libro fictional minds.completo

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Fictional Minds

Book by

Alan Palmer;

University of Nebraska Press

2004.

27 !"s.



Parts of this volume previously appeared in “The Construction of Fictional Minds, ” Narrative 10 (1)!"#$%&

' !00$ y the oard of *e+ents of the niversity of -eras.a /ll ri+hts reserved Manufactured in the nited tates of /merica ⃝ 2irary ofCon+ress Catalo+in+3inPulication 4ata Palmer, /lan, 1560# Fictional minds 7 /lan Palmer& p& cm&#(Frontiers of narrative) 8ncludes ilio+raphical references and inde9& 8- 03"0:!3:;$:3< (cl& al.& paper) 1& Fiction#Techni=ue& !& Characters and characteristics in literature&:& 8ntellect in literature& 8& Title& 88& eries& P-::":&C$P:6 !00$ "05&:>5!;#4C!! !00:015;00



Contents

/c.no?led+ments vii1& 8ntroduction 1

1& ac.+round 12. Summary 53. Some Definitions and Assumptions 1%$& @hat the oo. 8s -ot !16& / -ote on the Te9ts !6!& ome -arratolo+ical /pproaches !"1& tory /nalysis !"2. Possible Worlds :!3. Characterization :%$& Co+nitive cience and Frames $$6& FocaliAation $":& The peech Cate+ories 6:1& ummary 6:!& The Prosecution 6;:& The 4efense %5$& Thou+ht *eport ;6$& The @hole Mind ";. !unctionalism ";2. "an#ua#e 5!

3. Non$verbal Consciousness 5;%. Non$consciousness 10$&. Dispositions 10"'. (motions 11!

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). Action 11""& First3Person /scription 1!$6& The ocial Mind 1:01& Pulic Thou+ht 1:1!& Third3Person /scription 1:;:& The 4evelopment of Purposive Thou+ht 1$;$& 4ialo+ic Thou+ht 16!6& The Mind eyond the .in 16;%& The Fictional Mind 1;01& ummary 1;0!& The Continuin+3Consciousness Frame 1;6:& Bmedded -arratives 1":$& The tory?orld 15$

;& The Fictional Mind in /ction !061& ac.+round !06!& Thou+ht and /ction !10:& 8ntermental Thou+ht !1"$& 4ouly Bmedded -arratives !:0"& Further /pplications !$0ilio+raphy !$58nde9 !%:

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Acknowledgments

8 ?ould li.e to than. the follo?in+ my mother rian and heila arford Denneth Par.er usannah *adstone 2inda *oAmovits Molly/ndre?s and Corinne =uire of the Centre for -arrative *esearch at the niversity of Bast 2ondon Eames Phelan 2isa unshine CouAe Genn,











































for his thou+htful +uidance and encoura+ement Marie32aure *yan, for tellin+ me aout the theorytheory7simulation deate ri Mar+olin, forsome stimulatin+ and very helpful email discussions rian Din+ for his ri+orous and sensitive copyeditin+ and the editors of the niversity of -eras.a Press for their invaluale assistance&

There are three people to ?hom 8 o?e a particularly lar+e det of +ratitude& *oert Chase and 4avid Herman have een e9tremely conscientiousand amaAin+ly enthusiastic and supportive mentors& oth have een unfailin+ly +enerous ?ith their time, advice, assistance, and support& The pure, disinterested scholarship of o and 4avid has een an inspiration& Finally, 8 ?ould li.e to dedicate this oo. to my partner, ue sine *ua

non&



1Introduction

“@e never .no? them ?ell, do ?eI” “@hoI” “*eal people&” “@hat do you mean, >real people>I” “/s opposed to people in oo.s, ” Paolae9plained& “They>re the only ones ?e ever really .no? ?ell, or .no? truly&&&& Maye that>s ecause they>re the only ones aout ?hom ?e +etreliale information&&&& -arrators never lie&” # 4onna 2eon, / ea of Troules

1. Background

Fictional Minds is aout “people in oo.s&” 8n particular, it is aout the amount, ran+e, variety, and reliaility of the information on the fictionalminds of people in oo.s that ?e are ale to otain from those oo.s&

/ little personal history may e helpful here in order to e9plain the purpose of this oo.& 8 e+an studyin+ fictional minds in 1556& 8 did this yloo.in+ at the o9 Hill chapter in Eane /usten>s (mma and the @aterloo all chapter in @illiam Ma.epeace Thac.eray>s +anity !air to see ho?

the minds of the characters in those chapters ?ere constructed& 8 chose those t?o te9ts ecause 8 thou+ht that it ?ould e interestin+ to e9aminethe consciousnesses of characters interactin+ in +roups& /t that time, 8 am ashamed to say no?, 8 ?as not even a?are of the e9istence of narrativetheory, or narratolo+y, althou+h as it happened this direct approach to primary te9ts turned out to e an asolutely inspired idea& Then once 8 haddiscovered that there ?as such a thin+ as narrative theory, 8 thou+ht that it ?ould e interestin+ to find out ?hat it said aout my chosen area ofstudy& /fter all ?hat could e more central to the theoretical analysis of fiction than the ?or.in+s of characters> mindsI My first encounter ?ithnarrative theory ?as ?ith ?hat 8 ?ill call the speech cate#ory approach, and 8 ?as immediately struc. y the fact that it did not provide aconvincin+ e9planation or even description of ho? the ?hole minds of characters in action ?ere constructed& 8t seemed to

me that there ?as a +ood deal that ?as +oin+ on in the /usten and Thac.eray chapters that had not een captured y classification of the specifice9amples of direct access to fictional minds into the various speech cate+ories& 8 felt as thou+h 8 had stumled into a lar+e, fascinatin+ field that 8

very much ?anted to e9plore further& / small corner of it had een tended and retended ?ith, perhaps, osessive care, ?hile the rest of itappeared to me at that time to e ne+lected&

8 read more ?idely ?ithin narrative theory and soon discovered the concept of focalization or ?hat used to e called point of vie,& o anothersmall corner of the field had een cultivated& FocaliAation ?as informative, ut it ?as still only a small part of the story& The third corner turned



out to e story analysis #the structuralist study of the asic elements of plot structures& -e9t 8 came across characterization and, in particular,ho? the reader rin+s to the te9t pree9istin+ cultural and literary stereotypes in order to construct satisfyin+ patterns of ehavior and convincin+fictional personalities& Finally, and ine9cusaly late in the day, 8 encountered possible$,orlds theory& This has proved very helpful indeed,althou+h 8 soon found out that in certain ?ays it is not that ?ell suited to the study of fictional minds& (Jou may have noticed that there are five

corners# it is an irre+ularly shaped field&)

o, the corners of the field are ?ell tended, ut in the middle there remains a very lar+e and apparently une9plored patch of land that still loo.s Kust as interestin+ to me today as it did at the e+innin+& ut the oddest thin+ of all, as 8 continued my search ?ithin narrative theory for acomprehensive treatment of the ?hole of my area of interest, ?as that 8 found very little reco+nition of the fact that there ,as an area of interestat all& The various corners adKoin other fields and appear to e vie?ed primarily as adKuncts to those other fields the analysis of spo.en speech inthe case of the speech cate+ories various aspects of discourse analysis in the case of focaliAation interte9tuality in the case of characteriAationclassical structuralism in the case of story analysis and modal lo+ic in the case of possile3?orlds theory& This seemed stran+e to me then, and itstill does no?& 8n fact, it is this continued sense of stran+eness that drives this oo.& Bven no?, 8 still thin., @hy don>t other people as.themselves ?hat aspect of literary theory could e more important than fictional mindsI This study is an attempt to mar. out the oundaries ofthe field as a ?ell3defined suKect area in its o?n ri+ht y lin.in+ to+ether the previously ?ell3trodden parts of it and y tendin+ a fe? ne?

patches of my o?n& 8 decided on the title !ictional -inds, instead of other possiilities such as he Presentation of Consciousness

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in the Novel , ecause it sounds to me as much the name of a ne? suKect area ?ithin narrative theory as it does the title of a sin+le study&

8 ?ill descrie my e9ploration of the field ?ith the use, 8 am afraid, of another and final a+ricultural metaphor& ome?here (8 have een unale tofind the e9act reference) the philosopher 2ud?i+ @itt+enstein su++ests that there are t?o ?ays of e9plorin+ a piece of land such as a hill& Lne?ay is to attempt to define it y estalishin+ its oundaries ?ith precision& 8n this ?ay once you have dra?n an e9act line around the land in=uestion, you can say ?ith confidence that the hill consists of all the land ?ithin the order created y the line and ?hatever lies outside the

oundary is somethin+ else& The other ?ay to do it is to e9plore the hill y criss3crossin+ it from various directions& That ?ay you +et to .no? itintimately, and you have a fairly clear idea aout ?hat is the hill and ?hat is not, even thou+h you do not ever dra? a precise line around it& Bachmethod has its o?n .ind of value, and of course they are not mutually e9clusive& Perhaps he had in mind a comparison et?een the early ?or.in+method of the ractatus "o#ico$Philosophicus and the later, very different approach of the Philosophical 8nvesti+ations& 8 ?ould say that the



modus operandi of Fictional Minds is the criss3crossin+ of the field, rather than the strict delineation of its e9act orders, althou+h 8 hope that it?ill ecome clear that the oundaries of the fictional mind in discourse e9tend much further than have previously een reco+niAed&

4urin+ my studies, 8 discovered reader response theory, ?hich proved to e of +reat value& 8 ?ill pic. out one specific issue here the sheer scale

of the input re=uired from readers in constructin+ minds from novels& Have you ever, ?hile rereadin+ a novel containin+ a scene or a characterthat had a profound effect on you ?hen you first read it, een surprised at ho? little there actually ?as to that scene or character and ho? fe??ords ?ere used to descrie themI Jou thin., 4oes that scene really last for only a pa+eI Lr, 4oes that character really only appear in onlythose scenesI (/ particularly +ood e9ample of this phenomenon is Lrson @elles>s Harry 2ime character in the film he hird -an& 2ime doesnot appear until after the est part of an hour and says almost nothin+ apart from the famous cuc.oo3cloc. scene&) Ln rereadin+ a scene of thissort, you find yourself surprised that your ima+ination, as it then ?as, contriuted so much to flesh out the ?ords in the te9t, and it can sometimeshappen that your current ima+inative state does not do the same& 8t is almost as thou+h the te9t is simply the scaffoldin+ on ?hich you uild thevivid psycholo+ical processes that stay ?ith you for so lon+ after?ard& 8 recently felt this sort of disappointment

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?hile rereadin+ merto Bco>s novel he Name of the /ose, ?hich is ironic since he is a leadin+ reader response theorist 8t can also happen ?ithhistorical narrative, as it did for me ?ith Bmmanuel 2e *oy 2adurie>s -ontaillou& 8 find that the same sensation can also occur ?hen someonerecommends that 8 read an episode in a novel or see a scene in a film& 8 thin., 8 am not really sure that there is enou+h here for me to feel that it Kustified the uild3up that it +ot& There is a +ood deal that has een rou+ht to this scene y the other person, and 8 am not sure ?hat it is& /ll thisis an illustration of ?hat the narratolo+ist Moni.a Fluderni. refers to in the vivid phrase the “human ur+e to create si+nificance” (155:, $6;)&@hat 8 am descriin+ is one of those rare occasions ?hen you are acutely a?are of the creative nature of the readin+ process in +eneral and thestran+eness of character construction in particular& /ny theory that attempts to e9plain this process, or a part of it, has to reco+niAe the intense po?er of reader response to fictional minds&

8 decided at an early sta+e that it ?ould e re?ardin+ to illuminate the study of fictional minds y ma.in+ use of the insi+hts of some of thedisciplines relatin+ to real minds& For e9ample, 8 noticed ri+ht at the e+innin+ that durin+ my analyses of the Bmma and Ganity Fair passa+es 8?as findin+ it difficult in a numer of cases to separate out presentations of consciousness from descriptions of action, and 8 ?as a?are that anilluminatin+ perspective on this issue could e derived from the philosophy of action& (y the ?ay, this point is a perfect illustration of the enefits of theoriAin+ aout novels efore readin+ literary theory the theory that 8 read later appeared to assume that dividin+ the t?o ?asentirely unprolematical, ?hile the naNve reader that 8 then ?as could spot immediately that this ?as not the case&) 8n addition to philosophy such



as the philosophy of mind as ?ell as the philosophy of action, this oo. also ma.es use of other real3mind disciplines such as co+nitive science, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics& 8 hope that the result is a rich, fle9ile, sensitive, and inclusive paradi+m of the fictional mind that is ?ellsuited to capturin+ as much information as possile from fictional te9ts& !ictional -inds is an interdisciplinary proKect that is in a sense desi+nedto e a source oo. for non3specialists of some of the ideas aout the mind that are current in the various real3mind discourses& Ho?ever, it is

?orth pointin+ out ri+ht from the start that a +ood deal of humility is re=uired ?hen theoriAin+ aout the mind& The relationship et?een.no?led+e and its representation in the rain ?as characteriAed y the psycholo+ist @illiam Eames (rother of the novelist Henry Eames) in 1"50as “the most mysterious thin+ in the ?orld” (15"1, !1%)& /nd for every mystery that has een dispelled since Eames>s time, three more seem toarise to ta.e its place&

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Lne particular aspect of my approach is ?orth emphasiAin+ here& The entry y Col?yn Trevarthen in he -assachusetts 0nstitute of echnolo#y

(ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences (1555) (from no? on referred to as -0(CS ) on the topic of intersuKectivity descries t?o different perspectives on the mind the sub1ective first and the intersub1ective first &

The @estern philosophical tradition (as e9emplified y *enO 4escartes and 8mmanuel Dant) +enerally assumes that human minds are inherentlyseparate in their purposes and e9periences, see.in+ rational clarity, autonomous s.ills, and self3etterment&&&& PeopleQ construct an a?areness ofthe self in society ut remain sin+le suKectivities&&&& @e ?ill call this vie? of intelli+ent and civiliAed cooperation as an artificial ac=uisitionthe &&& “suKective first” position&&&&

/ different conception of human consciousness &&& perceives interpersonal a?areness, cooperative action in society, and cultural learnin+ asmanifestations of innate motives for sympathy in purposes, interests, and feelin+s#that is, that a human mind is e=uipped ?ith needs fordialo+ue andQ intermental en+a+ement ?ith other similar minds&&&& @e ?ill call this vie? of ho? human cooperation arises the &&& “intersuKectivefirst” position& (1555, $1;)

Mine is very much an intersuKective first approach to fictional minds, ut not ecause 8 deny the importance of the suKective first approach& 8t isimportant to stress that oth perspectives are e=ually valid, informative, and, indeed, necessary& The reason ?hy this study favors theintersuKective first approach is that the suKective first position has ecome the dominant paradi+m for the study of consciousness ?ithinnarrative theory, and the ias contained in this oo. is intended to redress the alance a little& For a contrastin+ and very suKective first approach



to the relationship et?een the novel, narrative theory, and co+nitive science, see Consciousness and the Novel (!00!) y the narrative theoristand novelist 4avid 2od+e&

8t is proaly the case that anyone ?or.in+ in the field of narrative theory has a ?or.in+ definition of narrative that they may ma.e e9plicit or

that may remain implicit& To ma.e thin+s easier for you, 8 ?ill no? ma.e mine e9plicit& My thesis is a fundamental one narrative fiction is, inessence, the presentation of fictional mental functionin+& 8 state my thesis here in this ald, star. manner for purposes of clarity& The fullimplications of it ?ill emer+e later on& 8f 8 am ri+ht, then it follo?s that the study of the novel is the study of fictional mental functionin+ and alsothat the tas. of theorists is to ma.e e9plicit the various means y ?hich this phenomenon is studied and analyAed& This is another ?ay

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of ma.in+ the point made earlier that the study of fictional minds should e estalished as a clearly defined and discrete suKect area ?ithinliterary theory&

8 do not .no? ho? many narrative theorists ?ill a+ree or disa+ree ?ith my claim re+ardin+ the centrality of fictional minds to any informative

definition of fictionality, althou+h 8 refer to some potential s.epticism in the ne9t section& 8 hope that it ?ill stri.e some as oviously true, eventhou+h 8 am a?are that the ?orld is full of people ?ho have advanced theories that they thou+ht ?ere oviously true ut then found to theirastonishment that they ?ere itterly contested& ut, true or not, and ovious or not, 8 am not a?are that it has een e9plicitly formulated efore,?ith the possile e9ception of Moni.a Fluderni.>s emphasis on her notion of eperientiality in o,ards a Natural4 Narratolo#y (155%)& Mythesis has al?ays een implicit in discussions of fictionality, and should e made e9plicit& /s the narratolo+ist 4orrit Cohn points out, innarratolo+y, “as else?here, norms have a ?ay of remainin+ uninterestin+, often even invisile, until and unless ?e find that they have een ro.en#or ?ant to sho? that they have not een ro.en” (1555, $:)& The description of fictional mental functionin+ has een re+arded as anuninterestin+ and even invisile norm ?ithin narratolo+y, and it ?ould e of enefit to the discipline if it ?ere +iven the central place ?ithin theconceptual frame?or. of the suKect that it deserves&

ome scholars in other disciplines tend to re+ard literary theory as arid, ?illfully oscure, solipsistic, dreary, stultifyin+, and literature3hatin+&The list is discoura+in+ly lon+& @hether or not this vie? is true of literary theory +enerally, as a picture specifically of narrative theory, it iscompletely mis+uided& 8t ta.es no account of the very lar+e ody of thorou+h, illuminatin+, and e9citin+ ?or. that is simply the result ofsystematic and ri+orous analyses of narrative te9ts& Ho?ever, all literary theorists, includin+ narrative theorists, have a responsiility to reach outto the rest of the academic ?orld y ma.in+ literary theory as reader3friendly as possile& 2iterary theory should spea. to, and e shared ?ith,



other scholars& /lthou+h this study is aimed primarily at specialists in literary theory in +eneral and narrative theory in particular, it also tries to e +enuinely helpful to scholars in other fields, for e9ample, researchers into and teachers and students of Bn+lish and other literatures& 8 elievethat the interdisciplinary reconceptualiAation that is e9plored here ?ill e of real value not only to research in fields that involve the practicalcriticism of fictional te9ts ut also to the teachin+ of practical criticism& uch criticism depends on the aility to use the availale evidence to

pronounce ?ith confidence on characters> thou+ht processes& My ?or. is concerned ?ith e9aminin+ precisely ho? this aility is

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made possile& The sort of =uestionin+ that 8 have in mind could occur not only in courses on literary theory ut also ?ithin sessions of practicalcriticism& 8n this ?ay, 8 su++est, theory and practice could +enuinely interpenetrate and syner+istically enrich one another& 8 am a?are that thisapproach does not appear to fit easily ?ithin current literary3studies approaches, ut is it such a ad thin+ for a discipline to =uestion some of thefoundations on ?hich it is asedI urely literature studies ?ould +ain ne? insi+hts from a perspective that is oth radically innovative and alsodirectly relevant to all other perspectives on the novel&

8n 15"1, ?hen revie?in+ 4orrit Cohn>s rilliant ?or. on thou+ht representation ransparent -inds (15;"), the narratolo+ist rian McHale

commented that the “history of our poetics of prose is essentially a history of successive differentiations of types of discourse from theundifferentiated >loc.> of narrative prose&” He then added that “there is still a siAeale loc. of undifferentiated prose left” (15"1, 1"6)& 8n myvie?, no one has yet responded to McHale>s challen+e, and a +ood deal more ?or. is re=uired efore the “siAeale loc. of undifferentiated prose” that is related to characters> minds is reduced any further& /s far as 8 .no?, Cohn>s is still the only full3len+th study devoted solely to thistopic& /ll the other full3len+th studies of ?hich 8 am a?are refer to speech as ?ell as thou+ht or are concerned ?ith narratolo+y +enerally& 8t isno? a lon+ time since Cohn ?rote her pioneerin+ ?or. and since McHale ?rote his ?holly Kustified praise of it, and yet there has een nosuccessor in the sense that there has een no other oo. ?holly devoted to her suKect& Riven the ovious importance of this issue for any formalstudy of the novel, this seems e9traordinary& The purpose of !ictional -inds is to e+in the attempt to theoriAe a part of the loc. of prose thatremains undifferentiated the aspect of narrative fiction that is concerned ?ith the ?hole of the social mind in action&

This enterprise is intended to fit comfortaly ?ithin the perspective on narrative that is offered y the Frontiers of -arrative series& The editor ofthe series, the narrative theorist 4avid Herman, in advocatin+ an approach that he calls postclassical narratolo#y, contends that ?e have recently?itnessed “a small ut unmista.ale e9plosion of activity in the field of narrative studies si+ns of this minor narratolo+ical renaissance includethe pulication of a spate of articles, special issues, and oo.s that rethin. and reconte9tualiAe classical models for narratolo+ical research”



(1555a, 1)& He also remar.s that postclassical narratolo+y is “mar.ed y a profusion of ne? methodolo+ies and research hypotheses the result isa host of ne? perspectives on the forms and functions of narrative itself” (1555a, !#:)& The narratolo+ist Rerald Prince a+rees ?ith Herman that

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“the very domain of narratolo+y is (and has een) in flu9” and “the discipline .eeps on chan+in+ as its oundaries are (re)dra?n” (155%, 1%0)&Herman also ma.es the heady claim that recent ?or. in narrative theory has “displaced and transformed the assumptions, methods, and +oals ofstructuralist narratolo+y” (1555a, !) and that this research has “hi+hli+hted aspects of narrative discourse that classical narratolo+y either failedor chose not to e9plore” (1555a, !)& This is precisely ?hat !ictional -inds attempts to do& 8t does so y usin+ concepts and ideas dra?n from avariety of different disciplines ecause, as Herman says, postclassical narratolo+y is an “inherently interdisciplinary proKect” (1555a, !0)&

My ar+ument lays +reat stress on the need to e9amine ho? fictional minds ?or. ?ithin the conte9ts of the story?orlds to ?hich they elon+&Postclassical narratolo+y>s attempt to rea. free from the structuralist purity of classical narratolo+y is also concerned ?ith the =uestion ofconte9t& For e9ample, Rerald Prince, in considerin+ the role of +ender in narratolo+y, maintains that narrative poetics “ou+ht to e more sensitiveto the role of conte9t & & & in the production of narrative meanin+” (155%, 1%:)& Prince has in mind the various real3?orld, sociocultural conte9ts in

?hich narratives are produced& Ho?ever, 8 ?ill use the notion of conte9t in a more narro? sense to focus on oth the conte9t of the ?holefictional mind durin+ the analysis of a particular part of that mind and also on the social and physical conte9t of the story?orld ?ithin ?hich thatmind functions&

The follo?in+ passa+e illustrates the .ind of fictional mental functionin+ that 8 am interested in& 8n it a policeman is confrontin+ a suspect

runetti ?atched as Murino asored this information, then ?aited as the other man e+an to consider ?hat his visile response should e& /ll ofthis too. only seconds, ut runetti had een oservin+ the process for decades and ?as familiar ?ith it& The people to ?hom he presentedhimself had a dra?er of responses ?hich they thou+ht appropriate, and part of his Ko ?as to ?atch them as they sifted throu+h them one at atime, see.in+ the ri+ht fit& urpriseI FearI 8nnocenceI CuriosityI He ?atched Murino flip throu+h them, studied his face as he considered, thendiscarded various possiilities& He decided, apparently, on the last&

“JesI /nd ?hat ?ould you li.e to .no?, CommissarioI” (2eon 155%, 155)



/t this point, 8 ?ill simply say that, for the reasons set out in chapters ! and :, current narratolo+ical approaches do not do a +reat deal to rin+out the full si+nificance of this passa+e& 8 ?ill refer to it a+ain at the end of chapter ;, y ?hich time 8 hope that, ?hen you read it there in theli+ht of chapters $

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to ;, much more of its si+nificance ?ill have een revealed& Lf course, there is nothin+ to stop you +oin+ strai+ht there no? e9cept possily thefeelin+ that you mi+ht have missed some interestin+ stuff alon+ the ?ay

2. Summary

This summary of the ar+ument of the oo. is placed here to assist readers ?ho ?ish to read the rest of the oo. and ?ho ?ill find it helpful to seefrom the e+innin+ the purpose of the theoretical +round?or. that is laid in later chapters, readers ?ho are not yet sure ?hether or not they ?ishto read the rest of the oo. and may find a summary of the ar+ument helpful in decidin+, and readers ?ho are sure that they ?ill not read the restof the oo. ut ?ho ?ill ?ant to .no? ?hat they are missin+&

@hat do ?e mean ?hen ?e tal. aout the presentation of consciousness in fictionI 8t is clear ?hat 4orrit Cohn has in mind ?hen she refers toher “predilection for novels ?ith thou+htful characters and scenes of self3communion” (15;", v) and her interest in “moments of lonely self3communion minutely tracin+ spiritual and emotional conflicts” (1555, "$)& /nd, as 8 ?ill su++est in chapter :, her li.in+ for private and heavilyintrospective thin.in+ is shared y other narrative theorists& elf3communin+s lend themselves to the hi+hly veraliAed, self3conscious form ofthou+ht that is .no?n as inner speech, and the theoretical predilection for fictional introspection is accompanied y a decided preference for thisform of thou+ht& /s the eminent narratolo+ist Rerard Renette has ar+ued in Narrative Discourse (15"0), the “novelistic convention, perhapstruthful in this case, is that thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech, e9cept ?hen the narrator underta.es to condense them into eventsand to relate them as such” (15"0, 1;1)& B9amples of self3communin+ characters ?ho are popular ?ith narrative theorists include 4orothearoo.e in Reor+e Bliot>s -iddlemarch 8soel /rcher in Henry Eames>s Portrait of a "ady tephen 4edalus, 2eopold loom, and Molly loomin Eames Eoyce>s 5lysses and Mrs& *amsay in Gir+inia @oolf >s To the 2i+hthouse&

This emphasis on the privacy of thou+ht e9plains ?hy it is customary in studies of this sort to refer to the asic reality of our lives that ?e do nothave direct access to the thou+hts of others& *& 4& 2ain+ put the point memoraly “ your eperience of me is invisible to me and my eperience of

you is invisible to you& 8 cannot e9perience your e9perience& Jou cannot e9perience my e9perience& @e are oth invisile men& /ll men are



invisile to one another” (15%;, 1%, =uoted in 8ser 15;", 1%6)& 8n contrast, the vast maKority of novels present directly to readers their maincharacters> thou+hts, and ?e have learned to accept this as

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perfectly natural& Lne of the pleasures of readin+ novels is the enKoyment of ein+ told ?hat a variety of fictional people are thin.in+& /s Paolae9plains in the epi+raph for this chapter, ?e +et “reliale information&” This is a relief from the usiness of real life, much of ?hich re=uires theaility to decode accurately the ehavior of others& 8t is ?orth d?ellin+ on the stran+eness of this activity for a moment& 8n one sense to read “shefelt happy” is the most natural thin+ in the ?orld ?e .no? ?hat it is to feel happy& 8n another sense, it is the oddest ?e do not .no? and cannever .no? ?hat it is to e9perience directly ho? another person can feel happy& The literary critic Reor+es Poulet captures the peculiar =uality ofreadin+ aout the thou+hts of others in this ?ay “ecause of the stran+e invasion of my person y the thou+hts of another, 8 am a self ?ho is+ranted the e9perience of thin.in+ thou+hts forei+n to him& 8 am the suKect of thou+hts other than my o?n& My consciousness ehaves as thou+hit ?ere the consciousness of another” (15%5, 6%)&

ut ho? does this intensely private, individualistic vie? of the mind account for the follo?in+ scene in the sit3com FriendsI Lne friend, Phoee,

lets slip to another, *achel, that all the other friends thin. that she, *achel, is still in love ?ith *oss& *achel protests that this is not true and thatshe is over him, ut then eventually a+rees that yes, all ri+ht, she is still in love ?ith him& “ut ?hy didn>t you tell meI” *achel demands to.no?& “ecause ?e thou+ht you .ne?” e9claims Phoee& @hat this e9chan+e appears to sho? is that *achel>s feelin+s aout *oss ?ere moreaccessile to the other friends than they ?ere to her& They all .ne? that she ?as still in love ?ith *oss even thou+h she herself did not .no?& Lnthe other hand, ?e should not +o too far in this direction ecause the conversation also sho?s that the .no?led+e that people have of the innerstates of others can e patchy& *achel did not .no? that the other friends .ne?, and the others did not .no? that *achel did not .no? 8n a sense,the humor in this scene is a ne? ta.e on the familiar, clichOd old Ko.e aout the t?o psychiatrists (or the t?o ehaviorists, dependin+ on your preKudice) ?ho say to each other ?hen meetin+, “Jou>re fine, ho? am 8I” Ho?ever, the !riends scene is more interestin+, it seems to me, for t?oreasons it ac.no?led+es that all of us, not Kust specialists in the study of the mind, have some sort of access to the thin.in+ of others and it alsoac.no?led+es that thou+ht can e private and inaccessile as ?ell as pulic and shared&

o, ?hat ?ould happen to the narratolo+ical study of private and introspective fictional minds if ?e applied to it some of the various discourseson real mindsI @ell, the philosopher Rilert *yle su++ests that to “tal. of a person>s mind is &&& to tal. of the person>s ailities, liailities, andinclinations to do and



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under+o certain sorts of thin+s, and of the doin+ and under+oin+ of these thin+s in the ordinary ?orld” (15%:, 150)& This is an alternative picturethat consists of the social mind in action ?hile en+a+ed in purposive mental functionin+ in a physical conte9t& Lther disciplines share this vie? of

the mind& @ithin anthropolo+y, Clifford ReertA ar+ues that “thou+ht is consummately social social in its ori+ins, social in its functions, social inits forms, social in its applications& /t ase, thin.in+ is a pulic activity#its natural haitat is the houseyard, the mar.etplace, and the to?ns=uare” (155:, :%0)& /nother anthropolo+ist, Rre+ory ateson, discusses the e9tent of the individual mind in these vivid terms “uppose 8 am a lind man, and 8 use a stic.& 8 +o tap, tap, tap& @here do 0 startI 8s my mental system ounded at the handle of the stic.I 8s it ounded y mys.inI 4oes it start half?ay up the stic.I 4oes it start at the tip of the stic.I ut these are nonsense =uestions& The stic. is a path?ay alon+ ?hichtransforms of difference are ein+ transmitted& The ?ay to delineate the system is to dra? the limitin+ line in such a ?ay that you do not cut anyof these path?ays in ?ays ?hich leave thin+s ine9plicale” (15;!, $%6)& These vie?s lead the psycholin+uist Eames @ertsch to remar. in Goicesof the Mind that, “to orro? from theorists such as Rre+ory ateson & & & and Clifford ReertA &&& mind is vie?ed here as somethin+ that >e9tends eyond the s.in> ” (1551, 1$)&

This social perspective on ?hat mi+ht e termed the mind eyond the s.in sho?s that the stran+eness of the device of direct access should not

allo? us to for+et that the reader>s e9perience of the minds of characters in novels does not depend solely on that device& Eust as in real life theindividual constructs the minds of others from their ehavior and speech, so the reader infers the ?or.in+s of fictional minds and sees theseminds in action from oservation of characters> ehavior and speech& 8n one sense, as 2ain+ says, ?e are invisile to each other& ut in anothersense the ?or.in+s of our minds are perfectly visile to others in our actions, and the ?or.in+s of fictional minds are perfectly visile to readersfrom characters> actions& Most novels contain a ?ide variety of evidence on ?hich readers ase their conKectures, hypotheses, and opinions aoutfictional minds&

This study su++ests that narrative theory has een concerned for too lon+ primarily ?ith the privacy of consciousness and that an emphasis on thesocial nature of thou+ht mi+ht form an informative and su++estive perspective on fictional minds& *educed to the very minimum, a character issimply a collection of the ?ords that relate to a particular proper name occurrin+ at intervals ?ithin the lon+ series of ?ords that ma.es up anarrative& The perspective that 8 am advocatin+ mi+ht help provide the e+innin+ of an ans?er to =uestions

3113



li.e these Ho? precisely do these +roups of ?ords ecome the reco+niAale fictional minds that are clearly contained in fictional te9tsI -arratives are aout the minds of characters, ut ho? are these minds constructed y the narrator and the reader of the te9tI Lviously these arehu+e =uestions that a sin+le study of this sort cannot hope to ans?er& 8nstead, 8 ?ill focus in particular on some of the areas of fictional mentalfunctionin+ that have not een e9plored ?ithin narratolo+y& 8n doin+ so, 8 ?ill ?or. ?ithin the possile3?orlds frame?or. that is e9plained in

chapter !, section !& / leadin+ possile3?orlds theorist, 2uomSr 4oleel, asserts that from “the vie?point of the reader, the fictional te9t can echaracteriAed as a set of instructions accordin+ to ?hich the fictional ?orld is to e recovered and reassemled” (15"", $"5)& My ar+ument is that?e need to loo. more closely at the sets of instructions that relate to mental functionin+ in fictional te9ts&

!ictional -inds ar+ues that the constructions of the minds of fictional characters y narrators and readers are central to our understandin+ of ho?novels ?or. ecause, in essence, narrative is the description of fictional mental functionin+& Ho?ever, narratolo+y has ne+lected the ?hole mindsof fictional characters in action& /t first si+ht, this may seem to e an implausile claim& urely characters> minds are considered ?ithin a numerof the suKect areas that ma.e up narrative theoryI For e9ample the study of ho? narrators +ive readers direct access to characters> thou+hts (thespeech cate+ory approach) the analysis of the structure of narrative stories in ?hich characters are considered as units or functions ?ithin thestructure the concept of focaliAation or point of vie? and the issue of characteriAation, or ho? narrators and readers use the various sorts of.no?led+e of character types that are +ained from real life and other novels in order to uild a sense of a character>s personality& My ans?er is

that these perspectives do not add up to a complete and coherent study of all aspects of the minds of characters in novels& @hat is re=uired is aholistic vie? of the ?hole of the social mind in action that avoids the fra+mentation of the approaches listed earlier& 8t is a functional andteleolo+ical perspective that considers the purposive nature of characters> thou+ht in terms of their motives, intentions, and resultin+ ehavior andaction& This ?ill involve some provisional and tentative typolo+y, ut as rian McHale oserves, “?e should not underestimate the usefulness of>mere> typolo+y& efore a phenomenon can e e9plained it must first e9ist for those ?ho ?ould e9plain it, ?hich means that it must e constitutedas a cate+ory ?ith oundaries and a name” (15"1, 1"6)& This discussion ?ill ta.e us a lon+ ?ay from analyses of lonely introspectiveselfcommunin+s in terms of the speech cate+ories& ut this is Kust as ?ell perhaps, as

31!3

the characters in a lar+e numer of novels are not +iven to intense introspection, and the narrators of many novels ma.e little use of the speechcate+ories of free indirect thou+ht or direct thou+ht that are descried later&The si9 chapters that are sand?iched et?een this introductorychapter and the concludin+ one can e +rouped into three pairs& Chapters ! and : are concerned ?ith e9istin+ narratolo+ical approaches to?ardfictional minds, chapters $ and 6 consider the implications of real3mind discourses for fictional minds and lay the theoretical asis for a ne?approach to?ard this area of narrative theory, and chapters % and ; e9plore the ne? approach in various specific directions&8n chapter !, “ome



-arratolo+ical /pproaches, ” 8 ?ill refer to a fe? of the ?ays in ?hich some narratolo+ical suKect areas can e rou+ht to+ether ?ithin a ne?theoretical perspective and therey contriute to?ard a coherent study of fictional minds& 8n chapter :, “The peech Cate+ories, ” 8 ?ill considerin a little more detail the prolems inherent in one particular area that 8 have referred to several times already the speech cate+ory approachto?ard fictional consciousness& 8 use the term speech cate+ory approach ecause the narratolo+ical analysis of characters> thou+ht processes is

ased on the assumption that the cate+ories that are applied to fictional speech can e unprolematically applied to fictional thou+ht& The maincate+ories, ?hich are e9plained in more detail in chapter :, section 1, are theseU direct thou#ht The train pulled a?ay& He thou+ht, “@hy the hell am 8 still ?aitin+ for herI” (@hen unta++ed and ?ithout =uotes, this is

free direct thou#ht &)U thou#ht report The train pulled a?ay& He ?ondered ?hy he ?as still ?aitin+ for her&U free indirect thou#ht The train pulled a?ay& @hy the hell ?as he still ?aitin+ for herI

This approach does not +ive an ade=uate account of the form or the function of presentations y narrators to readers of fictional characters>minds& 8n summary, the follo?in+ prolems occur 8t privile+es the apparently mimetic cate+ories of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht overthe die+etic cate+ory of thou+ht report vie?s characters> minds as consistin+ primarily of a private, passive flo? of consciousness ecause of itsoverestimation of the importance of inner speech and ne+lects the thou+ht report of such states of mind as emotions, sensations, dispositions,

eliefs, attitudes, intentions, motives, and reasons for action& 8 devote a separate chapter to these prolems ecause the

31:3

speech cate+ory approach has ecome the dominant theoretical discourse on fictional consciousness and, therefore, it has to e addressed efore 8+o on to uild up ?hat 8 hope is a richer and more informative discourse on the ?hole of fictional minds ecause its shortcomin+s form anilluminatin+ conte9t ?ithin ?hich the enefits of the ne? perspective ?ill ecome clear and ecause the +rip of the verbal norm (that is, the preoccupation ?ith inner speech) is stron+ and has to e loosened efore the ne? perspective is fully understood&

