Lewia F. Powell, Jt:. June 30, uno

B.ecoaaend.ation and Sut'D&Di&ry

foli.tlcal Warfare

!he Protracted Conflict All Componenta of Power Consequences of American Default Our Country 1 a Misconceived Reluctance Our B.es traint Baa Not Worked lbe Deci.alve A<lvant.•a• Distinction Between Internal and

External Operatione

Appendix

3 4 s

10 13 14

1.5

Al

June 30, 1970

§!elagatorx Note: T.he attached paper was prepared by a member of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, reflecting his concern as to thia neglected area of national defense. The paper was not submitted to or considered by the Panel.

Regomm.endation

'lbat the President aepoint e telect nog• partisan commission comeosed of ~ualified and distipsuished Americans with aut oriti to conduct an intensive study of the need for, and of the means to acco.Rlish, an adequate political warfare atratesx for the United Stat!•·

Brief ~rx

Military strength is only one element of n4t1onal power.

In recognition of this. the major Coomunist st•tes conduct exten­

sive political warfare against Aaler1ca and other free societies.

This warfare includes the entire spectrum of political, psycho•

logical and propaganda operations. In level of intenaity,

subtlety and skill, there is no precedent in history for the

extent and success of these techniques employed against us for

the past quarter of a century.

The United. States haa largely abdicated these arenas

of conflict to the Communist powers. The consequences of this

default are profound, especially in terms of the impact on the

lllinds and judgments of citizens of the free world. Tens of

2.

millions of people in non•COIDunist countries, including this

country, have accepted Communist propaganda in varying degrees.

MUch of it is parroted daily throughout the free world in the

communications media, on the campus, in literature, by the arts

and theater, and on the public platform.

Much of the world has come to believe the lies that

it is America - not the COmmunist superpowers • wbich is repressive,

militaristic and imperialistic. Much of the world no longer

believes there is a significant difference between totalitari.nism

and a free democracy, The credibility of our policies at home

and abroad has been impaired.

In 1hort, America is losing the ideological contest ..

not on ita merits but because we have abdicated the field of

political warfare to those wbo are committed to the suppression

of freedom on this earth.

June 30 1 1970

Ic ia well to r-..ber that military atrenstb, witb

the supporting economic and technological base; la only one

element of national power. In defending America. we are not

juat protecting the real eatate and nationalism of thia country.

We are d.ef•nding our philotophy ud form of govermaent aga.tn.t

the ayetea of tot.alitarian repreaaion wbiob claaaic eo.un1•t

ideolosy requirea every atate to lmpoae upon the world. 1be

conftoatatf.on wbtcb baa kept the world in tutmOil for a quarter

of a century ia basically ideological.

In thie oooteat America haa relied prt..rily on ita

ad.litary and economic strength to reatrun Coaauniat asgrea•

aiona and to pre1erve a meaaure of world order. We have

acarc•ly made any effort to oppose the Communlat powera with

the weapone employed in the ideological arena. In contraet

with thie default, tbe Soviet Union and 1\ed Qlina have

2.

incessantly conducted political warfare against .America and

other free societies. This warfare continues with no end in

sight. It includes the entire spectrum of political, economic,

psycbolosical and propaganda operations (herein called

"political warfare")•*

A thoughtful evaluation of the history of tbe poet•

World war II period 1'nd1catea that political operations _..,

be as important to national defense as military forcee; tbat -t~

political and ideological combat have been nealected over the

past 25 years almost to the point of national negligence; and

that 1 unless th1a neglect is repaired by approp.riate and

reap011.aible action, in the long run other defense meaaurea MY

be futile.

l.acODIQendation

In light of this judgment, it is recommended:

That the freaident •aeoint a telect nogartiaan s•· 111•111og caoaed of gualified and dittineiahed Amaricana pth

autboz:itx to coRduct an in&eneive etudy of the neecl for, and

of the mea.na to acc9!!lieg,. an adegutte political varfart

et:rateg for the U,aited §tatas.

*Subversion ia aleo a principal component of CoJBUntat operatt.ona aga1aat non-Communist states.

3.

Tbe remainder of this paper will discuss • in brief

outline - the background and reasons for this recoDIIIlendation.

