liberalism in the arab world: just a good idea?

Liberalism in the Arab World

Just a good idea?

Editor Dr. Ronald Meinardus

First Edition 2014

Liberalism in the Arab World - Just a good idea? 2

Title of the Book Liberalism in the Arab World Just a good idea? Editor Dr. Ronald Meinardus Editorial Assistant Dirk Kunze Publisher Al-Mahrosa for Publishing, Press Services, and Information Block 7399, Street 28 branching from Street 9, Mukkattam Cairo, Egypt Tel/Fax: 02-25075917 E-mail:[email protected] Chairman: Farid Zahran Serial Number: 8588/2014 ISBN: 978-977-313-533-1 This book was published by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty.


Table of Content

Preface 5 Ronald Meinardus Promoting the liberal cause in

the Arab world: A personal review

11

Clemens Recker Liberal ideas in Arab history of thought: A homegrown liberal tradition, or imported?

23

Saed Karajah Did Arab liberalism fail freedom in the Arab Spring?

33

Mohammed Tamaldou Networking for freedom and democracy: Gathering liberal political parties in the Arab region

41

Hassan Mneimeneh Liberalism in Lebanon: Foundations and obstacles

59

Houda Cherif The struggle for liberalism in Tunisia

75

Yusuf Mansur Bread, freedom and social justice: Why only the market economy will fulfill the aspirations of the Arab masses

87

Wael Nawara Crowd democracy: Future challenges facing liberalism in the Arab region

101

Esraa Abdel Fatah Loaded victory: Egypt’s revolution and where it stands post-30 June

115


Shehab Wagih

Politics and liberalism in Egypt: Did anything change?

129

Emil Kirjas The missing piece of the world puzzle: Liberal International and the Arab world

145

Koert Debeuf From Arab Spring to Arab revolution: Three years of ALDE representation in the Arab world

157

Ronald Meinardus My liberal times in Oum Al-Dounia

169

Biographies of the authors

177

Other books in the series “Liberal Publications”

181


Preface

In 2013, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty celebrated the 50th anniversary of its international work. It is of relevance that the first project of this Foundation outside Germany was organized in Tunisia with a program aimed at training journalists. Half a century later, the Foundation is still present in Tunisia - as well as in several other countries on the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediterranean - and involved in myriad programs and projects aimed at promoting liberalism.

The past 10 years have witnessed dramatic changes in this part of the world. Apart from the uprisings and upheavals that have dominated the international headlines again and again, we have seen important - yes, historic - structural changes. In a political context, the maturing of civil society and the development of a nascent partisan pluralism are among the most significant alterations. This is not the space to deliberate on the not always easy relationship between civil society organizations and political parties. However, their parallel development is proof that over the years the space for political participation, and also political pluralism, has grown. This is important, for participation and pluralism are two essential ingredients of liberal progress.

The book you are holding in your hands has been edited by Dr. Ronald Meinardus, who has served as regional director of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty for the Middle East and North Africa for more than seven years. His aspiration in this oft-tumultuous phase has been to promote liberal principles and politics through educative activities. In his opening chapter, he takes a closer look at these principles and shares his thoughts on the challenges and opportunities facing the liberal cause in the Arab world. In the closing chapter, the editor, who spent many years of his childhood in Egypt, shares personal reflections at the end of his professional journey, which as he


writes has been filled with excitement, joy and also occasional frustrations.

In some parts of the world, freedom is so entrenched that many people deem liberalism as void of a mission, and thus superfluous. In other, less free, parts of the world, the enemies of freedom accuse liberals of all sorts of transgressions and shortcomings in an effort to marginalize the concept of freedom politically, socially and even culturally. Unfortunately, the Arab world belongs to the latter category.

One of the most poisonous accusations against liberalism heard again and again, also in this part of the world, is that it is a foreign concept and not suitable for Arab societies. Against this background, it becomes all the more important to trace and document liberal roots in the Arab history of thought. This is done, in this book, by Dr. Clemens Recker, a German scholar and scholarship holder of the Foundation who has dedicated his academic life to studying and writing about the great Arab thinkers.

This book is an effort at stocktaking. The contributors share information and their perspectives on the state and prospects of liberalism in the Arab region. You will find a cascade of information, arguments and also commentary. A uniting element amid all the diversity is that all authors have been associated over the years with programs of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and have, thereby, established bonds of political and personal friendship with the liberal organization.

Throughout the past decade, the Foundation has sponsored liberal activities in many Arab countries and on various levels. A special feature of this effort are the synergies created between activities on the national or country level, on the one hand, and cross-border activities on the regional and international levels on the other. Bringing together liberal forces from the Arab world for an exchange of experiences and knowledge has been - and remains - the hallmark of the regional political work of the Foundation.


Considerable progress has been achieved over the past few years. Not only has a viable network or association of Arab liberal political parties been established. This network and the member parties thereof have also established close links with the international liberal family. Today, Arab liberals are equal members of this large global community. As one result of this, for the first time Arab liberal voices are heard in international liberal gatherings. This is good for the Arab world as it is good for the international meetings, and also the quality of international political dialogue.

In this book, we are pleased to feature the original accounts of three important Arab liberals who stood (or still stand) at the helm of the Arab liberal network. They are Mohamed Tamaldou from Morocco, Wael Nawara from Egypt, and Saed Karajah from Jordan. The fact that the members of the Alliance chose to change their leadership in a democratic manner regularly is symbolic of a new and liberal policy style.

Joining as authors are two European liberal leaders who have invested much work in “bridging the gap” between the Arab world and Europe. Koert Debeuf lives in Cairo where he represents the liberal faction in the European Parliament in the Arab world and has facilitated many an Arab political intervention in the European Union. Emil Kirjas, the restless secretary general of Liberal International, the world federation of liberal parties, has over the years become an enthusiast of the Arab world and the project of bringing Arab liberals into the international fold.

While the book has not the space to feature all the liberal stories of all Arab nations, the editor chose to feature two countries with a special role for the promotion of liberalism in the Arab world: Tunisia and Lebanon, two friendly nations whose representatives sometimes bicker over which of the two owns the right to be termed the mother of the Arab uprisings. We leave the answer to you after reading the accounts of Houda Cherif and Dr. Hassan Mneimeneh, who present to us fascinating


perspectives on their countries’ histories from a liberal vantage point.

Liberals strive for an open and pluralistic social order that entails the rule of law in combination with the protection of basic human rights, democracy and a free market. We need to highlight the free market, as it is here that liberals differ with socialists, many conservatives, and other political opponents. For liberals, economic freedom is not a problem but the key to solving many problems. Few - if any - Arab friends of the Foundation have argued this point as convincingly as Yusuf Mansour from Jordan, who over the years has become a backbone of the Economic Freedom of the Arab World conferences, which the regional office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty has regularly co-sponsored in cooperation with our comrades in arms at the Canadian Fraser Institute and the International Research Foundation of Oman. Mansour’s economic chapter highlights that eventually only an economically free society will be politically free - and prosperous also.

Egyptians fondly call their great nation “Mother of the Earth.” The fact that the regional office of the Foundation is in Cairo is a tribute to the immense political and also cultural influence Egypt holds in the Arab world. Many a discussion emanating from Egypt impacts discourses as far away as Morocco or the Arab Gulf. Not always has this radiation been of a positive or emancipative effect.

However, in all the regional projects of the Foundation, Egyptians have made important contributions and played crucial roles. This holds true also for the youth. Not surprisingly, many of the programs sponsored by the Foundation focus on the youth. Not only for theirs is the future, but also for their important role in the past - blasting the way in the uprisings against authoritarianism and suppression.

We are featuring two outstanding Egyptian liberals from a generation that wrote history on 25 January 2011, and thereafter. While Shehab Wagih and Esraa Abdel Fattah offer different


narratives - the one the story of an activist turned liberal party operative, the other an activist turned NGO leader - both agree in the end that Egypt’s transformation is far from over. It may take years, if not generations, to reach a state of affairs that may be termed free and liberal. What holds true for Egypt may be said to hold true for other countries of the Arab world.

This brings us, at last, to the title of this volume. All the authors, for sure, agree that liberalism is a good idea. They agree that the Arab world would be in a better state if liberal principles were respected and applied. However, we are far away from this state of affairs today. For the moment, in most parts of the region, liberalism remains just an idea - a concept and not a reality. It is up to freedom loving people to change that.


Promoting the liberal cause in the Arab world : A personal review

Ronald Meinardus

One of the privileges of working in the international program of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty are the many opportunities to meet liberal organizations from all parts of the world and liberal individuals of different national, cultural and religious backgrounds. The most lasting assurance I have taken from these many encounters has been that liberal ideas and the conviction that personal freedom is better than a lack of it are not confined to one part of the world or one culture. On the contrary, the desire for personal freedom is universal.

The size and impact of the liberal movement varies from one place to another, depending on numerous factors. In an international context, liberal forces in the Arab world may be understood as weak, in some respects, and with their backs to the wall. Liberals here are confronted with myriad challenges. Frequently these are related to false accusations and allegations. An oft-heard stereotype suggests liberal ideas are not compatible with Arab culture or Islam. Ironically, the assumption of the non-compatibility of liberal (read Western) and Islamic (read Arab) values is also propagated by influential Western thinkers who argue that a “clash of civilizations” is unavoidable.

Most Arabs today have at best a limited exposure to liberal conditions, as they grow up and live in a very different environment. In most parts of the Middle East, the only “tangible” experience with liberalism is “economic liberalization.” In many cases, however, the declared market


reforms have failed to improve living conditions and remained far below the expectations of the masses. Today, many Egyptians blame “market reforms” for the perceived widespread corruption and nepotism. They are not able - or not willing - to appreciate that it is not the market system that has failed but that the main reason for the absent “trickle-down” of wealth is the lack of rule of law and accountability. These are essential preconditions for markets to set free their beneficial power.

To say that liberalism has an image problem in the Arab world is no understatement. This, to a considerable degree, has to do also with international politics. On more than one occasion, the conduct of outside powers has damaged the concepts of democracy and liberalism (or liberal democracy). Western powers have intervened in the region advocating hallowed liberal and democratic principles and have then behaved in a manner not compatible with those very principles. The invasion of Iraq comes to mind, or the Palestinian question. In political debates throughout the Arab world these cases are mentioned as examples of Western double standards. This is not new. Historically, Western colonialism in the region has tainted not only the image of the colonizers but also the ideas they espoused. While they claimed to promote democracy and human rights (albeit gradually), on the ground they ruled in a profoundly illiberal manner.

Today, liberal values and principles are under attack from various sides in the Arab world. It is, therefore, useful to recall the intellectual roots these ideas have in the region. That these were much in fashion among Arab political thinkers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, became apparent to me as I read the book Liberalism in the Arab History of Thought by Clemens Recker, a German Arabist who has dedicated his academic life to the study of Arab political philosophy. His book was published in our “Liberal Texts” series and I am happy to share with you that it has become one of the most sought after publications we have produced. “Far from being only a contemporary political project,


the idea of Arab liberalism has deep roots in the region’s history of thought and was once prevalent in the public discourse,” Recker writes. Importantly, the author documents excerpts of writings of mainly Egyptian political thinkers that convey strong liberal messages. “Man preserves his freedom of thought and feelings and his natural liberty, even in the depth of a prison … He was created free, free in his will, free in his choices,” is one of my favorite quotes from Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid, the famous Egyptian intellectual who died in 1963 and has been described as an architect of Egyptian secularism and liberalism.

As a liberal, I could not agree more. My basic assumption is that most, if not all, people are fond of freedom. It is my philosophical understanding that human beings strive not only for material goods and spiritual peace but also for freedom. In this regard, I am not prepared to accept that individuals from different cultural, ethnic or religious backgrounds are different. We all strive for freedom. Our creator has created us as free beings, and we must defend this freedom. Or we should strive for it, should we live under conditions that are not free.

Liberals under attack In Egypt, as in most other countries of the Arab world, it is

not at all easy to be a liberal. These days, liberals are marginalized politically and also ideologically. Their ideas are far from being the mainstream. Political forces espousing liberal ideas are on the defensive, and even avoid the attribute “liberal” in their campaigns to reach the people.

There are various reasons for this defensiveness: some are homemade, others the result of a merciless ideological onslaught that has traits of systemic brainwashing. First, liberals are not famed for their unity. In the crucial phase of post-revolutionary Arab history we saw that liberal forces were not unified. Regarding important issues they didn’t speak with one voice. Much more harmful than the lack of unity has been the


ideological onslaught. This has succeeded in denigrating liberalism as a set of principles and values that are not compatible with Arab (and Muslim!) mores and culture.

Liberals are often under attack from dictators and dogmatists, who do not tolerate opinions others than their own. Dictators and dogmatists spread a climate of intolerance; they consider liberal forces as main foes. Liberals have suffered - and often withstood - this pressure.

Many definitions of liberalism exist. This is not unusual for one of the great political currents of our times. However, all liberals agree in one essential point: the conviction that the freedom of the individual is the most important political and societal aspiration. While this may sound banal, it is not so at all. Liberal politics strives to augment the freedom of the individual at all times and in all fields.

Probably there is no other political term that is misused more than the term “freedom”. More or less everyone is talking of freedom and “occupying” the well sounding term. When socialists, conservatives or religious fundamentalists speak of freedom, they usually do not have the freedom of the individual in mind. Their main concern is the rights and privileges of a certain social group, a political party or a segment of society. In political practice, this is different from the freedom of the individual liberals aspire to. For us, every single man and woman is entitled to the same rights and equality of opportunities.

The allegation that liberals and their ideas are inspired by outside forces and have no homegrown roots is probably the biggest challenge for liberals and liberalism in the Arab world today. It is crucial that Arab liberals confront this allegation, which - as we have seen and will argue extensively in this book - is false. To assert that the idea of individual freedom is foreign and, therefore, not compatible with Arab cultural and religious beliefs, in my eyes, borders on racism, as it insinuates that the people living in this sphere are either nor capable of or not ready for liberty.


This is not to deny that modern liberalism is a product of the European Enlightenment, which some centuries ago declared reason and individual freedom the measure of all things. From the outset, liberal thinkers and politicians promoted the ideas of freedom of the individual in close conjunction with responsibility, respect for human rights, and tolerance. Over the years, it has become a broad consensus of all political mainstreams that the basic liberal principles are universal in nature. The general recognition of the universality of human rights is one of the great achievements of human civilization.

“Most demonstrators in Tahrir were liberals” Egypt has its own proud liberal history. That this nation’s

freedom fighters and freethinkers did not necessarily use the epithet “liberal” as a label is irrelevant in this context. Much more important is the fact that with their writings and their deeds they aspired to promote freedom, human rights and other liberal values and principles.

This brings me to the uprising of 25 January 2011, which I had the privilege to witness up close. It is still too early for a definite assessment of that grand event. However, I would argue - and I have done so again and again - that what happened on that crucial day and in ensuing weeks had much to do with liberal aspirations. “Most demonstrators in Tahrir Square were liberals, without knowing it,” Ibrahim Issa, the famous Egyptian journalist, told a group of visiting European politicians a few weeks after the uprising.

The calls of Tahrir Square for freedom, human rights and social justice are liberal demands. Observers have likened the Egyptian Revolution with the French Revolution or the fall of the Berlin Wall: both historic events with a powerful liberal dimension.


Egypt’s Revolution has also been called the “Revolution of the Youth.” For good reason, the mainly youthful revolutionaries took the decision to maintain the national character of the uprising. To voice ideological or even partisan issues in Tahrir was a taboo. Nonetheless, it is no secret that liberal Egyptians - and foremost the liberal youth - stood at the forefront of the uprising from the very beginning.

Egypt finds itself in a political transformation of historic dimensions. There is widespread hope that the ongoing changes may lead to a viable and inclusive (and therefore stable) democracy that respects the rights of all citizens and is, therefore, and in the best sense of the word, a liberal democracy.

Building and strengthening institutions essential for a democratic order is among the main challenges facing Egypt today. In this context, I am not only referring to the classical democratic institutions - an independent judiciary, a functioning parliament, an uncorrupted bureaucracy, democratic political parties and a free press. An essential role in a democratic order is also played by civil society. By civil society we mean the large range of organizations and groups that are independent of the state and engage in political and/or societal work. These groups are often referred to as non-governmental organizations or NGOs.

Civil society’s pivotal role Historians of the future will surely ascertain that Egypt’s civil

society played a pivotal role in, at first, destabilizing the Mubarak regime and then, in a second step, helping bring it down. But the story does not end there. Against all the odds, civil society also plays a crucial role in building the new Egypt as a democratic and civil republic.

At the very center of the self-concept of civil society actors is the role of limiting and controlling the power of the state. In addition to the classic division of the executive, legislative and


judicial branches of power, civil society together with a free press has the function of watching those in power and preventing the misuse of their power. This mission is of particular relevance in countries like Egypt that has emerged from authoritarian rule.

While checking and monitoring those in power is one mission, civil society organizations also engage in promoting political participation and educating the people about their rights and duties. Not surprisingly these activities may lead to tension and conflict with those in power.

Among the most distressing experiences during my stay in Egypt has been what has become widely known as the “NGO crackdown,” the assault of the Egyptian authorities against foreign and Egyptian NGOs working mainly in the field of civic education. While the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty was not targeted directly (and many asked why we were spared), the heavy handed dealing led to a deep crisis also in Egyptian-German relations, thereby affecting our institute, at least indirectly.

The constitution and associated laws should guarantee the rights and freedoms of the non-governmental sector to fulfill their assigned tasks. The status of non-governmental organizations remains an issue of political debate and controversy in Egypt. The government would be well advised to heed the experience of other parts of the world - that a democracy ultimately will not be stable unless it enjoys the support and the cooperation of civil society.

Media revolution: a never-ending story In the world we live in, media plays an ever-increasing role.

Technological development - you may also call it progress - has lead to a situation in which ever-more people are using modern mass media. While television stands at one stage of the mass


media revolution, the Internet has opened another chapter in an unending story.

As more and more people spend more and more time being exposed to media (or in the case of new social media, actively using it), the importance of these media for society in general and politics in particular has grown.

Throughout its almost four decades long history, media projects have played an important role for the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty. In addition to conventional training courses for journalists and, at a later stage, activities for and with bloggers and social media activists, programs aimed at discussing the regulatory framework of the media in a liberal sense have been among my favorites.

There exist basic differences in the role of the media in democratic and authoritarian societies. These differences are of particular interest for Egypt, which is in a difficult process of transition from one order to the other. While Egyptians have much experience with the media in the old, authoritarian order, there is substantial debate as to how the new, democratic media should look.

Authoritarian rulers tend to see the media as an instrument to beautify their rule and make the people believe that all is in order. In the media of authoritarian rulers, the opposition is either silenced or given only marginal space. In a democratic society, which Egypt is aspiring to become, the media is considered a space for public communication. In this order, the media should aim at reconciling in a peaceful manner various opinions and interests, thereby facilitating the peaceful exchange of ideas. A democratic media system must, by definition, reflect the pluralism existing in society, be it in politics, in culture, in religious terms, and so on, to name just the most relevant differences. In this sense, the media system is a mirror of society. And as a result, the reader of newspapers, or the viewer of television programs, should become aware of this plurality and diversity.


If you talk about the role of media in transition, you will soon have to talk about the relationship between the state (or government) and media institutions. In an authoritarian setting, the influence of the state on the media is tremendous. In some cases it is so strong that the freedom of expression is endangered, so that journalists are forced to write or say what the political leadership wishes to hear. In a democratic order, on the other hand, freedom of the media is an important principle. How to “organize” this freedom - in the sense that it is not exploited to the detriment of others - is one of the challenges in establishing a democratic media order.

No (liberal) freedom without responsibility

While freedom is a valuable good we are striving for, this freedom should not be without limits. Freedom without limits is not democracy, but tantamount to anarchy, a state of disorder in which everyone behaves (or misbehaves) as she or he wants. Democratic citizens do not like disorder. As to the media, responsibility is one important limit to the freedom of the press. There are other limits, such as the personal rights of the individual, which journalists may not violate, or - on a more general level - the rule of law.

It is a challenge to find a balance, or compromise, between the total freedom of the media and other democratic principles and societal considerations like the personal rights of citizens, the rule of law, and social responsibility.

One suitable model to resolve this issue is through self-regulation and a media code of ethics. Both mechanisms contain elements of self-restraint or self-control on the part of the media. It is important to highlight that in this model of self-control it is not the government that exerts control: this would be censorship and not compatible with a democratic and liberal order. In the system of self-regulation the media and their associations regulate their affairs themselves. In some countries, such as Germany, a


national media or press council plays an important role in safeguarding media independence.

The Internet, meanwhile, is the biggest game changer of our times. I cannot think of another invention or innovation in recent memory that has had such a strong impact on the lives of so many people as the Internet. The Internet has revolutionized the way we communicate. This is no small matter, as communication is the very essence of human interaction. All this has had a major impact on our personal lives, but also on the societies we live in - and the politics of these societies.

Seen in political context, the impact of the Internet has been strongest in non-democratic countries. In authoritarian societies, the flow of information is typically controlled by rulers. They control the media and thereby effectively “manage” public opinion. As a result, political dissent is channeled if not blocked altogether.

The history of political authoritarianism is also a history of censorship and thought control. In the ages prior to the advent of the Internet, autocrats had a fairly easy task silencing dissent. Quite fortunately, from a liberal point of view, this state of affairs has come to an end with the arrival of online communications, which - for technical reasons - is much more difficult to control than traditional media.

The liberation of communicative channels has created the basis for popular uprisings against authoritarian rule. There is hardly a historical example that exemplifies this development better than the so-called Arab Spring. It is completely wrong to call the Arab uprisings a “Twitter Revolution” or “Facebook Revolution,” as some superficial observers did prematurely. The media, be it online media or traditional media, can never be the cause of a popular uprising. However - and this is an important point - there is general agreement that the Arab “revolutions” would not have materialized as they have had it not been for the significant role the modern communication tools played as instruments: Internet-based applications such as Twitter,


Facebook and YouTube have been and continue to be sharp weapons in the hands of those confronting authoritarian rulers. Also in the Arab world, the Internet has become the home of uncensored, free and independent communication. Dictators of all shades hate such “free” and uncontrolled spaces; they are thorns in their flesh.

Education matters most In 2013, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty

celebrated the 50th anniversary of its international projects. It is important to note that the first project outside the borders of Germany was a training program for journalists in Tunisia. It says a lot that unto this very day we are still active in that country and involved in training media workers.

For more than half a century, the Foundation has cosponsored educative programs in many parts of the world. For the most part of this period, the Arab world and Egypt played an important role. It is no coincidence that the regional office for the Middle East and North Africa is in Cairo, the heart of the Arab world or - as the Egyptians say with a touch of justified emotion - “Oum Al-Dounia” (Mother of the World).

Basically, the Foundation I work for is an educative institute. There exist various forms of teaching and learning. What we are talking of is civic - or as we say in Germany: political - education. Civic education is an important element for the progress of a society. Civic education is particularly important in a society in transition, as is Egypt and other Arab nations. In this new phase of democratic nation building, civic education becomes essential. The new Egypt aspires to be the democratic Egypt of all her citizens. This poses major challenges for the individual and society at large. To be a citizen in a democratic polity must be learned. What I want to say is: we are not born responsible citizens. By nature, we are not fit for a democratic society. To remedy this situation, education, and particularly


civic education, plays a decisive role. Civic education is a condition for effective and responsible political involvement, and thus also an essential requirement for democracy.

While most, if not all, the educative programs I was involved in throughout the years are designed for groups of people or organizations, in the end it is the individual that counts. For me, it has always been the most fulfilling of rewards, when at the end of a training session or workshop a participant would approach me and say, “Thank you, I have learned something.”


Liberal ideas in Arab history of thought: A homegrown liberal

tradition, or imported?

Clemens Recker Most observers would be quick to assess that liberal

traditions in the Arab world are few and far between. This seems to be as true for political systems as for the history and diversity of liberal political ideas and ideologies.

Until 2011, most political systems in the Arab world could be characterized as authoritarian or undemocratic. Fresh hope rose in the innocence of the first revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, but soon dissipated as uprisings turned violent in Libya, Yemen and Syria. By now, the outlook for liberal ideas and practices seems as dull as it was before 2011. So, those observers claiming that liberalism is alien to the Arab world seem to have been proven right. The revolutions of 2011 and after, according to this assessment, did not prove that there were indeed liberal movements in many Arab countries, but rather the opposite: their failure proved the weakness of liberalism in this part of the world.

In terms of political philosophy, the roots of Arab liberalism are obscure to most people. To many, the “Orient” - to use this catchy and unclear term - has never accepted any liberal, progressive or modern ideas. This view, however wrong, has dug deep into the conscience of a politically interested audience. Montesquieu in his De l’esprit des lois had few positive things to say about the Middle East. Ernest Renan later came up with the idea that Islam is the main culprit in the lack of open-mindedness in the Arab world. In short, the Arab world was seen by European intellectuals and observers to resemble a model that was anything but liberal.


This was not only true for the development of political systems, for basic human rights and political liberties, but also for the development of a philosophy of freedom, of ideas on liberty that would constitute a liberal current within Arab political thought.

In modern Arab political thought, it was not liberalism that rose to prominence.

Modern secular Arab nationalism such as embodied by Gamal Abdel Nasser but also the Ba’ath Party in Syria and Iraq or the national movement in Algeria, is maybe known to people. Equally, Arab socialism was adhered to by many of the newly independent states following World War II. With the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of Islamism, especially since the 1980s, Islamic political thought came to be the most important and most dangerous contester of secular, yet authoritarian political regimes in the Arab world.

Arab liberals thus found themselves in a quagmire. They were squeezed between what they considered two evils. They could not support a state or a regime that was not liberal. However, strongly opposing it gave the chance that the winner in the end might come from the Islamist camp. This is very much what happened during the Arab revolutions. Although liberalism and liberals were involved, other movements came to power.

Also, historically speaking, the three ideological movements mentioned above (nationalism, socialism and Islamism) are related to the Arab world for good reason. Only in very few and rather short-lived instances did Arab liberalism as a set of political ideas translate into an actual political system, however flawed. Egypt after 1923 might have been such an instance, or Lebanon between independence and civil war.

Arab nationalism, socialism and Islamism, on the other hand, did translate into actual political systems. Most of the newly formed independent national states after World War II were both


nationalist and socialist; others - including monarchies - relied on tribal solidarity, and forms of Islamic legitimacy.

But liberalism?

There is not even a proper Arabic word for liberalism. Some call it libraliya, which is not wrong, but already sounds strange enough to count as anecdotal evidence for the assumption that liberalism is alien to the Arab world. In contrast to libraliya, other political ideas managed to get proper Arabic names, such as ishtirakiya (socialism), which is related to the notion of participation and thus inclusivity.

Arab liberals, knowing the weakness of their own terminology, have resorted to inventing alternative terms to coin what they mean by liberalism. Some used Ahrar (those who are free: plural of hurr, meaning free), but ever since Nasser and his “Free Officers” (Al-Dubbat Al-Ahrar), the name was taken. Even earlier, the great Egyptian liberal Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid had proposed the term hurriyeen (also the free ones), yet this idea did not make it past his newspaper Al-Jarida.

Today, liberals are actually hiding behind softer and more commonly accepted names than using libraliya outright. Generally speaking, secularism (‘almaniya) is replaced by the more moderate term of civic (maydaniya), capitalism by market economy (as European liberals do), and generally less contested terms are being used than librali. For instance, there are plenty of party names that include “democracy”, “reform” but it will be hard to find a party that bears the word “liberal” in its name. To be fair, the same is true for many European liberal parties.

Ironically, it was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that found the arguably best solution by calling its political wing the “Freedom and Justice Party.” Can you get more liberal than that?

Today, the problem is not only the lack of a proper term for liberalism, but also of a definite and accepted meaning of the word. For many, the term liberalism signals something close to atheism, gay rights, liberalization of drugs and other supposedly


dodgy things. To be fair, the notion of what liberalism really is is as much contested in the West as it is in the Arab world. In the US, being liberal basically means being leftist. In Germany, as an example, liberalism is associated with both advocacy of capitalism as much as progressiveness on societal issues.