The re=uired reconceptualiAation of fictional minds ecomes an interdisciplinary proKect in chapter $ ecause it ma.es use of ?hat 8 shall call the parallel discourses on real minds, such as co+nitive science, psycholin+uistics, psycholo+y, and the philosophy of mind, in order to study ?hat 8shall variously call the ,hole mind , the social mind , and the mind in action& *eal3mind discourses are invaluale here ecause they can e used to provide e9planations that are fuller than those that are currently availale ?ithin narrative theory as to ho? the reader can recuperate meanin+from fictional te9ts& They are parallel discourses ecause they contain a very different .ind of picture of consciousness from that provided ynarrative theory, and as far as 8 .no?, the t?o pictures have not yet een rou+ht to+ether in =uite the ?ay in ?hich they are here& For e9ample,



in chapter $, “The @hole Mind, ” 8 attempt to enlar+e our picture of the ?hole fictional mind in a numer of the different directions that aresu++ested y real3mind discourses& These include the functionalist approach of co+nitive scientists to?ard human mental functionin+ (that is,studyin+ ?hat thin.in+ is for) ho? the vie?s of psycholo+ists and philosophers vary on the e9tent of the relationship et?een lan+ua+e andthou+ht the importance not only of non3veral conscious events ut also of entirely non3conscious mental states the pivotal role of dispositions

in any picture of the ?hole mind the role of emotions in mental life and in particular their relationship ?ith co+nition the lessons to e learnedfrom the philosophy of action ?hen considerin+ the relationship et?een thou+ht and ehavior and, finally, first3person ascription and in particular the unreliaility of many self3ascriptions of motives and intentions& (*ememer the !riends scene that ?as discussed earlierI)

8 move the ar+ument on in chapter 6, “The ocial Mind, ” y considerin+ the ?hole mind that is descried in chapter $ no? put in its socialconte9t& 8 start y e9aminin+ the considerale e9tent to ?hich our thou+ht is pulic and social in nature& 8 then pic. up the discussion aoutunreliale first3person ascription at the end of chapter $ and contrast it ?ith the reliaility of a +ood deal of third3person ascription (the !riends

scene a+ain)& /fter a rief section on the ?or. of *ussian psycholin+uists on the development of purposive thou+ht, 8

31$3

continue ?ith the *ussian tradition y focusin+ on the insi+hts of the +reat discourse theorist Mi.hail a.htin on the dialo+icality of thou+ht&Finally, in a section entitled “The Mind eyond the .in, ” 8 e9plore the fascinatin+ issue of the socially situated or distriuted nature of much ofour co+nition, action, and even identity&

The purpose of chapter %, “The Fictional Mind, ” is to relate this ?or. more specifically to the fictional mind& 8 e+in y uildin+ on thediscussion in chapter !, section $ of co+nitive frames and narrative comprehension y applyin+ these issues in more detail to mental action innovels& 8 ar+ue that one of the .ey frames for comprehendin+ te9ts is ?hat 8 refer to as the continuin#$consciousness frame& 8n other ?ords,readers create a continuin+ consciousness out of the isolated passa+es of te9t that relate to a particular character& 8n this ?ay, ?e assemle ?hat 8call an embedded narrative the ?hole of a character>s various perceptual and conceptual vie?points, ideolo+ical ?orldvie?s, and plans for thefuture considered as an individual narrative that is emedded in the ?hole fictional te9t& 8n usin+ this term 8 am follo?in+ the narratolo+istMarie32aure *yan, ?ho introduces it in an article entitled “Bmedded -arratives and Tellaility” (15"%) and later in her oo., Possile @orlds,/rtificial 8ntelli+ence, and -arrative Theory (1551)& 8 then relate the emedded narrative notion to the concept of teleolo+y, or the investi+ationof narrative in terms of its final purpose or endin+& Finally, the various ideas introduced in this chapter are considered in the conte9t of theaspectual nature of the story?orld, ?hich is only ever vie?ed under particular aspects or from individual and therefore limited points of vie?&



8n chapter ;, “The Fictional Mind in /ction, ” 8 e9plore some of the specific implications of the +eneral ideas that ?ere introduced in the previous chapter& sin+ a numer of e9amples from a specific te9t, Bvelyn @au+h>s +ile 6odies, 8 consider some of the suframes of thecontinuin+3consciousness frame& Lne suframe concerns the relationships et?een fictional thou+ht and fictional action and ho? theserelationships are presented in fictional discourse& 8n particular, the term the thou#ht$action continuum is introduced to dra? attention to the fact

that the distinction et?een thou+ht and action in fictional te9ts is not as clear3cut as narrative theorists have assumed& 4ra?in+ on the ?or. inchapter 6 on the social mind, 8 +o on to discuss another suframe the prevalence in novels of ?hat psycholo+ists call intermental thou#ht , orshared, +roup, or Koint thin.in+& 8n order to consider the third suframe, 8 introduce the term doubly embedded narratives in order to convey theidea that versions of characters e9ist ?ithin the minds of other characters and that the relationships et?een these versions determine to a +reate9tent the teleolo+y of the plot& To finish the oo.,

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8 devote the last chapter, “Further /pplications, ” to some tentative su++estions for further historical applications of the ideas summariAed earlier&

8n summary, !ictional -inds descries a theoretical frame?or. that considers the ?hole of a particular fictional mind, therey avoidin+ the

fra+mentation referred to earlier vie?s characters> minds, not Kust in terms of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirectthou+ht, ut in terms of the narrator>s positive lin.in+ role in presentin+ characters> social en+a+ed mental functionin+, particularly in the mode ofthou+ht report analyAes in functional and teleolo+ical terms the purposive nature of characters> thou+ht their motives, intentions, and theresultin+ ehavior and action hi+hli+hts the role of the reader in constructin+ characters> emedded narratives y means of a series of provisionalconKectures and hypotheses aout their mental functionin+ and sho?s ho? readers read plots as the interaction of those emedded narratives&

everal of the devices that are used in the constructions of fictional minds y narrators and readers, such as the role of thou+ht report indescriin+ emotions and the role of ehavior descriptions in conveyin+ motivation and intention, have yet to e defamiliariAed& /s He+el puts it,?hat is “ >familiarly .no?n> is not properly .no?n, Kust for the reason that it is >familiar> ” (15:1, 5!)& The narratolo+ist Manfred Eahn refers in adifferent conte9t to a “numer of interestin+ co+nitive mechanisms that have lar+ely remained hidden elo? oth the reader>s and thenarratolo+ist>s threshold of a?areness” (1555a, 1%")& 8n my vie?, this numer includes some of the mechanisms that produce the illusion offictional minds& Ho?ever, ?ithin the emedded narratives frame?or., these devices can e fully defamiliariAed and therey made more visile&

3. Some Definitions and Assumptions



Narratolo#y and narrative theory& 8 ?ill use these terms interchan+ealy& ome theorists distin+uish et?een them y reservin+ the former termfor the type of thin.in+ aout narrative that arose from the structuralist movement of the 15%0s, 15;0s, and eyond and y usin+ the latter term ina much roader sense to cover all theoretical ?ritin+ on the nature of narrative& Ho?ever, althou+h this distinction may seem attractive in theory,8 thin. that it ?ould e difficult to maintain in practice&

he narrator and the implied author & 8 ?ill use the term narrator to descrie the a+ency responsile for the ?ords on the pa+es of fictional te9ts&8 shall not refer to the actual author, ecause 8 am studyin+ only the fictional te9ts themselves and not their historical circumstances& The otherterm that is used in this conte9t, implied author , ?as made famous y the literary critic

31%3

@ayne C& ooth in he /hetoric of !iction (ori+inally pulished in 15%1) and further developed y a numer of narratolo+ists since& The term isdefined in Rerald Prince>s Dictionary of Narratolo#y (15";) as “the implicit ima+e of an author in the te9t, ta.en to e standin+ ehind the scenesand to e responsile for its desi+n and for the values and cultural norms it adheres to” (15";, $!)& Prince e9plains that the narrator must edistin+uished from the implied author& The former recounts the situations and events and is inscried in the te9t as a teller the latter is ta.en to e

accountale for the selection, distriution, and comination of the events and is inferred from the te9t& ut, Prince concedes, ?hile the distinctionis clear in the case of first3person narrators, it can e prolematical in other cases (15";, $!#$:)& The concept of the implied author is a validand informative ?ay to refer to responsiility for the values and cultural norms that can plausily e inferred from a te9t, suKect to the caveatthat different readers may infer different implied authors from the same te9t& Ho?ever, durin+ the discussions of a ?ide variety of novels that arecontained in the follo?in+ chapters, 8 have not found it possile to maintain a coherent distinction et?een the a+ency that is responsile forselectin+ and or+aniAin+ the events (as Prince descries the role of the implied author), and the voice that recounts them (the narrator)& Fore9ample, ?hich one decides that direct access is +iven to the thou+hts of one character and not anotherI @hich one decides on the len+th ande9tent of access or ?hether it is +iven in direct or free indirect thou+ht or in thou+ht reportI @hich one decides on the precise de+ree to ?hichthe lan+ua+e used in the discourse e9plicitly or implicitly conveys the motivation of a particular characterI ecause 8 have not een ale toans?er these =uestions, 8 ?ill refer only to the narrator&

Non$narrated narration& ome narratolo+ists elieve that it is possile for narration to occur ?ithout a narrator& For e9ample, in he !ictions of

"an#ua#e and the "an#ua#es of !iction (155:), Moni.a Fluderni. asserts that “there can be narration ?ithout a narrator& That is to say, in pure

reflector mode narrative there cannot e any indication of a narrative voice” (155:, $$:)& (The term reflector mode descries a novel such asHenry Eames>s he Ambassadors in ?hich the action is reflected throu+h the consciousness of a reflector character &) Ho?ever, other



narratolo+ists are e=ually insistent that all narratives must necessarily have a narrator& For the narratolo+ist Mie.e al, as she e9plains in Narratolo#y (155;), the statement “BliAaeth felt some?hat tired that day” should e read as “8 narrate &&& >BliAaeth felt some?hat tired thatday>” (155;, !6)& There is a very comple9 and technical deate ehind these t?o positions, and it ?ould ta.e me a lon+ ?ay out of my ?ay to Kustify my elief that reflector novels such

31;3

as he Ambassadors contain plenty of evidence of the presence of a narrator& For this reason, 8 ?ill simply say that one of the assumptions ehindthis oo. is that al is correct to say that all narrative has a narrator& (For more on this issue, see the hi+hly illuminatin+ discussion in *ichard/cAel>s article, “Hearin+ Goices in -arrative Te9ts” 155"Q&)

he reader & 8 refer fre=uently throu+hout this oo. to the reader& Here 8 mean ?hat is meant y the term implied reader the theoretical constructof the ideal, informed, or model reader that is implied y or can e constructed from the te9t& -evertheless, 8 hope that my +eneraliAations arealso true to a fairly lar+e e9tent of the psycholo+ical activities of real readers& /fter all, it is necessary to presuppose a hi+h de+ree of correlation et?een implied and real readers in order to e9plain the incontrovertile fact that most fictional te9ts are readily understood y real readers&

Ho?ever, 8 have to o?n up to the fact that 8 have done no empirical research at all on ho? real readers read&

Story and discourse& This is a standard narratolo+ical distinction& /s defined y Prince, the story is the content plane of narrative, the ?hat of anarrative, the narrated (15";, 51)& The discourse is the e9pression plane of narrative, the ho? of a narrative, the narratin+ (15";, !1)& The t?oelements are often referred to in *ussian formalist terms as the faula and the sKuAhet& There are also many other names for this pair of concepts, ut as some terms are used y different people to si+nify oth sides of the dichotomy, 8 ?ill not confuse you y listin+ them here& 8t is a prolematical distinction& Many theorists have pointed out that any attempt to tell the story simply results in another discourse& 8t is never possile to arrive at a pure unmediated story, and each reader>s story ?ill e sutly different from every other reader>s& 8n some cases, say (mma,the differences mi+ht focus on the personality of the heroine& 8n other cases such as Henry Eames>s he urn of the Scre,, readers mi+ht differ=uite sustantially over ?hat events too. place in the story& /lso, the literary critic Eonathan Culler (15"0) ma.es the important point thatultimately the t?o concepts are entirely incompatile planes of e9planation& “Bmma marries Dni+htley ecause she falls in love ?ith him” is astory e9planation “Bmma marries Dni+htley ecause that is the endin+ that rin+s to a satisfactory conclusion the various themes and meanin+sof the novel” is a discourse e9planation and these t?o e9planations cannot e reconciled& Finally, 8 have found that it can often e difficult todecide ?hether an issue such as the motivation for an action elon+s to the story plane or the discourse plane& -evertheless, the distinction



et?een the events and situations in the story and the presentations of them in the ?ords on the pa+es of the fictional te9t is a valuale one& omenarratolo+ists use models that

31"3

as he Ambassadors contain plenty of evidence of the presence of a narrator& For this reason, 8 ?ill simply say that one of the assumptions ehindthis oo. is that al is correct to say that all narrative has a narrator& (For more on this issue, see the hi+hly illuminatin+ discussion in *ichard/cAel>s article, “Hearin+ Goices in -arrative Te9ts” 155"Q&)

he reader & 8 refer fre=uently throu+hout this oo. to the reader& Here 8 mean ?hat is meant y the term implied reader the theoretical constructof the ideal, informed, or model reader that is implied y or can e constructed from the te9t& -evertheless, 8 hope that my +eneraliAations arealso true to a fairly lar+e e9tent of the psycholo+ical activities of real readers& /fter all, it is necessary to presuppose a hi+h de+ree of correlation et?een implied and real readers in order to e9plain the incontrovertile fact that most fictional te9ts are readily understood y real readers&Ho?ever, 8 have to o?n up to the fact that 8 have done no empirical research at all on ho? real readers read&

Story and discourse& This is a standard narratolo+ical distinction& /s defined y Prince, the story is the content plane of narrative, the ?hat of anarrative, the narrated (15";, 51)& The discourse is the e9pression plane of narrative, the ho? of a narrative, the narratin+ (15";, !1)& The t?oelements are often referred to in *ussian formalist terms as the faula and the sKuAhet& There are also many other names for this pair of concepts, ut as some terms are used y different people to si+nify oth sides of the dichotomy, 8 ?ill not confuse you y listin+ them here& 8t is a prolematical distinction& Many theorists have pointed out that any attempt to tell the story simply results in another discourse& 8t is never possile to arrive at a pure unmediated story, and each reader>s story ?ill e sutly different from every other reader>s& 8n some cases, say (mma,the differences mi+ht focus on the personality of the heroine& 8n other cases such as Henry Eames>s he urn of the Scre,, readers mi+ht differ=uite sustantially over ?hat events too. place in the story& /lso, the literary critic Eonathan Culler (15"0) ma.es the important point thatultimately the t?o concepts are entirely incompatile planes of e9planation& “Bmma marries Dni+htley ecause she falls in love ?ith him” is astory e9planation “Bmma marries Dni+htley ecause that is the endin+ that rin+s to a satisfactory conclusion the various themes and meanin+sof the novel” is a discourse e9planation and these t?o e9planations cannot e reconciled& Finally, 8 have found that it can often e difficult todecide ?hether an issue such as the motivation for an action elon+s to the story plane or the discourse plane& -evertheless, the distinction et?een the events and situations in the story and the presentations of them in the ?ords on the pa+es of the fictional te9t is a valuale one& omenarratolo+ists use models that



come ?ith a particular mood, tone, or color& For e9ample, earle refers to the “pleasure7unpleasure dimension” to all consciousness (155!, 1$1)&4amasio stresses the “continuity of the melodic line of ac.+round emotion” (!000, 5:)& 8 am sure that an investi+ation of these variousrelationships ?ill illuminate a +ood deal of fictional thou+ht&

(mbedded narratives& /s e9plained in the previous section, a central concept in this oo. is one that 8 lael embedded narratives, the use of?hich has the undeniale dra?ac. that many theorists attach a completely different meanin+ to the term& 8ts more familiar meanin+ is a self3contained narrative that is emedded ?ithin a so3called frame narrative& For e9ample, in he Arabian Ni#hts, the stories that heheraAade tellsher husand every ni+ht are emedded ?ithin the frame narrative of her attempts to delay her threatened e9ecution& The creation of an additionaluse is re+rettale ut, on alance, Kustified ecause the term vividly illustrates a numer of the important features of fictional minds to ?hich 8?ish to dra? attention&

Mimesis and die+esis& These t?o terms are staples of literary theory, ut unfortunately oth contain a ?ide variety of meanin+s& Prince>sdictionary reflects some of the drift in use& His lon+ entry for the term mimesis (15";, 6!#6:) contains, in summary, these three meanin+ssho?in+ (as opposed to tellin+), ?hich is defined else?here in his oo. as “a mode characteriAed y the detailed, scenic renderin+ of situationsand events and y minimal narratorial mediation” (15";, ";) the direct speech of a character and an accurate representation of life& Lne prolem

is that these completely separate meanin+s# to+ether ?ith several others, identified, for e9ample, y the narratolo+ist Meir terner+ (15"!)# are often confused ?ith each other& /nother prolem is that the partner term, die#esis, is sometimes used in opposition to mimesis and sometimesused in completely separate senses& /ccordin+ to Prince (15";, !0), die+esis has t?o meanin+s tellin# (as opposed to sho?in+), ?hich is definedas “a mode characteriAed y more narratorial mediation and y a less detailed renderin+ of situations and events than sho?in+” (15";, 5%), andthe story?orld in ?hich the narrated situations and events occur& Lviously, the first meanin+ for die+esis is used in opposition to mimesis utthe second is not& / further complication is that some definitions of mimesis, Moshe *on>s, for e9ample (15"1, 1") and Fluderni.>s (155:, $65,$%:), have inflated its meanin+ so far that it completely encompasses the notion of die+esis& For these reasons, it seems to me that the t?o termsare eyond precise definition& 8 ?ill use them only ?hen other theorists commonly do& For e9ample, narratolo+ists re+ularly refer

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to direct thou+ht as the most mimetic mode of thou+ht presentation, and thou+ht report as the most die+etic&



4. What the Book s !ot

Lccasionally you read oo. revie?s in ?hich the chief criticism is that the ?ron+ oo. ?as ?ritten& @hy oh ?hy did the author not see that ?hatthe ?orld really needs is a completely different study ?ith, possily, Kust the ori+inal title survivin+I Typically, these revie?s, follo?in+ faint

praise for the oo. for ein+ so short, contain a lon+ list of additional topics that if included ?ould have tripled its siAe& *eaders of these revie?soften sense that the list is in effect the oo. that the revie?er ?ould have li.ed to have ?ritten, had he or she thou+ht of it or had the time to do it&The follo?in+ section is intended to assist such a revie?er y providin+ a chec.list of the topics that comprise the oo. that this is not & Thischec.list is particularly necessary as the title !ictional -inds is so +eneral that it can e e9plored in a ?ide variety of very different directions&

Fiction and non3fiction& 8 ?ill not e addressin+ the various issues relatin+ to the definitions of and the oundaries et?een such cate+ories asnarrative, fiction, non3fiction, history, and the novel& /nyone interested in this fascinatin+ topic should consult such authorities on narrativetheory as Hayden @hite (15;", 15";), Michael McDeon (15";, !000), Marie32aure *yan (155;), and 4orrit Cohn (1555)& 8 have simply ta.en asa +iven the e9istence of a numer of te9ts that are +enerally accepted as novels and have tried to see ho? they ?or.&

"iterary criticism& 2iterary critics are concerned ?ith the ?ide variety of strate+ies that are used y novelists to +ive meanin+ and form to the

narrative, such as the use of symolic structures of motifs, metaphors, metonymies, and so on& They then fre=uently relate these symolicstructures to the historical circumstances of the novels that they are analyAin+& / study of the relationship et?een these issues and the suKect ofthis study ?ould focus on the means y ?hich narrators construct characters> emedded narratives and, therefore, in a++re+ate, the plot, in orderto achieve these effects& 8t is my intention to theoriAe an aspect of the process of readin+ and not the end product& The emedded narrativeapproach is primarily an attempt to e9plore fully the ?or.in+s of dense and comple9 fictional te9ts& This is the process& The end products are thevarious purposes to ?hich these e9plorations mi+ht e put&

he historicized approach& 8 ?ill not address the issue of ho? presentations of fictional minds have developed and chan+ed over time& Ho?ever,chapter " ma.es some su++estions aout ho? it ?ill e possile to historiciAe

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the ne? approach& For e9ample, put simply, the device of direct presentations of characters> minds ?as the suKect of a fierce deate in themiddle to late ei+hteenth century, ecame naturaliAed in the early to middle nineteenth century, ?as prolematiAed to?ard the end of thenineteenth century, and ecame the suKect of various sorts of e9periments in the t?entieth century& Ho?ever, the purpose of the present study is



discourses are to e re+arded as the norm from ?hich fictional3mind discourses may or may not deviate& My ?ay of ?or.in+ is the other ?ayround as far as fictional minds are concerned, 8 re+ard fictional discourses as the norm, and 8 then investi+ate ?hether or not the use of real3minddiscourses can illuminate our study of them& 8n my vie? real3mind discourses assist the study of such non3realist te9ts as the postmodernist noveland fantasy fiction Kust as much as the realist novel& 8t may appear that 8 am predisposed to realist fiction ecause, as it happens, most of my

e9amples elon+ in that cate+ory& Ho?ever, this is not si+nificant as 8 am concentratin+ on canonical novels that Kust happen to e realist te9ts&ee the ne9t section for more on this point&

he unconscious& 8n chapter $, section $ 8 consider the non3conscious activities of the mind, ut 8 say very little there aout the unconscious, thecentral concept of Freudian psychoanalytical theory& This may seem surprisin+& Lne reason for the omission is that, as e9plained in the openin+section, 8 see this oo. as a counter?ei+ht to the current iases in narrative theory, and as psychoanalytical approaches are ?ell estalished?ithin the theory, there is no pressin+ need for further comment here& The other reason is that 8 am personally =uite s.eptical of Freudianism andhave al?ays found it puAAlin+ that a school of thou+ht could ecome so ?ell estalished on the asis of so little empirical evidence& Ho?ever, tohave ar+ued this vie?point ?ould have een a distraction from the main purpose of the oo., and so it seemed est simply to put the =uestion toone side&

Stream of consciousness and interior monolo#ue& 8 suppose these t?o terms mi+ht e the most surprisin+ omissions& Ho? can a oo. aoutconsciousness in fiction have so little to say aout themI The ans?er is simple li.e mimesis and die+esis, they are eyond precise definition&/lthou+h the t?o terms have different ori+ins, they have no? ecome ine9tricaly lin.ed& Stream of consciousness ?as first used in 1"50 y@illiam Eames in Principles of

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Psycholo#y& 8t is thou+ht that interior monolo#ue ?as proaly initially used to descrie 5lysses& 8nterestin+ly, althou+h the formal or theoreticaldefinitions for these terms vary ?idely, the ostensive or practical definitions are very precise& That is to say, apart from occasional references toearlier novelists (for e9ample, Bdouard 4uKardin), theorists define the t?o phrases in relation to the modernist novels of Eoyce, Gir+inia @oolf,@illiam Faul.ner, and 4orothy *ichardson& The e9amples used to illustrate the terms are invarialy ta.en from 5lysses or, less often, from

@oolf >s To the 2i+hthouse or Mrs& 4allo?ay&

ome of the theoretical definitions descrie the types of fictional thou+ht that occur in the minds of characters in the story& /lthou+h mostemphasiAe the random, associative, illo+ical, and seemin+ly un+rammatical free flo? of thou+ht, others mention more controlled and directed



thou+ht non3conscious, ut also conscious thou+ht veral, ut also non3veral thou+ht& ome specify co+nition only, ?hile others includevarious cominations of co+nition, perception, sensations, and emotions& Confusin+ly thou+h, other theoretical definitions refer to a completelyseparate issue the techni=ues of thou+ht and consciousness presentation in the discourse& Most of these definitions stress an apparentlyunmediated presentation in the mode of free direct thou+ht& Ho?ever, this can e misleadin+& Many illustrative passa+es contain a dense mi9ture,

often in e=ual proportions, of surface description of the physical story?orld to+ether ?ith all three modes of thou+ht presentation thou+ht report,free indirect thou+ht, and direct thou+ht& For e9ample “Made him feel a it pec.ish& thou+ht reportQ The coals ?ere reddenin+& surfacedescriptionQ /nother slice of read and utter three, four ri+ht& free direct thou+htQ he didn>t li.e her plate full free indirect thou+htQ” (Eoyce15"%, $6)&

To add to the confusion, there is no clear consensus on the relationship et?een the t?o terms& ome theorists use the terms interchan+ealy&Lthers re+ard one as a particular type or suset of the other& ome attach different and separate meanin+s to each& Perhaps the most commondistinction is this tream of consciousness descries the thou+ht itself and7or the presentation of thou+ht in the sort of third3person passa+e that 8have Kust =uoted and that is characteristic of @oolf and the early episodes in 5lysses& 8nterior monolo+ue descries the lon+ continuous first3 person passa+es or ?hole te9ts that contain uninterrupted, unmediated free direct thou+ht such as “Penelope” (Molly loom>s famous monolo+uein the last episode of 5lysses) or the first three sections of Faul.ner>s he Sound and the !ury& For e9ample “8 suppose she ?as pious ecause no

man ?ould loo. at her t?ice 8 hope 8ll never e li.e her a ?onder she didnt ?ant us to cover our faces” (Eoyce 15"%, %0")&

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ome ?riters, after commentin+ on the re+rettale confusion, +ive firm advice aout ho? the t?o terms should e used in the future& /s thesesu++estions invarialy +o unheeded, the advice that 8 ?ould other?ise have een tempted to +ive (do not use the t?o terms at all) ?ill not e+iven&

". A !ote on the #e$ts

/s my interest is solely in narrative fiction, all of my primary sources are novels& 8 ?ill not e considerin+ formal non3fiction narratives such as

histories, io+raphies, autoio+raphies, and memoirs, or informal or natural narratives such as spo.en life histories, testimonies, conversation,stories, and Ko.es& -arrative has ecome a very fashionale heuristic tool ?ithin such social sciences as sociolo+y, cultural studies, andanthropolo+y, and 8 ?ould e very e9cited if my conclusions ?ere of interest to scholars ?or.in+ in these fields, ut, as 8 say, my focus is onfiction&



8 have tried to ma.e use of a ?ide ran+e of canonical novels ?ritten in Bn+lish from /phra ehn to Thomas Pynchon& My claim, ri+ht or ?ron+,is that the aspect of the readin+ process ?ith ?hich 8 am concerned is fundamental to all narrative fiction& 8n tal.in+ aout narrative as thedescription of fictional mental functionin+, 8 may sound as thou+h 8 am tal.in+ aout the consciousness novel of Henry Eames or the stream ofconsciousness or interior monolo+ue novels descried earlier& ut nothin+ could e further from the truth& 8 am tal.in+ aout the novel as a ?hole

ecause all novels include a alance of ehavior description and internal analysis of characters> minds& 8n addition to the canon, 8 have made+ood use of thrillers& 8 read thrillers ecause 8 enKoy them& ut 8 find that 8 cannot follo? the plot of a thriller unless 8 have a fairly clearconception of the mental functionin+ of the main characters (?ho .no?s ?hat and ?ho is tryin+ to achieve ?hat at any +iven point in the story)&8t is this operation of attemptin+ to follo? the lines of their thin.in+ that enales me to follo? the lo+ic of their actions and, therefore, the t?istsand turns of the plot&

8n +eneral, 8 ?ill concentrate on third3person novels and ?ill pay much less attention to first3person novels& That is to say, my priority is theheterodie#etic narrator (one ?ho is not a character in the story ein+ narrated) and not the homodie#etic narrator (one ?ho is a character in thestory ein+ narrated)& There are various comple9ities inherent in this apparently simple distinction& 8t is ?ell .no?n that some heterodie+eticnarrators of third3person novels (the famous e9ample is Henry Fieldin+>s om 7ones) do not let the fact that they are not participants in thestory?orld inhiit them from ma.in+ lieral use of the “8” pronoun ?hen lettin+ us have their vie?s on a ?ide variety of

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suKects& Conversely, some homodie+etic narrators of first3person novels (such as /nthony Po?ell>s A Dance to the -usic of ime series) are sounotrusive that there is fre=uently very little use of the “8” pronoun for lon+ stretches of te9t& 8t is e=ually ?ell .no?n that there are al?ays t?ofirst persons in any homodie+etic narrative the one ?ho e9periences the events and the one ?ho later recounts them& The Pip ?ho is the narratorof Charles 4ic.ens>s 8reat (pectations is much older and ?iser than the Pip ?ho e9periences the events& Lther comple9ities include a first3 person narrator disappearin+ and ein+ replaced y a third3person narrator (as in Rustave Flauert>s -adame 6ovary)& /lthou+h, as 8 say, 8discuss very fe? first3person novels, 8 thin. that it is =uite li.ely that my approach ?ill prove to e as ?ell suited to them as to third3personnovels& 8n particular, the variety of evidence that is availale for the construction of character (action and ehavior as ?ell as direct access tothou+hts) ?ould e9plain ho? first3person narrators construct other characters& For e9ample, it ?ould sho? ho? oth the older and the youn+er

Pip differently construct the character of Eoe despite neither havin+ direct access to his thou+hts&

8n addition to the primary te9ts, a ?ord of e9planation is also re=uired for the secondary te9ts& There has een a truly vast amount of ?or. doneon real minds in such fields as co+nitive science, philosophy, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics& 8t ?ould not e possile for a sin+le ?or. to do



Kustice to it all& /ny selection of the vast source material availale in these fields is ound to e aritrary& / lar+e numer of oo.s could e?ritten on my suKect ?ithout any overlap at all in the choice of real3mind studies& Jou may finish this oo. sayin+, “@hy on earth didn>t hemention 9 or yI” (add name of philosopher, psycholo+ist, or co+nitive scientist of choice)& 8f you do, my initial position is that 8 am referrin+ toreal3mind discourses only in so far as they are ale to illuminate fictional minds and that the t?o phenomena, real minds and fictional minds, are

very different thin+s& My fall3ac. position is the 4r& Eohnson defense @hen as.ed y a ?oman of his ac=uaintance ?hy he had incorrectlydefined the ?ord pastern as the .nee of a horse, he replied “8+norance, madam, pure i+norance”

Finally, 8 should add that 8 have made e9tensive use of M8TBC, the encyclopedia of the co+nitive sciences that 8 referred to earlier& 8t is aninvaluale sourceoo., and 8 recommend it stron+ly#it is much less intimidatin+ than it sounds

Conclusion

8n 5nspea9able Sentences (15"!), the narrative theorist /nn anfield declares that “the lan+ua+e of narrative has the resources for a picture ofthe activities

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and states of the mind commensurate ?ith the most sophisticated theories of .no?led+e and consciousness” (15"!, !10)& 8 elieve that she isri+ht& Ho?ever, 8 also thin. that our theories aout the presentations of the pictures of the activities and states of the mind that are contained innarrative fiction need to ecome more sophisticated than at present if they are to reflect the richness and comple9ity of current theories of.no?led+e and consciousness&

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2

Some !arratological Approaches

Many of the prolems that are discussed in this oo. arise from the fact that narratolo+y has created clear oundaries et?een various aspects offictional minds, even thou+h the fictional te9ts themselves sho? that these oundaries are not clear at all& B9amples include those et?eenindividual minds and their conte9t, et?een thou+ht and action, and also, ?ithin minds, et?een different types of thou+ht& They have come



aout ecause different ranches of the discipline of narrative theory have developed in different directions& Clear oundaries and ri+oroustypolo+y are understandale and necessary, especially in the early sta+es of a discipline& Ho?ever, disciplines mature, and ?hen they do, theheuristic and peda+o+ic tools that have een historically useful have to e reconsidered and, if necessary, remolded& 8n the case of fictionalminds, the time has come for the map to e redra?n&

%. Story Analysis

There is a discourse ?ithin narrative theory that is concerned ?ith ?hat is variously called narrative +rammar, narrative structure, the analysis ofstory, the functional classification of action se=uences, and so on& 8 ?ill refer to this ranch of narrative theory as story analysis& 8t is associated?ith the *ussian theorist Gladimir Propp>s seminal study of *ussian fol. tales, -orpholo#y of the !ol9 ale: ?hich ?as ori+inally pulished in*ussia in 15!" and proved hi+hly influential on the ?or. of French hi+h structuralists such as Claude remond (15;:), /& E& Rreimas (15":), andTAvetan Todorov (15;;) ?hen it ?as elatedly discovered y them in the 15%0s and 15;0s& Propp>s purpose ?as to identify the commonelements in the narrative patterns contained in nearly t?o hundred *ussian fol. tales& The constant features ?ere astracted from the morecontin+ent aspects of the stories and ?ere descried as functions& / function is an “act of a character, defined from the point of vie? of itssi+nificance for the course of the action” (Propp 15%", !1)& Propp identified thirty3one such functions& They occur in various cominations in the

tales ut, interestin+ly, al?ays in e9actly the same

order& He also devised a model of the dramatis personae ?ho act in ?ays that emody these functions& 4urin+ the 15%0s and 15;0s, structuralisttheorists such as remond, Rreimas, and Todorov developed various models that closely follo?ed Propp in this respect and that ?ere ased onthe concept of an actant “/ fundamental role at the level of narrative deep structure” (Prince 15";, 1)& 8n essence, these models ?ere typolo+iesof the types of characters ?ho fulfill the various recurrin+ functions that are found in narrative& / typical model contains the follo?in+ si9actants suKect, oKect, sender, receiver, helper, and opponent& /s is clearly apparent, this sort of analysis, ?hich tries to identify features of allnarratives, is necessarily carried out at a very hi+h level of astraction&

efore attemptin+ to place this suKect area ?ithin my ar+ument, 8 ?ould li.e to ma.e a +eneral point in passin+ Propp analyAed some fol. tales&He did not analyAe all types of fol. tales he did not analyAe other sorts of *ussian narratives he did not analyAe narratives from other national

traditions& 8t is my +uess that he mi+ht have een surprised if he had .no?n of the conceptual ?ei+ht that no? rests on his slim empiricalfindin+s& 8t ?ould e interestin+ to .no? ?hether someone ?ho did not .no? aout Propp or the French structuralists and ?ho attempted toconstruct a typolo+y of narrative story forms could arrive at an account that ?ould loo. nothin+ li.e Propp>s ut that ?ould fit an e=ually lar+enumer of stories& 8 do not have anythin+ in mind 8 simply as. ?hether the thou+ht is implausile& 8f no one has constructed such a typolo+y so



far, then that itself is an important piece of evidence, ut 8 do not find the thou+ht that someone could do so entirely inconceivale& This iscertainly not a criticism of Propp& 8t is simply a su++estion that possily too much use has een made of his pioneerin+ and seminal ?or. and thatless reliance on it in the future mi+ht result in a richer and more complete picture of narrative form&

To return to my ar+ument a +ood deal of hi+hly technical, re?ardin+, and ori+inal ?or. has een done on the analysis of story structure&Ho?ever, ?hen narrative is considered from the point of vie? of fictional minds, story analysis can seem rather ri+id, mechanical, anduninformative& There can e a tendency to force particular narratives into a straitKac.et that does not necessarily illuminate them& Ho? much doesit help our understandin+ of -adame 6ovary to e told that the actants in it are these suKect V Bmma oKect V happiness sender V romanticliterature receiver V Bmma helper V 2eon, *odolphe and opponent V Charles, Jonville, *odolphe, Homais, and 2heureu9 (Prince 15";, !)I 8tis temptin+ to ?onder ?hether this is an ovious area in ?hich the structuralist ori+ins of the discipline have had a limitin+ effect& /s 4avidHerman e9plains, “sQtructuralist narratolo+ists, interested in formulatin+ a

3!53

>+rammar> of narrative, ?anted to shift attention from characters as >ein+s> to characters as re+ularly recurrin+, typifiale >participants> in the

synta+matic unfoldin+ of the narrated action” (1555, !::#:$)& /lso, the narratolo+ists *uth Rinsur+ and hlomith *immon3Denan point outthat in classical narratolo+y characters “?ere related neither to ?orld vie? nor to time3space, ut#laelled >functions>#?ere suordinated to thesuccession of events” (1555, "0)& Ho?ever, if the ?ays in ?hich characters are constructed y readers are to e fully understood, they have to ere+arded as fictional ein+s that are related to ?orld vie? and time3space in a fuller and more holistic manner than story analysis envisa+es&

8n particular, the ?ay in ?hich the concept of action is used ?ithin story analysis is rather limited and impoverished& /ction is crucial to thisstudy, and it is discussed at a numer of points, for e9ample, in chapter $, section ; chapter 6, section 6 and chapter ;, section !& 8 e9ploredifferent aspects of the concept of action at various sta+es in my ar+ument in order to deepen and ?iden our understandin+ of the term eyondthe story analysis use& The analysis of narrative structures is clearly dependent on a +ood deal of indirect inference aout fictional minds throu+he9aminations of the function and si+nificance of the physical actions caused y those minds& @hat ?as the purpose, motivation, intention, and soon ehind the decision to ta.e the actionI Ho?ever, this methodolo+y is rarely e9plicitly descried y story analysts in terms of mental

functionin+ ecause the minds of characters tend to e re+arded as a +iven rather than ac.no?led+ed as a discursive construct& This point is orne out y the follo?in+ discussion of the story analysis notion of an event &



There is a noticeale emphasis on events in a numer of proposed definitions of narrative& For e9ample, a narrative is “the semioticrepresentation of a series of events, meanin+fully connected in a temporal and causal ?ay” (Lne+a and 2anda 155%, :) narration is “a discourserepresentin+ one or more events” (Prince 15";, 6;) and narrative fiction is “the narration of a succession of fictional events” (*immon3Denan15":, !)& Mie.e al defines an event as “the transition from one state to another state, caused or e9perienced y actors” (155;, 1"!)& al>s last

point is an important one& Bvents only have si+nificance if they are e9perienced y actors& 8t is difficult to ima+ine a narrative that consistedentirely, for e9ample, of descriptions of natural events in ?hich no person ?as present to e9perience those events& Lne+a and 2anda refer toevents ein+ meanin+fully connected in a causal ?ay, and the causal lin.s et?een events are nearly al?ays formed y fictional minds& Bventscause or are caused y mental states and mental episodes& 8n fact, one could ar+ue that to tal. of events does