Jb• Protracted Conflict

Since the and of WOrld War 11, world politics have

been shaped by the bitter contest between the Communist super•

powers and tba free democracies led by the United Statea. the

Communist states, unwilling to leave other ayatema alone, have

sought to conquer by force where feasible and otherwise to under•

mine and subvert free governments by all .. an• of political

warfare. This policy of overt and covert agarea1ion baa

frustrated all efforte to aaaure a aenutnely peaceful world,

and haa forced the u.s. year after year to expend billion•

to uintain an adequate national ctefenae.

ln recent years the monolithic unity of the Communist

nations has been fractured, with Red Olina eaerging as the

second Communist superpower competing for leadership with the

Soviet Union. Although many perennial optim:iata hailed thi1

development aa the end of the cold war and the beginning of

a new era, there 'is llttle hard evidence to support this view.

the truth ie that the protracted conflict waged by

the CoMuniat povera against the free world continues, and

only the naive can believe there 1a any real prospect of ita

abat.ant. Protracted conflict against "tape~:ialiatic" and

"eapitalist:l.cu societies 11 a baelc Mat:xist•Leninist dogma

which all eo.muaiata support. It contemplates the utilization

of all available reaourcee and techniques to extend Communist

ideology and power throughout the world, and to weaken and

eventually destroy Alaer1can d•ocra.cy as tba only effective

oounterforce.

All .9!Ponents of ,Power

Coaauniat leadere have under•tood, far better than

free world leaders, the 1nterrelat1onahip of the various com•

ponent• of conflict and power. They have not neglected con•

ventional military atrengtb, recognizing always the truth of

Mao'• •oriam that power deriv .. ~ from the ''muzzle of a gun".

But in the age of hydrogen weapons • in which a third world

war would leave no victor, the Communist euperpowera for the

1101t part have avoided direc.t adlita.ry conflict,* Instead

they have concentrated on leas con.ventional methods of conflict,

1nclud1na the fermenting aad aupportins; of "wars of liberation"

and the conducting of •ubveraion, propaganda, political,

economic and paycbological warfare.

*Examples to the contrary include the Soviet Union•s attaoka on Hunaary and Czechoalovakia, an4 a.d atiaa • 1 conquest of tibet an4 ita border incuraion~ against India.

s.

OUr government, aa well aa p~ivate centers of Soviet

atu41ea, have abundant docum.entation of the utent to which

these conflict techniques have been employed. Suffice it to

••1 here that in level of intensity, continuity, diversity,

subtlety and skill, thel'e 1a no p!iecedent in biatory for the

extent and success of these techniques aa e~~ployed for the peat

qu..rter of a cent.ul'y ap:btet the free world.

C!M•suencea of LY!eriyg pefault

During tbia aame period of t~e the u.s. largely

abdicated these arenaa of conflict to the enMy. There have

been ••veral efforts. confined largely to info~tion progr .... * But •• have ·not ensased in any auatained .. , in propaganda,

political or paycb.ological warfare agaiaat either the soviet

Union or Reel China.**

'l'be conaequencea of this default are profound -

e•pecially in terms of the impact on the mind• and judgments

of oitiaen• of the free world. The thtuat of Communist political

warfare again1t the West bas been directed at a variety of

*i• An•nd&! A hereto which sUD~~Urizee past u.s. efforts in certain aspects of political warfare.

**1his paper ie addJ:eaead to the strategic, worldwide conflict which has continued aince the end of World W.r II. During the loreaa and SOuth Vietnam••• wara our •~•4 forces have engaged• to • l~ited extent and in a strictly controlled aenae, in "tactical" propaaanda and P•Tchological warfare in support of current military operations.

targets, all interrelated. lt bas aoupt to create doubt, '•

division, distrust and disloyalty amons the American people,

and to undermine the faith and confidence of free peoplee

everywhere in tb.e values of ••tern culture, It also has

•ought, especially with reapeet: to the peoples of un4evelopad

and unco.a1tted nations, to deatroy confidence in the intes:tity,

strength and will of the u.s. The u.s. is branded aa the enemy of ''peace", ••

"1mperia11stic'* and "adlitariatic" in its relations witb other

nations, the free enterprise syatem ia attacked with special

venoat. Amel'ican domestic policies are labeled aa "fascist .. ,

nracist" • ••repressive" and "exploitativen. No opportunity is

lost to embarrasa and defame the u.s. Tbia political warfare 11 messive in scale of effort

and pervasive in scope.

