthestateoftheeconomywouldbea“keyfactor”indecidinghowforhowmuchlonger.Thereportimpliedthatitwasimportanttokeepthesanctionsembargoinplacebecause“IfUNsanctionscontinueandSaddamisunabletoselloil,hispositioninternallywillbeatincreasinglygreaterrisk”(CIA1991,9).

Bythenextyear,theUSseemedtothinkthatSaddam’sprospectshadimproved.ANationalIntelligenceEstimatefrom1992entitled“SaddamHusayn:likelytohangon”saidthatiftherewasenormouspopulardissatisfaction,Saddammightbeoverthrown.However,theestimateprojectedthatSaddamwouldstayinpowerforatleastayearmorebecauseSaddamhadbeenabletokeephissupportbasehappybyprotectingthemfromtheworsteffectsofthesanctions(DCI1992).

ThediscussioninboththesedocumentsofsanctionsasacriticalingredientinSaddam’shypotheticaldownfallshowthattheprimaryoutcomevariableofthesanctionstheUScaredaboutwaswhetherornotSaddamwouldstayinpower.

TheUSintelligenceapparatuscontinuedintotheClintonyearstospeculateonhowlikelyitwasSaddamwouldstayinpower.AmuchmoreextensiveNationalIntelligenceEstimatefrom1993providesmoreevidencethattheUSthoughtofsanctionsprimarilyintermsofhowtheywouldaffectSH’sabilitytostayinpower,ratherthanhowtheymightchangehisbehavior.Considerthefollowingexcerpts:

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““Ifthesanctionswereeased…thepressureonSaddamwouldlighten,andhischancesofsurvivinginofficewouldbesubstantiallyenhanced.”“Ifenforcementofthesanctionscontinuesunabated,thereisabetter‐than‐evenchancethatSaddamwillbeoustedduringthenextthreeyears.”“AlthoughsanctionsbythemselveswillnotdirectlytoppleSaddam,theyhavehelpedestablishandenvironmentthatthreatenshim.”“EvenifUNsanctionsremainineffect,thereisonlya20to30percentchancethatSaddamwillbeoustedduringthenextyear”“weseelittleprospectthatSaddamcanimprovethissecurityenvironmentorhisprospectsforsurvivalwhilesanctionsremaininforce”“thelongerthesanctionsremainineffect,thegreatertherisktohim”(DCI1993,v‐35).

ThesequotesreflectanearobsessionwiththequestionofhowlongSaddamwouldstayinpower,showingthatthepurposeofthesanctionswastoweakenhimsohewouldbeoverthrown.Furthermore,shortlyaftertakingofficein1993,PresidentClintonsaid,“Thereisnodifferencebetweenmypolicyandthepolicyofthe[Bush]Administration…Ihavenointentionofnormalizingrelationswith[SaddamHussein]”(inGordon2010,17).

ThereismoreevidencethatDeputyNationalSecurityAdvisorGates’andPresidentClinton’sstatementstrulyreflectedtheUS’spost‐warapproachtowardsIraq.

InMay1991,PresidentBushauthorized“acovertactioncampaignto‘createtheconditionsfortheremovalofSaddamHusseinfrompower’”(Pollack2002,59).Inotherwords,PresidentBushtoldtheCIAtodoeverythingtheycouldtogetridofSaddam.

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Furthermore,thecovertactioncampaigninitiatedbyPresidentBushin1991continuedthroughouttheClintonyears.TheCIAneedsWhiteHousepermissiontoconductoperationstargetedatoverthrowingaforeignleader(Pollack283).Becausethesecovertopscontinuedwellintothe1900s,PresidentClintonclearlyauthorizedtheircontinuation.ThepresidentialordersofthekindBushhadsigneddidnottechnicallyauthorizeorinstructtheCIAtokillSHbecauseassassinatingforeignleadersviolatesinternationallaw.However,theCIAmightaswellhavebeentryingtoassassinateSaddambecausethey“providedfundstogroupsthatitknewwereattemptingto”doso(SmithandOttaway1996).

TheCIAbackedtheIraqiNationalCongress(anoppositiongroup)from1992to1996,initseffortstooverthrowregimeeitherthrough“popularrevolt”ormilitarycoup.Theseoperationshad“amplefunding”(Pollack2002,288);asof1996,theCIAhadspentaround$100millionsupportingcoupeffortsinIraq(SmithandOttaway1996).Furthermore,theydidnotjustprovideassistanceremotely.Atleastin1995‐1995,theCIAhadagents“ontheground”tomonitortheINCandKurdishpartners(SmithandOttaway1996).

In1995theCIAtriedtoinstigatea“rollingcoup”(apopularrevolt)inwhichKurdishareaswouldrebelfirst,andgainsupportastheymovedtowardBaghdad(SmithandOttaway1996).ThisultimatelyfailedbecauseamainKurdishfaction,theKDP,wouldn’tbacktheINC(Frontline1999).2)Regimechangegoalmeansnointerestinchangingbehavior,andthereforenorewardforpartialcompliance

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IhaveestablishedthatfortheUS,sanctionswereintendedtobringaboutSaddam’sdownfall.IhavealsostatedthatunlikeFrance,Russia,orChina,theUSwasnotinterestedinchangingSaddam’sbehavior.Thisfollowslogically,andperhapsseemssomewhatobvious.However,itiscriticaltounderstandinghowtheUS’sregimechangegoalshapedsanctionsinawaythatgaveSaddamnoincentivetocomply.So,IwillpresentsomeevidencethattheUShadnointentionofusingthesanctionstochangeSaddam’sbehavior.

Anexcerptfromtheverybeginningofthepreviouslycited1993NIEshowsthatchangingSaddam’sbehaviorwasnotagoal:“ThroughoutthisEstimate,weassumethat:SaddamHusaynwillnotalterhisbasicdomesticandforeignpolicygoals:tomaintainhisholdonpowerbyanymeansnecessary,tore‐imposefullcontroloverthecountry,torebuildIraq’smilitarymight—includeweaponsofmassdestructionprograms—andtomakeIraqthedominantregionalpower…”(DCI1993,iii).

Asimpliedbythewords“willnotalter”,thegoalsenumeratedareonesthatthatSHhadbeenpursuing,andwhichhadledSaddamtotakeactionstheUSfoundunacceptable,suchastheinvasionofKuwait.ItisimpliedthatthesegoalsdriveSaddam’sactions.SO,whatisessentiallybeingsaidhereisnotjustthatSaddamwouldnotchangehisgoals,butthatSaddamwouldnotchangehisbehavior.ItwasassumedthatSaddamwouldnotchangehisbehaviorinresponsetothesanctions.

Thereisfurtherevidenceofthis.InthatsameNIE,anotherassumptionislistedaftertheoneIhavejustquotedanddiscussed.TheauthorsoftheNIEwrote:“(throughoutthisestimate,weassumethat…)SaddamHusaynwillnotfullycomplywithUNresolutions”(DCI1993,iii).

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Complyinginvolvestakingacourseofactionyouwouldnototherwisetake—thatis,changingyourbehaviorinsomeway.So,bysayingthatSaddamwouldnotcomply,theUSwassayinginaslightlydifferentwaythatitdidnotexpectSaddamtochangehisbehaviorunderthesanctions. HereweseeagovernmentdocumentthatdiscussesthepotentialimpactofthesanctionsonSaddamHussein,andinwhichitisassumedthatSaddamwouldnotchangehisbehaviortocomplywiththesanctions.Itisinconceivablethen,thattheUScouldbetryingtochangeSaddam’sbehavior—inconceivablethattheUScouldbetryingtogetSaddamtocomply.

