Liberals and Social DemocratsPaperback 19 Nov 1981byPeter Clarke(Author)1 customer review

See all 3 formats and editions Hardcoverfrom 3.995 Usedfrom4.645 Newfrom3.99 Paperback44.9911 Usedfrom22.5321 Newfrom36.31Want it tomorrow, 6 May?Order it within4 hrs 52 minsand chooseOne-Day Deliveryat checkout.DetailsRead lessThis ambitious and wide-ranging book is about the relationship between liberalism and socialism in Britain in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It focuses largely on a group of intellectuals whose names are familiar but whose work has been neglected or misunderstood. Graham Wallas is the forgotten man of early Fabianism. L. T. Hobhouse has misleadingly been typecast as the last major exponent of a dying liberal tradition. J. A. Hobson's reputation has been obscured by repeated claims that he was a precursor either of the Leninist theory of imperialism or of the Keynesian revolution in economics. The historical work of J. L. and Barbara Hammond has suffered similar revenges from the whirligig of time. There are other liberals or socialists - notably Gilbert Murray, Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, R. H. Tawney and J. M. Keynes - who receive considerable attention. In the later chapters the economic approaches of Hobson and Keynes are disentangled and put in their proper historical setting.

See imageThe Moral LandscapeHow Science Can Determine Human ValuesBySam Harris bestseller Sam Harriss first book,The End of Faith, ignited a worldwide debate about the validity of religion. In the aftermath, Harris discovered that most peoplefrom religious fundamentalists to non-believing scientistsagree on one point: science has nothing to say on the subject of human values. Indeed, our failure to address questions of meaning and morality through science has now become the primary justification for religious faith.

In this highly controversial book, Sam Harris seeks to link morality to the rest of human knowledge. Defining morality in terms of human and animal well-being, Harris argues that science can do more than tell how we are; it can, in principle, tell us how we ought to be. In his view, moral relativism is simply falseand comes at an increasing cost to humanity. And the intrusions of religion into the sphere of human values can be finally repelled: for just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, there can be no Christian or Muslim morality. Using his expertise in philosophy and neuroscience, along with his experience on the front lines of our culture wars, Harris delivers a game-changing book about the future of science and about the real basis of human cooperation.

20APR/151

By Jennie Han**This article wasoriginally publishedon April 1, 2013.**"Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection. Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from all others. To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kants world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains ones imagination to go visiting."-- Hannah Arendt,Lectures on Kant's Political PhilosophyArendts appeal to the enlargement of the mind of Kantian judgment is well known and is often discussed in relation to Eichmanns failure to think and recognize the worlds plurality. To the extent that we find lessons in these discussions, a prominent one is that we might all be vulnerable to such failures of judgment.While recognizing how easy it is for us to not think, especially in the bureaucratic structures of the contemporary world, I want to focus here on the moments of thinking and judgment thatdooccur but fail to garner recognition.

Source: Bard Prison InitiativeI was recently involved in a discussion about educational and other support programs in prisons around the country. During the conversation, someone made the observation that these programs seem to appeal especially to women. It was the case that each of the women in this conversation had been involved in some prison program, either as an attorney or an educator. But the observation was intended, of course, to go beyond this relatively small group.I dont know whether its true that many more women than men are involved in programs like Bards Prison Initiative or the Innocence Project or any number of such programs. But what struck me about this conversation was that despite no one claiming to possess any knowledge beyond his or her personal observations, many seemed relatively certain about the possible explanation about this phenomenon (or non-phenomenon): that women might have a greater capacity to empathize with others, not because we are innately sensitive beings, but because we can more easily recognize the suffering of others and respond to that suffering.Many readers of Arendt will immediately react to this description with Arendts critique of empathy in mind. For Arendt, empathy destroys critical thinking to the extent that it tries to know whatactuallygoes on in the mind of all others as opposed to the comparing our judgment with thepossiblejudgments of others (Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy, 43). In trying to feel like someone else, empathy makes it impossible to respond politically, as it destroys the distance between individuals that makes a response to another as other possible.

Source: Todd Hayen TherapyBut if not empathy, what might better describe those, whether they are women or men, who are open to the sufferingsandinjustices of others? The answer, I submit, is critical thinking.For Arendt, critical thinking is necessarily imaginative, as it requires that the thinker make the others present. The presence of others is not achieved by imagining what goes on in each of the minds of these imagined others. Rather, this presence is what allows one imaginatively to construct a public space in which ones actions are visible to other people.Critical thinking thus most importantly lies not in the ability to compare our judgment with the possible judgments of all others, which is what is often stressed in discussions of Arendtian judgment, but rather in the adoption of the position of Kants world citizen. Adopting such a position is less about imagining others as such and more about recognizing that one is always puttingoneselfout there for others to judge. Insofar as it is necessary to construct the audience to which the thinker presents herself, the imagination of others is the first step to critical thinking, but only the first step. Critical thinking is, as Kant writes in What is Enlightenment?, addressing the entirereading public such that that one presents oneself for judgment by this learned group of which one purports to be a member. Like a politician or a writer or an actor, the critical thinker acts with the understanding that she will be judged not just by friends, lovers, or like-minded compatriots, but by an entire learned public whose judgments are tempered neither by love nor even self-serving support.The space in which women moved has always been public to the extent that women who acted always did so with the knowledge that they are opening themselves up to the judgment of others. Thus acting takes courage and a true living of the motto of the enlightenment Sapere aude!Have the courage to use yourownunderstanding! (Kant, What is Enlightenment?).

Source: Barnes and NobleBut acting also necessarily engages critical thinking in another sense: ones actions are always public to the extent that in acting one presents oneself for judgment to the world anddisclosesoneself. The thinking of women might, in this way, have been forced into the realm of the critical, for as solitary as the activity of thinking necessarily is, it occurs in a space in which the others are present by not only the force of imagination, but also the force of history. Thus,ifcertain professions, causes, or activities do draw relatively more women than men, part of the explanation might be that women think more critically. The world that one sees, with all its injustices and its suffering, does not move one to action or service. But this world is not the world in which one thinks or acts. Rather, one moves in and responds to the imagined one in which what one does is meaningful because ones actions are being judged and because as vulnerable as one might feel in being judged, judgment brings along with it the implicit recognition that what one does is visible to others and, quite simply, that it might matter.Arendts understanding of judgment is closely tied to KantsCritique of Judgmentfor a good reason: she herself builds her ideas directly on Kantian judgment. But reading Arendtian judgment through Kants shorter piece, What is Enlightenment? opens up to us aspects of the former that have previously been obscured. And it opens us up to acts of thinking, judgment, and courage to which we are often blind. Again, I dont know that more women than men engage in work that supports prisoners and advances the cause of prisoners rights. But I dont think it is controversial to say that the perception that they do exists and that womens ability to empathize with others, whether because of their backgrounds or simply because they are women, is frequently an accompanying discourse. This could be the right explanation. But it could also be an expression not only of prejudices of what women are, but also of an insufficiency of our conceptual vocabulary to capture what it is that is going on in a way that does not simply reassert these prejudices.-- Jennie Han(Featured Image: Jose Baldaia)

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Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice and without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privileges, or beliefs. This state of mind is not common, but it is essential for right thinking...."-- Leo Tolstoy(Featured Image: Leo Tolstoy; Source:The Huffington Post)

The Hannah Arendt Center

30JUL/140

"A man's thinking goes on within his consciousness in a seclusion in comparison with which any physical seclusion is an exhibition to public view."--Ludwig WittgensteinWhat the World Needsto Know aboutInterfaith Dialogueby Richard M. Landau, MA

Comprehensiveebookshows you how tobuild bridges between conflicting religionsYes its true that many wars and conflicts have started over religion. Now heres an electronic book that shows you how purposeful inter-religious dialogue can actually bring about peace.The product of 30 years of research and practice,What the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialogue, is a comprehensiveebookthatcovers virtually every aspect of dialogue between diverse religious groups.