Each of tbe basic chars•• mad• againlt the u.s. ia

actually a characteriatic of OOmmuniat foreign pol1ey or a

rMliUy of Communi1t 4ome.st1c policy. Bach ol the wrons• for

which Aaeriea 11 blaaecl i1 in truth a vrona perpetrated ... not

-.uodically but delibera.tely as eatabliabed .c:o-unJLat policy •

by the Soviet Union, Jled Cbina and other Coaauniat statea.

The technique, quite aimply, ia the Hitlerian one

of repetition of the big lie.

One would have thought that the od.d$ were overwhelairagly

against the Comuwn1ata. '!he facts were almost totally a.ga1ntt

th•· But the free world leadex-a • who put their faith in the

ultitD&te triumph of truth on ita own merit, grievously miacal•

culated. Ten• of milliona of people 1n non•Comauniat countries,

including millions in thil country, have accepted Communist

propapnda in varying degrees. El•enta of i .t are par:rot•d.

daily in much of the cOIIIIIWlicationa aaedia • on the campua, in

literature, by the arta and theater, and on the public platfon

in thi1 country and abroad.

The war in Southeaat Aaia affoedec:t a unique oppor•

tunity for Communist exploitation. Leaitl .. te queatione have

exiated from the outset as to the wiado. of ~rican part1o1pa•

tion in a land war in Asia. Moreover, a nuaaber of conaiclera•

tiou. .. fdiltar to ua all • have combined to aaake this wa.r

vastly unpopula.'C' at bosae and abroad. But unpopularity of a

national c::OIDI:Id.tment ia one thing, ancl general acceptance of

the enemy propaganda line with reapect to 1ucb coamit .. nt ia

a far more aerioua matter.

Whatever the reaaona may be• the lies of Koacow,

Pieping and Hanoi with reepect to Araericaa "asareaaion",

"f.aBorality" and .. brutality" in Southeast A81a uve been widely

s.

accepCed as truth by much of the civ111aed world. Arnold J.

Toynbee • internat.1ona11y known British hiatol'iaa, recently

published a savage article attacking AMrica on all of theae

counts. He said:

nA.erica nov looka like the ~at dan&eroue country in the world ••• . • In fact, the roles of America and luasia have been reveraed in the world • 1 aye. Today Mel' loa haa become the world's nigbt.are •••• ·~

The Toynbeea • and the countlesa ott.ra who join 111

clenouncing Alaer:lca, rarely 1f ever find any fault with the

Colmalniat eneaai.ea of freecloa. In the fr1pteo1ng mlndleaaaeaa

of th:l.a age ... when aloaan• are ao often substituted for thoupt •

tbe repreaaiona of a regime which requires a Berlin Wall are

largely ignored and it1 agreaaione agaiut olbera are even

justified. Yet the freeat and moat c<Mpaaa1oaate society ia

pilloried and ita efforts to protect the free world are

conclau:led.

!bia incredibly f•lae inversion of the facta of biato~y

a.tteeta to the extraol'dina.ry aucceaa of <::oawrd.at political

wa""fare.

lt alao aooeatta the folly of our failure to IBOUnt

or auatain an effective refutation of th• pl'opaaanda and llea

isee Reston, N.Y. Twa, May 27, 1970.

directed aaainat us, and to take the offensive in waging

political and ideoloaical warfare 4ga1aat: tu•sia 1 lted China

.and North Vietnam.

The c;um.ulattve results of this uno-contest" policy

ext•l:ld far beyond Southeast Asia. Theft are deep miag1vin&•

around the world about America. Milliona of our people. have

turned against their own country to the extent of blaming .

.._l'ica .. rather than the Communists ... for the level of inter•

na.ttoul discord.

