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Language Accommodation and Style Shifting in the Speech of Gamal Abdel NasserWilliam Cotter, University of Essex

As president of Egypt and the figurehead of the pan-Arab nationalist movement, Gamal

Abdel Nasser served as a symbol for an entire generation in the modern Middle East.1 Even

today his legacy is visible both in Egypt and throughout the region. Periodic calls for Arab-

nationalism and the recent surge in pan-Arab solidarity in the wake of the Arab Spring hark back

to the period of Nasserist rule which defined the middle part of the 20th century. Nasser’s

oratorical skill brought his message to a wider Arab populace and rallied everyday people around

his ideals for a socialist Egypt free from the grip of European influence. By examining Clive

Holes’ 1993 article on the political speech of Nasser, this paper will discuss language

accommodation and style shifting in Nasser’s speech through the lens of the unique linguistic

marketplace of Nasser’s Middle East. Additionally, the paper aims to highlight the political and

linguistic ideologies which may be seen as influencing Nasser’s varying use of Standard and

Egyptian Arabic in his public address. 2

Through his landmark work Language & Symbolic Power, Pierre Bourdieu offers his

conception of legitimate language and the linguistic market through discussion on the dominant

competence as linguistic capital and the ability of powerful groups to impose that competence as

1 Although the preferred spelling for Holes is “Nasir”, unless quoting his work directly in which this spelling is used I have opted for the more widely noted “Nasser”.2 Fine grained differences exist but for the purposes of this paper “Standard”, “Classical”, and “Fusha” all refer to the same form of the Arabic language and I have attempted to favour “Standard” wherever possible in order to avoid confusion.

the legitimate form of language (Bourdieu 56-57). Leigh Swigart notes that, “Bourdieu’s basic

idea…is that language and linguistic practices can be viewed in economic terms. Different sets

of linguistic practices can be viewed as ‘linguistic capital’ that can be exchanged for ‘profit’ on

the ‘linguistic market’” (Swigart 91). The first question that we must examine is, on the

linguistic market of Nasser’s Egypt, what constitutes legitimate language in Bourdieu’s terms?

Nilofar Haeri provides an answer in this regard when speaking of the pan-Arabism that

arose and became a prominent feature of Nasser’s political Egypt. Haeri states that, “pan-Arab

ideology overrode other ideologies on the issue of language. The language of pan-Arabism is not

the various ‘divisive’ and ‘lowly’ dialects but the unifying and standard Classical Arabic” (Haeri

798). Importantly to note, however, is that according to Haeri the realm of public speeches often

utilize both Standard and Egyptian Arabic, with the Egyptian dialect often being the primary

code with interspersed Classical Arabic (Haeri 797). A final point by Haeri is that the notion that

Bourdieu supported wherein there is a direct link between dominant language and dominant

group is not reinforced by the results of her own linguistic research in Egypt (Haeri 799). These

points give nod to the unique socio-political realities that helped to create the linguist market of

Nasser’s Middle East.

Turning now to the analysis of the political speech of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Holes notes

that political speech, “is governed by social conventions about ‘correct’ and ‘appropriate’

language use…Nasir achieved much of his popular appeal in Egypt precisely through his

flouting of these conventions and by the directness and accessibility of his language” (Holes 22).

In this instance Holes seems to offer a potential counter point to Haeri wherein she had stated

that Egyptian Arabic was often the preferred code in political address. It is interesting to note

here that although Nasser was known for flouting the conventions of official speech which would

Cotter 2

have, as Holes states, heavily supported the use of Standard Arabic, his pan-Arab agenda very

much enforced the notion of an official language through its policy of support for Classical

Arabic in Egypt. Leila Ahmed’s A Border Passage provides evidence of this point when

discussing her Arabic studies in Nasser’s Egypt. Ahmed writes of studying, “boring passages in

what, we were told, was ‘real Arabic’, ‘correct Arabic’ – whereas what we spoke was an inferior,

corrupt, incorrect Arabic, and Arabic that could hardly be called Arabic at all” (Ahmed 147).

Holes further mentions that a loosening of the linguistic rules was a political requirement

for Nasser, who needed to convince the Egyptian masses of the value of his plans for economic

and social reform, and this could not be done if speeches were delivered in Classical Arabic

(Holes 22). Beyond the political situation of Egypt itself, Nasser was a figure on the regional and

world stage. Holes makes note that much of the output of Nasser’s political speeches was

directed outside of Egypt’s political borders at a wider Arab populous and attributes these factors

to the variations in Nasser’s speech style (Holes 23). Although Holes does not touch on this in

his discussion of Nasser’s political speech, it is probable that Nasser was acutely aware of his

status as a political symbol on the regional stage. Through varying his speech style or code in

favor of Standard Arabic Nasser was able to bring his pan-Arab agenda to a wider audience.