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not accurately convey ho? fictional narrative ?or.s& 8n practice, nearly all of the physical events descried in novels are perceived y charactersand have an impact on their mental functionin+& Lther?ise, ?hy mention themI B9ceptions to this rule mi+ht include the historical events thatare referred to y narrators in novels y ?riters such as ir @alter cott and Reor+e Bliot and that are not e9perienced y the characters, ut in+eneral, 8 ?ould maintain that my +eneraliAation holds true& 8t ?ould in a sense, therefore, e more accurate and more revealin+ aout the

function of physical event descriptions in narratives to refer to them not as events ut as eperiences& 8n addition, many events are actions that are performed y individuals ?ho e9perience the mental episodes that constitute the motives, intentions, and so on that cause the action& Thesemental events have to e recovered (ri+htly or ?ron+ly) y the reader from the discourse as part of the operation of assemlin+ characters> purported mental functionin+& This is an essential element in the readin+ comprehension process& For actants and functions to e understood, theymust e translated into lan+ua+e that refers to the consciousnesses of the fictional ein+s in the story& / =uest y a hero is not Kust a =uest, it is adecision ta.en y the hero to +o on the =uest& 8n addition, the discourse may reveal that the decision is ta.en Koyfully, re+retfully, fearfully, or?hatever&

tory analysis relates primarily to the structures contained in the story, ?hile any comprehensive consideration of fictional minds must focus othon the action contained in the story and also on the presentation of the accompanyin+ consciousness in the discourse& 8t is revealin+ that thelan+ua+e of actants and functions is totally alien to the lan+ua+e of fictional minds and consciousness& @hen characters are not seen as ein+s,

issues of consciousness do not arise& Lf course, characters are elements in the narrative structure as ?ell as ein+s, ut 8 su++est in chapters % and; that there is a ?ay of ac.no?led+in+ this aspect of fictional minds that is not reductive and mechanistic& The .ind of perspective that 8 envisa+eaddresses the +ulf et?een the story and discourse sides of narratolo+y& Lne+a and 2anda su++est that most theories of narrative privile+e eitherstory or discourse (155%, !6)& Ho?ever, it is possile that further research mi+ht sho? that there is a ?ay of rin+in+ to+ether the story and the



2. &ossi'le Worlds

The concept of possile ?orlds e+an life ?ithin analytical philosophy& 8t ?as developed initially y such philosophers as aul Drip.e (15"0)and 4avid 2e?is

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(15;:) in order to deal ?ith various technical issues in modal lo+ic, the ranch of lo+ic that is concerned ?ith necessity and possiility& o, fore9ample, necessity can e defined in terms of propositions that are true in all possile ?orlds possiility in terms of propositions that are true inat least one possile ?orld and impossiility in terms of propositions that are not true in any possile ?orld& The idea ?as then adapted ande9tended y such narrative theorists as 2uomir 4oleel ( ;eterocosmica, 155"), Thomas Pavel ( !ictional Worlds, 15"%), and Marie32aure *yan(1551) to refer to the possile ?orlds that are created in ?orlds of literature and that are also .no?n interchan+ealy as fictional ?orlds, narrative?orlds, te9t ?orlds, and story?orlds& (ee also Paul @erth>s et Worlds 1555Q for a more lin+uistics3ased perspective&) These theorists,ho?ever, to+ether ?ith others such as *uth *onen in Possible Worlds in "iterary heory (155$), are careful to emphasiAe the differences et?een the ori+inal philosophical model of possile ?orlds and the ne? narrative model of story?orlds& From no? on, 8 ?ill e considerin+

only story?orlds& 4iscussions on ho? fictional minds are constructed have to e put in the conte9t of possile?orlds theory& The purpose of thissection is to ma.e a fe? introductory remar.s aout the concept efore later chapters develop the idea in relation to fictional minds in moredetail&

/lthou+h the story analysis strand of narrative theory that ?as discussed in the previous section has as its asis the concept of story (as opposedto discourse), it is 4oleel>s vie? that the “asic concept of narratolo+y is not >story,> ut >narrative ?orld,> defined ?ithin a typolo+y of possile?orlds” (155", :1)& tory?orlds are possile ?orlds that are constructed y lan+ua+e throu+h a performative force that is +ranted y culturalconvention& @hen a third3person narrator ma.es a statement aout a character it is, accordin+ to speech act theory, a performative utterance itcreates ?hat it says in the act of sayin+ it& This is ?hy the =uote ?ith ?hich 8 started the oo. su++ested that it is only fictional people aout?hom ?e +et completely reliale information& Renerally, third3person narrators never lie (althou+h some self3conscious e9periments in theFrench -ouveau *oman have played ?ith the idea of the unreliale thirdperson narrator)& The =uestion of the unreliale narrator that ?as made

famous y @ayne C& ooth in he /hetoric of !iction is a completely separate issue that relates to first3person narrators&



Possile3?orlds theory has made a profound contriution to narratolo+y in a numer of ?ays& Lne relates to its focus on the =uestion of access tofictional ?orlds& 8n other ?ords, ho? do readers comprehend fictional te9ts sufficiently to e ale to enter the story?orld that is descried in thete9tI This line of

3::3in=uiry uilds on the ?or. that ?as done ?ithin the earlier tradition of reader response theory& @ithin possile3?orlds theory, readin+#andtherefore access to the story?orld#has three elements the source domain, the real ?orld in ?hich the te9t is ein+ processed y the reader thetar+et domain, the story?orld that constitutes the output of the reader>s processin+ and the system of te9tual features that tri++ers various .indsof reader3held real3?orld .no?led+e in a ?ay that proKects the reader from source domain to tar+et domain& The reference to the utiliAation ofreal3?orld .no?led+e in the readin+ process ?ill rin+ us in section $ to the contriution that co+nitive science can ma.e to an understandin+ ofthe readin+ process& 4oleel maintains that “fictional ?orlds are accessed throu+h semiotic channels and y means of information processin+”and that readers can do this “y crossin+ someho? the ?orld oundary et?een the realms of the actual and the possile” (155", !0)& Thereconstruction of the story?orld y the reader “inte+rates fictional ?orlds into the reader>s reality” (4oleel 155", !1)& My thesis is that the mainsemiotic channels y ?hich the reader accesses fictional ?orlds, and the most important sets of instructions that allo? the reader to reconstruct

the fictional ?orld, are those that +overn the reader>s understandin+ of the ?or.in+s of characters> minds& Lnce this central point has eenestalished, then ?or. can e done on the differences et?een the sets of instructions that are characteristic of various +enres and su+enres suchas, for e9ample, the psycholo+ical novel and the thriller& The same point applies to different historical periods of the novel& ee chapter " forfurther details&

tory?orlds differ onto lo+ically from the real ?orld ecause they are incomplete& (Lntolo+y is the study of e9istence, the nature of ein+, andthe essence of thin+s&) Bvery story?orld contains ontolo+ical +aps or “spots of indeterminacy” in a phrase of *oman 8n+arden>s (15;:, !$%) that?as later orro?ed y @olf+an+ 8ser (15;", 1;0)& These +aps constitute the difference et?een, on the one hand, the comination of the storyand the discourse that constitutes the te9t and, on the other hand, the story?orld& -o discourse could ever e lon+ enou+h to say in its story allthat could e said aout the ?hole story?orld& o, fiction is necessarily incomplete and full of lan.s ?here nothin+ is said aout a part of thestory?orld and +aps ?here somethin+ ut not everythin+ is said& (8 ?ill use the term #aps to cover oth lan.s and +aps&) Lviously, the nature

of the +aps varies& ome +aps are temporary (for e9ample, the identity of the murderer in a ?hodunit) and are filled in later in the discourseothers are permanent, and it is these +aps that ?e are tal.in+ aout here& 4oleel distin+uishes et?een +aps in terms of implicitness& He statesthat “implicitness



3:$3

ased on presupposition is a maKor source of fictional3?orld construction and reconstruction” (155", 1;6)& “The meanin+ of all te9ts is acomposite of overt and covert semantic constituents” (4oleel 155", 1;!)& He then introduces a threepart distinction “e9plicit te9ture constructsdeterminate fictional facts, implicit te9ture constructs indeterminate facts and Aero te9ture creates +aps” (1556, !05)& 8n terms of Bmma@oodhouse>s mind, it is e9plicitly stated at the end of the novel that she loves Dni+htley it is implied throu+hout that she has al?ays loved himthere is Aero reference to her vie?s on the French *evolution& Marie32aure *yan rin+s to+ether the t?o issues of access and +aps y ar+uin+that one important semiotic channel for accessin+ fictional ?orlds and for creatin+ the implicit te9ture that closes ontolo+ical +aps is ?hat sheterms the principle of minimal departure that is, ?hile readin+ a te9t and reconstructin+ a story?orld from it, the reader assumes the minimal possile departure from the actual ?orld unless such a departure is specified or stron+ly indicated y the te9t& o the reader ?ill assume thatBmma has one head, t?o arms, t?o le+s, and so on unless told other?ise& 8 ?ill e9plore in chapter % ho? the theoretical treatment of +aps has tota.e account of the special nature of fictional minds&

4oleel refers at some points to the semiotic procedures for the creation and re3creation of fictional minds, commentin+ that for the “semantics offictional narrative, inferences re+ardin+ aspects and constituents of actin+ are of special si+nificance” (155", 1;6)& He then cautions us in this

?ay “Jet many precautions have to e ta.en ?hen inferrin+ the mental traits of fictional persons from their actions” (4oleel 155", 1;%)& ut ishis ?arnin+ necessaryI urely ?e ta.e many precautions in inferrin+ the mental traits of real persons from their actions& The ta.in+ of these precautions is second nature& 8t is precisely those inferential s.ills, an e9ample of the real3?orld .no?led+e referred to aove, that enale us toread at all& o ?hy is the ?arnin+ necessaryI The ans?er is fairly ovious 4oleel is reinforcin+ the distinction referred to aove et?een thee9plicit story?orld3creatin+ .no?led+e that is infallily supplied y the third3person narrator and the implicit .no?led+e that is all too fallilyinferred y the reader from the te9t& 8 am not =ueryin+ this entirely valid distinction, ut 8 do ?onder ?hether too much emphasis on it can causeus to lose si+ht of the variety of ?ays in ?hich readers construct fictional minds& ome of these ?ays are uni=ue to the creation of fictionalminds the performative utterances of the narrator re+ardin+ individual characters and also the fact that readers have fre=uent direct access tofictional minds& Lther ?ays have features in common ?ith real minds ?e ?ei+h the vie?s of others ?hen comin+ to our vie? aout anindividual, and also, as 4oleel says, ?e infer mental traits from actions& My

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concern is that possile3?orlds theorists appear to privile+e the first ?ay, the self3creatin+ statements of the narrator, at the e9pense of the others&



/s story?orlds are called into ein+ throu+h the unrestricted creative po?er of fictional lan+ua+e, possile3?orlds theorists lay a +ood deal ofemphasis on the ar+ument that the limits of the fictionally possile are the limits of the e9pressile or ima+inale& 8t is =uite true that the ran+e offantasy ?orlds created in ima+inative literature is e9traordinary& cience fiction, science fantasy, and ma+ical realist novels are notale e9amples&Ho?ever, 8 ?ill su++est in chapter %, section $ that the special nature of fictional minds places limits on the e9tent to ?hich story?orlds are aleto depart from the actual ?orld&

8 referred in chapter 1 to different parts of narrative theory as different corners of a lar+e field& -arrative theorists have een a?are for some timeof these divisions& 4oleel has convincin+ly advanced the vie? that the concept of a story?orld “enales us to leave ehind the split thattraditional narratolo+y created y separatin+ story from character& / narrative semantics ased on action theory radically psycholo+iAes the storyand, at the same time, features fictional characters as persons for and in actin+” (155", 66)& The possile3?orlds approach forms a promisin+ ?ayto unify previously diver+ent approaches to fictional minds& 8t is interestin+ that the foremost possile3?orlds theorist should see the potential forthat theory to deepen and enrich the story analysis treatment of fictional minds& 8n the follo?in+ section 8 ?ill sho? ho? narrative theorists suchas ri Mar+olin have made clear the implications of possile3?orlds theory for the suKect area of characteriAation&

3. Characteri(ation

/ +ood deal of illuminatin+ ?or. has een done ?ithin narrative theory on characteriAation y, for e9ample, merto Bco (15"1), EonathanCuller (15;6), hlomith *immon3Denan (15":), Mie.e al (155;) and ri Mar+olin (15"%, 15";, 15"5, 1550, 1556a, 1556, 155%a)& Thefollo?in+ passa+e contains an e9cellent summary of the sort of ?or. that has een done to date& Characters, it states, “can e more or lesste9tually prominent, dynamic or static, consistent or inconsistent, and simple, t?o3dimensional, and hi+hly predictale or comple9, multi3dimensional, and capale of surprisin+ ehavior they are classale not only in terms of their conformity to standard types (the ra++art, thecuc.old, the femme fatale) or their correspondin+ to certain spheres of action ut also in terms of their acts, ?ords, feelin+s, appearance, and soon and their attriutes can e directly and relialy stated (for e9ample, in a set3piece presentation) or inferred from their (mental, emotional and physical) ehavior” (Prince 15"!,

3:%3

1!$)& Ho?ever, theorists have consistently e9pressed dissatisfaction ?ith the current state of characteriAation theory at the time of their ?ritin+&For e9ample, accordin+ to Patric. L>-eill, the “multifarious ?ays in ?hich characters emer+e from the ?ords on the pa+e, in ?hich story?orldactors ac=uire a personality, is one of the most fascinatin+ and least systematically e9plored aspects of narrative theory and narrative practice”



(155$, $5)& Mie.e al contends that “no satisfyin+, coherent theory of characteriAation is availale” (155;, 116)& 8n my vie?, these comments donot ta.e sufficient account of the ?or. done y ri Mar+olin& 8n a lon+ series of articles pulished et?een 15"% and the present, he sets out acomple9, ri+orous, and comprehensive conceptual frame?or. for the study of character& These essays, ?hich contain numerous e9amples oftypolo+ies that comprise the essential features of various different aspects of characteriAation, are a rich, full, and su++estive resource for futureresearchers in the field of characteriAation&Lne of Mar+olin>s maKor contriutions is to e9plain ho? the various definitions of character haveemer+ed out of contrastin+ te9tual approaches& These definitions can e summariAed as follo?s (for more detail, see Mar+olin 15";, 10;#"15"5, 1#6 1550, "$:#$;)a& 8rammatical person& The character as a topic entity of a discourse, the suKect of referrin+ e9pressions such as noun phrases, proper

names, and pronouns& uKect area te9t lin+uistics& 8 ?ill not e concerned directly ?ith this approach e9cept in so far as it underpins (c)speech position&

& "iterary device& The character as part of the desi+n of a literary ?or. of art, one of many means of achievin+ aesthetic effects& uKectarea literary criticism& /s 8 say in chapter 1, section $, 8 ?ill not e addressin+ the issues that arise from this suKect area&

c& Speech position& The character as a constitutive role in the process of narrative transmission or communication& These roles includete9tual spea.er and also narrative instance or level such as narrator and focaliAer& uKect area narratolo+y& 8 discuss focaliAation insection 6 of this chapter and the speech cate+ory approach in detail in the follo?in+ chapter&

d& Semes& The character as standin+ for a thematic element, a semantic comple9, or macrosi+n composed of semes and unified y a propername (as descried in *oland arthes>s S<= )& uKect area semiotics& ome aspects of this approach are discussed later in this section&e& Actant & The character as a role or element in the story structure& uKect area story analysis& This approach ?as discussed in section 1 of

this chapter&

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f& Non$actual individual & The character as a non3actual ein+ ?ho e9ists in a possile ?orld and ?ho can e ascried physical, social, andmental properties& uKect area possile3?orld semantics& This is the paradi+m that ?as introduced in the previous section and that isadopted throu+hout this study&

The non3actual individual approach seems to me to e far richer and more informative than the others, althou+h it must e ac.no?led+ed thatthey all have their place& @hile descriin+ this approach, Mar+olin refers to the importance of the mental dimension, the features of ?hich helists as follo?s co+nitive, emotional, volitional, and perceptual events, and inner states such as .no?led+e and elief sets, attitudes, ?ishes,+oals, plans, intentions, and dispositions& He calls the sum of these mental phenomena interiority or personhood (15"5, $)& The same =uestion



applies to Mar+olin>s notion of interiority as ?as applied to Fluderni.>s notion of e9perientiality in section 1 of this chapter& Ho? can ?e come toa full understandin+ of ho? characters come into e9istence in the reader>s mind ?ithout an ac.no?led+ement of the importance of the mentaldimensionI /nd if the non3actual individual approach allo?s for a +reater ac.no?led+ement of the importance of interiority and personhood thanthe others, then it has a prima facie case to e considered as the est approach& 8nteriority, e9perientiality, and fictional minds are, after all, a+ood part of ?hat ?e read novels for&

Mar+olin>s vie?s on the relationships et?een, and the relative merits of, the si9 approaches chan+e over time, and it is instructive to follo? thedevelopment of his thou+ht& 8n “8ntroducin+ and ustainin+ Characters in 2iterary -arrative” he does not comment on the relationships et?eenthe approaches or refer to their relative value he says only that the discussion in the rest of his essay ?ill focus on the non3actual individualapproach (15";, 10")& 8n “tructuralist /pproaches to Character in -arrative” (15"5), he is much more e9plicit in sayin+ that the various perspectives have incompatile features and irreconcilale presuppositions (15"5, !)& -o t?o of them “can e translated into each other orreduced to a common denominator nor can they e synthesiAed in any meanin+ful ?ay” (15"5, 6)& He also appears to +ive them e=ual value“each seems to command a certain de+ree of theoretical le+itimacy, and each of them enales us to see and say thin+s ?e could not haveother?ise” (15"5, 6)& “-o concept of character can conse=uently raise a claim to an ultimate, e9clusive, or oli+atory theoretical status” (15"5,;)& Ln the other hand, he declares that the

3:"3

notion of a character as a non3actual individual “is ar+ualy the closest to our cultural intuition, fle9ile and open3ended, and at the same time,theoretically ?ell3+rounded” (15"5, 10), and so, as in 15";, he devotes the rest of his essay to it& Ho?ever, y 1550 he seems to e moreoutspo.en& @hile discussin+ three of the approaches he su++ests that the non3actual individual approach is superior to the speech position andactant approaches in terms of conceptual comprehensiveness, theoretical depth, e9planatory po?er, and the diversity of te9ts to ?hich it isapplicale& For e9ample, unli.e the other t?o, the non3actual individual approach can handle ontolo+ically prolematical as ?ell as ontolo+icallystrai+ht story?orlds that is, it can account for postmodernist as ?ell as for “realist” constructions of character& He descries the speech positionand actant approaches as acceptale ut hi+hly partial, selective, and ?ea. on the intuitive notion of character (1550, "$6#$%)& He also comes toa different vie? on the relationship et?een the approaches and ar+ues that, as the speech position and actant approaches implicitly presuppose

the e9istence of story?orlds ?hile the nonactual individual approach ma.es such an e9istence e9plicit, the possile3?orlds approach can includeas susets the predicates of the other t?o (1550, "$6)&



Manfred Eahn certainly supports the susumin+ of the actant approach under the non3actual individual approach, pointin+ out that, ?hile in “earlystructuralist accounts, literary characters are Kust >roles,> >functions> or as arthes calls them, >paper ein+s,> ” in fact, “a reader must proKect a pra+matic identity on fictional characters in order to understand description and narrated perception, speech, and action” (1555, 1;)& 8 ?ould putthe point even more stron+ly in case Eahn>s list implies that there are some aspects of narrative that do not need such a proKection in order to eunderstood& 8n my vie?, there are essentially no aspects of narrative that can e understood ?ithout the semiotic operation to ?hich Eahn refers&

Mar+olin ma.es the point that the non3actual individual approach is suitale for various different .inds of te9ts& 8t is my vie? this approach may e the only one that is suitale for all te9ts& /s Mar+olin su++ests, a theory of character chan+e, or ho? characters develop in various ?ays overthe course of a narrative, “should e ased on a ?ide corpus, emracin+ a ma9imal numer of types of narrative, ancient and modern, realisticand fantastic, hi+h and popular, ?ithout privile+in+ the realistic psycholo+ical model” (1556a, 6)& The theory of character as non3actualindividual is suitale for all of these and not Kust for the realistic psycholo+ical model ecause it e9plains ho? ?e read all narrative& Mar+olin>s point aout character chan+e is a +ood e9ample& 8t is a centrally important aspect

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of narrative, and it is much more amenale to the story?orld perspective than to the others ecause the others do not have the necessaryfle9iility, fluidity, and comprehensive reach& CharacteriAation is a continuin+ process& 8t consists of a succession of individual operations thatresult in a continual patternin+ and repatternin+ until a coherent fictional personality emer+es& *eaders create fictional people on their firstencounter ?ith them, and these ein+s continue to e9ist until they leave the narrative, the narrative ends, or they “die&” 4urin+ an initial act ofcharacteriAation, ?hen ?e first meet a character, ?e mi+ht say to ourselves, “That ?as a selfish act&” Ln the other hand, particularly if ?e havean e9pectation that this mi+ht e a character that ?e ?ill meet a+ain, ?e are also =uite li.ely to say somethin+ li.e, “He must e a selfish person&” The uildin+ of a ?hole personality starts happenin+ immediately, even durin+ the first act of characteriAation& CharacteriAation is aninference from an individual action, then, to?ard a supposed disposition or trait, and these are states of mind that e9tend over time& 8n the same?ay, suse=uent actions are interpreted y the reader in the conte9t of the ?hole of the character>s mind as hypothesiAed up until that point&Eud+ments are then adKusted y the interpretation placed on the action, and a ne? frame is formed ?ithin ?hich future actions can e interpreted&This process is not easy to theoriAe ?ithin the non3story?orld approaches&

8 mentioned in the previous section that much of the discussion of the role of the reader ?ithin the possile3?orlds perspective echoed theconclusions of earlier reader response theory& 8t may therefore e helpful at this point to consider some of the aspects of that theory that arerelevant to the reader>s constructions of ?hole characters& merto Bco has used the thou+ht3provo.in+ phrase, “the cooperative principle in



narrativity” (15"1, !6%)& 8n effect, the meanin+ of a te9t ?ill not unfold unless the necessary cooperation e9ists et?een the reader and thenarrator, and this principle of cooperation applies in particular to the specific and central issue of the construction of characters> minds&

The main thrust of @olf+an+ 8ser>s ar+uments in he Act of /eadin# (15;") is that a readin+ causes a ?or. to unfold its inherently dynamiccharacter& /s the reader uses the various perspectives offered y the te9t in order to a?a.e responses in himself or herself, the te9t may not +o farenou+h, resultin+ in oredom for the reader, or may +o too far, resultin+ in overstrain for the reader& The development in the mind of the readerof a net?or. of the emedded narratives of various characters is an essential factor in the dynamic process that 8ser descries& Ln the asis of theinitial information contained in the

3$03

te9t and otained from the various sources descried in this study, the reader ?ill form initial hypotheses aout the past (that is, the character>smemories and feelin+s aout the past), the present (the character>s decisions aout ehavior and action), and the future (lon+er3term intentions, plans, and +oals)& These hypotheses ?ill then e modified in the li+ht of further information aout the development of other emedded narrativesand the relationships et?een them in the conte9t of the ?hole story?orld& Too much information aout fictional minds, as 8ser says, means that

the reader has too little to do to construct that mind& Poorly ?ritten novels often fail on this point& Too little information, and the construction ofminds ecomes difficult& This last point is, of course, not necessarily a prolem& Thrillers and ?hodunits depend for their effect on the sense ofmystery that results from a paucity of mental3life information& Many modern novels use a variety of modernist, postmodernist, and ehavioristtechni=ues in ?hich this information is at a premium& @hen readers say that such novels are “difficult, ” it is often this feature that they have inmind&

8ser ar+ues that, as part of the dynamic process that he descries, the un?ritten outlines of the te9t, its +aps, dra? the reader into the action andinfluence the interpretation of the ?ritten te9t& The ?ritten te9t imposes certain limits on the un?ritten in order to prevent the ?hole e9periencefrom ecomin+ too haAy and lurred& Ho?ever, the un?ritten implications ?or.ed out y the reader>s ima+ination endo? the ?ritten te9t ?ith far+reater si+nificance than it ?ould other?ise possess (15;", 1;0#;5)& There is a lar+e numer of constraints on the amount of evidence that thenarrator can ma.e availale in the discourse for any one character, even a prota+onist& /s only a certain numer of the ?ords on the pa+es of the

te9t can refer to a particular character, it is part of the competence of the reader to construct, oth from this ?ritten te9t and from the un?rittenimplications that comprise the +aps ?ithin the ?ritten te9t, a continuin+ consciousness for that character& Havin+ accomplished that initial and asic tas., the reader then has to interpret all the availale evidence, not Kust that ?hich is made availale y direct access, in order to plot thedetail and direction of that character>s emedded narrative&



The topics of +enre and interte9tuality form the asis of a +ood deal of the discussions on character& 8n terms of the real3?orld .no?led+e thatreaders rin+ to an understandin+ of a story?orld, these issues relate to readers> .no?led+e of other story?orlds& 8t is much easier to access astory?orld if the reader can apply .no?led+e of other story?orlds that are constructed in similar ?ays& Renre is a common and useful asis ofsimilarity et?een individual novels& For

3$13

e9ample, it helps to .no? that one is readin+ a romance rather than a thriller in order to use previously e9istin+ .no?led+e of other romances tointerpret the various +enre3related te9tual cues that invarialy arise& imilarly, the ?ideran+in+ and comple9 interrelationships et?eendiscourses that fall under the headin+ of interte9tuality are of +reat enefit to the reader ?hile attemptin+ to construct coherent and satisfyin+fictional personalities& Eonathan Culler ma.es several very interestin+ points on characteriAation that are primarily concerned ?ith interte9tuality(15;6, !:0#:")& Culler remar.s that character is not simply a con+lomeration of features, it is a directed, teleolo+ical set ased on culturalmodels& @e do not simply add to+ether the actions and attriutes of an individual character, dra?in+ from them a conception of personality androle& /ccordin+ to Culler, ?e are +uided y formal e9pectations aout the roles that need to e filled& He emphasiAes that it is not necessary thatcharacters should precisely fit stoc. types, ut that these models +uide the perception and creation of characters, enalin+ readers to compose

situations and attriute intelli+ile roles (15;6, !:6#:;)&

The notion of interte9tuality ma.es an important contriution to our understandin+ of ho? readers construct characters& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould ar+uethat the vitally important aspect of reader construction of character that has come to e .no?n under this lael has een +iven much moreattention than the complementary and specifically te9tual approach that 8 have in mind& Culler, Bco, and others have convincin+ly e9plained the precise nature of such e9trate9tual material as the cultural and literary codes that readers use to construct notions of character, ut 8 am a?are ofvery little ?or. on ?hat mi+ht e called the intrate9tual evidence in the discourse that is used y readers for the same purpose& 8t mi+ht e a +oodidea to comine oth approaches so that the intrate9tual evidence that is made availale ?ithin the emedded narrative approach can einterpreted in terms of the interte9tual models that Culler descries& Lf course, it is an oversimplification to dra? such a sharp distinction et?een the t?o& Culler indicates that the interte9tual process is dra?n oth from non3literary e9perience and literary conventions& *evealin+ly,as an e9ample of the former, he comments that, as soon as the asic outline of a character e+ins to emer+e, one can call upon any of the

lan+ua+es developed for the study of human ehavior in order to structure the te9t in those terms (15;6, !:;)& This descries perfectly the usethat 8 am tryin+ to ma.e of the parallel discourses of philosophy, psycholo+y, and co+nitive science& ut, althou+h 8 am usin+ these discourses, ineffect, as interte9tual models, 8 ?ould still maintain that a distinction can e made, as my approach encoura+es more attention to



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the evidence that is availale ?ithin the discourse than the approaches that commonly come under the name of interte9tuality&

4espite the first3rate =uality of the research that has een done so far on characteriAation theory, only a fraction of ?hich ?as discussed rieflyearlier, a serious concern remains& 8t is that a fault line has developed ?ithin narrative theory et?een the study of characteriAation and the studyof the presentation of consciousness& For e9ample, in her e9cellent study, Narrative !iction (15":), hlomith *immon3Denan devotes t?o finechapters to the suKect of characteriAation and one to speech representation that includes some discussion of thou+ht presentation& Ho?ever, thereis no reference at all in the characteriAation chapters to thou+ht presentation, apart from a passin+ reference to the fact that the consciousnesses ofMrs& 4allo?ay and Molly loom are “presented from ?ithin” (15":, $!)& B=ually stri.in+ly, there is no reference at all in her chapter on speechand thou+ht presentation to characteriAation& This seems stran+e& Ta.e a sentence such as this “/s usual in these circumstances, he ecamean+ry and defensive&” This is the sort of statement that recurs continuously in narrative te9ts and often fulfils a pivotal role in +uidin+ thedirection of the narrative& 8t presents an episode of immediate consciousness (the emotion of an+er) ?ithin the conte9t of the character>sdisposition to an+er& The disposition in part causes the episode& The episode is a manifestation of the disposition& The event and the state areindissoluly lin.ed& 8t is y interpretin+ episodes of consciousness ?ithin a conte9t of dispositions that the reader uilds up a convincin+ and

coherent sense of character& 8t is throu+h the central lin.in+ concept of dispositions that characteriAation and thou+ht presentation can e seen asdifferent aspects of the same phenomenon& Ho?ever, ?ithin narrative theory, dispositions elon+ to the suKect area of characteriAation, andmental events elon+ to the suKect area of thou+ht presentation& The asence of a holistic approach ma.es a reco+nition of the ?hole mind verydifficult to achieve&

8n 15"5 ri Mar+olin advanced the vie? that the theory of character as nonactual individual had, up until that time, een treated as ancillary andas some sort of post scriptum to more fundamental theories such as actantial patterns and narrative situations& He su++ested, thou+h, that thesituation had recently improved due to the formulation of semantic models for fictional ?orlds and non3actual individuals, as ?ell as the +radualelaoration of co+nitive models for the selective representation of information frames for te9ts& He concluded ?ith a fine flourish y sayin+ thatthe “tas. is efore us” (15"5, !:)& 8 hope that this oo. can, ho?ever imperfectly and incompletely, ma.e a contriution to the response that isstill re=uired to Mar+olin>s challen+e&

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4. Cogniti)e Science and *rames

8t appears that the term co#nitive science is used in rou+hly t?o senses, one narro? and one road& 8n the road sense, the term is used for thestudy of human co+nition& 8t comprises those aspects of the disciplines of philosophy, psycholo+y, neuroscience, artificial intelli+ence,lin+uistics, and, sometimes, anthropolo+y that relate to co+nition& The increasin+ use of the plural term co#nitive sciences (as in the title of -0(CS ) seems to involve an ac.no?led+ement of this road usa+e& The development of this ne? discipline is often dated to the 1560s andlin.ed to the emer+ence of -oam Choms.y>s theory (15%6) that the system of rules underlyin+ our lin+uistic competence is “hard3?ired” into our rains as part of our innate +enetic endo?ment& 8n the narro? sense, the term refers specifically to the study of the computational theory of themind that is, it comprises only those aspects of the disciplines listed earlier that ear on ho? the neural information processin+ of rains can estudied in the same ?ay that the information processin+ of computers can e studied& The rain is treated as thou+h it is a .ind of computer,althou+h the e9tent of the claimed relationship et?een rains and computers varies from ?riter to ?riter& Gie?s also vary on the nature of therelationship et?een the road and narro? tendencies&

road co+nitive science is uncontroversial& Bveryone a+rees that co+nition should e studied and that there is still a +ood deal that ?e do not.no? aout it& Ho?ever, narro? co+nitive science is very controversial indeed& everal ?riters, includin+ Eohn earle in philosophy and /ntonio

4amasio in neuroscience, disa+ree ?ith much of the computational theory of the mind& These and other ?riters say simply that the rain is not acomputer& Lr, in a more nuanced oKection, they say that ?e do not learn very much aout the rain y studyin+ it as thou+h it ?ere a computeror similar to a computer& 8t is clear from 4amasio>s emphasis in he !eelin# of What ;appens (!000) on the importance of consciousness and theemotions that he feels that the rain is too comple9 and its nature too elusive for the computational theory of the mind to e of much help indescriin+ ho? it ?or.s& earle is a ?ell3.no?n s.eptic, and in he /ediscovery of the -ind (155!), he asserts luntly that there are “rute, lindneurophysiolo+ical processes and there is consciousness, ut there is nothin+ else &&& no rule follo?in+, no mental information processin+, nounconscious inferences, no mental models, no primal s.etches, no ! 17!4 ima+es, no threedimensional descriptions, no lan+ua+e of thou+ht, andno universal +rammar” (155!, !!"#!5)& His list of ?hat does not ta.e place in the rain is a co+nitivescience tool .it& Ho?ever, it seems to methat, not?ithstandin+ earle>s concerns, road co+nitive science has a lot to offer narrative theory& *eaders ?ho are in

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terested in e9plorin+ the diverse ?ays in ?hich the t?o disciplines can enrich and illuminate each other are recommended to read Narrative

heory and the Co#nitive Sciences (!00:), edited y a pioneer in the field, 4avid Herman& 8n Herman>s very persuasive vie?, ?hich is alsoe9plained in Story "o#ic (!00!), narrative theory should e re+arded as a ranch of co+nitive science (!00!, !)& Ta.in+ the relationship et?een



co+nitive science and narrative theory in a related direction, ri Mar+olin, in an essay in Narrative heory and the Co#nitive Sciences entitled“Co+nitive cience, the Thin.in+ Mind, and 2iterary -arrative, ” applies some of the conceptual tools of co+nitive science in a most illuminatin+?ay to such traditional narratolo+ical notions as the narrator, the implied author, focaliAation, and defamiliariAation&

8 am concerned more specifically in this oo. ?ith the ?ays in ?hich co+nitive science can add to our understandin+ of fictional minds& 2uc.ily,8 ?ill e s.irtin+ around some of the more contentious and controversial issues that are raised y narro? co+nitive science and ?ill, instead, efocusin+ on some of the contriutions that can e made to narrative theory y the road variety& / numer of philosophers and others (such as4avid 2od+e in Consciousness and the -ovel) have deep concerns that the issue of consciousness has ecome mar+inaliAed& For e9ample, earle?ishes to rescue the notion of consciousness from the ne+lect or even hostility of co+nitive science& 8t is his ar+ument that “mQore than anythin+else, it is the ne+lect of consciousness that accounts for so much arrenness and sterility in psycholo+y, the philosophy of mind, and co+nitivescience” (155!, !!;)& /nd one senses that co+nitive science is chief amon+ the arren and sterile culprits& 8t is fair to say that the Kury is still outon this point& 8 ?ill refer to earle>s concerns in later chapters, ut it seems to me that an interest in co+nitive science is not at all incompatile?ith a reco+nition of the importance and centrality of fictional consciousness&

-arratolo+ists have made +ood use of a numer of co+nitive3science concepts that can help to e9plain the readin+ process& 8n 15"%, Thomas

Pavel ?rote that “cQontemporary lin+uistics has +radually&&& shifted its attention from semiosis#the aritrary lin. et?een meanin+ and sound# to lan+ua+e universals, innate +rammars, and the lin.s to co+nitive psycholo+y& This shift has failed to ma.e itself felt in literary theory” (15"%,11%)& Ho?ever, althou+h he may have een ri+ht at the time of ?ritin+, co+nitive science has had a sustantial impact on literary theory in theyears since& Theorists such as 4avid Herman (155;, !00!, and !00:), Rilles Fauconnier (155;), Mar. Turner (1551), and Moni.a Fluderni.(155%) have contriuted a +ood deal to our understandin+ of the readin+ process y usin+ the techni=ues of co+nitive science& !ictional -inds

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is an attempt to uild on their ?or. y focusin+ on my specific area of interest& 8t ?ill do this primarily y concentratin+ on the concepts offrames, plans, and scripts& 8n Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin# (15;;), the co+nitive scientists *o+er chan. and *oert /elson e9plainthat ?e use “specific .no?led+e to interpret and participate in events ?e have een throu+h many times” (15;;, :;) and that “the reader rin+s a

lar+e repertoire of theseQ .no?led+e structures to the understandin+ tas.” (15;;, 10)& They call the .no?led+e structures frames& /nother veryinfluential co+nitive scientist, Marvin Mins.y, accordin+ to -0(CS , “proposed or+aniAin+ .no?led+e into chun.s called frames& These framesare supposed to capture the essence of concepts or stereotypical situations, for e9ample ein+ in a livin+ room or +oin+ out for dinner, yclusterin+ all relevant information for these situations to+ether& This includes information aout ho? to use the frame, information aout



e9pectations (?hich may turn out to e ?ron+), information aout ?hat to do if e9pectations are not confirmed, and so on” (-eel 1555, :!$)& -0(CS elaorates on the =uestion of e9pectations and assumptions as follo?s “Frames are .no?led+e structures that contain fi9ed structuralinformation& They have slots that accept a ran+e of values each slot has a default value that is used if no value has een provided from thee9ternal ?orld” (re?er 1555, ;!5)& @e assume that a restaurant ?ill serve food at a price unless ?e are informed other?ise& The default valueof the food slot ?ithin the restaurant frame is availaility for payment& Marie32aure *yan>s principle of minimal departure is a description indifferent terms of the default values contained in the frames that ?e apply to te9ts& Lur assumption that the story?orld ?ill not depart from thereal ?orld unless ?e are told other?ise is a default position&