Selected by Beliefnet.comas a guide and authority for online interfaith dialogue

What the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialoguecovers a range of practical and philosophical issues supplemented by anecdotal information. For example, it shows you -- How to overcome differences in theology and belief Which projects will gain recognition for interfaith groups How to get religious literalists and liberals to cooperate How to make interfaith meetings run smoothly How to temporarily suspend your heartfelt beliefs What "loaded" words to avoid How to defuse interfaith conflict How to distinguish a religion from a cult The "seven types of interfaith dialogue participants"-- and How to deal with explosive political issues

In the shadow of the September 11 disasters, interest in interfaith dialogue has boomed. So when Beliefnet.com the worlds foremost website dedicated to faith-related issues decided to launch online dialogue, they asked for permission to excerpt segments fromWhat the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialogue. And they asked me, as author, to moderate a dialogue group online.For 27 years I have organized, chaired and participated in interfaith dialogue groups throughoutNorth America. I work with all of the world religions every day -- and have studied their holy texts and histories. As Executive Producer of a dozen faith-related TV series and host of the multiple award-winning weekly interfaith TV programFaith Journal, I brought together all of the world religions.Over the years, police and judicial authorities have called upon me to assist in the resolution of inter-religious conflicts and for expert testimony. I am frequently contacted by faith communities, schools and interfaith groups seeking assistance with operational issues and religious conflict resolution.

Why I wrote theebook. . .I wrote the book because I see a lot of mistakes in how people approach dialogue and because there is no other book that explains the how-tosof interfaith dialogue.There are some books written about dialogue from ivory tower thinkers who dont participate in dialogue. This book is different. Its tried and tested in real down-to-earth interfaith dialogue.In the book, I propose to you an exclusive technique that I call the willing suspension of belief. . . It works. So, if a devout Jew is meeting with a pious Muslim, the technique shows how you buildgenuinebridges of understanding and unity between them.Traditionally interfaith dialogue groups have been hard to set up, difficult to sustain, and dogged by religious and personality conflicts. Frequently they do little more than spend hundreds of hours simply talking. But your group can accomplish much, much more -- if you follow the basic ground rules outlined in myebook.

Thisebookis being used by theUKgovernment and it was requested by the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives.Since it was first made available on the web, scores of local interfaith initiatives from North Carolina to the Netherlands have successfully applied its lessons to launch working interfaith groups.

What are the biggest interfaith dialogue mistakes?It's inevitable.Every dialogue group sooner or later faces a major challenge that can lead to a rift.Will you know how to handle it?Myebookshows you what to do in every situation . . . How do you avoid unintentionally favoring one faith group over others? Are you mistakenly assuming everyone has the "same" social or political agenda? What do you do when you have two faith communities that will not participate...unless the other is rejected? How do you respond when genuine undesirables --like a "Church" that believes in racial supremacy -- want to join your group? How can you establish criteria that let you exclude extremists without sideswiping faiths in good standing? A Gay group wants their issues on your agenda, some devout Muslims and Christians will leave if you accommodate the Gays. Is there any way out of this? What to do when your executive or members wont work with each other. How to keep hard-liners and liberals involved and engaged, at the same time. How to move beyond the talk-talk-talk cycle of interfaith dialogue.Master Interfaith Dialogue Right NowWritten in an accessible style,What the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialogueshows you how to overcome basic differences to ensure the longevity and productivity of an interfaith dialogue group.So many dialogue groups grind to a halt because of group politics, differences in approach, or because they have no sense of what they can do other than just talk. This book addresses and answers all of these issues.Youll come away with knowledge of the diplomatic tools required to start and conduct successful interfaith or inter-denominational dialogue. It will help you to build bridges of understanding, resolve conflicts, and identify problems before they develop.Learn -- An exclusive 13-point set of rules that ensure smooth meetings How to select a suitable task or project for your interfaith group The 5 criteria that define a legitimate religion What to do about quasi- andpara-religious organizations How to avoid an argument with a literalist OR a liberal The Law ofVermilion and Scarlet understanding why some faith groups dont seem to get along. . . and how to change it How to keep political causes from railroading your agendaPLUSThe Trends that Will Jolt Interfaith and Faith Groups During the Next 25 Years

Ive established and worked with numerous interfaith organizations. Ive helped them get moving and achieve grand objectives even when the tasks seemed daunting and the participants were few at the outset.Its good work. Its honorable work. Its a field that is growing exponentially.

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Its an entertaining, fast-paced reference text supplemented with additional useful anecdotal information.It touches on virtually every situation and challenge youll encounter in interfaith dialogue.Over 70,000-words (equal in length to a typical 250-300-page hardcover work), its an exhaustive sourcebook and a manual of diplomacy and tact.You can download the book right now for $14.99.Heres How You CanOrder the Book

What the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialogueis available only online through the iTunes iBooks Store, Google Play Book Store or via secure PDF. So when you click on the link below, you'll be prompted taken to a secure order page which will take you to either iTunes, Google or Paypal for your payment information and to complete the transaction.Your order is processed immediately, and you'll get a receipt for your purchase with a transaction number and a link to where you can download your book right away or you will be emailed a PDF copy within 48 hours if you select that option.

The whole process takes just a few minutes, so you could be reading the book less than 10-minutes from right now.Full return policyWhat the World Needs to Know about Interfaith Dialogue comes with a complete money-back guarantee. Read the book cover to cover and try the approaches. If the information in the book isn't helpful to you -- I'll refund your money, and you can keep the book.

An interview with...

Brink Lindsey on Traditional and Liberal ConservatismAbout Brink Lindsey

Brink Lindsey is vice-president for research at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, and author, most recently, ofThe Age of Abundance: How Prosperity Transformed Americas Politics and Culture.Brink Lindsey's HomepageBrink Lindsey on WikipediaBrink Lindsey's profile on Cato.org EMAIL COMMENTS PRINT AAATEXT SIZE

Modern conservatism is being driven by an historically unlikely coalition of libertarians and traditionalists, says the vice-president for research at the Cato Institute.

On LibertyBy John Stuart MillBuyLets start with John Stuart Mill,On Liberty. Youd think its obvious but no one else has suggested it. WhyOn Liberty?I dont know that its obvious since its a classic text of liberalism, not conservatism.Explain that to me.I think liberals, of both a libertarian, classical, liberal stripe and a more modern egalitarian stripe, see John Stuart Mill as a common ancestor, but hes not really in the conservative pantheon. Indeed it was Mill who said, While not all conservatives are stupid, all stupid people are generally conservative. So he was not only a liberal political theorist but a liberal Member of Parliament, and definitely not a Tory.Liberal in the European sense, ie libertarian?He strays from the contemporary libertarian line in a number of respects. But the reason I selected him is that there is a brief passage inOn Liberty(in the second chapter on defending liberty of thought and discussion) where he lays forth what I think is the best concise explanation for why there is a left and a right and why there always will be. Why, even though he wasnt a conservative and didnt think much of conservatives, he thought conservatism was a necessary and wholesome part of political life. Let me quote a sentence or two: In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity.I think the typical view of politics from inside a partisan mindset is to see politics as a battle of the good guys versus the bad guys. Maybe the good guys are on the left, maybe the good guys are on the right, but its this Manichean struggle and the way to get progress is for the good side to win and impose their will. Mill sees through that and sees that, in fact, politics is a dialectical process. At any given time truth is partly on one side and partly on the other. Its more a battle of half-truths and incomplete truths than of good versus bad. The excesses of each side ultimately create opportunities for the other to come in and correct those excesses. Liberalism, in Mills view and in mine, provides the basic motive force of political change and progress. It will go astray, it will have excesses, it will make terrible mistakes and a conservatism that is focused on preserving good things that exist now will be a necessary counterweight to that liberalism.Most Americans today think of liberalism in the European sense or libertarianism, as we call it, as part of the conservative movement. Most Tea Party-ers, for instance, would certainly agree with that. Do you see it as sharply distinct from the conservative movement? Are they, in fact, on opposite sides of Mills dichotomy?When Im talking about liberalism versus conservatism, Im also talking about modern egalitarian liberalism and not just libertarianism. You can approach it, as I did in my bookThe Age of Abundance, by looking at contemporary liberalism and its great triumphs in the 60s and 70s pushing for civil rights and backing the feminist movement. Those triumphs also had excesses and mistakes mixed in with them. We had problems with growing welfare dependency and the crime explosion, problems with runaway divorce rates and family breakdown, all of which summoned up a conservative movement to respond to those wrong turns. So we see the conservative revival of the 70s and 80s basically making the world safe for the liberal social revolutions of the 60s and 70s. Putting aside where libertarianism fits in, you can see the interplay of left and right correcting each other, fixing each others excesses and deficiencies in a way that neither side ever intended but works out better than either side ever would have done for itself.