At the same time Nasser faced the enormous task of convincing a largely illiterate

Egyptian population of the benefits of socialism and economic/social reform. This task had to be

tackled through the dialect of everyday speech, Egyptian Arabic. I argue that Nasser

accommodated his speech and switched styles across different speech events, as well as between

sentences in a single speech, in an effort to target different audiences or varying messages which

his speech carried. This will become clearer after examining and reinterpreting some of the data

which Holes analyzed in his work.

Cotter 3

Before moving forward, an interesting point that Kathryn Woolard makes regarding

ideologies of language relates to the case of Nasser’s Egypt. Woolard states that the widely

accepted view of ideology sees it as:

derived from, rooted in, reflective of, or responsive to the experience or interests of a

particular social position…this emphasis on social and experiential origins necessarily

denies explanatory independency to ideology. It casts ideology as in some way dependent

on the material and practical aspects of human life. (Woolard 6)

Woolard’s conception of ideology helps to clarify some of the potential contradiction in Nasser’s

linguistic use. Using Bourdieu’s idea of legitimate language as it operates on the linguistic

market would lead us to believe that Nasser should be more inclined to use Standard Arabic as

the dominant or legitimate form of language in Egypt, especially given his political and social

power as the leader of the country. If we complicate Bourdieu by utilizing the idea that ideology

is dependent on practicality we can create a more flexible definition of language ideology and

legitimacy in Nasser’s Egypt.

In the interest of further complicating Bourdieu’s notion of legitimate language, Haeri

notes in her article that Bourdieu has been criticized for ignoring the varying dynamics of power

and solidarity in regards to official or legitimate language use (Haeri 802). Judith Irvine goes

further by mentioning the inflexibility and oversimplification in his concept in stating that, “little

room is left for any statement made in one of the available varieties to make a difference to the

political and economic situation – to be anything other than a symptom of it” (Irvine 256). I

would propose that Holes’ examination of Nasser’s speech supports Haeri and Irvine’s

contestation of Bourdieu’s ideals as well as Woolard’s statements on the dependency of ideology

Cotter 4

on the practicality of use and a potential for flexibility in the application of ideology if it serves

strategic purpose.

While Holes examines six speech excerpts in his article, this paper will touch on only

four of those. The first two excerpts represent two very different speech styles delivered roughly

a week apart. As Holes notes, both were delivered at mass rallies in Cairo with the first being

given on November 9th, 1956 following Anglo-French attacks on Port Said and Port Fouad, the

manifestation of Anglo-French plans to retake the Suez Canal from Egypt (Abdel Nasser

09/11/1956). The second, delivered a week prior, was given when the Egyptian army was

retreating from Israeli forces in the Sinai but before the attack in Port Said (Abdel Nasser

02/11/1956) (Holes 23).

Holes labels the first speech as unusual for Nasser, as it was delivered in nearly pure

Classical Arabic (Fusha) (Holes 23). The importance here lies in Holes’ commentary on the

message of the first speech. As Holes’ states, the meaning in Nasser’s words is predominantly

that there is a difference between surrender and peace and that the Egyptian government had not

surrendered. Nasser offers this message through political abstraction and symbols (Holes 24).

Nasser never addresses the crowd in Cairo directly but, as Holes states, as “the stylized ‘sons of

Egypt’ or the abstract and anonymous third-person ‘individuals’ or ‘citizens’” (Holes 24). This is

a reoccurring theme in Holes’ analysis, which sees Nasser deploying Standard Arabic regularly

in situations which call for abstract political notion or symbolism.

In her work, Arabic Sociolinguistics, Reem Bassiouney offers support to Holes regarding

Nasser’s use of Standard Arabic for the purposes of political abstraction and symbolism. During

a 1954 speech in which there was an assassination attempt against Nasser, Bassiouney quotes

Cotter 5

Nasser as saying in near perfect Standard Arabic, “Citizens, if Gamal Abd Al-Nasser dies, he

will die happily because you are all Gamal Abd Al-Nasser (3 times). You all fight for freedom

and dignity. Men, move, with God’s blessing” (Quoted in Bassiouney 84). Bassiouney argues

that Nasser’s shift in speech reflects a change in his role. As she notes, “He was no more the

friend or peer. He was now giving himself a more subtle status. He was a symbol, an idea, and

this idea was inherent in all Egyptians” (Bassiouney 84). Conceptualizing Nasser’s use of

Standard Arabic in situations of political abstraction or symbolism is in line with Murray

Edelman when he notes that “the potency of political language does not stem from its description

of a “real” world but rather from… its evocations of unobservables in the present and of

potentialities in the future, language use is strategic” (emphasis added) (Edelman 13). This

elucidates the idea that Nasser was potentially aware of the different effect his language use

could have and how it could be used for specific audiences or purposes.