OUr f~elgn and defense policiea have been clouded,

eapeo:lally in the ad.nds of the yowger sene:rations. Our

mi.lltary establishment is widely auapected and asaa:Lled 1 and

ou~ intelligence services reviled at home $Ad abroad. Even

on. vital measures for the common defense of our country • the

rs-eaident and ttut COngress are se~:iously· inhibited ft:om taking

appropriate action. Moat disquieting of all, our national

unity ta fJ:actf.onalized.

It 1s not too .uch to say that the entire fo~etgn

policy and influence of America have been impAired by the

·erosion of support at bom.e and the u.ndeRird.q of confidence

ahroad •.

Revul•ion to the Vietnamese war no doubt bas coatri•

buted 11p1f1cantly to the present situation. lt is possible

10.

that tba war itself, without regard to our failure to conte•t

Coamun1at world.-wid.e propaganda, psychological warfaX'e and

subversion, would have cau1ed aome of the present anti•

Americanism abroad and lack of support at home.

But we would again miscalculate • perhaps irreparabl7 •

if we aaauaed that an end to tbe war would restore perspective

and understanding of truth. The startling success of the Com•

IDWllat ideological aaaault on America a.nd the values of the

free democracies was clearly evident before our involv•ent in

Viebulta. tf tbia assault l:'emains unchallenged it will ln time

deatroy the free world's confidence in de.ocracy as oppoead to

eo.muniam, and this could mark the end of western civilization.

Ou~ gguntrx'• Miaconstived Reluctange

Future biatoriana will wonder why America, with ita

t.enae communcatiou capabilities and wf.th truth on ita aide •

pursued thia policy of self•impoaed reat#aint in the critical

WI' of worda and ideaa. The reasons given are varied, but the

one •oat frequently voiced 1e that the American people conaider

political warfare to be unethical and immoral. Like eapionage.

it baa been considered a dirty buaineaa to which we should not

atoop.

11.

There also baa been the strongly held view that our

actions would speak for tbamaelves if objectively reported and

portrayed. We thus have relied on the United Statea Inforaaa•

t1on Agency which providea neva, books and other factual

infomation about America. Althoush the .. objectivity'' of USIA

has at times ae.,..d. to leu over backward., there ia no thouaht

of d11continuing or changing the character of this useful

American world-wide newa service.

lather, the need 1a for an effort of an entirely

different character and clilunaion. 'lbe need ia for a clefeoae

effort in political warfare c011parable in acale to that conc:lucted.

by the Soviet Union and BAd Otina agairuJt the United Statea,

through propaganda, political and paychological meaau1'es.

It ie important here to note tbat political warfare,

in tbe sense conducted againat tbia country.. is far more than a

public relations progr.-. It muat be a euatained and coordinated

effort • by all effective lllhl'UI • to di8oJ:'ecl1t COuauniaaa ••

a eyst• and the foreign and domeatic pol1c1ea of the Coaaunl•t

partial iA the Soviet Union and l.ed Cl:d.ll&. In aimpleet ter:u.

we are talking about conducting against these Communiet rest..•

tba type of political warfue which they have coftducte<l apinet

this country so Mrc1lellly, except that full diaoloaure of

12.

the truth about Communi•• would be employed to confront their

''big lie" technique.

We IIUSt put asicle the self deception that the

techniques of political warfare are UAethioal or ~ral~

the fact is that on the doaaeatic scene we t~~~~ploy ~~~&ny of th•••

techniques against each other with coo.siderable aavasery.

lxamplea. include the political .. warfare" oonatantly waaed

between Democrats and B.epubl1cana, between the Mew Left and

the Establishment. and • at a differ.ent level • between labor

and business. Even within the free enterprlae oompetit1ve

•yat•, legitimate advertilina; regularly includes el•ents of

propagand.a. and p1ychologioal motivation. Ho country has hAd

greater experience in the creating and dettroyina of ~es,

of likes and dislikes, in the generating of civilian attitudes,

an.d in the w1nn1q and influencing of public opinion.

Why is it that we practice these akilla with such

relentleasnese on each other and yet have been UDWilling to

employ them asa1n1t an en .. y which threatens our very survival?

Is it any 1••• ethical tor the u.s. to respond in

kU\4 to the politi.Qal warface of tba Coaauntst• than fo,; the

Democratic National Committee to try to diacredit the &epublican

Patty (and vice verta)?