Planet of the DurkheimiansBy Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham (in Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification by J Jost, A C Kay and H Thorisdottir)BuyMost of my conservative friends would say that liberalism wins this game because conservatives just correct it and then it continues to roll merrily along.Yes, I think conservatives are right to feel that they are always behind the eight ball of history. My second and third choices offer an explanation for why that is so and why that is really necessarily so. The wonderful article by Jonathan Haidt, Planet of the Durkheimians, which he is in the process of expanding into a book, explores his very insightful analysis of different foundations for liberal and conservative morality. When liberals talk about morality they are almost always talking about two different basic intuitions intuitions about harm and care. That is, we dont want people to be harmed and we want to care for people when they are hurting. Also, fairness and reciprocity: we want things to be fair, we want like cases to be treated alike. This is the basic liberal morality whether it is libertarian morality or modern liberal morality, those are the buttons that get pushed that activate a liberal sense of moral outrage. But there are other moral buttons in the human moral imagination that liberals dont pay much attention to that are still very present and lively and salient in the conservative moral imagination. Those are what Haidt calls the authority foundation, the in-group, out-group foundation and the sacreds versus disgust foundation. Authority is the sense of hierarchy and the sense that everything should be in its proper place. The leaders should lead and the followers should follow, people should know their station in life. The in-group out-group is just the solidarity of the tribe that the key distinction is between us and them.Nationalism, forms of patriotism, that kind of thing?Yes. Then there is the perception of the world as divided between the sacred and the profane: a sense of elevation and holiness about some things and a sense of revulsion about others, which, in conservatism, often comes down to issues of sex. We see that very much in the conservative freak-out over gay marriage: its just disgusting and its soiling the sacred institution of marriage. When liberals hear conservatives vaunting authority or being patriotic or nationalistic or being homophobic they think thats not a moral reaction at all, theyre just being Neanderthals. Haidt says no, they are being moral, they have a moral imagination. Its just a different one from what you have and its actually one that has much more in common with how people thought morally for a long, long time. I think thats right in the current setting the moral buttons that get pushed for conservatives are different from the ones that get pushed for liberals. But the fact is that those other three foundations of morality are more traditional, more old-fashioned and are under constant attack by the social forces that are shaping the contemporary world.And are not going away anytime soon.And theyre not going away anytime soon at all. This is the core insight of Ronald Ingleharts wonderful work on values change. Hes been doing this world values survey for over 30 years, starting in the United States and Europe

Modernization and PostmodernizationBy Ronald InglehartBuyYes, lets go on to Ronald Inglehart. He is someone who I think of as a global public opinion expert, and not ideological. Hes conducted the world values surveys for decades, in which he asks people in many countries around the world a similar set of questions.Yes, and hes been expanding the countries over time. What he has found in his work is something really quite remarkable, which is that there is a predictable pattern of values change as countries develop economically and get richer. As people move out of poverty and have discretionary income and some sort of insulation between them and want, as their lives become more complex and abstract by moving off the farm and out of the village and into the big city and into the white-collar world of knowledge work, as they become more autonomous in this complex, rich world choosing where they live, who their friends are, who they marry and what job they have their values change in predictable ways. In particular, they get a lot more focused on personal fulfilment, self-realisation, quality of life and they get a lot more sceptical about any kind of authority that stands between them and personal fulfilment and self-realisation and quality of life.Do they get more progressive in some sense then?They do. They get more secular, they get more spiritual and less religious, they get more sceptical of authority figures and government, and media elsewhere. They get more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic; in short, they get more liberal. Those three traditionalist kinds of moral foundation that Haidt talks about get weaker and weaker. The authority dimension just fades away. As we saw in the 60s, one of the buttons that everybody wore was Question Authority. That mindset has taken over American society. Our trust in government is way down from what it was in the 50s. It bounces up and down with the economy but it will never be what it was before. Our sense of national identity has become much more polyglot and cosmopolitan than the ol white bread WASP view of what it meant to be an American and what we still hear when we hear people talking about real America on the right.Does that suggest that inevitably America will start to look more and more like Europe?It suggests that our values and European values, and values of developing countries that are getting richer, are all moving in a common direction. Economic policy, I think, is a different matter. But in terms of social values, yes. In a whole host of dimensions if you compare attitudes today to attitudes when you and I were little kids on matters of race, the role of women, on sex and sexual orientation, on the role of religion in public life, on the nature of American cultural identity, Americans today conservative, right-wing Americans are way to the left of where their dad and granddad were.So again here, we have this notion of a conservatism whose role is to moderate a movement in a generally egalitarian direction?Yes. It is, Im afraid, their fate often to be decrying cultural trends that they see as leading to chaos, when a generation later those warnings look like the most benighted obscurantism. So we had Bill Buckley in the late 50s warning that enfranchisement of blacks would lead to catastrophic political consequencesDid Buckley say that?Yes. He said that the white race is the more advanced race and if it doesnt have the votes, it should maintain its authority any way it can. Theres a devastatingly frank passage in aNational Revieweditorial in the late 50s along those lines. Of course, that just looks horrible now and, later in life, Buckley admitted that was a terrible error. You had people thinking that a woman working outside the home in traditional male professions was the end of the world and it wasnt.

The Constitution of LibertyBy Friedrich A von HayekBuyLets move on to Hayek. You putThe Constitution of Libertyon here. Id be interested as to why you chose this book, with its famous postscript, Why I Am Not a Conservative.So modern postwar conservatism is about more than just traditionalist social values. Its also about economic libertarianism and limited government, free markets, a more sceptical view of the extent to which government can improve life. This kind of strange, unlikely marriage between classical liberalisms economic views and social conservatism was put together as much as anybody by Bill Buckley and theNational Review. It was dubbed fusionism by one of theNational Reviews early writers, Frank Meyer. The idea was that liberty and tradition went together. Instead of the state providing order, tradition did. You needed liberty for virtue to be able to assert itself because virtue is not really virtue unless it is freely chosen. So you have this idea of libertarian means for conservative ends. Certainly you see contemporary libertarians thinking of politicians like Goldwater and Reagan as a lot better than whats on offer today, as the kind of politicians that they can summon up enthusiasm for. And you have libertarian heroes like Milton Friedman and Hayek having their influence over the world by being adopted by conservative politicians like Reagan and Thatcher.Which Hayek might have perceived as a bit ironic given that he planted himself firmly in the direction of an open-ended, change-oriented, dynamic kind of system and very much against anything that relied on authority.What I wanted to focus on was not so much the libertarian stamp that has been put on conservatism as the conservative stamp that has been put on libertarianism by this alliance. I think this conservative alliance arose because of 20th-century liberalisms infatuation with, and seduction by, the promises and offers made by socialism. The idea that there were radical alternatives to markets, competition and money as the organising principles of society, that there was a more scientific and more rational way of organising things and also a fairer and more equitable way of organising things very much captured the imagination of people, of intellectuals, who saw themselves as the friends of progress. Classical liberals regarded this with utter horror. They saw the march towards more socialistic policies at home and the rise of totalitarian socialism abroad as not the continuation of liberalist promise but as a complete negation of it.Hayek being exhibit A here.Yes. And so, by necessity, they fell in with the anti-progressive right. It was an anti-socialist alliance and there was a logic to that but there are obviously deep philosophical tensions between classical liberalism and libertarianism on the one hand and traditionalist conservatism on the other.How does Hayeks book,The Constitution of Liberty, fit into the picture?It fits in in a couple of ways. First, in a postscript to the book, Hayek takes pains to distinguish himself from the conservatives who are, at that very time, making him into an intellectual hero. He had writtenThe Road to Serfdomback in 1944 in England for an English audience, it was excerpted byReaders Digestand sold millions in the United States and made him into a hero of the modern American right. So, by the time he was writingThe Constitution of Libertyin 1960 he was already very much identified as one of American conservatisms leading intellectual lights and he was rather uncomfortable with that. So he wrote this essay Why I am Not a Conservative and, as you mentioned, he said that classical liberalism, libertarianism, was all about ongoing experimentation and change and openness and individualismHeres a quotation: The main point about liberalism is that it wants to go elsewhere, not to stand still.Yes, and yet Hayeks case for free society is one that resonates very well with the conservative imagination and easily lapses into a conservative sensibility. His main case for liberty rests on our ignorance. The fact that any one of us knows only a tiny fraction of the things that affect our life, that we are all dependent on the actions of millions of other people whom we dont know, whom well never know, that we live under social rules that we didnt create and that we dont understand. So, for anyone to presume that he has the knowledge to plan everything rationally from the centre is engaged in a massive act of hubris that Hayek later called the fatal conceit. In making this point, Hayek stresses the importance of traditional ways of doing things and the fact that many of the rules under which we live and that have allowed us to achieve this wonderful prosperity and all the opportunities of modern life are rules that no one planned or designed. They are products of human action but not design the archetypal examples being language, money and law. These are things that no one sat down and hammered out in a rationalistic kind of way but evolved over time in a blind, unconscious way.Even if Hayek was not a fusionist, the elements of fusionism are here.Yes. Intellectually Hayek says all the right liberal things, ultimately about how tradition cant bind us going into the future. He was not at all satisfied with the status quo he had a whole platform of rationally thought-through reforms that he wanted to institute. And yet the gestalt of his writing gives off this veneration for tradition that is lapped up by conservatives.One wonders if that will last. In 100 years will this prove to have been a temporary coalition or will it be a permanent one?I think there is a real tension, even incoherence, in Hayeks thought between this appreciation for the unplanned and spontaneous blind workings of cultural evolution on the one hand versus his being an economist, and a rational social planner who has ideas for reforms that will make a better world on the other. And he cant quite figure out where he sits on that divide. As a result, he gives aid and comfort in ways he didnt really want to, to the kind of moss-backed traditionalism that he himself wasnt sympathetic to. You hear it today in arguments about gay marriage: you hear Hayekian arguments against gay marriage, people saying, Well we cant really see any harm that would be caused by letting people love each other, or pledge themselves in legally binding ways but, as Hayek said, there are all kinds of rules that we dont understand the function of. The fact that they have evolved and theyve been here a long time suggest that theyre pretty important so we shouldnt monkey with them.