Ifsanctionswerethestick,partialsanctionsreliefwouldbeacarrot.Carrotsaregiveninordertoencouragepositivechangesinbehavior.WewouldexpectthatiftheUShadnointentionofchangingSaddam’sbehaviortheUSwouldhavehadnointentionofgivingSaddamanycarrots—nointentionofgivinghimanypartialsanctionsrelief.Thiswasindeedthecase.

ThoughthisisconveyedintheGatesandClintonquotesIdiscussed,thereismoreevidenceofthis,too,ininthehighlyrevealing1993NIE.

Thethirdassumptionlistedatthebeginningofthedocumentreads:“Maintainingfullsanctionsandacoherentanti‐Saddamwillbeincreasinglydifficult”(DCI1993).

ThefactthatUSwasanticipatingdifficultyitwouldhavekeepingfullsanctionspressureonshowsthattheywerecommittedtomaintainsanctionsnomatterwhat,becauseitshowstheypreemptivelydisagreedwithotherstates’futuredesirestoeasesanctionsbasedonchangingcircumstances.

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TheNIEreportalsoshowedthatwhereothercountriesviewedsomeofIraq’sactionsasexamplesofpartialcompliance,theUSviewedthesesameactionscynicallyandsuspiciously.

Thereportdescribedsomewaysinwhich(despiteIraq’soverallpatternofnon‐compliance)IraqhadatthatpointsomewhatcompliedwithdemandsintheUNsanctions:

“Inthepastyear,IraqhasdecreaseditsharassmentofUNinspectorsandimproveditscooperationwithaspectsoftheUNresolutionsrelatedtoweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD).IraqrecentlyevenagreedtoabidebythetermsofUNSecurityCouncilResolution715,whichcallsforlong‐termUNmonitoringofIraq”.

But,insteadofcommentingonthesedevelopmentsbysayingsomethingtotheeffectof“wetaketheseasgoodsignsthatthesanctionsareindeedgettingSaddamtocomply”,orevenjust“Saddamhasshowngreatercompliancelately”,thereportcommentsonandsummarizestheseeventsbysaying“Baghdadhasbeenworkinghardtoreverseitspariahstatusandweakeninternationalsupportforthesanctions”(DCI1993,vi).

So,ratherthanconsideringpartialsanctionsreliefinresponsetotheseexamplesofpartialcompliance,theUSlamentedthembecausesuchpartialcompliancecouldweakenthesanctionscoalition.3)DifferentGoalsMeantDifferentDefinitionsofCompliance,andNoPartialSanctionsRelief

Itiscriticaltounderstandthathavingregimechangeasagoalofsanctionschangedthedefinitionofcompliance:FortheUS,fullcompliancemeant“noSaddam”.

Thefactthattherewasdisagreementoverthefundamentalgoalsofthesanctions—theUSwanteddisarmamentasastepalongtheroadtoregimechangeandothermajor

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playersontheUNSCFranceandRussiawantedonlydisarmament—meantthattherewasdisagreementoverwhatconstitutedcompliance.ThiswasimportantbecauseinthetextofUNSCR687,partialsanctionsreliefwasconditionedoncompliancewithcertainprovisionsofthesanctions.So,whetherornotSaddamcouldreceivepartialsanctionsreliefdependedonwhetherornottheUNSCfoundSaddam“compliant”ornot.Thegoal“generallyacceptedbyFrance,RussiaandChinawasthatsanctions[were]designedtochangetheGovernmentofIraq’sbehaviorinwaysdefinedbythemainrequirementsofResolution687”(Graham‐Brown1999,59).

ThesecountrieswantedtoseeSaddamhimspecificbehaviortargets:getridofWMD;permanentlyrespectKuwait’ssovereignty(stoptryingtoconquerit)andreturnanyKuwaitipropertytakenduringwar.Thesecountrieswerenotseekingto“dealwiththeleadershipofIraq”,meaningthattheywerenottryingtousethesanctionsforregimechange(Graham‐Brown1999,59)

ThismeantthatFrance,Russia,andChinadefinedfullcomplianceasSaddamtakingallthesespecificactionsanddemonstratingallthesespecificbehaviors;partialcompliancecouldbedefinedatakingoneorsomeoftheseactionsordemonstratingsomeofthesespecificbehaviors.

AsIhaveshowed,theUS’sgoalwasnotbehavioralchange,butregimechange.ThismeantthattheUSdefinedfullcomplianceastheabsenceofSaddam.Alsoasaresult,theconceptofpartialcompliancewasirrelevanttotheUS.Itwasonlyimportanttorecognizepartialcomplianceifyouplannedtorewarditwithpartialsanctionsrelief.BecausetheUS

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hadnointentionofliftingsanctionsevenalittlebit(lestthisstrengthenSaddam’sholdonpower),itneedednodefinitionofpartialcompliance.

ThetextofUNSCR687containedanambiguitythattheUSexploitedinordertoblockpartialsanctionsreliefforpartialcompliance.Thereweretwoparagraphsinwhichconditionsforsanctionsreliefweredescribed.Inoneparagraph,UNSCR687saidthattheoilembargoonIraqcouldbeliftedifIraqcompliedwiththedisarmamentprovisionthatsaidIraqmustdestroyitsWMD.Inadifferentparagraph,UNSCR678saidthatliftinganypartoftheembargowouldbeallowedonlyiftheUNSCdeemedthe“policiesandpracticesof”Saddam’sgovernmentshowedcompliancewith“allrelevant”demandsinthesanctionsGraham‐Brown1999,78‐79).

Thisseconddescriptionoftheconditionsnecessaryforsanctionsreliefwassoambiguousitmightaswellhaveread,“theconditionsforsanctionsreliefcanbewhateveryouwantthemtobeonanygivenday”.ThisallowedtheUStoclaimthattheconditionsnecessaryforsanctionsreliefhadnotbeenmet,regardlessofwhatSaddamhadactuallydone.

Onelastcriticaldetailisthat,undereitherinterpretation,liftingsanctions—evenpartially—requiredaunanimousvoteoftheSecurityCouncilP‐5.Therefore,nomatterhowmanyothermembersoftheUNSCwantedtoauthorizesomesanctionsrelief,theUScouldblocksanctionsrelief.Indeed,theUSblockedallotherP‐5memberattemptstograntSaddamsomepartialsanctionsrelief.(Gordon2010,39‐60;Graham‐Brown1999,56‐93).

ButwhatabouttheOil‐for‐Foodprogram?

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OnecouldobjectherethatinfacttheUnitedStatesdidrewardSaddamwithsomepartialsanctionsreliefintheformoftheOil‐for‐Foodprogram.UndertheOil‐for‐Foodprogram,Saddamcouldsell$1billionofoilabouteverythreemonths.TheUNmonitoredthesalesandSaddamhadtogiveportionsofthemoneytotheUNandtoKuwait.Saddamcouldusetheremainderofthemoney(about60‐65%)toimporthumanitariangoods,allunderthewatchoftheUN(Gordon2010,25).

Onthesurface,thisdoesappeartobeakindofpartialsanctionsrelief.However,wemustlookathowandwhytheoil‐for‐fooddealcameabout.

Bythemid‐1990s,thesanctionshadcausedadirehumanitariancrisisinIraq.MostIraqishadaccesstoonlyabout1,100caloriesaday(Gordon2010,25).Iraqhadalwaysproducedverylittleofitsownfood,andtheembargomadeitdifficultforIraqtoimportnearlyasmuchfoodasneeded—bothbecausethegovernmentnolongerhadoilrevenueandbecauseitcouldnotimportgoodfromanycountryinthesanctionsbloc..OperationDesertStormhaddestroyedmostofIraq’sinfrastructure,whichmadeitnearlyimpossibletodistributeevenwhatfoodtherewastothepeoplewhoneededit.ThedestructionofIraq’sinfrastructurealsoledtoextremelypoorwatersanitationinmostpartsofthecountry,resultinginwidespreadillness.TheUSalsopreventedIraqfromimportingthetechnologyandequipmentthatwouldbenecessarytorebuilditsinfrastructure,inshortbecausetheUScouldnotguaranteethatIraqwouldnotusethosegoodstorebuilditsweaponsprogramandmilitary(Gordon2010,23‐38).