Our esteemed reader should be sufficiently disillusioned by now and believe that there is no such thing as Arab liberalism.

But if that was true, why this book? To make things short: because there is an Arab liberalism that

deserves to be discussed, promoted and supported. There is an Arab liberalism that does not have to shy away in comparison with liberal traditions in other countries or regions. There is an Arab liberalism that has every right to reject accusations that are directed against it, that it is alien, that it was imported. This Arab liberalism has developed over centuries, actively and critically engaging with inputs from the outside world and reactions in its society. It played the role of a bridge, connecting the dots between what other civilizations had used to solve their problems with the necessities of local societies that had to be treated with homegrown political recipes.

Interestingly, the argument of being alien and imported is hardly applied to other ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism, although their roots as modern ideologies should assumingly be as European as liberalism.

What should surprise us is not that there is - in fact - an Arab liberalism. We should be surprised that we know so little about it. Liberalism is a set of political ideas that is usually being developed in an illiberal environment. As we said before, there are plenty of reasons for Arab political thinkers to turn liberal.

So, were liberal ideas imported? Yes, of course! Arab liberalism was as much imported as any other ideology, and as much as German, American, French, British liberalisms were.


There is no such thing as purity in political ideas. It is the exchange of ideas and experiences that enriches and advances any school of political thought.

What would German liberalism be without its inspirations from France and Great Britain? Where did American liberalism come from? Was not the rule of law imported from ancient Rome? Is democracy not an ancient Greek invention?

If liberal ideas were imported in the first place, did they stay so? No. Arab thinkers did what their colleagues had done, and still do, in other countries: they selected, they adapted, they put into context and they merged. They did so with creativity and fervor.

When Rifa’a Al-Tahtawi was sent to Paris in 1826 by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali to accompany a mission that was about to learn and study there, his homeland and with it the whole Arab region and the Ottoman Empire were in a state of crisis. Almost 30 years before, Napoleon had conquered Egypt and had shown how advanced Europe had become in terms of weaponry, training, logistics, technology - everything. Something must have gone wrong in the region to fall behind and the delegation Muhammad Ali sent to Paris was on a mission to catch up.

Upon returning to Cairo, Tahtawi wrote an account on his stay in Paris. It contained descriptions of French and Parisian life in the late 1820s. But he also wrote about the French political system and this is what was to inspire generations of liberal thinkers after him. “It should be noted,” Al-Tahtawi wrote, “that the French king does not yield absolute powers.” The parliament is independent; the judiciary does not follow the orders of the king. The French system had inspired Tahtawi, who was later to found the first Egyptian official newspaper and to head the School of Languages from which many future Arab liberals graduated. Tahtawi’s description of the French political system became in many ways a blueprint for intellectuals in his own society. Ironically, Tahtawi dedicated the book to his sponsor, the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali.


A generation after Tahtawi, the crisis in the Arab world and the Ottoman Empire had worsened. While there was a certain degree of optimism during Tahtawi’s time that, when implementing the right reforms, the region would soon be back on track and could follow and even overtake Europe, this optimism had faded by the end of the 19th century. By then, the Ottoman Empire had been considerably weakened; Egypt was occupied by Great Britain, and greater parts of Northern Africa by France. The notion of crisis had gained currency, and so did calls for change.

Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, for instance, related the weakness of the Ottoman Empire to its authoritarianism and looked at it from every possible angle: authoritarianism in education, science, politics, finance, culture, and other domains. The result is a strong call for liberty in the face of illiberal rule.

Qasim Amin as another example, who was one of the most fervent advocates of the liberation of women, established a link between the status of women in society and the country’s overall progress. In 1899, he wrote his first piece called “Tahrir Al-Mar’a” (Liberation of the Woman), in which he argued that men and women have to be treated equally. He also tried to prove from an Islamic point of view that the headscarf for women is not compulsory.

The new situation was accompanied by the rise of a new powerful force that was to have a strong impact on liberalism. In the face of foreign occupying forces, nationalism began to spread in Egypt. This nationalism had its own dynamics and forces, but it took sides with liberalism. In the writings of Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid shortly before the outbreak of World War I, the call for liberty is twofold. One addresses the occupying power, Great Britain. “It was England,” Al-Sayyid wrote, “who taught the peoples of the world the value of freedom. Why does it deny this freedom to the Africans?” However, freedom from an outside power is only one side of the coin. For the truly free society Lutfi Al-Sayyid hoped for internal freedom was necessary. Egyptian


liberals were quick, therefore, to merge nationalist and liberal ideas and demands into a political program that was to be reflected in the delegation (wafd) of Egypt to the peace negotiations in Versailles and that ultimately received at least partial Egyptian independence in 1923.

A generation after Tahtawi, another thinker rose to prominence that was to take on liberal ideas from a very different angle. Muhammad Abduh (1800-1866), Islamic scholar and formerly a radical student of Al-Afghani, tried to merge Islamic jurisprudence and classical political thinking on the one hand, and modern ideas such as democracy, just rule and freedom on the other. What he accomplished was one of the most important achievements in Arab liberal thought. How could liberalism be alien if it was expressed in Islamic terms? Muhammad Abduh saw modern democracy as already rooted in Islam, by the concepts of shura and ijma’. The principle of shura says that every ruler has to consult and should listen to what his advisors or his people tell him. Ijma’ is a consensus that is a principle in Islam on the exegesis of the Qur’an. Of course, both concepts do not fully or exactly reflect the modern concepts of democracy as it was exercised at the time. What was more important, though, was that the principle existed. Muhammad Abduh later gathered a number of prominent disciples around him, many of whom would become important liberal thinkers themselves.

One of them and who followed in Abduh’s path to reconcile or bring together Islamic teaching and liberal ideas, was Ali Abd Al-Raziq. During the caliphate debate in the 1920s, he published a book called Islam and the Roots of Governance. In this book, Abd Al-Raziq refuted the notion that Islam was both din (religion) and dawla (state). There were, of course, other intellectuals who had held that opinion before, but Abd Al-Raziq set out to refute the claim on the ground of the same arguments and using the same instruments as those who suggested that Islam was indeed religion and state.


This branch of Arab liberalism, which was concerned with harmonizing the teachings of Islam and liberalism, achieved two important developments at the same time. It Arabized liberalism and it liberalized Islam.

By the beginning of the 20th century, some Arab liberals started to rediscover the heritage of ancient Greece and Rome as an inspiration. This was to have profound influences. It started in the literary field when Sulaiman Al-Bustani, a Lebanese polymath, translated Homer’s Iliyad into Arabic. Twenty years later, the Egyptian thinker and intellectual Taha Hussein published a controversial book titled The Future of Culture in Egypt. In this book, he placed his country, Egypt, into the Mediterranean civilization. He takes the political system of the ancient Greek City States as a role model for Egypt. As Egypt is part of the Mediterranean civilization, it is directly linked to its Greek heritage. And it was in Greece where democracy was born, Taha Hussein writes in an essay later on. Taking Greek democracy as a model for Egypt is thus not an import from a foreign civilization but a mere revival of Egypt’s own roots that had been forgotten. This line of argumentation had a sensitive side-effect: it more or less ignored the role Islam played in the development and formation of Egypt as it was in the early 20th century. If Egypt was a Mediterranean civilization and can directly link itself to Greek and even Roman heritage, centuries of Islamic rule in Egypt were - intellectually speaking - insignificant. However, this way, democracy was also not an idea that modern Europe had brought to Egypt or the Arab world. Democracy was part of the region’s very own historical heritage and thus a revival of its own past, not a European import.

The examples mentioned and explained above show and reflect the richness of Arab liberalism. It also clearly proves that Arab liberals did not just express a Western concept of liberalism in Arabic. A truly homegrown tradition did develop since Tahtawi published his book on Paris in 1831.


An idea is not wrong because it comes from a different region that had different experiences. But it is up to the Arab thinker - people like Rifa’a Tahtawi when he went to Paris - to take and adapt what might be useful for his own country.

This is why liberalism in the Arab world had, and has, in many ways other priorities than liberalism has elsewhere. This was already the case in the 19th century. Arab liberals perhaps gave more thought to the notion of just rule and the relationship between worldly and divine affairs, between religion and state, than Western liberal thinkers. On the other hand, Western liberalism has focused much more on economic freedom than Arab liberalism ever did.

Also between countries in the region, priorities of liberal political parties differ. In some countries, for instance, liberals want to build an impartial and functioning state. In others, the priority lies in downsizing an overstretched government.

The task for Arab liberals has never been an easy one. By arguing that there is a current of Arab liberalism - politically and philosophically - one does not suggest that a landslide victory is imminent. But one does suggest that there is a serious alternative to those political recipes that have been applied so far.

Arab liberals today can look back to a remarkable tradition of free and liberal thought in their own intellectual traditions. They worked as politicians, journalists, lawyers and translators - translating not words but meanings, not phrases but ideas.

Liberalism in the Arab world is no longer alien, because Arab thinkers chose to engage it. In this respect, a lot has been achieved. However, it is a task that never ends.


Did Arab liberalism fail freedom in the Arab Spring?

Saed Karajah “Freedom” came at the forefront of Arab Spring demands.

Crowds took the streets in an apparently unplanned manner, yet expressed accumulative mass rejection of despotism and totalitarian rule that kept Arab citizens living in a state of isolation, fear and political absentia, depriving them of taking part in political life for decades.

It is honest, however, to admit that the concept of freedom - across the horizons of the Arab Spring - was not well crystalized in the minds of the revolting masses, neither in the minds of political and cultural elites. Arab peoples surprised their elites, as well as they did themselves. They have not recovered from that surprise even yet.

Arab masses took the streets in order to topple totalitarian regimes, aspiring for freedom and a better economic life. Yet, in their political consciousness, they did not realize the final destination of freedom as they seized the historic moment. The Arab people had had enough, and they revolted to put an end to authoritarian states and leaders. But this did not necessarily mean that the people were conscious of what to do with their acquired freedoms, and where to go next.

For revolutions to experience setbacks is a fact of history. The French Revolution (1789) needed 100 years to be settled as the enlightening revolution we all aspire to nowadays. Another established fact is that revolutions often devour their young, in the full sense of the word. They are the first to be brutally killed and mercilessly excluded. However, this does not change the fact that in the reality of our Arab world in revolt, vast question marks


hang over liberties in general, and political freedoms in particular. This is a matter for deep consideration; not in the way of an analysis or perspective, but rather as an ultimate challenge that needs to be addressed by political and revolutionary powers in order to rescue the Arab Spring, to not let it turn against its mass revolutionary spirit which - as I already said - sought to eliminate totalitarianism and despotism, and to strengthen the participation of the people in rule.

If this were to be the general duty of political powers, it then constitutes depth, identity, and objectives for political and Arab liberal powers, where individual and political freedoms - and even freedoms in general - are the core and frontline of their political actions.

This opportunity gives me not only space to evaluate the attitudes of liberal powers towards Arab Spring events, but space for reflection on the concept and significance of freedoms in Arab contemporary political discourse.

If I may begin with language, it is surprising that the word “freedom” or “free” has no comprehensive or synonymous definition. It is a context-bound term. The “free” is the opposite of the “slave.” The term “freedom” has no inclusive definition in the Arabic lexicon, which is a reflection of pre-Islamic culture. Poets of the pre-Islamic era expressed the concept of freedom in a moral context, and related freedom to nobility and honor as the far opposite of inferiority, of slavery and slaves. However, such indications did not approach the general meaning of “freedom” as the essence of human beings, and a condition for their survival.

Islam elaborated a concept of freedom, but only from a religious perspective, and only for the purpose of setting criteria for acts of worship. This elaboration first started with the early Mu’tazilah1 on the issue of freedom of will. But insofar as the issue of freedom has been raised lately, it is in a political context, as a means of resistance to the coercive mentality that dominated the Umayyad era and that facilitated and justified despotism,


especially when Umayyad rulers built upon the single voice of the ruler and freed it from any active grassroots participation.

With the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment, mid-18th century and early-19th century, Arab enlightened thinkers such as Ahmad Lutfi As-Sayyed,2 Imam Muhammad Abdo,3 and others recalled the concept of freedom as realized by the West. They placed freedoms in the context of human nature. Lutfi As-Sayyed even wrote: “our hearts and minds refuse to be satisfied but through freedom.” Despite this foundation, the struggle for freedom, and its reflections, remained captive, later expressed within a “human rights” framework - especially women’s rights. The late liberals failed in laying solid grounds for - and advocating - a comprehensive concept of freedoms, one based upon non-negotiable individual freedom.

The discourse of the Arab enlightened thinkers remained - in my view - a mere recall of Westernized freedom. They failed to philosophically or realistically conceptualize freedom in a manner that conforms to the exigencies of the Arab political and social arena. Freedom remained a demand that could be exchanged for other priorities, such as liberation from colonialism, or eradication of poverty, or laid aside on claims of the unpreparedness of the masses for absolute freedom.

Through the 1950s and post-50s era, totalitarian and invasive states were established, oppressed individual freedoms and fought against liberal parties and progressive thought. The ultimate result was undaring liberal parties, particularly in respect to personal and individual freedoms. One cannot disregard serious endeavors to achieve political freedoms and participation; however, personal and individual freedoms remained marginal in such endeavors. Moreover, close observation reveals a recursive retreat in personal freedoms and the rights of minorities, in parallel with an increasing fight against individualistic ideology and practices, which constitute pillars of the modern state. Notions of liberty and personal freedoms, therefore, remained but utterances on the sidelines of progressive and liberal political


discourse that was limited to liberalist (versus Islamist) slogans, void of any real influence.

While political Islamist groups were promoting their own misinterpretation of freedom, as being the adoption of “politically-interpreted Islamic laws,” Arab liberals were busy finding reconciliatory grounds for concepts of freedom and “politically-interpreted Islamic text.” Thus, the struggle for freedoms became confined within the folds of “politically-interpreted religious text,” while liberal endeavors devolved to bargaining on concepts of freedom in the Arab sociopolitical arena. Further, freedom principles started to lean towards, and reflect, the common grounds deemed shared with its very adversary - the claim that “freedom” is no more than “politically-interpreted Islamic text”; the very claim that lead to oppression of both political and individual freedoms.

Moreover, Arab liberals complied with the rules of “politically-interpreted Islam,” and took part in the so-called “ballot game.” Alliances had been made between liberals and utter exclusionists, and people had confused the ballot game with compromising the basic constitutional rights of Arab citizens.

Even worse; by accepting such strategically unjustifiable alliances and by compromising individual freedoms, the Arab - Egyptian, in particular - liberals trapped themselves into the dilemma of having to give up ballot-based democracy. 30 June 2013 is a vivid demonstration of the same. The dilemma took shape amid the revelation of the exclusionary reality of theocrats, their intolerance for power sharing, and when they tried to lay the ground for building a totalitarian, authoritarian and autocratic state that philosophically, politically, and realistically contradicts the liberal vision of the state and its role in public life.

In fact, the lack of a comprehensive, well-defined concept of freedoms, especially political and individual ones, and even negotiating and compromising freedoms, led to severe distortions in Arab politics. In Egypt, for example, civil society laws imposed limits on the right of assembly. In Tunisia, personal


status laws were very progressive, compared to those of Egypt, despite the fact that both Tunisia and Egypt were under totalitarian, autocratic regimes.

Arab political discourse and opinion - especially the liberal strand - has missed the full understanding of freedom. It sets personal and individual freedoms as grounds for social and political life, and builds upon them to accomplish economic and political freedom, which makes it easier to sweep away personal freedoms.

The best example is the exclusionary totalitarian rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They tried to censor - or even mute - the satire show of Bassem Youssef, and likewise did the 30 June order, which excluded the Muslim Brotherhood. Both regimes failed to tolerate a satire-based TV show. The Egyptian media accented its promotion of a savior and inspirational leader, and toned up a discourse that may pave the way back to a totalitarian, Nasser-like regime.

In truth, the situation is no surprise. The lack of a politically enlightened and cognitive mainstream receptive to freedoms in Arab discourse, and the absence of a cultural consensus on a comprehensive concept for freedom as a core essence of existence, opened the door to totalitarian rule, dispensing with the individual on pretexts taken from the history of military juntas - such as the “priority of decolonization” and “critical timing.”

Arab liberal powers need to understand that fighting despotism takes place only through further freedoms and the rule of law, and that overcoming oppression through denial of freedoms, and stripping them, even from political opponents, will only bring in a totalitarian regime - one that suppresses freedoms and blows away hopes of the Arab Spring bringing individual, political and social freedoms.

To put it in a nutshell: Arab liberal powers need to stop politicizing liberal principles, and to be more politically rigid. In other words, no bargains or compromises should be made to the


detriment of personal and individual freedoms, ownership, and minority rights - not even under certain circumstances, or for “timely” political motives. Political alliances should be made within the context of clear agreements that do not jeopardize liberal values, but rather ensure the continuity of Arab liberalism in the Arab political arena.

The Arab Spring did not fail freedoms. Rather, the staunch advocates of freedom failed it. It is time now for Arab liberal powers to stand up and commence relentless efforts to ground and promote a full understanding of freedom, based upon glorifying personal and political freedoms, both for opponents and allies, within a state of law and the rotation of power.


References 1- The Islamic school of thought that adopted reasoning as a

source of knowledge. 2- Ahmad Lutfi As-Sayyed (1873-1963) was a renowned

Egyptian liberal intellectual. 3- Imam Muhammad Abdo (1849-1905) was an Egyptian

Muslim scholar and one of the founders of modernism in the Arab world.


Networking for freedom and democracy: Gathering liberal

political parties in the Arab region

Mohammed Tamaldou

When my friend Dr. Ronald Meinardus asked me to contribute to a book that simplifies the past, present and future of liberalism in the Arab region, and suggested that I cover the topic from a personal perspective, highlighting the efforts and challenges that accompanied the development of a comprehensive organizational framework for Arab liberal parties and organizations, I realized the difficulty and complexity of the task at hand. It does not require a chronological arrangement of events, a detailed narrative of obstacles and challenges, or a simplified presentation of the different positions and approaches adopted by this party or the other so much as it requires studying the early manifestations - and analyzing the contexts - that appeared with the development of an unprecedented Arab organizational framework. These contexts posed embarrassing questions from the beginning. We encountered a major challenge: breaking the taboos surrounding liberalism in the Arab region. Upon these taboos is based what is known as “the Arab exception” - a concept used as a shield against democracy, freedom, dignity, and similar values that continued to bother Arab rulers at the time. The need for networking, cooperation, and unifying opinions emerged, due to a common knowledge of our joint Arab reality.

At first, when this entity came into existence, doubt was confused with certainty, politics overlapped with security, and the organizational aspect overshadowed the intellectual aspects. Nevertheless, the Network of Arab Liberals was born, setting its


announced objectives to be protecting individual freedom, plurality, democracy, rule of law, and enhancing market economy. The Network of Arab Liberals was the umbrella that turned into the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy. If the word “liberalism” has disappeared from the second title, this does not at all mean that it was a rejected term. The opposite is true. This term became widely circulated in the media, politics, and society in the Arab region, especially amidst the Arab Spring, which ignited two years after the establishment of the Network of Arab Liberals. Some, rightly or wrongly, considered it a pre-indictor for the transformation to be experienced by the region, and upon which the values of freedom, democracy, and dignity would be based.

For our part, it is hard now that we are close to these events to assert whether they occurred by coincidence or in synchronization with a group of events and developments that this liberal organization can be a part of. In all events, analysis and study will reveal this relation in the future.

Arab liberal thinking between originality and Westernism

One cannot speak about Arab liberal parties and intellectual trends without at least briefly touching upon the dilemma of the relationship between Arab thinking and liberal thinking, and therefore between Arab society and liberalism. Then come the relationship structures between religion, politics and society, and the position of freedom in such relationship structures.

Any reviewer of the interaction between the development the Arab thinking and global thinking will notice that this development has gone through three stages that created the current Arab situation.

First is the stage of gaining awareness of the role - that created liberal values - of the free, creative and active human


being. This stage became clear after the expansion of the Islamic Arab world in the Arab east by the Abbasyid and Ottoman empires. It was the same stage that was reflected at the intellectual, social and economic levels after the expansion of the Islamic empire in Andalusia. In these two events, Islamic and Arab communities experienced prosperity in two different areas. This prosperity was based on a huge margin of freedom for Arabs that was created thanks to the vastness of the Arab empire, breaking centralized authority, and that would allow for initiative, creativity, and innovation resulting in the prosperity of the sciences, raising opportunities for learning about the ideas and experiences of other peoples and civilizations, establishing a culture of tolerance, coexistence, and acceptance of difference. Therefore, it can be deduced that liberal thinking is universal and not exclusive to a specific geographical area or human group. Arab intellectuals knew its early features before they were fully crystalized in a system of thinking emerging in European thought. Hence, any talk about importing this thinking from the West is refutable.

The second stage entailed understanding the importance of applying liberal values in developing daily life and strengthening society. This stage became even clearer in the 19th century, especially with the strong confrontations between Arab armies and Western armies when Napoleon came to Egypt in 1798, and the Isley defeat that occurred in Morocco in 1848. As a result, the Arab existentialist question about the secret behind the victory of the West and the defeat of the Arabs was raised. However, some Arab pioneers in thought realized that the secret lies in the intellectual and cultural climate, understanding the West’s momentum as the outcome of a liberal culture that was like, as the Moroccan researcher Abdulah Al-Arwi said, “the air breathed by whoever is aware of his personality and rights in Europe during the 19th century.”

This conclusion may be the motivation that encouraged several Arab intellectuals, such as Muhammad Abduh, Rifa’a Al-


Tahtawi, Qasim Amin and others, to take to Europe to find out the truth about it.

The third stage entailed understanding the inevitability of adopting liberal values as a mechanism for societal building. This stage witnessed the most important obstacles, the most significant enticements, and the most dangerous maneuvers that led to the deliberate sidelining of liberal thinking while providing room for thinking trends that are against it, hostile to it, and contradict it. This stage witnessed the emergence of tyranny, subjugating all voices calling for freedom and dignity.

For this purpose, socialists, conservatives, and others joined forces to tighten the noose around those who embraced liberal thinking, who were sometimes branded as infidels and at others accused of espionage. In all cases, they were deemed aliens to the Arab and Muslim community.

As a result, a discussion on the originality and Westernism of the liberal trend was started. Some say it is a Western trend and therefore does not accommodate the elements of Arab society, making it imperative to reject it as a whole. Others said it is a type of human thinking that is original to man, and therefore is applicable in the Arab and Muslim community. In addition to these two opposite positions, a third position came to light calling for what is known as “inception” - i.e., the assimilation of Western thinking into Arab thinking by building conceptual bridges linking it to the original culture of the Arab and Muslim community. Mostly, religious concepts were used as the bridge over which Western liberal thought must pass, in order to link to the original culture of the Arab and Muslim community. Such bridges would mainly be used to clarify liberal values or to immerse liberal ideas in religious values.

To conclude, bringing liberal thinking to the Arab and Muslim reality was never an easy task. Networking between liberal parties and groups in the Arab region was not at any point a task that could be implemented in reality only by thinking about it, and developing mechanisms to implement it.


The truth of the liberal political trend in the Arab region

Speaking of the liberal political trend in the Arab region, it basically means political plurality in the region, and therefore freedom of expression and opinion, and the right to differ. We understand to what extent can plurality - in the sense of multiple trends and choices and not multiple groups and tribes - be a part of Arab politics. Except for five or six countries, this type of plurality cannot be seen in Arab political systems. The partisan plurality-based liberal trend is very limited. If we include intellectual plurality in the general list, and the ensuing freedom of opinion, thinking and expression, along with the right to differ, we inevitably bump into an unsatisfactory reality, especially when busy creating a conducive environment for successfully establishing the concept of Arab networking to defend the values of freedom, dignity, and democracy.

I speak of this to give readers an impression of the difficulty we experienced while working to achieve a dream whose requirements were not available.

There were some Arab parties that embraced liberal values, the oldest of which is Egypt’s Wafd Party. There was also the Moroccan Constitutional Union, which was the first Arab party that declared its belief in liberalism. It was also the first party to join Liberal International. In addition to these two parties, there were parties that were serious about their affiliation, while others were either hesitant or experimenting with it. Moreover, some brave figures and forums played a pioneering role in the dissemination of the liberal trend in countries were partisan plurality is unknown, or the conditions for founding a liberal party are unclear. Conservatism and Islamism prevailed and the one party or the majority party is the system used in the rest of the Arab dictatorships. As a result, the emergence of a liberal political trend in the Arab region was some kind of revolution against the present situation. It was a political and intellectual


revolution that has made it binding to believers in this type of thinking across the world to appreciate this unprecedented courage, and to help disseminate liberal values in Arab communities in particular. The Arab region has begun to attract the attention of the international community, being a political hotspot that is economically rich and has societal tensions the results of which cannot be predicted.

The first sign of interest was when Liberal International’s executive committee convened in Casablanca, Morocco, in 2003. It was the first time for Liberal International to hold a meeting in an Arab country, which took place during the Iraq crisis. Interest started to pick up with Liberal International holding two conferences in Arab countries. The first one was held in 2006 in the city of Marrakesh, and the second was in 2009 in Cairo.

This was what sparked the interest in networking and creating a framework that would allow Arab liberal groups to gather and discuss joint issues, and to meet with other members of the global family of liberalism.

The birth of the Network of Arab Liberals It was in Cairo in 2006 that a group of liberal parties and

groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) learned of a meeting chaired by Lord Alderdice, president of Liberal International at the time, in the same year in Marrakesh. The Cairo meeting was attended by several groups from all countries of the region. I met with Syrians, Egyptians from the National Progressive Unionist Party, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Sudanese that I did not expect to see in such a meeting. I wondered at the time if this was a sign that they had begun to be convinced with liberalism, or if they were just assigned to attend. In any case, this meeting reached a number of conclusions. The first of these conclusions was that working on a region such as the Middle East and North Africa with its different races, sometimes different languages (Turks), and the contradictions and gaps between its


political structures, would render a network of such size unable to undertake its role. It might be enough to work on the Arab region only, to reach the intended purposes.

This was the opinion reached in the meeting held on the sidelines of Liberal International’s conference in Marrakesh in November 2006. The decision was taken to found a network to focus on the Arab region. Ever since this moment, the liberal family has been taking care of the new baby through Liberal International and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

From early on, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation emerged as a key supporter of the project, seeking to disseminate the values of freedom, dignity, democracy, and human rights in the Arab region. At first, it provided the necessary logistics to assist members to structure their organizations, produce papers and documentation to support their work, and build relations between them and liberals across the world. Casablanca was the actual launching point for the Network of Arab Liberals, where the first constituent meeting was held in 2007 resulting in the birth of the leadership and direction committee, which I was honored to chair. It is no secret that this meeting was a screening process that eliminated the parasites that sought to attach themselves to this new political framework for their own purposes.

After that, meetings were held in Cairo, Beirut and Tunisia for more deliberations and discussions before going on a trip to some European capitals to learn about Western liberal experiences in creating frameworks and training mechanisms. The last stop in this process was in Al-Ein Al-Sokhna in Egypt.

Al-Ain Al-Sokhna was the real testing ground for bringing different Arab views together in the frame of liberal reality. The German expert who came to train us on how to draft a document to announce our principles, set objectives, and develop an action plan taking into account our points of weakness and strength as an Arab group, worked hard to encourage us to embrace the intellectual strictness and accuracy that Germans are known for. Some of us carried a purely Arab culture, while others mixed this


culture with a French tinge, and others still combined it with an Anglo-Saxon spirit. Nevertheless, he managed to deliver the message before delegating me to translate it into reality when my brothers chose me to chair the session for developing the network’s charter.

This was one of the most difficult and richest sessions. It gave an early summary of the concerns of the Arab street that would be voiced in public two years later, speaking for minorities and women, and those who are vulnerable and persecuted because of tyranny in the Arab world.

During this session, the problem of generalizing the characteristic of being an Arab was presented. Non-Arabs also reside in the Arab world. Also, the issues of the civic state, secular state, citizenship, and others became the subject of open discussions in Arab communities. Although the discussion was heated, we managed to draft a joint statement upon which everyone agreed.1 This was our first successful step in overcoming differences and adopting a mind-based - instead of emotions-based - way of thinking.