Returning to Holes’ analysis of the first speech, Nasser’s words could also be seen as

calculated in the sense that they are directed not only at Egyptians but as well to a wider Arab

audience. This accommodation and shift towards Standard Arabic in his speech could reflect his

awareness that, in this instance, Classical or Standard Arabic was a more effective vehicle for his

message than Egyptian Arabic. Nasser’s July 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal from

European control (BBC News) was seen not only as an incredible victory for the Egyptian

people but as well a victory for the pan-Arab movement of which Nasser was at the fore.

Nasser’s choice of Standard Arabic in this particular speech excerpt could signal his potential

recognition that Anglo-French attacks at Port Said in November 1956 were not only a strike

against Egypt but also a retaliation against a larger pan-Arab identity. Through his choice of

Standard Arabic, Nasser could ensure that his political rhetoric and message of steadfastness and

Cotter 6

fearlessness would travel well beyond Egyptian borders to reinsure supporters of Nasser’s

political ideology abroad in the face of European and Israeli aggression. This example could

again reflect Nasser’s awareness of his status as a regional symbol of Arab identity which would

not buckle under a threat against Egypt and pan-Arabism as a whole.

The second speech sample which Holes analyzes is predominantly made up of Egyptian

Arabic. As he notes, the recorded version of the speech diverges notably from the textual version

and has a much more conversational style and feel. Holes argues that the second speech is a

concrete personal challenge to the invading enemy while the first is an abstract inspirational

appeal to the Egyptian nation (Hole 26). When speaking of the abstraction of the first speech,

Holes notes that:

abstraction, idealization, and eternal values have become associated in the psychology of

Arab society with an abstract and idealized form of language, and to be effective to an

Arab audience…a message which sets out to appeal to abstractions and ideals should

itself be in an idealized form of the language, that is, fushaa (Standard). (Holes 27)

Although the plausibility of Holes’ argument is without question, the choice of Egyptian Arabic

in the second speech could also reflect Nasser’s attempts at negotiating his unique linguistic

market; a market that, given his wider regional status as a symbol of pan-Arabism, may not be

integrated or unified. His speeches operate within varying local and regional markets which

could be seen to place differing value on speech style. Furthermore, the diglossia of Arabic may

be called upon as evidence for the notion that Nasser delivered his speech under varying

linguistic conditions and with different markets or audiences in mind. This notion is reminiscent

of Bell’s Audience Design in which speakers design their speech style for or in relation to their

Cotter 7

audience (Bell 143). These two speeches show evidence of Nasser navigating varying terrain

between markets.

In this second speech Nasser speaks directly to the Egyptian people and, as Holes puts it,

“the affective and communicative punch of the aamiya (colloquial) in expressing such domestic

values overrides the fushaa dominated conventions of public speaking” (Holes 27). While the

abstractness of the first speech can be seen as an attempt by Nasser to appeal to pan-Arabism, the

style and language of the second speech very much directs Nasser’s message to Egypt, the

Egyptian people, and his audience in Cairo. This is evidenced by his reflections on personal

experiences in the 1948 war with Israel, his continual use of “we” to refer to Egyptians, and his

assertion that “I’m with you here in Cairo” and “We will fight, like I told you yesterday, to the

last drop of blood” (Holes 25). This example echoes Edelman’s point that, “the leader of a

country in imminent danger of aggression from a foreign enemy is expected to assure the

population that resistance will be resolute…It is not creativity that wins an audience in such

cases, but rather telling people what they want to hear in a context that makes the message

credible” (Edelman 15).

I believe this reflects the political situation in Cairo at the time. When Nasser delivered

this speech on November 2nd 1956, his army was in retreat from Israeli forces in Sinai after three

days of intense fighting and additional days of bombardment from European forces. For Nasser,

the ultimate aims of European and Israeli forces to recapture the Suez Canal from Egypt were

probably still unclear. The noticeable shift in Nasser’s speeches could reflect the changes in the

political situation over the intervening week and a potential realization on his part that European

forces were not intervening to stop an Egypt-Israeli war, but with ulterior motives.

Cotter 8

Shifting focus now to the final two speech excerpts which Holes analyzes it is possible to

see some of the same accommodation techniques applied previously by Nasser in his earlier

speeches. These two speech samples come from Nasser’s Victory Day speeches in 1957 and

1964. The 1957 speech excerpt is very much Standard Arabic without case inflections, which

sticks closely to the written version of the speech (Holes 34). As with the first speech discussed,

the message of this excerpt is abstract and political. Nasser uses abstractions in the forms of a

grand “Egypt”, “the world”, “the policy of nonalignment”, and “removing the specter of war”

(Holes 34).