Asaresult,theUSwasunderenormouscriticismforthedevastatingeffectsofthedraconiansanctionsagainstIraq.Keepingthesanctionscoalitiontogetherwasprovingharderandharder,andtheUSwasafraiditwouldnotbeabletosustaineconomicpressure

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onIraqwhilethehumanitariansituationwassodireandcontinuedtodeteriorate.Thus,theUSchosetooffertheoil‐for‐fooddealnottorewardIraqforanypartialcompliancewiththesanctions,buttofendoffcriticsofitsownpoliciesandtokeeppressureonSaddaminthelongterm(Graham‐Brown1999,81‐83).MadeleineAlbrightmadethisclearwhenshesaidoftheUS’sdecisiontoimplementtheOil‐for‐Foodprogram,

“FranklyitisthebestofallpossiblewaystomakesurethatthesanctionsregimeremainsinplacesothatSaddamHusseinisnotentitledtopretendheisconcernedforhispeopleandshedalotofcrocodiletears”(inGraham‐Brown199,82).

Sodidthen‐UNSecretaryforPoliticalAffairsandFormerUSAmbassadortotheUNThomasPickeringwhenhesaidin1998,

“Inaveryrealsense,the‘oil‐for‐food’programisthekeytosustainingthesanctionsregimeuntilIraqcomplieswithitsobligations”(inGraham‐Brown1993,83).

Ofcourse,weknowthattheUSwasn’treallytryingtogetSaddamtocomplywithitsobligations.So,whatPickering’squotereallymeansisthattheoil‐for‐foodprogramwasthekeytosustainingthesanctionsregimeuntilSaddamwasgone.

So,whiletheUSdidnotbringaboutregimechangeunderthesanctions,thisgoalwasstillenormouslyconsequential;aslongastheUSmaintaineditsgoalofregimechange,SaddamwouldneverbefullycompliantintheUS’seyes,and,giventhevotingrequirementsontheUNSC,thisensuredthattherewouldbenopartialsanctionsrelief.Saddamknewallthis

Heknewthatoursanctionsgoalsdifferedfromthegoalsoftheothermembersofthecoalition,andthatwewouldnotrewardhimforpartialcompliancebecauseweweretryingtogetridofhim.

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Iwon’tspendmuchtimedefendingthisclaim,becauseIthinkitisfairlyuncontroversial.WhileI’veuseddeclassifiedUSdocumentstoprovideexcellentdirectevidenceofthesethings,Ithinkmydiscussionalsoshowsthatthesethingswerenotsecret;I’vereliedalsoonscholarlyworkthatwasbeingconductedduringthesanctions,andthusdependedonreal‐timetransparency.I’vealsocitedstatementsmadebypublicofficials.TherewasplentyofcircumstantialevidencethatthereweredifferencesbetweentheAmericanapproachtothesanctionsandtheapproachtakenbymostothercountriesandthatwewantedSaddamgone.Ifinterestedandastuteobservers(suchasscholars)couldpickuponthesethings,ofcourseSaddam,thetargetofallthesepolicies,knewwhatwashappening. Evenso,Iwillprovidealittlemoreevidenceinsupportofthesethings.

AfterUSforcescapturedSaddamin2004,hewasinterviewednumeroustimesbytheFBI.Inoneoftheseinterviews,inwhichSaddamdiscussedthebeginningofthepost‐GulfWarsanctionsperiod,hesaid,“TheUnitedStatesstartedthecauseandothersfollowed.[UNSCR]661wasagreeduponbyallpartieswhile[UNSCR]687wasnot”andthat“[UNSCR]687wasapprovedattheinsistenceoftheUnitedStates”(FBIFeb132004).Inotherwords,SaddamsawUSasringleaderofthepostGulf‐warsanctionsandfurtherasusingtheUNasaplatformforadvancingitsownagenda(ofregimechange),anagendathatothermembersofUNSCdidnotfullysupport.

WhileSaddamdefinitelyknewtheUSwasusingthesanctionsasatooltogetridofhim,heknewthatoureffortsextendedbeyondthis.Pollack,aformerintelligenceanalyst,wrote,

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“AttheCIA,weusedtosaythatanycoupplotweknowabout,Saddamknewabout.Thishas,unfortunately,turnedouttobetrue.”(2002,289),ThisshowsthatSaddamknewweweretryingtogetridofhimviacovertaction.TheoverallstructureofsanctionsgaveSaddamnoincentivetocomply;rather,it

gaveSaddamanincentivetonotcomply

Saddamhadnoincentivetocomplywithdisarmament,whichatleastonpaperwasthemostimportantgoalofthesanctions.Saddamknewthatevenifhedisarmed,theUSwouldkeepthesanctionspressureonhim.HehadeveryreasontonotcooperatewiththeweaponsinspectionsbecausetheseinspectionswerepartoftheUNandtheUS’sefforttogetSaddamtodisarm.DisarmingSaddamwouldmakeiteasiertooverthrowSaddamiftheUSevergotaroundtoconductinganovertregimechangeeffortandintheneartermwouldmakehimmorevulnerabletoeventhemostamateurofcoups.Pollackwrotethat“IraqwaswellawareoftheCIAcovertactioncampaignandassumedthatAmericaninspectorswerefeedinginformationregardingtheIraqisecurityservicestotheCIA(Whichturnedouttobelargelytrue,althoughtheUNSCOMitselfwasunawareofit)”(Pollack79).

Inotherwords,SaddambelievedthattheweaponsinspectionsweredirectlyhelpingtheUS’scoverteffortstooverthrowhimduringthattimeperiod—andhewasright.

ContinuationofsanctionsappearedonsurfacetobeconditionalonSH’sbehavior—certainlyifyoulookatthesecuritycouncilresolutionsfromthetime(notably661,687)thereweredefinedconditionsforsanctionsrelief.WhileitwasnosecrettoanyonethattheUSwasusingthesanctionstotrytooustSaddamandthattheywouldnotrelentuntilhe

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wasgone,theUSalsoclaimedthatSHalwayshadthepowertogetthesanctionsrelievedorSaddamcouldhavestoppedthesanctionsatanytime(Rieff2003).Thisisamind‐bogglingcontradiction.

PartofthereasontheUSassumedthatSaddamwouldneverfullycomplywithwhattheUSsawasthegoalofthesanctionswasthatvoluntaryfullcompliancewouldmeanSaddamhadcapitulated—capitulatedinthesenseofthrowinghishandsupandwalkingoffthejob,saying,“YouwantednoSaddam?Fine.YougotnoSaddam.I’mheadedtoEgypttohangoutthereforawhile.Seeya.”Thisisobviouslylaughable.

TheotherreasontheUSassumedthatSaddamwouldneverfullycomplyisbecausetheUSunderstoodhowdraconianthesanctionswerethatthey,withthehelpoftheinternationalcommunity,hadimposed;theUSknewthatifSaddamtrulycompliedwithallthedisarmamentdemandsinthesanctionsanddidnotcheattheinternationalembargoatall,hewouldbesoeconomically,militarily,andpoliticallyweakenedthathewoulddefinitelyfallfrompower.