Lther co+nitive3science concepts have a numer of similarities ?ith frames& For e9ample, mental models “the mind constructs >small3scalemodels> of reality to anticipate events, to reason, and to underlie e9planation” (Eohnson32aird 1555, 6!6) frame,or9s a “frame?or. is aninterconnected set of eliefs, notions and predispositions ?hich >frames our ?orld3vie?> ” (Freeman 1556, ;5) and inner maps ?e “navi+ate our?ay throu+h our social and physical ?orld y constructin+ an inner representation, an inner map of that ?orld, and ?e plot our course from thatinner map and from our representation of ?here ?e ?ant to +et to” (terelny 1555, $61)&

@ithin our co+nitive frames, ?e use scripts and plans to +uide our everyday ehavior& / script is a stereotypical se=uence of events, and a plan is

a stereotypical set of ?ays of reactin+ to stereotypical situations and events& There is a natural mi9ture of scripts and plans in day3to3dayfunctionin+& cripts and

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plans also include the default mechanism that is characteristic of frames& For e9ample, plans “provide the mechanism for understandin+ eventsaout ?hich there is no specific information” (chan. and /elson 15;;, 5;)& They do this y allo?in+ us to use default assumptions aout ?hatis li.ely to happen in particular situations in the asence of specific information& 8t is only ?hen our assumptions are proved ?ron+ that ?e haveto improvise&

8t is si+nificant that much of the description of frames, scripts, and plans is functionalist in the sense that the descriptions emphasiAe the function

or purpose of these phenomena& ee chapter $, section 1 for more on the notion of functionalism& 8n particular, frames et cetera are lin.ed to+oals for the future& “cripts and plans serve as +uides for individual actin+ & & & and ecome indispensale in the pursuit of comple9 socialactivities” (4oleel 155", %6)& “/ plan is made up of +eneral information aout ho? actors achieve +oals” (chan. and /elson 15;;, ;0)&cripts are “or+aniAed y +oal structures that are used to ma.e sense of the need for them” (chan. and /elson 15;;, !!;)& Finally and



particularly interestin+ly, chan. and /elson discuss this issue in terms that ma.e real people sound li.e characters in novels or, in my terms,that ma.e real minds sound li.e fictional minds “8n a role theme, a particular actor>s +oals are determined y his role&&&& Lnce a role theme isinvo.ed, it sets up e9pectations aout +oals and actions” (15;;, 1:!#::)&

8n chapters % and ; 8 ?ill e9plore the ?ays in ?hich co+nitive frames enale readers to comprehend the fictional minds contained in te9ts& The purpose of the present discussion is simply to indicate in +eneral terms some of the ?ays in ?hich frames ?or.& My final point here is thatco+nitive frames e9plain ho? readers fill +aps in story?orlds& /ccordin+ to the ?ell3.no?n psycholin+uist teven Pin.er, ?ritin+ in ;o, the

-ind Wor9s (155;), “the mind refle9ively interprets other people>s ?ords and +estures y doin+ ?hatever it ta.es to ma.e them sensile and true&8f the ?ords are s.etchy or incon+ruous, the mind charitaly fills in missin+ premises or shifts to a ne? frame of reference in ?hich they ma.esense& @ithout this >principle of relevance,> lan+ua+e itself ?ould e impossile& The thou+hts ehind even the simplest sentence are solayrinthine that if ?e ever e9pressed them in full, our speech ?ould sound li.e the convoluted veria+e of a le+al document” (155;, 66!)& Jou?ill notice that Pin.er tal.s of the real3?orld +aps in our .no?led+e of other minds& He as.s, @hat is the nature of the purported mentalfunctionin+ that ?ill ma.e sense of other people>s +esturesI /nd he also as.s of lan+ua+e specifically, @hat is the nature of the purported mentalfunctionin+ that ?ill ma.e sense of other people>s ?ordsI These =uestions apply e=ually ?ell to fictional minds&

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". *ocali(ation

-arratolo+ists have developed and made much more systematic, ri+orous, and comprehensive the concept that ?as once .no?n as point of vie,,and have +iven it the name of focalization& ince the term ?as first introduced y Rerard Renette (15"0), it has under+one a series of sustantialadKustments su++ested y such theorists as Mie.e al (155;), hlomith *immon3Denan (15":), Patric. L>-eill (155$), and Manfred Eahn(1555c)& 4avid Herman has, for e9ample, introduced a helpful ne? cate+ory entitled hypothetical focalization (!00!, :10)& This continual process of chan+e has een accompanied y an undercurrent of s.epticism from theorists such as Moni.a Fluderni., ?ho thin.s that focaliAationis a cate+ory “?hose precise definition has &&& never een a+reed upon and is still open to remappin+” (155%, :$$)& “Ln account of theseinconsistencies, ” she feels, “it may e ?ell to scrap the concept of focaliAation in its traditional confi+urations” (155%, :$%)&

8n summary, focaliAation is the perspective, an+le of vision, or point of vie? from ?hich events are related& 8n Renette>s famous formulation, itmust e distin+uished from the act of narration in the follo?in+ ?ay @hen you read a discourse and as. “@ho spea.sI” or “@ho narratesI, ”you are concerned ?ith narration& @hen you as. “@ho seesI” or “@ho thin.sI” then you are concerned ?ith focaliAation& ometimes an a+ent



sees and spea.s at the same time, and sometimes the a+ent ?ho sees is different from the a+ent ?ho spea.s& Garious typolo+ies of focaliAationhave een created, ut perhaps the est .no?n is Renette>s ori+inal model zero focalization occurs in the traditional novel of the omniscientnarrator ?here the events are not focaliAed throu+h a sin+le character ut are clearly focaliAed throu+h the narrator internal focalization occurs?hen the events are, in +eneral, focaliAed throu+h a sin+le character or characters in turn and eternal focalization occurs ?hen descriptions arelimited to characters> e9ternal ehavior (in ?hat is called ehaviorist narrative) (15"0, 1"5#50)& 8t is clear that the concept of focaliAation iscrucially relevant to the study of fictional minds ecause it is concerned ?ith the decisions that readers ma.e aout ?hich consciousness is ein+ presented in the te9t at any one time&

The concept of focaliAation has a +ood deal of potential as one tool amon+ others for the e9amination of the presentation of fictional minds& 8n particular, focaliAation is an opportunity to e9plore in detail the precise methods y ?hich a narrator uses a character>s consciousness as the perceptual vie?point or an+le from ?hich the narration ta.es place& @ithin the speech cate+ory approach, this techni=ue is called free indirect

perception& Ta.e this e9ample “He sat on the

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ench& The train pulled a?ay&” /t first +lance, the second sentence loo.s as if it is as much a simple physical description as the first sentence&Ho?ever, it can also e read as the character>s perception of the physical event and, even more importantly, y e9tension, the character>se9perience of the psycholo+ical implications of the event& /s 8 said in section 1 of this chapter, physical events should e considered as charactere9periences& The conte9t may sho? that he ?as ?aitin+ for the person he loves ?ho ?as not on the train& Free indirect perception involves therecovery of those parts of the discourse that initially appear to e pure narratorial report ut that, on reflection, can e read as descriptions ofevents or states in the story?orld as e9perienced y a particular fictional mind& / free indirect perception readin+ ta.es responsiility forsuKectivity a?ay from the narrator, ?here it initially appears to e, and +ives it to a character& 8nternal focaliAation readin+s can naturaliAe as acharacter>s perception a +ood deal of discourse that appears at first si+ht to e pure narratorial description& y this means, the ?holeconsciousnesses of characters can e e9panded to include descriptions of aspects of the story?orld that are seen from their perceptual, co+nitive,and evaluative point of vie?& This interface et?een characters and their story?orld is a hi+hly informative ?ay to lin. the internalconsciousnesses of characters to their e9ternal social and physical conte9t&

Ho?ever, 8 thin. that there are some prolems ?ith the concept of focaliAation& For e9ample, it ?as envisa+ed primarily for, and ?or.s very ?ellfor, one aspect of mental functionin+#perception& 8t is noticeale that theorists of focaliAation are much more comfortale tal.in+ aout perception than aout other areas of mental life, and most of the e9amples used in e9planations of focaliAation are of perception& Ho?ever, the



notion ?or.s much less ?ell for the other aspects of consciousness that are descried in chapter $& @hen other types of thin.in+ such asco+nition or the emotions are discussed, the conceptual frame?or. can ecome rather cumersome, uninformative, and even misleadin+& Fore9ample, ?hen thou+ht presentation occurs, the character ?ho is havin+ the thou+hts is oth the focaliAer and the focaliAed oKect& @ithin al>sscheme, in first3person novels the introspectin+ character has three functions as the narrator, as the internal focaliAer (155;, 1$"), and as ?hatshe calls the non$perceptible focalized ob1ect (155;, 16:)& 8n the case of third3person narration, the narrator has at least one function as e9ternalnarrator& The character has at least one function the non3perceptile focaliAed oKect& Lpinion is divided on ?ho has the e9ternal focaliAerfunction&

8n the case of “8 felt happy” (first3person narration), this means that there is a lot of conceptual apparatus to e9plain a very simple sentence& Thereare

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three elements the “8” ?ho is reportin+ the feelin+ the “8” ?ho is havin+ the feelin+ and the “8” ?ho is introspectively a?are of the e9istence ofthe feelin+& 8ntuitively, one feels that only t?o and not three elements are needed the “8” ?ho is reportin+ the feelin+ and the “8” ?ho is oth

havin+ the feelin+ and is a?are of the feelin+& earle has convincin+ly demonstrated that introspection cannot e understood in terms of oneentity doin+ the introspectin+ and another entity e9periencin+ the oKect of the introspection& The “8” ?ho is feelin+ happy cannot e separatedfrom the same “8” ?ho is introspectively a?are of the feelin+ of happiness& 8n earle>s terms, such a vie? of the faculty of introspection “re=uiresa distinction et?een the oKect spected sicQ and the spectin+ sicQ of it, and ?e cannot ma.e this distinction for conscious states” (155!, 1$$)&To relate earle>s point to the lan+ua+e of focaliAation, the distinction et?een the internal focaliAer and the non3perceptile focaliAed oKect is afalse one&

8n the case of “He felt happy” (third3person narration), as 8 said, there appears to e some confusion over ?ho is the focaliAer& *immon3Denansays firmly that it is the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& Ho?ever, other theorists ar+ue that the narrative is focaliAed here from the point of vie? ofthe character& The difference is, 8 thin., a result of the varyin+ levels of fluidity in the concept& The first approach is to re+ard focaliAation as afeature that is fairly fi9ed and constant throu+hout the ?hole len+th of a te9t then the focaliAer in the case of “He felt happy” is considered to e

the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& (/n e9ception is the reflector novel, ?here the focaliAation is considered to e fi9ed ?ith the reflector characterfor the len+th of the novel&) The second approach is to use the concept in a very fle9ile and fluid ?ay the identity of the focaliAer often thenchan+es from sentence to sentence& L>-eill uses the concept in this ?ay& Ta.e this e9ample “He felt happy and she felt happy too&” @ithin thefirst approach, the focaliAer is the e9ternal narrator3focaliAer& @ithin the second approach, there are t?o focaliAers the internal character3



focaliAer “he” for the first part of the sentence and the internal character3focaliAer “she” for the second part of the sentence& This confusion oversuch a asic element in the conceptual frame?or. seems to me to e unsatisfactory&

/ further concern is that focaliAation is defined in terms of the distinction et?een the a+ent ?ho spea.s and the a+ent ?ho sees& ut is thisdistinction ?or.aleI Ho? is it possile Kust to spea., as opposed to seein+ then spea.in+I urely spea.in+ involves seein+ ?hat it is that you?ish to spea. aoutI 8t seems to me that the =uestion “@ho spea.sI” should really e reformulated in part, and in the case of third3person te9ts,as “@ho is the narrative a+ent ?ho sees

3603

that a character a+ent seesI” That is, it may e the character ?ho sees, ut it is the narrator ?ho sees that the character sees& 8t is only then thatthe narrator is ale to spea.& This issue arises in particular ?ith the mode of thou+ht report& This mode is usually descried as characterfocaliAation, ut in practice, it is often clear that it is the narrator ?ho sees that the character is seein+ (or not seein+)& -arrators often reportmental processes that a character is not a?are of, or only dimly a?are of& This point is an e9ample of the fact that the concept of focaliAation cansometimes conceal a +ood deal of the comple9ity of narrative& The laelin+ can often e uninformative or even misleadin+& The statement, “the

narration is focaliAed throu+h character 9, ” covers a very ?ide ran+e of cases& /t one end of the scale is the case ?here the narration follo?s acharacter around so that there are no scenes in ?hich 9 does not appear 9 is the perceptual vie?point from ?hich the narration ta.es place, utthere is little information aout the ?or.in+s of 9>s mind& /t the other end of the scale is the case ?here the reader is +iven a full and detailedanalysis of every aspect of 9>s mental functionin+, includin+ not Kust perception ut also co+nition, dispositions, and so on& /nd, of course, thereis an infinite numer of +radations alon+ this scale& @hat is needed, therefore, is a typolo+y that distin+uishes et?een cases in a much moresensitive and discriminatin+ ?ay than the conceptual frame?or. does at present&

FocaliAation can e re?ardin+ly reconsidered ?ithin the conte9t of fictional minds& / +ood e9ample is contained in Mie.e al>s famous story ofthe lau+hin+ mice (155;, 1$$#$%)& al descries a lar+e as3relief in 8ndia in ?hich mice are sho?n lau+hin+ at a cat in a yo+a position& hee9plains that it can only e understood once the narrative is focaliAed throu+h the mice and the vie?er realiAes that they are lau+hin+ ecausethey .no? that the cat ?ill not no? chase them& Ho?ever, this point can also e made in terms of fictional minds& The vie?er thin.s that the

mice thin. that the cat thin.s and so the mice thin. &&& and so on& Most narrative theorists (althou+h not, for e9ample, Rerald Prince) accept thatthe concept of focaliAation applies to the discourse the same story can e presented in different discourses from different points of vie?&Ho?ever, ?hat 8 ?ill do in later chapters is to e9plore the ?ider concept of aspectuality (used in the philosophical and not the +rammatical sense)as it applies to the story?orld& Mie.e al e9plains that “?henever events are presented, they are al?ays presented from ?ithin a certain vision”



(155;, 1$!)& al develops this insi+ht into the discourse ?ithin the conceptual frame?or. of focaliAation& My rather different point is that,?henever events occur in the story?orld, they are

3613

al?ays e9perienced from ?ithin a certain vision& 8 ?ill call this feature of the story?orld aspectuality, and 8 ?ill ta.e it in the various directionsindicated y later chapters&

Conclusion

/ recurrin+ theme throu+hout this chapter has een that, althou+h the approaches discussed earlier all have their o?n individual stren+ths, theirvalue ?ould e even +reater if it ?as e9plicitly reco+niAed that they ?ere concerned ?ith fictional minds& 8 ?ill ta.e three e9amples at random/c.no?led+ements of the importance of causal connections et?een events in definitions of narrative ecome even more valuale ?hen it isreco+niAed that these causal connections relate to the ?or.in+s of fictional minds& /lso, the inferences and hypotheses to ?hich reader responsetheorists +ive =uite Kustified importance involve, in the main, readers> analyses and Kud+ments of characters> thou+ht processes& Finally, many of

the co+nitive frames that ?e use to enale comprehension of te9ts to ta.e place are concerned ?ith fictional mental functionin+& Thenarratolo+ical approaches descried in this chapter do not, ta.en to+ether ?ith the speech cate+ory approach descried in the ne9t chapter, form acoherent and complete perspective on fictional minds& Ho?ever, they ?ill ma.e invaluale contriutions to?ard one ecause they can all einte+rated into the frame?or. descried in the later sta+es of this study&

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3

#he Speech Categories

%. Summary

ecause the speech cate+ory approach of classical narratolo+y is ased on the assumption that the cate+ories that are applied to fictional speechcan e unprolematically applied to fictional thou+ht, it is concerned primarily ?ith the part of the mind .no?n as inner speech, the hi+hlyveraliAed flo? of selfconscious thou+ht& For this reason, it does not do Kustice to the comple9ity of the types of evidence for the ?or.in+s offictional minds that are availale in narrative discourse it pays little attention to states of mind such as eliefs, intentions, purposes, and



dispositions and it does not analyAe the ?hole of the social mind in action& The purpose of this chapter is to sho? ho? narratolo+ical approachesto consciousness have een distorted y the +rip of the veral norm& Chapters $ to ; ?ill e concerned ?ith the areas of the mind that have een+iven insufficient attention ?ithin the speech cate+ory approach& They ?ill adopt a functional and teleolo+ical perspective on those areas and ?illnot simply try to find a ta9onomic e=uivalent to the speech cate+ories& The mind that is studied in this alternative ?ay is not passive, ut active itis not isolated in individuals, ut is social and conte9tual it is not simply the oKect of discourse, ut is the a+ent of action& Typical para+raphs offictional te9ts tend to e made up of densely ?oven fra+ments of a ?ide variety of different modes& They are not streams of direct thou+ht ?ithinterruptions, or flo?s of free indirect thou+ht ?ith intrusions& Wuite simply, they are typically comple9 in their portrayal of the fictional mindactin+ in the conte9t of other minds ecause fictional thou+ht and real thou+ht are li.e that& Fictional life and real life are li.e that& Most of ourlives are not spent in thou+htful self3communin+s& -arrators .no? this, ut narratolo+y has not yet developed a vocaulary for studyin+ therelationships et?een fictional minds and the social situations ?ithin ?hich they function&

This chapter has een ?ritten ?ith reluctance& ections ! and : are necessarily rather ne+ative and occasionally rather e9asperated in tone, andso, if you are ?illin+ to ta.e my ?ord for it that the distortions that 8 have referred to have

occurred, you mi+ht ?ish to s.ip these middle sections and +o strai+ht to section $ and the more positive chapters that follo?&

Lne difficulty in discussin+ the speech cate+ory account is that there is a ?ide ran+e of models to choose from& They +o from t?o speechcate+ories, to the standard numer of three, to rian McHale>s ?idely adopted seven3level model as contained in his influential article “Free8ndirect 4iscourse / urvey of *ecent /ccounts” (15;", !6"#%0), and even to Moni.a Fluderni.>s particularly elaorate construct, ?hich, intotal, contains no fe?er than thirty elements (155:, :11)& /nother prolem, often referred to at this sta+e in the discussion, is that each cate+oryhas several different names& 2i.e 4orrit Cohn, 8 thin. that there are three fundamental cate+ories to ?hich, unli.e her, 8 have +iven very simplenames direct thou+ht, thou+ht report, and free indirect thou+ht& For reasons that should e clear y no?, it is vital to use names for the thou+htcate+ories that separate them from speech& 8 descried the three cate+ories riefly in chapter 1, section !, ut 8 ?ill no? discuss them a+ain inmore detail&

4irect thou+ht is the narrative convention that allo?s the narrator to present a veral transcription that passes as the reproduction of the actual

thou+hts of a character (for e9ample, “he thou+ht, @here am 8I”)& 8t ecame conventionaliAed in the formal, mannered, and styliAed solilo=uyof the ei+hteenth3 and early nineteenth3century novel& Bventually it developed into free direct thou+ht, in ?hich =uotation mar.s and ta+s (suchas “she thou+ht”) are not used, durin+ the early part of the last century ?ith modernist ?riters such as Eames Eoyce and Gir+inia @oolf& 4irect



The relationship et?een the three modes of thou+ht presentation and the areas of the mind presented y them can e put in the follo?in+, verysimple terms direct thou#ht can e used only for inner speech free indirect thou#ht is e=ually suitale for inner speech ut in addition,accordin+ to some theorists ut not others, can have an ami+uous, hypothetical =uality that ma.es it suitale for the presentation of some otherareas of the mind and thou#ht report is suitale for presentin+ all areas of the mind, includin+ inner speech&

8t is also ?orth e9plainin+ at this point the type of thou+ht report .no?n as narratized speech& Prince defines it as a “type of discourse ?herey acharacter>s utterances or veral thou+hts are represented, in ?ords that are the narrator>s, as acts amon+ other acts a discourse aout ?ordsuttered (or thou+hts) e=uivalent to a discourse not aout ?ords” (15";, %$)& Renette descries it y sayin+ that the narrator can condense veralthou+hts into mental events in “a narrative of thou+hts, ” or “narratiAed inner speech” (15"0, 1;1)& This concept usefully descries one, ut onlyone, of the many uses of the versatile techni=ue of thou+ht report in this case, its aility to summariAe inner speech and present it as mentalaction& -arratiAed speech can e an invaluale element in the discourse& For e9ample, “He thou+ht, >8 ?ill lift the ?heel&> ” can seem rather

36%3

clumsy unless there are particular reasons for that formulation& The alternative, in narratiAed speech, is “He decided to lift the ?heel&” This is

sharper and ?ill perhaps more often fit the needs of the narrative& Ho?ever, there is a dan+er inherent in the concept of narratiAed speech& 8f oneaccepts the vie? that thou+ht is indeed speech, then it must lo+ically follo? that all thou+ht report is narratiAed speech and that this is its onlyfunction& Ho?ever, there is very often no evidence in the narrative for the reader to suppose that e9amples of thou+ht report are narratiAedspeech& The second e9ample ?as used as an illustration of inner speech, ut it is unli.ely that a reader ?ould read it as such, ecause it is+enerally not important ?hether or not this mental event involved inner speech& 8t is more interestin+ to classify it as a decision and therefore asan e9ample of mental functionin+ or mental action in a social and physical conte9t&

2. #he &rosecution

8t seems to me that there are at least five prolems ?ith the use of the speech cate+ories to analyAe presentations of fictional thou+ht&

1& The privile+in+ of the apparently mimetic and rather +lamorous cate+ories of free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht over the die+etic andseemin+ly uninterestin+ cate+ory of thou+ht report&



/ +ood deal of rilliant, ima+inative, and sutle ?or. has een done on free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht ut very little has een done onthou+ht report& Lnly 4orrit Cohn in her seminal and still e9citin+ study ransparent -inds +ives e=ual ?ei+ht to thou+ht report despite the factthat it is the most si+nificant mode in terms of amount of use& The ?ords that narratolo+ists tend to use aout the role of the narrator andtherefore aout thou+ht report are ne+ative ones such as narratorial “interruption, ” “intrusion, ” “interference, ” and “distortion&” 8nstances ofthou+ht report are re+ularly simply mista.en for free indirect thou+ht& Passa+es of narrative that are laeled interior monolo+ue or stream of

consciousness often contain a +ood deal of thou+ht report that is simply not +enerally reco+niAed y theorists&

!& he overestimation of the verbal component in thou#ht &

The favored cate+ories of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht tend to sho? only that part of a character>s mind that is the hi+hly veraliAedand self3conscious flo? of consciousness .no?n as inner speech& o, inner speech ecomes the paradi+m of the mind, even thou+h it is only avery small part of the total activity of fictional minds& Perception is the only other part of the mind that has een analyAed in any detail& The mindis seen in metaphorical terms primarily as a stream or flo? of self3conscious mental events& ut this

36;3

metaphor is too linear and one3dimensional& The mind is a three3dimensional container& etter still, +iven the e9istence of latent states that e9istover time, it is actually four3dimensional&

:& he resultin# ne#lect of the thou#ht report of characters> states of mind & Many of the episodes of current consciousness that occur incharacters> minds are not inner speech& Consider, “He suddenly felt depressed&” B9amples of such mental phenomena include mood, desires,emotions, sensations, visual ima+es, attention, and memory& Characters> minds also contain latent mental states& The truth or falsehood of +eneralstatements aout these states is independent of the person>s feelin+s at the time that the statements are made& Consider, “He is prone todepression&” That statement can e true even if the person is happy at the time ?hen it is made& B9amples of such states include dispositions, eliefs, attitudes, Kud+ments, s.ills, .no?led+e, ima+ination, intellect, volition, character traits, and haits of thou+ht& uch causal phenomena asintentions, purposes, motives, and reasons for action can e either immediate mental events or latent states, dependin+ on ?hether or not they are

present in consciousness at any particular moment& 8 hope that these lon+ lists +ive an indication of the vast areas of the mind that are not suitalefor analysis under the speech cate+ory approach& Presentin+ these various phenomena is a lar+e part of the role of the narrators of novels, ut ithas received very little attention ?ithin the speech cate+ory account ecause of the first t?o prolems& / conse=uence is that narratorialreferences to latent states of mind such as dispositions and eliefs are usually discussed under the entirely separate headin+ of characteriAation& 8t



is an important part of my ar+ument to =uestion this entirely artificial distinction& CharacteriAation and consciousness should e rou+ht to+etherunder the ?ider headin+ of mind &

$& he privile#in# of some novels over others: and some scenes in novels over others&

8 referred at the start to 4orrit Cohn>s “predilection for novels ?ith thou+htful characters and scenes of self3communion” (15;", v) and for“moments of lonely self3communion minutely tracin+ spiritual and emotional conflicts” (1555, "$)& 8f you ?ere to rely on classical narratolo+y>sspeech cate+ories for your picture of fictional minds in Bn+lish literature, you mi+ht find that it consisted to a surprisin+ly lar+e e9tent ofthou+htful characters in scenes of lonely self3communion& For e9ample, ei+hteenth3century novels, 4ic.ens, Thac.eray, Hardy, and the formalconservatives of the t?entieth century such as Rraham Rreene and Bvelyn @au+h are underrepresented ecause they are not entirely suitale forspeech cate+ory analysis, althou+h they respond ?ell to the approach that is descried in the follo?in+ chapters& Fluderni.>s ar+ument that /phraehn has

36"3

a crucial role in the development of ?hat she calls the consciousness novel (155%, 1%"#;!) is a ?elcome e9ception& The ?ay that narrators of4ic.ens>s novels construct characters> minds is different from, say, the narrators of Eane /usten and Reor+e Bliot ecause the former use moresurface ehavior, +aps, and indeterminacies and less direct access& Therefore, different demands are made upon the reader&6& he tendency to #ive the impression that characters> minds really only consist of a private passive flo, of consciousness& (The final prolem is perhaps the mostimportant one&) @hat is missin+ is an e9plicit reco+nition that much of the thou+ht that ta.es place in novels is the purposeful, en+a+ed, socialinteraction that is discussed in later chapters&Moni.a Fluderni. uses the follo?in+ passa+e from om 7ones to illustrate the use of thou+ht reportfor ?hat she descries as “+eneral and distant descriptions of consciousness” (155:, !5;)& 8t descries Captain lifil>s plans for the future “TheseMeditations ?ere entirely employed on Mr& /ll?orthy>s Fortune for, first, he e9ercised much Thou+ht in calculatin+, as ?ell as he could, thee9act Galue of the @hole ?hich calculations he often sa? Lccasion to alter in his o?n Favour /nd secondly, and chiefly, he pleased himself?ith intended /lterations in the House and Rardens, and in proKectin+ many other chemes, as ?ell for the 8mprovement of the Bstate as of theRrandeur of the Place” (1556, ;!, =uoted in 155:, !5;)& Her comment on this passa+e can e related to the five prolems ?ith the speech

cate+ory approach as follo?s1& The passa+e ?ill seem “+eneral and distant” if the paradi+ms for the presentation of thou+ht are the modes of direct thou+ht and freeindirect thou+ht&

!& B=ually, it seems “+eneral and distant” if the paradi+m for thou+ht is inner speech&



:& The comment does not ta.e into account the riches to e discovered in the analyses of states of mind in the mode of thou+ht report (seesection $ of this chapter)&

$& Bi+hteenth3century novels such as om 7ones do not enefit from speech cate+ory analysis in the ?ay that later novels do&6& @hen the passa+e is seen as a description of active mental functionin+ rather than as a summary of a private and passive flo? of

consciousness, it ecomes the opposite of “+eneral and distant&”

-arrative theorists mi+ht say of the five prolems, “ut 8 don>t thin. these thin+s” 8 am not sayin+ that they do& My point is that, althou+hnarratolo+ists

3653

mi+ht a+ree ?ith my ar+uments if as.ed, the theory as ?ritten does not ta.e sufficient account of them& /nalyses of particular passa+es of freeindirect thou+ht or direct thou+ht ?ill necessarily reveal the social conte9t of the thou+ht under discussion& ut 8 am sayin+ that the relationship et?een the thou+ht and the conte9t is not e9plicitly theoriAed& Lviously no narratolo+ist thin.s that readin+ Eane /usten or Reor+e Bliot is thesame as readin+ Gir+inia @oolf or Eames Eoyce& Ho?ever, is it too far3fetched to suppose that, ecause of the emphasis in the theoretical

literature, a reader of speech cate+ory narratolo+y ?ho had not previously read any of these novels mi+ht e surprised to find that neither (mmanor -iddlemarch ?as a @oolfian or Eoycean stream of consciousnessI B=ually, no narratolo+ist elieves that 5lysses consists entirely of passa+es of stream of consciousness or interior monolo+ue& Ho?ever, a reader of speech cate+ory narratolo+y ?ho had not previously read the oo. ?ould, 8 thin., have difficulty reco+niAin+ it, particularly the latter t?o3thirds of it, from the theoretical descriptions& The chiefcharacteristic of the oo. as a ?hole is the increasin+ prevalence of more and more outlandish and iAarre narratorial voices, ut ?ho ?ould+uess it from the theoryI

The rest of this section is devoted to the first and second prolems, startin+ ?ith the first& Lnce those parts of the mind that are most veral have een privile+ed over those that are least, then it follo?s that the speech cate+ories that are most suited to the apparently mimetic representation ofinner speech ?ill e privile+ed over the cate+ory thou+ht report that is most suitale for the presentation of all the other areas of the mind& Fore9ample, 4ere. ic.erton tal.s of the “supersession” of thou+ht report y free indirect thou+ht (15%;, !:%)& ome theorists of free indirect

thou+ht such as *oy Pascal (15;;) and 2ouise Flavin (15";) do not even mention the e9istence of thou+ht report& Lthers use terms such asnarratorial description and do not ma.e it clear ?hether they mean surface description of the physical story?orld or thou+ht report& Paul Hernadiar+ues that the si+ns of authorial narration in the mode of thou+ht report are “aritrary” in a ?ay that the other t?o modes are not& Theconse=uence, accordin+ to his revealin+ly hostile description of thou+ht report, is that it treats mental events as thou+h they are alto+ether non3



veral& For this reason, accordin+ to Hernadi, there is a “static, often lifeless =uality” in much thou+ht report (15;!, :5)& There are at least three prolems here& First, thou+ht report is ale to descrie inner speech in non3veral terms ?hen the techni=ue of narratiAed speech is used, ut thisis not the same as treatin+ inner speech as thou+h it is non3veral in ori+in& econdly, some mental events are alto+ether

3%03

non3veral& Thou+ht is a continuum, and thou+ht report is fle9ile enou+h to present all the different varieties of it in a lar+e numer of different?ays that are suitale to the needs of particular narratives& Finally, the result is static and lifeless only if it is done adly it is full of movementand life if it is done ?ell& Hernadi also su++ests that y usin+ free indirect thou+ht the narrator “avoids” renderin+ thou+ht from an e9ternal perspective and analytical distance (15;!, :5)& @hy should this e a techni=ue to e avoidedI 8t is part of the function of the narrator to analyAe psychic life and very often it is most appropriate for the narrator to do this y renderin+ thou+ht from an e9ternal perspective and ?ith analyticaldistance& These practices are not necessarily to e avoided&

@hile emphasiAin+ that free indirect discourse is not uni=ue to literature, rian McHale su++ests that it is “distinctively literary &&& ecause theessential character of literature itself is inscried in miniature ?ithin it” (15;", !"$)& Michael McDeon, ?ho lavishes similar praise on freeindirect discourse in his Theory of the -ovel (!000), refers to its “strictly >literary> character” (!000, $"%) and descries it as “an e9clusively>literary> style” (!000, $"6) despite the lar+e ody of evidence to the contrary that is contained in Fluderni.>s The Fictions of 2an+ua+es and the2an+ua+es of Fiction& /s someone ?ho uses free indirect discourse re+ularly in my (decidedly non3literary) ?or., 8 am ale to say from personale9perience that McDeon is mista.en& 8 laor the point only to stress that the hi+h re+ard in ?hich free indirect discourse is held can lead theoristsinto inaccuracy&

Much thou+ht has een +iven to the +ray area et?een free indirect thou+ht and thou+ht report& This deate arises ecause it is sometimes notclear ?hether the suKectivity ein+ e9pressed in a particular passa+e is the character>s or the narrator>s& Ho?ever, as far as 8 .no?, the issue isonly ever discussed in terms of ?hether or not the passa+e is free indirect thou+ht, not ?hether or not it is thou+ht report& 8nterest is lost if it isestalished that it is not free indirect thou+ht& -o one ever refers to the delicious uncertainty and ami+uity of thou+ht report in the same terms asfree indirect thou+ht& ut ?hy notI 8f free indirect thou+ht tends to e fascinatin+ and sutle and thou+ht report is potentially static and lifeless,

?hy can they e so difficult to tell apartI Lf course, laels are Kust means to ends, and in itself, it is of little si+nificance ?hether a particular passa+e is laeled in one ?ay or another& 8n a sense, there may e no ri+ht or ?ron+ aout these decisions& *eaders read discourses in different?ays, and this is particularly true of a discursive phenomenon such as free indirect thou+ht that is so dependent on the interpretive decisions ofreaders& Ho?ever, it does ecome a prolem ?hen theoretical decisions are ta.en that contain a



3%13

ias that impoverishes our understandin+ of the richness, sutlety, and variety of the various means y ?hich characters> consciousnesses are presented to readers&

Lne result of the cate+ory ias is that the concept of free indirect thou+ht +ro?s and +ro?s and is then applied inappropriately& Fluderni. hasri+orously analyAed one e9ample (155:, "1#"!)& Manfred Eahn has discussed another& He says this aout a study y usan Bhrlich (1550) (8 ?illuse my o?n terms for the three cate+ories in order to avoid confusion) “To ma.e matters ?orse, free indirect thou+htQ is further e9tended yBhrlich to cover even direct thou+ht and indirect thou+ht&&&& Lne of the immediate effects of Bhrlich>s no? seriously overe9tended free indirectthou+htQ is that, cuc.oo3li.e, it has cro?ded out all its silin+s&&&& ut, it may e as.ed, is it not e9actly @oolf >s conscious modulation, herorchestration of all of the techni=ues, that produces the remar.ale depth3effects and rhythmic =uality of her novelsI B9tended free indirectthou+htQ not only provides no ans?er the =uestion itself is pointless if almost everythin+ is free indirect thou+htQ” (155!, :%0)& Wuite&

4iscussions aout the relative fre=uency of the three modes ?ill have only a limited value until careful empirical studies are done that use preciseand universally a+reed criteria for the modes (for e9ample, see hort, emino, and Culpeper 155%)& -evertheless, it is still ?orth ma.in+ one ort?o +eneral points ?hile ?e a?ait the empirical evidence& Fluderni.>s perspective on the issue is that, in the representation of consciousness,“direct discourse is the least common techni=ue (e9cept in the interior monolo+ue of the t?entieth3century novel), ?ith a traditional preponderance of thou+ht reportQ and, in second place, free indirect discourse, ?hich comes close to competin+ ?ith thou+ht reportQ in late3nineteenth3 and early3t?entieth3century fiction” (155:, !51)& 8 a+ree ?ith her vie? that thou+ht report is the most common mode, ut 8 ?oulddispute the ?ei+ht that she +ives to interior monolo+ue& 8n my e9perience, ?hat is called interior monolo+ue often contains as much thou+htreport as the other t?o modes, as ?ell a +ood deal of narratorial surface description of physical conte9t& 8 ?ould also dispute the ?ei+htin+ +ivento free indirect thou+ht and ?ould su++est that it can only e arrived at y classifyin+ a +ood deal of colored thou+ht report as free indirectthou+ht& /s 8 said, thou+h, this can only e a very impressionistic discussion at this sta+e&

Follo?in+ is a rief indication of the amount of attention that has een +iven to the three modes and to focaliAation in a random (honestly)selection of classic narratolo+ical articles and full3len+th studies& This sort of approach is very crude, ut it does +ive a fairly accurate indication

of ?here the interest lies&

3%!3



!ree indirect discourse ,ith a bias to,ard speech anfield 15"!, 4illon and Dirchhoff 15;%, Flavin 15";, Fluderni. 155:, Hernadi 15;!,McHale 15;", McHale 15":, -eumann 15"%, Pascal 15;;, *on 15"1, @einer+ 15"$ (total 11)&

!ree indirect thou#ht ic.erton 15%;, rinton 15"0, 4ry 15;; (total :)& Direct thou#ht Friedman 1566 (total 1)& Narratolo#y survey ,ithdirect thou#ht bias Chatman 15;" (total 1)& Narratolo#y survey ,ith no bias Cohn 15;", Fluderni. 155%, McHale 15"1 (total :)& -arratolo+y

survey ?ith focaliAation ias al 155;, Renette 15"0, Renette 15"", L>-eill 155$, Prince 15"! (total 6)& Thou+ht report none& Narratolo#y survey ,ith thou#ht report bias none&

@hat this list sho?s is that there is, so far as 8 am a?are, no oo. or article that is devoted specifically to thou+ht report, and no survey ofnarratolo+y that is iased to?ard thou+ht report& Cohn is the only narratolo+ist ?ho is scrupulous in +ivin+ e=ual ?ei+ht to all modes& 8nTransparent Minds, each mode is +iven a separate chapter& The chapter on thou+ht report is first and is of the same len+th as the others&

Here are the results of another survey& 8 have identified ninety3five separate episodes of direct access to the thou+hts of characters in chapter !5of Thac.eray>s +anity !air and have classified them as follo?s direct thou+ht# 1 free indirect thou+ht#$ thou+ht report#50& 8t is easy to see?hy there are fe? analyses of the presentation of the mind in +anity !air in the current narratolo+ical literature& 8f the response to this point is,“@ell, the presentations of fictional minds in +anity !air are not that interestin+, ” my response is, “Ho? do ?e .no?I”