Atlas ShruggedBy Ayn RandBuyLastly, Ayn Rand,Atlas Shrugged, 1957. Why is she here?Once again, she obviously doesnt think of herself as a conservative. She got read out of the modern right by Bill Buckley and Whittaker Chambers. Chambers wrote a savage review ofAtlas Shruggedin theNational Review, ending with that quote From almost any page of Atlas Shrugged, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: To a gas chamber go!. saying it had a totalitarian sensibility behind it. So Buckley read the Randians out of the conservative movement and she was happy to be read out. Most fundamentally, Rand was a militant atheist and rejected conservatisms attempt to ground free society in religious principles. Nonetheless, the fact is a whole bunch of conservatives have been inspired and energised by Ayn Rand. Paul Ryan, who is one of the brighter lights in the Republican Party these days, as far as a serious small government conservatism is concerned, has declared openly his inspiration by Rand.Theres a whole bunch of people on the right who have used Rand as the gateway drug, as Jennifer Burns, the new Rand biographer, puts it. And shes certainly not loved on the left, thats for sure. So Rand, in spite of herself, has been a huge influence on the right and this goes to the story of the libertarian streak in modern conservatism. But theres also a streak in Ayn Rand that is very right-wing and explains in part why, despite her atheism and despite the obviously anti-conservative elements of her thought, nonetheless there are deeper elements that are very appealing to the conservative mind. Those are, firstly, her absolutism and secondly, her attempt to ground the case for liberty in nature. It makes sense for any party of order and stability to be very focused on order, to be drawn to the idea that there is black and white and right and wrong and absolutes and also to be attracted to the idea that there is a natural order of things. That no matter what anyone is saying, no matter what ivory-tower intellectuals schemes for reform and social improvement are, there is an unchanging human nature, there is a transcendent moral order and for anyone who tries to defy these things, its like trying to defy gravity.Rand is an ally in that way of thinking because she is as absolutist a moralist as you can come across. Her intellectual project is to ground the case for liberty in natural rights freedom and individual liberty are necessary to the fulfilment of human nature. I think ultimately thats a philosophical project thats doomed; it doesnt work. But it absolutely is one that is congenial to the way that people with a right-wing sensibility think and I think it helps to explain why in temperament and sensibility if not in the details of her argument Rand has had such an influence.There is a predominant progressive critique of conservatism which is that so-called freedom is really a conspiracy by the strong to dominate the weak.Yes, of course another strong element in Rand is a glorification of societys winners of the smart, the brilliant, the talented, the productive geniuses; she lionises them and makes them into heroes. And I have considerable sympathy for her project of doing so. But, at the same time, she expresses a fairly unmasked contempt for ordinary folks and societys losers and underdogs. This also fits in with the basic alternative between a society of order and stability and a society of reform. Youve got one side that is happy with the way things are and wants to keep them that way. Who are those people going to be? They are going to be the people who are thriving and prospering under current rules and the people who sympathise with lifes winners. You have another side pushing for reform who are the most obvious constituencies for change, people who arent doing so well under the current dispensation and the people who sympathise with them.I think theres a deep resonance between Rands way of thinking and the conservative party of order/stability sensibility, one that she might not have recognised and might have thought was abhorrent but nonetheless is quite true. It is entirely possible to frame libertarian principles in a completely different way, to argue that it is capitalism that has lifted up the poor more effectively than any social programme and that if you really care about the underdogs and losers in the world, that a free society with open and competitive markets is in fact your best bet for lifting up the unprivileged and less advantaged. But that wasnt Rands way of making the argument. Her way of making the argument is one that fits in better with the right-wing point of view.What emerges from this interview is a description of conservatism as an improbable alliance based on surprisingly sustainable contradictions and, maybe even more surprisingly, successful contradictions. It is odd to have Randians and Christians in the same general movement, for example, or traditionalists and Hayekians on the same side.Yes, you see it today in the Tea Party crowd; you see folks with their signs and their Dont tread on me flags, all very libertarian kind of imagery, with a Take our country back Palinite middle-American white populism all mixed together.And the larger context in which conservatism makes sense, despite its internal contradictions, is as a corrective to the progressive project.Yes, and certainly the Tea Party movement is a backlash. Republicans were rudderless and incompetent and corruption-plagued, presiding over two unpopular wars and presiding over an economy that went down the toilet. Of course they were going to get bounced. The other guys come in and thought they saw in the election results a mandate to move the country in a fundamentally different direction. I think they over-read their mandate and they summoned up the Tea Party backlash in a dialectical fashion and thats constrained them to a considerable extent.Published on Aug 15, 2010Books by Brink Lindsey