13 ..

It will b• said that the undertak1q of political

warfaxe by the u.s. will exacerbate relationa with eo.mun~at

countrf.ea. will heat up tbe "cold war*'• and will inhibit

4isarma.ent negotiations.

In eaeence, these are the , ... aJ:SUiMnta which have

beea ude for two decadea. They are preaiaed on the aeaumptf.ou •

d..aonatrated by biatOI'J tO be false • that eo.uniat l'ej1Jae8

ara tnlluenced by good exa~~ple, by l'eatratnt, or by "tumina

the other cbeeku,

The total exp.el'ience of deallns witb Coaauniat reatae•

indicates that tbey are never influenced by friendlinaaa,

seaturea of aoodw11l, foreign trade • or by oonceaatona ucle

unilaterally without obtaining an equivalent consideration.

AI W4a true of Hitlerian Qermaay. conduct of thi• teind ie

regarded aa evidence of weakness to be e-.p1o1ted.

In undertaking political operation~ it abould be uaade

clear that they are aubject to 14negottationau, ju.t u ve ue

willing to negotiate ane 11aitat1onl. ln othel" wrda, we

abould unclertak• political warfare operation.a • aa a ~~&j or

element of national defense, on essentially the aama aoale aa

tbo1e 811ployed asalnat ua. We should do ntJ/ more, and cel',tainly

we should do no le••·

14.

we have tried for 37 years (since recognition of the

u.s.s.a. in 1933) to br:f.ns the soviet Union into the ·orbit of

nations which conduct normal diplomatic relations without

employment of propasa.ncla, political and paycholoaical warfare

techniques. there hat been no sustained reaponae to thia &ood

example. t• it not time that we abandoned a policy wbicb baa

failed ao conapicuou1lyi and confront ·tbe ~Jniat superpower•

with the same type of operationa which they persistently employ

aga . .tns t ua?

lbe Rtc1a1ve Advantest

OUr reluctance to include this component in defense

of ou~ values and country le all the more bewildering in view

of the opportunities !or aucceaa.

If the peoples of the world understand the truth about

o., .. ,nd.sm, aa contrasted with the fr" daaocraciea, there would

be no conteet of ideologiea. eo..untaa la an affront to the

dipity of man, and once experienced it becomes araatheata to

1110at h\lfD&n beings. No people of any countr:y have ever voted

for the Communiat eysta. where election• were free and they

had a oho1oe. Mo Oommuni•t country has ever pe~itted free

el•ction• or even the expression of d.ivergent views.

15.

America has ita faulta, and no thoughtful person would

ad.n:t.mf.ae their scur:Lo~neaa or the 1ntraotabi11ty of roany of 0\ll:'

pJ:>oblems. But the iaaue 11 not whether one a yet• is perfect

and the other not. Ratbar 1 it ia which ay•tem providet the

greatest opportunitiaa for mankind, for self fulfillment and

for human liberty. Here tndeed there should be no doubt •• to

the a.naweJ:.

The single beat evidence of this, de1pi.ta 25 yeara

of Coaau.ni1t propaganda, ia that every Coaaun1et country baa

to restrain ita OWG people from leavia.g by walla and barbed

w~••· No free democracy requires auch ba~baric restraint to

keep ita own people fr~ fleeing.

America therefore baa the JaOat 1nvit1na opportunity

to conduct dramatically auccesaful ideological operati.ona qainet

the eo.tun:lat povera. Moreover, such opera tiona azoe eaaant1ally

low coat when compared with weapon. ayatema and conventional

defenee .-.aurea. In tbe end, the moat humane type of conflict

u to contest for minds of people rather than rely entirely on

..ana to kill them.

R1at1notion Betwe4lft Jntergal and External 9e•rtti9;M

'l'bere is, regrettably, coaaiderable •vicl•nce of the

effeotiveneaa here in ~rica of Soviet propaganda, subversion

16.

anc:l polittcal warfare. But it t• aot auagested that the federal

gove~n.t uncler:take 81\1 counter propqand.a operatiou oa the

home front. Whatever the rtak of Communiat auccesa may be

1nte.ru.11y • we do not want a federal •lnlstry of propaganda.