Holes does note, however, one important down shift in speech style. This is attributed to

a change in the interpersonal aspect of the message. As an example of this Holes states that:

The ‘we’ of the first twelve lines is the political ‘we’ of Egypt on the world stage

working towards peace and stability but the ‘we’ of (18b) is the ‘we’ of ordinary

Egyptians, the audience themselves doing such everyday things as ‘looking’ and

‘remembering’, tangible things like ‘battles’, ‘violence’, ‘flags’, and ‘martyrs’ – hence

the symbolic switch to a kind of Arabic redolent of local values and actual experience.

(Holes 35)

Following this relatively brief downshift in style Nasser returns to speaking in Standard Arabic

and to the abstract political discussion on issues of peace and freedom and the future for Egypt

and, I would argue, for the rest of the Arab World.

The final excerpt mentioned in this paper is the last which Holes analyzes in his article.

As with the previous, this extract comes from another Victory Day speech, this time in 1964. In

this speech Nasser is very much addressing Egypt and this was the most colloquial of all the

Cotter 9

speeches examined in the article (Holes 35). Nasser is lauding the accomplishments that average

Egyptians have achieved, commenting on an Egyptian food crisis, and rejecting American aid to

Egypt. Hole’s notes that “The solitary ‘we’ = ‘you and me together’ is emphasized throughout,

and the world which ‘we’ inhabit is not an abstract or idealized one, but a real world of factories

being built, land improved, and new fields created and irrigated.” (Holes 36).

Bassiouney also provides a further example regarding the use of Egyptian Arabic in

political speech. In examining the speech of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak,

Bassiouney notes that Mubarak utilized Egyptian Arabic predominantly when reminiscing with

the audience about past experiences from a shared Egyptian childhood, or when, as she puts it,

Mubarak was playing the role of the “old friend” with the audience (Bassiouney 77,80). This

analysis of Mubarak’s speech is very much in line with Holes examination of the speech of

Nasser, where both Egyptian leaders chose to deploy Egyptian Arabic in instances where they

were trying to relate to their audience as Egyptians, or playing the role of “friend” through a

shared past.

As Holes notes, Nasser could have made the same speech on the same general topics with

another audience and easily have utilized different speech forms but, “where these issues are

being dealt with so that the plain man can understand and empathize… this calls for a variety of

Arabic which is instantly comprehensible in its form, symbolism, and frame of cultural reference

to all – the aammiyya [colloquial]” (Holes 36). Although I would not categorically attribute the

apparent accommodation and style shifts in Nasser’s speech to the overarching political situation

in the Arab world at the time, it is still beneficial to attempt to tie the two together in a

meaningful way. Nasser delivered his 1957 Victory Day speech in late December, which was

after his nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent Suez crisis. 1957 also marked an

Cotter 10

important precipice in the life of the pan-Arab movement which Nasser was considered to be a

champion of. Just two months after delivering his 1957 Victory Day speech Egypt, with Nasser

at its helm, formed the United Arab Republic with Syria (Palmer 50). Pan-Arabism was still

reaching its apex and Nasser was in an important political position as the mouthpiece of the pan-

Arab movement and, as emphasized previously, his language choice may reflect his realization

of his position as an international political symbol. All of these are facts which could aid the

argument for strategic style shifting or accommodation to a wider Arab audience.

The intent in this paper has not been to argue that Nasser was specifically and

meticulously gearing each of his speeches to cater to pan-Arabism or to his Egyptian

constituency. However, as dsicussed, Nasser was aware that Standard Arabic was a vehicle that

could bring his words and ideals to other parts of the Arab world. Although many in the Middle

East find Egyptian Arabic mutually intelligible, Standard Arabic was the locus through which

Nasser could reach millions outside of his borders and by looking at the excerpts which Holes

analyzes in his article I believe that we see the manifestations of that awareness. In those

instances when Nasser hits on the abstract politics of Egypt and the region, topics that could have

a wider and pan-Arab appeal, we see Nasser using Standard Arabic predominantly. However

when speaking on issues of immense importance to average Egyptians; recounting personal

experience, or trying to sell socialism to his people, Nasser often employed what was most

comfortable and utilitarian for the purpose, Egyptian Arabic.

Nasser’s speech output was sizeable and further examination of his political speeches

would be beneficial in determining what patterns in his speech usage may arise. As a major

political symbol Nasser was constantly in the public eye and his experiments at pan-Arabism

united Arabs across the region. Even today, Nasserist ideals are still held in extremely high

Cotter 11

regard throughout the Middle East. Studying the speech of political figures such as Nasser can

aid in providing a clearer picture of the tools utilized in political speech within Arabic

sociolinguistics while contributing to a greater understanding both of issues of language

accommodation and style shifts, as well as political speech more generally.

Cotter 12

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Cotter 14