he political thought of the Liberals and Liberal Democrats since 1945: book reviewByMark Pack| Wed 26th January 2011 - 10:25 amKevin Hicksons volume,The political thought of the Liberals and Liberal Democrats since 1945, may be a short volume from an academic publisher with an academic book price tag to boot (look out for cheaper second-hand copies) but its contributors include many political practitioners. With Vince Cable, Steve Webb, David Howarth , Richard Grayson and Duncan Brack amongst them, this book has a very strong representation of people at the coalface of policy making rather than simply those who know of it only in theory.As Hickson points out in the books introduction, the policies of the Liberal Democrats even more so than other aspects of the history of the party and its predecessors since 1945 have had very little coverage in books, an omission which this volume sets out to remedy and which political fortunes in the year after the books publication has made all the more useful a task to tackle.However, the book suffers from two principle defects only one of which is outside of the editor and contributors control. The one outside their control is how the rapid pace of political developments since the books appearance in 2009 (and some pieces in it were written earlier) has put into focus areas of policy that the book barely touches on.Questions such as who should provide public services (the state or a range of other organisations), the role of social mobility, whether power should be devolved to councils or to other local bodies and the relative merits of investing in early years or higher education are not new to the Liberal Democrats or Liberals, but they have traditionally played only a small role in internal policy debates. As a result, the book is very light in discussing such issues, even though the current political situation puts them (or perhaps more accurately, should put them) at the centre of policy discussions in Liberal Democrat circles.That in large part is bad luck with the timing of the publication. But the other significant defect is the books structure, which is also its biggest assumption: breaking the story of Liberal / Liberal Democrat policy into three strands of classical liberalism, social liberalism and the centre.As Hickson himself concedes, It would be a mistake to subsume all political discussion in the Liberals and the Liberal Democrats to such a distinction as there are both issues which cut across this distinction (including constitutional reform) and ones which do not really fit into it at all (including environmental ones). Given the importance of political reform and the environment to the modern Liberal Democrats, and the Liberals for many years previously, these sorts of exceptions highlight just how limiting that structure is.In part the book tries to deal with this by adding in the category of centrists, that is those who do not fit neatly into one or other of the camps. This is only a patch job to the books structure, however, as is reflected in the tangled choice of contributors for the last three chapters of the book.It is Vince Cable who contributes the concluding classical liberal chapter (though it is also he who in recent years has called for large scale nationalisation and regulation in the financial sector). FellowOrange Bookcontributor Steve Webb is also there but as the author of the concluding social liberal chapter, and just to add to the cross-over complexities it is worth remembering that in addition to the Orange Book, he also contributed to the social liberal bookReinventing the State. One of the editors of that book, David Howarth, also contributes a concluding chapter but not on social liberalism. Instead he gets the centrist chapter, with this tangled web showing how limited is the usefulness of such labels are in explaining peoples views or classifying policies.Indeed, Richard Graysons chapter on social liberalism argues that the distinction between social and economic liberals has little justification save on the question of the extent to which the state should wage war on economic inequality in order to advance freedom. Grayson approvingly quotes Hobhouses dictum that liberty without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid result and Michael Ignatieffs comment that freedom is empty so long as we are trapped in physical necessity.After Grayson traces some deep roots for social liberalism in the party, he warns of overstating social liberal influence on the 1945-79 Liberal manifestos and instead sees the 1992 manifesto as the one where the agenda began to shift in a more overtly social liberal direction, with a further move in the social liberal direction following Charles Kennedys election as leader in 1999. Even then, hepoints out, social liberals were muted in arguing for higher taxes for their redistributive impact, instead concentrating on their role in raising funds to pay for policies a role that became less important as Labours high spending moved the debate on from one about how to spend more.Graysons chapter therefore both shows the limitations of the books approach, but also its strength for as with his piece, there are some very strong individual contributions in the book that expertly map parts of the policy history of the Liberals and then Liberal Democrats.The quality of the contributions and the sympathy of the authors towards the party inevitably varies. Even the most sympathetic sharply illuminate issues the party has struggled with, as whenDuncan Brack illustrates a continuing tension in the party with his quote from Richard Acland (a Liberal MP who left to found his own party) who criticised the Liberal Party saying: Mention any injustice and its the government will put that right; mention any restriction imposed by government on anyone and its well set the people free.The quality of some of the individual contributions make up for the books overall structural problem. The way that political debate has moved on to issues largely neglected in the book makes it better as a history book than as a prompt for current policy ideas, save that it highlights how much serious policy thinking on those neglected areas is needed.

Progressive, like the 1980sJohn Gray on the coalitionYou are invited to read this freeessayfrom theLondon Review of Books.Registerforfreeand enjoy 24 hours of access to the entire LRB archive of over 12,500 essays and reviews.

Though few anticipated the agreement, it is not difficult to understand why David Cameron and Nick Clegg should have made a bargain to share power. By forming a coalition Cameron secured protection from his mutinous right wing, while Clegg became the pivotal player in British politics. What is more surprising is the degree of unity the government has so far exhibited. In Britain we think of coalition government as non-ideological, formed from necessity and living by compromise. When the coalition came to power there were many who welcomed it as a refreshing departure from tribal politics. Others feared that a government made up of parties with such different histories and cultures would lack clear direction decisions would be fudged, policies too cautious. In fact the predominant feature of the coalition has been its consistent radicalism. At a time of economic uncertainty, deep cuts in public spending can only be an enormous gamble. Despite confident assertions by George Osborne, no one can really know what the result will be. Cameron commonly seen as a Conservative in a tradition that distrusts ideas in politics has embarked on one of the boldest experiments in British political history. Even more remarkably, Clegg the leader of a party that has long supported government intervention as a force for progress has signed up to a programme that promises an unprecedented roll-back of the state.Partly this is a matter of strategic calculation. When Clegg signed up to the agreement he knew that a Cameron government would pursue an aggressive policy of deficit reduction. Well before the Conservatives came to power they were studying the drastic action taken in Canada in the 1990s to curb public spending. Osbornes wild claim when shadow chancellor that Britains public finances were in a worse state than those of Greece showed which way the wind was blowing. There was no advantage for the Lib Dems in being part of the government while remaining semi-detached from its central strategy: if the gamble on deficit reduction worked Clegg would gain no credit, if it failed he would suffer the political cost along with Cameron. Unwavering support for the cuts was the only prudent stance.But it is also a stance that squares with the market liberalism advocated inThe Orange Book(2004), a collection of essays coedited by David Laws that included contributions by Chris Huhne, Vince Cable and Clegg himself. The aim of the contributors was to reaffirm a version of liberalism they believed had been lost: one in which support for small government and the free market goes with a strong commitment to civil liberties and freedom of lifestyle. This strand of liberalism was mistakenly discredited, they argued, when Thatcher attempted to link the free market with social conservatism. In its heyday a time the contributors never precisely specified liberalism had been a forward-looking movement, which recognised and welcomed the tendency of markets to undermine traditional hierarchies; but with the rise of Thatcherism this tendency came to be seen as a moral hazard rather than an advance in freedom. The task at hand was to reclaim this liberal philosophy from the right and reinstate market liberalism as a truly progressive creed.TheOrange Bookliberals were avowedly anti-conservative. The principal target of their critique of British politics was not the free-market right, however, but the powerful social democratic strand in their own party. The influx from the SDP that followed the Labour split in 1981 had reinforced a tradition that goes back to Beveridge and Lloyd George. For the liberals who were part of this tradition the majority of the party over the past few decades the free market was simply one way of organising the economy rather than the way the economy organises itself in the absence of government intervention. Far from embodying liberty, markets often worked against personal autonomy. When that was the case they had to be constrained for the sake of freedom. Again, the distribution of income and wealth that the market produced was neither self-evidently fair nor always socially beneficial. If the distribution became too unequal, or damaged society in other ways, government had to intervene. There was nothing intrinsically valuable in the market itself.In an agenda-setting speech, delivered at the LSE in January 2008, Clegg had signalled his firm rejection of this kind of liberalism. The state was necessary to ensure proper funding of public services such as health and education, he allowed; but once it had done that, government should back off and allow services to be supplied privately. He repeated this message on many occasions, but few in his party seem to have realised the nature of the shift that was underway. What Clegg and his fellow market liberals were engineering was a fundamental reorientation in the partys values. Instead of the type of liberalism exemplified by Hobhouse and Keynes, which accepted that the market had to be curbed when it failed to benefit society, the party was sold a liberalism in which the market became the benchmark by which society would be judged. Rather than being assessed according to standards of freedom and equality, the market became the fundamental norm from which any departure would in future have to be justified.