So,intwosenses,Saddamhadtobenon‐compliantwiththedemandsofthesanctionsinordertohaveanychanceofpolitical(andpossiblyphysical)survival:First,voluntarycompliancewiththeUSdemandofregimechangewasanonstarter.Second,materialcompliancewithallthetermsofthesanctions—noillegaltrade,noobstructionofweaponsinspections,noweaponssmugglingtorebuildhismilitary—wouldhavebeensuicide. Graham‐Brownimpliedthiswhenshewroteandthatwewantedtomaintainpressureofsanctionsbecauseheweknewhe“couldnotcomplywithalltherequirementsfortheliftingoftheeconomicembargoandbyimplication,therefore,sanctionswould

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remaininforceuntiltheregimecollapsed”(Graham‐Brown1999).Inotherwords,weassumedhewouldnotfullycomplywiththesanctionsdemandsasarticulatedinUNSC867notbecausewethoughthewascongenitallyincapableofcompliance,butbecauseweknewthesanctionswekeptinplaceweresodraconianthattheywouldhavebeenimpossibleforanyremotelyself‐preservingleadertocomplywith.Curiously,thisseemstocontradictthereasoningbehindtheneedforregimechange.Ifhewasreallyso“irredeemable”thathecouldnotbedeterredorcompellednomatterwhatwedid,thenwhydidweneedtomakeitstructurallyimpossibleforhimtocomply—wouldn’thehavejustfailedtodonomatterhowwestructuredthesanctions?

TheworstpossibleoutcomeforSaddamofnotcomplyingwiththesanctionswasthathewouldlosepower(andnotsurvive).Theworstpossibleoutcomeforhimofcomplyingwiththesanctionswasthathewouldlosepower(andnotsurvive).Thedifferencewasthataslongashedidnotcomplywiththesanctions,hehadachancetostayinpower.Deterrence/Compellenceduringthesanctionsperiod:SuccessesIgnoredand

OpportunitiesMissed

Additionally,therewereotherproblemswiththeUS’sclaimthattheentirepost‐warperiodshowsthatSaddamisundeterrable. Firstofall,eventhoughtheoverallstructureofthesanctionsmadeitimpossibleforSaddamtofullycomply,thereweresmalleropportunitiestodeterorcompelSaddam.TherewereincidentsinwhichSaddamwassuccessfullydeterredorcompelled,whichtheUnitedStatesapparentlydiscountedinordertomakeitsclaimofcategoricalnon‐compliance.Furthermore,theUnitedStatesmissedsomeoftheseopportunitiestodeteror

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compelSaddamortodemonstratethreatcredibilitythatcouldhelpdeterorcompelhiminthefuture.TheUSsuccessfullyusedthethreatofforcetodeterandcompelSaddam.OurenforcementofthenoflyzonesweinstitutedinthenorthernandsouthernpartsofthecountrybuiltourthreatcredibilityandhelpedussuccessfullydeterSaddam.

InAugustof1992,PresidentBushinstitutedanoflyzonebelowthe32ndparallelinordertoprotectShi’iteMuslimsinthesouthernpartofthecountry.Iraqiplanesroutinelytestedthisno‐flyzone,especiallyatfirst(Graham‐Brown199,351).However,wemadegoodonenforcingiteverytimeIraqtestedit,whichhelpeddeterSaddamfrommoreseriousinfringements.

Forexample,onDecember27of1992,theUSshotdownanIraqifighterjetthatinfringedontheNFZandthenthenextdayUSplaneschasedtwoIraqijetsoutoftheNFZ.Subsequently,atbeginningofJanuary1993,whenUS,UK,andFrenchlearnedthatIraqwasattemptingtounderminecoalitionabilitytoenforceno‐flyzoneby“movingsurface‐to‐airmissiles”southofthe32ndparallel,theythreatenedtotakemilitaryactionifIraqdidnotremovethemissiles.Iraqcompliedatthelastminute(Graham‐Brown1999351‐352),whichwaslikelyaresultofseeingthattheallieswereseriousaboutenforcingtheno‐flyzonejustweeksbefore.

AnotherinstanceinwhichtheUSsuccessfullyusedthethreatofforcetodeterSaddamwasinanincidentIhavealreadymadereferenceto:in1994,SaddamstartedmassingtroopsontheKuwaitiborder—ultimatelyupwardsof70,000ofthem.PresidentClintonrespondedbyordering36,000USmilitarypersonneltomassontheothersideoftheborder(Gordon1994October8).Saddambackeddown(Graham‐Brown1999,353).

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NooneknewexactlywhySaddammassedhistroopsontheborder.However,by1994,theIraqieconomywasadisaster,andmanyobserversthoughtthatSaddamwastryingtocreateacrisishecouldusetonegotiatesomepartialsanctionsrelief(Gordon1994October8).WecannotknowforsurehowseriouslySaddamintendedtoinvadeKuwait,andthereforewecannotforcertainsaythiswasacaseofsuccessfuldeterrence—becauseifSaddamwasneverseriousaboutinvadingthenitisunfairtosaytheUSdeterredhim.

However,KennethPollacknotedthat,basedoninformationlatersharedbyHusseinKamel—Saddam’sson‐in‐lawwhodefectedtoJordanin195—itseemsverylikelythat“Saddamwasnotbluffingbutgenuinelyintendedtoattack”(Pollack2002,267).Therefore,itismorethanfairtosaythatinthisinstance,theUnitedStatessuccessfullyusedthethreatofforcetodeterSaddam.ThisthreatwascrediblebecausethelasttimeSaddamhadinvadedKuwait,theUShaddemonstratedawillingnesstogotowarandkickhimout.

Furthermore,theUSsubsequentlypointedtothisincidentnotasevidencethatSaddamcouldbedeterred,butasanotherexampleofhisnoncompliance,andthereforeevidencethathewasnotdeterrable.Graham‐Brownexplainedthatwhilewhile“RussiaandFrance…emphasizedthatthecrisishadresultedinIraq’srecognitionofKuwait’sborderandsovereignty”,andwasthereforeevidencethatSaddam’scouldbesuccessfullydeterred,“PresidentClintonstressedthattheeventsofOctober1994showedIraqstillthreateningitsneighbors”,showingthatitcouldnotbeseenascompliantwitheventhemostbasicprovisionsinUNSCR687(respectingKuwaitisovereignty)(1999,79)HereweseetheUStakinganinstanceinwhichitsuccessfullydeterredIraq,andwarpingittofitthe

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narrativethatSaddamwasnoncompliant,whichweknow,lateron,becamejustificationforwar. TheUSalsooccasionallysuccessfullyusedforcetocompelSaddam. Forexample,alsoinJanuaryof1993,IraqhadstillrefusedtoremoveallitsforcesfromthedemilitarizedzonealongtheKuwaitiborder,eventhoughtheareawassupposedtobeturnedovertoKuwaittheverynextday.Thefollowingday,theUSsent1,200troopsintoKuwait,totrytocompelSaddamtoremovehisforcesfromtheDMZ.Whenthisprovedineffectual,theUSleveledabuildingthoughttobeinvolvedinIraq’snuclearweaponsprogramandalsoconductedmissilestrikesonahotelinthemiddleofBaghdad.Iraqthenwithdrewitsremainingforcesfromthedemilitarizedborderzone(Graham‐Brown1999,352). However,theUSalsomissedopportunitiestodemonstrateitsthreatcredibilityandtouseforceinadeterrent/compellentway. TheUSdidpotentialdamagetoitsthreatcredibilitybyfailingtofollowthroughonalltheconditionalthreatsitmadetowardsSaddam.InNationalSecurityDirective54,issuedonJanuary151991—thedeadlineforIraqtowithdrawitsforcesfromKuwait—BushoutlinedthemissionobjectivesofOperationDesertStorm.BushmadeclearthattopplingSaddamwouldnotbeoneoftheseobjectives,butthathewouldbroadenthemissionobjectivestoincludeforcibleregimechangeifSaddamperpetratedcertainspecifieddeeds.