Concernin+ the second prolem, there are numerous e9amples ?ithin narratolo+y of the assumption that thou+ht can e treated simply as internalspeech& For e9ample, the narrative theorist eymour Chatman claims in Story and Discourse (15;") that the “most ovious and direct means ofhandlin+ the thou+hts of a character is to treat them as >unspo.en speech> ” (15;", 1"!)& Renette asserts that the “novelistic convention, perhapstruthful in this case, is that thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech” (15"0, 1;1)& Renette also declares that “ >Thou+ht> is indeedspeech” (15"0, 1;"), addin+, some?hat oscurely, “ut at the same time this speech, >oli=ue> and deceitful li.e all the others, is +enerallyunfaithful to the >felt truth>#the felt truth ?hich no inner monolo+ue can reveal

3%:3

and ?hich the novelist must ultimately sho? +limpses of throu+h the concealments of ad faith, ?hich are >consciousness> itself ” (15"0, 1;")&ri Mar+olin ?rites that “?m@ental acts share many features ?ith veral ones, especially in narrative, ?here they must une9ceptionally everaliAed in the form of inner speech” (15"%, !16)& Mar+olin also refers to thou+ht a numer of times as “inner veraliAation” (for e9ample,!000, 65!) and as “suvocal” (for e9ample, 15"%, !1")& Mie.e al dra?s out a very important implication ?hen she maintains that “uQnspo.en



?ords#thou+hts, interior monolo+ues#no matter ho? e9tensive, are not perceptile to other characters” (155;, 16:)& This statement sho?s veryclearly ho? the veral ias ?or.s a+ainst an understandin+ of the social and pulicly accessile nature of thou+ht& *ememer ho?, in the scenefrom !riends, *achel>s thou+hts ,ere perceptile to Phoee and the othersI

@ith re+ard to the t?o statements from Renette that are =uoted in the precedin+ para+raph and that are ta.en from Narrative Discourse (15"0),

he concedes in his later -arrative 4iscourse *evisited (15""), that “Cohn le+itimately insists on ma.in+ a place for the nonveral forms ofconsciousness, and 8 ?as certainly ?ron+ to classify as >narratiAed inner speech> a statement such as >8 decided to marry /lertine,> ?hich is y nomeans necessarily tied to a veraliAed thou+ht” (15"", %0)& This is +ood& ut he then comprehensively loses any +round that he mi+ht have+ained y sayin+ the follo?in+, ?hich illustrates the +rip of the veral norm even etter than any restatement of the ori+inal vie? could havedone “4orrit Cohn>s Kustifiale reservation aout a possile nonveraliAed consciousness holds +ood only partly for one of her three cate+ories&2et us aritrarily fi+ure this part at 17! Cohn>s reservation holds +ood for 17% of her o?n system” (15"", %1)& He is ma.in+ t?o points here, othof ?hich are Kustified& 8t is the conclusion that he dra?s from them that is so revealin+ly mista.en& First, he is sayin+ that direct thou+ht and freeindirect thou+ht are necessarily tied to inner speech (thou+h many theorists disa+ree ?ith him aout the latter), and so it is only ?ith thou+htreport that the issue of non3veral thou+ht arises& econd, the concept of narratiAed speech means that some of the thou+ht presented in the modeof thou+ht report could have een of veral ori+in& He then aritrarily su++ests that this narratiAed speech mi+ht account for half of all thou+htreport, and so the oKection only applies to half of one3third of Cohn>s system& To estalish precisely ho? specious this ar+ument is, it is est toapproach the point from completely the opposite direction& 8 have emphasiAed throu+hout this discussion that there are vast areas of the mind thatare not addressed ?ithin the speech cate+ory approach& /s it is these areas that ?e are tal.in+ aout here, from my perspective the prolem loo.smuch lar+er

3%$3

than one that affects Kust one3si9th of the ?hole& *eversin+ the proportions and sayin+ that Cohn>s reservations hold +ood for five3si9ths of thefictional mind mi+ht e nearer the mar.&

The veral ias is clear ?hen ?e loo. at some of the terms used y narrative theorists& The title of hlomith *immon3Denan>s chapter on the

suKect is “-arration peech *epresentation, ” and ?ithin it, she never e9plicitly addresses the =uestion of thou+ht presentation as opposed tospeech presentation at all& *oy Pascal uses the phrase free indirect speech throu+hout his oo. to refer to thou+ht as ?ell as speech& /nothernarrative theorist, Helmut onheim, e9plains the thin.in+ ehind this policy y sayin+ that the “narrative mode speech, then, includes not onlyspeech in the narro?er sense of ?ords supposedly spo.en aloud ut also a variety of ?ays in ?hich thou+hts and perceptions can e conveyed”



(15"!, 61)& Ho?ever, he also concedes that, since a particular character under discussion “is not supposed to e spea.in+ &&& all the terms for freeindirect thou+htQ ?hich su++est speech are a little misleadin+” (onheim 15"!, 6:)& Manfred Eahn has dra?n our attention to a curious aspect of/nn anfield>s term for free indirect discourse, represented speech and thou+ht “-othin+, strictly spea.in+, is ever a representation of speechand thou+ht& Thou+ht, as opposed to speech, is non3discursive, private, non3communicative, non3pra+matic and semi3veral, to list Kust a fe?differential properties” (155!, :60)& anfield>s term is especially surprisin+ ecause she is emphatic that she does not e=uate thou+ht ?ith inner

speech& (Thou+ht is “not lin+uistic in form” anfield 15"!, "0Q&) /s Eahn points out, for anfield, “the assumption of >inner speech> is a fallacy”(15":, 6)& ut if anfield thin.s that thou+ht is never veral, ?hy does she yo.e thou+ht and speech to+ether in the same termI 8 am not a?arethat she ever separates them out, sometimes as represented speech and at other times as represented thou#ht & 8t mi+ht e thou+ht that 8 ?oulda+ree ?ith anfield aout thou+ht not ein+ “lin+uistic, ” +iven the direction of my ar+ument, ut this is not the case& 8n my vie?, the position isvery simple sometimes thou+ht is hi+hly veraliAed and can accurately e descried as inner speech sometimes it is not and so cannot&anfield>s do+matic antiveral approach is Kust as mista.en as the e=ually infle9ile proveral vie?s discussed earlier&

/s 8 said at the end of section 1, ?hen te9ts are analyAed, the e9tent of the verality of a character>s supposed thou+ht event is not only oftenunclear, it is usually not relevant& For e9ample, “he felt e9cited&” The temptation to re+ard the putative verality of fictional thou+hts as spots ofindeterminacy (rememer the discussion on +aps in the story?orld section in chapter !I) should usually e resisted& 8n most cases, an attempt toclose this particular +ap is not necessary&

3%63

The reader does not need to speculate on the verality of a fictional mental event such as “he felt e9cited&” 8t is much more informative toanalyAe the thou+ht in terms of motives and intentions, ehavior and action& y contrast ?ith such discussions, speculations on the verality of putative mental events are rather sterile and scholastic& /n e9tended e9ample may e of value here& 4ere. ic.erton ar+ues in his article “Modesof 8nterior Monolo+ue / Formal 4efinition” that the methods used to present inner speech are comparale to the methods used to presentordinary speech (15%;, !:!)& 8n the case of direct thou+ht, the lin. is ovious, as the use of direct thou+ht in the e9ample “He thou+ht, >8 ?ill liftthe ?heel> ” is the e9act +rammatical e=uivalent of direct speech, as in “He said, >8 ?ill lift the ?heel&> ” Ho?ever, ic.erton +oes further andmaintains that thou+ht report “is inner speech rendered in indirect speech” (15%;, !:")& There are t?o oKections to this ar+ument Lne is that his

reference to inner speech i+nores the other areas of the mind& The other is that thou+ht report only sometimes resemles the +rammatical form ofindirect speech& 8n the e9ample “He thou+ht that he ?ould lift the ?heel, ” the thou+ht report does indeed resemle indirect speech, as in “Hesaid that he ?ould lift the ?heel&” Ho?ever, in “He decided to lift the ?heel, ” the +rammatical form of the thou+ht report ears no resemlanceto indirect speech& 8t loo.s more li.e a report of a physical action, such as “He lifted the ?heel” ecause “He decided to lift the ?heel” is the



thou+ht report of mental functionin+ or mental action, not of inner speech& 8t is therefore not true that thou+ht can only e represented y one ofthe methods for renderin+ spo.en speech&8n the first para+raph of his article, ic.erton refers to the need for novelists to convey characters> innerlives& Ho?ever, y his second para+raph, this need has ecome solely identified ?ith the use of interior monolo+ue (15%;, !!5)& ic.erton uses a passa+e from Reor+e Bliot>s -iddlemarch, a summary of 2yd+ate>s inner life, to conclude that in it “the inner speech is summariAed” (15%;,!:6)& 8 ?ill =uote the first para+raph of this passa+e, in my o?n formattin+, in order to sho? that this identification of thou+ht report ?ith

narratiAed speech is simply ?ron+& My comments apply e=ually ?ell to the second para+raph, ?hich is omitted solely for reasons of spacea& 2yd+ate elieved himself to e careless aout his dress, and he despised a man ?ho calculated the effects of his costume & it seemed to him only a matter of course that he had aundance of fresh +armentsc& #such thin+s ?ere naturally ordered in sheaves&

3%%3

d& 8t must e rememered that he had never hitherto felt the chec. of importunate det, and he ?al.ed y hait, not y self3criticism&e& ut the chec. had come (15;;, $0%#;, =uoted in 15%;, !:6)&The content of the thou+ht in this passa+e is not inner speech, and the form in ?hich it is presented is neither narratiAed speech nor the e=uivalentof indirect speech&a& descries 2yd+ate>s states of mind, specifically his dispositions& The first statement is a elief, and the second statement is an attitude or

preference& oth are true descriptions of his mental life ?hether or not he is consciously thin.in+ aout them& 8t is unnecessary to postulate an ori+inal occurrence of inner speech durin+ ?hich they may have een formulated&

& is also a state of mind and is even further removed from inner speech& 8t ?ould e perfectly possile to preface it ?ith a statement such as“@ithout consciously thin.in+ aout it, it seemed to him &&&”

c& has an uncertain status& 8t can e read as indefinite free indirect discourse ?hat the character mi+ht have out?ardly said or in?ardlythou+ht, althou+h no specific occurrence of inner or spo.en speech can e identified& (There is more information on this phenomenon inthe ne9t section&) Ho?ever, it can also e re+arded as colored thou+ht report&

d& departs even further from inner speech than (a), (), or (c)& Ho? can a sentence e descried as a character>s inner speech ?hen it consistsof the narrator remindin+ the reader first that somethin+ had never happened to that character, and then that he ?as in the hait of not

thin.in+ aout such thin+sIe& is the narrator>s summary of the events that had happened to 2yd+ate to modify his dispositions&



The +rip of the veral norm is a very ti+ht one indeed ?hen an e9ample of narrative discourse that is so far removed from summariAed innerspeech can e presented as such&

The three cate+ories are value3free tools to e used ?hen appropriate& 8t is perfectly possile to criticiAe an author for an unima+inative orunrevealin+ use of a discursive tool ?ithin the pra+matic needs of a particular discourse, ut it is foolish to claim that t?o of the modes are

inherently superior to the third& 8t is unclear ?hy narrative techni=ues have to e valued at all e9cept in the conte9t of the specific and differentnarrative effects for ?hich they are desi+ned& The presentation of thou+ht in Harle=uin or Mills and oon

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romances is sustantially in free indirect thou+ht and is static and lifeless in Henry Fieldin+, it is sustantially in thou+ht report and is full of lifeand movement& Ho?ever, this is no reason for me to claim that thou+ht report is intrinsically superior to free indirect thou+ht&

Mar+olin claims that “modern @estern literary narrative &&& has a clear preference for the rich, detailed, and “unmediated” presentation ofindividual human inner life on all levels of consciousness” (!000, %0%)& 8 am not sure that 8 a+ree& 8 ?onder ?hether it is more that narrativetheory has that preference& The .ey is in the ?ord “unmediated&” Much of the confusion descried earlier can e traced ac. to the privile+in+ ofsho?in+ over tellin+ in the deate initiated y Henry Eames in his prefaces, continued y Percy 2uoc. in he Craft of !iction (15!1), andcriticiAed y @ayne C& ooth in he /hetoric of !iction& The lifil and 2yd+ate passa+es =uoted earlier are oth latant e9amples of thedis+raceful practice of tellin+ rather than sho?in+& *immon3Denan has perceptively commented on this preference for sho?in+ over tellin+“Ho?ever interestin+ this normative deate is, it is ultimately irrelevant for a theoretical and descriptive study of narrative fiction& & & & TQhere isnothin+ inherently +ood or ad in either tellin+ or sho?in+& 2i.e any other techni=ue, each has its advanta+es and disadvanta+es, and theirrelative success or failure depends on their functionality in the +iven ?or.” (15":, 10;#")& Theorists are =uic. to see the irrelevance of anormative deate ?hen it is put in terms of sho?in+ and tellin+ perhaps ecause those terms etray the historical conte9t of that deate&Ho?ever, there can e a tendency on the part of some to see less clearly the irrelevance of the fascination ?ith direct thou+ht and free indirectthou+ht at the e9pense of thou+ht report&

The conte9t in ?hich these difficulties can est e understood is that of the ideolo+ical distrust of the narrator& /s Fluderni. points out, mimesis,“particularly in the tellin+ vs& sho?in+ opposition, then comes to privile+e the seemin+ly >unmediated> te9t of >pure> mimesis in direct contrast tothe Platonic +roundin+s of the distinction, and this development relates directly to the discreditin+ of narratorial >interference> at the end of thenineteenth century” (155:, $65)& Fluderni. also advances the vie? that, in the areas of oth speech and thou+ht representations, narratolo+ists



“distrust the narrator>s discourse as a lin+uistically and ideolo+ically distortive medium, placin+ a premium on >oKective> description and on theuse of direct (or at least free indirect) speech” (155:, $65)& 8t is in this ?ay that the vital role of thou+ht report is devalued& 8t is seen as adeparture from the unmediated ideal, as distortion, as interference, and as interruption& Fluderni. asserts that authorial narrative “is most familiarto us in

3%"3

the form of a reliale +uide to human affairs& There is a consolin+ aility to .no?, to see into characters> minds & & & and to uncover life>s rules andre+ularities&&&& 8t ma.es possile ?hat is naturally impossile” (155%, 1%6#%%)& Ho?ever, this consolin+ly reliale role of the narrator is no?distrusted as authoritarian and repressive& 8t is in this conte9t that Renette, in referrin+ to free direct thou+ht, ar+ues that “one of the main paths ofemancipation of the modern novel has consisted of pushin+ this mimesis of speech to its & & & limit, oliteratin+ the last traces of the narratin+instance and +ivin+ the floor to the character ri+ht a?ay” (15"0, 1;:)& This is speech, accordin+ to Renette, that is “emancipated &&& from allnarrative patrona+e” (15"0, 1;$)& These are very revealin+ e9pressions “emancipation, ” “free, ” “oliteratin+, ” “patrona+e&” This is a very cleare9pression of hostility to the controllin+, distortin+, interferin+, and patroniAin+ narrator ?ho needs to e oliterated and from ?hom the readerre=uires freedom and emancipation&

efore the role of the narrator can e discussed in such value3laden terms, it must first e accurately identified and fully understood& The narratorhas an essential and asic lin.in+ function that is fundamentally necessary to the ?ay in ?hich fictional narrative ?or.s and that can only veryrarely e dispensed ?ith& For e9ample, it is not needed in “Penelope, ” the famous final episode of lysses, for the ovious reason that Molly islyin+ in ed in the dar.& ut this is a very rare case ?here the conte9t in ?hich the thou+ht is ta.in+ place is so minimal and non3social that thelin.in+ function of the narrator is not necessary& 8t is this crucial, conte9tual function of the narrator that must e reco+niAed efore theideolo+ical implications of other aspects of the role can e denounced& 8t is y such means as thou+ht report and surface description of thestory?orld that the narrator lin.s the thou+ht of characters to the social and physical conte9t& This lin.in+ function has ecome so naturaliAed andfamiliariAed that it is no? partially invisile not only to ordinary readers ut also to some analysts&

3. #he Defense

he ad1ustment ar#ument & @hile readin+ the ne9t fe? para+raphs, you may e thin.in+ that they have een put in the ?ron+ place and that theyshould have +one in the previous section& @ith a defense li.e this, ?ho needs a prosecutionI My reason for puttin+ these vie?s here is that theyform ?hat mi+ht e called an ad1ustment ar#ument , ?hich +oes as follo?s all ri+ht, the fit et?een speech and thou+ht is not a perfect one, and



difficulties do arise, ut ?hen suitaly adKusted, it is still informative to analyAe thou+ht in terms of the speech cate+ories& 8t is this line ofthin.in+ that lies ehind the phenomenon of narrative theorists

3%53

referrin+ to the disKunction et?een speech and thou+ht, emphasiAin+ the need for +reat care and then, in effect, carryin+ on re+ardless&

4orrit Cohn has +one further than most in dra?in+ attention to the difficulties that are inherent in the speech cate+ory approach& he ar+ues thatthe “lin+uistically ased approach &&& oversimplifies the literary prolems y carryin+ too far the correspondence et?een spo.en discourse andsilent thou+ht” (15;", 11)& he mentions that one of the dra?ac.s of the speech cate+ory account is that “it tends to leave out of account theentire nonveral realm of consciousness, as ?ell as the entire prolematic relationship et?een thou+ht and speech” (15;", 11)& Cohn says ofthou+ht report that “lin+uistic3structuralist critics, y reducin+ the techni=ue to an unvoiced indirect discourse, disre+ard its various functions precisely ecause it is not primarily a method for presentin+ mental lan+ua+e” (15;", 1!)& he concludes, unsurprisin+ly, that thou+ht report is“the most ne+lected of the asic techni=ues” (15;", 1!)& 8 include her vie?s here, thou+h ecause despite these reservations she has ?ritten the est account of the speech cate+ory approach&

Moni.a Fluderni. is the narratolo+ist ?ho has the most radical reservations& 8n her vie?, the “scale model is =uite unale to deal ?ith thefunctional differences et?een the representation of utterances and that of consciousness& /lthou+h apparently the same means of lin+uistice9pression are at one>s disposal in the utterance and consciousness domains, their discourse effect is entirely incompatile” (155:, :10#11)&2eech and hort also ma.e the same point that the discourse effects produced y particular cate+ories durin+ the presentation of thou+ht can every different from their effects in speech presentation (15"1, :1", :$!#$")& Fluderni. oserves that “the traditional tripartite schema & & & ishopelessly inade=uate to the empirical te9tual evidence” (155:, :16) and e9plains that the “tripartite model rea.s do?n entirely in relation tothou+ht representation, ?here the parameters for the reportin+ of speech events are no lon+er operative” (155:, ;")& /+ain, thou+h, her vie?s arecontained in this section ecause her solution in he !ictions of "an#ua#e and the "an#ua#es of !iction is to create a very elaorate model ofover thirty elements that is intended to remedy this inade=uacy& Bven so, it still involves a +ood deal of ?hat she calls “fuAAiness” (155:, :1$# 16)& The moral appears to e that more and more elaorate ta9onomies simply result in diminishin+ returns& i+nificantly, y 155%, Fluderni.>s

solution in o,ards a Natural4 Narratolo#y is a much more radical one as it involves a reconte9tualiAation of the ?hole concept of narrative,and this reconte9tualiAation is ased on the notion of consciousness& 8 hope that the ar+uments in my later chapters are consistent ?ith hers&

3;03



8 should mention here another of Fluderni.>s responses to the prolem of speech cate+ory ias& Follo?in+ anfield (15"!), she descries ?hatshe calls the direct discourse fallacy as “the mista.en (in+rained) elief that direct discourse is in every sense of the ?ord primary or ori#inary toother types of =uotation” (155:, !"1)& 8n her vie?, fiction fre=uently suverts the convention that direct discourse is a primary source from ?hichindirect =uotation can e derived& The lo+ical conse=uence is this ar+ument “Contrary to the standard approach to speech and thou+htrepresentation, in ?hich the characters> direct discourse is the most reliale part of the fictional universe and in ?hich the narrator>s or narrative>s

mediation is y definition al?ays already a distortion, the approach that 8 have een advocatin+ re+ards narrative discourse as a uniform one3levelled lin+uistic entity ?hich y its deictic evocation of alterity#?hether in the form of direct thou+ht, free indirect thou+ht, or thou+htreport, includin+ colored thou+ht reportQ# pro1ects a level of lan+ua+e ?hich is not actually there ut is implied and manufactured y a .ind oflin+uistic hallucination” (155:, $6:)& 8n other ?ords, direct discourse is not to e privile+ed over the various indirect forms& Ln the discourse plane, this is a coherent and satisfyin+ e9planation& ut the difficulty arises ?hen it is considered in the conte9t of the story?orld, ?herecharacters use speech, includin+ sometimes inner speech& @ithin this perspective, there must e speech and inner speech events that ta.e place inthe story?orld, that can e directly =uoted, and that form a primary veral source from ?hich indirect =uotation is derived& 8t is re+rettale thatFluderni.>s solution is not compatile ?ith the concept of fictional ?orlds, ut 8 cannot see any ?ay round it&

he hypothetical ar#ument & This ar+ument has t?o aspects althou+h the discourse may appear to present the “actual” ?ords of inner speech, it isin fact presentin+ a reconstruction y the narrator that is hypothetically ased on ?hat characters ?ould have said that they ?ere thin.in+, hadthey een as.ed and althou+h the discourse may appear to present an “actual” episode of inner speech, it is really presentin+ a summary ofseveral possile such episodes& The hypothetical approach +oes eyond the representation of individual episodes of the hi+hly veraliAed mentalevents of inner speech and descries the elusive, amivalent =uality of some passa+es of thou+ht presentation, mainly in free indirect thou+ht&This approach sho?s a partial ?ay out of the e9a++erated concern ?ith the de+ree of verality of the putative ori+inal mental event& 8t also +oes part of the ?ay to?ard an interest in more re?ardin+ aspects of thou+ht presentation such as the need for vivid presentations of states of mindand the role of the reader in uildin+ up a sense of stale and continuous

3;13

characters& Ho?ever, the limitation of the ar+ument is that theorists tend to see the alternative to a sin+le mental event as ein+ a series of mental

events, therey missin+ the point that ?hat hypothetical thou+ht presentations often represent are states of mind&

Fluderni. asserts that ?hen free indirect thou+ht is used to render a character>s consciousness, it si+nifies more than Kust an internal speech act ythat person, and no transcription of a thou+ht act need e implied (155:, ;;)& /lthou+h she does not specify ?hat this “more” mi+ht e, she



appears to e ed+in+ to?ard a reco+nition that free indirect thou+ht can e used as a summary of a numer of inner speech episodes& ut perhapsthese episodes reflect a particular state of mind& Free indirect thou+ht can appear, for the sa.e of vivid immediacy, to present a state of mind asthou+h it is a sin+le mental event& For e9ample, durin+ a passa+e of free indirect thou+ht, the statement “he .ne? that he loved her” may occur&8n that conte9t, the reader can read this as a sin+le mental event, say a sudden rea?a.enin+ of that feelin+, even thou+h no specific mental eventof this sort is e9plicitly descried& ut, in other conte9ts, it may e clear that the statement is simply the report of a permanently held elief&

anfield ar+ues that represented consciousness is not a realistic reproduction of the mind at ?or.& 8n a rather pointed reference to the title ofCohn>s oo., she claims that narratives do not create transparent minds “The mind is never transparent, not even to >omniscient narrators&>*ather, its contents are hypothetically reconstructed and represented in a lan+ua+e sensitive to its various modes” (15"!, !11)& 4illon andDirchhoff have a similar perspective& They feel that, in +eneral, “the material that appears in free indirect thou+htQ is to e understood as arepresentation of a character>s e9pressions or thou+hts as he ?ould e9press them, not necessarily as a >veratim> renderin+ of >internal speech> ”(15;%, $:1)& The .ey phrase is “as the character ?ould e9press them&” They are su++estin+ that it is part of the narrator>s role to reduce thecomple9ity of the mind to a form that ?ill meet the need for the fictional discourse to e understood y the reader& This form is the one that?ould result if the character could self3consciously respond to the =uestion “@hat ?ere you thin.in+ Kust no?I” ut any such summary, to e a plausile picture of the ?hole mind, ?ould have to include reference to states of mind as ?ell as inner speech& Cohn feels that free indirectdiscourse, y leavin+ the relationship et?een ?ords and thou+hts latent, casts a “peculiarly penumral li+ht” on the character>s consciousness,“suspendin+ it on the threshold of veraliAation in a manner that cannot e achieved y direct =uotation” (15;", 10:)& This note of mysteryencapsulates eautifully the inade=uacy of the speech cate+ory picture of the mind& Cohn>s

3;!3

point can e prosaically re?orded y sayin+ that free indirect thou+ht is +ood at presentin+ states of mind such as eliefs and attitudes almost asif they are sin+le mental events ut ?ithout the narrator ein+ specific as to the e9act occasion on ?hich these events mi+ht have ta.en place& 8nthis ?ay, free indirect thou+ht can e used to solve the formal prolem of ho? to present latent states of mind in an immediate, forceful, andactive ?ay& There is no mystery to this, and it is not necessary to shroud the discussion in peculiarly penumral li+hts&

The narratolo+ist /nne @aldron -eumann has attempted to provide a conceptual frame?or. that can account for the hypothetical nature of freeindirect discourse& -eumann defines free indirect discourse as “that mode of indirectly reported speech or thou+ht ?hich =uotes ?hat ?e feelcould e at least some of the ?ords of a character>s actual utterances or thou+ht, ut ?hich offers those ?ords inter?oven ?ith the narrator>slan+ua+e &&& ,ithout eplicitly attributin# them to the character in *uestion” (15"%, :%%)& he e9plains that the study of reported speech and



thou+ht in fiction may necessitate reconstructin+ or hypothesiAin+ ?hat ?as “actually” uttered in the story from ?hat is reported in the discourse&To read a sentence as free indirect discourse, ?e must use our in+enuity and infer ?ho is =uoted and ?hich ?ords in the sentence are =uotations&@e are left to +uess ?hether the ?ords in the discourse ?ere ever uttered in the story and, even if ?e thin. that the ?ords did occur, ?hether they?ere spo.en or ?ere thou+ht (15"%, :%"#%5)& 8n her vie?, there are three types of free indirect discourse definite, ?hen ?e are certain that the?ords ?ere used y the character almost definite, ?hen ?e .no? that ?ords ?ere used and that they ?ere the sort of thin+ that the character

?ould say or thin. in that situation and indefinite, ?hich uses lan+ua+e characteristic of the character ut leaves it unclear ?hether the ?ords?ere spo.en or thou+ht or ?hether it only reports the sort of thin+ that they ?ould say or thin.& @e can correctly identify it ?ith the character inthe discourse, ut its status in the story is uncertain (15"%, :;0, :;%)&

8 thin. -eumann>s account is valuale for its stron+ emphasis on the active role of the reader, its a?areness of the hypothetical nature of muchfree indirect discourse, and its ac.no?led+ement that a +ood deal of narrative discourse is indeterminate in status& Ho?ever, her ideas can edeveloped further& /s ?ith Cohn, the distance and ami+uity that -eumann refers to can e e9plained y the fact that ?hat is ein+ representedis states of mind& /lso, the points that she ma.es re+ardin+ indefinite free indirect discourse can provide a startin+ point for an analysis of the precise means y ?hich the reader uilds up a sense of a stale and predictale fictional character& For e9ample, ho? is a reader

3;:3

ale to say ?hether or not lan+ua+e is “characteristic” of a fictional person, is “the sort of thin+ that they ?ould say or thin.”I 8n the follo?in+section 8 ?ill =uote short passa+es of thou+ht report that illustrate the relationship et?een the presentation of consciousness andcharacteriAation& This is the frame?or. ?ithin ?hich readers can ma.e interpretive decisions aout characters and therey recuperate meanin+from such discursive phenomena as indefinite free indirect discourse&

he pra#matic ar#ument & This is the vie? that ?e are simply tal.in+ aout convenient assumptions aout ho? the mind ?or.s and the acceptedconventions y ?hich fictional minds are represented in narrative fiction& /s =uoted in chapter 1, section ! and in section ! of this chapter,Renette ar+ues that the narrative convention is that “thou+hts and feelin+s are no different from speech” (15"0, 1;1)& 8t is onheim>s vie? that“thou+ht may e, or at least in the conventions of narrative usually is represented as, a process ?hich can e considered veral” (15"!, ;0)& The

ar+ument is that, in sayin+ that it is a convention that all thou+ht is veral ecause it is assumed that thou+hts and feelin+s are inner speech, ?eare simply relatin+ convenient assumptions aout the nature of consciousness to the particular needs of narrative discourse& terner+ here ma.ese9plicit the assumptions ehind the pra+matic approach “noody is li.ely to deny that much narrative thou+ht sho?s elements other than veral,and that all thou+ht, in order to pass from unuttered to communicale form, must e mediated and +iven physical shape y a reporter& -ot even



the most speechli.e interior monolo+ue offers a pure, reporter3free transcript& Many such monolo+ues involve transmutin+ impression andsensation into lan+ua+e some are openly styliAed, artificial, multi3voiced” (15"!, 1:$)& He is sayin+ that, pra+matically, thou+ht has to e treatedas speech in order for it to e +iven “physical shape” in the discourse& ee the earlier discussion on narratiAed speech on ?hy this is not the case&4espite the apparent attractiveness of the pra+matic approach, it causes at least t?o prolems& Lne is that, ?hile narratolo+ists may assume thatthe fictional convention is that all or most thou+ht is indeed speech, it is simply not true to say that fictional narrators share that assumption&

@hat is speechli.e aout the lifil and 2yd+ate passa+es =uoted earlierI The second prolem is the dan+er that the oservation of literaryconventions can easily harden into convictions aout ho? the mind actually ?or.s& Renette undermines his point y addin+ that the convention is“perhaps truthful in this case”(15"0, 1;1) onheim is e=ually amivalent& Care should e ta.en ?ith notions of novelistic conventions& 8t is veryeasy for them to solidify initially into ?or.in+ assumptions and then into firm conclusions#for e9ample, that

3;$3

thou+hts and feelin+s really are no different from unspo.en speech or that the ovious and direct means of handlin+ fictional thou+hts are theonly means&

Chatman holds that ?hat is “important for narrative theory is only ?hat authors & & & and their audiences assume the mind to e li.e& Theirassumptions may e =uite ?ron+ scientifically and still function verisimilarly, as a cultural commonplace” (15;", 1"1)& Put luntly, it is not a prolem for readers and narrators to have a mista.en vie? of the ?ay in ?hich the mind ?or.s, as lon+ as they share that vie?& 8 a+ree& Ho?ever,it does ecome a prolem ?hen readers and narrators share a rich and comple9 vie? of the mind (that may e ri+ht or ?ron+), ?hile the speechcate+ory approach imposes on narrative an oversimplified and impoverished mind picture that does not do Kustice to the practice of narrators andthe e9perience of readers& /s it happens, 8 thin. that the parallel discourses of co+nitive science, psycholin+uistics, and philosophy have a lot incommon ?ith the mind pictures of oth readers and narrators#it is the speech cate+ory theory that appears to e out of step&

8n summary, 8 have descried three related defenses a+ainst the criticisms contained in the previous section& The three ar+uments appear to +osome ?ay to ameliorate the crudities of the speech cate+ory account& Ho?ever, they do not affect the five asic prolems that ?ere descriedearlier (the privile+in+ of free indirect thou+ht and direct thou+ht over thou+ht report the overestimation of the veral component in thou+ht the

resultin+ ne+lect of thou+ht report of characters> states of mind the privile+in+ of some novels over others and some scenes in novels over othersand the impression that characters> minds really only consist of a private, passive flo? of thou+ht)& The adKustment ar+ument is little more than anac.no?led+ement of the e9istence of the prolems the hypothetical ar+ument does not +o far enou+h and the pra+matic ar+ument, thou+hsuperficially attractive, has dan+erous pitfalls& @hat is re=uired is not to try to modify the speech cate+ory account, ut to step outside its



limitations alto+ether& The three vie?points then ecome unnecessary& The reader does not need to adopt either a hypothetical or a pra+maticvie? to?ard the supposed verality of the fictional mental events reported in statements such as “He ?as overKoyed” or “he decided to ?al.&” -either does the reader have to ?orry aout ho? the speech cate+ories can e adKusted to ta.e account of these statements& They are simplyreports of states of mind and mental functionin+&

4. #hought +eport

@hile revie?in+ 4orrit Cohn>s ransparent -inds, rian McHale dre? attention to the ne+lect of thou+ht report& “8n the analysis of third personte9ts,

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thou+ht reportQ has al?ays een the poor relation, ne+lected in favor of the more +lamorous, more mimetic techni=ues of direct thou+ht andfree indirect thou+htQ& @e have y and lar+e een content to treat thou+ht reportQ as a sort of de+ree Aero of psycholo+ical realism& -o? Cohnhas effectively le+itimiAed thou+ht reportQ, delimitin+ its oundaries, outlinin+ its devices, functions, potentialities& he has put it on the map of psycholo+ical techni=ues once and for all” (15"1, 1"%)& This section is an attempt to uild on Cohn>s achievements& The concept of fictionalminds transcends the speech cate+ory approach, ut if it is to e considered in terms of the three modes, it privile+es the mode of thou+ht report& 8?ill propose here an approach to?ard thou+ht report that ?ill, rather than mar+inaliAe it, put it at the center of the presentations y narrators toreaders of the contents of fictional minds in their social and physical conte9t& 8t is an approach to?ard narrators> presentations of the ?hole mindthat focuses on oth states of mind and inner speech and that ac.no?led+es the indispensale and pivotal role of thou+ht report in lin.in+individual mental functionin+ to its social conte9t& The presentation of the mind in narrative fiction is a dynamic process, a ne+otiatedrelationship et?een the narrator, the character, and the reader in ?hich a set of formal conventions is +iven meanin+ y the reader& Much of?hat the reader does in usin+ presentations of characters> minds to construct from the discourse those aspects of the story that relate to theseminds is done y means of thou+ht report&

@ith re+ard to the distinction et?een story and discourse, it is important to stress that the story contains mental as ?ell as physical events& 8t

consists of characters> reasons for action as ?ell as the actions themselves& 8n fact, a distinction cannot really e made et?een the t?o, ecausethe concept of an action necessarily contains ?ithin it mental phenomena such as intentions and reasons& These reasons, intentions, motives, andso on form an indispensale part of characters> emedded narratives that can e recovered y readers from the discourse, in part ?ith the help ofdirect presentations of minds& / vital part of this ?hole process is the use of the mode of thou+ht report& 8n particular, it has ?hat 8 shall call a



lin9in# function, ?herey the narrator, in presentin+ a character>s consciousness, connects it to its surroundin+s& The use of this deviceemphasiAes the nature of consciousness as mental action and therey rin+s to+ether consciousness and physical action& The mode of thou+htreport is ideally suited to informative presentations of the purposive and directive nature of thou+ht as ?ell as its social nature& The other t?omodes are much less suited to this lin.in+ function, ?hich forms such a lar+e part of the richness and comple9ity of the novel&

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@hen the mind is re+arded as a private, passive flo? of consciousness, the e9plicit presence of the narrator appears to e unnecessarily otrusiveand distortin+& Ho?ever, most characters> thou+ht ta.es place in a social conte9t of action and interaction ?ith others& For this aspect of thenovel, thou+ht report is the most suitale mode of presentation& 8t is not an interruption, an intrusion, or a distortion& ecause thou+ht report provides a ac.+round, lo?3level flo? of conte9tual information, its presence in the discourse is often overloo.ed& Theorists tend to see the useof thou+ht report as increasin+ the audiility and prominence of the narrator& ince its presence in discourse is so often disre+arded, myinclination is to dra? the opposite conclusion& 8n any event, my chief concern is ?ith the almost continuous form of thou+ht report thatunotrusively and, it appears, almost inaudily, lin.s characters to their conte9t& This is very different from the prominent Kud+ments orcommentaries that narratolo+ists tend to identify ?ith thou+ht report& Part of the purpose of this section is to defamiliariAe this completelynaturaliAed device& The resonant last fe? ?ords of Culler>s Structuralist Poetics are “as yet ?e understand very little aout ho? ?e read” (15;6,!%6)& @e ?ill understand a little more once ?e pay more attention oth to the presence and also to all the functions of thou+ht report&

Thou+ht report can of course +o eyond the simple reportin+ of thou+ht and shade into commentary or ethical Kud+ment on that thou+ht&Ho?ever, the t?o activities, reportin+ thou+ht and commentin+ on it, are lo+ically distinct from each other& 8 am concerned only ?ith the issuesraised y the apparently simple device of the reportin+ of thou+ht and not ?ith the other =uestions raised y narratorial Kud+ments& This point isimportant ecause, as 8 have said, it is possile that much of the preKudice a+ainst the “otrusive” narrator can e traced ac. to a disli.e of the Kud+mental and moraliAin+ narrator& ut ecause insufficient care has een ta.en to distin+uish et?een the different functions of the prominentnarrator, this disli.e has also attached to the entirely separate function of the reportin+ of thou+ht& The irony of the intrusion preKudice is that thesort of thou+ht report ?ith ?hich 8 am particularly concerned is so lo? level that it is all ut invisile& 8t is almost parado9ical that 8 am tryin+ toraise the visiility of thou+ht report ?hile comatin+ the ?idespread perception of its alle+ed intrusiveness

The mode of thou+ht report is normally assi+ned ?hat mi+ht variously e called a default, supplementary, safety net, or stop+ap function& 8tappears to e assumed that the narrator uses thou+ht report only ?hen the more preferale techni=ues are not suitale for a particular conte9t& 8t isnecessary to turn this