Among Liberal Democrat activists and some on the Labour left, Clegg is often accused of compromising his principles and selling out for the sake of power. The charge is absurd, for the Con-Lib programme is in many respects a straightforward application of Cleggs brand of liberalism. Very little compromise was necessary. The Liberal Democrat leader has few reasons to feel uncomfortable with a government that is implementing much of the programme he urged on his own party. Just as much as Blair and Cameron, Clegg aims to replace British social democracy with a version of Thatchers market-based settlement.The confidence with which Clegg defended the shift to market liberalism is striking, not least because the collapse of the market liberal order was underway at the time he gave his speech at the LSE. It may be that the programme he presented expresses deeply considered convictions. More likely, it reflects the workings of an acutely intelligent and at the same time highly conventional political mind. The market ideology of the 1980s Conservative Party has been internalised across the British political class, so that it now seems no more than common sense. Like Cameron, Clegg has known nothing else.In making his party a vehicle for his own market liberal project Clegg thus continued a trend that has been evident in British politics since Thatcher. She became Conservative leader by chance; but once in office she turned the party into her instrument, a change in its nature that was not reversed when she was toppled. Having been an institution embedded in the wider society, the Conservative Party became a delivery mechanism for a succession of leaders, with political initiative concentrated in a cadre of advisers with strong links to the media. The hollowing out of parties continued with the rise of New Labour, which was invented by fewer than a dozen people who turned a mass political organisation into a vehicle for the Blair/Brown project of market-friendly modernisation. The breakdown of Blairs relationship with Brown ensured that the transition would not be without friction, but the resulting conflicts were personal rivalries played out within a small circle.As in the 18th-century elite politics analysed by Lewis Namier, British politics today is shaped by a handful of closely related people. The prosaic reality underlying the media romance of sibling rivalry between the Milibands and marital disharmony in the Balls family is competition within this small group. The new politics which is supposedly emerging around Ed Miliband looks like being not much more than a further iteration of this Namierite struggle, as Miliband entrenches his position by marginalising potential rivals.In its reliance on the advice and support of a closed circle of media-conscious advisers Camerons rise followed a similar trajectory to that of New Labour. But Cameron has never achieved anything like the control Blair exercised over his party. The sharpest tensions within the coalition have not been between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats but among Conservatives, and it would not be surprising if the first resignation were to come from Liam Fox or Iain Duncan Smith rather than Vince Cable. No doubt each of them has genuine objections to aspects of coalition policy. But if any of the three were to walk away, it would be as much from thwarted ambition one of them was party leader, while the other two might have been as from reasoned dissent. None of them can claim to be at odds with the coalitions overall programme or its ideology.If the coalition is a novelty in British politics, there is nothing that is remotely new in its ruling ideas. Cleggs synthesis of social with market liberalism makes no advance on the position taken by Michael Portillo when he launched his bid for the Conservative leadership nearly a decade ago, while Camerons much touted big society is a recycled version of the civic conservatism advocated by David Willetts in the early 1990s. These were attempts to remedy deficiencies in Thatcherite thinking, with Portillo arguing that a free-market economy should be complemented by liberal social values and Willetts maintaining that the corrosive effects of market forces could be overcome by giving greater space to non-governmental institutions neighbourhoods, churches, charities and the like. The difficulty they faced was reconciling the dynamism of the free market with the need for social stability. This is not a new conflict it troubled Adam Smith and in truth it cannot be resolved, but it is all the more acute now that market capitalism is itself in trouble. Vince Cables true role may be that of a licensed critic of capitalism, whose assaults distract attention from problems for which the coalition has no solution.The argument around the coalitions strategy of deficit reduction has been framed in terms of economic theory, with some seeing it as a replay of the debate between Keynes and Hayek in the 1930s. There are parallels, but too much has changed since that time for their economic theories, or the prescriptions they derived from them, to be applicable today. Whether the Great Depression originated in a misallocation of capital as Hayek maintained, or came about as a result of a collapse of aggregate demand as Keynes believed, does not much matter. Quite possibly the causes cannot be known. Keynes won the argument because he showed how markets can spiral downwards in a self-reinforcing process, which is only accelerated by retrenchment in government spending. Unlike Hayeks, Keyness analysis suggested policies that were politically possible, and which for several decades actually worked.It is not obvious that these policies can be as effective today. The US has been pursuing a Keynesian-style programme of monetary stimulus, which looks like being continued in another round of quantitative easing QE2, as it is sometimes called. Whether or not the stimulus will be large enough (some ultra-Keynesians doubt this), it will not be accompanied by any coherent action on the federal deficit. The collapse in Obamas popularity is likely to result in the Democrats losing control of one or both branches of Congress. Trapped by its archaic and dysfunctional system of government, the US will then be gridlocked. The global economy will continue to drift, and any recovery in Britain will fall away. The situation will be worse if Chinese-American relations founder and China declines to continue funding the US at the level it has done in the past. In that case the crisis will intensify, with results that are unpredictable.

There is also danger from Europe. The austerity package imposed on Greece is not only economically self-defeating (in that withdrawing purchasing power only increases the burden of debt) but politically impossible. No democracy will accept steeply declining living standards in return for nebulous promises of growth in a hypothetical future especially when the package promising this has been imposed from outside. Whatever European officials may say, Greece is heading for default. The event will be described in terms of restructuring, but for the markets the reality will be clear enough. The future of the euro has not been secured, even if a deeper crisis has for the time being been staved off.There will be some in the coalition who defend the cuts as a response to these uncertainties. It is not an ideological preference for a small state that drives the coalitions policies, they will say, but economic necessity: with the world economy in such a fragile state Britain cannot continue to borrow on the scale it has done, and must accept that it cannot afford the social democratic state that was established more than 60 years ago. But it is hard to square this argument with the claim that services will actually be improved by the cuts. Both Cameron and Clegg have insisted that moving away from state provision is not just a matter of saving money: the result, they say, will be services that are more responsive to personal choice. It is true that injecting markets into public services may not save any money; the large changes that are being rapidly introduced in the NHS may end up creating a service that is significantly more costly. This only confirms that the coalition is ideologically driven. It may believe that it is responding pragmatically, but its view of things is shaped by the ideas of the 1980s: ideas that in many respects lag behind events, and which the coalition may yet be forced to discard.As a consequence of the financial crisis, the market-based globalisation of the past couple of decades is giving way to a model in which states are the principal actors. Chinese state capitalism has weathered the global crisis better than any market liberal economy and even Russia is less burdened by debt. After the implosion of the American financial system emerging economies need no longer submit to the dictates of a Washington consensus that was never implemented in Washington. It might be thought that the current phase of globalisation would allow a greater degree of international co-operation. In some ways, however, this new phase is more disorderly. The retreat of American power has left the world without a functioning monetary regime. Economic imbalances are surfacing in geopolitical rivalries and currency wars, and it is unclear how these conflicts will develop. What is evident is that the era in which states were ready to surrender control of their economies to market forces is over. The postwar welfare state may be history, but governments cannot risk leaving their populations without a shelter against chaos. If social democracy is not a viable option, neither is market liberalism.A roll-back of the state of the magnitude that the coalition envisages will leave people more exposed to the turbulence of world markets than they have been for generations. Inevitably, they will seek protection. The prosperity enjoyed by the majority of those in Britain in the decade leading up to the crash was largely an illusion. Debt-fuelled consumption masked the full extent of the increase in inequality, while the casualisation of sections of the labour force concealed the real scale of unemployment. Reining back welfare benefits and shedding labour in the public sector as the government intends will only make the drop in living standards that is now unavoidable larger and more painful. There is much talk of the coalitions lack of a narrative of growth to complement the need for retrenchment, but in these circumstances its lack of any convincing narrative of fairness may be more disabling. In the terms ofThe Orange Book, condemning the pattern of incomes that emerges from the market as unfair is a category mistake; there is no standard of fairness independent of the market. There is plainly some awareness of this difficulty in the government. In his conference speech Cameron defended the withdrawal of child benefit from higher earners on the ground that it is fairer if this group makes a larger contribution towards cutting the deficit. At the same time some ministers (including Clegg) have defended dismantling the public sector with the claim that those who work in it enjoy unfair privileges. Public sector pensions are singled out for particular criticism because they provide a degree of protection against the risks of the market that is no longer available to the rest of the population: fairness requires that everyone be subject to the same insecurity. Since the result is to place the settled middle-class life to which many people still aspire beyond reach, it is hard to see this view having much traction.Iain Duncan Smith has emerged as a kind of reactionary radical who acknowledges the hazards of market society and insists that government must deal with them by encouraging a return to traditional values, even if this means government spending more money. Clegg has supported Duncan Smith in this stance. But it makes little sense to talk about restoring traditional forms of family life while insisting on the necessity of adapting to a highly mobile and continuously changing labour market a feature of the universal credit scheme announced at the party conference. This is not an inconsistency peculiar to the coalition. It is a conflict inherent in capitalism, which none of its defenders has been able to overcome. Most economic liberals have tended to evade the fact that free markets work against traditional values, including commonly accepted ideas of fairness. Hayek is an honourable exception, but if the market is blind to need and merit, as he candidly admitted, how can those who have no reasonable expectation of benefiting from it be reconciled to their situation? The question is especially relevant at times when the majority of the population belongs in this category. This, in effect, is the question faced by the coalition: how can it weather the hostility that is in store for it when the pain of the cuts begins to be felt?One answer is that the two parties have every reason to ensure that the agreement will last its full term. Having failed to gain an overall majority in the general election, the Conservatives are as a result of the unpopularity the cuts will incur unlikely to improve their prospects in the foreseeable future, while the Liberal Democrats are not going to cut short the first spell in peacetime government they have enjoyed for more than two generations. There are too many people with a stake in the deal for it easily to come apart. Cameron and Clegg have the power of patronage, which they can use to buy the support of their critics. The Tory right may not like the coalition, and is incensed by what it sees as Camerons betrayal of Conservative values in defence funding; but defence is not a crucial issue for voters, and even if Liam Fox delivers on his threats and resigns the right has nowhere to go. Similarly, failure in the referendum on the Alternative Vote would be a setback for the Liberal Democrats, but hardly a deal-breaker. The prospect has already been factored into the calculations of MPs, while Lib Dem activists have never been keen on AV, which many regard as worse than the present voting system. Some of these activists are migrating to Labour a trend Ed Miliband is actively encouraging. But how far Labour will be able to exploit any decline in the coalitions popularity is unclear. Certainly the government is vulnerable to the accusation that the cuts are unfair. But when times are hard it is not fairness that most concerns voters. More than anything else they want safety, and Miliband will find it hard to persuade the electorate that the party has broken with the policies that preceded the crash or can be trusted to deal with its consequences. He may justify passing over Ed Balls and appointing Blairite Alan Johnson as shadow chancellor as part of a process of renewal in which internecine rivalries are left behind; but the decision looks more like a continuation of such rivalry, with Miliband determined to avoid a threat to his leadership of the kind Brown posed to Blairs. Rather than challenging the government, the new leader has chosen to secure his position in the party.