I remember here that my friend Camil Chamoun said to me after the end of the meeting, “I admire your ability to turn tough arguments to your side!” My brother Makram Ebied joked: “How could you say we congratulate ourselves? Isn’t this a type of selfishness?” I answered him: “The Arab self is not a unified entity yet, which is why we should ask its separate parts to congratulate one another!”

Cairo and the guided leadership test I do not know what happens to us whenever the issue of

leadership is raised. We cannot help ourselves, and do not measure our capacities, or assess our efficiencies before announcing our intention to compete for a leadership post. I knew

1 The document is to be found at the end of this chapter.


this beforehand, and was psychologically ready for it, not because I wanted to compete for the leadership of the Network of Arab Liberals, but because I was prepared to form a correct opinion of the competition for the presidency, to help me avoid going to an extreme, becoming emotionally reckless, and submitting to prejudices, and to use reason, prioritize public interest, and serve the objectives of the network. As brothers are accustomed, I was nominated to chair the general assembly session to ratify the statute, and to democratically elect a new president and an executive bureau. That was the second test after the common ground test at Al-Ain Al-Sokhna.

I remember I adjourned the session for a break, in order for members to choose candidates for the presidency of the network, and for candidates to convince supporters. However, I felt some coldness in the atmosphere during the break, as if it was not an election, during which in our Arab region we are used to tricks, plots and much screaming. While thinking about all this, my friend Jordanian MP Mohamed Arslan requested to be given the floor immediately after we re-enter the room, because he had a proposal that he wanted to present on behalf of all members. I began to realize the reason behind the coldness. They had agreed on a name to be nominated for the presidency of the network. I thought to myself if I should let the session follow the same scenario as all other Arab partisan conferences, resulting in the election of a president by group applause! I decided against this. When we returned to the room, I deliberately ignored my friend Mohamed Arslan who raised his hand to be given the floor. I looked the other way asking if anyone wants to be given the floor. Three members spoke before I returned to my friend to give him the floor, who said that all of the brothers reached a consensus on nominating Mohamed Tamaldou to be the president of the network. I do not know why I was a little bothered by this proposal. My task was to chair the general assembly - let alone the fact that I did not nominate myself! Hence, I asked several times if anyone wants to nominate himself. When no one came


forward, I agreed to put Mohamed Arslan’s proposal to vote and it was a democratic consensus.

Despite this I felt uneasy. And over the two years set by regulation to be the mandate of the president, after which he may not run again, I tried to deal with this uneasiness.

If you remember the two key supporters I was telling you about, Liberal International and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, they were the first to send their congratulations on this occasion. Lord Alderdice, president of Liberal International, said in his message: “I have been keen on supporting the development of political work not only in your region, but in the whole world. Within this context, I was honored to preside over the first meeting for this network in July 2006. I felt more comfortable when I learned that the network will be led by an experienced liberal like you. It has made me very hopeful about the continuous development and success awaiting the network.” Meanwhile, Dr. Wolfgang Gerhardt, chairman of the Board of Directors of Friedrich Naumann Foundation, said: “I learned of your election as the first president of the Network of Arab Liberals. It is great news and I congratulate you for it. I have learned of the huge contribution you have made to bring together liberal parties and organizations in the Arab region. I would like to congratulate you for that. I honestly wish you the best of luck leading this network.”

Early years and outcomes: 2008-2010 Oddly, the Network of Arab Liberals came to existence at the

same time as the global financial and economic crisis. We came to say that market economy is the only way to develop nations and people, and that the freedom of initiative is the way to develop people’s skills and motivate their creativity. However, a golden opportunity came up for those claiming that capitalism and liberalism were the cause for the economic crisis, and if the


market were more subject to laws and regulations, mistakes would not have happened.

We had to face this emergency, and we did, by demonstrating the importance of liberal positions in an event staged by the Free Thought Forum in Jordan. My dear brother and friend, the current president of the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy and president of the Free Thought Forum, Mr. Saed Karajah, presented a number of specialized speakers who proposed ways of facing the crisis from a liberal perspective in a gathering that shed a lot of light on the implications of the crisis for Arab economies and presented practical points with a view to reducing the impact, and addressing the implications, of the crisis.

I remember that my brother Mr. Karajah displayed a characteristic that is rarely found these days: the courage to voice his beliefs. Many of those who claim to defend established beliefs cannot arrange a gathering under the title of liberalism in a primarily conservative Arab community, and amidst narrow-minded religious trends and numerous slanders and insults against liberalism. I respected Mr. Karajah for his persistence in organizing that gathering despite the surrounding risks. Which is why when he approached me two or three days ahead of the gathering requesting to hold the meeting without setting up a banner outside of the room with the word liberalism on it, I could not but respond positively to his request. I did not hesitate to tell him that I understand. I remembered this while visiting Oman as part of an international observation mission for the last legislative elections, and seeing the heated political conflict between tribes and how Islamists defended their position on elections. I realized that the liberal trend in Jordan is in real need of patience and serious work to be done by those who truly embrace beliefs and protect principles and women.

The Arab Alliance for Democracy and Freedom supports the message that we all carry, which is disseminating liberal values across the Arab region. This task cannot be undertaken in a short


period of time, being a task that must be entrusted from one generation to another. As a result, the network gave attention to youth and women, and gave communication and media a large role in the dissemination of these values. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation managed to produce several books and allowed for limitless electronic communications to train youth on freedoms of expression and opinion. Out of faith in the role of the youth, we provided space for youth who stumbled sometimes, and stood up at others, until they became stronger and effective representatives of liberal thinking in the Arab region. They also became field activists who played a role in Arab activism at all levels and in several Arab region countries.

Networking domestically and internationally The process of exchanging ideas and experiences between

Arab countries via representatives of their liberal parties has significantly developed. Through this process, we learned about the truth of the situation in Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. Every now and then, we focused on regional issues from proximate perspectives. A Maghreb seminar was held in Morocco by the Constitutional Union on the relationship between religion and politics. It was attended by liberal parties from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Mauritania. It was also attended by representatives of the Islamist Justice and Development Party in Morocco. This was an important step to establish liberal openness at the domestic level, and an attempt to come up with a regional liberal vision on a specific subject - the issue of migration. The Network of Arab Liberals held a meeting on this issue in Tunisia, in which Arab liberal parties produced a joint document that was presented to the European Parliament. We interviewed a group of liberal parliamentarians on this issue before a joint group of European liberal parliamentarians and met with Arab liberal parliamentarians in the city of Rabat to discuss it.


This meeting that was presided over by Mr. Hans Van Baalen, president of Liberal International, marked the beginning of Arab-European networking at the level of liberal parliamentarians. The session held by the Moroccan parliament was a significant indication of the importance of cooperation between joint liberal groups to find liberal solutions to joint issues. I hope we take this further in the future.

The most important achievement in this area was made in Cairo when the Liberal International conference was held in Egypt, the “Mother of the World,” as my friend Dr. Ronald Meinardus repeatedly calls it in perfect Egyptian dialect. Held in 2009, it was the second conference to be held by this organization on Arab land in no more than three years after the Marrakesh conference. This international meeting was a true representation of the spirit of liberal understanding on crucial Arab issues, including the Palestinian cause. It enhanced the status of Arab liberals in this generous country. This conference shed light on the significant liberal and dear friend Dr. Ayman Nour, highlighting the truth of loyalty to principles and values, and recognizing the sacrifices made to defend values.

It was only natural for us after these steps to think of a way to network and communicate with Liberal International in an institutionalized manner. For this purpose, I made a proposal to the secretary general of Liberal International to find a legal means to make the voice of Arab liberals heard in the organization’s steering bureau, with the same applying to other regional networks. This proposal was a reason for amending the organization’s internal laws. A clause was introduced to allow a representative of the Arab liberal network to attend the proceedings of the steering bureau. As a result, I gained the opportunity to be a member in the international bureau. After the Arab Spring, I was able to make the voices of Arab liberals heard in the bureau and to present their visions, demands, and views of what has been taking place in Arab countries.


Back to the start In Casablanca, the leadership and direction committee of the

Network of Arab Liberals was formed. If Cairo were the place for drafting instruments and electing a president and steering structures, Beirut would be the place for rotating members of these structures in 2010. The legal mandate of the elected steering bureau in Cairo has come to an end, and new procedures needed to be taken for holding new elections to choose a new leadership. Some of my friends wanted me to continue and begged me to do so - to which I responded that the regulations did not allow for that. Some of them proposed to turn the ordinary general assembly into an extraordinary one, to change the regulations, and to hold another general assembly to elect a president in accordance with the new circumstances. However, this proposal mirrored what was being done by tyrant Arab leaders that we used to scandalize. Given this, how could I, or we, accept that?

In any case, I went to the meeting room and announced my resignation as president and that of the bureau in accordance with the regulations we had originally agreed upon. The resignation was accepted and we all got rid of the notion of the “leader of necessity” that had threatened us - the leader without whom corruption would prevail. The Network of Arab Liberals had got rid of a deep-rooted Arab complex. After the end of the general assembly where he gave a speech, and after the election of my friend Wael Nawara to be the new president of the network, Dr. Ayman Nour said: “I admire your sense of deeply rooted democracy. I would like to ask your permission to call you the golden bracelet of Arabs.”

The uneasiness I felt after my election in Cairo was entirely gone because I did not participate in establishing an undesirable tradition to produce Arab leaders the old way, which had nothing to do with the spirit of democracy. It felt like liberalism was not established enough in our conscience, which did not go beyond the democratic mechanism to adopt an approach based on respecting the other, recognizing his right, and the added value


that no one but him can present. The experience highlighted the value of the individual, and faith in difference, which is the origin of creativity, the source of riches, and the launching pad for progress and development.

Hence, I felt that we have yet to realize the true deeper meanings of liberalism. We have yet to incorporate it in our Arab thinking. Therefore, in the beginning we had to take into account that some of us have fully understood this type of thinking, while others are still testing it, looking for common ground between beliefs and new principles, while others are on a mission and are ready to play a role. This was a reality that we faced with careful attention that some continued to deem idiocy. I became sure of it after the end of my mandate as president when I spoke to a correspondent who called for denouncing the protests that erupted in Tunisia as a result of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. That was the first spark of the Arab Spring saga, and the request to denounce the protests was made by a “liberal” group.

The Arab region is today better prepared to accept the values of liberalism and deal with them in accordance with the dignity, freedom and creativity that the people of this region desire. Significant efforts were made by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation to facilitate what was achieved. Hopefully, these efforts will not stop until we reach our dream of seeing an Arab society that is proud of its character and features and is in tune with the diversity and dynamism of the international community.


Ain Sokhna Declaration

The Network of Arab Liberals (NAL) is comprised of Arab liberal parties and activists in the Arab world. The NAL is committed to the principles of freedom, responsibility, pluralism, tolerance, market economy, civil state, and the separation of religion from state affairs. The NAL helps its members to promote liberal reforms for a better life in peace and prosperity in the Arab world.

The Network of Arab liberals (NAL) supports its members to achieve more democracy, and free and fair elections to overcome authoritarian corrupt behavior and practices, and give the power to the people in the Arab world to participate actively in politics. The NAL knows that true democratic behavior and the rule of law will fend off the danger of extremism and repressive regimes in our region.

The Network of Arab liberals (NAL) supports its members to fight for private and public freedoms. The NAL wants that all citizens of the countries of the Arab world can live without any discrimination and repression, regardless of race, ethnicity, and religion.

The Network of Arab liberals (NAL) supports its members to promote market economy, and competitive abilities of the Arab world, vis a vis the current and future challenges. The network also promotes the inclusion of the economies of Arab countries within world economy, to enable these economies to achieve prosperity and the fairest distribution of national wealth.

The NAL members are upright, brave, dedicated, credible, and experienced in all forms of reform in the countries of the Arab world.

With its international ties the NAL is an important factor for defending the Arab world interests in the international community to overcome the unfair double standard oriented behavior of some international powers.


The NAL invites all liberal parties, institutions and personalities who believe in liberal values, and have the conviction to political reform to join or support the NAL to bring peace, freedom, democracy and prosperity to our Arab world.


Liberalism in Lebanon: Foundations and obstacles

Hassan Mneimeneh

Unlike other Arab states, Lebanon enjoys a political composition that stands upon liberal foundations. Observers find liberal principles well presented in the preamble and provisions of the Lebanese Constitution, an indication that the founding fathers of Lebanon desired it to be saturated with liberal values; not only culturally and economically, but also politically. It is no mistake to say that liberalism is a cornerstone of the Lebanese system and Lebanese society as well, both in ancient and modern times.

This fact has been reflected in the behavior of the Lebanese people, whose creativity and initiative have always been basic merits in their daily routine, and their political and cultural environment. The Lebanese people have always been the first among Arab states to catch up with world changes, and the first to engage with the newest political and ideological updates, which shows a reality colored with liberally-based and liberally-powered resilience.

Liberalism in the Lebanese Constitution The Lebanese Constitution preamble builds a firm conviction

that the Lebanese system is a liberal one, in the full sense of the word, and that liberalism serves as the pillar of the Lebanese system and protective umbrella for religious diversity. Liberalism in the Lebanese Constitution safeguards Lebanese minorities, preventing any political or sectarian majority from exercising dominance over minorities.


The preamble clearly states: “Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination.”

It also provides that: “Lebanese people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise these powers through the constitutional institutions.”

Regarding economy, it is clearly stated in the Lebanese Constitution that, “the economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right to private ownership.”

Moreover, the charter provides equality among all Lebanese, providing that: “Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese has the right to live in any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. There is no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of affiliation, and no fragmentation, partition, or colonization.” It adds: “All Lebanese citizens are equal before law. All citizens equally enjoy their political and civic rights, and bear their public duties and responsibilities without discrimination.”

The Lebanese Constitution also safeguards freedoms in a decisive and direct manner. It provides in Article 8: “Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one may be arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law. No offense may be established or penalty imposed except by law.”

Further, Article 9 stipulates: “There shall be absolute freedom of belief. The state in rendering homage to the Allah Almighty shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.”


The Lebanese Constitution attentively refers to education, freeing it from the control of the state. It stipulates in Article 10: “Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds.”

Article 11, in turn, addresses freedom of expression in an explicit manner: “The freedom to express one’s opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by law.”

Ownership, as well, is emphasized in a liberal manner in Article 14, which states: “Rights of ownership shall be protected by law. No one’s property may be expropriated except for reasons of public interest, in the cases established by law and after fair compensation has been paid beforehand.”

With such a plenty of dense liberal-based texts, there is no room for doubt that the political system in Lebanon is well established upon liberal bases and foundations. The Lebanese Constitution has left no single liberal principle not explicitly and directly provided within its terms. This means that the core of the Lebanese system, and Lebanese identity, was established by intention upon liberal foundations. Liberalism has always been the ultimate goal of the Lebanese system, and the base of any political activity or legislation.

Probably it was due to the flexibility of its political system, and by fostering liberal values that promote and encourage tolerance and coexistence, that Lebanon has successfully sustained its national peace and social integrity in times of extreme hardship. Thanks to the wide spread of liberal values, which nurture diversity and plurality, no antagonistic or totalitarian ideology has grown or flourished in Lebanon.

To liberalize the Lebanese system, therefore, is not the goal - neither to float liberal values in Lebanon. That would be in vain.


The real challenge is to address obstacles that stand against enhancing the liberal mood and culture in Lebanon.

Dilemma of liberalism in Lebanon Liberalism is not a strict ideology; neither is it a strict

partisan order. As mentioned, it is rather a rights approach and a general framework for any activity, be it individual or social, cultural or political. That simply means that not every “Islamist” is necessarily “anti-liberal,” while not every “irreligious” person is necessarily “liberal.” Anti-religious despotism is not liberal. Also, religious enlightenment - whether Islamic or Christian - that respects and fosters rights may include a vehement liberal approach. Like, for instance, the Justice and Development Party of Turkey.

The poor performance of the so-called “liberal powers” is one of many problems liberalism faces in the Arab region, particularly Lebanon. Those “liberal powers” have limited their liberalism to populist discourse in an attempt to mobilize people, yet real liberal values and principles are absent from their practice and political agenda.

Another problem is the dominance of “identity” discourse, which focuses on cultural and intellectual invasion and regarding liberalism as an alien imperial ideology while liberalism is a rights approach that does not only limit the despotism of local authorities, but also curbs imperialism itself, and abolishes any excuse for a given state to colonize or manipulate another state, considering such actions a flagrant violation of fundamental human rights.

What is required is a well-tailored, mature sensitization campaign on liberalism. Liberalism should not introduce itself as an alternative to established intellectual or political movements; neither should it be conceived nor practiced as political parties competing with others over power. Rather, liberalism needs to be


introduced as a human rights system and set of principles, establishing a framework for social and partisan solidarity, political order, and any other human activity. The more awareness is raised, the closer society gets to a liberal reality and framework. The more liberalism is limited to be a mere political opponent, the further society gets from the essence of liberalism, and the deeper the despotic mentality goes.

Liberalism is not a political agenda. Liberalism is rather a lifestyle, not enthusiastic slogans that respond to populist or urgent needs. It is meaningless to say that a liberal party exists among other political parties, because real liberalism requires its deep philosophical implications to be present inclusively, not only in a group or party. Liberalism is a general framework for the whole of society, demanding every single individual comply with its values and principles.

Obstacles to liberalism in Lebanon Obstacles to liberal awareness in Lebanon include:

i. Structure of Lebanese system The Lebanese system does enjoy a liberal essence, but the

Lebanese Constitution itself can be regarded as one of the biggest challenges to liberalism. This is because of the conflicts the constitution includes, in articles that are not so much counter to liberalism per se, but yet might imply a conflict in their application in Lebanese life.

The most challenging obstacle is sectarianism. Historic sectarian components have been transformed by the system into detached self-centered political blocs that moderate their own social, cultural and religious affairs away from state control, rather than being well-established social and traditional components that have a doctrine-based religious structure.


The constitution, for example, stipulates that Muslims and Christians are to be equally represented in the Chamber of Deputies, with proportional seat distribution among confessional groups of the two religious communities in a manner that guarantees fair representation of all confessional groups in the formation of the cabinet. Grade One posts shall be equally distributed between Muslims and Christians.

Such provisions established a sectarian political reality. Although these provisions were meant to be transitional, as stipulated, they turned out to be static and a main feature of public life.

Moreover, the constitution referred individuals to external sectarian references to control them, confine their freedoms, and limit their choices. Thus the constitution provides confessional groups with full independence in managing their internal affairs. It stipulates that: “autonomy of confessional groups has its historic roots and became a well-established tradition in the social and political history of Lebanon. It is a main pillar upon which the Lebanese system is established.” Confessional groups independently manage their personal status affairs. This led a political society made up of sects, each of which represents an organic unit in the state structure. Confessional groups do not only enjoy judicial, administrative and legislative independence from the state; even more, they take part in structuring the state through their representatives’ role in composing and facilitating institutions.

It is not our goal to highlight the imbalance caused by political confessionalism in Lebanon, but rather to draw attention to the fact that the confessional structure in Lebanon curbs individual freedoms and hinders stabilization of natural non-alienable human rights.

Confessionalism curbs the state’s capacity to perform its role in protecting the individual’s rights and providing means for the individual to achieve his goals. Further, confessionalism has turned into a tool used by every confessional group to serve its


interests, to imprison individuals within these interest systems - which even take the shape of institutionalized mafia at times - and create obstacles to those who do not belong to them.

One outcome is that Lebanon has become a fragile, lame-duck state unable to protect itself from the hegemony of external powers that manipulate its internal dynamics, depleting its resources, to besiege individuals, limit their freedoms, and penalizes them if they get disobedient - all under the nose of law and traditions.

ii. Societal composition Liberalism in the Arab world, particularly in Lebanon, suffers

from the dominance of traditions in society, and in family relations. Tradition, in this context, does not mean Islam, which is a victim of traditions in many cases (especially newly emerging traditions that prevent Islam itself from responding to the requirements of contemporary life).

It is true that traditions protect sustainability and transfer a society’s set of values through the generations, which ensures dynamic stability. But dilemmas occur when traditions become calcified and unchangeable, blocking the capacity to develop in parallel and cope with major changes and updates that take place everywhere. This may cause society to stiffen in turn, presenting a hurdle to its advancement. Dilemmas emerge between what is old and what is new, what is historical and what is modern, and between what is authentic and what is contemporary. Without satisfactory settlement, or an ability to overcome hard binaries, forward momentum grinds to a halt.

Elimination of traditions is not the target, of course, but rather moving them into a new arena, one that can contain new human rights successes and merge them into the fabrics and lifecycles of traditions. This includes individual freedoms and


lifting restrictions on human rights in general, regardless of gender, class, race or religion.

Another dilemma is to be added to dominance of traditions in society: the confessional composition of society. Confessionalism is far more complex than simple religious affiliation. It is not about sets of institutional and social relationships based upon religion, but rather a form of fanaticism with internal political and hierarchal order, and social inwardness, like a sealed wooden chest. All members of a given sect are expected to uphold the same attitudes and mentality, and any deviation or difference from the norm punished in various ways, from censure and exclusion to murder.

Therefore, the dilemma of Lebanese liberals contrasts with the dilemmas of liberalism in neighboring Arab states. At the time liberalism in the Arab region was about introducing constitutional and institutional safeguards to protect national and religious groups from the power and dominance of the state, liberalism in Lebanon was concerned rather with finding safeguards to protect both the individual and the state from the hegemony of confessional affiliations and sectarian fanaticism. As a result, Lebanon’s political life lacks an inclusive public sphere and awareness with the role of state as a legal entity, and misses the minimal commonalities that build up an inclusive national culture - an essential requirement to sustain a unified society rather than a divided one.

Due to all of these reasons, the modern history of Lebanon is a history of confessional groups, not one of a unified political entity attempting to accumulate its experiences and to correct and improve its performance, reinforcing its centralism and sovereignty.

The dilemma of liberalism in Lebanon is that the individual is the victim of society’s culture, which does not encourage free initiative or release the internal powers of human beings. The individual falls victim to sectarian and confessional affiliation, which curbs individual freedoms. When the individual resorts to


his group to protect him from slavery, or at least marginalization, at the hands of the state, he suddenly finds himself a slave of a no less savage entity. Confessional groups started to establish their own systems of penalties and rewards, their own centralities and security apparatuses with powers outweighing even the power of the state itself. Channels for free expression almost vanished, and no shelter could be found from the new despotism.

One could say that in Lebanon two parties threaten the individual and confiscate his freedoms: confessional groups, and the state based on confessional structure. The hegemony of the two parties will only be lifted through the revival of civil society, which creates free and open space for creativities to emerge with inter-sectarian voluntary activities, to act as a protection from the hegemony of the state, and as well from the over-dominance of confessional affiliation.

Civil society is the missing element in our Arab and Lebanese reality, through which the individual may restore his individuality away from his cultural affiliation, and broaden his channels for expression. Civil society is the individual’s opportunity to remove the margins of the non-state and to redraw the boundaries of his state, impact its performance and limit its powers.

However, it is worth underlining that civil society cannot emerge in a weak state, or develop in a non-existing one. Civil society is the child of balanced powers within the state. It cannot be the outcome of state’s destruction, deterioration, or destabilization; it is rather the outcome of a well-defined relation with the state. This establishes the state and civil society as requisites for each other’s existence, and makes the ultimate result of their absence an infinite state of sectarianism.

iii. Absence of supportive liberal powers The current challenge is not about existence or absence of

liberal movements in Lebanon, but rather in one’s willingness to


be liberal, and one’s desire to take reality into the broad liberal space. The question of liberalism is a question to one’s self, and the main challenge is the ability to change, and having genuine will to change.

This is a process that will not take place automatically and spontaneously; it rather needs supporting powers, to be enlisted in the political, cultural and social agenda, without bargains for political deals or ministerial posts, and without waiving human rights - no matter what consequences may take place, or how powerful traditions and backwardness are.

Liberal movements in Lebanon and the Arab world need to take an aggressive stance, in well-tailored performance that puts into consideration present conditions and possibilities, in order to stabilize the de facto liberal reality in political life, and further in all aspects of public and private life. To do this, clarity of visions and objectives must exist; there should not be any hesitation pressing such visions or objectives, and neither any retreat under pressure of those who do not understand the real meaning of liberalism, or those who antagonize, casting liberalism as an anti-religion approach. They want nothing but to serve their own narrow interests after realizing that liberal culture would free individuals from their control and dominance, giving birth to an active, flexible and creative reality instead of the stifled, dysfunctional reality that exists at present.

The liberalism we understand, and aspire for The liberalism we understand and aspire for in our Arab

space, particularly for Lebanon, can be identified by the following merits and characteristics:


i. Liberalism is a human achievement Liberalism lifted all forms of dominance over humans and

strengthened the faith in the individual’s ability to challenge his destiny, determine his future, manage his life, and take his own decisions. Liberalism has broadened the space for man’s existence, and diversified his choices. Moreover, liberalism has passed to man the responsibility of realizing his goals, and rather making a whole world - not alone, but with help of other fellow individuals. In other words, in terms of liberalism, a man is as responsible for others as he is for himself.

Liberalism, in this sense, calls for the elimination of all obstacles to achieve one’s goals, and elimination of fake authorities - those standing on lies. No one, therefore, shall have control over another, except within limits of necessity, such as guardianship over minors till age of maturity. No economic power shall be used as a pretext for exceptional controls. No political power shall be transferred through inheritance. Power is acquired by consent of everyone, only through liberal-based democratic mechanisms. Similarly, no one shall have control over the values and religious principles of society. All members of society participate in interpreting these values, modifying them, or even creating new ones. All individuals have the right to understand and interpret their religion, given that all necessary qualifications are provided.

ii. Liberalism means unleashing individual and group initiative Liberalism believes in individual creativity and innovation. It

is necessary to provide an enabling environment for such creativity, and to remove all barriers in order to savor its fruits and outcomes. Free initiative is not limited to freedom of trade and materialistic production; it rather includes all domains where man can express himself, explore nature, and develop


communities. It is our role to encourage creativity, to develop talent, and to raise-up persons longing for innovation and exploration. We aspire for a dynamic society that does not live by memories but rather looks forward to the future.

iii. Liberalism means a set of natural rights for individuals Natural rights cannot be retained, limited, or stripped away.

This set of rights is a core component of human being’s identity. Philosophers of the Classical Age referred to this set of rights as including rights of ownership, freedom, and security, and a human rights package can be added as well as a universal value all individuals are entitled to have and sustain. Add to that also human dignity, which was the spark for the latest Arab uprisings. Advocating these rights is not about slogans; it is our target to integrate them in any legal interpretation, or include them in any constitutional amendment. It is our target also to refine our legal system, as well as our cultural system, from anything that may counter such rights.

iv. Liberalism means that man is the ultimate goal of a state Man must be the end, or goal, of all values. Man is the source

of legitimacy for all powers. Everything must serve man’s needs, not otherwise. Everything must be working for man’s best interest, happiness, and perfection.

v. Liberalism means that the state’s job is limited to securing the interests of its individuals Building individuals’ capacities, and to empower them to be

productive effective members of society, is central to liberalism.