We must r:ely on the re•poaaible political. leade~:s of both putl.es

to devote a greater effort to info~ng the public aa to eo.• auniat activities. W. 111\14t also rely on the private aector,

.an4 eepecia.11y upon our educational 1nat1tut1ona • to •••uae

with gxeater bi1torical perc.,tlon the neglected reapontibility

of tuchlna the tJ:Utb about the contl'aat bGtween wr ayst• of

fr .. da. under law· and Communi••·*

!be conductin& of political defen.e operation• inter•

aatiottally ia a different utter. If tbeae a:re undertaken,

there should be a feder:al agency in chars•. Wbether it ehould

be within the Depacc.ent of Defenae or • aeparate agency ia a

1ubject to be studied.

Wbatevel' the agenoy may be, it ehou1d. be organlaecl1

staffed and financed •• a peraanent pa%l of our national 4efenae

structure. with eatabliabed ... na of coordinating the effort• of

all aaenclea at aov~nment which have 1nteznationa1 reaponaibilitiea.

*&l'e 1a .relatively little intentional pro•Co•uniat tMchin& in tble oountry. !bare ia • however • a curious hostility amons tat•llectu.ls to ''anti·eoa.uni•t•• teaching. loaa:l.'bly •• u ""•r•r:eaction to ·~carthyi•n, Mny leaders of intellectual opinion in the u.s. a~:e aore diapoeed to react actveraely to "antl .. Coaaunilau than to ••eo..m1amn.

17 •

.rerhap• first of all there is tbe urgent need fow

bipartisan recognttion of lbe fact that in the late 20th.

Cen~y conventional anaaraenta alooe •r• not auffic1ent; tlult

the ·C..sn1at supeJ:powe~•• through eonttnuecl •ployment of

the total araenal of political conflict, eaa create a .fatal

pal!'•lysia of public 1vpport and will; arul that the only effeoti ve

way to counter such warfazoe 11 to at:Qploy appa:Qpr:iate po11t1cal

aeaaure• apinat tbc.ae who •••k to deatX'oy ft:•eclora.

tewta r. Powell • JJ:.

-...

. .

II

I I

I I

I I I

APPENDIX

.?ummary of Past U. S. Govei•nmcnt Activ:i.til~ ! ;

Following World Har II, the United States dissol\rc.!d

its 1.var time apparatus for political communication even more r.:1pidly

t han it demobilized its armed forces. On August 31, 1945, only

s ixteen days after the Japanese surrender, President Truman abol-

i shed the Office of War Information.

An interim program was developed at a very low l evel of

expenditure. But in January 1947, the interim agenc y was granted

permanent status as the Office of International I nforma t i on and

Cultural Affairs. William Benton was the first director of this

fi rst venture of t he United States into pencetime international

po l i tl cal coruHtUnic&tion. Despite his enc::rgctic efforts, th e

- . -r~~0n e~ Jr cnn-

' stan tly was \v i th threats to its very existence in Congress .

In 1948, t he Smith-Mundt Act was ·passed as the basic

·charter o f t h e rol e of t h e government in deve1oping internationa l

infor mation and cul t ura l exchange. TI1e names of the new agency

were constan tly changed and only meager appropr i ations were made.

But beginning in 1950, th e Nationa l Security Council inaugurated

a policy of more aggress i ve us e o f propaganda and Presiden t Tru-

man announc ed a "Great Campaign of Tr uth". Th e "Campaign", under

the l eader ship of Edward W. Bar r e tt, was des i gned to support

/ .'

..

A2

American l eadership and to reduc e Soviet influence in the inter-

national community, and to pres ent America fully and fairly as a

counter to Soviet propaganda.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, a further stepped-up

program was developed to answer the defamation and false charges

which '\vere by then a constant stream from the Soviet bloc. Staffs

and budgets '\vere somewhat enlarged and the effectiveness of the

agency improved to meet its expanded obligations. United States

Info rmation Service (USIS) posts were multiplied around the world,

a co rps of professional media experts began to develop and expo-

sure for the agen~y;s media product~ u 2dched

h -- -ip 1 P.d C1u r i ng this

period to a rate of 400 million persons a year.