NSD54clearlystatedthatifSaddameitherusedWMDagainstcoalitionforcesorburnedtheKuwaitoilfields,theUSmilitarywoulddeposeSaddam(Bush1991).Thisknowledgewasnotavailableonlytothosehigh‐levelUSofficialswhowereallowedtoread

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NSD54;Thisconditionwasincludedbecauseamidstdebateoverthewar,therewasspeculationthatSaddammightuseWMDoncoalitionforces(SifryandCerf1991,197‐354)andbecauseSaddamhadthreatenedtoburntheKuwaitioilfields(Shenon1991)iftheUnitedStatesinvaded.

ThereasontheBushadministrationhaddecidednottoincludeforcibleregimechangeasanoutrightgoalofDesertStormwasthattheyfearedgettingboggeddowninalengthyandmessyoccupationofIraq(Frontline,1997).ItissafetosaythattheUSgovernmenthopedtheywouldnothavetomakegoodontheirthreattooverthrowSaddam.Therefore,theinclusionoftheWMDuse/KuwaitioilfieldprovisioninNSD54wasintendedasathreattodeterSaddamfromperpetratingthosedeeds. WhileSaddamdidnotuseWMDagainstcoalitionforces,hedidsettheKuwaitioilfieldsonfire(Shenon1991).TheUSdidnotdowhatithadpromised.TheUSdidnotmarchitsforcesonBaghdadtoremoveSaddam.

TheUSalsomissedopportunitiestopracticeusingforceinacompellentway.Oneofthelargestsuchfailuresoccurredinthe1998OperationDesertFox.OperationDesertFoxwasafour‐daybombingcampaignlaunchedbytheUSafterIraqexpelledallUNSCOMweaponsinspectorsfromthecountry.

Thestrikes,however,werepurelypunitive,becausetheywerenotdesignedtogetSaddamtore‐admittheinspectors.ThestrikeswerenotdesignedtogetSaddamtodoanything.

InaspeechgivenattheendofOperationDesertFox,PresidentClintonsaidthattheUS’s“objectivesinthismilitaryactionwereclear:todegradeSaddam’sweaponsofmassdestructionprogramandrelateddeliverysystems,aswellashiscapacitytoattachhis

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neighbors”(Clinton1998).NowhereinthesearticulatedgoalsforthestrikewassomeactionthattheUSwantedSaddamtotake.

Critically,too,thecontinuationofthestrikewasnotconditionalonanythingSaddamdidordidnotdo.Ifweweretryingtouseforceinacompellentway,wewouldhavesaid“wearegoingtobombyouandkeepbombingyouuntilyoutakestepsxyandz”.But,asPollackexpressessuccinctly,“TherewerenodemandsplacedonSaddam.Hewasnevertoldthatifheallowedtheinspectorsbackintheoperationwouldcease.”(2002,94).

Thus,inDesertFox,theUSmissedanopportunitytouseforceforcompellentpurposes.Moreover,DesertFoxwasanespeciallylargemissedopportunitytocompelSaddamgiventhescale,intensityandsuccess.

AccordingtoaDepartmentofDefensepressreleaseinaftermath,(Kozaryn“Strikesdamagedmore”)theoperation“involvedmorethan30,000U.S.troopsinthePersianGulfand10,000morefromoutsideCentralCommand”.Themilitaryalsoflewover600sorties,deployed40ships,andlaunched300cruisemissiles,allinjustfourdays.Themilitaryhit64outof66intendedtargetsanddeclaredanoverall“effectiveness”of“85%”fortheoperation(Kozaryn1999,“StrikesDamaged”). Ifwehadinsteadmarshaledthisuseofforceinacompellentway—ifwehadtriedtousetheforcetoelicitsomeconcessionfromSaddam,isn’titatleastpossiblewewouldhavesucceeded?Afterall,thiswastheUS’smostextensivesingleuseofforceofthepost‐warsanctionsperiod.PerhapsthefactthatthisforcewaspunitiveratherthancompellentandisevidencenotjustofmissedopportunitybutfurtherevidencethatwehadnodesiretotrulycompelSaddamtochangehisbehavior.

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Furthermore,aftertheoperationwasover,theDefenseDepartmentgladlycalledattentiontoSaddam’scontinued“non‐compliance”.Inanotherpressrelease,theDefenseDepartmenthighlightedthisapparentobstinacy,sayingthatSaddamwas“ventinghisfrustrationbychallengingcoalitionforcespatrollingU.N.‐mandatedno‐flyzones”(Kozaryn1999,“USConfronts”).ReferencingSaddam’snon‐compliancewiththeNFZs,aMilitaryleaderisquotedinthesamearticleassaying“we’regoingthroughaperiodofchallenge”.ThisstatementsuggeststhatSaddam’sbehaviorwasposingmoredifficultthanusual.ButchallengingNFZswasnotnewbehaviorforSaddam,sothisstatementsuggestsanincreaseinnoflyzonetesting.Thus,thepurelypunitiveOperationDesertFoxactuallyworsenedSH’sbehavior.

However,thiswouldn’tstoptheUSfromusingthisbehaviorasfurtherevidencethatSaddamwasundeterrable/uncompellable;TheUScouldpointtothisandsay“look,helashedoutevenafterwebombedthecrapoutofhim.Theguywon’tquitnomatterwhatwedo”.

Infact,DickCheneydidexactlythis.InhisAugust2002speechataVeteransofForeignWarsConvention,CheneyusedSaddam’sbehaviorafterOperationDesertFoxtohelpbeatthewardrumstotuneof“Saddamisundeterrable”,saying“Nothinginthelastdozenyearshasstoppedhim—nothisagreements;notthediscoveriesoftheinspectors;nottherevelationsbydefectors;notcriticismorostracismbytheinternationalcommunity;notfourdaysofbombingsbytheUnitedStates”(inEhrenbergetal2010,78).

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ItisalmostimpressivehowseamlesslyCheneymanagedtofitthisintotheSaddam‐the‐undeterrablenarrative,giventhatOperationDesertFoxwasnotdesignedtodeterorcompelSaddaminanyway.

Evenwithinasanctionsstructurethat,onthewhole,gaveSaddamnoincentivetocomplyorbetdeterred,theUSignoredinstancesinwhichitsuccessfullydeterredorcompelledSaddamduringthesanctionsperiodandtheUSmissedobviousopportunitiestobolsteritsthreatcredulityanduseforceinacompellentway.PerhapswecanviewtheseinstancesasmoreevidencethattheUSwastrulynotinterestedinchangingSaddam’sbehavior.This,asweknow,stemsfromtheUS’sgoalofregimechange.

ButwhywasthisagoalfromtheendoftheGulfWaron?SinceSaddamwasapparentlysuchabigproblemintheUS’seyes,itwouldhavemadetheUSgovernment’slifeeasieriftheycouldhavegottenSaddamtoshapeupandstopdoingallthethingstheydidn’twanthimtobedoing.Andafterall,wariscostly,andtheyhadalreadyfoughtoneagainstSaddam.So,wecanonlyassumethattheUShadverygoodreasonformakingregimechangeitsgoalintheimmediateaftermathoftheGulfWar.Inthenextsection,IwillexaminejusthowsoundtheUS’sreasonsforthiswere.

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SectionIII:

TheGulfWarPeriod

Inthissection,I’lltrytoanswerthequestion:whydidtheUSdecidetosetregimechangeasagoalofthepost‐warsanctionsperiod?IwillalsoanalyzehowjustifiedtheUSwasindecidingtodoso.WhydidtheUSenterthepost‐Gulfwarsanctionsperiodwiththegoalofregime

change?