Any power that overweighs the interests of individuals - or the interests of society as a group of individuals - shall be meaningless. Liberalism is not only about rejection of despotism and absolute powers, it rather rejects all sorts tradition-driven powers, or disguised despotism that comes out from the heart of democracies, such as majority despotism.

vi. Liberalism is the absolute guarantee for real

democracy The democratic process can easily be manipulated,

transformed to become null and void. Liberalism requires a democracy that is not a mere interface for power possession. Democracy, from liberalism’s perspective, is strictly linked to maintaining all people’s rights. In the liberal view, the end goal of democracy is not power, but rather expressing people’s minds and aspirations, and protecting their interests and rights.

vii. Liberalism means that society joins the state in

decision-making and public sphere management Individuals have the right to build voluntary and free

associations, through which all aspects of public life can be addressed, in case the state fails to, or in case society can contribute more effectively. This may include charities, social solidarity, family support, and human rights lobbies. Liberalism believes that society, through its internal dynamics and institutions, is capable of balancing the state’s powers, and even limiting them, while contributing to the creation of enabling and humane productive spheres.

viii. Liberalism provides that the individual is an

integral part of society An individual shares with others identity, culture and values,

while having his own private sphere apart from society. An


individual’s affiliation with a group or sect, or a religion, does not mean the creation of a surrounding out of which he cannot go. Affiliation and belonging are pointless if coerced or imposed. Affiliation and belonging must come as free will and desire. So, individuals enjoy freedom of movement within their societies, and are entitled to build free associations as added affiliations. Social identity is not a closed circle; it is rather an interactive dynamic, and is not limited to one form, but rather is an ongoing renewed being. In a liberal atmosphere, therefore, no social or cultural identity has the right to confiscate the individual’s will, or limit his choices, or strip away his rights to be unique and different, even within the narrow circles of affiliations - let it be family or tribe, village or city, sect or religion. Affiliation is everyone’s right, and at the same time, no individual should be forced into an affiliation or belonging against his own will. The right to join a group, a party, a religion, or a social organization, must be preserved and protected as a part of man’s natural rights. It is a voluntary and free decision to be part of a group, and must never be forced or coerced.

ix. Liberalism means protecting everyone’s right of belief Under liberalism, everyone has the right to practice rites he

believes in, providing necessary protective measures for him to do so and preventing persecution because of beliefs. Liberalism is not a new religion - this must be stressed - and is not here to compete with other religions. Liberalism is a rights approach that works for the protection of all believers, defending their right to freely choose their beliefs and preventing anyone from imposing their choices on others. Liberalism is not here to reject a conviction, or to judge an ideology, simply because it is not a cognitive system or scientific research methodology. In the first place, liberalism is a rights approach to human activity, and it provides the best environment for human creativity and effectiveness.


x. Liberalism is not a way out of religion Neither is liberalism a step above religious values, as some

may unknowingly promote. Liberalism respects man’s beliefs and choices. However, there is a problem in stiff interpretations of religions, and not religions per se; the dilemma of encountering mentalities that try to narrow religion to a single interpretation. That is the ancestral mentality. They refuse to listen or to see the updates surrounding them, intentionally or unintentionally. They want to suppress all intellectual and scientific thinking of new horizons, because this may harm their positions as the guardians of belief, and will reveal how narrow minded they are. Liberalism releases man’s creative faculties to better understand and make new methodologies that would go deeper into facts and knowledge. The same applies to religion, where responsible, not absolute, freedom helps finding new tools for understating, and helps creating critical mentalities to better understand how religious texts will serve our lives, not our ancestors’ lives. Islam enjoys a vibrant spirit that will never be sensed and lived without having a similar spirit in mind and mentality. This can only be achieved through liberalism, which is keen on unleashing man’s powers, including his powers of spirit and mind.

xi. Liberalism means ongoing development and productive economic mobility There has always been confusion between liberalism and

capitalism. They are completely different. It is true that liberalism supported accumulation of capital, in the early 19th century, when it first started. Yet, that was for the purpose of launching new individual initiative, and stabilizing the individual’s right to employ his wealth and work in whatever way he may desire. However, capitalism reached an oversized aggressive limit that required liberals themselves to confront and challenge capitalism, calling for reasonable limits on it and the fair redistribution of wealth. Even more, neoliberalism adopted social justice as its


slogan. When the focus of liberalism comes first on the individual’s right to invest his own financial and intellectual properties, this means keenness on having a sustainable and dynamic economic movement. It does not stumble except by the state putting its hands on production and trade, which may detach the individual from his creativity. The generators of development break, and recession sets in.

xii. The objective of liberal parties is to consolidate society under universal human values Universal values lift cultural barriers among peoples,

allowing gaps to be bridged. National identity is the pivot, not sect or memory or history, despite their significance. Human depth and solidarity is the core, along with the sacred right to live in a dignified manner.

xiii. Liberalism means sharing the world’s problems and crises Liberalism does not to limit itself to cultural or geographic or

religious privacy. As long as the target is to free man, and to unleash his internal abilities, liberalism is a universal concern. The concern is to develop the whole world, not only one’s limited surroundings, and to eliminate ignorance, fanaticism, poverty, and dictatorships everywhere. This is the liberal approach to providing man with a universal identity, to be shared by everyone, particularly those who believe in man’s pricelessness.

This is our liberalism. This is what we want to accomplish in

Lebanon and share with the rest of the world. This is our pass into a dynamic world, and our key to making our modern and contemporary history.


The struggle for liberalism in Tunisia

Houda Cherif

Liberal philosophy in the history of Tunisian political

thinking traces its roots back as far as the 14th century and the scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). The Tunis-born intellectual held progressive views on politics, justice and free economy, regarding tax policy, production, the role of the state and private property. He inspired many others.

In the mid-19th century, Ibn Khaldun’s theories were adopted and developed by Kheireddine Ettounsi (1822/3-1890). Kheireddine put forward the concepts of freedom, equality, democracy, and individual rights. One may say he laid the ground for a Tunisian liberal philosophy. Kheireddine acquired a good understanding of the West through his visits to Europe and his four years residence in France (1852-1856) after which he returned to Tunisia to advocate individual liberty and underline its importance to achieving progress.

Kheireddine Ettounsi became prime minister in 1873 and was the first Tunisian leader to urge for a compromise between the nation’s heritage and openness to Western civilization. He believed that the problem of underdevelopment could be overcome by creating a modern system in which freedom is the prerequisite to ensure economic growth. He also propagated that the European economic model could be emulated, although it needed to be adapted to Tunisian specificities; that change should respect Tunisian traditions and take into account the Arab-Islamic identity of the country. He believed that liberal ideas are compatible with Islam, which also called for freedom, respect of belief and encouraged trade and good governance.


So there exists a call for a Tunisian liberalism since the end of the 19th century. For Kheiredinne, blind copying of Western concepts would be dangerous and produce negative effects. He called for reform of the administration and the modernization of laws allowing for more freedom. He also believed education is the best way to achieve these aspirations. In 1875, Kheireddine founded the Sadiki School. Eventually, he retreated for seven years to put down all his knowledge and theories in a book he titled Akwam El-Masalek fi Maarifati Ahwal Al-Mamalek (The Surest Ways to Know About the State of Nations). There, he described life in European countries and his admiration for Europe’s lifestyle, expressing the need for Western democracy where rulers are responsible to an elected assembly. Kheireddine called for urbanization and the introduction of the banking system.

Since the end of the 19th century, and with the beginning of direct European interference in the affairs of Tunisia, there was a growing presence of liberal thinking. However, this did not appear in a systematic or well-defined manner and was also not adopted by ideological movements or political parties. Freedom was the basic tenet of a new class of thinkers. This concept was present in the writings of the main leading reformers who promoted political freedom and called for the right of the people to choose their rulers and for the necessity to draft a constitution that would guarantee individual rights and set a path to democracy.

In 1920 came the birth of the Free Tunisian Constitutional Party (Al-Hizb Al-Horr Al- Destouri Al-Tounsi), which I consider the first Tunisian liberal party. This coincided with the birth of a national movement against French colonialism. In spite of their poverty and their simple and primitive weapons, Tunisians began to fight against the French who had occupied Tunisia since 1881.

Newspapers appeared and linked the leaders of the national movement and the people. Numerous associations that declared


themselves anti-colonial flourished. These were first signs of hope for freedom of speech and opinion, and eventually even national independence.

The Free Tunisian Constitutional Party (known in short as the Destour Party) emerged from “The Movement of Young Tunisians” and demanded the establishment of a constitutional system, the separation of the three powers, and freedom, equality and compulsory education.

Unfortunately, in 1934, the party split into two - the old and the new Destour parties. While the first - the Old Destour Party - called for a return to Arab-Muslim traditions, the latter put Tunisia’s independence and modernization as its main goal.

Tunisia celebrated her independence in 1956. Soon after, a Constituent Assembly was elected and tasked with developing a new constitution that the sovereign - at the time Lamine Bey - promised to proclaim without modification. Meanwhile, the Court deliberated several reform decrees during meetings of the Council of Ministers. Among these was the Personal Status Code of 13 August 1956, which gave Tunisian women many rights and a unique status in the Muslim and Arab world. It also marked Tunisia as a country that seriously strived for modernity.

The monarchy was abolished by the Constituent Assembly on 25 July 1957, and on that day the first Tunisian Republic was declared. Then Prime Minister Habib Bourguiba was appointed president and his government reaffirmed commitment to the realization of national sovereignty and the modernization of society, focusing on three axes: politics, society, and culture and education.

In due course, the main state institutions were “Tunisified”: namely, the national security apparatus, the diplomatic service, the judiciary, the administration and the staff in the governorates. The new government also strived for monetary independence through the establishment of the Tunisian Central Bank and the creation of a national currency, the Tunisian Dinar, in late 1957.


That year also saw the birth of public schools, which were new, modern and free of charge, and that aimed at eradicating illiteracy.

Until the early 1960s, the Neo Destour Party defended liberal principles and traditions: the idea of a free civil society governed by a constitution that clearly outlines the limits of government and protects the citizen from the abuse of power. However, 1962 marks a drastic shift when the national council of the Neo Destour Party proclaimed the adoption of socialism, and - only one year later - declared a one-party system. In consequence, all political activities outside the new one party framework were banned.

While socialism was soon to fail in Tunisia, one party rule continued for many years.

On the economic level, the 1970s were characterized by the dominance of quasi-liberal economic policies that gave priority to economic efficiency through government investment and incentives for foreign investment. Politically, Tunisia entered a phase of isolation with strong limitations on the freedom of expression, and also political marginalization.

After Bourguiba fell ill in 1975, the question of his succession dominated the political scene. Opposition movements flourished in response to Bourguiba’s continued refusal to accept political pluralism and an autonomous civil society. This led to the beginning of social turmoil and the rise of Islamism.

The emergence of fundamentalism (or the religious right) threatened liberal achievements and modernist efforts and pushed Bourguiba towards adopting repressive measures. Thus his long reign, which had begun in an atmosphere of liberalism, ended in a climate of harsh struggle against the rise of Islamist ideology.

In the midst of this, Minister of Interior Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali proclaimed himself the “Savior of the Republic” and led a fierce struggle against the Islamists, which in fact actually increased their number and consolidated their ranks.


At the beginning of his reign, Ben Ali promised real democratization. He canceled the life presidency, limiting it to three terms, and proclaimed a law allowing for the creation of political parties. In 1994, the legal opposition entered the Chamber of Deputies. Ben Ali then announced a constitutional reform that would allow party leaders to run for president.

While Bourguiba had failed to make of Tunisia a country of rights, liberties and democracy, Ben Ali excelled in faking the same. He created an illusion. His 23-year rule made of Tunisia a country of repression, corruption and total degradation of education; a country where the people had lost all confidence in their rulers, and where political parties were useless and served mostly as decor.

Following 14 January 2011, Tunisia experienced an explosion of ideologies and the emergence of more than 100 political parties of various tendencies. The long-awaited dream of political pluralism became a full-fledged reality. In normal times, political parties serve two purposes. They’re either in power and run the government or they are in opposition and develop alternate proposals expressing and representing the dissatisfaction of voters unhappy with their rulers. After 14 January, political parties found themselves in neither the first nor the second position. Their responsibilities in this difficult phase of transition to democracy were not clear.

With no party in power after the dissolution of the former ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), they could not operate as opposition. They then placed themselves as spokespeople of multiple political and ideological circles. They represented different categories of Tunisian society, stimulating public political debate. All this was done with an eye on future elections and a desire to attract voters. Tunisia’s political spectrum was getting more and more complicated with political actors increasing at an extraordinary pace. The new wind of freedom revealed a society rich in ideas, projects, and programs of various orientations. They seemed to have one common


denominator: a free and democratic Tunisia. This we could see from the similarity in the names of different political parties, but also looking at their programs and goals. At some point, we were faced with a total mix up of ideologies within one and the same party. Apart from one or two parties who openly declared themselves as liberal, most other parties defended liberal ideas but did so using different hats - such as democrats, social democrats, center parties, and many others.

On 23 October 2011, 1,500 lists with 11,000 candidates from 27 constituencies stood for election. A fierce campaign had preceded this historic event. In this political setting, liberalism was among the first victims. Many voters associated liberalism with reckless freedom, “wild liberalism,” and even imperialism. Others identified it with decadence in Western societies, or with drugs and prostitution.

Just after the revolution, the following parties professed to foster liberal ideas:

The Maghrebi Liberal Party (later the Maghrebi Republican Party) advocated interdependence between representative and participatory elements of democracy and, in its program, gave particular importance to the youth, women and Tunisians abroad. It said it would promote the liberal values of freedom of expression and free enterprise and urged the elimination of all forms of inequality, exploitation and alienation.

The Social Liberal Party promoted freedom and human rights, the protection of minorities, the abolition of the death penalty and support for just causes such as the rights of the Palestinians. For them, social equity was an important issue also.

The Young Democrats Party advocated freedom, equality and the rule of law and called for the defense and promotion of human rights and multiculturalism. The Young Democrats supported a middle way between a free and planned economy and a fairer distribution of national wealth.


Afek Tounes party called for the protection of individual freedom and in particular the freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of faith and freedom of opinion. The party promoted the necessity of establishing rule of law with an independent judiciary defending the fundamental rights of citizens. Afek Tounes called for the separation of powers and for a state-regulated economy based on an equitable distribution of wealth.

The Social Centre Party called on all Tunisians to gather around liberal and modern social values. The party promoted the idea of a true democracy taking into account the economic, social and cultural development of the Tunisian people. As with the other parties, this group expressed total commitment to human rights as established by international law and sought to install a spirit of fair and effective competition between different actors in the economic field. The party also made an equitable distribution of the country’s wealth among all citizens a demand.

The National Movement for Justice and Development did not deny adhering to an Islamist ideology, claiming it presents the ideas of Ibn Khaldun. The party encouraged private initiative and the rule of justice. It advocated an Islamic economy and encouraged private investment to reduce disparities and promote solidarity.

It is apparent that all these parties call for freedom, equality, human rights, a constitutional state, democracy, free and fair elections and a - more or less - regulated liberal economy, respecting individual rights, social justice and the specificities of Tunisian society.

However, in Tunisia, liberalism remains a very controversial concept. One explanation is that this could be related to the nature of the Tunisian people who tend to act differently when it comes to the private and public spheres. They accept the idea of individual freedom in the first, but seek more dependence and reject free entrepreneurship in the second. This could be explained by a mentality that feels more comfortable and secure


in a group. For different reasons, liberalism has been identified with money and business, and for many almost became a symbol of domination of a global capitalist order that threatens the country’s wealth through foreign control.

In mid-April 2012, the president of the Maghrebi Liberal Party, Mohamed Bouebdelli, changed the party’s name to “Parti Republicain Maghrebin.” This change reflects the aversion of many Tunisians to liberalism and the anti-Islamic or anti-religious connotation it holds. The party leader felt there was no time to waste on raising confusion about liberalism and liberal values. These could be promoted, he thought, without mentioning the highly controversial term “liberalism.”

I could quote several articles in Tunisian newspapers that added to the people’s confusion about liberal ideas and concepts. Sadly, liberalism is not portrayed as a concept of freedom that augments growth and wealth, but on the contrary as a notion that leads to increased poverty and marginalization.

This takes me to the time I was in politics and preparing for the first party meeting of Afek Tounes. The party had been founded by a group of self-made men and women who had studied abroad and had come home with new visions and fresh ideas. Many were owners of businesses and drove to the meeting, which was held in Downtown Tunis, in their private cars. Some of these cars were rather luxurious. This simple fact created a problem for the party, prevented it from taking off for some months. We were tagged as liberals, as if this itself is a sin. Our distractors did not accuse us on the basis of the content of our program. Our program was not yet ready at that point. They attacked us simply because we drove expensive cars. From there on in, it was easy to associate the party with business, money and special interests. This little episode labeled the party as a group of “wild” liberals.

For many Tunisians, liberal means having money, it means looking out for one’s own interests and ignoring those of others. It means selling the country to foreign powers. It means a wild


kind of freedom - freedom that can stomp over all other values. In short, many Tunisians have little knowledge of liberalism and cling to a pre-set negative opinion, and stereotypes.

The unfortunate fate of liberalism in the Arab world came to the surface in the various meetings and conferences organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty that again and again dealt with this challenge. I have come to some conclusions:

First, one of the main factors that blocked liberalism in the Arab world is the absence of democracy and the presence of corrupt systems that have brought about political and economic instability. Poverty and social injustice made people look at individual liberties and entrepreneurship with much suspicion. They think these are the cause for their distress and, therefore, violently reject the liberal concept.

Add to this the absence of strong liberal leaders able to find a balance and adapt liberal values to the specific Arab context. Liberal leaders need to get into the frame of mind of the Arab person as an individual, and in his or her community (“the street”), and come up with suitable liberal responses to the specific challenges of each society. This has, quite obviously, not happened after the “Arab Spring.”

Finally, with the rise of religious fundamentalism, liberalism has received an even more violent blow as the contest came to focus on emotions. Islamists deliberately linked liberalism to moral decay and religious negation. Islamists - wrongly - pointed to a freedom detached from responsibility, while liberal thinkers put responsibility at the very core of their theory.

While writing this paper, I posted the question “What is liberalism?” on my Facebook page to get some reaction from people. Answers varied from “imperialism,” “freedom, less state,” “free initiative,” “do whatever we want,” “economic freedom and political freedom,” “an absolute freedom of ideas and expression,” “let it be, let it go,” “a strong rule of law,” “the right to difference,” to “the first step towards anarchy,” and more.


Quite clearly, there is some ambiguity regarding the definition - let alone understanding - of the term. This presents a danger to the spread of the concept in this country. Liberalism is so vast that it has to be defined whenever mentioned. Some of the above definitions were close but not complete. Unfortunately, that is also true for many more political terms and concepts. One answer to this challenge is political education.

Providing the most basic knowledge required to understand, analyze and make good decisions in politics has become an urgent matter. Terms like democracy, the rule of law, state, individual, and other freedoms, socialism, liberalism, conservatism and many others need to be precisely defined so that the citizen may acquire a clear mind, allowing him or her to make responsible choices.

Liberals in the Arab world need to find a strong branding. Then they have to identify tailor-made strategies specific to each of their countries to spread the concept as a complete well-defined theory.

Liberal movements in the Arab world are a hidden power that can push towards reform, just like in the past. They need a pragmatic approach, to mobilize large segments of society and lead the next phase.


References 1. Chouikha, Larbi, “Tunisie: les chimères libérales,” La pensée

de midi, No. 19 (2006), pp. 29-37. http://cairn.info/revue-la-pensee-de-midi-2006-3-page-29.htm

2. Hibou, Béatrice, “Le libéralisme réformiste, ou comment perpétuer l’étatisme tunisien,” L’Economie politique, No. 032 (2006).

3. M’rad, Hatem, Liberalisme et liberté dans le monde arabo-musulman (Edition Nirvana, 2012).

4. Talbi, Mohamed, Goulag & Démocratie (Finzi Usines graphiques, 2011).


Bread, freedom and social justice: Why only the market economy

will fulfill the aspirations of the Arab masses

Yusuf Mansur

It has been argued that the causes of the unfolding “Arab Spring” in various Arab states are similar; the uprisings had their roots in the global economic crisis and in the patrimonial political natures of the governments in the region.1 Others blamed the “youth bulge” being under- or unemployed as underpinning the “Arab Spring.”2 Some claimed that failed policies, such as agriculture policy in Egypt - which made the population dependent on wheat imports - and water and agricultural policies in Syria, were behind the rise of the masses.3 Others asserted that global warming contributed to the spike in food prices, which led among other things to the uprisings.4 More still argued that social media and Internet penetration were a cause of the revolutions.5

The arguments presented herein will underscore that the roots of the Arab Spring arise from the failure of Arab economies to develop. This failure, it is emphasized, is due to institutional factors that have stymied and curtailed the development of freedom in all its forms, leading to “unfreedom” and the consequent lack of development. Changing/reforming failed institutions is a necessity for development. National institutions, formal and informal, must change for the better. Such change, as established by history, will not come without turmoil.

This chapter defines economic freedom in the first section, presents a brief summary of what Arabs want, based on publications in this regard, discusses the relationship between


economic freedom and political and civil rights, links growth to development, and offers conclusions based on the above.

Defining economic freedom Alfred Marshall identified “economic freedom” with

“freedom of industry and enterprise.”6 Decades later, Milton Friedman saw economic freedom as the ultimate model as it allows actors greater productivity.7 In the Friedman tradition, economic freedom means efficient governments, the respect and protection of property rights, and freedom of exchange. It is about the extent to which rightly acquired property is protected, individuals are engaged in voluntary transactions inside or outside a nation’s borders, and the freedom to move freely within and across those borders.8

A researcher who dares to set aside his intellectual biases would probably find the treatment of freedom presented by Noble Laureate Amartya Sen, in Development as Freedom,9 as the most comprehensive in the literature. To Sen, economic freedom is only one of several types of freedom, which should include “(1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security.”10 Furthermore, Sen stressed that such freedoms are interactive; they contribute dynamically to each other and any imbalances lead to deficits. “Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.”11


What the Arabs want Arguably the most comprehensive and honest view of the

Arab region was recorded in the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 2002. The report noted that Arab countries had invested more in physical capital than human capital, and stated: “The Arab region might thus be said to be richer than it is developed with respect to basic human-development indicators.”12 The report asserted that human development in the Arab region should be addressed by resolving three key deficits: freedom and good governance, women’s empowerment, and the human capabilities/knowledge deficit relative to income.13

While several Arab countries have been making gains in health and education service provision, they are still unproductive, even though, as both neoclassical and Marxist analysts agree, healthier and better-educated people are more productive.14 Meanwhile, approximately 60 percent of the Arab population is under the age of 25, making the Arab world the most youthful region in the world.15 That potential is not without challenge, however. Surface water, for example, is scarce and 43 percent of it originates from elsewhere.16

Interestingly, the AHDR 2005 predicted an “Arab Spring.”17 Another more recent voice came from the Arab Center for

Research and Policy Studies, which publishes the Arab Opinion Index. The Arab Opinion Index Report for 2011, based on a survey covering 12 Arab countries and 85 percent of the Arab population,18 provided some insights into what the region really wants. A clear majority supported democratic reform, believing in the transfer of power; less than half trusted the executive branch of government; 36 percent only trusted their countries’ legislative bodies; 83 percent believed that corruption was widespread in their countries; only 19 percent thought their countries’ legal systems treated all citizens equitably; 67 percent of respondents believed that intra-Arab cooperation was not satisfactory; around three-quarters supported lifting travel and


trade restrictions between Arab countries and establishing a unified monetary system.

Most respondents attributed Arab revolutions to corruption, dictatorship and the lack of justice and equality. In other words, economic freedom is not enough. Further, respondents believed that it is doubtful that a well-functioning market economy will be achieved without democracy and proper representation or participation, in addition to transparency and accountability mechanisms.

Economic freedom, political and civil rights In its most generic and agreed form, economic freedom

means an improved business and investment environment with little to no red tape. Note that based on this definition alone, one would stipulate that the lack of economic freedom in Tunisia was the trigger that ignited the Arab Spring. After all, Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian man who self-immolated on 17 December 2010, did so in dismay at the lack of economic freedom afforded to him by the local bureaucracy: he had been prevented from gaining a permit to operate a vegetable stand.19 It took his burning image, coupled with economic strife and rising unemployment, to erupt a nation on 18 December 2010. Within less than a month, President Ben Ali relinquished power. The surge was so quick, and the removal of the president so swift, and relatively costless, that a wave of protests took hold in Arab countries, each demanding reform in various degrees.

Economic freedom matters, yet it must be supported by political and civil rights to enable development. Furthermore, as Sen asserted, without political and civil rights economic freedom - like any other economic system - “will hardly produce optimal results.” New empirical evidence supports the view that political and civil rights are important contributors to growth and development. In a study of 100 countries over 30 years, the Economic Freedom of the World Index20 found indices of civil


rights and political liberties to be strongly linked to a country’s per capita income growth in the long run.21 A one-unit change in the initial stock of economic freedom on a scale of one to 10 is associated with a rise of almost one percent in the average economic growth rate during the period; a one-unit change in initial civil and political rights conditions on a scale of one to eight increases average economic growth by more than 0.3 percent during the period.

The market economy and its mechanisms require political liberty, as Adam Smith noted;22 freedom of exchange and transaction are part of the basic liberties that people desire and appreciate. This does not take away from the importance of the market mechanism and it being the most efficient tool at creating economic growth and even economic equity under some conditions, as noted by many scholars. However, civil and political freedom facilitate the better functioning of the market economy by enabling more predictability and stability within the market through better protection of property and transaction rights in addition to an institutional policymaking process.23

Could Arab governments have sidestepped issues of economic and political freedom by simply giving people more subsidies and economic rent - given that they could afford it, of course? In other words, could bread alone be the answer? After all, several Arab countries witnessed revolts when bread prices increased. In some Gulf countries, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, which witnessed the beginning of turmoil, demands were either economic or could be subdued or addressed through economic gains.24 Several oil rich Arab countries, and some not so rich, were able to stave off rebellions by dispersing money, cash, gifts, and jobs to their citizens.25 However, one would argue that rents and gifts by rulers are but temporal solutions and not remedies.

Stable and steady long-term economic growth, and consequent development, which goes far beyond bread alone, will continue to elude Arab governments and economies as long as all


types of freedom do not exist or are considered lagging. Current growth bursts are resource based and depend upon world demand cycles for hydrocarbons.

Liberalizing economies without other freedoms taking root within the institutional setup does not work. Lacking transparency and accountability due to forms of absolutist governance leads to market distortions and inefficient distributions. Almost all Arab states in this regard can be classified as exclusionary states, whereby groups close to the ruler are offered rents while others are not. Of course, levels of reward and exclusion depend on whether the state is in possession of great rents or not.

Seeming improvements and movement towards economic freedom are not tenable without political reform, as has become evident over the years. Without political and civil rights, gains will be ill distributed and successes can be derailed. Elites close to rulers have been able to divert the gains of the market economy to their own coffers while the masses suffered. Further, some, as in the case of Ahmad Ezz in Egypt,26 purportedly a partner of Alaa Mubarak (Hosni Mubarak’s son) and regarded as the king of steel in Egypt, was able to change competition legislation 27 in order to safeguard his own interests and curtail whistleblowing activities in his many enterprises.

A state that possesses ample oil and gas reserves is able to shower its elites with direct fiduciary rents and other benefits such as licenses to import or establish activities from which others are excluded. On the other hand, a country that is poor in resources would probably appoint its “loyalists” into public posts and enable them through selective transparency practices and non-accountability to become rich by skimming from the public. Across the board, Arab governments deployed their resources to subordinate citizens and gain loyalties28; in the process they curtailed not only economic freedom but also freedom in general, and thus sacrificed development.


Obviously in such societies the weak and vulnerable will find no voice. Non-elected governments will find no need, unless pressed or threatened externally and/or internally, to rally the people to support their policies. Hence, such governments, which answer to the dictator, do not usually follow popular demands, but bypass them and push them aside as long as the ruler is satisfied with their performance or has not become aware of riots or destabilizing movements. When it becomes apparent to the leader that the government has become a liability, they exit and are replaced with a new team that works under the same or similar directives of exclusion.

Arab governments, particularly those that do not have ample oil or gas reserves to create significant rents and usually receive significant amounts of aid, have tried to become hubs for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In this sense, they thought FDI would increase people’s incomes and welfare. Yet they missed an important point that given the rentier state, the welfare gains will be ill distributed, thus exacerbating existing inequalities, creating inflation without jobs, which would foment greater unrest. Furthermore, given the unilateral nature of decision making in these economies,29 most FDI sought the safest form of investment, real estate, which did not help lower high unemployment rates within these countries.30

Arab markets, opened over the past two decades through trade liberalizing agreements and reform programs, have not lead to industrialization; gains went to the few and people saw monopolists raise prices. The results of market enhancing mechanisms and policies, such as trade liberalization, which would tend to enhance competitiveness, have lead to higher prices and greater distortions. The Arabs were thus labeled the “orphans of globalization.”31


From growth to development Growth in every Arab country that is not dependent on

carbon exports has not been steady or rising for extended periods of time. Although many of the countries were engaged with the global economy and allowed for capital and labor flows, they lacked other factors such as governance and inclusiveness, which have been determined as important for a rising and long term growth. The literature is rife with evidence that over time, the institutional arrangements within a country are the primary cause of sustained high economic performance.32 Further, a growing number of economists now believe that the institutional arrangements within a country matter the most,33 and that factor accumulation and technological advancements are a result of growth and not the causes of growth.34

The idea that institutions matter have become even more popular recently due to, among others, the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson,35 which emphasized that institutions are the fundamental cause of long term growth - an argument that has been further elaborated in Why Nations Fail by Robinson and Acemoglu. In the latter, the authors underlined that, more than any other reason, nations whose institutions are exclusive and extractive fail.36

Failing to produce good governance and transparency in the Arab world may have been intentional whereby autocracies attempt to buy time by appeasing certain groups they believe are necessary for regime survival. However, by doing so they would be fomenting unrest among those who do not receive rent - the majority of the people. In other words, Arab regimes relied on pleasing a minority of elites that had become used to extracting the fruits of any economic gains.