3;;3

ne+ative approach on its head and e9plore positively the real and important functions of thou+ht report& Thou+ht report is a mediation y thenarrator et?een the character and the reader& /t certain points in the te9t, the pra+matic re=uirements of the narrative may indicate the need fora hi+h level of mediation, for e9ample, ?hen it is necessary for the narrator to indicate to the reader the various conte9ts in ?hich the thou+ht of

the character is ta.in+ place& /t other times, lesser levels of mediation are re=uired, for e9ample, ?hen the conte9t is not important, or ?hen ithas already een estalished or is to e .ept delierately va+ue& The other modes can then e used& ut, ?ithin this approach to mind presentation, the mode of thou+ht report is the norm ecause the lin.in+ function is such a vital contriution to ?hat can plausily e descriedas the purpose of the novel the e9ploration of the relationship et?een individuals and the societies ?ithin ?hich they live&

Thou+ht report is not the only means of placin+ characters> minds in conte9t& For e9ample, the narrator may use a passa+e of e9ternal descriptionthat sets the scene, follo?ed y a passa+e of direct thou+ht that relates in some ?ay to that scene& The relationship et?een the t?o ?ill eimplicit ut can still e perfectly clear& /lso, 8 refer to the lin.in+ function of free indirect perception later& Ho?ever, althou+h thou+ht report isnot the only ?ay to connect thou+ht ?ith conte9t, it is the mode that is most suited to this function& o, the =uestions to as. are functional ones@hat factors affect the decisions of the narrator relatin+ to presentation of conte9tI @hy are different levels of mediation re=uired at different points in the narrationI @hat are the different ?ays in ?hich the three modes contriute to the lin.in+ functionI @hat effects relatin+ tomediation and conte9t are specific to thou+ht reportI

ome theorists have commented riefly and in passin+ on the lin.in+ function, thou+h ?ithout +ivin+ it the emphasis that it ?arrants& Chatmanimplicitly refers to the need for it, oservin+ that critics “have noted the difficulty of unrelieved pure interior monolo+ue, of conveyin+ the outeraction and situation of a character if the te9t is totally loc.ed up in his mind& 8nferences can only +o so far” (15;", 1"6)& ut notice that “pure”unmediated thou+ht presentation is the norm and that thou+ht report is the departure from the norm that is re=uired only ?hen inferences canfinally +o no further& ic.erton also refers to the conte9tual function in a rather ne+ative ?ay, statin+ that it enales “the narrator to incorporate ac.+round and narrative material into the monolo+ue” (15%;, !:6)& /+ain, the norm is the character>s monolo+ue, and thou+ht report issometimes necessary in order to “incorporate” other material into it& The rela

3;"3tionship et?een consciousness and situation is a process that can e analyAed in a much more dynamic and positive ?ay than simply theincorporation of ac.+round material into a monolo+ue&



Cohn dra?s attention to ?hat she calls the dovetailin+ function as it relates to the presentation of characters> perceptions on the orderline et?een thou+ht report and free indirect perception& he comments that descriptions of characters> perceptions lur the distinction et?een thee9ternal and the internal scene and neatly dovetail the representation of oth inner and outer reality (15;", $5)& This point is pursued ?ith +reatsutlety and insi+ht in Reor+es Poulet>s article, “The Circle and the Center *eality and -adame 6ovary” (1566)& He uses the famous discussion y Brich /uerach in -imesis he /epresentation of /eality in Western "iterature of a para+raph from -adame 6ovary that vividly e9presses

Bmma ovary>s perception of, and consciousness of, her physical environment& The passa+e is this one “ut it ?as aove all at mealtimes thatshe could ear it no lon+er, in that little room on the +round floor, ?ith the smo.in+ stove, the crea.in+ door, the ooAin+ ?alls, the damp floor3tiles all the itterness of life seemed to e served to her on her plate, and, ?ith the steam from the oiled eef, there rose from the depths of hersoul other e9halations as it ?ere of dis+ust& Charles ?as a slo? eater she ?ould nile a fe? haAel3nuts or else, leanin+ on her elo?, ?ouldamuse herself ma.in+ mar.s on the oilcloth ?ith the point of her tale3.nife” (=uoted in /uerach 156:, $": Poulet 1566, :5!)& 8t is a comple9mi9ture of thou+ht report (the feelin+s risin+ from the depths of her soul), free indirect perception (her a?areness of the room), and action(nilin+, ma.in+ mar.s) that is hi+hly informative aout Bmma>s states of mind& Poulet>s vie? is that, if Flauert had simply decided to paintBmma from the outside, she ?ould merely e an oKect amon+ oKects& 8f, on the other hand, he had ?anted to ma.e her a purely suKective ein+, then nothin+ ?ould have een left e9cept the sensations and emotions caused in Bmma y the surroundin+ oKects& There ?ould then have een no a?areness on the part of the reader of Bmma as a person standin+ a+ainst a ac.+round of thin+s, since she ?ould have een reduced tothe status of a stream of thou+hts and feelin+s (Poulet 1566, :5:)& Poulet>s ar+ument is that Flauert succeeded in devisin+ a ne? ?ay of

presentin+ the relations et?een the mind and the surroundin+ reality (1566, $06)& He contends that -adame 6ovary has an inner coherence ecause thin+s are constantly fused to+ether in the unity of a sin+le, perceivin+ mind and also ecause this mind, conversely, is .ept fromdisappearin+ into its o?n consciousness y the oKectivity of a ?orld ?ith ?hich it is in constant

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touch& There is not only a theoretical representation of reality, there is also a concrete medium throu+h ?hich this representation has eenreceived (that is, Bmma>s perceptions) (Poulet 1566, :5:)& Poulet ar+ues that Flauert achieves his purpose of conveyin+ vividly the interrelationof a consciousness and its environment y sho?in+ somethin+ purely and intensely suKective, Bmma>s mind, located ?ithin a place andsurrounded y a lon+ enumeration of details of the environment that are oKective in themselves ut are also endo?ed ?ith affective po?ers

(Poulet 1566, :5:#5$)&Poulet>s point is that narrators have to find ?ays of cominin+ t?o very different oKectives the need to convey the suKective process of a sin+leconsciousness and the need to descrie the social and physical environment ?ithin ?hich that consciousness is functionin+& The narrator has to



present a consciousness as fully as possile ?hile conveyin+ the surroundin+s ?ithin ?hich it is placed& The comined use of thou+ht report andfree indirect perception allo?s the t?o oKectives to e met simultaneously& Minds do not function in a vacuum& -ot many fictional minds are at?or. ?hile completely divorced from any interaction ?ith other minds or the stimulus of an active physical environment (li.e Molly loom inthe “Penelope” episode in lysses)& There are many ?ays in ?hich this lin.in+ can e done, and not all of them are y thou+ht report& /s 8 said,this passa+e includes free indirect perception& @hile the narrator is descriin+ Bmma>s perception of her environment, he is simultaneously

descriin+ her consciousness, her physical environment, and the comple9 and dynamic relationship et?een the t?o& /nother ?ay of tyin+to+ether consciousness and environment is the description of action, ?hich is oth a private mental event (Bmma amusin+ herself) and a physicalhappenin+ in the pulic ?orld (ma.in+ mar.s)& Bmma ma.es mar.s on the talecloth as a response to her intolerale situation& The distance et?een the narrator and the character that is created y thou+ht report, as opposed to the t?o less3mediated modes, is often the ?ay in ?hich afictional consciousness can e situated ?ithin its environment& Furthermore, this situatin+ process is usually an inte+ral part of the plot3formin+aspect of narrative& Bmma>s feelin+s aout the environment ?ithin ?hich she is situated so vividly y the narrator ?ill lead to the tra+edy at theend of the novel&

Here are some of the specific ?ays in ?hich thou+ht report can fulfill the lin.in+ function that 8 have Kust descried& ome of my comments arevery s.etchy ecause 8 e9plore the related issues in more detail else?here in the oo.& 8t seemed useful nevertheless to +roup to+ether some ofthe .ey attriutes of thou+ht report in one place&

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Presentation of variety of mental events& ection ! contained a lon+ list of mental events#includin+ inner speech, perception, sensations,emotions, visual ima+es, attention, tone or mood#that are suitale for presentation in the mode of thou+ht report& Many are less or not at allsuitale for presentation in the other t?o modes& This is particularly noticeale in the case of emotions& The narratolo+ical ne+lect of theimportance of the emotions is e9traordinary until it is rememered that they cannot occur as such in inner speech& 8 develop this point and thefollo?in+ t?o points in the ne9t chapter&

Presentation of latent states of mind & /+ain, as listed in section !, the fictional mind consists of a lar+e numer of areas or aspects that include

attitudes, Kud+ments, evaluations, eliefs, s.ills, .no?led+e, character traits, tendencies of thou+ht, memory, intellect, volition, mood,ima+ination, and desires& The philosopher 4aniel 4ennett uses the memorale phrase “mind3ruts” (1551, :00) to descrie the ?ay in ?hich+roups of mental events can coalesce into tendencies of thou+ht&



Presentation of mental action& This point arose durin+ the discussion of narratiAed speech& More +enerally, it is related to the mental causalnet?or. ehind actions that includes motives, intentions, and reasons for action& Thou+ht report is the mode that is est suited to the ascription of particular motives, intentions, and so on& / particularly unfortunate conse=uence of the speech cate+ory account is the assumption that thedivision et?een thou+ht and action is unprolematical& / +ood deal of the interest that novels have for us lies precisely in the prolematicalcomple9ities that arise ?hen the relationship et?een thou+ht and action is studied& The follo?in+ =uote from he -on9 y Matthe? 2e?is is a

+ood e9ample of the amount of information on motives and intentions that can e conveyed in Kust a fe? ?ords y thou+ht report “The lady ?as perfectly satisfied ?ith the conversation ?hich had passed et?een them she loo.ed for?ard ?ith satisfaction to the prospect of his ecomin+her son3in3la? ut prudence ade her conceal from her dau+hter>s .no?led+e the flatterin+ hopes ?hich herself no? ventured to entertain”(2e?is 155", 150)& 8f you cast your mind ac. to the lifil passa+e, you ?ill see a similar picture of +oals and intentions ein+ ?or.ed into plansfor the future&

Presentation of character and personality& 8n the lifil and 2yd+ate =uotes used earlier in the chapter, and also in the passa+e from he -on9 ,you ?ill see that thou+ht report is startin+ to shade into characteriAation& 8n fact, puttin+ it in those terms is misleadin+& Ho? could ?e +o aoutestalishin+ ?here the thou+ht report ended and the characteriAation e+anI @ithin my approach to fictional minds, this sort of passa+e is thenorm and not the

3"13

meetin+ of oundaries et?een t?o different phenomena& 8t is one of the .ey strate+ies for readin+ te9ts ecause it lin.s the present thou+hts ofthe character ?ith earlier Kud+ments and hypotheses re+ardin+ that character and, in this ?ay, provides the asis for predictions re+ardin+ thefuture course of the narrative& 8t is difficult to ima+ine ?hat readin+ narrative ?ould e li.e ?ithout the use of this strate+y&

Summary& Cohn points out that thou+ht report is the most fle9ile mode, particularly in temporal terms, ecause it is suitale oth for summaryand for the e9pansion of a si+nificant moment (?hich is referred to later)& 8t can summariAe an inner development over a lon+ period of timeusin+ a panoramic vie? or telescopic perspective& Cohn refers to three different rhythms of time condensation iterative, ?hich or+aniAes eventsinto a pattern of recurrence (for e9ample, “very often, ” “occasionally”) durative, ?hich or+aniAes events into a pattern of persistence (for

e9ample, “continued, ” “still”) and mutative, ?hich, unli.e the others, refers to chan+es over a time span (15;", :6)& Cohn descries the capacityof thou+ht report to present “mental descriptions in a lar+e time frame” (15;", :$) and also refers to it as a “.ind of panoramic vie? of anQ innerself ” (15;", :$), “an inner development over a lon+ period of time” (15;", :$), “a distant perspective, loo.in+ over the entire time span” that thenarrator recounts (15;", :6), and “a psychic syndrome continuin+ over an e9tended time period” (15;", :%)& tates of mind such as eliefs and



dispositions necessarily e9ist over time, and so for their presentation in narrative, summary ecomes the norm& / len+thy time period ?ill seem“+eneral and distant, ” to use Fluderni.>s description of the lifil passa+e, only if you are approachin+ the mind in terms of a series of discretemental events&

Presentation of bac9#round information& This is a ?ide cate+ory that includes such features as ne+ative .no?led+e, physical conte9t,

presupposition, and other conte9tual information&

-e+ative .no?led+e& This is ?hat the character does not .no? ut the narrator does, and it is particularly si+nificant in the conte9t of motivesand intentions& ometimes it is clearly si+naled as in, “He had not realiAed yet ho? much he loved her&” /t other times the issue is lessstrai+htfor?ard “He left ecause he ?as an+ry&” Here, it is not clear ?hether it is the narrator or the character ?ho is estalishin+ the causalrelationship& People ?ho act ?hen they are an+ry often do not .no? until after?ard, if then, that they acted because they ?ere an+ry& 8t is verycommon in passa+es of this sort to find that the character>s self3conscious .no?led+e of their o?n states of mind, and in particular of the causalrelationships et?een them, is difficult to estalish ?ith precision& The

3"!3

use of thou+ht report leaves the =uestion open& The other t?o modes are much less fle9ile their use ma.es it clear that the character is self3consciously a?are of the state of mind&

Physical contet & / +ood e9ample appears in the openin+ para+raph of he ;ouse of -irth y Bdith @harton “elden paused in surprise& 8n theafternoon rush of the Rrand Central tation his eyes had een refreshed y the si+ht of Miss 2ily art” (15;5, 6)& 8t is very common forsentences to consist oth of thou+ht report and also of surface description of the physical story?orld& There is more in chapter ; on this point&

Presupposition& Chatman defines presupposition as the part of a sentence that is a +iven, that +oes ?ithout sayin+, and that is already understood&For e9ample, this is the first sentence in Bdmund @hite>s he -arried -an that directly descries the main character>s consciousness “/ustinthou+ht there mi+ht e more action in the pool and the sho?er rooms, ut he didn>t li.e s?immin+ and he>d sort of +iven up on cruisin+” (!001,

1)& 8t is le+itimate to presuppose that /ustin is +ay& / clichOd e9ample of presupposition is the =uestion “@hen did you stop eatin+ your ?ifeI”Chatman remar.s that it is a po?erful device for hintin+ that the character ?hose consciousness is ein+ presented is deluded and self3deceivin+(15;", !05#11)& Presupposition is, therefore, an important element in the interpretation and Kud+ment sufunction that is mentioned later& Ltherforms of presupposition, this time involvin+ characters rather than readers, are illustrated ?ith e9amples from +anity !air & 8n one e9ample, “they



understood each other perfectly ?ell” (155$, !";), a state of affairs is descried#an a+reement or understandin+ et?een t?o characters#that presupposes .no?led+e y oth characters of the other>s mind& Presupposition can also relate to the feelin+s of an individual “the pair, ?hoseconduct has so chafed the Kealous Reneral” (155$, !"6)& The description of the actions of t?o people presupposes the mental functionin+ of athird person& /nother e9ample that is also closely related to action is “Reor+e said to his ?ife, ?hom he could leave alone ?ith less scruple ?henshe had this society” (155$, !"!)& / relationship et?een t?o characters that results in a course of action ein+ ta.en in certain circumstances is

mentioned in passin+& 8t presupposes the prior .no?led+e of oth their minds that ?ould e9plain the conte9t to this arran+ement& These e9amplessho? that the device of presupposition is often closely related to intermental thin.in+&

Presentation of intermental thin9in# & 8 ?ill ar+ue in chapter ;, section : that the use of thou+ht report for the presentation of intermental or +roup, Koint, or shared thou+ht is one of the most important aspects of the construction of fictional minds& 8t has een ne+lected ecause of the veral ias&

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(pression of consensus & 8n commentin+ on a particular e9ample of thou+ht report, Chatman notes that it contains “the su++estion of a .ind of>in>3+roup psycholo+y &&& a sense of the roader social conte9t&” 8t is “indistin+uishaly the thou+ht of one or all of the family, or ?hat one of them

said to the others, or the narrator>s Kud+ment of the situation” (15;", !0;)& The reason ?hy it is not possile to distin+uish et?een the various possiilities for the source of ?hat is e9pressed is ecause everyone is in a+reement& 2oo.ed at another ?ay, there is a certain sort of doule3voiced discourse that may loo. li.e an e9pression of opinion y an intrusive narrator ut that on closer inspection turns out to e the e9pressionof a consensus, a shared vie? ?ithin a particular social +roup& 2eech and hort say of an e9ample of thou+ht report that “it need not eassociated ?ith a particular character, ut may e the e9pression of aQ communal point of vie?” (15"1, :$5#60)& McHale calls this phenomenon “the idiom of the +roup” (15;", !;0)& 8n “4iscourse and the -ovel, ” a.htin tal.s aout “the common vie?” (15"1, :01#!)&Mar+olin, in discussin+ Fluderni.>s idea of the “typification, schematiAation, or contraction of reco+niAale shared stances, perspectives, vie?s,or common opinions held y numerous memers of the +roup, ” unfortunately refers to it as “collective inner speech” (!000, %06#%)& Fluderni.also uses the term “communis opinio, ” ut she seems more interested in the implicit use of this concept as a deictic center, or vie?point onaction, rather than the e9plicit e9pression of communal opinion y a narrator (155%, 15!)& 4avid 2od+e =uotes the follo?in+ sentence from

-iddlemarch, “/nd ho? should 4orothea not marryI#a +irl so handsome and ?ith such prospectsI” and as.s ?here the =uestion comes from& -ot from 4orothea, he su++ests, and not even from the narrator& 2od+e concludes that “it is the voice of Middlemarch that is evo.ed here y thenarrator, the voice of provincial our+eois ?isdom” (1550, "6)&



+anity !air contains several similar e9amples of the apparently intrusive narrator in reality simply e9pressin+ a communal vie? “a little troop ofhorsemen, consistin+ of some of the very +reatest persons in russels” (155$, !"1) and “8t ?as almost li.e Lld Bn+land” (155$, !"!)& Lne ?ayto identify the consensus type of thou+ht report is to listen for the note of irony that it often contains& 8n these t?o e9amples, it is =uite li.ely thatthe narrator does not thin. that the horsemen ,ere the very +reatest persons in russels or that it ,as almost li.e Lld Bn+land& The e9pression ofthe vie? of the consensus is another aspect of the presentation of intermental thin.in+&

0nterpretation: analysis: and 1ud#ment & 8 ?ill not discuss these uses here

3"$3

as they have een ?ell covered already in a numer of studies, particularly in eymour Chatman>s Story and Discourse (15;", !!%#6:)&

8n all of these sufunctions of the lin.in+ function of thou+ht report, the thou+ht processes of individual characters are connected y the narratorto their environment, therey illustratin+ in very concrete and specific ?ays the social nature of thou+ht& These various aspects of thou+ht reportalso tend to emphasiAe the active nature of thou+ht as mental functionin+& /s 8 said earlier, it is much less easy to e9plore these aspects ofconsciousness ?hile usin+ other modes ecause it is in thou+ht report that the narrator is ale to sho? e9plicitly ho? characters> minds are

operatin+ in a social and physical conte9t&

For the sa.e of completeness, and to emphasiAe the versatility of the mode, 8 ?ill also riefly mention another function of thou+ht report, ?hichis not mentioned earlier ecause it is not related to its lin.in+ function& 8t is ?hat Cohn calls the epansion of the moment & /s Cohn e9plains,thou+ht report can e9pand or elaorate a mental instant that is of particular si+nificance& This techni=ue is popular in the modern novel& Proust isthe ovious e9ample& B9pansion is often achieved throu+h the use of ?hat Cohn terms psycho3analo+ies& These are tropes that are used toe9press consciousness& he =uotes this e9ample from Gir+inia @oolf “/s a person ?ho has dropped some +rain of pearl or diamond into the+rass and parts the tall lades very carefully” (15;", $$)& Cohn su++ests that it is sometimes difficult to tell ?hether the analo+y is ein+ used ythe narrator or y the character (althou+h not perhaps in the case of that @oolf e9ample)& Psycho3analo+ies are often sprin.led into passa+es of?hat is other?ise free indirect thou+ht, ?hen in Cohn>s ?ords the narrator “is un?illin+ to entrust the presentation of the inner life to the

character>s o?n veral competence” (15;", $$)& The e9pansion of the moment is particularly useful for Cohn>s favorite use of thou+ht report#thee9ploration of ?hat she calls the “nether depth” (15;", 1$0)&



Conclusion

8 hope that 8 have not +iven the impression that 8 thin. that the speech cate+ory approach is eyond repair& Ln the contrary, as ?ith the otherapproaches considered in chapter !, 8 thin. that it has an essential place in the study of fictional minds& My point is simply that it is only oneamon+ a lar+e numer of perspectives on this crucially important aspect of narrative discourse& The distortions arise ?hen it is thou+ht to e the

only one& There is time for one last hymn to the virtues of thou+ht report& 8t tends to e centrifu+al in nature,

3"63

?hile direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht tend to e centripetal it directs the reader>s attention out?ard into the conte9t of social situationand action, ?hile the others direct the reader>s attention in?ard into scenes of thou+htful self3communion& 2et us no? travel further in thecentrifu+al direction indicated y the mode of thou+ht report and +o on to consider first the ?hole mind and then the social mind&

3"%3

4

#he Whole ,ind

Lur mental usiness is carried on much in the same ?ay as the usiness of the tate a +reat deal of hard ?or. is done y a+ents ?ho are notac.no?led+ed& # Reor+e Bliot, /dam ede

8 ?ill no? e+in the process of ?idenin+ and deepenin+ our concept of the fictional mind eyond the phenomenon of inner speech& /lthou+h thischapter and the ne9t are mainly aout real minds, 8 try to relate the ar+uments at re+ular intervals to the fictional sort& 8t is in order to otain avariety of perspectives on the means y ?hich readers construct fictional minds that the parallel discourses of co+nitive science, philosophy, psycholo+y, and psycholin+uistics are e9amined in this chapter and the ne9t& /s 2uomir 4oleel remar.s, in order to “uild a theory ofinteractin+ in fictional ?orlds, narrative semantics has to tap other sources of inspiration#social psycholo+y, sociolo+y, cultural semiotics, and

so on” (155", 5;)& 8n addition, 8 hope that these t?o chapters are of interest in themselves to students of literary theory ?ho may not previouslyhave encountered some of the real3mind discourses discussed in them& The notion of alance ?ill recur throu+hout this chapter& 8n attemptin+ to rin+ to+ether parallel discourses, each of ?hich tends to emphasiAe one aspect of the mind at the e9pense of others, 8 am tryin+ to achieve a full



picture of fictional minds& 8 su++est that the est ?ay to produce a rich, informative, and +enuinely heuristic perspective on the consciousnessesof characters in novels is to find a alance et?een these different vie?s&

%. *unctionalism

This section descries a functionalist approach to?ard the areas of the mind that are considered later in this chapter ecause it is ?ithin afunctional perspective that these aspects of the mind can est e understood& 2uomir 4oleel points out that “aQll mental faculties, from sensory perception to emotionality to thin.in+ to rememerin+ and ima+ination, operate et?een the poles of

intentional actin+ and spontaneous +eneration” (155", ;:)& 8t is the latter pole, ?hich emraces such phenomena as contemplation, daydreams,fantasies, and free associative thin.in+, that has een the focus of attention ?ithin traditional narratolo+y& Thin. of the deep interest in stream ofconsciousness and interior monolo+ue& The attempt to redress the alance a little ?ith a functional focus on the pole of intentional actin+ startshere&

roadly spea.in+, there are t?o uses for the term functionalism& tron+ functionalism is the doctrine that “f Qunctional .inds are not identified y their material composition ut rather y their activities or tendencies” (Maloney 1555, :::) and that minds are functional .inds& tron+

functionalists conclude from this that it is possile for roots or computers to have minds, even thou+h the machine supportin+ this mentalfunctionin+ is made from a completely different sustance than that of human rains& o rains can e made out of machinery& @ithin co+nitivescience some theorists adopt a ottom3up approach that is determined y the iolo+y of the rain this is the ?ay the rain ?or.s and that is ?hat?e ?ill study& Conversely, stron+ functionalists adopt a top3do?n approach that is derived from the computational theory of the mind& 8tconsiders the outputs of mental functionin+ and studies the rain only in a very astract manner as, in effect, the information3processin+ machinethat produces those outputs& This is a contentious and controversial position to ?hich there are a numer of co+ent oKections& earle, fore9ample, re+ards stron+ functionalism as one of a numer of approaches to the mind that deny the reality of suKective consciousness& 8 am notusin+ the term functionalism in this very stron+ sense, ut in a much ?ea.er sense to mean an emphasis on the activities and tendencies of mindsthat as.s the =uestion @hat is thin.in+ forI tron+ functionalism is not relevant to the purpose of this oo. ecause, as fictional minds e9ist onlyin a semiotic and not in a physical sense, the =uestion of ?hat they are made of does not arise& @ea. functionalism, ho?ever, is very relevantindeed&

8t is a asic, operational, ?or.in+ assumption of co+nitive scientists that the mind is an information3processin+ device& 4aniel 4ennett, one of theforemost philosophers of co+nitive science, su++ests that ?hat “ma.es somethin+ a mind & & & is not ?hat it is made of, ut ?hat it can do” and



that “?hat minds do is process information” (155%, %")& teven Pin.er uses very similar ?ords “The mind is ?hat the rain does specifically,the rain processes information, and thin.in+ is a .ind of computation” (155;, !1)& These comments illustrate the functional vie? of the mindthat analyAes ?hat it does and ?hat it is for, rather than as.in+ ?hat the rain is made of& @ithin this conte9t, the approach of co+

3""3

nitive science to?ard the phenomenon of consciousness is very illuminatin+& The first surprise is that co+nitive scientists see consciousness asonly a small part of their study& The second surprise is that they can even entertain the possiility that the centrality and importance ofconsciousness can e =uestioned at all& Most of us unthin.in+ly re+ard it as a +iven consciousness is ?hat ma.es us ?hat ?e are, ?hat ma.es ushuman& 8t Kust happens& ut co+nitive scientists are a?are that many or+anisms survive perfectly ?ell ?ithout consciousness in the human, self3conscious sense, and so they as., @hat is consciousness forI 8 am sure that this ?ould stri.e most of the rest of us as a very odd =uestion&Ho?ever, you ?ill e relieved to hear that the ans?er is a positive one& For e9ample, the neuroscientist /ntonio 4amasio>s ans?er to the =uestionis that the “devices of consciousness handle the prolem of ho? an individual or+anism may cope ?ith environmental challen+es not predicted inits asic desi+n such that the conditions fundamental for survival can still e met” (!000, :0:)& Consciousness allo?s us to adapt intelli+ently toour environment& @e ?ould not adapt so ?ell ?ithout it& This is ?hat it is for&

The psycholo+ist @illiam Eames is no? famously associated ?ith the phrase stream of consciousness& This term is related to the pole ofspontaneous +eneration that 4oleel refers to& ut M8TBC stresses his interest in the opposite pole of intentional actin+& Eames “emphasiAed theadaptive nature of co+nition the fact that perception, memory, and reasonin+ operate not simply for their o?n sa.e, ut to allo? us to surviveand prosper in our physical and social ?orld&” Furthermore, Eames “reco+niAed that the hallmar. of an intelli+ent ein+ is its aility to lin. ends?ith means#to select actions that ?ill achieve +oals” (Holyoa. 1555, 9lii)&

8t is ironic that Eames>s actual approach is a lon+ ?ay from the narrative term no? associated ?ith his name& 8t is note?orthy that Eames appliedthis functional perspective to the concept of intelli+ence, ?hich teven Pin.er defines as “the aility to attain +oals in the face of ostacles ymeans of decisions ased on rational (truth3oeyin+) rules & & & that is,Q specifyin+ a +oal, assessin+ the current situation to see ho? it differs fromthe +oal, and applyin+ a set of operations that reduce the difference” (155;, %!)&

8ntelli+ence clearly re=uires a minimum amount of .no?led+e aout the environment and appropriate plannin+ to chan+e the environment& Roal3directed action of this sort involves not only close attention to conte9t ut also a clear focus on the future& The concept of a +oal involves a +ap



et?een an actual and present state of affairs and a counterfactual and future state of affairs that is more desirale& /s 4ennett puts it in t?o verystri.in+ phrases in Consciousness

3"53

(plained , “the fundamental purpose of rains is to produce future” (as the poet Paul GalOry ori+inally said), and “all rains are, in essence,anticipation machines” (1551, 1;;)& This .ind of interaction ?ith the ?orld is clearly not a private or passive process& 8t is en+a+ed andinteractive& “Co+nition is neither copyin+ nor constructin+ the ?orld& Co+nition is, instead, the process that .eeps us active, chan+in+ creatures intouch ?ith an eventful, chan+in+ ?orld” (*eed 155%, 1:)&

8 su++est a functional approach to?ard fictional minds& Ta.e Pip in 8reat (pectations& He is an adaptive, +oal3directed, information3processin+device& This sort of tal. may seem deeply alienatin+, depressin+ly mechanistic, and chillin+ly antihumanist, ut ?hyI 8nformation processin+ isconcerned ?ith perception, daydreams, and contemplation as ?ell as ?ith an active en+a+ement ?ith the social and physical conte9t& Thelan+ua+e may e unfamiliar and possily even repellent, ut the reality is .no?n to us all& Pip>s mind processes the information that he receivesfrom the other minds around him and from other aspects of his physical and social environment& He learns, in particular from Bstelle and MissHavisham, that he ?ants to e different& He develops +oals, such as ?antin+ to e a +entleman, that conflict ?ith his current situation& He then

learns from Herert, Mr& Ea++ers, and so on ho? to adapt and ho? to ecome a +entleman& His mind adapts differently to all of the various minds?ith ?hich it interacts& Finally, he learns the most difficult lesson of all#that ecomin+ a +entleman is not enou+h and that he has another +oalhe has still to learn ho? to e a +ood person& /t every sta+e he estalishes ?hat his present situation is, ?hat his desired situation is, and ho? est to reconcile the t?o& Pip has plans for the future, ut these have to e adapted and continually updated to deal ?ith the various surprises thatconfront him& The surprises are lin.ed, and ecome a plot, throu+h the plans that he adapts in the li+ht of them& Lf course, you ?ill e thin.in+ y no?, Pip is not an information3processin+ device at all He is a character in a novel, a collection of ?ords on the pa+e& o ?hat 8 am reallysayin+ is that the reader must read those ?ords as if they refer to an information3processin+ device& Ho? else can ?e follo? the plot of the novelI

Lnce this point is +rasped, it is clear that a functional perspective on real minds is the asis of a teleolo+ical perspective on fictional minds&Teleolo+ical analysis is the study of narrative in terms of its ultimate purpose and overall desi+n& The teleolo+ical analysis of a te9t is ased onthe assumption that its parts function coherently to?ard a comprehensile end purpose& The plots of novels are +oal3directed in the sense thatthey have, or should have, coherent and satisfyin+ endin+s or, alternatively, they delierately frustrate readers> desires

3503



for such endin+s& The chan+in+ +aps et?een Pip>s current situations and his various +oals define the structure and desi+n of the narrative& Theycomprise its teleolo+ical shape&

Lnce the unfamiliarity of thin.in+ of fictional minds in terms of co+nitive science has ?orn off, the parallels continue to e instructive and a richsource of insi+hts into mental functionin+ in novels is revealed& The theorists in the parallel discourses themselves are a?are of the value to e

+ained from pursuin+ these parallels& This is teven Pin.er a+ain “Lnce the fictitious ?orld is set up, the prota+onist is +iven a +oal and ?e?atch as he or she pursues it in the face of ostacles& 8t is no coincidence that this standard definition of plot is identical to myQ definition ofintelli+ence&&&& Characters in a fictitious ?orld do e9actly ?hat our intelli+ence allo?s us to do in the real ?orld” (155;, 6$1)& B=ually, somenarrative theorists are also a?are of the value of a similarly functional approach to fictional minds& 4oleel descries very clearly the pole ofintentional actin+ that is referred to earlier y statin+ that the concepts of “intentionality and motivation define the >out?ardly> oriented domain ofthe mind, the practical mind directin+, controllin+, and monitorin+ actin+ and its results&&&& The operations of the practical mind, such as practicalreasonin+, decision ma.in+, calculation, plannin+, scriptin+, and the li.e, are prototypes of mental acts” (155", ;!#;:)& Marie32aure *yan hasdivided the repertory of mental re+isters of characters into five cate+ories& T?o of them, (the epistemic ?orld of characters containin+ their eliefs, proKections, and introspections and the desires, fears, li.es, and disli.es of characters) are at the private and introspective pole& The otherthree (the individual oli+ations of characters that are created y promises and the social oli+ations of characters that are created y la?s theactive +oals of characters and the plans throu+h ?hich characters see. to fulfill their active +oals) (1551, !!$) are functional in that they relate to

ho? people plan ahead, adKust in the li+ht of circumstances, and operate +enerally in a social conte9t&

Finally, 8 ?ould li.e to end this section ?ith a tentative su++estion& @riters sometimes complain aout the tyranny of teleolo+y and theartificiality of careful plottin+& /ealism is, of course, a notoriously slippery concept, ut, for e9ample, the modernist emphasis on stream ofconsciousness and interior monolo+ue has often een descried as more “realistic” than ?ritin+ that is +eared to the intentional actin+ pole&Ho?ever, perhaps the time has come for a re3evaluation of this deate& 8t is possile that the functionalism of real3mind discourses su++ests thatthe teleolo+ical nature of traditional fictional3mind representations may not e so “unrealistic” after all&

3513

2. -anguage

This section ?ill consider a ran+e of vie?s on the relationship et?een lan+ua+e and thou+ht and, in particular, on the importance of lan+ua+e inthe formation and development of the mind& 8t sho?s that there is a +ood deal more s.epticism ?ithin the co+nitive sciences re+ardin+ the role of



lan+ua+e than there is ?ithin literary theory& 8n his oo. "iterary heory (15":), Terry Ba+leton refers to lan+ua+e, ?ith its prolems, mysteries,and implications, as oth paradi+m and osession for t?entieth3century intellectual life (15":, 5;)& The first sentence of "an#ua#e and

-aterialism Developments in Semiolo#y and the heory of the Sub1ect (15;;) y *osalind Co?ard and Eohn Bllis is this “Perhaps the mostsi+nificant feature of t?entieth3century intellectual development has een the ?ay in ?hich the study of lan+ua+e has opened the route to anunderstandin+ of man.ind, social history, and the la?s of ho? a society functions” (15;;, 1)& This is a lar+e claim and one that 8 certainly do not

feel e=uipped to comment on& My ar+ument is simply that, ?hatever the value of the study of lan+ua+e +enerally, an undue emphasis on the roleof lan+ua+e has inhiited our understandin+ of fictional mental functionin+& The previous section provided a +ood illustration of this point& Thefunctional approach is not primarily interested in the de+ree of verality in thou+ht& 8 am sure that you noticed that there ?as not a sin+lereference to inner speech in the discussion of the mind in the previous section&

There is a continuin+ deate on the e9tent of our need for lan+ua+e in order to learn aout the ?orld and, therefore, its role in formin+ theconceptual frame?or. for our thou+ht& @hat is at issue is the e9tent to ?hich the ?hole of our co+nitive universe is determined y the lan+ua+eand culture ?ithin ?hich ?e are socialiAed and, therefore, the e9tent to ?hich all of the thou+ht of an individual is culture3specific& The positionthat an individual>s thin.in+ is to a lar+e de+ree determined y his or her culture is often called the Sapir<Whorf hypothesis, after the /mericananthropolo+ists Bd?ard apir and enKamin 2ee @horf& 8 am not primarily concerned ?ith this deate ut ?ith the much more limited point thatinner speech is Kust one part of the ?hole mind& To use a+ain the simple e9ample of drivin+ a car inner speech is not necessary to the ?or.in+s

of the mind ?hile drivin+, ut it is not possile to learn to drive a car ?ithout lan+ua+e& 8 am interested, then, not in the role of lan+ua+e in ho??e learn to thin., ut in the supposed verality of fictional mental events&

First, 8 ?ill descrie some perspectives on the nature of thou+ht that do?nplay the role of lan+ua+e& The s.epticism that e9ists ?ithin co+nitivescience re+ardin+ the e9tent to ?hich lan+ua+e is involved in day3to3day thou+ht is not a ne? phenomenon and has e9isted ?ithin psycholo+ythrou+hout the

35!3

t?entieth century& /s the popular3science ?riter Eohn McCrone points out, the “elief that ?ords can only clothe thou+ht has seemed soa9iomatic that until a rediscovery of Gy+ots.y>s ?or. in the late 15"0s, it ?as e9ceptional to find a recent @estern philosophy or psycholo+y te9tthat even mentioned the possiility that lan+ua+e mi+ht ma.e a difference& /nd in truth, introspection seemed to su++est that ?ords are indeedmostly secondary” (1555, !"5)& The reference to introspection here raises an interestin+ point& ome people>s introspections seem to tell themthat, on the contrary, ?ords are indeed mostly primary& 8ntrospection is clearly a tric.y usiness& /lso, althou+h 2ev Gy+ots.y (a *ussian



psycholin+uist active in the late 15!0s and early 15:0s) rou+ht the notion of inner speech to the center of psycholo+y, he ac.no?led+ed that,“even if recorded in full ?ith the help of some supersensitive phono+raph, the inner speech ?ould remain areviated and incoherent” (15"%,!:6) and admitted that inner speech ecomes so fra+mented that it is arely lan+ua+e at all& He refers to inner speech as “practically ?ordless”(15"%, !$:), “speech almost ?ithout ?ords” (15"%, !$$), and “to a lar+e e9tent thin.in+ in pure meanin+s” (15"%, !$5)& 8 say more aoutGy+ots.y in chapter 6, section :&