Itseemsthatafterthewar,theUSsawregimechangeastheonlypermanentwayandultimatelythemostefficientwaytokeepSaddamfromdoingthingstheUSdidn’twanthimtodo.That’sbecause,intheUS’sinterpretation,theGulfWarhadshownthatSaddamcouldnotbemadetocomplybyanymeansotherthanwar.Wariscostlyandnotalwaysfeasible.SoitwouldjustbebettertogetridofSaddamonceandforall.Onthesurface,thisreasoningseemsfairenough.Afterall,SaddaminvadedKuwait,wegavehimmorethanfivemonthstowithdraw,herefused,andwehadtogotowartodrivehimout.ThebasicnarrativeisthatUSdideverythingsomeonepossiblycoulddotocompelSaddamtobackdown,andyethewasn’tdeterred.Butthis,liketheUS’snarrativeaboutSaddam’sconductduringthepost‐warsanctionsperiod,isnotthefulltruth.

First,itwillbehelpfultoreviewthebasicandrelevantfactsoftheperiodbetweenwhenSaddaminvadedKuwaitandtheUSlaunchedOperationDesertstormtounderstandthetimelineofevents.And,becausewearetalkingaboutwhetherornottheeventspriortotheGulfwarreallydemonstratedthatSaddamcouldnotbecompelled,itisimportanttounderstandthebasicdemandsthatwerebeingmadeofSaddam.MotivationforWar

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Byallaccounts,SaddaminvadedKuwaitoutofeconomicdesperationandasensethatKuwaitwascontributingtohiscountry’seconomicwoes.SaddamwasinmassivedebtaftertheIran‐Iraqwar(1980‐1988).Kuwait(amongothercountries)hadleantSaddammoneytofinancehiswareffort.Saddamfeltthatthisdebtshouldbeforgiven,becauseinhismind,hehadprotectedallthesmallPersianGulfcountriesfromIranianaggression.Kuwait,also,wasproducingandsellingmoreoilthanitsOPECquotaallowed.Thiswasdrivingdownthepriceofoil,makingSaddam’sownoilsaleslessprofitable.Additionally,SaddamaccusedKuwaitofhavingstolenasignificantamountofoilfromIraqirigs(FreedmanandKarsh1993;Timmerman1991;BaraminDanchevinKeohane1994;RubininBaramandRubin1993;amongothers).

TimelineofEventsAugust021990:SaddaminvadesKuwaitAugust061990:UNSCissuesresolution661(imposessanctions)August1990:SaddamannouncesannexationofKuwaitJanuary091991:MeetingbetweenIraq’sForeignMinisterTariqAzizandUSSecretaryofStateJamesBaker.BakergivesaletterfromPresidentBushtoAziz.Theletter,intendedforSaddam,demandsunconditionalwithdrawalfromKuwait.AzizobjectstohostilelanguageinletterandrefusestopassitalongtoSaddam.LastmeetingbetweenUSandIraqihighlevelofficialsbeforeJanuary15January151991:DeadlineforIraqtowithdrawfromKuwait,afterwhich,CoalitionforceswouldtakemilitaryactiontodrivehimoutofKuwait

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January171991:OperationDesertStormbeginsFebruary281991:OperationDesertStormendsApril031991:UNSC687PassedDemandsMadeofSaddamThedemandsmadeofSaddamwereissuedinUNSCR660,whichdenouncedSaddam’sinvasionofKuwait,andreaffirmedinUNSCR661,whichimposedinternationalcoalitionsanctionsonIraq,andineachofthesubsequentUNSCRsbetweenAugustof1990andJanuaryof1991.Thesedemandsweresimple:Iraqwasto“withdrawimmediatelyandunconditionallyallitsforces”fromKuwaitandtobegin“intensivenegotiations”withKuwaittopeacefullyresolvethedifferencesbetweenthetwocountries(UNSCinSifryandCerf1991,137‐156). TounderstandwhytheUSenteredthepost‐warsanctionsperiodwiththegoalofregimechange,wehavetofirstlookmorespecificallyathowtheUShassubstantiateditsclaimsthatthehistoryoftheGulfWarshowedSaddamtobeundeterrableanduncompellable.

BycombingspeechesmadebyUSandalliedstatesmenandbyreadingcontemporaneouspro‐warargumentsbyscholarsandothergovernmentofficials,IidentifiedcommonthemesandconsolidatedthemintoafewbroadclaimstheUSmadeaboutwhytheGulfWarperiodshowsSaddamcannotbedeterred.IwillthendetailwhatseemtobetheUS’sexplanationsinsupportofthosebigclaims,sowecangetanideaofhowtheUSviewedtherelationshipbetweentheirownactionsandSaddam’sresponses.Iwillassesswhether,ineachcase,eitheroftheseclaimsisactuallyborneoutbythehistoricalfacts.

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TOkeepthesebroadclaimsassuccinctaspossible,Iwillstatetheminthisway:“Saddamwascrazytothinkordoxthing”,inwhichthepartyexpressingtheopinionistheUS.So,anexpressionthat“Saddamwascrazytodothingx”isanotherwayofsaying“weintheUScannotforthelifeofusfigureoutwhySaddamwouldmakechoicexbecausetoourminds,anyrationalpersonwouldnothavemadechoicex”andtherefore,Saddamisnotrationalandthereforenotdeterrable.

Theclaimsareasfollows:1) HewascrazytoinvadeKuwaitinthefirstplace,becauseheshouldhaveknownwe

wouldcare2) HewascrazynottobackdownandwithdrawhisforcesfromKuwaitbeforethe

January15ultimatumexpiredTheSecondoftheseclaimsneedstobebrokendownintoanassumptionunderlyingthe

claimandintotwosomesub‐claims:2a.(Assumption):TheUSgaveSaddamamplechancetoavoidwaranditwastotallywithinSaddam’scontroltoavoidwar2b.(Sub‐claim):Saddamwascrazytothinkhecouldwinthewar2c.(Sub‐claim):HewasCrazytothinkthewarwouldn’treallyhappen.Thislastsub‐claimneedstobebrokendownstillonestepfurther.2c‐i:AssuminghebelievedtheUSthreattogotowarwascredible,hewascrazytothinkwarmightsomehowhavebeenavertedunlesshemadetheunconditionalwithdrawaldemandedofhim2c‐iiHewascrazyifhedidn’tbelievetheUSthreattogotowarwascredible

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Now,Iwilltakeeachoftheclaimsandsub‐claimsinturnandexplainwhytheyarenotasjustifiedastheyfirstappear.

1.HewascrazytoinvadeKuwaitinthefirstplace,becauseheshouldhaveknownwewouldcare

OfcourseSaddamknewwewould“care”ifheinvadedKuwait.SaddamknewthattheUSwouldpreferSaddamnotgoaroundinvadingothercountries,justastheUSwouldpreferthatnocountrygoaroundinvadingothercountries,asthisispotentiallydestabilizingaction.SaddammadethismuchclearwhenheultimatelymetwithAmbassadorGlaspietodiscusshisdisputewithKuwait,saying“wedonotaskpeoplenottobeconcernedwhenpeaceisatissue…Itisnaturalforyouasasuperpowertobeconcerned”(inSifryandCerf1991,130).

WhatSaddamdidnotknowwashowmuchtheUSwouldcareorbeconcerned.Butitdoesnotmatterhowmuchwe“cared”orwere“concerned”insomeabstractway.Intermsofdeterrence,allthatmatterediswhatSaddamthoughtwe’dbewillingtodoaboutit.

There’spreferringSaddamnotdosomething,andthenthere’spreferringSaddamnotdosomethingsostronglythattheUSwouldbewillingtotakeactionagainsthimtostopit.ThisiswhatSaddamdidnotknow.

TheUnitedStatesdidnotgiveSaddamaclearindicationbeforeheinvadedKuwaitthatwewouldusemilitaryforcetodrivehimout.