Extractive economic institutions lead to a lack of law and order, insecure property rights, artificial entry barriers, regulatory hurdles to the functioning of the market economy, and non-level playing fields. On the other hand, extractive political institutions


concentrate power in the hands of the few, reduce transparency and checks and balances, and enable corruption. The former needs the latter, and a vicious cycle emerges.

The majority of the people languish in poverty and underdevelopment. Rulers are thus encouraging and growing dissent on the home front by favoring short term remedies and temporary measures over addressing long term problems. The situation is best summarized in the words of Winston Churchill: “Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry.”

Conclusion The reason why Arab economies have failed so far is due to

the existence of exclusive and extractive institutions. Formal and informal institutions cause exclusionary practices and have elites that extract the wealth of the nation, thus preventing the majority from reaping the fruits of their labor.

Arab economies can move towards becoming effective market economies through substantive reforms that transition countries from rentierism into inclusive meritocracies. To do so requires dramatic changes in key institutions in the Arab world.

The post-colonial history of the Arab world, where autocratic regimes ruled through exclusive institutions, should not be viewed as the destiny of the Arabs. It can be changed, as history attests in several other regions of the world. However, history also shows that political upheaval accompanies this reform, whether by minor or major revolutions.


References

1. Joffé, George, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and prospects,” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2011).

2. “Special Report: The Arab Spring,” The Economist (2013).

3. Goldman, David P., “Economic Blunders Behind the Arab Revolutions,” The Wall Street Journal (2013).

4. Johnstone, Sarah and Jeffrey Mazo, “Global Warming and The Arab Spring,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2011).

5. De Sterck, Hans and John Lang, “The Arab Spring: A simple compartmental model for the dynamics of a revolution” (2013).

6. Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1890; reprinted, 1949), p. 8.

7. Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (London: Seker & Warburg, 1980), p. 3.

8. Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson et al., Economic Freedom of the World: 1996 Annual Report.

9. Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

10. Ibid, p. 10. 11. Ibid, p. 11. 12. Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating

Opportunities for Future Generations (UNDP) p. 26. http://arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf

13. AHDR 2002 only mentioned freedom as a deficit. However, in the preface of the AHDR 2004, which focused on freedom, the concept of good governance was immediately joined with freedom, thereby emphasizing the significance of governance in addition to freedom.


14. Richards, Alan et al., A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2013), p. 98.

15. Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries (UNDP) p. 36. http://arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf

16. Ibid, p. 37. 17. Arab Human Development Report 2005: Towards the

Rise of Women in the Arab World (UNDP), p. 29. http://arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2005e.pdf

18. The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index, published by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0

19. Abouzeid, Rania, “Bouazizi: The man who set himself and Tunisia on fire,” Time Magazine (21 January 2011). http://time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html

20. The Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index measures and ranks countries according to the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas: size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises); legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to trade internationally; and regulation of credit, labor and business. Within these areas, 21 components are incorporated into the overall index. Many of the components are themselves made up of several sub-components.

21. Chauffour, Jean-Pierre, “Freedom, Entitlement and the Path to Development,” The World Bank Economic Premise, The World Bank, Issue 59 (June 2011) pp. 1-5.

22. Sen, Amartya, “Freedom of Choice: Concept and content,” European Economic Review (1988).

23. See: Chauffour, Jean-Pierre, 2009. The Power of Freedom: Uniting human rights and development


(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2009); and Chauffour, Jean-Pierre, “On the Relevance of Freedom and Entitlement in Development: New empirical evidence (1975–2007),” Policy Research Working Paper 5660, The World Bank (2011).

24. Abdullah, Abdulkhaleq, “Repercussions of the Arab Spring on the GCC States,” Doha Institute, 17 May 2012. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/050a254b-e013-4060-9aab-32238f34cf47

25. See: Mansur, Yusuf, “Arab Renaissance and Economic Freedom,” in Meinardus, Ronald (Ed.), Bridging the Gap: An Arab-European dialogue on the basics of liberalism (Cairo: Al-Mahrousa for Publishing, 2013), and Mansur, Yusuf, “Did the Arab Spring Benefit Economic Freedom in Jordan?” lecture delivered at an event hosted in Amman, Jordan, by the Young Entrepreneurs Association (YEA) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) as part of Global Entrepreneurship Week 2012.

26. Ezz is currently serving a three-year sentence in Egypt. 27. “Jordan: Hurdles to Implementing Competition Policy

in Jordan,” in Mediterranean Competition Bulletin / Bulletin Méditerranéen De Concurrence, European Commission (October 2009).

28. Springborg, Robert, “The Precarious Economics of Arab Springs,” Survival, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2011).

29. Nugent, Jeffrey, “Explaining the Paradox: Generous foreign investment laws but little foreign investment in Arab countries - the role of legal shortcomings,” Working Paper, University of Southern California (2001).

30. Mansur, Yusuf, “Overcoming Barriers to FDI in Jordan,” Working Paper, The Fraser Institute, Fraser Institute/International Research Foundation Publications (2008).


31. “The Orphans of Globalization?” Global Compact International Year Book 2011, The Evian Group, IMD. http://imd.org/research/centers/eviangroup/upload/Lehmann_GCYB_2011_Arab_Spring.pdf

32. Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report: Strategies for sustained growth and inclusive development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008). http://growthcommission.org

33. Easterly, William, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ adventures and misadventures in the tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

34. North, Douglass C., and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A new economic history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Also see: Rodrik, Dani, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What they are and how to acquire them,” Working Paper 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA (2000).

35. Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” Working Paper 10481, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA (2004).

36. Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).


Crowd democracy: Future challenges facing liberalism

in the Arab region

Wael Nawara

Over the past few years, Tunisia, Egypt and several states in the Arab region experienced massive grassroots movement, including protests, uprisings and revolutions that changed ruling regimes and brought down presidents and governments. The main slogans of the grassroots movement called for freedom, social justice, and human dignity. These uprisings called for liberal values and ideals and we could clearly spot the liberal colors of huge groups of participants. We cannot say, however, that liberal parties - or parties of any other ideology - had organizationally or politically led this movement, because it was self-organized and took place mainly at the grassroots level where most of the participants carried no specific ideology. When we look at the roots of the revolution, we cannot help but see the liberal element evidently clear along the way. Some liberal parties in Egypt, for instance, were among the pioneers that heralded the revolution and produced a generation of youth, activists and political leaderships that had struggled against Mubarak’s regime for many years before the revolution, and later participated in the revolution, and were used by media outlets as icons for it.

Post-revolution developments in Egypt brought down the myth of Islamist popularity and dominance. This is not to deny that Islamist movements enjoy deep allegiances or vast resources, but their strong support is restricted to a limited segment of society alone, as we anticipated in articles dating back as early as 2004. And while larger segments may not have a specific political allegiance, they are against Islamism and perceive it as


not only a threat to the national identity and cultural identity of the country, but also to national security and the very concept of the homeland itself. Islamists do not acknowledge the idea of a homeland based on a certain nation identifying with a specific geographic territory that has been inhabited by their ancestors for centuries - or in the case of Egypt, many millennia. Sayyid Qutb, a leading Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, regarded homeland as “nothing but a fist of rotten dirt.” For Islamists, the homeland is their monolithic faith, or rather a narrowly defined extremist and strict version of it. This poses the risk of dividing any country they come to govern, as happened in Sudan.

Nevertheless, Islamists can and do win a disproportionately large share of elections, leveraged by their superior financial and organizational capacity, the effectiveness of their electoral machine and the obedience they command from their troops. In other words, they win by their superior resources and logistics, as compared to their rivals, and not necessarily because voters like them or feel compelled to elect them as a religious duty. If the latter were the case, it would be something hard to change.

Yet despite an incredible financial and logistical edge over his competitors, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, received only 25 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections. In the second round, Morsi won slightly more than half the votes, mainly because his competitor was Ahmed Shafiq. Many of those voting for Morsi did so because they identified Shafiq with Mubarak’s regime in an attempt to prevent a past they loathed from being resurrected.

Although some people would now regret electing Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in post-revolution Egypt, my belief is that the collective consciousness of Egyptians greatly benefited from experiencing the Brotherhood’s coming to power. The experience has contributed to bringing down many illusions, legends, barriers and taboos. For the first time in the history of Egypt, we saw angry groups of Muslims praying in a mosque, preventing preachers from using that mosque as a platform for


political campaigning. They have even established sieges around the mosques used by Islamists for political propaganda, mobilization, or those used for harboring Islamist militias, or as camps where Brotherhood members tortured their opponents. To indicate that they are Muslims, contrary to Brotherhood televised claims that the protesters were mainly Christians, many protesters would pray on the ground outside the mosque during the siege.

At the end of the Brotherhood’s period in power, millions took to the streets to call for Morsi’s removal and bringing down “the Morshed’s rule” - referring to the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, whom Egyptians came to regard as their president’s boss. These massive demonstrations took place not only in Cairo and Alexandria, but also in most cities, towns and even many villages, especially in the Delta region. The events that took place between 2011 and 2013 in Egypt compressed the hundreds of years it had taken Europe to revolt against Church authority and finally separate religion from politics. This separation may not be complete, neither in Europe nor in Egypt. But it has begun. Hence bringing down the Brotherhood government, with all the cultural implications of this event, may prove to be more significant than toppling Mubarak’s regime.

However, the Brotherhood was not brought down by the ballot box but by popular protests that began in November 2012 after Morsi’s famous decrees by which he placed himself above the judiciary and the constitution. Popular protests grew and escalated over the next months. Anti-Muslim Brotherhood state institutions, such as the judiciary, police, army, private media, remnants of Mubarak’s regime, and even Salafists at the end (or at least their political leaderships), joined the 30 June front that toppled Morsi and brought down the Brotherhood regime. Although opinion polls conducted by Gallup and Baseera showed very clearly the unprecedented collapse of the popularity of the Brotherhood, even months before the removal of Morsi, bringing down the Brotherhood by the ballot box was almost impossible for several reasons. As it was impossible to remove Mubarak


through elections, removing the Brotherhood through the ballot box might have been even more difficult because of its unlimited and unchecked underground resources, the clandestine ways of the organization, the international nature of its operations, and the way it works to infiltrate multiple domains, including businesses, syndicates, unions, universities, religious establishments, schools, clinics and various social services.

The Brotherhood was removed by large-scale protests supported by the army, police, judiciary, and most of the state agencies and wings. However, did that mean the end of the Brotherhood or the inability of Islamism to gather votes in the upcoming elections and what follows? Does this mean that voters will shift to voting for liberal and or leftist parties? Not necessarily. The 25 January Revolution and the 30 June wave added little to the strength of official parties. These massive uprisings occurred as a result of a high level of people’s empowerment, or what we can call “crowd democracy.”

Crowd democracy At the end of March 2008, at a workshop in Beirut that was

attended by the founders of the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (which was called the Network of Arab Liberals at the time) and sponsored by the Freidrich Naumann Foundation, I remember giving a presentation entitled “The Facebook Revolution”. I basically prophesized how social networks would change the world, and the implications of this on the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of life. I also said that the coming change would not be merely a change of governments or regimes, but rather in the nature of “power.” That change would alter the relationship and modes of interaction between the people, on the one hand, and symbols and institutions of authority on the other. In other words, it is not only the person who sits at the top of the pyramid who will have to go, but the pyramid itself will no longer exist! For someone from Egypt, where pyramids


have always been so fashionable, both as grand monuments and in administrative structures, this seemed a bit strange! Change would not just change figures, but also the structures and the relationships that rulers had traditionally used to govern.

The future of power hierarchies is bleak. Traditionally hierarchies will become flatter and will look more like a flexible network, where influence would be more interactive, coming not only from top to bottom, but also from all relevant sides. At the time (March 2008), I had had a brief yet very impactful personal experience to support that theory. In August 2007, I was forced to use Facebook as a political and media platform when Mubarak’s security apparatus decided to shut down Al-Ghad newspaper. I had to find an alternative and decided to turn from the offline world that was taken over by Mubarak and his security apparatus to the “parallel” online world of Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. In line with the “parallel state” theory that I published in 2005 and 2006, whenever a formal channel is closed or shows too much resistance, pressure builds up creating a “parallel” informal channel. In the same fashion, I had to create one of the very first political forums on Facebook, together with a number of friends and colleagues, under the name “The Third Republic.” It included over 1,000 members and started to gain influence. It could be regarded as a combination of “a virtual political party” and “a virtual newspaper media channel” in the parallel world. This forum initiated discussions on the emerging power of the people and the sweeping change that would be caused by a new power that the regime could not stop. The power of “influence” was about to influence power. A few years later, the spark of change was ignited in Tunisia, followed by Egypt and Libya. The infection spread across the Arab world, and regimes, governments and presidents fell. The whole world order is now facing a new challenge: large crowds are rising and reclaiming their power from political bosses and middlemen. The balance of power has changed in favor of the people.


Traditional democracy is based on power, while crowd democracy is based on influence. Influence is intangible and voluntary. Power is also intangible, but when needed it summons claws and fangs. Power (or the state that holds power) monopolizes violence. Because social media influence is voluntary, it cannot use violence or threats of violence, although it may incite it.

How did governments, security apparatuses, and state-owned newspapers and media outlets lose the balance of power to individuals and crowds that are connected to one another in different ways?

Due to the spread of social networks, blogs, and citizen journalism, and the ability of a single person or a small group of people to start their own personal TV or radio channels on platforms such as YouTube, Vimeo and Soundcloud, the advantages previously exclusive to states, governments, parties and giant organizations that accompanied the emergence of representative democracy have been eroded, and crowd democracy began to appear as a step towards a true popular - or even direct - democracy.

But what is crowd democracy? Does it mean that whoever is capable of gathering more crowds on the street can rule? Or will the world be run through Twitter and Facebook? Definitely not!

Crowd democracy is based on the simple idea that the masses can take better and wiser decisions than a small group of the ruling elite. The word elite itself implies the presence of some exclusively distinguished group that is capable of taking smarter decisions and drawing up wiser policies and legislation on behalf of the masses who, if they took charge, may make populist decisions, legislation, or policies. By populist we mean popular, but also irresponsible and unsustainable, such as reducing taxes while increasing government expenditure on public services and utilities, causing growing budget deficits and public debt accumulation leading to definite disasters. Has this already not


happened in most countries under different “wise” regimes, including parliamentary democracies?

If we think about it, elected officials may be more prone to adopting irresponsible financial policies, because they often remain in their posts for a limited and short period of time. They are often described as myopic who could not care less about what might happen in the future after they leave office. But while representatives and presidents stay for a term or two and then eventually leave, the people, in the “collective” sense, remain. If you make one mistake, you and your family will pay for it sooner or later, gradually leading decisions to eventually become more responsible.

Traditional parties are made of members who are connected by a long-term organizational relationship. They develop a consensus around a certain agenda or manifesto that represents their ideology with more or less fixed positions on hundreds of economic, social and political issues. A party derives its power from the number of its members and supporters, the quality of its leadership and cadres, the depth of its pockets and funds, its media and political strength, its ability to mobilize in elections and ultimately garner parliamentary, local and executive seats.

Opposite to that, crowd democracy does not know solid organizations or long-term loyalties, but depends on flexible clusters of activists, enthusiasts, and supporters who embrace a certain cause, goal or a limited set of demands in a voluntary manner that is based on self-organization and personal initiative.

In a parliamentary democracy, a group of “representatives,” or elected or appointed government officials, decide upon policies and legislation on behalf of the people, while crowd democracy maximizes the power of the people. In other words, the people regain the power to make decisions by public opinion, which creates a “connected mind” or a “collective mind” empowered by social networks and modern communication technology.


In 2005, James Surowiecki, who writes a famous column in The New Yorker, published a book entitled Wisdom of the Crowds. The title itself is an allusion to another book adopting somewhat an opposite view, written by Charles Mackay and published in 1841 under the title Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Other books were published in the same spirit, holding the crowds’ judgment in low esteem and often using the terms “crowd psychology” or “mob psychology” as synonyms for foolishness.

Surowiecki postulated that crowds could make better choices than small elites, even if the elite were a group of experts on the topic in discussion. To be fair, Surowiecki mentioned some situations where crowds may fail to take the right decision, for reasons related to the psychology of crowds.

The experience of the past three years in Egypt has proven that crowds can - and do - make serious mistakes, but they can quickly correct them or revisit their decisions. The collective mind, and not for instance activists or so-called opinion leaders, is what directs and moves the people. Some think that social media is power and they strive to harness that power to themselves. But social networks are the opposite of power.

So what is power? Power starts when a fraction of the freedom of choice and the

will of decision-making is embezzled from millions of individuals. No matter how small the part that is taken is, when it is multiplied by millions, the president, government or institution would control immense power. Concentration of power in the hands of an elite creates a great deal of authority when compared to the fragmented nature of the will of citizens. With social networks, thousands and millions of opinions made by simple individuals are often filtered out through a process of natural selection of trends, and the collective mind or the connected mind evolves quickly, bringing out decisions that are supported by the


crowd’s wisdom. The election here is not for a deputy, a representative, or a president, but for a specific decision on a specific issue. This is the difference between parliamentary democracy and crowd democracy, as a step towards direct democracy. Social networks give back freedom of choice and will power to their owners, retrieving stolen goods, while technology gradually eliminates the need for the services of middlemen and representatives, or at least reduces their powers.

The end of power?

We are lucky to be witnessing radical transformations in the nature of power and the style of government. Not only political or economic authority is being challenged, but social, cultural and spiritual authority as well. We can see protests spreading across the world, not only in the Arab region. Greece, Turkey and Brazil saw similar massive protests. Movements such as Occupy Wall Street in the United States, and similar networks in many other countries, are initial manifestations of the change in the nature of power. The future of power, at least power as we knew it, is bleak. This, however, does not mean the end of the state, parliaments, governments, or executive authority. These institutions may continue, but their role will change and their power will decrease. The likely function of a future parliament will be as a facilitator rather than legislator. It will facilitate the social dialogue of the crowd, craft the legislation drafted by the collective mind or connected mind, implement the policies that the people think right for them, and focus on the priorities of the people, and not on those of lobbyists that have for long become brokers or middlemen between authority and big corporations.

Manifestations of crowd democracy

What is the proof that crowd democracy exists? Is it only some theory describing a far-flung future? Have we seen indications and proof of this phenomenon in Egypt?


I claim that crowd democracy has been in action since 25 January 2011 and maybe even before that. But on 25 January, people or crowds became self-aware of their collective power giving birth to the collective mind and gathering the scattered wills of individuals into one popular will. As a result, the seat of government moved from the presidential palace to Tahrir Square! The Square started to make its own decisions; dismissing the president, dissolving the government and the parliament, abolished the constitution, ordered the detention and trial of corrupt officials, it even dissolved the State Security Investigations apparatus. SCAF (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) and the interim government that came after Mubarak realized this change and started to interact with it. Almost every Wednesday, decisions were made by SCAF or the interim government to respond to the demands of “the Square” or the collective mind of the crowds, to avoid their rage the next Friday. Also, crowds started to refrain from gathering when activists called for events that the people did not approve of, such as the sit-in in front of the Ministry of Defense in July 2011 and May 2012. When the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated People’s Assembly in June 2012, the crowds did not assemble a single voice of protest because they were satisfied with the ruling to dissolve an assembly they felt did not represent them or speak for them. The same happened in the early days of the revolution when an activist climbed the Tahrir main stage and ordered the people to go home. The people refused and turned their back on him. Some activists went to negotiate with then Vice President Omar Suleiman on behalf of the crowds and returned with items that summarized the agreement. But that agreement was not binding on the Square and no one gave it notice. Concerned activists discovered their true limited influence on the crowds when they opposed the collective mind.

On 30 June and after it, the crowds imposed their will and removed a president, and a wealthy organization and powerful organization from power. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s


funds, militias, weapons, international relations, and strong alliances with terrorist groups, they found themselves isolated and hunted not just by the state, but also by the people. The crowds imposed a roadmap with specific steps. The army had to follow. And while SCAF temporarily replaced Mubarak in February 2011, it was the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court who became the interim president on 3 July 2013. Neither the army nor the police could stand against the public will of millions of Egyptians. The army and police abandoned Morsi as they did Mubarak before him, because no army could successfully force a people with a conscious collective will.

Challenges facing liberal parties The traditional challenges facing liberal parties can be

summarized as follows:

Organizing and building an effective movement with committed members.

Funding. Most liberal parties are either penniless or rely on a small group of capitalist financers.

Building an electoral machine at the central level, and at the level of districts, municipalities and bases.

Developing an economic, social and political program that is based on reality but is also inspired by the ambitions of the people, and coming up with solutions for chronic problems and a vision for a future of opportunities.

Developing inspiring media messages and preparing leaders with charisma and media influence.

Developing cadres and young leaders.

Empowering youth and women.

Putting an end to fragmentation and internal conflicts via mergers, alliances and coalitions.


Activating a social agenda and engaging and serving the people at a grassroots level.

These are the traditional challenges. What about crowd

democracy? Does it not impose other types of challenges? The main challenge facing parties under crowd democracy is

the need to think differently. Times have changed and the role of the middleman will be phased out. What applies for markets where consumers communicate directly with producers, removing several layers of the distribution chain, applies to the “market” of politics. Political parties are becoming irrelevant. One of the slogans of the revolution was, “No Brotherhood, no parties. Our revolution is a revolution of youth!”

The main candidate for the presidential elections in Egypt is Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, who does not belong to a party. The political landscape shows that there is little interest in political parties, whether liberal or socialist, unless they create a real role for themselves. This may possibly be achieved if a party joins a “crowd” adopting its cause and demands. The party may, for instance, come up with communication mechanisms to enable its members and “crowds” it identifies with to express their opinions and “influence” the political agenda of the party. The biggest mistake for a party is to seek to have a group of “famous activists” who belong to a crowd (adopting a certain cause) to join the party, thinking that they would automatically attract the crowd into following them. The opposite could happen, because crowds seem to abandon whoever claims to be leading them and they go along with those who appear to be following them!

The best move for a party that seeks to have a spot on the future map is to develop new rules for the political game in line with crowd democracy and not clashing with it. These rules would, for instance, make parliament a facilitator for social dialogue - the dialogue of the crowds. It should propose mechanisms, and technical, political and legislative tools, for this


dialogue to happen and gather due influence. These mechanisms should encourage policymakers to listen to the collective mind and learn from the wisdom of the masses. We must not forget that liberalism is much wider than liberal parties. Liberal parties should therefore encourage the presence of “liberal crowds” in the general sense, even if there are not many points of agreement in various issues.

Many traditional challenges will continue to face liberal parties in the future, especially that Islamist parties will continue to exist for years to come. But perhaps the best move for liberal parties at this point is to respect the crowds, and listen to the voice of the collective mind. Follow the crowd and you will most likely be right on the things that really matter.


Loaded victory: Egypt’s revolution and where

it stands post-30 June

Esraa Abdel Fatah I count myself among members of the generation of Egyptian

liberal youth who are between their twenties and forties. I believe they bring new blood to liberalism in the Arab world after several strikes the Arab liberal movement sustained. The hardest strike came in 1952 by the Free Officers who staged a coup against a fledging plurality-based and parliamentary rule system. It shook the foundations of free liberal economy in Egypt and ushered in socialist and totalitarian thinking.

This cruel experience had implications on the climate of creativity and freedom of opinion, and on development and quality in all areas. There was also the unforgettable June defeat, which was not only a military defeat, but also an event that revealed the extent of the hypocrisy, lying and deceit of varied state bodies that monopolized knowledge, news, radio, TV, education and industry. The Voice of Arabs Radio reported that we were fighting on the outskirts of Tel Aviv, only for us to realize we had lost Sinai and were fighting on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

The size of the disaster and the persistence needed to overcome it all but stopped a generation. This might have been the reason why Sadat tried to reopen the parties, previously shut down by Nasser to prevent them from contemplating and reevaluating the socialist totalitarian dictatorship experience.

Our generation was born after the peace treaty with Israel was signed, a parliamentary coalition between the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood was formed, liberal writers and


intellectuals such as Farag Fouda were assassinated, and the Berlin Wall fell. This was the first manifestation showing very clearly that the capitalist model and the liberal economy are about to deal a deathly blow to the socialist camp. Stories of human rights violations started to be circulated, and others of how the liberal West respects the humanity of man, is creative in production and development, while granting citizens individual freedoms.

All of this took place under ongoing government control over the media that used to pick what type of news we would hear, what type of movies we could watch, and even what type of activities parties could undertake inside their facilities.

The Gulf War had a huge impact on the stories Nasserites and Islamists used to repeat about the “one nation,” be it Arab or Muslim. We all heard of the killings, thefts, rapes that were committed by the Arab Iraqi Army against Arab Muslims in Kuwait! That was a painful blow to the different kinds of Arab totalitarian and socialist regimes.

We saw regimes that claimed to fight imperialism everywhere allow for Western bases to be established on their territories and run to sign a joint defense agreement with a major state that was previously classified as “infidel.”

Then we reached the point where the Madrid Conference was held and the Oslo Accords signed, presenting a real and live model for us, the youth generation, to prove that gains can be made through legal and political struggle, rather than hate speech and war.

All of this remained in the consciousness of my generation that continued to observe, analyze, and understand, until we came to be convinced that there was a major global wave unfolding based on the freedom of the individual, the freedoms of expression and opinion, and the freedom of economy, while respecting law and democracy.


Satellite channels emerge In the mid-1990s, Egypt launched Nile Sat, which marked the

official beginning of the “open skies” era. With the increase in the number of arts, sports, drama, and news satellite channels, the region entered a new intellectual phase. The conflict turned into an intellectual and ideological one, where every group defended its logic using a large group of speakers and even a larger group of viewers no longer centered within the borders of one state but spread all over the region.

Moreover, the professionalism and huge expenditures of these channels provided the opportunity to not only learn about the experiences of major and developed countries, and hear from their officials, but also to learn about their elections, including political campaigns, motivating my generation to expand their imagination, dream bigger, and ask questions. Why does the same not happen in our countries? Why is there no plurality? Why can’t Egypt have a new president? Why is there no role for the youth, women, Copts, or minorities? Why are elections not rigged in Europe? Why no impact on national security? A lot of questions continued to be raised without answers until the Internet became available in Egypt.

Internet in Egypt A great technological leap has made communication easier,

safer, and distant from brutal authorities that suppressed any gathering of a political nature. Then, chat rooms and forums that were bolder in discussing issues of religion and politics freely, and with no censorship, inspiring discussions and motivating minds. After being convinced of the points of view of others, many changed their positions. At this point, it became clear that there is a generation that does not need to be spoon-fed and has begun to use the rest of its senses.


Kefaya movement and Al-Ghad Party Egyptian politics has also gone through a development phase,

in parallel to the development of thinking, and may have been affected by it. There was a great need for new blood to bring life to the political movement that had been stiffened, including the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) at the time.

The Kefaya movement included different political groups - Islamist, leftist and liberal. The foundation of Al-Ghad Party was a massive addition, enabling the youth generation to have a political platform similar in orientation to them; that spoke their language, and used their modern methods. As a result, Al-Ghad and Kefaya became meeting points for youth. All members of Al-Ghad Party, who were automatically members of the Kefaya movement, gained experience in organization and enlightenment, and learned the features of the new Egyptian political spectrum that seemed to be overlapping at many times, where liberal overlapped with national and with socialist. At every gathering, differences between individuals appeared and closer groups were not formed until Facebook appeared.