These expansion years were marked by a change of emphasis

in the agency's program. Aware that accurate portraits of Ameri-

can standards of living often induced envy or despair among poorer

peoples, and convinced that persuasion, rather than information

alone, was the agency's mission, the agency heads placed greater

emphasis on a program of hard-hitting propaganda.

With increased success and visibility, the agency continued

a political issue in Congress and in the presidential campaign of -r-

1952. Several Congressional invesigations occurred, some respon-"

• >

---~~---~~----~-----------,_, ___ _

sible and some less so. The most exhaustive of them \vas by a

subcon~ittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed

first by Senator Fulbright and then by Senator Hickenlooper. Con­

gress 1vas obviously skeptical of the value and effectiveness of

an expanded foreign information program. Several members sug­

gested that propaganda ought to go beyond the "campaign of truth"

t o comment and argument of a more positive nature. Other criti­

cism was directed at the lack of inter-departmental cooperation

and the failure to assure effective operation of the information

agency through giving it sufficient prestige as an independent

.::1gcncy and adeqt18te1y rrainP-d personnel.

As a result of these and other investigations, the agency

was again reorganized in 1953, by a presidential reorganization

plan , submitted to Congress. The plan created the United States

I nformation Agency (USIA) as an independent organization, while

t h e overseas apparatus retained its wartime identity as USIS.

( The educational exchange program was left in the Department of

State. ) The Agency, while receiving its foreign policy guidance

from the State Department, was fully responsible for its own in­

f ormation policy .

USIA 1.vas to report to the President through the National

Security Council . Gradually the Director became a voting member

of the Operations CoordinDting BoDrd and finnlly wa s accorded

full Cabinet status in 1956. A succession of relatively well-

knmv-n directors of USIA follO'~ved through the 1950 ' s and early

1960' s .

In the late 1950's, long-range education projects took

their place along with more conventional information activities .

The "People-to-People" project, involving contacts among private

citizens of nations was developed and coordinated by USIA.

But the emphasis, especially after the misunderstandings

apparently caused ·by some Hungarian-language broadcasts during

the Hungarian uprisings and during the days foll01..;ring the launchi~~

of sputnik, ·was increasinely upon detached and accurate news

reporting, with the hope of reinforcing the credibility of USIA,

and of the United States.

USIA, under Edward R. Murrow, in the early 1960's, I

:achieved an influence in foreign policy formulation that can '

I

; be ascribed to the prestige of the Director himself. Budgets

/ gre\v to $170 million by the time cancer forced Murrow to resign.

I Although preoccupation with events in southeast Asia diverted

/ resources and attention from USIA, it has continued to be an I / important component in the foreign policy of the United States. I I It does not purport, however, to engage in propaganda or political

1 warfare operations. I

/ :

-----~~------~-~--------~----n_,--~--

The Chief instrument of USIA , and th e be s t-kn O\vn, is

radio, particulculy the Voice of Amcr i ca (inc l ud:Lng RIAS [radio

in the Amer ican sector] ). In addit ion, the rn cl i o Hork of USIA

is supplemented by several private l y mvned ra di o s tations : the

Worldwide Broadcasting Syst em, op e1ating for over a quarter of

a century from Boston, the Committee of Free Asia, Inc., sending '

programs to Asia from San Francisco and Manila, Radio Libera-

tion, operating from Munich, and Radio Free Europe .

The la~ter agency, ·non-governmental in nature , is per-

mitted greater flexibility and freedom, including fr~~dom from

Congressional interferenc e . It was st~ted in 1949 under the

':·.::U:h the C'0lle.hnr.'1ri nn nf n p;:m Ar.h P.~on. The orl!anization embarked

on a number of ambitious enterprises, including the Free University

-in Exile, set up at Strasbourg, France, later discontinued. It

:is supported by funds from various sources through an independent

: agency, Crusade for Freedom. Other media efforts, as well as the

./ vast education, library and exchange programs, are coordinated

I from Washington but directed largely from the USIS field offices.

I · I

The effectiveness of these services is attested to by their broad

I I I I

popularity and by the violence \vith \·.7hich the Communists often

make USIS facilities targets of mob action.

. )

/ :