The coalition may be stronger than its critics would like to believe, but that doesnt mean it will be able to carry through its programme. The market liberal agenda it is promoting is a relic from the past that is unlikely to withstand a protracted economic downturn. The determination to scale back debt could itself create the conditions for a U-turn. If the result of the retrenchment projected in the comprehensive spending review is sharply increased unemployment and stubbornly feeble or negative growth, a period of inflation may seem the only remaining option. That was the response in the early 1970s, when Anthony Barber, chancellor of the exchequer in Edward Heaths government, made his dash for growth. While never doctrinaire, Heath had begun as something of an economic liberal; but the upshot of Barbers great inflation was a massive expansion in government economic intervention. It is true that the Bank of England was not in charge of monetary policy, as it is now. But that need not preclude something similar happening again. The banks remit continues to be defined by government, and there is nothing to stop this remit being revised if the gamble on deficit reduction fails to pay off. There are already signs that QE may be ramped up to fend off a double-dip, a course of action that could also have the benefit of triggering a burst of inflation, which would devalue debt and enable it to be paid off more easily. A revision of the coalitions ideology would follow, with government reclaiming its role in protecting the population from the insecurity of the market.Cameron and Clegg both accept the ideas of the 1980s as embodying the only progressive philosophy. But if there is anything certain about progress, it is that its meaning shifts with events. As Hayek noted inThe Constitution of Liberty, what matters is the successful striving for what at each moment seems attainable Progress is movement for movements sake. Hayek was referring to the pursuit of changing wants in a liberal market economy. It didnt occur to him that this liberal conception of progress would be left behind as a result of the self-defeating effects of market liberal policies. But that is surely what will happen if the consequence of fiscal orthodoxy is to exacerbate the fragility of capitalism. It is too early to know whether the coalition can succeed in bringing about a fundamental realignment of British politics on the centre right. But if it does it will be because it has an ability to reinvent itself that Labour at present lacks. Cameron and Clegg belong in a generation shaped by the ideas of the 1980s; but in forming the coalition they have demonstrated an impressive ability to break with the past. They may turn out to be the politicians who lead Britain into a new era of statism.