When Facebook appeared in 2007, it offered a perfect political platform where virtual protests, discussions, debates, alliances, and even electoral campaigns took form. Pages criticizing the ruling authority and fighting bequeathal plans for the presidency were created. Groups and pages promoting liberalism were also created. With some surprise, liberals realized they are much greater in number than they thought they were. We found there were enough of us to start parties and change movements by enlightenment drives. In 2008, I once called on people to watch “Heya Fawda” (It is Chaos), a movie by Khaled Youssef and Youssef Shahin. It was a realistic and painful movie where the security state we lived under was perfectly depicted, clarifying that it can only be fought by the people, who must unite and face and break the security fist. We arrived at Radio Cinema where the movie was showing only to find tens of security vehicles surrounding the building to prevent the protest


that started after the movie aimed at greeting the filmmakers and sending a message to all others that art is a free liberal tool of cultural and intellectual change. Facebook, it turned out, forced the security forces to mobilize!

So we thought, let us do it again and pick a day for peaceful action, like Gandhi did, calling for a strike all over India to force the occupation authorities out. For us, that was 6 April 2008. Two weeks earlier, I started a Facebook page named “6 April, Public Strike by the People of Egypt.” Attracted to the title, politicized and un-politicized youth started to join to learn about what would happen in Egypt on 6 April. They knew, wrote, created, and came up with ideas to spread the word. Our purpose was to reach out to people through their economic needs, which represent a priority for them. They started to feel that we are on their side when we called for increasing income in line with price hikes. They participated and through freedom of expression they wrote on the page to spread the idea. Among the ideas proposed were writing on banknotes, and putting up 6 April signs on cars or balconies. The day was a success in which different society groups participated. Young men and women were arrested, and I was one of them. I was arrested because I called for it, and founded the page while emergency law was in effect. Thanks to the people’s sympathy and local and international media pressure, I was released. The mature people of this country called me the “Facebook girl” and a new stage of struggle began with a newly acquired experience and popular faith in freedom of expression, even virtual expression, that was being violated and that must be fought for.

The ceiling of demands of the struggling liberal generation became higher with Ayman Nour’s release from Mubarak’s prison after ElBaradei’s announcement of his possible presidential candidacy. My political activity started in 2004 with Ayman Nour, Al-Ghad Party, and the Kefaya movement. Then I met with some liberal youth who worked with Dr ElBaradei in 2010 and we organized a huge popular welcome for him after the


end of his term at the International Atomic Energy Agency and his return home. His presence and intention to run when the constitution was changed, allowing a true and competitive democratic environment, raised the ambitions of all of those who called for change - particularly liberals. He chaired the National Association for Change that included figures from all groups of the Egyptian opposition, while demands for amending the constitution became louder, aimed at enabling independents to contest elections - and real elections, not the usual fake ones.

ElBaradei’s international status as a Nobel Peace Prize winner shed a lot of light on the importance of change in a stifled Egypt. The activity of Ayman Nour and his movement did not stop, and the courage of Al-Ghad Party youth played a role in fighting repeated bequeathal attempts. We can also never forget the national campaign against bequeathal, “He Shall Not Rule,” regardless of the frustration that crept into the minds of some youth because of the recent acts of some of the same figures who led it.

Then came 2010, with signs that Mubarak’s regime could be forced out. After amending the constitution twice, and the “judges crisis,” the time came for legislative elections that were paving the way for the awaited “bequeathal” to take place in about a year, after the end of Hosni Mubarak’s then-current term. For that reason, the NDP was very extreme in its attempt to get rid of all types of opposition to the extent that the resulting parliament was almost 100 percent composed of the ruling party. Ahmed Ezz, the NDP’s organizational secretary at the time and the engineer of the 2010 parliamentary elections, had made a most foolish mistake that the whole NDP paid for after. Liberal democratic groups and leftists became more enraged. Even ordinary citizens were enraged.

At the time, I worked as an elections observer with a trained team from the Egyptian Democratic Academy, of which I am honored to be a cofounder. Our monitoring was not traditional: we used maps and had violations appear wherever they happened,


anywhere in the country, and in a timely fashion. This was one of the modern tools we used to make real change, to expose and eliminate corruption and election rigging. Society started to bristle with rage, especially after Ayman Nour published a picture of the face of a completely un-politicized young man from Alexandria, Khaled Said, after he was tortured to death. Khaled was not a political activist, but an ordinary citizen, which made the public feel they were prone to danger even if they kept a low profile. Meanwhile, the National Association for Change took action by establishing a parallel parliament within Al-Ghad Party. Made of 100 members, that parallel parliament included figures not only from Cairo but also from other governorates. At the inaugural session of the invalid 2010 parliament, Mubarak described the parallel parliament in his speech as worthless, saying: “Let them have fun.” That spurred young liberal and democratic groups to begin preparing for what we believed could be a final battle, and one that was close.

Against the backdrop of these political events that took place between 2009 and the end of 2010, I began to work on rights awareness through the Egyptian Democratic Academy. We observed the 2010 parliamentary elections, and communicated with, motivated, and trained youth from different groups by engaging them in political or rights-based public work. Our ability to communicate with some international liberal organizations honed our experience and helped us to learn from international liberal experiences. One of the most renowned and well-established liberal organizations was Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Having an office in Cairo, and young liberal Egyptians who understand the nature of Egyptian society in its team, made this organization particularly special. The best thing it did was encouraging liberal youth to write, compete in writing, and share experiences, along with hosting international liberals in Egypt. Liberal youth were given the opportunity to travel to Germany and attend international conferences to exchange experiences. I am honored to be one of these youth who gained the skill of exchanging experiences locally and internationally.


The Tunisian Revolution In mid-December 2010, when most of the Egyptian

democratic change forces were preparing for the next steps, a young man from the Tunisian city of Bouzaid named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest at the economic and security circumstances affecting his rights as a human being. That spurred anger on Tunisian streets that reached outside the country’s borders. I challenged those who said “Egypt is not Tunisia,” saying “Egypt will follow Tunisia.” At that time we were working on the page of “We Are All Khaled Said” to call for a protest for change and against police violations on Police Day, 25 January 2011. A full-scale revolution erupted in Tunisia to the extent that Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali could not contain the resounding impact of the chant, “The people want the fall of the regime!” Later, I heard that slogan echo in other Arab capitals.

Cairo was the first to repeat that chant, which was originally a liberal demand. People demanded their freedom years after giving it up to suppression and injustice.

Eighteen days passed, just like the 18 days I spent in Mubarak’s prison after 6 April 2008. Eighteen days in 2008 that changed me as an Egyptian citizen, and a different 18 days in 2011 that changed Egypt. These 18 days were the age of the Egyptian democratic civil revolution. It became clear that dark forces were about to rise to grab the fruits of this revolution, depending on the poverty of the simple people who are not educated enough to spot traders in religion. At that point, liberals and civil state advocates started to meet frustrations.

Dreams crushed by obstacles The Muslim Brotherhood meeting with Omar Suleiman to

negotiate the release of its leaders, such as Khayrat El-Shater, from prison, which was aired on the media, was a prelude to what several rounds of negotiations throughout the 18 days lead to.


One could not help but wonder what these dark forces were negotiating with the dictatorial forces then in power. Overwhelmed with the historic moments we were making, we did not give much attention to the details. Our dream came true and the president stepped down. We were too blinded by this moment and the joy of the victory over the tyrant regime to think that the alternative that was soon to rule and manage the transition period was part and parcel of the regime that was supposed to have fallen. Despite doubts we had about the constitutionality of the resignation, we were optimistic and hopeful that the military institution would manage the transition period to achieve the principles of the revolution expressed in Tahrir Square. The method of resignation confirmed to us that the 1971 Constitution was no longer standing and that a new constitution would be drafted.

Led by Field Marshal Tantawi, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) announced the formation of a committee to amend the 1971 Constitution that was brought down at the moment of Mubarak’s resignation. Revolutionary and liberal forces sought a true democracy, not a fake one, as we were used to before the revolution. Democracy is not only a ballot box, but also a long process that ends - not begins - with elections. We, the civil forces, raised the slogan of “Constitution First” and rejected the constitutional amendment committee that included no liberals. The product of this committee had nothing to do with free civil principles. Liberals faced a major challenge represented by the alliance formed between SCAF, the former regime, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafists who began to organize themselves, become more visible, and participate in million-man marches. That alliance represented about 75 percent of Egyptians, which was reflected in the “heaven versus hell” referendum on 19 March 2011, while liberals and the rest of the democrats constituted about 25 percent of the votes. Certainly, all types of weapons - religion included - were used. If you say yes, you will go to heaven. If you say no, you will go to hell. This was the first


strike against the free civil liberal state that we dreamt of, and thought we could achieve, after 11 February 2011.

This was followed by elections for which liberal parties - particularly those formed after the revolution - were not ready compared to political Islamic forces that commanded old and interconnected organizations, in addition to a lot of funds collected through charity work or taken from some Gulf countries. The second strike was the electoral loss to political Islam.

That other side, which stood against the rise of a liberal state, was not the only reason for the consecutive blows to our dreams. Liberals themselves were a reason, as some liberal parties decided to go into electoral coalitions with the Muslim Brotherhood that resulted in very little benefit for them. Al-Ghad Party committed this mistake and still does, unfortunately.

The challenge of religious groups controlling the whole scene was a nightmare for real liberal forces that did not realize the dire need for unity and integration. Liberal groups continued to be scattered in the form of tens of parties, only two or three of which had real weight, while others had closed offices.

However, the performance of the Free Egyptians in parliament, and that of individual Wafd Party parliamentarians, gave a glimpse of hope until parliament was dissolved by virtue of a decision from the Supreme Constitutional Court. God saved us from the inferno of Islamists taking control over legislation, bent on forcing us back to past ages where liberty and opinions were suppressed and women enslaved. Despite the consecutive blows, liberals managed to stand up again and cling to thin hopes that could turn to realities.

After the dissolution of parliament, we began to work on the presidential elections, in which no revolutionary young liberal candidate participated. We did everything we could to save what could be saved and to unite some candidates who carried different ideologies but shared the desire to save the revolution from the


trap of the former regime and that of political Islam. Unfortunately, personal interests were prioritized at the expense of public interests, as all candidates insisted on competing and scattered the civil revolutionary voting bloc. Liberal youth were fragmented, as one group supported an Islamist candidate who claimed modesty, Dr. Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, and another stood by a leftist candidate who claimed openness, Mr. Hamdeen Sabahi. Others saw nothing wrong with backing Mr. Amr Moussa, due to his closeness to the liberal camp and despite his former affiliation with the Mubarak regime. Others supported General Ahmed Shafiq, fearing that the Muslim Brotherhood would come to power.

In the end, the fears we had from the beginning became reality in the runoff round when Islamists mobilized - supported by some liberals who feared the return of Mubarak’s regime represented by Shafiq - in support of Mohamed Morsi, who claimed to be the revolution’s candidate. Meanwhile, another group refused both Morsi and Shafiq and either boycotted the election or invalidated their ballots. I personally believe that those who invalidated their ballots, including myself, were more than one million, constituting the critical liberal revolutionary bloc that could not vote for a candidate affiliated with dictatorship or fascism.

Mohamed Morsi won the runoff and became president. As a result, we entered the worst year in memory as the political Islamic current manipulated and abused religion to shield its failures and defame the civil opposition. Gaining control over all key state institutions was a clear priority for the Muslim Brotherhood government. A new strike against the idea of the civil liberal state was delivered by Morsi when he issued a dictatorial constitutional declaration in November 2012, ironically uniting democrats, liberals and leftists together in a new political coalition under the name The National Salvation Front. That coalition was a sign that the liberal trend was gaining ground and winning support. This became crystal clear in the


Itihadeya, Moqattam and Tamarod protests, as well as in other moments when larger groups of Egyptians came to see liberalism as the only logical route to achieving their reasonable human needs.

30 June and after On 30 June 2013, a revolution that was liberal at heart

erupted, bringing down abusers of religion and drawing up a new political roadmap. This revolution brought a significant liberal figure to the position of vice-president - Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. Later, Dr. ElBaradei pulled out, leaving in shock those who had supported him for years, while embarrassing liberals who delegated him in Tahrir Square to represent them at the country’s time of need. This, together with the support of Dr. Ayman Nour and others who promoted the theory of a “soft coup” to the Muslim Brotherhood, frustrated liberals. In spite of this, other liberal groups, such as the Wafd, the Free Egyptians, and the Conference Party, as well as independents, insisted on continuing the 30 June drive to fight terrorist groups, expressing popular sentiment to different degrees.

The blows after 30 June were less harmful than those before. They could be tolerated or deemed as a natural outcome of the critical situation. They started when the 50-Member Committee tasked with amending the 2012 Constitution was composed of an absolute majority of leftist Nasserites, to the extent that Dr. Mohamed Abu El-Ghar, president of the leftist Egyptian Social Democratic Party, was chosen as a representative of liberals, signifying clear exclusion of this promising trend in Egypt. The fact that we were unable to repeal the article on military trials was also a strike against the idea of the civil state. However, it was kept due to the need to fight terrorism. We are hopeful that it will be changed in a future parliament that represents us clearly. We also hoped for positive discrimination for women, at least temporarily, which we still hope to see in the next election law.


Hope and working to achieve what we seek was a motivation for us to go on. Despite frustrations, the liberal minority managed to draft a constitutional chapter on freedoms, which we consider a victory of liberal principles in the history of the development of Egyptian constitutions.

Implementing the first step of the post 3-July political roadmap, which was the referendum on the constitution that has already taken place, signifies that we have achieved the first demand we had after Mubarak’s fall - “Constitution First” - and have proven to Egyptian society and public opinion that we were right from the beginning; that true democracy must have its principles established in a constitution for all Egyptians. The next step was to face other challenges, the first of which for liberals to have a presidential candidate. That was not achieved, as Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi has won the vast majority of the public’s support. He has become Egypt’s most powerful man, with liberal parties seeking to be on his good side, and to be close to him by all possible means. Leftists, on the other hand, presented more than one candidate; namely, Mr. Hamdeen Sabahi and Mr. Khaled Ali.

Unfortunately, liberal political groups presented no strong liberal alternative until now - one capable of making the people feel the same enthusiasm and optimism they hold for El-Sisi. We have become confused and are waiting on his decisions. We are waiting in hope for a liberal candidate to come forward to compete and convince the people of his worth.

All of this inspired me to write on my personal pages on social media websites that the third anniversary of 11 February is one of a loaded victory. We must be cautious of all that is coming, since temporary deceptions - albeit ones that impress us - lead us to fall into long dreams.

Certainly, we must all think again, rectify our course, make the right choices as liberals, and set our own priorities. Now, there is still time, which we may not have tomorrow.


Politics and liberalism in Egypt: Did anything change?

Shehab Wagih

I do not remember the first time I heard the word “politics.”

But I distinctly remember the impression this word gave in my country and most of the Arab region towards the end of the last century. It was a magical word surrounded with a holy aura. I remember that mentioning this word left people with different impressions: fear of provoking important people, power and influence, and big change in people’s lives, and on fewer occasions hope for a better life. I also remember that the word “liberalism” did not mean much in the life of Egyptians and that most Egyptians either did not understand what it means or did not care to. In the beginning of this century, everything changed and words such as politics and liberalism started to leave different impressions. Here, I would like to tell you the story from my own perspective, and support it by presenting some of my personal experiences. I imagine the story as made up of three chapters. The first began in the middle of the first decade of this century, while the second chapter began on the evening of 25 January 2011 and ended with millions coming out against Dr. Mohamed Morsi on 30 June 2013, marking the beginning of a new chapter, the outcome of which, and when it will end, I cannot tell.

Chapter I In his book, Political Challenges and Changing Agendas, Dr.

Mark Kesselmen claims that the most important factors that changed political situations globally in the beginning of this century were the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the fall of the


Berlin Wall, the events of 11 September 2001, and the 2008 global financial crisis. Although I cannot confirm that all of these international factors had anything to do with what happened in the Arab region in the beginning of 2011, I can relate to you what led to these events.

12 December 2004 was an unremarkable winter day in most of Egypt. Although most Egyptians sensed no change, it was different in the Downtown area of Cairo where hundreds of Egyptians gathered in front of the High Court to say “Enough” (Kefaya) for the first time to the Egyptian president, who is still venerable and wise until this moment, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak. No one can tell when exactly this group began to come together. Some believe that the beginning was in the protests arranged in support of the second Palestinian Intifada in October 2001. While others think that the group did not come together except in March 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq. What is certain, though, is that the group came together despite ideological differences. Kefaya held its first meeting in November 2004 at Abu El-Ella Madi’s home, where they agreed to say to Mubarak “Kefaya / Enough, no to extension, no to bequeathal.” The Kefaya alliance, if I may call it such, included Islamists, communists, anarchists and liberals, in addition to some of those enamored with fame and who tried to become visible at the expense of a group of honest patriots who loved this country.

Kefaya reached the peak of its success in 2005 when it managed to hold a large number of events in areas that were considered to be off-limits, such as the International Book Fair and Downtown Cairo. Most importantly, it managed to open for the first time channels for dialogue and communication between various political groups in Egyptian universities. In my school, I saw Ahmed Badawi, member of the liberal Al-Ghad Party, and Mohamed Eid, who is a liberal and brother of activist Ahmed Eid, working with Mostafa Mohey and Khaled El-Sayed, who are leftists, not caring about their ideological affiliations. The Muslim Brotherhood was supposed to cooperate with Kefaya in


universities. But it was clear to me - at least in my school - that the Brotherhood members were very afraid of adopting Kefaya’s slogans, because they believed they crossed their red lines, and they decided to protest only for national and Islamist issues instead of national political issues. I was impressed with Kefaya just like many others from my generation and I went with its members to my second protest ever. The first protest I had ever been to was one of the protests supporting the Palestinian Intifada. I was a high school student at the time.

I cannot give one reason for the dissolution of Kefaya, but I distinctly remember when it started to break down. It was when I suddenly learned that some colleagues of mine were no longer directly affiliated with Kefaya, but affiliated with Students for Change. I learned that others preferred to work with Youth for Change. Groups began to fight over actual roles and communication with the elite. This was followed by the withdrawal of all Islamists who justified their move by an article posted on a website that they believed undermined the value of the hijab (the veil). I must not forget to mention that some were monitored by security and others slandered by the media. However, what was certain was that by the beginning of 2006, Kefaya had become very weak and lost a lot of its glamor.

In the winter of 2006, I was on my way to attend a lecture at my school when I was stopped by a colleague who knew my beliefs and who asked me to join the Democratic Front Party. My colleague believed the party to be the heir of the liberal wing of Aziz Sedky’s front. Knowing the restrictions suffered by parties in Egypt, and interference of the security apparatus, I was hesitant. But I was determined to go through with it and I remember very well the first meeting I attended with the youth of the Democratic Front Party. Dr. Shady El-Ghazali Harb was the party’s youth secretary at the time and he was very passionate about the new party and wanted it to be a party that truly represented the liberal trend. Then, I was not as enthusiastic about the intellectual trend as I was about building an organization that


could compete with the National Democratic Party (NDP). I found the minimum of capabilities and young efficient members in this party to make this dream possible.

I wish today I knew in 2007 that the most important thing lacking in the Democratic Front Party was more training for members on its political beliefs, and respect for the rules of organizational work and teamwork. The party lost a lot of its members due to the lack of clarity in the purpose of partisan work, and organizational discipline, and the passion of party members that was at most times overwhelming. At times, this passion contradicted with the party’s political beliefs.

To be honest, many attempts were made by several local and foreign partners to support the Democratic Front Party and improve its performance by providing training opportunities for its members. The first opportunity was a meeting between party youth and Ukrainian Orange Revolution youth in Istanbul. The meeting was arranged with support from the British Liberal Democratic Party and Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Tens of events were organized by the party in cooperation with civil society organizations. Institutions would not have been able to arrange these events without the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. These activities helped build the capacities of the cadres of several political movements until they had a role in the Egyptian political landscape.

In early 2008, the status of the workers of El-Mahalla Spinning Company aggravated, and shy calls for a strike were made, capturing the interest of the Democratic Front Party. The suggested date for the strike was 6 April 2008. A few days earlier, it was clear that that day would not be an ordinary day. The media, on the other hand, tried to convince citizens that it was an ordinary day, although reality was completely different. On that day, the city of Mahalla was out of the control of the Egyptian state. Armed men took over the streets and imposed charges for cars to pass. On that day, citizens expressed unexpected anger against the police and anyone connected with


the NDP in Mahalla. For a moment, I asked myself if it was possible for the same to happen elsewhere in Egypt.

The period between 2008 and 2010 was the peak time for youth movements - especially the April 6 Movement that was established when calls for the Mahalla strike were first made. Most of its leaders at that point were not new to political work, as rumored. On the contrary, most of them were graduates from Kefaya. I remember my first meetings with Ahmed Maher in Al-Ghad Party before he became the leader of the April 6 Movement. He was a young liberal man who was loved by most of his colleagues. He truly hated Mubarak’s regime and was ready to do anything to face it. I remember the day he was released after spending some time in detention in El-Basateen Police Station. While taking him home in my car, it crossed my mind that prison might have undermined his passion. But on the way home, he was preparing for events to challenge Mubarak’s regime. Conflicts inside April 6 started from the first day. Some of these conflicts were ideological, but most were personal. What was certain, however, was that despite all of the conflicts, the age of a unified April 6 was much longer than that of a unified Kefaya. The reason for this might have been the passion of its youth, or the public leadership of Ahmed Maher, and his concern that the movement had a clear image.

6 April 2010 was a critical day in my life. Before that day I was a political activist in a party and carried a certain political ideology. But I could not say that I truly knew what politics was before that day. I followed closely politics in the European Parliament and was always impressed by its rich diversity and interest in political research. I saw in 2010 a job ad for temporary researchers at the European Parliament, specifically with the liberal and democrat bloc. I was very enthusiastic about this temporary job, applied for it, and was surprised when my application was accepted and my date of travel set to 10 April 2010. I was thrilled about the new experience to the extent that I prepared everything to travel - my visa, flight ticket, and army


clearance - one week before the date of travel. Then came 6 April 2010 when there was a call for a protest in Downtown Cairo. Before the protest began, and while trying to assemble, I was arrested together with a number of colleagues. On the evening of 8 April, I was transferred to Maadi Police Station to be released. But the real purpose was the idea that putting me with convicts would make me respect my supposed masters. I remember well the many interventions made for my release on the evening of 9 April, so I could travel to Brussels on the morning of 10 April. I distinctly remember the feeling that arises when your country puts you in prison for expressing your political opinion about your homeland, while another country is willing to host you, pay you a salary to express your political opinions and analyses, and teach you how politics should be. The experience of working for the European Parliament was the most important in my life, because it is where I learnt that politics is not about attractive slogans, but procedures that improve people’s lives.

During my stay in Brussels, Mohamed ElBaradei started to take a place in the political scene, and many Egyptians began to look up to him as a source of hope. Opposition groups at the time tried to make Dr. ElBaradei a center point of attraction, and established the National Association for Change around him. However, what was truly special was the group of youth that tried to organize themselves in what was known as the ElBaradei Support Campaign. Then an incident occurred, one sadly usual, but due to special circumstances it changed the face of Egypt. A young Egyptian man from Alexandria, named Khaled Said, was beaten to death by the police. His picture went viral on social media, enraging many of those who belonged to his social class and did not - until then - care about political work. It seemed to everyone that the practices of the police apparatus could no longer be tolerated.

After the comedy of the 2010 parliamentary elections organized by the Egyptian regime, many youth movements wanted to use the anger of Egyptians against the police. Being a


holiday, calls for protests against the practices of the police apparatus on Police Day were made on the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” with the purpose of removing the interior minister. As events developed in Tunisia, the ceiling of the ambitions of the youth started to rise. If we speak of the early days of 2011, we must not forget the events following bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria, and the thousands of Egyptian Copts who protested against the slackness of the security apparatus that did not defend their churches.

The morning of 25 January 2011 was not like its evening. The change that Egypt went through on that day was unprecedented. But before leaving this scene, I would like to explain that at those times the word “politics” was connected to hope for change in Egypt, where it was possible to criticize the president and fine to criticize ministers. As such, at that point, liberalism was not popular. But even though the term liberalism was an enigma for most Egyptians, parties and movements declared themselves liberal.

Chapter II

I fully admit that I am biased on this stage in the history of Egypt. Despite the mistakes we made, it was a stage of hope and feeling the strength of these people and their ability to change. In this stage, the word politics was connected to change, freedom, and revolution. Fear of the word vanished and Egyptians started to learn more about liberalism. But liberalism was heavily attacked and had its image destroyed in these days - a defaming of people more than it was a defaming of the principles of liberalism per se.

On the morning of 25 January 2011, some limited and usual clashes occurred between security forces and activists. But the numbers were extremely surprising, especially that most of the faces were entirely new. We had never seen them before. By evening, protestors managed to take over Tahrir Square.


Although the numbers of protestors in the square were not large on that day, it was a group that truly represented the Egyptian educated elite. I remember very well the attack of the security forces on that day against protestors near Kasr El-Aini Street. Responding to that attack, I heard protestors crying very strongly for the first time, “The people want to bring down the regime.” The customary attacks by security forces could not disperse the protestors, as the numbers were unusual. I remember that many, including Dr. Osama El-Ghazali Harb and Mr. Ibrahim Eissa, decided to bring tents and spend the night in the square. By midnight, security forces made an unusual attack where huge amounts of teargas and large numbers of conscripts were used. Security decided not to let the sit-in continue.

Most of the political groups gathered and decided to call on citizens to come out on Friday, 28 January, to protest after Friday prayers. On 26 and 27 January, security forces were exhausted chasing protests led by youth who were mostly no more than 20 years old. I cannot really tell until this moment what motivated these youth and these large numbers of people to come out without a clear call. Then came 28 January, which was a very different day. On that day, the police wanted to break protestors by force, only to be broken by the protestors for good. Police vehicles and stations were attacked, police officers and cadets were attacked on the streets, and the police lost its prestige after losing its respect. The attack against police stations and policemen was by us justified at the time as an act of self-defense against the attack led by the police force against protestors. However, three years after the revolution, I must admit that while the attack of the police against protestors was a crime, the attack against police stations and policemen was also a crime.

After 28 January, the situation developed and as we all know led to the resignation of Mubarak on 11 February 2011. The question raised on 28 January was who was the alternative. Some believed the solution to be a presidential council, while others thought it to be urgent elections. Others proposed forming a


government with absolute powers. To be honest, the problem was not about the form of the alternative as much as it was about his identity. Most leftists and Islamists at the time were against Dr. ElBaradei. All groups were struggling to secure a large share of the presidential council, if created. Eventually, most groups agreed to let the military council (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) run the government temporarily. I remember at that time that some civil groups, in one of the meetings of the National Association for Change, called on the army to give power to a civil authority but the Muslim Brotherhood withdrew from the meeting and sent less important representatives to subsequent meetings.

At this stage, many felt that the reason behind the success of 25 January was the use of force. Others believed that change can never be made except by force, and considered any negotiations in politics to be betrayal - hence refusing negotiations with Mubarak. A serious imbalance occurred when those who had the power and ability to make change on the ground had the stronger voice, instead of those who adopted reason and politics. The authorities at the time wanted to appease whoever was capable of mobilizing people more than those who had a political vision or a vision for the future. I do not claim that the Youth Revolution Coalition represented all of the revolutionary groups on the ground. But it could have been an acceptable representative of the voice of reason. But because many sided with power and change by pressure, neither the coalition nor any other group could enter into a political negotiation. Eventually, the military council had absolute authority, with no side present to express the revolution politically.

The situation in political parties at this stage was at its absolute worst, given that Egypt was already suffering from too many ineffective political parties before 25 January. After that date, the situation got out of control, as most of those who founded political parties did not have a clue what political parties are. Hundreds wanted to create parties and accused older parties


of treason. Then others established parties to accuse the new parties of treason, while a number of youth movements continued to accuse all parties of treason and reject the very idea of them.