Forexample,onJuly251990,SaddamHusseinmetwithAmbassadorAprilGlaspietodiscusshisdisagreementwithKuwait.Bymanyaccounts,shemightaswellhavegivenSaddama“greenlight”onhisinvasionofKuwait.Thisincidentisdiscussedinvirtually

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everypieceofwritingthathasattemptedtoexplainSaddam’sinvasionofKuwait.Mostcommonlycitedisthatinthismeeting,shesaid,

“WehavenoopinionontheArab‐Arabconflicts,likeyourborderdisagreementwithKuwait…Allthatwehopeisthattheseissuesaresolvedquickly”(inSifryandCerf,130).Moreover,afterhermeetingwithSaddam,shereportedbacktoWashingtonthatSaddamwascommittedtoapeacefulsettlement,makingeveryonethinkSaddamwouldnotactuallyinvade. Itishardtoarguethatthiswasnotaseriousblunder,andthatitmaytemporarilyhavemadeSaddammoreinclinedtoinvadeKuwait.ThosewhomaintainthatSaddam“shouldhaveknown”willcounterbysayingthattheUnitedStatestookmeasurestocorrectforthisblunderafter‐the‐fact.However,thesemeasuresweretotallyinadequate.AccordingtotheIsraeliScholarofIraq,AmatziaBaram,the“strongestmessagetheUSdelivered”read,simply:“Webelievedifferencesarebestresolvedbypeacefulmeans”(inDanchevandKeohane1994).ItishardtoarguethatthiswouldhavecorrectedGlaspie’sblunder,consideringshesaidtheexactsamethingatonepointinherJuly25meetingwithSaddam(ininSifryandCerf1991)Evenif,aftertheGlaspiemeeting,theUShadissuedanunequivocalthreatthatitwoulddeclarewaronSaddamifheinvadedKuwait(whichtheUSobviouslycamenowhereclosetodoing),itstillwouldhavebeendifficulttocorrectforGlaspie’sblunder.

ThecontextinwhichtheGlaspiemeetingoccurredrendereditmuchmoreinfluentialthanyoumightexpectanyonemeetingtobe.

Tosupportthis,however,Ineedtobackup,andlookattheeventsthatleduptoSaddam’smeetingwithAprilGlaspie.

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OnJuly171990,SaddamgavearevolutionarydayspeechinwhichheimpliedthathewouldtakemilitaryactionagainstKuwait(andpossiblytheUAE)iftheydidnotagreetoraisetheiroilpricesandstopexceedingtheirproductionquotas. ThethreatsinSaddam’sspeechalarmedtheBushAdministration.StatedepartmentofficialstoldtheIraqiAmbassadortotheUnitedStatesthatitwascommittedtothesovereigntyofallGulfStatesandanydisputesneededtobe“settledpeacefullyandnotbythreatsorintimidation”.TheUSthenbegantodetectIraqitroopmovementsneartheKuwaitiborder,andsoon,largenumbersofIraqitroopshadmassedontheKuwaitiborder.Inresponse,onJuly24,PresidentBushorderedandannouncednavalexercisesintendedtoshowsupportforKuwaitisovereigntyandissuedastatementthattheexerciseswereinkeepingwiththeUS’scommitmenttothe“freeflowofoilthroughtheStraightofHormuz”(FreedmanandKarsh1993,51).SaddamcalledameetingwithUSambassadortoIraqAprilGlaspiefortheverynextday(FreedmanandKarsh1993,52).ThereforeitseemsthiswaswhenSaddamrealizedthatperhapstheUS“cared”enoughifheinvadedKuwaitthattheymightbewillingtotakeactionagainsthim.HewantedtogetabetterideaofhowtheUSwouldreactifhedidinvadeKuwait.ThiswaswhathewantedtolearnfromhismeetingwithAmbassadorGlaspie.

InSaddam’smind,therewasnoinherenttensionbetweenhisinvadingKuwaitandthefreeflowofoilfromtheGulf.Wewasmadeawarehowever,aftertheUS’sreactiontohisJuly17speech,thattheUSperhapssawatensionthere.

SaddamcertainlyrecognizedthattheUnitedStateswascommittedtothefreeflowofoilfromthePersianGulf.Ifanyonedoubtedthis,itwasmadeclearinthetranscriptfromhisJuly25,1990meetingwithAmbassadorAprilGlaspie,whenhestated,“TheUnited

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Stateswantstosecuretheflowofoil.Thisisunderstandableandknown”(inSifryandCerf1991,125).

But,bothinSaddam’smindandinfact,SaddamHussein’splantotakeKuwaitdidn’tnecessarilyposeathreattothefreeflowofoilthroughtheStraightofHormuz.ThereisnodoubtthatSaddamintendedtotakeoverKuwait’soilwhenheinvaded.SaddamwasinmassivedebtfromtheIran‐Iraqwar,andashemadeclearbothinhisJuly17speech(FreedmanandKarsh51)andinhisJuly25meetingwithAprilGlaspiethewholereasonhewantedtocontrolKuwait’soilinthefirstplacewasbecause(foranumberofcomplicatedreasons)Kuwait’soilsalesweremakingIraq’slessprofitable(HusseinandGlaspieinSifryandCerf1991,122‐133).

Manypeople,suchasAndrewKopkind,thenassociateeditorofTheNation,andDougBandow,formerspecialassistanttoPresidentReagan,wroteeditorialsduringtheUSinternaldebateleadinguptoOperationDesertStormthatelaboratedonthispoint:ifSaddamcontrolledKuwait’soilaswell,hecouldhavemarginallymorecontroloverthepriceperbarrel,butmoreimportantly,hecouldsellitandkeeptheprofitstoalleviatehisdebtproblems(inSifryandCerf1991,216‐220).PatBuchanan,aconservativepoliticianandpoliticalcolumnistmadethepointespeciallyclearlyinaneditorialthatappearedinseveralnationalnewspapers.Hewrote,

“TheThiefofBaghdadstoleKuwait’soil,nottositonit,buttosellit.Heisdesperateforcash”(BuchananinSifryandCerf1991,213‐215).

Furthermore,inSaddam’sJuly25meetingwithAmbassadorGlaspie,whensheexpressedthatPresidentBushwasconcernedaboutSaddam“chargingtoohighapriceforoil”,Saddamrespondedbysaying“Wedonotwanttoohighpricesforoil.AndIremindyou

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thatin1974IgaveTariqAziztheideaforanarticlehewrotewhichcriticizedthepolicyofkeepingoilpriceshigh”(HusseinandGlaspieinSifryandCerf1991,129).

So,keepingoilflowingthroughthestraightofHormuzwasjustasimportanttoSaddamasitwastotheUnitedStates—perhapsevenmoreso.

Therefore,whiletheUnitedStatessawSaddam’sinvasionofKuwaitassomethingthatmightrestricttheoilsupply,eitherthroughdeliberateaction,orsimplybydestabilizingtheentireregion(Bush1990),Saddamdidnotconceiveofhisplaninthisway.SaddamcalledameetingwithAmbassadorGlaspieinordertogetasenseoftheUSviewonlyaftertheUShadannouncedNavalexercisesandpointedlydeclaredsupportforthefreeflowofoilthroughtheStraightofHormuz.ThisshowsthatSaddamdidnotautomaticallyassumetheUSwouldbesodistressedbyhisinvasionofKuwait. So,inhismeetingwithGlaspie,Saddam’sintentwasnotjusttoseehowmuchtheissuematteredtotheUSinanabstractway,buttogetasenseofwhetherornottheUSwouldbewillingtotakeconcreteactionagainsthim.ThisissupportedbythefactthathealludedrepeatedlytoahypotheticalmilitaryconflictwiththeUSifheinvadedKuwait.