Philosophy of Science after Feminism

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Author name:Janet A. KouranyPublisher:Oxford University PressPublish Date:2012Publisher Place:OxfordISBN:978-0199732616What should be the underlying motivation of science? Should it be primarily an epistemic endeavor or should it strive to promote the well-being of all members of society? Janet Kourany'sPhilosophy of Science after Feminismoffers an answer that reveals new areas of research for philosophers in the process. A much-needed addition to the Oxford University Press seriesStudies in Feminist Philosophy, Kourany's book is the first in the series to address the nature of science, which not only fills a critical void, but also calls attention to the continued social injustice sanctioned by scientific research. Advocating for a new science that serves the needs of society, Kourany recommends a more comprehensive program for philosophy of science, one that is more socially informed and motivated by "an egalitarian ideal of human flourishing" (15). To that end,Philosophy of Science after Feminismfunctions as a "blueprint for a philosophy of science more socially engaged and socially responsible than the philosophy of science we have now" (vii). Kourany's task, amounting to the overhaul of an entire discipline, is ambitious, and the topics introduced in the book require more treatment than a single work can provide. YetPhilosophy of Science after Feminismoffers a general survey of the terrain, making it a ready guide for future work in the philosophy of science.Kourany's first chapter, "A Feminist Primer for Philosophers of Science," opens with four examples of the social injustices experienced by women around the world. Citing statistics from different agencies of the United Nations Development Group, for example, UNICEF and UNFPA, Kourany points to injustices occurring in the workplace and home as well as those existing in broader contexts, such as the increase of military strategies that include rape and violence toward women. Kourany notes that these problems, among others, might be alleviated, or even solved, by science. Yet in spite of its resources to contribute to the cause of social justice, research referencing women has often perpetuated the belief that women are inferior, giving rise to research determined to locate differences between genders and informing social policies affecting women. Recent examples taken from biology, psychology, economics, and medicine support Kourany's point: science serves only some of society.Given that science has the resources to combat the marginalization of women--and by analogy that of nondominant races, ethnicities, sexual orientations, and physical abilities--should it take on a more socially responsible role? Kourany's answer is a resounding yes, for two reasons. First, science has the potential to enact further future harms on already marginalized groups; therefore, it should, at the very least, halt any future harm. Second, in light of the fact that society finances science and that our self-understanding is largely informed by science, science must be responsive to societal needs. Since every member of society requires justice, science should, if it is to be responsive, promote justice.Unlike current philosophy of science, Kourany's program includes the broader, normative questions about the "social responsibility of science" (SRS) (14). In fact, the SRS questions introduce new areas of discourse and "encourage a comprehensive, well-integrated exploration of science in society and a comprehensive, well-integrated plan of action to bring about needed change in both science and society" (16). This new philosophy of science, one meant to go beyond the traditional epistemic role, introduces the social context in which science is conducted. Of course, a broader program of research may not offer an incentive to persuade philosophers of science to embark on socially engaged research, especially if some may incur costs. To that end, Kourany devotes the following chapters to exploring the motivations for the discipline's neglect of a wider social context and anticipating the possible reasons for continuing that neglect. Kourany concludes by advocating for a new, politically active role for philosophers of science who adopt "the ideal of socially responsible science" (68).In "The Legacy of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science," Kourany provides an abridged historical account of the philosophy of science intended to explain why the discipline does not engage a wider social context. Coming into its own as a professional discipline in the mid-twentieth century, philosophy of science was largely guided by the context distinction attributed to Hans Reichenbach. Influenced by the context of justification, philosophy of science exhibits a tendency toward a narrow conception of scientific rationality. Of course, some features of rationality were not captured by the tools of logic and empiricist epistemology, as was evident in the critiques tendered by "Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson, Stephen Toulmin, and many other distinguished philosophers and historians of science" (24). Although these critiques broadened the range of contextual factors, Kourany notes that the issues of how society was shaped by science, and how politics and private funding shape science, were not addressed (30 and 46).Like the questions concerning the direction of research programs, objectivity, and realism, SRS questions fall squarely in the domain of philosophy of science as well. For example, the military funding of science exerts great influence on the methods and sizes of groups performing research, creating new issues for philosophers (30). Requirements of "secrecy, classification, and restriction of access to research results," even the departure from "basic research to military applications," pertain to the basic issues of philosophy of science (3031). Politics, too, generates similar issues, and the question of society shaping science, or vice versa, demands the attention of philosophers of science as well (4246). Kourany further cites the controversy surrounding the effects on science during different presidential administrations. Conservatives and liberals both charge each other with the manipulation and distortion of science (43). Kourany notes that questions about expertise, the increase of specializations, and the use of different methods and standards may be " more congenial to one political perspective" or other (44). Even though such issues belong to the philosophy of science, philosophers "remained silent" (46).Although mainstream philosophy of science ignored the larger, social questions, Kourany notes in the second chapter, "What Feminist Science Studies Can Offer," that "feminist philosophers of science, along with feminist scientists and historians" responded to more local, gender inequality questions in various ways (49). Kourany points out that a majority of these responses proceeded from the belief that sexist and androcentric science resulted from a poor methodology and were motivated by the belief that an "ideal of value-free science" was still possible (55). Yet the move to privilege feminist values in science did not make science more objective (57). According to Kourany, "no clear replacement for the ideal of value-free science has yet emerged" (57). She devotes the rest of this chapter to the analyses of three possible alternatives.The first, referred to as the "Social Value Management Ideal of Science," is associated with the major works of Helen Longino (Longino 1990; 2002) (58). Longino's account is informed by a social conception of objectivity based on the methods of scientists (58). On this procedural account, scientific communities are organized in such a way as to ensure the potential for "transformative criticism" (59). Kourany points out that the knowledge acquired via this alternative may not be free of bias, and it is possible that the procedures might fail to "bring about social reform" (62). Thus Kourany contends that this view does not escape the same pitfalls encountered by the "Ideal of Value-Free Science" (62).The second alternative, "The Empiricist Ideal of Science," is exemplified by the work of Louise Antony and Miriam Solomon (Antony 1993; 1995; Solomon 2001). Kourany describes the primary motivation of this view as an examination of scientific practice for "features that contribute to and explain its success" (63). For example, having a particular standpoint may enable one to detect biases in science (63). Also, certain values, such as those that are distinctly feminist, might promote a more objective science (6364). These two explanations for empirical success are what underwrite this alternative. However, for Kourany, the standpoint and the values hypotheses are problematic. As regards standpoint, supporters have yet to explain the "feminist consciousness," the particular heightened awareness that aids in the detection of bias, making a test for its role in epistemic success impossible (66). The values hypothesis is equally problematic. At times, feminist values have not been successful and/or empirical success may depend upon other features, ones that are not distinctly feminist (67). Thus, "The Empiricist Ideal of Science," whether dependent upon a specific standpoint or on values that may play a key role in the success of a science, fares no better than the "Social Value Management Ideal" or the "Ideal of Value-Free Science." The shortcomings of these previous contenders open the door for a new alternative, one endorsed by Kourany (68).Referred to as the "Ideal of Socially Responsible Science," this alternative "recognizes that rooting sexism and androcentrism out of science is tantamount to implanting egalitarian social values into science" (68). Values are inescapable in science, and Kourany believes that society can exert influence--both financial and regulative--to promote those values that address its needs (68). Success, for this alternative, includes not only the standard notion of empirical success, but also "human flourishing, what makes for a good society" (68). Given its aims, this alternative addresses the political needs not filled by the other alternatives.To assess whether the Ideal of Socially Responsible Science functions as a "genuine source of knowledge," Kourany provides an example of a socially responsible science: a "new psychological research program" presented by Carolyn West (West 2002) (69). The aim of this research program, as described by Kourany, is "to uncover the similarities in intimate-partner violence within the black and white communities of the United States without negating the experiences of black women and simultaneously to highlight the differences within the black and white communities without perpetuating the stereotype that black Americans are inherently more violent than other ethnic groups" (69). Given the program's complexity, the research looks radically different from its predecessors. Changes in the definition of violence, different standards of measurement, and the exploration of other explanatory factors, such as violence due to "socioeconomic differences," are examples of modifications in the new program (69). In short, egalitarian social values as well as epistemic values both equally guide the research (69).The research program presented by West is Kourany's only example of SRS-guided research. Given that this example bears the burden of convincing the reader to support her "Ideal of Socially Responsible Science," I would like to have seen a second case or, at the very least, more detail that would distinguish this research from that described by the previous alternatives. I would particularly like this program to be contrasted with the "Empiricist Ideal of Science" when motivated by standpoint theory. A concrete example taken from West, appearing in Kourany's footnote 10, notes the possible contribution made by Black feminist thought to the identification of differences between communities that doesn't resort to racial stereotypes (70). According to Kourany, Black feminists are in a position to provide historic context, which might explain why Black women who have been battered are not as likely to pursue legal actions against their partners (70). Although not a "feminist consciousness," this unique experience and/or knowledge may be considered a standpoint, thereby requiring further treatment from Kourany. If experience is constitutive of one's standpoint, then the "Empiricist Ideal of Science" remains on the table.The last four pages of "What Feminist Science Studies Can Offer" include some objections and responses to SRS, both of which are necessary and appreciated given the quick pace of the previous section. One worry is that the style, one that assumes an adversarial reader, detracts from the meat of the issues. Phrases such as, "you exclaim, voice rising" or "you retort, irritation in your voice" may miss the mark and irritate or more likely confuse the reader (71 and 72). The issues surrounding SRS are substantial, for example, what to do when the social/epistemic values conflict with each other or whether the "Ideal of Socially Responsible Science" impedes the acquisition of knowledge. Kourany makes good points with respect to these issues, but I fear that the style will hinder uptake. Of course, these are not the only objections levied against a socially responsible science.In "Challenges from Every Direction," Kourany acknowledges that the "Ideal of Socially Responsible Science" poses to science a threat of "serious social interference" (79). Historically, scientists and science are believed to value freedom from particular types of social interference. Anticipating the resistance to contextualizing science, Kourany addresses five reasons for maintaining a science insulated from social interference. Of the epistemological, historical, sociological, economic, and political reasons, I restrict my comments to Kourany's discussion of the political reason because it, unlike the other reasons, does not generate testable claims for defending the autonomy of science (100). Rather, it motivates a new line of philosophical inquiry focused on instances where scientific freedom and social values conflict.Various charters, declarations, and congresses have claimed that scientists have rights and that these include, but are not limited to, the right to freely choose an area of research, to have a say in how research is to be carried out, and to publish their research results (10001). Social interference, as Kourany describes, consists of various types of "constraints" that a socially directed science imposes upon the freedom of individual scientists (101). Protecting the environment, recognizing personhood, and even the "respect for 'human dignity' and the 'integrity of the person' [found] in the European Charter," are a few examples of the constraints scientists already face, but these, according to Kourany, are often "vague and incomplete," requiring "further specification" (102). Not only is there a need for specificity, but the conflict between the needs of society and the freedom of scientists also requires some method of adjudication (103). Previously left out of the conversation, philosophers of science, Kourany believes, have an important role in articulating the ideals that guide SRS practice. Kourany touches upon various issues in the last chapter, "The Prospects for Philosophy of Science in the Twenty-First Century."Historically, the goal of philosophy of science was "to articulate and even improve upon . . . scientific rationality," which came to include not only nondeductive forms of argumentation, but also the contributions of knowledge provided by models and equipment (107). Today, the goal of philosophy of science is still to improve science, but it is no longer strictly an epistemic endeavor. The presence of codes of ethics in different scientific associations signals a different need in science, one of values. Although these codes were created to address specific needs, Kourany notes that they often suffer from "vagueness and incompleteness" (109). Also, professional associations may lack the resources to sanction violators (113). In spite of the presence of ethics codes, little has been accomplished toward mitigating public anxiety concerning science (11417). New codes, conscious of connecting both the epistemic and normative projects, form the starting point for Kourany's science, and philosophers of science seem best suited to advise and play a productive role in the creation of these codes (119). Although I agree that philosophers of science have the resources to make a contribution to the creation of codes of ethics, I think that it may be more of a collaborative effort between scientists and philosophers than Kourany admits.