In the meantime, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only political group that could present an agenda backed by a strong and coherent organization. The purpose of the Brotherhood was to seek authority through speedy elections before the other groups could prepare themselves to compete. For that purpose, the Brotherhood presented itself to the military council as the loyal ally and close friend that supports the process of peaceful change and does not make radical demands that are difficult to meet. In the meantime, youth groups that spoke to themselves and to the media became tougher in their demands to which they received no response due to their inability to mobilize large numbers of people.

The March 2011 constitutional referendum was one of the hardest strikes against civil parties and youth groups that united together with the people against the military council and the Brotherhood, but that were sorely defeated. Most civil groups wanted to have the constitution drafted first; religious groups and military council supporters were clearly campaigning for stability and the will of God. Despite the strength of the strike sustained by civil groups, they did not unite truly and accusations of treason continued to be made. The gap became even wider when some civil groups came out calling for a renewed use of popular force.

The loss of the parliamentary elections was another defeat, but it was to a great extent an expected defeat, as the selection criterion for civil groups was not popularity on the ground as much as it was revolutionary purity and personal relations. As a result, the candidates presented were not only weak in terms of electoral performance, but also in terms of political performance, which became evident after their election. In the parliamentary elections, we saw overblown accusations against existing leaderships - of being remnants of the former regime. Even Osama El-Ghazali Harb, who was one of the first to go to Tahrir


Square on 25 January, was accused of being a remnant of the former regime by some revolutionary adolescents. In this stage, it became clear that youth groups started to lose the sympathy of the Egyptian people because some of these groups were too extremist in their demands and too persistent for radical solutions that cannot be achieved.

But the absolute defeat that changed the scene and rearranged coalitions happened in the 2012 presidential elections. Civil groups were divided and failed to settle on one candidate. A number of youth groups began to claim they were the best choice, leading to the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate who promised to respond to the demands of youth groups and engage civil groups. However, once he came to power, Mohamed Morsi broke all his election promises and began to restructure the state to be the Muslim Brotherhood’s preserve, depending on the fact that it was the only organized group that was well experienced in the mechanisms of political work. Several confrontations took place between him and youth groups. Later, animosity grew between him and the army and pro-stability groups due to several actions that were seen as promoting violence and extremism, leading to Al-Qaeda leaders raising black flags in the North Sinai city of Al-Arish.

The actions of Mohamed Morsi forced the leaderships of civil groups to unite and form the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF started a political battle against Dr. Morsi aimed at revealing the true nature of his acts to the public and the outside world, to strip him of what he claimed was his legitimacy. Mohamed Morsi lost most of his allies and by the time the Tamarod Movement began to collect signatures in support of withdrawing confidence from Dr. Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood had lost all of its political allies. When the calls for the 30 June protests were made, a different scene started to appear in Egypt, indicating that everyone would join forces to put an end to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.


Chapter III I do not know how many took to the streets 30 June 2013, but

I am sure it was the largest protest in the history of Egyptian protests. These large numbers of people were truly enraged by the Muslim Brotherhood, the fact that certain groups monopolized the state, and their feeling that the state was changing. Many of them yearned for the relative stability that was present under Mubarak. This might have been the first time for political coalitions to change to the extent that the most extreme leftists stood by Mubarak supporters against the rule of Mohamed Morsi.

The majority of people knew that Morsi would not remain in power. We hoped he would call for early presidential elections, but he continued in denial and insisted to challenge millions of protestors. The Brotherhood staged a huge sit-in at Nasr City’s Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square. The purpose of the sit-in and its demands were not clear, but the intended message was “I have supporters too.” The comparison on numbers was not at all in favor of Mohamed Morsi. We knew the army would intervene, but the question was when. Our biggest fear was that the army would intervene after an open confrontation between the protestors of the Rabaa sit-in and the protestors of the Al-Itihadeya (Presidential Palace) sit-in, because the human price of such a confrontation would have been very high and the impact would have been truly frightening.

On 3 July, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the Coptic Pope, and a number of patriotic politicians met with then Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to announce the removal of Dr. Morsi and the beginning of a new political roadmap. Clearly, the Muslim Brotherhood did not get the message and raised the tone of its discourse against what they sometimes called the undermining of electoral legitimacy and at others God’s legitimacy. The Brotherhood barricaded the Rabaa sit-in and another at Al-Nahda Square in Giza. They also set up their media machine inside the sit-ins, turning them into mini states within the state. I cannot tell if the rumors circulated about the presence


of wanted terrorists in the sit-ins are true or not, but I am sure that the state would not have been able to reach into the sit-ins even if they were.

We expected Dr. ElBaradei to become prime minister after 3 July and expected a lot from him. But we were surprised to see Dr. ElBaradei excluded from the selection process for the post and instead appointed as vice-president for international affairs. In the meantime, the Muslim Brotherhood escalated its activities against the state, declared it did not recognize the new government of Egypt, and took things a step further by inciting violence against the army and the police. People began to be more enraged by the Brotherhood. Moreover, the rage against the Brotherhood was connected to similar rage against the government that was seen as being too tolerant with sit-ins that made the lives of local residents impossible. A popular anti-Brotherhood wave was formed rejecting reconciliation or even dialogue and calling for the use of violence against pro-Morsi protestors.

It was widely rumored that negotiations were held before the sit-ins were forcibly dispersed, but until now there is no direct evidence of such negotiations from neutral sources. The only thing certain is that the security forces dispersed the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins after the Brotherhood and its associated National Coalition to Support Legitimacy decided to escalate without limits. As time passed, the escalation increased to the extent that coalition members considered the Egyptian state an infidel entity or traitor, and believed that members of its apparatus may be killed and its facilities vandalized, leading popular hatred against the coalition to grow.

The way the government managed the crisis was not ideal, as the government did not embrace the necessary enlightenment and transparency. It even tolerated the old ways that were used by Mubarak’s regime for years and proven useless. On the other hand, the National Coalition to Support Legitimacy was no smarter, as it provoked many by hate speech that incited violence


against the army, police, Copts, and 30 June supporters, dramatically decreasing their popularity as a political group capable of running the state and making some of their sympathizers state they would refuse to vote for them if elections were held and they participated.

The constitution that was adopted might have been the only gain made by Egypt after 30 June. We do not consider it an ideal constitution, but most of the Egyptian political spectrum agreed on it. Salafists, communists, representatives of Al-Azhar, the Coptic Church, and syndicates, artists, the revolution youth, and all other important groups of Egyptian society held serious discussions on it. Most political groups deemed the new constitution better compared to older Egyptian constitutions.

The popularity of Islamist groups decreased dramatically in Egypt. Believing Islamists cannot rule the country has made citizens more open to the term liberalism. Also, daily political discussions contributed to achieving a better understanding of politics and realizing its impact on our lives. But although many Egyptians started to better see the impact of politics on all our lives, many tended to blame politics for the recent deterioration in Egyptian standards of living. Some yearned for security even at the expense of freedom. Under these circumstances, some may think liberalism has no chance. But I believe it has a golden chance, now being the only system that was not tried in Egypt.

In Egypt, despite the relentless accusations that crisscross the political scene, liberalism has a bright future. Many regular citizens yearn for the voice of reason. Due to technological developments, and learning about the experiences of others, Egyptians have a real appetite for freedom, wish to improve their living conditions, and have a better understanding of the lies of populists. The greatest risk now is not political competition or the interference of the state; the fear is that the interim government fails to deal with present crises, leading to economic and security chaos. However, if the government is able to manage this stage, hold elections, and bring a diversified parliament that represents


the entire Egyptian political spectrum, Egypt will have taken its first steps towards establishing a liberal democracy that responds to the ambitions of people who aspire for freedom.


The missing piece of the world puzzle: Liberal International and the

Arab world

Emil Kirjas* “We call upon all men and women who are in general

agreement with these [liberal] ideals and principles to join us in an endeavor to win their acceptance throughout the world,” are the final words of the famous Oxford Manifesto from 1947, which many describe as among the major political documents of the 20th century. It was exactly the document that founded Liberal International - the oldest liberal international political organization in the world. For far too long those words have not reached the ears or the hearts of the people in the Arab world; until the last decade, when the Arab liberal awakening echoed these words in Arabic from the Gulf to the Atlantic.

A lot of words have been said and many texts have been written about the “Arab Spring.” Some praise it, others deny it, some challenge it, others embrace it; there are many different opinions about it in the Arab world. However, one fact remains undeniable: over the past years the people in the Arab world started hearing, discussing and debating openly about freedom, if not breathing it with full lungs. And that is a qualitative change that cannot go unnoticed. While it will be history that will ultimately judge, in that sense the last decade has been the decade of the Arabs in the international liberal family. Slowly, Arab liberals have made it on the stage of the world of international liberalism.

* The positions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not

necessarily reflect those of Liberal International.


Initial steps The first decade of the new millennium was marked by the

unveiling of the biggest missing puzzle on the map of international liberalism: that of the Arab world. While the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s brought Latin American and Eastern European liberals, the late 1990s and the first years of the new century were the days of African and Asian liberals. And when many thought that it would take a while for the empty puzzle of the map to be filled, liberal politicians from Tunisia, Morocco, and then Egypt and Lebanon, made the world map complete.

Arab liberals had a challenging task: both to operate in a very difficult environment, mostly in countries run by despotic undemocratic regimes, and to present themselves to a world that had little-to-no-knowledge of the countries where they were coming from. For many in the democratic world, Arab countries were terra incognita in a political sense. Many had known about the oppressiveness of Arab regimes, the suppression of any freedoms and liberties, but not so much about the hidden movement of critical thought, mainly expressed through philosophy and culture. Breaching those barriers was anything but an easy task.

While all countries in the Arab world have their nascent movements in past decades, the first ones who reached out to the international liberal community were the Tunisian liberals. Operating under an undemocratic regime, being allowed to be in certain way involved in the daily political life of the country ruled by President Ben Ali, was Parti Social-Libéral (PSL). While tolerated by the system, and even allowed to have some nominal representation in parliament, PSL was itself subject to monitoring, surveillance and intimidation.

PSL joined Liberal International in 1997, the first of the liberal parties in the region. It was a period of dialogue and opening of doors. The youth got integrated in the International


Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY), following the footsteps of the mother party. However, it took 11 years for PSL to change its status from observer member to full member of Liberal International. Pressures from the system, a lack of reliable and independent information on the ground, and insufficient trust marked relations with the international liberal family. It was exactly the barrier that the Arab liberal had to breach towards joining the international liberal family.

I vividly remember my visit to Tunis in 2002, then as president of IFLRY. I met the leadership of the party, but not in their headquarters. We had to meet in the street, and then in a restaurant, because we were followed. While walking down the streets of Tunis we discussed how difficult it was to operate in the state controlled by Ben Ali, and how they aspired that “one day we would feel free as you feel free in Brussels (where the headquarters of IFLRY were at that time).” “Look at that guy. He is from state security,” pointed my host from PSL to a grumpy-faced gentleman in dark brown clothes. He continued: “He knows you are a foreigner, he knows we are meeting, and he is following us. Wait and see, he will follow us in the restaurant.” And in fact, he did. The security guy calmly sat down two tables from us, all by himself, not even making an effort to cover up that he was observing us. I very clearly remember what my Tunisian liberal friend said: “Don’t worry, he won’t harm you. They just want to know what we are talking about. And if someone, they will interrogate us. But we have nothing to hide. And most importantly, as long as we have you as friends, we are covered.”

The last words were the most important: the relations and belonging to the international liberal family offered a refuge, and some clout of protection. Maybe the Tunisian liberals from PSL were not the best example of freedom fighters one might imagine from that perspective, but at that time they were opening doors. And it remains a fact that they were the first members from the Arab world of Liberal International; just as much as it remains a fact that Liberal International formally complained to Socialist


International that their full member - Ben Ali’s Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) - was harassing members of PSL. At Liberal International events, especially in the second half of the last decade, PSL representatives spoke of the need for more freedom, more respect of human rights, more women’s rights, and closer links with the democratic world.

It was the organization of the first Liberal International Congress in Africa, in Dakar, under the title “Islam and the West,” that opened the door for closer relations with the world in which Islam was the dominant religion - and in that sense, with the Arab world. That congress echoed loudly the message that Islam and liberalism are in fact compatible. The document adopted by Liberal International in Senegal was as much eye opening for Western liberals as heart-warming for many liberal followers of Islam. Exactly in Dakar, on the edges of the world of Arab influence, Liberal International welcomed two key parties from the Arab world: Union Constitutionelle and Mouvement Populaire from Morocco. An important country, a country that was transforming itself earlier than any other country in the Arab world, Morocco was a nation that had decided to deepen links with the democratic world. The inclusion of these two important Moroccan parties with parliamentary and government representation marked the process of real Arab inclusion and involvement in Liberal International. It marked the opening of a decade that I dare say no one expected would follow.

Arab liberals get organized If in 2003 in Dakar someone loudly predicted that by the end

of the first decade of the 21st century two out of four congresses of Liberal International would take place in the Arab world, and that in the next year two out of four executive committees of Liberal International would be dedicated to the Arab world, the delegates would have near unanimously declared that person a foolhardy optimist. The developments in the years to come have


proven that such an optimist would have actually been a realist, and fortune-teller!

Among some there is a general misconception about Liberal International. It is perceived as an institution on its own, a non-governmental organization set up to promote liberalism around the world. In fact, Liberal International is a federation of parties that voluntarily decided to join forces and to promote their common liberal values, nationally and internationally. This is what makes Liberal International strong and vivid. Members fight to win elections nationally, but also understand that in the world it is only by joining forces, supporting each other and sharing experiences, that we can achieve our common aspirations. That is the sprit that guides the organization. Based on that spirit, empowered by the Dakar Congress, many members of Liberal International oriented their international solidarity and support efforts towards Africa and the Arab world. Champion among them was - and remains - the German liberal foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF).

Based on the example set by then Liberal International president Annemie Neyts Utteboeck, who organized the congress in Dakar, the newly elected president, John Lord Alderdice, in 2005 initiated a policy of “engagement and dialogue” with the Arab world. With his extraordinary experience as the first president of the Northern Irish Assembly after the Good Friday Agreement, Lord Alderdice embarked on extremely difficult tasks to facilitate talks that seemed impossible: among the Israelis and the Palestinians, among the Palestinians themselves, among the different factions in Iraq. In parallel with the Liberal International presidency, that involvement created new atmosphere of trust among a number of Arab liberal leaders and the leadership of Liberal International. As much as there was a growth among the Arab liberal movements in various countries, Lord Alderdice had a distinct sense of understanding for the historic opportunity to seize the momentum and deepen the cooperation. Under his presidency, Liberal International


organized two out of three congresses in the Arab world: in Marrakesh, Morocco (2006) and Cairo, Egypt (2009). Indeed, if he didn’t host a congress in his native Belfast, Northern Ireland (2008), maybe all Liberal International congresses under his presidency would have been in the Arab world.

With unparalleled support offered by FNF, and with inclusion of other partners like the Liberal Group in the European Parliament, in 2006 Arab liberals gathered in Cairo, Egypt for a major international liberal conference under the title, “A Framework for Liberal Democracy in the Middle East.” Many Arab liberal organizations were present. Some were political parties, some were think tanks, and some were NGOs. They all shared one goal: to bring liberalism to the Arab world, to ensure that all Arabs live in freedom and democracy. That conference was a historic event that ended with foundation of the Alliance of Liberals in the Middle East and North Africa (ALMENA). Later renamed the Network of Arab Liberals (NAL), and finally known today as the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AAFD), that network took over the torch of liberalism in the region. It encouraged and empowered members of the network; that through mutual support they can indeed achieve liberalization of their societies. The Arab liberals organized themselves to be equal partners with the existing liberal networks in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Liberal International was there to fully back this new regional development and the first General Assembly of the Arab liberal network took place in parallel with the Liberal International Congress in Marrakeh, Morocco, in November 2006. An elegantly chosen theme, “Democracy and Development,” sent clear message to the region that progress could be achieved through liberal democratic reforms. The region was no longer marginal, but became actor in the global world of liberalism. The coordinator of the network, Mohamed Tamaldou of Union Constitutionelle (Morocco), won in competitive elections the post of vice president in the bureau of Liberal International.


It was the turn of Egyptian liberals to make their breakthrough in Liberal International. Under the leadership of one of the most prominent liberals in Egypt, Dr Osama Harb, a newly created liberal party, the Democratic Front Party (DFP), expressed its desire to strengthen the international liberal family with its membership. The congress in Belfast, Northern Ireland (2008), brought Egypt onto the map of Liberal International. Soon El-Ghad Party, led by Ayman Nour having been freshly released from prison, established cooperation with Liberal International. Instrumental in that process was prominent Egyptian writer Wael Nawara, who decided to dedicate himself fully not only to promoting liberalism in his country but also in the region. He made sure El-Ghad became a member of Liberal International and he took over the presidency of the Network of Arab Liberals. This new situation helped us all learn something that should have been obvious: Arab liberals are completely alike liberals in the other parts of the world, as set by the example by the two member parties from Egypt - DFP and El-Ghad - which later, after the toppling of Mubarak’s regime, were not able to join forces and present a common candidate list at the elections. On this particular issue, Egyptian liberals have proven to be alike their colleagues from the Netherlands, Denmark and Finland. Few would have thought of such a comparison.

Liberal International maintained a focus on the region. There were no revolutions in sight, but important work was going on. The annual Liberal International Prize for Freedom in 2008 was awarded to Professor Padraig O’Malley, especially inspired by his latest efforts in peaceful reconciliation and democratization work in Iraq. Jordan saw growth of its liberal groups, while Lebanese liberals made their way in IFLRY, not only joining the global liberal youth organization, but also hosting its executive committee and congress. Liberal International’s bureau debated and decided that liberals in the region needed further support, and that the focus should be Egypt.


One of the most interesting discussions followed on how to organize a congress in Egypt that would be supportive to Egyptian and Arab liberals but at the same time be permitted by Egyptian authorities to take place. Joint reflection with Dr Harb of DFP and the vigilant Dr Meinardus of FNF produced a result: “Education for the 21st Century.” As co-hosts of the congress in Cairo, they claimed rightly that it would be difficult for any government to say no to education. Mubarak and his people accepted; even a minister from the cabinet was sent to the opening of the congress. There, dozens of young liberal volunteers and many delegates from Egypt and the region discussed “Education and Human Rights,” “Education and Democracy,” “Education and Freedom,” and “Education and Free Trade.” The devil is in the detail, it is said. In this case, liberalism -regarded by Mubarak as the devil -was indeed in the detail of the congress theme. Maybe one of the greatest achievements of that 2009 Cairo congress was indirectly seen two years later on TV screens around the world: half of the young people who were volunteers at the Liberal International congress were in the front rows of the January 2011 revolution that toppled President Mubarak.

Coincidentally, it was in Cairo that Hans van Baalen, as newly elected president of Liberal International, announced that he sees “politics as playing rugby, and not tennis.” Mubarak faced a practical demonstration of what Van Baalen meant.

Revolution and evolution A logical consequence of the policy of “engagement and

dialogue” was the approach of “strength and growth.” That is how Hans van Baalen led his presidency of Liberal International in the region and globally. Liberal International consolidated its membership in the region and saw growth. It was a period of people awakening at the end of 2010 and 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt, with a domino effect on the whole Arab world.

Liberal International was quick to react to developments in the region, both as an organization and a network of member


parties and partners. As the world was following on TV screens the liberation of the Tunisians and Egyptians from autocratic rule, various liberal partners gathered in London for a coordination meeting on a rapid reaction and immediate assistance to the Arab world. There were FNF, European Liberal Democrats from the European Parliament and the party, Liberal Democrats (UK), VVD and D66 (the Netherlands), SILC (Sweden), the Danish Liberals, NDI (US), etc. Various policies, actions, activities, visits and support were agreed upon. The Arab world continued to be focus of Liberal International, but in a different and much more dynamic way. Liberal International’s president went immediately on multiple visits to Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Other bureau members followed suit. FNF and the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) Group in the European Parliament were quick in organizing a significant conference in Cairo on the Arab Spring. We were not there to tell anyone what to do; we were there to offer experiences and support, whenever asked. Arab liberals already had the status of equal partner within the international liberal family. Just as many in other parts of the world have learned from their mistakes, so will liberals in the Arab world.

Liberal International transformed itself into a key player in the region. The Socialist International, which had in its membership Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and Ben Ali’s RDC, had no credibility. The Christian Democrats/Conservatives had nothing to offer. Liberalism became the only credible alternative on the political system, but faced a new challenge: religious populism and the lack of a democratic system. Constitutions needed to be altered, elections to be organized, but the rules of the game were not clear and there was insufficient political training. Populism was difficult to counter. Liberals were at the forefront of the revolutions, but were not able to manage the processes that followed. Islamists were leading in Tunisia and Egypt, while Libya and Syria were involved in bloody wars. The need for a liberal Arab world was again the main theme of Liberal International. Its executive committee met on the first


anniversary of the Arab Spring, in Barcelona (Catalonia), hosted by the Catalan liberal government and in cooperation with the Union for the Mediterranean. The Free Egyptians Party affiliated to Liberal International, while Mahmoud Jibril of Libya became part of the Arab Liberal Leaders Network led by ALDE Group leader Guy Verhofstadt.

New political initiatives were born, including a network of liberal parliamentarians from the region, putting the Arab liberal world ahead of some other regions in the world. The presence of Arab liberals in the decision-making bodies of Liberal International was fortified with the election to the bureau of Abir Al-Sahlani (Iraq/Sweden), the first Iraqi woman elected democratically in a parliament outside of Iraq.

Lebanese liberals realized they had to fill the vacuum created by their absence from the international liberal family. The Future Movement, under the renewed leadership of Saad Hariri and Secretary General Ahmad Hariri, was quick to react. Not only did they join Liberal International, but they also launched major efforts to support the liberal idea in the region, with the executive committee meeting in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2013. The president of Lebanon, who pointed at Liberal International and AAFD as crucial political actors in the region, received Liberal International’s president and bureau.

Today, Morocco is slowly on its own genuine path to become a truly open democracy, with liberals, now reinforced with the membership of RNI (the National Rally of Independents) in Liberal International, playing a key role. Tunisia has shown that one can have a conclusive democratic dialogue in the Arab world, and we hope that the liberals from Afek Tounis will soon join the international liberal family. Egypt, after major setbacks, has to be persistent in implementing fully its roadmap to democracy. The role and the responsibility of liberals are paramount. Lebanon continues to be the hub of democracy in the Middle East, with growing pressure on liberals from the armed conflict in Syria and militants within Lebanon. Here, we have to admit that all our


collective efforts failed in the case of Syria. It is a tragedy that will remain a dark spot on our collective consciousness for many years to come.

In place of conclusions Many rushed to compare what happened in Eastern Europe to

what was happening in the Arab world. This led to erroneous expectations on both sides. Some crucial elements remain shared: Eastern Europe is not homogeneous, and neither is the Arab world; cultural background played a role in Eastern Europe, and so too in the Arab world. In looking for parallels and building expectations it would be better to compare the Arab world to countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire. We can see that neither are the polities stable, nor democracy deeply rooted, nor liberalism flourishing in any of those states - be they former Ottoman or in the Arab world. Building functional liberal democratic societies is a long process, but we must maintain the effort, be energetic and never give up. That long-term vision should and must include freedom and liberty for people in the Gulf.


From Arab Spring to Arab revolution: Three years of ALDE representation in the Arab world

Koert Debeuf 17 December 2010 was an important day for the European

Union. The European Council of Prime Ministers and Heads of State decided to change the Lisbon Treaty (or the new European constitution) in order to make more cooperation between European countries possible. This cooperation was urgently needed to tackle the global economic and financial crisis and crisis of the Euro. This crisis was the main topic of debate since it began in 2008. Solving this crisis was (and still is) a matter of survival for the European Union and consumed the attention of European leaders as well as the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the European Parliament.

Nobody noticed that on the same day Mohamed Bouazizi had self-immolated in Tunisia after the police had confiscated his wares, the only possessions he and his family had. The fact that protests erupted in the entire country appeared in the news, but nobody paid attention. The fact that people took the street asking the regime to leave seemed to be a small detail compared to the challenges the EU was dealing with.

From Brussels, over Tunis to Cairo On 14 January 2011, I was in Amsterdam where I had a

meeting with one of my friends who happens to be half-Dutch half-Tunisian. He was permanently distracted. He received phone calls from his father. When I asked him what was going on, he told me that it seemed probable that Tunisia’s president, Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, would step down. A few hours later, when I sat


on the train back to Brussels, my friend called me overjoyed that his father was right: Ben Ali had fled the country.

I was shocked. How was this possible? Why didn’t we see it coming? And maybe more importantly, would this revolutionary spirit spread to other countries in the neighborhood?

Apart from one press release, of one of the ALDE MEPs, Marietje Schaake, congratulating the Tunisian people, no one really knew what to make of the Tunisian case. However, a Tunisian girl on an Italian talk show, just after the revolution, gave one very strong answer. Guy Verhofstadt, president of ALDE, was a guest on the same program. She said that at the funeral of Mohamed Bouazizi, on 4 January 2011, it was not the green flag of Islam but the red flag of Tunisia covering his coffin. In other words, it was not an Islamist but a liberal revolution.

It was this insight that helped us to react swiftly and firmly once the revolution started in Egypt on 25 January 2011. From that moment on the ALDE group was committed to support the Egyptian people in their demands for freedom, dignity, social justice and bread. And we pushed the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, to do the same with all the means we had. Just after Hosni Mubarak stepped down, we organized a videoconference with liberal opposition leader Ayman Nour in order to understand and endorse the demands of the Egyptians. On 26 February 2011, a high level delegation from ALDE (ALDE president Guy Verhofstadt, Liberal International president Hans Van Baalen and vice-president of the European Parliament Edward McMillan-Scott) visited Cairo, attending a conference organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

From Cairo, over Tripoli to Damascus

The ALDE delegation in Cairo quickly understood the importance of what happened in Tunisia and Egypt and the opportunity of it for the Arab world and for Europe. That’s why we called for a “Marshall Plan” in order to help these post-


revolutionary countries to become stable, prosperous democracies. That was exactly what the Marshall Plan did for Europe after World War II and what the European Union did for the former communist countries of Central Europe. We also asked the European Parliament to establish representation in Cairo.

However, in the meantime, the revolutionary spirit spread like wildfire all over the Arab world. On 14 January, people started demonstrating in Jordan. On 3 February, protests had started in Yemen. On 17 February, in Libya. On 19 February, in Bahrain. On 20 February, in Morocco. On 14 March, in Saudi Arabia. On 15 March, in Syria. The outcome of the demonstrations in each of these proved to be very different. In Morocco and Jordan, both kings, with bloodlines going back to the Prophet Mohammed, succeeded in calming down the protests by promising reforms. In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the revolts were crushed in the most brutal way. In Yemen, it would lead to the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, while in Libya and Syria revolts descended into civil war.

On 10 March, the ALDE group invited a delegation of the Libyan opposition. No one had ever heard of the persons that would come to Strasbourg. But we decided to give them a chance to explain their case. Mahmoud Jibril was the man that took the floor. He was very precise in describing the Libyan situation and in what he expected from Europe: to recognize the National Transitional Council, to install a no-fly zone over Libya, and to provide the liberated areas with medicine and food. Jibril convinced ALDE to endorse his demands immediately and to try to convince other actors to do the same. After this meeting Jibril (together with subsequent Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan) met with Catherine Ashton, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, each one of whom he convinced of his demands. That is in short how the NATO intervention in Libya came to happen.


This positive outcome convinced European liberals that we could do more to support the Arab people in their fight against dictatorship. One lesson we learned from the transition of the post-communist countries in Central Europe was that it is a mistake not to support political parties. Parties are the backbone of democracy. If political parties don’t function, the goal of a stable liberal democracy will never be reached. During a new visit of ALDE to Cairo, in the beginning of May 2011, the idea of sending a representative on a permanent basis to the Arab world was born.