SaddamsaidoftheUS’scommitmenttothefreeflowofoil,thattheUS”mustnotdeploymethodswhichtheUnitedStatessaysitdisapprovesof—flexing

musclesandpressure.Ifyouusepressure,wewilldeploypressureandforce.“HesaidofhisofhisdisagreementwithKuwaitthat“thesolutionmustbefound

withinanArabframeworkandthroughdirectbilateralrelations”(inSifryandCerf1991,124‐125).

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Laterinthemeeting,hesaid,“Wedon’twantwarbecauseweknowwhatwarmeans.Butdonotpushustoconsiderwarastheonlysolutiontoliveproudlyandtoprovideourpeoplewithagoodliving.”Andhesaid“Wewantfriendship,butwewarenotrunningforit.Werejectharmbyanybody.Ifwearefacedwithharm,wewillresist”(inSifryandCerf1991,126).

Thesestatementsmakeclearthat1)SaddamunderstooditwaspossiblethattheUSmightreactwithforce,2)SaddamwantedtheUStounderstandhewouldnotbackdownfromsuchforcebutthat3)Saddamdidnotwantittocometothis,andwouldprefertheUSstayoutofthematter.

Bycommunicatingthesethings,SaddamfloatedatestballoontoAprilGlaspienotonwhetherornottheUScaredabouthisdisagreementwithKuwait,butspecificallyonwhethertheUSwouldbepreparedtotakemilitaryactionagainsthimoverthematter. GlaspierespondedasIhavequotedabove.Butshesaidotherthingsthataddedtothedamage.TheslightlyexpandedversionofthatquoteontheborderdisagreementwithKuwaitisthis:“Iadmireyouextraordinaryeffortstorebuildyourcountry.Iknowyouneedfunds.Weunderstandthatandouropinionisthatyoushouldhavetheopportunitytorebuildyourcountry.ButwehavenoopinionontheArab‐Arabconflicts,likeyourborderdisagreementwithKuwait”(inSifryandCerf1991,130).So,notonlydidGlaspiecommunicate,asissooftencited,thattheUSwasambivalenttowardsSaddam’sdesignsonKuwait;IntryingtoappearsympathetictoSaddam’seconomicwoes,GlaspiemadestatementsthattoSaddam’searsprobablysoundedlikeaffirmationandvalidationofsomeofhismostbasicreasonsforwantingtoinvadeKuwait.

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Justacoupleofsentenceslater,Glaspieadded:“[SecretaryofState]JamesBakerhasdirectedourofficialspokesmentoemphasizethisinstruction”(HusseinandGlaspieinSifryandCerf1991,130). ThisaddedcredencetoherstatementbyconveyingthatthisreallywasthepositionoftheBushAdministration,andnotjustherbestguessonthespot. GlaspiealsotoldSaddamthatshewasthereon“directinstructionfromthepresidenttoseekbetterrelationswithIraq”(inSifryandCerf1991,128)ShealsotoldhimthatonthesubjectofIraq’sdisputewithKuwait,whiletheUSwantedtoknowSaddam’s“intentions”towardsKuwait,Glaspiewasthere“inthespiritoffriendship—notinthespiritofconfrontation”(inSifryandCerf1991,130). So,returningtotheaccusationthatSaddamshouldhaveknown:SaddamwentintohismeetingwithAprilGlaspieknowingthattheUSwasconcernedaboutthepossibilityhemightinvadeKuwait,butnotknowinghowconcernedandthereforenotknowingwhattheUSwouldbewillingtodoinresponse.ThemessageSaddamreceivedwasthat,whiletheUSwouldpreferSaddamnotinvadeKuwait,theUSdidnotwanttogetinvolvedinit,andthattotheUS,maintainingatleastworkingrelationswithIraqwasahigherprioritythanconfrontingIraqoveranyfunnybusinessinKuwait. This,andthegreatandlastingimpacttheJuly25GlaspiemeetinghadonSaddam’sthinkingaboutourintentionsissupportedbyhowSaddamlatercharacterizedthemeetingina1992interview:“I…askedhertopersuadehim[PresidentBush]topressureKuwaitifnecessary.She[Glaspie]replied:‘Iwillconveyyourmessageimmediately.’Howevershecontinued,‘theUSdoesnotwanttobeinvolvedininterArabdisputes.’Ithensaid:‘wedonotwantyoutobe

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involvedeither’…Theysaidtheywouldnotinterfere.Insosayingtheywashedtheirhands.WhatresponseshouldIhavewaitedfor?WeenteredKuwaitfourdayslater…Bushralliedtheworld…andattackedIraq.Whatwastheproblem?Theyhadsaidthattheywouldnotintervene!”(BaraminDanchevinKeohane1994,28). Furthermore,let’snotforgetthattheUSCongressdidnotissueauthorizationfortheuseofmilitaryforceuntilJanuary12th—justthreedaysbeforethewithdrawaldeadline.Furthermore,thecountrywaslockedinverypublicdebateoverwhetheritshouldgotowarfromAugustuntilthattime.

ItishardtoarguethatSaddamshouldhaveknownthatifheinvadedKuwait,theUSwouldgotowar,whentheUSwasn’tevensurewhatitwoulddoifheinvadedKuwait.

InonechapterofAWorldTransformed(1998),authorsformerPresidentGeorgeH.W.BushandFormerNationalSecurityAdvisorBrentScowcroftdiscusstheadministration’simmediatereactiontoSaddam’sinvasionofKuwait.Bush’sexplanationofwhyhedidnotimmediatelyannouncehewoulduseforceagainstSaddamwassimplythathewasn’timmediatelysurewhattheUScouldorshoulddoinresponse(315).PresidentBushwasn’tevensurewhathewoulddoinresponsetoSaddam’sinvasionofKuwaitafterithappened.Howthen,wasSaddamsupposedtoknowwhattheUSwoulddoinresponsetohisinvasionofKuwaitbeforehehadeveninvaded? TheUS,then,hasnogroundsonwhichtoclaimthatittrulyattemptedtodeterSaddamfrominvadingKuwait.

ThereisanotherproblemwithassertingthatSHjust“shouldhaveknown”thattheUS’sthreatwascredible.Settingasidethefactthatitissimplytautological,itcontradictsanotherargumenttheUShasatvariouspointsusedtosuggestitisdifficulttodeter

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Saddam;TheUSsaysthatSaddammakesdecisionsinanechochamber,surroundedbyyes‐menwhodon’tdaresayanythingotherthanwhatSaddamwantstohear.ThismeansthatSaddamdoesn’talwaysreceivealltheinformationanoutsidermightthinkwasobvious,whichinturnmakesithardfortheUStopredictwhatSaddamwilldo.(Pollack2002,250;258‐271)So,ineffect,theargumentthat“Saddamshouldhaveknownwewouldbewillingtogotowarbecauseit’sjustsoobvious(andthereforehecan’tbedeterred)”contradictstheargumentthat“Saddamdoesn’tknowstuffthatwewouldthinkeveryonewouldknow(thereforehecan’tbedeterred)”.Thisproblemiscomparativelyminor,butworthmentioningbecauseitshowsinternalinconsistencyintheUS’s“logic”behindTheClaim.

2.HewascrazynottobackdownandwithdrawhisforcesfromKuwaitbeforethe

January15ultimatumexpired

2a.(Assumption):TheUSgaveSaddamamplechancetoavoidwaranditwastotallywithinSaddam’scontroltoavoidwar.

TheUnitedStatesgovernmentkeptupanarrativethatSaddamhadtotalcontroloverwhetherornottheUnitedStateswenttowarwithhim.OnJanuary9th,1991,sixdaysbeforethedeadlineforIraqtowithdrawitsforces,SecretaryofStateBakerandTariqAzizmetinGenevainalastefforttosettlethematterpeacefully.Shortlyafter,thatsameday,PresidentBushheldapressconferenceattheWhiteHouse,inwhichhedescribedthemeetingandsaidthatwhileSecretaryofStateBak