/ numer of psycholo+ists have as.ed ?hether the loss or reduction of intellectual functions invarialy accompanies a maKor impairment oflan+ua+e competence, and so ?hether thou+ht is dependent on an intact lin+uistic function& The importance of this =uestion is that if the t?o can e separated, then thou+ht is possile ?ithout inner speech& everal studies of +roups of patients ?ith aphasia (that is, loss of speech) havereported that the patients have unimpaired levels of non3veral reasonin+ and intelli+ence& There are several ?ell3.no?n cases of severelyaphasic people ?ho are unale to understand or respond to even the simplest ?ords or phrases and ?hose speech is ale, ut ?ho canunderta.e a variety of comple9 tas.s, learn ne? s.ills, and maintain +ood social relations& The *ussian psycholin+uist /le9ander 2uria reportedthe case of the composer healin, ?ho suffered a serious stro.e, the result of ?hich ?as severe difficulty in spea.in+ and understandin+ speech, ut ?ho continued to produce remar.ale music (Bllis and eattie 15"%, !;1#;!)& 8t appears that a person can e virtually roed of lan+ua+eyet still perform intelli+ently in other areas&

The lan+ua+e of co+nitive science refers to mental spaces, lends, scripts, frames, plans, and so on& This is not a conceptual frame?or. thatallo?s ?ith any ease for a central role for lan+ua+e in thou+ht& -one of these concepts is concerned ?ith inner speech& This point can eillustrated very easily& There are $;1 entries in -0(CS , ut only a very fe? of them consider the role of lan+ua+e in thou+ht, apart from thesmall +roup of entries that are specifically concerned

35:3

?ith lan+ua+e& 8n particular, the entry on consciousness (4avies 1555, 150# 5!) does not refer to lan+ua+e in +eneral or inner speech in particular at all apart from a rief passin+ reference to spo.en speech& 8n a oo. of :1: pa+es on the ?or.in+ of the rain, 8oin# 0nside A our

/ound a Sin#le -oment of Consciousness (1555), Eohn McCrone does not +et around to tal.in+ aout lan+ua+e until pa+e !;"& Terry /u>s entryin -0(CS on lan+ua+e and thou+ht is also =uite cool on the impact of the apir3@horf hypothesis “@hile the Kury is still out for the apir3@horf hypothesis, it is proaly safe to say that important aspects of our ?orldvie? are unli.ely to e at the mercy of aritrary aspects of ourlan+ua+e” (1555, $$6)& He reinforces the point y assertin+ that recent findin+s on lan+ua+e3specific impairments “su++est that lan+ua+e and



co+nition can e decoupled&&&& TQhere is some evidence for our co+nition and perception shapin+ the evolution of our lan+ua+e& Bvidence forinfluence in the opposite direction, ho?ever, seems more elusive” (1555, $$$)&

There is astonishin+ly little aout inner speech in /ntonio 4amasio>s oo. aout consciousness, ?hich shares the relentlessly unconvinced toneof other real3mind discourses& For e9ample, lan+ua+e, he maintains, is a “translation of somethin+ else, a conversion from nonlin+uistic ima+es

?hich stand for entities, events, relationships, and inferences&&&& TQhere must e a nonveral self and a nonveral .no?in+ for ?hich the ?ords >8>or >me> or the phrase >8 .no?> are the appropriate translations, in any lan+ua+e” (!000, 10;#")& He also refers to the “core self thatQ must e in place for its translation into a suitale ?ord to occur” (!000, 1"%) and to “the ima+ed, nonveral narrative of core consciousness” (!000, 1";)&

Here 8 ?ill =uote a lon+ passa+e from he "an#ua#e 0nstinct (155$) in ?hich teven Pin.er e9plains his vie?s on the matter in no uncertainterms& 8t is ?orth =uotin+ in full in order to +ive a flavor of the depth of the hostility that e9ists amon+st some co+nitive scientists on this issue&

The idea that thou+ht is the same thin+ as lan+ua+e is an e9ample of ?hat can e called a conventional asurdity a statement that +oes a+ainst allcommon sense ut that everyone elieves ecause they dimly recall havin+ heard it some?here and ecause it is so pre+nant ?ith implications&&&&Thin. aout it& @e have all had the e9perience of utterin+ or ?ritin+ a sentence, then stoppin+ and realiAin+ that it ?asn>t e9actly ?hat ?e meantto say& To have that feelin+, there has to e a “?hat ?e meant to say” that is different from ?hat ?e said& ometimes it is not easy to find any

?ords that properly convey a thou+ht& @hen ?e hear or read, ?e usually rememer

35$3

the +ist, not the e9act ?ords, so there has to e such a thin+ as a +ist that is not the same as a unch of ?ords& /nd if thou+hts depended on?ords, ho? could a ne? ?ord ever e coinedI Ho? could a child learn a ?ord to e+in ?ithI Ho? could translation from one lan+ua+e toanother e possileI (155$, 6;#6")

To +et around these difficulties, some co+nitive science is ased on the controversial and contested assumption that ?e thin. in a very astract,symolic lan+ua+e form that is called mentalese& /ccordin+ to Pin.er, ?e do not thin. in a natural lan+ua+e such as Bn+lish ecause naturallan+ua+es are full of ami+uities and ?hatever ?e thin. in cannot e ami+uous ecause that is not the ?ay our mental functionin+ ?or.s& /lso,spo.en lan+ua+es are full of ?hat he calls “+rammatical oilerplate, ” ?hich is not necessary for the lan+ua+e of thou+ht& “o, ” Pin.erconcludes, “the statements in a .no?led+e system are not sentences in Bn+lish ut rather inscriptions in a richer lan+ua+e of thou+ht, >mentalese>” (155;, ;0)&



/s 8 said, this is a continuin+ deate, and there are some co+nitive scientists ?ho emphatically stress the centrality of lan+ua+e to thou+ht,althou+h these vie?s are often related more to the po?erful role that lan+ua+e plays in formin+ our minds, rather than the role of lan+ua+e ineveryday thou+ht& 4aniel 4ennett ma.es the point aout co+nitive formation that lan+ua+e “infects and inflects our thou+ht at every level&&&& Thestructures of +rammar enforce a discipline on our haits of thou+ht, shapin+ the ?ays in ?hich ?e proe our o?n >data3ases&> & & & @Qe can seeho? the po?erful voices that a lan+ua+e unleashes in a rain can e e9ploited” (1551, :01)& Co+nitive scientists have dra?n methodolo+ical

conclusions aout the study of the mind from this ar+ument& *ay Eac.endoff oserves that “any theory of the semantic structure of lan+ua+e isipso facto a theory of the structure of thou+ht” (15":, !05) and that “to study semantics of natural lan+ua+e is to study co+nitive psycholo+y”(15":, :)& Rilles Fauconnier ma.es a similar point& “ecause ?e .no? lan+ua+e to e intimately connected to some important mental processes,?e have in principle a rich virtually ine9haustile source of data to investi+ate some aspects of mental processes” (155;, !#:)& Ho?ever,Fauconnier also offers this important caveat “2an+ua+e data suffers ?hen it is restricted to lan+ua+e, for the simple reason that the interestin+co+nitive constructions underlyin+ lan+ua+e use have to do ?ith complete situations that include hi+hly structured ac.+round .no?led+e,various .inds of reasonin+, on3line meanin+ construction, and ne+otiation of meanin+” (155;, ;#")& 8t is surely deeply si+nificant that this?arnin+, althou+h it

3563

relates to the study of the real mind, uncannily echoes the ar+ument of this oo. re+ardin+ the need to study the fictional mind in the conte9t ofthe complete situations that are descried in novels&

8 mentioned earlier that the results of introspection can vary ?ildly& 4ennett evocatively descries the sensation of inner speech in a ?ay that, tome certainly, rin+s very true “-ot only do ?e tal. to ourselves silently, ut sometimes ?e do this in a particular >tone of voice&> Lther times, itseems as if there are ?ords, ut not heard ?ords, and at still other times, only the faintest shado?s or hints of ?ords are someho? >there> to clotheour thou+hts” (1551, 65)& Ho?ever, in a ?ay that is characteristic of philosophers ?hen discussin+ consciousness, he provides a familiarreservation “8n any event, the phenomenolo+y of vivid thou+ht is not restricted to tal.in+ to oneself ?e can dra? pictures to ourselves in ourmind>s eyes, drive a stic.3shift car to ourselves, touch sil. to ourselves and savor an ima+inary peanut3utter sand?ich” (1551, 65)& Mye9perience of ?or.s of philosophy and psycholo+y is that they tend to sound more comfortale ?hen descriin+, for e9ample, the visual aspectsof consciousness than ?hen they are discussin+ the lin+uistic aspects&

/n important characteristic of the pro3lan+ua+e perspective is its functional emphasis on the purposive nature of lan+ua+e the use ?e ma.e oflan+ua+e to direct and mana+e our thou+ht and action& Here are four different perspectives on this issue From a neurolo+ical perspective, it



appears that scanner ima+es sho? that the structure of lan+ua+e penetrates many parts of the rain and not Kust roca>s and @ernic.e>s areas, thet?o that are most closely associated ?ith the use of lan+ua+e& 8n the normal course of events, ?hen ?e learn lan+ua+e ?hile youn+, ?hen the rain is fairly plastic, the hard?irin+ of the rain is crucially affected y lan+ua+e& From a developmental perspective, 4ennett su++ests that “the practice of as.in+ oneself =uestions could arise as a natural side effect of as.in+ =uestions of others, and its utility ?ould e similar it ?ould e a ehavior that could e reco+niAed to enhance one>s prospects y promotin+ etter3informed action3+uidance” (1551, 156)& That is, tal.in+ to

oneself is “a ?ay of uildin+ a >virtual ?ire> et?een the relevant susystems” (1551, 15%)& Here 4ennett follo?s the Gy+ots.ian line of thin.in+on ho? outer, directive speech +oes under+round and ecomes inner speech& He concludes that “the +reater virtues of sotto voce tal.in+ tooneself ?ould e reco+niAed, leadin+ later to entirely silent tal.in+ to oneself ” (1551, 15;)& This idea is discussed in +reater detail in chapter 6,section :&

From the perspective of situated, distriuted, or shared co+nition (see chapter 6, section 6), the philosophers /ndy Clar. and 4avid Chalmersassert in their

35%3

article “The B9tended Mind” (155") that “the maKor urden of the couplin+ et?een a+ents is carried y lan+ua+e& @ithout lan+ua+e, ?e mi+ht

e much more a.in to discrete Cartesian >inner> minds, in ?hich hi+h3level co+nition relies lar+ely on internal resources& ut the advent oflan+ua+e has allo?ed us to spread this urden into the ?orld” (155", 1")& 8 discuss in chapter 6 the insi+ht that lan+ua+e is one co+nitive toolamon+ others, aleit the most important of them& Finally, the narratolo+ical perspective& /ccordin+ to 2uomir 4oleel, “ iQnner conflict islocated in the mental domain of the actin+ person it arises from contradictory intentions, desires, +oals, strate+ies, and so forth& 8t manifests itselfin the form of interior monolo+ue, a asic veral e9pression of mental tension” (155", 105)& This is a ?elcome functional approach to?ard therole of lan+ua+e in fictional thou+ht& Ho?ever, the veral e9pression of mental tension is only one form of e9pression amon+ a ?ide ran+e ofothers, and ?e miss a +ood deal of other evidence of fictional mental functionin+ if ?e place e9cessive reliance on the purely veral .ind&

8t is interestin+ to note that none of the theorists discussed earlier consider the possiility that the e9tent of verality of thou+ht, the importance ofinner speech, may vary from individual to individual& There is an illuminatin+ discussion on this point y /nn @aldron -eumann in ?hich shecompares the ta+s used to descrie BliAaeth ennet>s and 2ydia ennet>s thou+ht processes in Eane /usten>s Pride and Pre1udice& -eumanncomments that the narrator uses the term sa, fre=uently ?hen conveyin+ 2ydia>s inner life in order to su++est a very simple primarily visualconsciousness, ?hile BliAaeth>s thou+ht is more hi+hly developed and sophisticated and much more closely related to inner lan+ua+e& /lthou+h



this is a useful idea, 8 am not sure that 8 ?ould accept these value3laden terms, and it is predictale that -eumann should conclude ?ith theremar. that “2ydia su++ests a nearly total asence of thou#ht ” (15"%, :":)& Thou+ht that occurs in hi+hly visual terms is still thou+ht&

3. !on)er'al Consciousness

8 dre? attention in the previous section to the non3veral nature of the terms that are used y co+nitive science theorists to descrie aspects ofconsciousness& There are several other e9amples of similar terms& Lne that is fre=uently used y philosophers is the term *ualia “The felt or phenomenal =ualities associated ?ith e9periences, such as the feelin+ of a pain, or the hearin+ of a sound, or the vie?in+ of a colour” (lac.urn155$, :1:)& -ote the non3lin+uistic nature of the three e9amples& Philosophers also use the term ,hat it>s li9e as a near synonym for =ualia&/nother e9ample is this repeated reference to feelin#s

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“Consciousness e+ins as a feelin+ & & & consciousness feels li.e a feelin+ & & & a feelin+ of .no?in+&&&& The mysterious first3person perspective ofconsciousness consists of ne?ly3minted .no?led+e, information if you ?ill, e9pressed as feelin+” (4amasio !000, :1!#1:)& The term ima#es isyet another e9ample& Many of us, 8 thin., ?ill have e9perienced a deeply unpleasant memory as a visual ima+e comined ?ith an almost physical

pain& 4amasio tal.s repeatedly of mind events as ima+es, and althou+h he stresses that these need not e visual, his terminolo+y undoutedlymar+inaliAes the role of lan+ua+e in thou+ht& /ccordin+ to M8TBC, “ima+ery played a central role in theories of the mind for centuries”(Dosslyn and *ain 1555, :";)& /lso, “sQtill other evidence for thin.in+ ?ithout lan+ua+e has to do ?ith mental ima+es& cientists and ?ritersas ?ell as visual artists have claimed that some of their most creative ?or. ?as inspired y their mental ima+es&&&& 8t seems, then, rilliant as ?ellas mundane thou+ht is eminently possile ?ithout lan+ua+e” (/u 1555, $$$)& Finally, ?ith re+ard to purposive and functional mental activity,4ennett>s vie? is that “tQal.in+ aloud is only one possiility& 4ra?in+ pictures to yourself is another readily appreciated act of self3manipulation” (1551, 15;)& For e9ample, “4oc McCoy had a fairly +ood map of the nited tates in his mind, surprisin+ly detailed, and as up3to3date as he could .eep it” (Thompson !00!, 55)&8n the follo?in+ ta9onomies of consciousness, notice ho? little attention is +iven to thelin+uistic elements& teven Pin.er identifies three different uses of the term consciousness as follo?s1& self$9no,led#e self3a?areness or self3consciousness&!& access to information the information relatin+ to mental events that can e accessed y the systems> underlyin+ veral reports, rational

thou+ht, and delierate decision3ma.in+& This .ind of consciousness has four features a rich field of sensation (colors, shapes, sounds,smells, pressures, and aches) portions of this information fallin+ under the spotli+ht of attention, +ettin+ rotated in and out of short termmemory, and feedin+ delierative co+itation sensations havin+ an emotional flavorin+ (pleasant or unpleasant, interestin+ or repellant,



e9citin+ or soothin+) and an e9ecutive, the “8, ” ?hich ma.es choices and pulls the levers of ehavior&:& sentience or =ualia, suKective e9perience, phenomenal a?areness, ra? feelin+s, ?hat it>s li.e to do somethin+ and so on& (Pin.er 155;,

1:$#:5)

8n ?hat 4aniel 4ennett refers to as a “rief tour of the phenomenolo+ical +arden” (1551, $6), he pic.s out the follo?in+ items “e9periences of

the >e9ternal> ?orld such as si+hts, sounds, smells, slippery and scratchy feelin+s,

35"3

feelin+s of heat and cold, and of the positions of our lims” “e9periences of the purely >internal> ?orld, such as fantasy ima+es, the inner si+htsand sounds of daydreamin+ and tal.in+ to yourself, recollections, ri+ht ideas, and sudden hunches” and “e9periences of emotion or >affect>&&&ran+in+ from odily pains, tic.les and >sensations> of hun+er and thirst, throu+h intermediate emotional storms of an+er, Koy, hatred,emarrassment, lust, astonishment, to the least corporeal visitations of pride, an9iety, re+ret, ironic detachment, rue, a?e, icy calm&” 4ennettstresses that “this ta9onomy o?es more to superficial similarity and duious tradition than to any deep .inship amon+ the phenomena” (1551,$%), and his oo. is in fact an attempt to replace this “fol.3psycholo+y” version of the mind ?ith a more counterintuitive version& -evertheless, 8refer to it here ecause, li.e Pin.er>s, it is a ?idely accepted vie? of the mind in ?hich the emphasis is very much on the non3veral aspects of

consciousness&

The rest of this section is ta.en up ?ith a fairly detailed e9ploration of a third ta9onomy of consciousness to+ether ?ith illustrations from afictional te9t& Eohn earle lists in The *ediscovery of the Mind (155!) ?hat he calls t?elve +ross structural features of normal everyday mentalreality (155!, 1!")& 8t is his attempt to descrie ?hat the e9perience of consciousness is actually li.e& 8 have reor+aniAed and simplified his list inorder to sharpen its relevance to narrative& 8t is si+nificant that only one part of one of earle>s t?elve features refers to inner speech& 8 haveillustrated earle>s cate+ories ?ith =uotes from he Cryin# of "ot %B y Thomas Pynchon& 8 noticed after 8 had chosen the e9amples that they areall in the mode of thou+ht report, althou+h one or t?o are on the orderline ?ith free indirect thou+ht&

earle refers first to ?hat he calls finite modalities& These include the si9 senses, includin+ alance odily sensations such as pain and thesensory a?areness of the position of one>s ody and the stream of thou+ht& The stream of thou+ht contains feelin+s and emotions such as asudden sur+e of an+er ?ords visual ima+es and other elements that are neither veral nor ima+es& For e9ample, a thou+ht can occur suddenly ina flash and in a form that is neither ?ords nor ima+es (earle 155!, 1!")&8t is si+nificant that, even ?ithin the aspect that earle calls the stream



of thou+ht, he emphasiAes non3veral elements such as emotions and visual ima+es at the e9pense of inner speech, ?hich is completelymar+inaliAed&

The ne9t feature is unity& earle ar+ues that conscious states come to us as part of a unified se=uence& @ithout a sense of unity, ?e could notma.e sense of our e9periences& (earle and 4amasio tend to emphasiAe the unity +iven y the

sense of the self conversely, 4ennett and also Ralen tra?son 155;Q stress the “+appiness” and discontinuity of consciousness&) Gertical unityis the indin+ of disparate elements into a unified column 8 have simultaneous e9periences of various separate thin+s as part of one and the sameconscious event& HoriAontal unity is the rememered present, the or+aniAation of conscious e9periences throu+h short stretches of time 8 ama?are of the e+innin+ of the sentence that 8 am no? finishin+ (earle 155!, 1!5#:0)& B9ample of vertical unity “Ledipa stood in the livin+room, stared at y the +reenish dead eye of the TG tue, spo.e the name of Rod, tried to feel as drun. as possile” (155%, 6)& B9ample ofhoriAontal unity “Throu+h the rest of the afternoon, throu+h her trip to the mar.et & & & then throu+h the sunned +atherin+ of her marKoram &&& intothe layerin+ of a lasa+na & & & eventually, oven on, into the mi9in+ of the t?ili+ht>s ?his.ey sours &&& she ?ondered, ?ondered, shufflin+ ac.throu+h a fat dec.ful of days” (155%, 6#%)&

This feature could e used to as. several =uestions of fictional te9ts @hat techni=ues, if any, does the narrator use to convey this sense of the

unity of characters> consciousnessesI @hat are the difficulties in conveyin+ vertical unity, +iven the relentlessly linear nature of narrativediscourseI 4o some narrators convey it more than othersI 8f these differences e9ist, ?hat ?ould e their si+nificanceI For e9ample, a +ood dealof t?entieth3century fiction can e understood in terms of its evident desire to disrupt or prolematiAe the sense of the unified nature ofe9perience and to portray clearly non3unified states of consciousness& This comment also applies to several of the other features later descried&

earle then discusses the technical, philosophical concept of intentionality& 8n this conte9t, intentionality means that a conscious state is directedat, or is aout, somethin+ or other& Most consciousness is intentional, ut not all& 8f 8 am depressed aout somethin+, this is an intentional state& 8f8 am depressed, ut not aout anythin+ in particular, then this state is not intentional (earle 155!, 1:0#:1)& He elaorates further and introducesa concept that ?ill assume +reater and +reater importance ?ithin this study& He says that every intentional state has ?hat he calls an aspectual

shape& This means that my conscious e9periences are al?ays from a particular point of vie?, are al?ays perspectival& eein+ an oKect from a point of vie? consists of seein+ it under certain aspects and not others& /ll seein+ is seein+ as (earle 155!, 1:1)& B9ample of an intentional state“?or.in+ hours ?ere e9=uisite torture to him” (155%, ;)& B9ample of a non3intentional state (?here the conte9t ma.es it clear that the state is nota response to the surroundin+s) “He +aAed at her & & & hisQ face no? smooth, amiale, at peace” (155%, 55)& The narratolo+ical implications ofthis analysis are



31003

fascinatin+& 8ntentional states of consciousness ?ould tend to relate to events and situations that have already een estalished in the story& Theseevents and situations ?ould form reasons, causes, and motives for the resultin+ states of mind and ?ould therefore have an ovious teleolo+icalvalue& For e9ample, a character may e depressed ecause of a reversal in fortunes& -on3intentional states ?ould ?or. in a different ?ay ecause

they ?ould not have e9ternal causes ut could themselves function as causes of future events& For e9ample, ecause the character ?as depressedfor no reason, he ?ent on a Kourney that made him feel etter&

Lne of the most pervasive features of ordinary conscious a?areness is the aspect of familiarity& earle ar+ues that the prior possession of anapparatus that is sufficient to +enerate or+aniAed consciousness automatically +uarantees that the aspectual features of conscious e9perience ?ill e more or less familiar& @hen 8 ?al. do?n the street, oKects are familiar to me as trees, houses, and so on& Perhaps most important of all, 8 havean inner sense of ?hat it feels li.e to e me, a feelin+ of myself (earle 155!, 1::#:$)& This aspect of familiarity ma.es possile much of theor+aniAation and order of my conscious e9perience& Consciousness involves cate+oriAation, ut the cate+ories have to e9ist prior to thee9perience ecause they are the conditions of possiility of havin+ the e9perience& They enale us, to varyin+ de+rees, to assimilate oure9periences, ho?ever novel, to the familiar (earle 155!, 1:6#:%)& B9ample of familiarity “he .ne? the pattern ecause it had happened afe? times already” (155%, :0)& Lf course, narrators tend to e more interested in a character>s lac. of familiarity ?ith their surroundin+s& This

sort of unfamiliarity has a +ood deal of potential for various sorts of psychic disturance and conflict ?ith others& B9ample of unfamiliarity “hemoved throu+h the campusQ carryin+ her fat oo., attracted, unsure, a stran+er, ?antin+ to feel relevant ut .no?in+ ho? much of a searchamon+ alternative universes it ?ould ta.e” (155%, ;1)&

earle also comments on ?hat he descries as the fi#ure$#round or #estalt structure of conscious eperience& Restalt psycholo+y sho?s that our perceptual e9periences come to us or+aniAed as a fi+ure a+ainst a ac.+round& For e9ample, 8 see the s?eater a+ainst the ac.+round of the taleon ?hich it is lyin+& 8 do not perceive mere undifferentiated shapes, ecause our normal perceptions are al?ays structured in this ?ay& Ho?ever,earle ar+ues that this seems to e true not only of perception ut also of consciousness +enerally& @hen 8 focus my attention on somethin+, it isa+ainst a ac.+round that is not the center of attention& /ll seein+ is seein+ as all perceivin+ is perceivin+ as and all consciousness isconsciousness of somethin+ as such and such (earle 155!, 1:!#::)& 8t is ?ithin

31013



this conte9t that earle focuses on the =uestion of attention and introduces the notions of the center and the periphery& @ithin the field ofconsciousness, some thin+s are at the center of our attention, and some thin+s are at the periphery& @e are conscious of a very lar+e numer ofthin+s that ?e are not attendin+ to or focusin+ our attention upon& -onetheless, all of these phenomena are part of our conscious a?areness(earle 155!, 1:;#:")& earle emphasiAes that ?e need to distin+uish the center of attention7periphery distinction from theconscious7unconscious distinction& @hen 8 drive, my attention may e on other thou+hts, ut 8 do not drive unconsciously& There are different

levels of attention ?ithin conscious states& 4urin+ a drive, my hi+hest level of attention is on my thou+hts at a lo?er level, ut still attention, 8am payin+ attention to my drivin+ in addition, there are many other thin+s that 8 am peripherally a?are of ut that are no?here near the center ofmy attention& Ho?ever, it is not true to say that 8 am unconscious of these thin+s& He concludes in a functionalist manner that attention +oes to?here it is needed and +oes a?ay from ?here it is not needed (earle 155!, 1:"#:5)&

B9ample “he stood in a nearly deserted par.in+ lot, ?atchin+ the headli+hts of MetA+er>s car come at her, and ?ondered ho? accidental a previous incidentQ had een” (155%, 6$)& Her ?onderin+ is at the center of her attention, and the car is at the periphery& ut if the car ?ere tocome too close, attention ?ould +o to ?here it is needed, and the car ?ould then ecome the center of her attention& /nother e9ample “he +otin and rode ?ith him for t?o miles efore realiAin+ that & & & the disc Koc.ey tal.in+ ?as her husand, Mucho” (155%, 6$#66)& The radio pro+ramis at the periphery of her attention ut comes into the center once the aspect of familiarity is reco+niAed& earle>s use of the philosophical conceptof attention is fle9ile and illuminatin+ in part ecause it is a continuum, not a dichotomy& 8t is often not possile and not interestin+ to say ho?

conscious or unconscious a character is of a particular mental event& 8t may e easier and more re?ardin+, as in these e9amples, to analyAefictional thou+ht in terms of the center and periphery of attention& /lthou+h 8 have used the term non$consciousness in the headin+ to the ne9tsection ecause it is the +enerally accepted term, 8 thin. that earle>s terminolo+y is in many ?ays preferale&

/nother important feature of everyday mental reality ?ith e9tensive implications for narrative discourse is the e9istence of boundary conditions&4urin+ the stream of thou+ht, 8 tend not to thin. aout ?here 8 am located, ?hat day of the month it is, and so on& This is part of the situatedness,the spatiotemporal, socio3iolo+ical location of my present conscious states& /ny state

310!3

of consciousness is characteristically located in this ?ay, althou+h the location may not e the oKect of consciousness, even at the periphery& The pervasiveness of the oundary of consciousness is most noticeale in cases of rea.do?n& / sense of disorientation occurs ?hen one cannotrememer ?here one is or ?hat day it is (earle 155!, 1:5)& -ovels tend to e aout crises in characters> lives, and so the oundaries that earledescries are often reached& Therefore, the description of fictional minds e9periencin+ this rea.do?n is common in a ?ide ran+e of novels& 8n



particular, it is not surprisin+ that a postmodern novel such as The Cryin+ of 2ot $5 has several e9amples& “Qo in her first minute of an -arciso, a revelation also tremled Kust past the threshold of her understandin+” (155%, 16) “/t some point she ?ent into the athroom, tried tofind her ima+e in the mirror and couldn>t& he had a moment of nearly pure terror” (155%, !;) “omethin+ came to her viscera, danced riefly,and ?ent” (155%, 6:) “feelin+ li.e a flutterin+ curtain in a very hi+h ?indo?, movin+ up to then out over the ayss” (155%, 106) and “he stood&&& in the ni+ht, her isolation complete, and tried to face to?ards the sea& ut she>d lost her earin+s” (155%, 1!!)&

earle also refers to the overflo?& y this he means that conscious states tends to refer eyond their immediate content& They spill over toconnect ?ith other thou+hts in lon+, associative series& 8f 8 loo. out of the ?indo? at the trees, the la.e, and so on, and 8 am then as.ed ?hat 8have seen, my ans?er ?ill have an indefinite e9tendiility (earle 155!, 1:;)& B9amples “@hat the road really ?as, she fancied, ?as thishypodermic needle, inserted some?here ahead into the vein of a free?ay” (155%, 1%) and “ut she>d only een reminded of her loo. do?nhillthis noontime& ome immediacy ?as there a+ain, some promise of hierophany printed circuit, +ently curvin+ streets, private access to the ?ater,oo. of the 4ead” (155%, !0)& 8t is in these ?ays that narrators ma.e re+ular use of associations in thou+ht processes such as the chains ofcorrespondences in ?hich memories and sensations accompany immediate e9periences& 8t can form an important part of the presentation of mind,not Kust in stream of consciousness novels, ut also in more plot3oriented fictions such as he Cryin# of "ot %B&

Finally, earle comments on mood & / mood, y itself, never constitutes the ?hole content of a conscious state& *ather, it provides the tone or

color that characteriAes the ?hole conscious state& @e are al?ays in a particular mood if the ?ord is defined roadly enou+h to include a tone toour e9periences, even if it is sometimes a neutral tone& 8t is characteristic of moods that they pervade all of our conscious e9periences, and it istypical of normal conscious life that ?e are al?ays in some mood or other& Moods need not e consciously

310:3

directed at any intentional conditions of satisfaction (earle 155!, 1$0)& / related feature is the pleasure<unpleasure dimension& 8f ?e ta.e the?hole of a conscious state, a slice out of the flo? of consciousness that is i+ enou+h to have some unity and coherence, then there is al?ays adimension of pleasure or unpleasure (earle 155!, 1$1)& ometimes this can e intentional (in the philosophical sense descried earlier) such asfindin+ it unpleasant to see somethin+ dis+ustin+ and sometimes not as in odily sensations (earle 155!, 1!5)& The description of characters>moods is clearly an important element in narrative discourse& B9amples “There had hun+ the sense of uffetin+, insulation, she had noticed theasence of an intensity, as if ?atchin+ a movie, Kust perceptily out of focus, that the proKectionist refused to fi9” (155%, 1!) and “he could carrythe sadness of the moment ?ith her that ?ay forever, see the ?orld refracted throu+h those tears, those specific tears” (155%, 1:)& Ho?ever, 8found it si+nificantly more difficult to illustrate this feature from the Pynchon novel than 8 did the others& This may e ecause it should often e



:& all the dispositions that ?ere ac=uired throu+h e9perience, lie dormant, and may never ecome an e9plicit neural pattern$& all the =uiet remodelin+ of such dispositions and all their =uiet renet?or.in+#that may never ecome e9plicitly .no?n and6& all the hidden ?isdom and .no?3ho? that nature emodied in innate, homeostatic dispositions&

/maAin+, indeed, ho? little ?e ever .no?& (!000, !!") 8tems three, four, and five of 4amasio>s list are dispositions that are dealt ?ith in the ne9t

section&

The points that 8 ?ish to ma.e on non3consciousness can perhaps est e illustrated y the narratolo+ist /nn anfield>s comments on ertrand*ussell>s An 0n*uiry into -eanin# and ruth (15$0), from ?hich she =uotes as follo?s “uppose you are out ?al.in+ on a ?et day, and you seea puddle and avoid it& Jou are not li.ely to say to yourself >there is a puddle it ?ill e advisale not to step in it&> ut if someody said >?hy didyou suddenly step asideI> you ?ould ans?er >ecause 8 didn>t ?ish to step into that puddle&> Jou .no?, retrospectively, that you had a visual perception &&& and &&& you e9press this .no?led+e in ?ords” (*ussell 15$0, $5, =uoted in anfield 15"!, 15;#5")& anfield uses this e9ample toillustrate the conceptual distinction et?een ?hat she calls reflective or veral thou+ht and ?hat she calls non3reflective consciousness, ?hichshe appears to identify primarily ?ith perception& Her uncontroversial ar+ument is that perception is not dependent on veral or consciousthou+ht& /s she and *ussell a+ree, people do not say to themselves, “There is a puddle

31063

and 8 ?ish to avoid it&” Ho?ever, the ri+idity of the veral ias prevents anfield from ta.in+ the e9ample further& he misses the full force of it y focusin+ only on the visual perception of the puddle as an e9ample of non3veral thou+ht& The much more interestin+ conclusion to e dra?nfrom this e9ample is that the individual does not Kust have a perception of the puddle and therey ac=uires the 9no,led#e that it is a puddle thatthey see& The person also adopts the belief that steppin+ into the puddle ?ill e unpleasant, forms the intention to avoid the puddle for the purpose of not +ettin+ ?et, ma.es a decision to avoid the puddle, and then performs the action of ?al.in+ around the puddle& 8t is verysi+nificant that anfield edits out of her =uote from *ussell a reference y him to action& The ori+inal passa+e reads “Jou .no?, retrospectively,that you had a visual perception, to ,hich you reacted appropriately” (*ussell 15$0, $5 emphasis added)& This is an e9ample, not Kust of passive, private perception, ut also of mental action in a physical conte9t& This mental functionin+ involves a sophisticated co+nitive process, comprisin+several elements, involvin+ various areas of the mind in addition to perception, and all ta.in+ place at the periphery of the suKect>s attention&

/ccordin+ to anfield, ?hat forces consciousness to ecome reflective is the suKect ein+ as.ed ?hat he or she is doin+ a re=uest for lin+uisticinformation is the catalyst ecause to spea. of somethin+ al?ays implies reflective consciousness of it (15"!, 15")& Thou+h true, this is very



misleadin+& 8n the case of the very artificial and hi+hly unli.ely e9ample of a conversation aout a puddle, it is the re=uest for information thatforces the mental event to ecome conscious and therefore hi+hly veral& Ho?ever, in reality, there is an infinite numer of other reasons ?hynon3self3conscious mental events ecome conscious and ?hy they then cease to e self3conscious y no lon+er ein+ at the center of anindividual>s attention& There is a ?ide spectrum of attention alon+ ?hich mental events move, and this movement to and fro alon+ the scale ofattention is very fluid& The ri+id dichotomy of reflective and non3reflective thou+ht does not reflect the comple9ity and the fluidity of the mind

that ?as sho?n in the earle ta9onomy, ?hich ?as discussed in the previous section& anfield>s e9ample is also interestin+ ?ith re+ard to the presentation of action in the discourse& Most attempts to list episodes of presentations of mind in a particular passa+e of fiction ?ould not includea sentence such as “he avoided the puddle&” 8t is much more li.ely that this statement ?ould e classified simply as a narrative description of anevent in the story?orld& This is proaly ?hy anfield leaves out of her =uotation the ?ords that relate to the action ta.en& ut 8 ?ill ar+ue insection ; of this chapter and also in chapter ;, section ! that descriptions of

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actions should e re+arded, in part, as descriptions of the net?or. of mental states and events such as intentions, eliefs, and decisions that lie ehind the physical ehavior and form part of the philosophical concept of action& 8t is throu+h descriptions of actions that narrators portray thesocial minds of characters in their pulic and physical conte9t& The distinction et?een descriptions of action and of consciousness can often e

difficult to see&

/ntonio 4amasio is very +ood on the sensation of realiAin+ that nonconscious processes have een at ?or. ?ithin our minds ?ithout our“.no?in+” it& He reminds us that “?e often realiAe =uite suddenly, in a +iven situation, that ?e feel an9ious or uncomfortale, pleased or rela9ed,and it is apparent that the particular state of feelin+ ?e .no? then has not e+un on the moment of .no?in+ ut rather sometime efore” (!000,:%)& The non3conscious includes not only feelin+s that ?e elatedly ecome a?are of and the processes involved in automatically avoidin+ puddles ut also lar+e and important mental events& For e9ample, sometimes ?e ma.e up our mind aout a i+ decision ?ithout realiAin+ it&Consciously, ?e are torn et?een choice / and choice & Ho?ever, ?e e+in to notice that, unconsciously, all our plannin+ aout the future is predicated on the assumption that ?e ?ill choose & @hen ?e then finally and consciously choose , ?e .no? instantly that it is the ri+ht thin+to do& @e do not e9perience the douts that ?e thou+ht ?e ?ould have& @e feel a sense of li+htness and relief ecause ?e had made up our mindsome time a+o ut had not realiAed it& For e9ample, “he had feared that ein+ on her o?n a+ain ?ould e painful instead, she had e+un to

realiAe, she felt rather li.e that +ull it hadn>t li.ed the ?ay it ?as treated, so it had ta.en fli+ht and soared a?ay” (2eon !001, 116)& @hen ?esay, “8 did that ?ithout thin.in+” and “8 didn>t put much thou+ht into it” ?hat ?e often mean is that all the thou+ht ?as put in eforehand&Picasso, near the end of his career, ?hen as.ed ho? lon+ it had ta.en him to do a very simple s.etch, replied that it had ta.en him si9ty years& Ln



a less e9alted plane, this is ho? s.ills of many sorts are developed& 8ndeed, “mQany of our unthin.in+ activities, such as drivin+ a car, could ecome unthin.in+ only after passin+ throu+h a lon+ period of desi+n development that ?as e9plicitly self3conscious” (4ennett 155%, 166)& Lurdispositions, eliefs, and attitudes are unconscious for most of the time unless activated for some reason “*eli+ion, runetti reflected, as hestood on the steps, thou+h he had never realiAed this until Paola had pointed it out to him, al?ays made him uncomfortale” (2eon !001, 160)&

Much of the non3conscious nature of our mental functionin+ can e e9plained y the functional approach to the notion of attention& Co+nitivescience