Three years of ALDE representation I had the honor of becoming this representative of ALDE in

the Arab world. The choice fell on me because of my political experience (advisor to the Belgian prime minister, director of the Flemish Liberal Party, chief of staff of the president of ALDE) and my fascination for the Arab world. I had visited the Arab world several times, where I had felt the weight of dictatorship, not least in Syria. ALDE gave me three main tasks: 1) to try to understand what is happening in the Arab world and write regular reports; 2) building a network of liberal Arab leaders and connecting it to ALDE; and 3) to try to give advice to liberal politicians, parties and activists in order that they can reach their goals - this in cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

My first mission - trying to understand what was happening in the Arab world - was more difficult than I thought. I realized soon how little we, Europeans, know about the Arab world and its history. I quickly understood how Eurocentric our Western view is. It is not exaggerating to say that Europeans have no knowledge of Arab history between the death of Cleopatra and the foundation of the State of Israel. The only time the Arab world, or the Islamic world, appears in our history books is when they were a “threat to our civilization.” The Battle of Poitier in


732, in which the Frankish leader Charles Martel defeated the Islamic troops and “saved Europe.” The Crusades, when our knights had to liberate Jerusalem from the intolerant Muslims and safeguard Christian access to Christian holy places. The fall of Constantinople in 1453, when we “lost” the capital of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans. The same Ottomans even came all the way up to Vienna twice (in 1529 and 1683) but were “luckily” defeated. These moments were the 9/11s of the Middle Ages. They left us with the impression that the Arab world and its Islamic troops had only one goal: to destroy our Western Judeo-Christian civilization.

Apart from these confrontations, Westerners generally have no idea what else happened in the Arab world. We know that in 1798 Napoleon invaded Egypt and found a “backward society.” He brought in a team of scientists and historians to record what was left of this great Pharaonic society. It was the French who rediscovered the pyramids and the old temples, deciphered the hieroglyphs and composed an “Egyptian encyclopedia”: the Description de l’Égypte. The other prominent image we tend to have of Egypt is of Lawrence of Arabia, the British soldier who finally succeeded in uniting the quarrelling Arabian tribes. Yet, the moment they get the opportunity to govern liberated Damascus, they make a complete mess of it.

However, the Christian West did have a weak spot for the Arab world, in particular for the world of One Thousand and One Nights, the Arabia of the harems, the Turkish bath, polygamy, the mystery behind the women’s veil. It is the Arabia of sensuality and sexuality. Everything that was forbidden in Christian morality appeared to be possible behind the thick walls of Arabia. It is this combination of ignorance and romanticism that Edward Said called “Orientalism.” In his famous book of the same name, Said explores the incidence of Orientalism in a vast amount of Western literature and art on the Arab world. Certainly in the 19th century, the age of Romanticism, the Arab world was pictured as a refined but decadent - and thus forbidden - world.


That changed in the second half of the 20th century. With the foundation of Israel in 1948, the Arab world came again to spell trouble. There were the wars with Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973, the Suez Crisis, the oil crisis, the war between Iran and Iraq, the civil wars in Lebanon and Algeria, and the terrorist attacks by Algerians in France. The fact that more than a million Algerians were killed in their War of Independence seems not to bother Westerners much. Instead, we watch the news of the hijacking and bombing of planes by the Palestinians of Yasser Arafat, and the Libyans of Muammar Gaddafi, the frightening Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini and his declaration of war on the West, the first and the second Intifadas, the terrorist attacks on US embassies, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, followed by the First Gulf War, the attacks by the PKK in Turkey, Hamas in Gaza, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Another important reason for our misunderstanding is the lack of knowledge about Islam. I remember when I was in Washington in 2006, the Belgian ambassador showed me an article in The New York Times in which the journalist discovered that in Iraq there were two important different groups of Muslims: Sunni and Shia. This is three years after the US invasion of Iraq. It is just one example of how limited our understanding is of the broad spectrum of interpretations and theological discussions within Islam. I heard so many times in Europe that democracy and Islam are opposites. Those who expound the idea forget that the third largest democracy in the world, Indonesia, is 90 percent Sunni Muslim.

It is impossible to understand liberalism in the Arab world without knowing a few historical facts. In the 19th century, there were major efforts to modernize the Arab world and to search for reconciliation between the ideas of the West and the East. But it must be said that the West wasn’t very supportive of these efforts. On the contrary, the two major democratic revolts in Egypt - in 1889 and 1919 - were crushed by the British. The Arab Revolt


against the Ottoman Empire, during World War I, ended in betrayal. We all know the story of Lawrence of Arabia where the Allied Forces promised the Arabs independence if they would unite and fight on their side. Instead, the French and the British divided the Middle East between them in the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement. On top of that, British Prime Minister Balfour promised the Jewish community a new home in Palestine.

This is not the right place to discuss the entire history of the Arab world. But the point I want to make is that Europeans often forget how 19th and 20th century colonialism blocked genuine efforts towards independent liberal democracies in the Arab world. It is the colonial past that created the combination between liberalism and nationalism, on the one hand, and between Islamism and anti-Westernization, on the other. And I am sad to say that as a matter of fact our Western policy hasn’t really changed during the last decades, and even not since the Arab Spring. Neither Europe nor the United States have made a serious policy shift after the people got rid of their dictators. There is no new vision, no extra support, and no efforts to help this liberal democratic revolution succeed.

Arab Leaders for Freedom and Democracy The second mission ALDE gave me was to create a network

of liberal leaders in the Arab world and make a connection between them. Of course, a similar network already existed: the Friedrich Naumann Foundation had created the Network of Arab Liberals, later the Alliance of Arabs for Freedom and Democracy. This liberal network included parties and organizations and gathered on a regular basis. So many asked the question: What could be the use of creating another network?

The aim of Arab Leaders for Freedom and Democracy was to bring together only one or two top leaders per country in order to share information and experience on an informal basis. To my surprise, all the Arab leaders I asked to join this network


immediately agreed: Amr Moussa (former secretary general of the Arab League and foreign minister of Egypt), Ayman Nour (a key opposition leader in Egypt) Mahmoud Jibril (former prime minister of Libya), Ahmad El-Hariri (opposition leader, Lebanon), Awn Khasawneh (former prime minister Jordan), Yassine Brahim (opposition leader and former minister of economy of Tunisia), Néguib Chebbi (opposition leader, Tunisia), Naguib Al-Masri (economic tycoon, Palestine), Hanan Ashrawi (former minister of the Palestinian Authority) and Fawaz Tello (Syrian opposition leader).

The network itself gathered only once so far, in September 2012, in Cairo. The events of the Arab Spring postponed every other planned meeting: bomb explosions in Lebanon; the massive protests on 30 June 2013 in Egypt that led to the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi and the writing of a new constitution; and so much more. Instead, several of the members of the network of Arab Leaders for Freedom and Democracy met with one another when occasion allowed, giving each other information and advice. Almost every one of the leaders visited the European Parliament on the invitation of the ALDE group in order to explain what was happening in their country, and to point out what they expected from the European Union.

Amr Moussa was the first to visit the European Parliament, in June 2011. After him followed Mahmoud Jibril. Then Yassine Brahim. Fawaz Tello explained the Syrian situation on several occasions. Ahmad El-Hariri warned the European Parliament of the involvement of Hizbullah in Syria before they officially announced it. And there was the debate with Mahmoud Jibril and Néguib Chebbi on what the EU should do to help the Arab Spring succeed.

The ALDE group paid special attention to Syria. The first public appearance of Salim Idriss, general commander of the Free Syrian Army, happened in the ALDE group meeting in Brussels. The first visit of Ahmed Jarba, president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, to Brussels was also organized by the ALDE


representation in the Arab world. Obviously, such unique visits are only possible through a deep and continuous involvement in Syria. That is probably the most important role that ALDE and its representation have played during the last three years: giving Arab leaders a European platform at the highest level. It changed the view of many decision makers on what exactly was happening in each of these Arab countries. It also pushed the European Parliament, the European Commission and the high representative to go further in their support for those people who fight for freedom and democracy in the Arab world.

Giving advice to liberal parties, politicians and activists

By trying to fulfill the third part of my mission I realized how different the situation and the people in the respective Arab spring countries are. Most Tunisian politicians have had an education in France that makes them pretty sensitive towards democratic values. In Libya, people have no political experience at all, as Gaddafi forbade every political activity. However, Libyans are very eager to learn; this contrary to most Egyptians. In Egypt, the elder generation is very proud and unwilling to take any advice - certainly not from a foreigner. The younger generation is different, but in general still too revolutionary-minded in order to work in a strategic and structural way.

In Jordan, political parties do not exist, apart from the Muslim Brotherhood. In Palestine, there is a political landscape but it is completely dominated by Fatah. In Lebanon, there is a political tradition, but the situation is currently blocked by what is happening in Syria and the strong involvement of Hizbullah in the Syrian war. In Syria, there is a lot of potential, but doing politics in times of war is a whole different ball game. On top of that, the international community and its main actors are playing their own political and geostrategic game that hasn’t been beneficial to the cohesion of the Syrian opposition.


During the three years of my mission in the Arab world I also learned that the word “liberal” has different meanings in all of these countries. In Egypt, being liberal means in the first instance being non-Islamist, but not necessarily being anti-regime. In Syria, liberals are also non-Islamists, but always anti-regime. In Tunisia, the word liberal has the same connotation as in France: being on the right side of the economic spectrum. The same counts for Palestine. In Libya, using the word liberal is not a smart thing to do as for most people it is exactly the same as “atheist.” Last summer, there was even a campaign against Mahmoud Jibril’s affiliation with ALDE. His picture was put on a pamphlet together with the picture of Guy Verhofstadt and myself, saying that ALDE supported gay rights. In Jordan, liberalism has no real meaning, while in Lebanon it symbolizes openness towards European values.

Knowing this, it forces European liberals to be openminded in choosing partners in the Arab world. I have trained the National Forces Alliance from the day it was formed in order to prepare it for the first elections in Libya. Liberal or not, they were the only party in the Arab world that defeated the Muslim Brotherhood in elections. I also trained individual politicians, activist networks and women’s rights organizations throughout the Arab world, but I must admit that the results of that are rather blurred. Perhaps more important was the role ALDE and I could play in putting their concerns on the agenda of the European Union, and of their own country. ALDE has written many press releases to put pressure on governments to release activists from jail or to press the EU to get more involved in Libya or Syria.

This is an Arab revolution The most important thing that I have learned after three years

living and working in the Arab world is that this is not just an Arab Spring. What we are witnessing is much bigger. If we take a look at the demographics it is clear that a tsunami of change is on


its way. More than half of the Arab population is younger than 35. The patriarchal and hierarchical system on which the Arab societies are built is coming under huge pressure and is on the brink of collapse.

At the same time there is a huge battle going on between two fundamental and different views on the future of Arab societies. It’s a battle between those who think existing problems will be solved by religion and by going back in time, and those who are convinced that it’s time for new ideas and that religion is not a part of the political way forward.

It took France more than 80 years and 14 constitutions to pass from the French Revolution in 1789 to the stable democracy of the Third Republic in 1870. Expecting the Arabs to succeed in becoming stable democracies in a few years’ time is nothing less than shortsighted nonsense. There is no Arab Spring, as there is no Arab Winter. There is an Arab Revolution that will bring a deep transformation of the Arab world. We have to be more patient, but also more supportive. It would be a historic mistake to give up supporting Arab liberals at moments where we have difficulties to understand what they are aiming for. I am convinced that the Arab Revolution will evolve towards liberal democratic societies, albeit not European ones. It is time to accept this and to welcome it.


My liberal times in Oum Al-Dounia

Ronald Meinardus

The Arab world looks back at turbulent years. The Middle

East and North Africa have seen dramatic changes - uprisings and upheaval, revolutions and revolts. I had the privilege to witness this up close. For a zoon politikon, or a political animal, there could have hardly been a more attractive posting than the capital of Egypt, which her people proudly and in slight exaggeration refer to as Oum Al-Dounia, the Mother of the World.

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) assigned me to serve as their regional director for an area spanning from Morocco in the West to Turkey in the East. In this position, I found myself at the interface of politics, civil society, academia and journalism. It’s been a fascinating time, full of suspense, excitement, and drama that captured me also emotionally. All this came together with heartbreaking moments of disappointment, and despair. As I write these words, I am aware that although a foreigner in a foreign land, I took many things I witnessed personally and to heart. You may term it empathy; in any case it is sympathy for the people and their causes I often identified with.

* * * * *

The story is far from over. All agree that Egypt and the Arab

world are in a phase of transition. How long this will last and where it will end is anyone’s guess. Much of the early enthusiasm, the atmosphere of departure in early 2011, has vanished. Gone is the widespread certainty - in hindsight one would say naiveté - that an era of democracy, human dignity and


social justice laid just ahead. Many pronouncements have turned out to be empty slogans. In many places, hope and euphoria have vanished to be replaced by disappointment, cynicism, and retreat.

All this has not come overnight. For a long time, I used to spend my Fridays in Tahrir Square, which became my personal barometer of the public mood and the status or condition of the revolution. Another indicator of the general mood was the uncounted discussions with Egyptian friends and colleagues, mostly on the sidelines of educative activities and seminars. I developed a sufficient proficiency in (Egyptian) Arabic to address an audience and engage in valuable dialogues that helped me shape a picture.

* * * * *

My job came along with clearly defined objectives. Apart

from managing a sizeable administration, which at times seemed to grow inexorably, my mission circled around the goal of promoting liberalism in Egypt and the MENA region. While ideologically liberals always focus on the individual, our project work for very practical reasons centered on organizations we would partner with. You need to identify partners to reach your target groups. For me, it has always been essential that all educative activities would have their local partner, and thus a local beneficiary.

Promoting liberal values and principles is a political objective. The people interested in liberal issues and advocacy are typically organized in political parties and civil society groups. For this reasons, many of our programs take place in cooperation with these partners. Direct cooperation with political parties has been a no-go all along. Such interaction could rightly be construed as illegal political interference. I always made it clear that our programs are addressed at members of political organizations and not at the organizations themselves. While this


may sound like hair splitting, there is a major difference. Helping or even financing political parties or groups in campaign activities is another red line. This has never happened and would breach not only the laws of host countries, but also our own strict regulations.

I mention this because the role of the Foundation I work for has repeatedly been an issue of controversy. Among the most depressing experiences during my stay in Egypt has been what has become widely known as the “NGO crackdown,” the assault of the authorities against foreign and Egyptian NGOs. While we were not directly targeted, the political fallout was substantial and led to a deep crisis in relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Arab Republic of Egypt. This also affected our institute indirectly. For the record, I need to add that those Egyptians - be they in government, academia, in the media or in the political sphere - who know our work distanced themselves from the witch hunt and acknowledge our contribution.

* * * * *

Promoting liberalism in the Arab world is a Herculean task. It

is no exaggeration to say that liberalism has an image problem here. Many, if not most, Egyptians have a negative view of all things liberal. Out of ignorance and as a result of systematic brainwashing, many perceive liberalism as against their heritage and culture and in contradiction with religious teachings. I find this stereotype repugnant and an unacceptable affront against the many liberals who are religious. Over the years I have worked with many Arab Muslims and Christians who are true believers in the Almighty and just happen to have more progressive views in political and social issues than their reactionary denouncers. Defaming these people as unbelievers goes against the rules of human decency.


There are various reasons for the weakness of liberalism in the Arab world. You may find authoritative explanations in this book. They are sociological, cultural and political. It is well established that many, if not most, political parties claiming to be liberal are elitist and have a hard time to pass their message “on the street.” It is also no secret that many of these parties lack organizational clout and unity. Disunity and factionalism remains the Achilles heel of Arab liberalism. As long as this malady prevails, liberal forces will remain far away from popular success and political power.

In the Arab world, as in other cultural environments, “liberal” is not an attractive brand name. It is no surprise that not a single political party in the Arab world uses this epithet in their name. Of course, I felt disappointment when in late 2011 the Network of Arab Liberals, a federation of liberal political parties from the region, took the unanimous decision to drop the name “liberal” and rechristened the group as the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AAFD). Full of political symbolism, this very visible retreat was a concession to a hostile public that has yet to understand what “liberalism” stands for.

To rectify this unfriendly image and promote a rational debate about liberal ideas and policies has been the main focus of my work in this part of the world. We have organized myriad educative activities and various campaigns to raise liberal awareness. I am particularly fond of a liberal book series in Arabic in which mainly Arab liberals publish their thoughts. You are holding the most recent volume of the “Liberal Texts” in your hands right now.

* * * * *

Another priority throughout has been efforts to promote

cooperation between liberal parties in the region. The buzzword here is networking. Liberal parties in the Arab world have come a long way in associating and working together. Liberal networking


does not only have a regional, Arab dimension, but also an international extension. Over the past few years, the bonds between Arab parties and their Alliance and the international liberal family have grown exceptionally. Today, many Arab liberal political parties are members of Liberal International, the world federation of liberal parties in London. They participate in its congresses and thus have a chance to promote distinctly Arab causes in these international meetings.

Many challenges our societies face today will never be solved on a national level: regional and international coordination is of the essence. The field of international relations should not be left exclusively to governments. Political parties, and civil society, should have a stake also. For this, they need to cooperate. This is one raison d’etre for organizations like the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy or Liberal International.

* * * * *

More recently, the sense of harmony between liberals in the

Arab world, particularly in Egypt, and their companions in Europe and the West has suffered a blow. Differing assessments of the events in Egypt in the summer of 2013 are the main reason for the setback. This is not the place to get into details. But it is safe to say in a nutshell that liberals outside the Arab world have shown little understanding, let alone sympathy, for the conduct of the security forces against Islamists. As a result, there exist profound differences of opinion between Egyptian and European liberals on how to deal with political Islam. I share the European position that in the long run the problems facing Egypt (including detestable terrorism) will only be solved in the context of a political process.

Discussing these matters honestly and openly has become increasingly difficult. In an environment governed by emotions fanned by nationalistic media, Egyptian interlocutors often expect


unconditional support for their position and the actions of authorities. This makes reasonable dialogue difficult, and as a result foreigners with a diplomatic inclination often simply avoid such interaction.

The exchange of ideas is always important - particularly in difficult times, like the ones we are in right now. This goes all the more for dialogues among liberals who intrinsically hold a common set of values. Against this background, we have developed new programs that aim at bringing young liberal leaders from Europe and the Arab world together to discuss issues of common interest and, hopefully, arrive at joint conclusions.

* * * * *

Looking back, the past three years have been exhausting emotionally and also physically. If I say this as a foreign political observer, what should Egyptians say who have acted at the forefront of political developments throughout? Politics in Egypt has become exceptionally dynamic and short-lived. At times so many things happened in so little time that it became nearly impossible to keep up with the frenzy. This is a paradise for news junkies, one could conclude. But the speed of events has a downside. When so many transgressions happen all at once, the judiciary faces problems following up. New violations occur before old ones are redressed. This may lead to a climate of impunity, which is the opposite of the rule of law.

* * * * *

Once you drink from the River Nile, you are destined to

return. So goes an old proverb that holds true for me. I spent part


of my childhood in Cairo and my return to this grand metropolis nearly half a century later in a senior professional position was an experience laden with emotion. Strangely, very few Egyptians who know my biography would inquire how it felt coming back after so many years. I assume they just wanted to avoid the answer that all was better back then and today things have become much more difficult. Of course, it was a completely different country then - a different epoch in the 60s and 70s of the last century.

Amid all the changes, many of which are not to the benefit of the country, one important component has survived more or less unaltered, and this deserves special mention: the kindness and human generosity of Egypt’s people. For me, it remains a mystery how in all the chaos and degradation the average Egyptian, the men and women in the street, the shopkeepers and taxi drivers, the messengers and doormen, and all the others, preserve their friendliness and exceptional sense of humor. I dislike stereotypes and I am not an anthropologist. My unprofessional explanation would be that making fun, and the unparalleled - at times annoying - Egyptian habit to take things lightly is a collective reaction to the daily sufferings and humiliations.

Although I have lived the privileged life of a hawaga (foreigner) without the sufferings of the average Egyptian, I note that I have been partially infected by the stated Egyptian character traits. I like to crack jokes even when the formal situation does not necessarily invite such distractions. I am also, quite sincerely, starting to take things less seriously, although as a German by upbringing I will probably never fully adopt the culture of malesh (nevermind).

* * * * *


Egypt is confronted with myriad problems. Living in Cairo, this beast of a city, one senses that these problems keep growing by the day. To make things worse, few are the signs that those in charge, whoever they may be, have the intention, let alone a plan, to put order into the uncontrolled chaos. Recently, strategic politics has become victim of transition politics with short-lived governments living from hand to mouth.

Everybody seems to agree that the country must find solutions for colossal problems. But beyond that, little is visible. A united effort, a national vision and, on top of it all, a declared political will are in demand. What should the country look like in 10, 20 or 50 years?

I have missed such debates. The only seemingly reliable projection I have heard repeatedly is that by 2050 - a horizon the big mass of young Egyptians will be around to experience - Egypt’s population will have exploded to 150 million. This projection is material for foreign doomsday prophets who fear Egypt’s problems have reached dimensions and complexities beyond control and management. They predict more impoverishment, hunger revolts, chaos and as a political answer to all of this, harsh dictatorial rule. Arguably, this is the bleakest of all the bleak scenarios available in the market place of opinions. As an optimist by nature, I stay away from this school of thought. However, for the bleak scenario to remain what it is (a dark projection of the future), radical and structural political adjustments need to be taken now. The problem for Egypt is that such drastic steps are nowhere to be seen.


Dr. Clemens Recker read political and Middle Eastern studies in Heidelberg, Damascus and London. He wrote his PhD thesis on “Liberalism in Arab History of Thought” at Heidelberg University.

An alumnus of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF), Dr. Recker collaborated closely with the regional office of the FNF in Cairo, publishing an Arabic-language reader on liberalism in the Arab world in 2011 and presenting his academic findings in various educational activities throughout the region.

Saed Karajah is legal counselor and attorney at law for Karajah & Partners Law Firm, which he established 1994. He is a member of the board of directors of various for profit and non-profit institutions, such as the Jordan River Foundation and the Jordan Media Institute. He is also a member of the Royal Committee for Educational Development, the Higher Committee for Women’s Affairs, and the Jordanian Lawyers’ Syndicate. As a social activist, Karajah represents the Free Thought Forum (FTF), a liberal foundation. He is the current president of the Arabic Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AAFD). Karajah has published many articles on civil society, individualism and liberalism in the Arab world.

Wael Nawara is a strategist, a serial entrepreneur and a corporate coach. He is a regular contributor to Al-Monitor, the Huffington Post and the Egyptian newspapers Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dostour, Al-Tahrir and others. His articles have also appeared in international publications, among them The Guardian and New York Post, Harvard’s Crimson and Slate. Nawara is co-founder of Egypt’s Al-Ghad Party, the National Association for Change, and Al-Dostour Party. He served as president of the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AAFD) from 2010 to 2012. In December 2011, TIME Magazine profiled Nawara as “the Protester” for its Person of the Year. Nawara graduated as a mechanical engineer with honors and earned a Master’s in international marketing from the University of Strathclyde. In 2012, Nawara was a visiting fellow at the Institute of Politics (IOP) at Harvard Kennedy School. In November 2013, he was scholar in residence at Trent University, Ontaria, Canada.


Mohamed Tamaldou is a senior member of the Union Constitutionelle from Morocco and a founding member and former president of the Arab Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AAFD), formerly known as the Network of Arab Liberals (NAL). Tamaldou currently serves as vice president of Liberal International and is the treasurer of the Arab Center for Scientific Research and Human Studies in Morocco. He is the author of several studies on the Arab world and has translated a variety of books from French to Arabic.

Dr. Hassan Mneimneh holds a degree in history from the Faculty of Arts at the Lebanese University. He received his PhD in history from l'Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). He worked as professor and director of the College of Arts and Humanities where he lectures in the Department of History. He also worked as a journalist in a number of newspapers and magazines, authoring a large number of cultural, political and educational articles. He was vice president of the Lebanese Association for Studies and Historical Research and participated in several committees to update the educational curriculum and bylaws of the Lebanese University.

Houda Cherif is an independent political and civil society activist in Tunisia. In 2011, she was among the founders of Afek Tounes and later served in the executive bureau of Al-Joumhouri party, a fusion of centrist and leftwing opposition parties formed in early 2012. While responsible for external affairs in Afek Tounes, Cherif took charge of transitional justice issues within Al-Joumhouri. She has published on varied subjects, such as women, the disabled, education and transitional justice, in local and international media. Cherif is a graduate of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences of Tunis and holds a diploma in teaching methodology from the University of Bristol, England, as well as degrees in political science and technical communication.


Esraa Abdel Fattah is an Egyptian activist and blogger. Arrested by Egyptian security in 2008, she drew the attention of the media thereby challenging the state’s censorship policy and becoming a symbol of resistance and resilience against corruption and injustice. Abdel Fattah played an active role in the uprising that called for the end of the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak. She was shortlisted as one of the candidates for the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize. In October of that year, Glamour magazine named her a Woman of the Year. She is currently vice-chairperson at the Egyptian Democratic Academy (EDA). Arabian Business Magazine recently included her in a list of the 100 most powerful Arab women.

Shehab Wagih holds a Bachelor’s degree in engineering from Helwan University. He is currently regional program coordinator at the Cairo office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF). He is also the spokesman and president of the Educational and Political Training Committee of the Free Egyptians Party (FEP).

Dr. Yusuf Mansur is CEO of EnConsult in Jordan and a specialist in economic consulting in the areas of policy, trade, antitrust, competitiveness and strategy. He worked as CEO for the Jordan Agency for Economic Development and the Jordan Investment Board, held the position of director general of the Jordan Telecom Regulatory Commission and served as resident representative of the UNDP in Kuwait. Within the Jordan Upgrading and Modernization Program, Dr. Mansur worked as an international capacity building and policy adviser. Dr. Mansur received his Master’s and PhD in economics from the University of Oklahoma.


Emil Kirjas is secretary-general of the London-based Liberal International. He was junior minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Macedonia from 2004 to 2006. A former president of the International Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY), a position he occupied for four years, Kirjas’s past professional experiences include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF). Kirjas holds a Master’s degree in geopolitics from King’s College London.

Koert Debeuf lives in Cairo where he represents the European Parliament’s Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the Arab world. He served for many years as advisor to the Belgian prime minister. He publishes with EU Observer, Carnegie, Al-Monitor and others mainly on developments in the Arab world. Debeuf studied ancient history at the universities of Leuven and Bologna. He was president of the students of the Faculty of Arts and student representative on the academic council of KU Leuven. In 2008-2009, he founded a liberal think tank, Prometheus, of which he was director. In 2014, he published the book, Inside the Arab Revolution. Three years on the frontline of the Arab Spring.

Dr. Ronald Meinardus holds a PhD in international relations from Hamburg University. A journalist by profession, Dr. Meinardus worked for several years for Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster. He served the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) in Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, and most recently in Egypt as regional director for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While in South Korea, Dr. Meinardus was adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Local Autonomy of Hanyang University. He has published widely on current political affairs in academic journals and newspapers. His publications deal with developments in Germany, the Balkans, Southern Africa, East Asia, the Arab world, and matters related to liberalism and democracy.


Other books in the series “Liberal Publications” Refaat Lakousha: Liberalism and Egyptian Society -

Crisis and Guide, 2009 Henriette Haensch (Editor): Women and Mirror -Visions

on the Contemporary Reality of Women, 2009 Ronald Meinardus and Ahmed Naji (Editors): Why I am

Liberal, 2009 (also available in English) Ronald Meinardus (Editor): Liberalism in the Arab world

- Visions and Perspectives of Arab Politicians, 2009 The Program of Liberal International, 2009 Clemens Recker: Liberalism in the History of Arab

Thought, 2010 Basem Fathi (Editor): We Were There - Liberal Youth

Voices of the Egyptian Revolution, 2011 Hala Mostafa: The Crisis of the Arab Liberalism -Egypt’s

Model, 2011 Amira Hussein and Wafaa Attia (Editors): Human Rights

and the Egyptian Political Parties after the January 25 Revolution, 2012

Ronald Meinardus (Editor): Bridging the Gap - An Arab-European Dialogue on the Basics of Liberalism, 2013 (also available in English)

Ronald Meinardus (Editor): If Egypt Were Liberal - Youth Articles on Liberalism, 2013

Links to these and other liberal publications at:

http://www.fnst-egypt.org/Publications.html

liberalism in the arab world: just a good idea?

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