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sho?s that the rain>s preference is to ma.e as much as possile of its activity non3conscious& This .ind of “mana+ement y e9ception” is moreefficient than consciousness ein+ involved in activities for ?hich it is not re=uired& /s earle says, attention +oes to ?here it is needed& This?ay, consciousness is reserved for surprises and can deal ?ith the une9pected& 4amasio oserves that only a “fraction of ?hat +oes on mentallyis really clean enou+h and ?ell lit enou+h to e noticed&” 8n fact, it is “advanta+eous not to notice yourself .no?in+” (!000, 1!5#:0)& 4ennettand 4amasio oth ma.e this point in sli+htly different terms “Most of our intentional actions are performed ?ithout elaorate practicalreasonin+Q, and a +ood thin+ too, since there ?ouldn>t e time” (4ennett 1551, !6!)& “The lac. of dependence on conscious survey automates a

sustantial part of our ehavior and frees us in terms of attention and time#t?o scarce commodities in our lives#to plan and e9ecute other tas.sand create solutions for ne? prolems” (4amasio !000, :00)& This emphasis on the need to reserve attention for ?hen it is re=uired to deal ?ithsurprises fits in ?ell ?ith the need for narrators to focus on fictional events that, in order to form a plot, ?ill “surprise” (in the ?idest sense) thecharacters& Pip is livin+ a settled and uneventful life that does not re=uire all his attention until he e9periences the surprise that Ma+?ich>s return+ives him& His dilemma re=uires his full attention, and the plot ecomes eventful&

". Dispositions

Philosophical ehaviorists maintain that mental events are lo+ical constructions out of dispositions to ehave in certain ?ays& This is a verystron+ claim that amounts, in non3philosophical lan+ua+e, to sayin+ that, ?hen ?e tal. aout mental events, ?e are tal.in+ only aoutdispositions to ehave& 8 am not concerned ?ith the truth or falsity of this position or ?ith ?hether or not its truth or falsity could ever e

estalished& 8 simply ?ant to point out that it is odd that narrative discourse analysis has ne+lected phenomena such as dispositions that are socentral to other discourses that are also related to the mind& 4ispositions play an especially important role in the ?or.in+s of the fictional mind ecause they are the primary lin. et?een the study of characters> immediate consciousnesses and the area of characteriAation& Currently, as 8



said in chapter !, there is surprisin+ly little cross3fertiliAation et?een these t?o areas, and 8 hope that this state of affairs ?ill come to seemincreasin+ly stran+e as ?e continue throu+h this chapter& 8 ?ish to uild up a perspective on the mind in ?hich it is seen, in Patricia Hi+hsmith>s?ords, as “not an event, not a moment, ut a condition” (15%", 1;:)&

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The term dispositions covers a very ?ide ran+e of mental phenomena& /s 4amasio remar.s, ?hat ?e “usually descrie as a >personality> dependson multiple contriutions &&& anythin+ from trivial preferences to ethical principles” (!000, !!!)& Clifford ReertA contends that the term mind

denotes “a class of s.ills, propensities, capacities, tendencies, haits” (155:, 6")& These are states of mind or dispositions that, 4amasio claims,are “records ?hich are dormant and implicit rather than active and e9plicit, as ima+es are” (!000, 1%0)& 8n the vivid and very informative phrasethat 8 used in chapter :, 4aniel 4ennett calls them “mind3ruts” (1551, :00)& B=ually important to an e9panded narratolo+ical vie? of fictionalstates of mind is earle>s concept of the bac9#round , ?hich has somethin+ in common ?ith the notion of dispositions& He points out that somemental states sound unnatural ?hen descried as eliefs& For e9ample, 8 may have a elief that the system of con+estion char+in+ that hasrecently een imposed in 2ondon (that is, char+in+ motorists to drive into the center of the city) ?ill enefit the center of 2ondon& ut 8 do not, inthe same ?ay, have a elief that oKects are solid& 8 simply ehave in such a ?ay that 8 ta.e the solidity of oKects for +ranted& 8t is part of mynet?or. of ac.+round suppositions& @hat earle calls the ac.+round consists of the mental capacities, dispositions, stances, ?ays of ehavin+,

.no?3ho?, and so on that manifest themselves in, for e9ample, intentional actions, perceptions, and thou+hts (155!, 15%)& earle is tal.in+ aoutsome asic states of minds that, to+ether ?ith more sophisticated states such as eliefs and attitudes, are as much a part of ?hole fictional mindsas immediate consciousness& To ta.e earle>s concept in a sli+htly different ut related direction, it is necessary for readers to ma.e use of asimilar net?or. of ac.+round suppositions in order to put to+ether coherent fictional minds out of scattered references to particular characters inthe te9t& ome aspects of the ac.+round ?ere included in the alternative approach to consciousness that ?as discussed in section :&

/ntonio 4amasio descries the differences et?een immediate, sin+le mental events and states that continue over time in terms of t?o selves“the seemin+ly chan+in+ self and the seemin+ly permanent self ” (!000, !1;), ?hich he also refers to as the core self and the autobio#raphical

self & He su++ests that, in “core consciousness, the sense of self arises in the sutle, fleetin+ feelin+ of .no?in+, constructed ane? in each pulse&”Ln the other hand, “eQ9tended consciousness still hin+es on the same core >you,> ut that >you> is no? connected to the lived past and anticipatedfuture that are part of your autoio+raphical record” (!000, 15%)& 8n the conte9t of this discussion, mental events happen to the core self, and

states are attriutes of the autoio+raphical self& 8ncidentally, 4amasio uses

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this notion of the t?o selves to shed a little li+ht on one of the +reat mysteries of life ?hy ?e feel that ?e are al?ays chan+in+ ?hilesimultaneously feelin+ that ?e al?ays stay the same& 8n his vie?, it is the core self that causes the feelin+ of chan+e and the autoio+raphical selfthat causes the feelin+ of sameness&

Memory is clearly an important aspect of the picture of the mind that is descried in this chapter, includin+ oth memory stores that hold

information for very rief periods of time and lon+3term memories that ?e carry ?ith us al?ays ut may never retrieve for years at a time& earlear+ues a+ainst a simplistic vie? of memory, pointin+ out that oth lan+ua+e and culture tend to force on us a picture of memory as a storehouseor lirary of propositions, ima+es, and representations& earle thin.s that it is more comple9 than that& @e should thin. of memory rather as amechanism for +eneratin+ current performance, such as conscious thou+hts and actions, ased on past e9perience (earle 155!, 1";)& This notionof memory as a mechanism rather than a i+ storeroom is completely consistent ?ith the functional and dynamic conception of characters> mindsas emedded narratives& oth convey a sense of the causal process or relationship that e9ists et?een memories of the past, ehavior in the present, and plans for the future& 8n oth cases the past is seen as actively causin+, or +eneratin+, the present and the future&

-ot?ithstandin+ earle>s ?arnin+ that ?e should e careful aout an oversimplistic use of mental metaphors such as storerooms, the fact remainsthat ?e do use metaphors of this sort in order to conceptualiAe mental functionin+& Riven that ?e do, the metaphor that is most suitale for the?hole mind is not that of the stream or flo? of consciousness, ut that of the mind as a container& The former tends to lead us to thin. of

immediate consciousness as the norm ?hile the latter ma.es room for all aspects of the mind& For e9ample, “spea.ers often tal. aout ideas as ifthey ?ere physical oKects at different physical locations in the mind conceived of as a physical container& This commonsensical vie? is the ?ell3.no?n M8-43/3CL-T/8-B* metaphor& 8t is manifested in sentences such as >Jolanda put the idea into <avier>s mind> and >8n some dar.corner of his mind, <avier .ne? he ?as ?ron+> ” (arnden 1556, !$")& / numer of other metaphors are also derived from the container model&8t is si+nificant that ?e tal. of havin+ somethin+ “at the ac. of ” our minds& This is a fol.3psycholo+y reco+nition of the fact that the mind is athree3 or four3dimensional, not a t?odimensional phenomenon& There are other fol.3psycholo+y formulations that are e=ually revealin+ “turn mymind to it, ” “it ?ent out of my mind, ” “he ?as out of his mind, ” “in my mind>s eye, ” and “off the top of my head&” 8nterestin+ly, many of themlend themselves very ?ell to third3person formulations& The

31103

tendency to conceptualiAe the mind as a multidimensional container, not as a t?o3dimensional stream, +ets support from 4amasio, ?ho says thatin the rain there is an ima+e space and also a dispositional space& “The dispositional space is that in ?hich dispositions contain the .no?led+e



ase and the mechanisms ?ith ?hich & & & the processin+ of ima+es can e facilitated&” 8n other ?ords, they are “astract records of potentialities”(4amasio !000, ::1#:!)&

The terminolo+y already e9ists ?ithin narrative theory that can reflect the distinction et?een immediate mental events, and dispositions andstates of mind that e9ist over time& /s a numer of dichotomies are availale for this purpose, it ma.es it all the more surprisin+ that the

opportunity has not een ta.en to apply the terminolo+y in any systematic ?ay to mental life& The event7state, event7e9istent, and thedynamic7static oppositions are standard ones in narratolo+y& tates and e9istents are those thin+s that e9ist throu+h time, and events are thechan+es that occur to e9istents& Thou+hts are dynamic events and states of mind or dispositions are static states or eistents& The same distinctioncan e put in terms of stasis (in this conte9t, states of mind) and process (mental events)& To illustrate this relationship, 8 ?ill use t?o e9amplesfrom Ganity Fair First, “/?ay ?ent Reor+e, his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement at the ne?s so lon+ loo.ed for, so sudden ?hen it came”(155$, !5!)& Here, process modifies stasis& The stasis is the state of anticipatin+ the ne?s the process is the reaction to the ne?s& econd, “LurBmmy, ?ho had never hated, never sneered all her life, ?as po?erless in the hands of her remorseless little enemy” (155$, !"5)& Here, stasis isthe cause of process& The stasis is the disposition not to hate or sneer the process is the current feelin+ of po?erlessness&

The current ias ?ithin the study of fictional minds to?ard events at the e9pense of states appears to e a reflection of a ?ider ias that affectsthe presentation of fictional ?orlds +enerally& Marie32aure *yan has pointed out that, ?hile “events are usually represented in +reat detail in

narrative discourse, the confi+uration of states is hardly ever fully e9plicited sicQ” (15"6, ;1")& B=ually si+nificantly, from my point of vie?,*yan ar+ues that, althou+h “events +et more attention on the level of discourse & & & they receive their meanin+ from the states et?een ?hich theymediate, and the specification of the latter is of e=ual importance on the level of plot” (15"6, ;15)& /lthou+h she is tal.in+ +enerally here, thissounds to e li.e a very accurate description of the relationship et?een mind events and mind states& -ot all narrative theorists are fi9ated onmental events, ho?ever& *ichard E& Rerri+, ?hen considerin+ the factors that influence characters> actions, dra?s a sharp distinction et?een thedispositional factors that are internal to individuals and the situational factors that are e9ternal to

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individuals (155:, 6$)& This distinction raises fascinatin+ =uestions such as, @hat e9actly are the means y ?hich ?e uild up the detailed andcoherent sense of a character>s disposition that enales us to ma.e the distinctionI / response to this =uestion mi+ht then lur Rerri+>s distinction

ecause it may e that it is often characters> dispositions that +et them into particular situations& 8t is this rich and comple9 relationship et?eenevents, dispositions, and conte9ts that is at the heart of novel readin+& @e as. ourselves continually, Riven the sort of disposition that this



particular character has, ho? ?ill he or she react in this specific situationI The ans?ers to this =uestion ?ill then modify to a +reater or lessere9tent the initial hypotheses that ?e have formed re+ardin+ that character&

/. 0motions

8n this section 8 ?ill attempt to demonstrate the importance of the emotions in any analysis of the ?hole of the fictional mind and to su++est someof the ?ays in ?hich fictional emotion can e studied& 8n the conte9t of fictional minds, 4oleel maintains that emotions have “re+ained theirstatus as po?erful motivational factors ut continue to elude theoretical +rasp” (155", %6)& @hile discussin+ real minds, 4amasio refers to “thescientific ne+lect of emotion” (!000, :5) ut reassures us that, in recent years, “oth neuroscience and co+nitive neuroscience have finallyendorsed emotion” (!000, $0)& -o? is the time for narrative theory to follo? suit&

/fter the o9 Hill e9pedition in (mma, Dni+htly reprimands Bmma for ein+ rude to Miss ates “Bmma recollected, lushed, ?as sorry, uttried to lau+h it off ” (155%, :05)& @hen he has finished his reprimand, this happens

He had misinterpreted the feelin+s ?hich had .ept her face averted, and her ton+ue motionless& They ?ere comined only of an+er a+ainstherself, mortification and deep concern& he had not een ale to spea. and, on enterin+ the carria+e, sun. ac. for a moment overcome#then

reproachin+ herself for havin+ ta.en no leave, ma.in+ no ac.no?led+ement, partin+ in apparent sullenness, she loo.ed out ?ith voice and handea+er to sho? a difference, ut it ?as Kust too late& He had turned a?ay, and the horses ?ere in motion&&&& he ?as ve9ed eyond ?hat could have een e9pressed#almost eyond ?hat she could conceal& -ever had she felt so a+itated, mortified, +rieved, at any circumstance in her life& he?as most forcily struc.& The truth of his representation there ?as no denyin+& he felt it at her heart& Ho? could she have een so rutal, socruel to Miss ates#Ho? could she have e9posed herself to such ill

311!3

opinion in anyone she valued /nd ho? suffer him to leave her ?ithout sayin+ one ?ord of +ratitude, of concurrence, of common .indness

Time did not compose her& /s she reflected more, she seemed ut to feel it more& he never had een so depressed &&& and Bmma felt the tears

runnin+ do?n her chee.s almost all the ?ay home, ?ithout ein+ at any troule to chec. them, e9traordinary as they ?ere& (155%, :10) This passa+e contains very vivid descriptions of several stron+ emotions&



There are no descriptions of Dni+htley>s feelin+s, ut the reader ?ill proaly infer from the conte9t that he feels an+er and disappointmentmi9ed, perhaps, ?ith a little self3ri+hteousness& / lar+e numer of Bmma>s feelin+s are e9plicitly laeled sorro?, an+er, mortification, concern,self3reproach, ve9ation, a+itation, +rief, and depression& everal conclusions can e dra?n from the passa+eU The emotions are reported in the mode of thou+ht report ecause this is the mode est suited for the presentation of emotion& Bmotions

e9plicitly contained in the other t?o modes ecome first3person ascription and the prolematical issues surroundin+ this form of

ascription are discussed in section " of this chapter& There is some free indirect discourse in the passa+e (the sentences e+innin+ “Thetruth, ” “Ho? could she, ” and “/nd ho? suffer”) that is used for Bmma>s remonstrations ?ith herself&U Her feelin+s are visile and pulic they result in out?ard si+ns of ehavior such as turnin+ a?ay, ein+ unale to spea., lushin+, and

cryin+& Ho?ever, they are also inaccessile and private Dni+htley misinterprets her feelin+s and thin.s that she is unconcerned&U The emotions are ine9tricaly lin.ed ?ith co+nition& Dni+htley>s (implicit) emotions arise out of his eliefs aout Bmma>s conduct and his

decision to share them ?ith her& Bmma>s emotions arise out of her elief that Dni+htley is ri+ht and that she has acted adly& he thin.sthat Dni+htley has misinterpreted her actions& he decides on the asis of her feelin+s to ehave differently in future and so on&

U The passa+e also sho?s that the presentation of emotion plays a vital part in the creation of character& Dni+htley>s an+er anddisappointment arise from his hi+h standards of conduct& 8t is a demonstration of his love for Bmma that he allo?s these feelin+s to sho?&8t also sho?s that Bmma is asically a +ood person ?ho re+rets the results of her hi+h spirits and her desire to sho? off& he ?ill tryharder in future to e more considerate and to help Dni+htley to thin. etter of her&

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U Finally, the passa+e has an important teleolo+ical value in that, thou+h the ar+ument temporarily drives them far apart, it ?ill ultimately rin+ them to their marria+e at the end of the novel&

Lne noticeale feature of ?or. in psycholo+y on the emotions is that there are numerous typolo+ies that tend to e similar to one another ut notidentical& /lthou+h 8 ?ill mention t?o here riefly, out of interest, 8 ?ill not pursue the point as 8 am not sure that a collection of typolo+ies is themost interestin+ approach to the suKect& / more functional approach, ?hich considers ho? emotions lin. ?ith co+nition to produce mentalfunctionin+ and ho? these interrelations are presented in fictional te9ts, seems to me to e a more re?ardin+ perspective& /ccordin+ to 4amasio,a distinction can e made et?een primary, secondary (or social ), and bac9#round emotions& The primary emotions are happiness, sadness, fear,

an+er, surprise, and dis+ust& The secondary or social emotions include emarrassment, Kealousy, +uilt, and pride& 4amasio collects to+ether alon+ and very interestin+ list of ac.+round emotions that includes the feelin+s of ?ell3ein+, malaise, calm, tension, fati+ue, ener+y, e9citement,?ellness, sic.ness, rela9ation, sur+in+, dra++in+, staility and instaility, alance and imalance, harmony and discord, ed+iness,



discoura+ement, enthusiasm, do?n3ness, lo?ness, and cheerfulness (!000, 60#6:, !"%)& Eon Blster ta.es a more minimalist approach in Alchemies of the -ind and limits himself to the follo?in+ an+er, hatred, fear, shame, pity, indi+nation, +loatin+, envy, malice, and contempt(1555, %1)& Blster comments ?ith commendale understatement that this is a “mostly dar.” list (1555, %1)& 4oleel lists a numer of other lists in ;eterocosmica (155", %;#%5)&

Bmotions last for varyin+ periods of time& @hen they are short3term, they are emotional events medium3term, they tend to e called moods aslon+3term states, they are closer in nature to dispositions& Bmotions therefore fit easily into the event7state frame?or. estalished earlier “He?as an+ry” is an event and “He is an an+ry person” is a state& 8n the construction of a fictional mind, different sorts of information play differentroles& Bmotions can e e9plicitly laeled or inferred from mental events that appear to emody an emotion such as an+er& For e9ample, if onecharacter says of another, “He>s an+ry, ” this has a different status from a direct presentation y the narrator of a stream of an+ry thou+hts&8mplicit information or e9plicit information such as a sin+le3?ord lael li.e selfish may have more or less impact on the reader, dependin+ on theconte9t& Certainly, the e9plicit laelin+ in the Bmma passa+e has a very dramatic effect&

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8n the vie? of /ntonio 4amasio, “consciousness and emotion are not separale” (!000, 1%)& 8 thin. ?e should pause for a moment here and

consider the implications of this statement& / +ood deal of ?or. has een done ?ithin narrative theory on fictional consciousness, and as far as 8am a?are, very little has een done specifically on the emotions& ut, accordin+ to an eminent neuroscientist, the t?o are not separale Lfcourse, one could ar+ue that the many discussions of consciousness in narrative theory necessarily involve a consideration of emotions, ut that isnot my point& The issue of fictional emotion has not een eplicitly reco+niAed as an indispensale element in fictional consciousness& Toreinforce his point aout inseparaility, 4amasio stresses the pervasiveness of emotion& “ome level of emotin+ is the oli+ate accompaniment ofthin.in+ aout oneself or aout one>s surroundin+s&&&& GQirtually every ima+e, actually perceived or recalled is accompanied y some reactionfrom the apparatus of emotion” (!000, 6")& For e9ample, “?e continuously have emotional feelin+s &&& sometimes lo? +rade, sometimes =uiteintense, and ?e do sense the +eneral physical tone of our ein+” (4amasio !000, !"6#"%)& His attempt to convey some of the “?hat it>s li.e”=uality of consciousness is very reminiscent of the earle typolo+y and the e9amples from The Cryin+ of 2ot $5 in section : of this chapter&

/s ?e sa? in the Bmma passa+e, emotion is one of the more ovious ?ays in ?hich our thou+ht can ecome pulic& oth -0(CS and 4amasio

dra? a distinction et?een the pulic and the private aspects of the concept& The former states that in “current usa+e, the concept of emotion hast?o aspects& Lne pertains to a certain .ind of suKective e9perience, >feelin+&> The other relates to e9pression, the pulic manifestation of feelin+”(rothers 1555, !;1)& 4amasio proposes that “the term feelin# should e reserved for the private, mental e9perience of an emotion, ?hile the



term emotion should e used to desi+nate the collection of responses, many of ?hich are pulicly oservale” (!000, $!)& 4oleel is also preoccupied ?ith the importance of ehavior and dra?s attention to the fact that emotions are “often accompanied y spontaneous physiolo+icalevents&&&& @hen the events are oservale (lushin+, spar.lin+ eyes, +estures) or audile (lau+hin+, cryin+, e9clamation of pain, tone of voice),they ecome si+ns (indices) of emotions” (155", %")& /s ?ith all such ideas, 8 am not sure that the su++estion of different uses for the termsemotions and feelin#s is ?or.ale, ut the distinction is certainly ?orth ma.in+& 8n the ne9t chapter 8 ?ill tal. more +enerally aout the pulic

nature of thou+ht&The relationship et?een co+nition and emotion is ?orth e9plorin+ further, as “most philosophical ?or. on emotions has een co+nitive”(Latley 1555, !;$)&

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Co+nition causes emotion& Bmma>s emotions arise from her eliefs aout ?hat she has done& Consider a situation in ?hich 8 am s?immin+, see ashar., and feel the appropriate emotions of fear, horror, and so on& Here, the emotions arise out of co+nitions (the elief that the shar. ?ill eatme), physiolo+ical reactions (increased lood pressure), feelin+s (say, of terror), and action (+ettin+ a?ay from the shar.)& The emotion of fear is playin+ a co+nitive role it is a rational and appropriate response to the situation& Bmotion can e a mode of vision or reco+nition& /lso, as

4amasio and earle su++est, co+nitions nearly al?ays have some sort of emotional component& 8n addition, theorists lay stress on the directiveand co+nitive role of attention ?hen discussin+ the emotions& 4amasio tells us that sometimes “?e ecome .eenly a?are of emotionsQ and canattend to them specifically& ometimes ?e do not, and attend, instead, to other mental contents” (!000, !"%)& 8 referred in the discussion onnonconsciousness to the importance of the notion of attention and to the fact that it +oes to ?here it is needed& /ny mental functionin+ that canefficiently e dealt ?ith ?ithout attention tends to proceed as non3consciousness& Ho?ever, ?hen somethin+ une9pected happens, ?hen ?e aresurprised, ?e attend to our response& Bmotions often have a role to play in this process& Fear is oviously a maKor factor in directin+ attention to possile dan+er, so the emotion has a co+nitive function here& 2ess dramatically, althou+h stress is often considered to e an inhiitin+ factor?ith re+ard to performance in e9aminations, its enalin+ role is less ?ell reco+niAed& Personally, 8 cannot sit at a des. and ?rite continuously forthree hours ?ithout the presence of stress

*evealin+ly, the sutitle of Blster>s oo. /lchemies of the Mind is *ationality and the (motions& This lin. is pursued to the point ?here even the

distinction et?een emotion and reason is =uestioned& /ccordin+ to 4amasio, “the presumed opposition et?een emotion and reason is no lon+eraccepted ?ithout =uestion& For e9ample, ?or. from my laoratory has sho?n that emotion is inte+ral to the processes of reasonin+ and decisionma.in+” (!000, $0#$1)& Patients ?ho have “lost a certain class of emotions” have also “lost their aility to ma.e rational decisions” (!000, $1)&



?hich is no? deeply unfashionale& /s perer and Hirschfeld point out, li.e “all relativist ideas, these vie?s are controversial” (1555, c99viii)&/t one time, it appeared that the

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idea that the 8nuit Bs.imos had a hundred ?ords for sno? (or ho?ever many# it +re? in the tellin+) ?as the academic e=uivalent of an uranmyth, and it ?as thou+ht that in fact they had the same numer as ?e do& Ho?ever, there seems to have een a ac.lash, and it is no? claimedonce more that they do have many more ?ords for sno? than ?e do& @hatever the truth of the matter, 8 thin. that it is ?orth reco+niAin+ thatthese ideas are sufficiently plausile for ?ell3respected anthropolo+ists to have held them& /s such, narrative theory should e conceptually ?elle=uipped to ta.e account of them& ome of the ?or. that 8 do in chapter 6 and chapter ; on real and fictional intermental thin.in+ mi+ht, 8 hope,ma.e the idea of socially distriuted emotion seem less outlandish than it may do at the moment&

1. Action

This section provides an introduction to the philosophy of action& 8n section 6 of the follo?in+ chapter 8 ?ill loo. at the sociocultural approach toaction, and in chapter ;, section ! 8 ?ill introduce a novel approach to descriptions of action in narrative discourse that 8 hope ?ill e of value to

future research in the field&

/ction arises ?hen an a+ent ?ants to chan+e some aspect of their environment and elieves that an action ?ill successfully rin+ aout thatchan+e& The a+ent sees oth the ?orld as they elieve it to e and also the ?orld as they desire it to e& /ction is re=uired ?hen there is adisparity et?een the t?o, and it is necessary to ali+n the ?orld as it is elieved to e ?ith the ?orld as it is desired& Philosophers sometimesrefer to this process as practical reasonin# and also as the action plannin#<decision system& The action plannin+ system can e run online, ?hile?e are ta.in+ action in the present, or off$line, ?hen ?e are plannin+ action for the future& Lviously, novels are full of e9amples of characters?ho act on3line and ?ho also +o throu+h hypothetical, ?hat3if situations in their mind ?hile plannin+ future action& 8t is common for charactersin thrillers to run throu+h a variety of scenarios in their minds in order to anticipate potential ostacles&

The philosophy of action separates the class of actions from the more +eneral class of doin+s or odily movements& For a doin+ to e an action,

the physical movement must e rou+ht aout y the conscious individual himself or herself and not, say, y someone else causin+ theirunconscious ody to move& 4oin+s are not actions if they are performed ?ithout the intention to perform them and ?ithout havin+ a specific purpose& /n action consists of oth a mental event of intention and a odily movement& ecause a definition of action in purely



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ehavioral terms such as odily movement is impossile, mental notions such as a?areness, .no?led+e, elief, desires, intention, and purposesare necessary& Lne issue that is of particular interest in the philosophy of action is the difficulty of definin+ an action& 8n the case of a death yshootin+, do you define the action of the .iller as the t?itchin+ of the fin+er, the pullin+ of the tri++er, the firin+ of the +un, the .illin+ of a person, or the murderin+ of a personI These descriptions differ to the e9tent to ?hich they ascrie consciousness to the a+ent, ta.e account of theconse=uences of the physical movement, and assi+n responsiility to the a+ent for those conse=uences& The philosophy of action approachesthese =uestions y loo.in+ at the technical issues relatin+ to the net?or. of mental events that lies ehind the physical events of action and ehavior& /ny analysis of descriptions of consciousness, ehavior, and action in fiction needs to ta.e account of these issues ecause they relateto the =uestions of personal responsiility that are at the heart of readers> responses to novels& 8t is part of our readin+ of (mma that Bmmainitially refuses to ta.e responsiility for the conse=uences of her actions ut then learns ho? to do so& Hurtin+ Miss ates ?as an unintendedconse=uence of Bmma>s action at the o9 Hill picnic, ut it ?as still her responsiility& The novel can e read as the process y ?hich she learns,ultimately, to ta.e responsiility in this ?ay& This is uncontroversial, ut it is important to have a theoretical frame?or. for estalishin+ in precise and ri+orous terms e9actly ho? the reader is ale to use the concept of action in order to read the novel in this ?ay&

/ny theoretical account of action has to unite the physical and mental sides of the concept and ac.no?led+e that the relationship et?een the

physical and mental is motivational& 8n other ?ords, the mental side has to provide the motive, reason, intention, and so on for the physicalmovement& @ithin the mental domain, philosophers typically isolate t?o asic types of thou+ht processes that +o to ma.e up intentions to act eliefs and desires& 4esires can include immediate volitions, settled oKectives, and +oal3directed action plans& 4esires move you in ?antin+ tota.e the action, and eliefs +uide you in ho? to ta.e it& / distinction can e made et?een intrinsic and e9trinsic desires the former ?e ?ant fortheir o?n sa.es, the latter as a means to an end& /s is fre=uently pointed out, the concept of intention is a comple9 and slippery one& 4ennettholds that it must involve consciousness “Mere odily complicity does not ma.e for an intentional action, nor does odily complicity under thecontrol of structures in the rain, for a sleep?al.er>s ody is manifestly under the control of structures in the sleep?al.er>s rain& @hat more must e added is consciousness, the special in+redient that turns mere happenin+s into

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actionsQ” (1551, :1#:!)& ut even ?ithin conscious action, there are different sorts of intentions& 8ntendin+ to do / is different from doin+ /intentionally& The latter can e a side3effect action that is an undesired conse=uence of an intended action& 8n slammin+ a car door, ?e do not



of the novel and the e9tent to ?hich their o?n narratives are consistent ?ith the narratives of the narrator and of readers ?ill oviously vary&@hat ?ill also vary is the relationship et?een the various counterfactual emedded narratives of characters as they relate to the future (“@hat?ould happen if 8 did thisI”) and ?hat actually does happen in the series of events in the story?orld&

8 ?ill no? consider the more specific issue of descriptions of actions in narratives& 8ntention is a crucial concept in this conte9t, ut it has eenne+lected y narrative theory& /s 4oleel has noticed, ?e are “faced ?ith a curious discrepancy ?hile in the philosophy of action the prolem ofintentionality is at the center of interest, empirical studies of actin+, includin+ narratolo+y, have hardly noticed its e9istence” (155", %:)& Gan4iK. descries narrative discourse as a form of “natural action description, ” and therefore “an interestin+ empirical testin+ +round for the theoryof action” (15;%, !";)& He sho?s that this is so y relatin+ the concept of action to the oservation and resultin+ descriptions of actions& -oticethat @itt+enstein>s =uestion ?as aout the reportin+ of ehavior& This perspective on action can e used to hi+hli+ht the role of the narrator in presentin+ such oservations and descriptions in the discourse& The relationship et?een the actor and the oserver, in the case of “natural”action, is similar to the relationship, in the case of fictional action, et?een the character and the narrator and also the character and the reader&Lur .no?led+e of the structure of action is closely lin.ed to the ?ay in ?hich ?e descrie actions and doin+s& /n action for ?hich an oserverdoes not have a concept remains for that oserver a mere doin+& 8t is si+nificant that a numer of the discussions of actions y philosophers referto onloo.ers (for e9ample, L>hau+hnessy 155;, 6%)& This insi+ht can e related to the role of the narrator, the reader, and of other characters inconsiderin+ a character>s actions& /ll three are onloo.ers in very different senses& y ascriin+ an action to someone, ?e either have access

31!13

to their intentions and purposes, or ?e ma.e informed assumptions aout their intentions and purposes ased on conventional inferences& Lfcourse, in fiction narrators can if they ?ish use direct access to characters> minds in order to ma.e motivation e9plicit, ut they need not do so, ecause the motivation ?ill often e clearly implicit&

Gan 4iK. ar+ues that e9amples of ?hat are clearly action descriptions necessarily imply purpose and intentionality (for e9ample, /nn carefullycleaned, arara accused him, and 2arry refused)& B9amples that are clearly not descriptions of actions include state descriptions (leaves are+reen, Peter is ill) motion vers ?ithout an animate suKect (the Paris train arrives soon) process vers (Eohn recovered =uic.ly) and patients ofevent vers (Mary could not pay)& 4uious and less ovious cases include descriptions of mental events (heila never realiAed) events ?here

there is some dout over the de+ree of control e9ercised y the a+ent (Harry found a riefcase) and odily states that may or may not have een rou+ht aout intentionally (2aura stared, Reor+e hesitated) (van 4iK. 15;%, :00)& These distinctions can e related to the role of the reader& Toadapt the remar. made earlier, an action y a character for ?hich a reader does not have a concept remains for that reader simply a doin+& 8t is



part of the competence of the reader to ascrie consciousness to surface ehavior& Therefore, the decisions made y the reader on van 4iK.>smar+inal e9amples ?ill depend on the ?illin+ness of the reader to ascrie the necessary mental events to the character& Conte9t ?ill often help& 8tmay e clear from the situation in ?hich they are actin+ ?hether 2aura>s starin+ and Reor+e>s hesitatin+ are actions or doin+s& @ith re+ard to hisclear e9amples, 8 ar+ue in chapter ; that there is a continuum and not a sharp divide et?een action descriptions and consciousness descriptions,and it seems to me that these cases are ed+in+ to?ard the middle of that continuum&

The mental events, processes, and states that distin+uish actions from mere doin+s are crucial to the concept of emedded narratives& /description y a narrator of a character>s action is a description of the development of that character>s emedded narrative& The reasons, motives,intentions, purposes, and so on ehind the action may e e9plicitly specified y the narrator, they may e implicit ut understood y the reader,or they may remain mysterious& Ho?ever, they are al?ays there in the story?orld& The core of the emedded narrative approach is the systematicanalysis of the structure of mental events that lies ehind the decisions that lead to actions and, specifically, of ho? this is presented in thediscourse y the narrator& This causal, mental process is the emedded narrative in action& 8n addition, physical action is the point at

31!!3

?hich different characters> emedded narratives entan+le& 4escriptions of Koint actions in particular reveal the enmeshin+ of the various mental

net?or.s of t?o or more characters&

8 ?ill finish this section ?ith a fe? ?ords aout action and characteriAation& 2uomir 4oleel has e9plained very clearly the lin. et?een thet?o& Motivational factors, he says, ecause they are “haitual features of a person>s character, produce re+ularities in actin+, modes of actin+characteristic of individuals and personality types&&&& MQotivation is the .ey to understandin+ the diversity of actin+, the ?hy and ho? of actions&The study of motivational factors is to ecome an important part of a semantics of fictional narrative” (155", %:)& /s 4oleel e9plains, onehi+hly informative ?ay of formin+ a sense of a fictional character or personality is y oservin+ re+ularities in ehavior and then y uildin+ uphypotheses aout the li.ely motivation for the ehavior& Ho?ever, analyses of action can e handicapped y the occasional invisiility of theconcept of action ?ithin narratolo+ical discourse analysis& Jou ?ill rememer ho?, in the ertrand *ussell puddle e9ample discussed in section:, /nn anfield edited out *ussell>s reference to an action& Here are t?o more e9amples 8n chapter :, section $, 8 discussed a short passa+e fromMadame ovary that has ecome famous from discussions of it first y Brich /uerach and then y Reor+es Poulet& Jou mi+ht thin., therefore,

that there is little left to add, and nothin+ of any si+nificance left to s=ueeAe out of it& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to ma.e one further comment on it& 8tconsists of t?o sentences& The first, on ?hich nearly all of the commentary has concentrated, consists of Bmma>s perceptions of the .itchen andher resultin+ revulsion in the modes of thou+ht report and free indirect perception& The second sentence, as 8 said durin+ the discussion, is a



description of three actions (eatin+ slo?ly, nilin+ nuts, and ma.in+ mar.s ?ith a .nife) and is not a direct presentation of consciousness(althou+h the phrase “amuse herself ” is mar+inal)& That this sentence is an action description is a very simple point, ut neither /uerach norPoulet, durin+ their sensitive and intricate analyses of Bmma>s consciousness, ac.no?led+e it&

Finally, Patric. L>-eill advances the vie? that there are t?o types of te9tual indicator of character& Lne, direct definition, is die+etic tellin+ theother, indirect presentation, is mimetic sho?in+ that operates y sho?in+ characters en+a+ed in action (155$, $5#60)& L>-eill then =uotes a passa+e of characteriAation from 4ic.ens>s ;ard imes as an illustration of direct definition as opposed to presentation of action& The characteroundery is descried as follo?s “He ?as a rich man an.er, merchant, manufacturer, and ?hat not& Then a description of his appearance&Q /man ?ho could never sufficiently

31!:3

vaunt himself a self3made man& / man ?ho ?as al?ays proclaimin+, throu+h that rassy spea.in+3trumpet of a voice of his, his old i+noranceand his old poverty& / man ?ho ?as the ully of humility” (1556, !1, =uoted in L>-eill 155$, 60)& There is a lot of action here for a passa+e thatis supposed to contrast ?ith descriptions of actions& ein+ a an.er, merchant, and manufacturer means haitually actin+ in certain ?ays&Gauntin+ and proclaimin+ are speech acts& ein+ a ully means ehavin+ in a ullyin+ ?ay& Presumaly L>-eill>s distinction is et?een a

description of a sin+le action and a description, li.e this one, of a series of actions& ut the differences should e put in those terms& /lthou+haction description shades into characteriAation, it should still e reco+niAed as action& Eust as thou+ht report and the emotions can ecomeinvisile, so can action&

. *irst&erson Ascription

This section ?ill continue the discussion on intention and motivation y loo.in+ at first3person ascription#ho? ?e ascrie motives andintentions to our o?n actions& 8 ?ill consider the issues raised y third3person ascription#ho? ?e ascrie motives and intentions to the actionsof others#in the follo?in+ chapter& The use of the ?ord ascrie in the first3person conte9t may sound surprisin+ly roundaout and indirectsurely ?e Kust .no? directly and immediately ?hat our mental states areI Ho?ever, as 8 hope to sho?, the process can e more prolematic thanit first appears& The ac.+round to the deate aout ascription is the oKective, third3person conception of the mental that ?as employed y

traditional ehaviorist psycholo+y& This approach tried to study the mind as if it consisted simply of oservale and measurale phenomena andi+nored any notion of consciousness that could e accessed from the first3person point of vie? of introspection& 8t therefore reversed our fol.3



psycholo+y privile+in+ of first3person access in favor of third3person reportin+& The follo?in+ passa+e considers the t?o forms of ascriptionto+ether

First, research on introspection and self3.no?led+e has raised =uestions aout ho? “direct” our .no?led+e of our o?n mental states and of theself is, and so called into =uestion traditional conceptions of first3person .no?led+e of mentality& econd, e9plorations of the theory of mind,animal communication and social play ehavior have e+un to e9amine and assess the sorts of attriution of mental states that are actually Kustified in empirical studies, su++estin+ that third3person .no?led+e of mental states is not as limited as has een thou+ht& Considered to+ether,this research hints that the contrast et?een first3 and third3person .no?led+e

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of the mental is not as star. as the prolem of other minds seems to intimate& (@ilson 1555, 9viii)

Put simply, first3person ascription can e less reliale, and third3person ascription more reliale, than is commonly supposed&

@ith re+ard to first3person ascription, ?e are often ?ron+ aout the nature of our mental functionin+& Brrors of very different sorts occur#from

hallucinations ri+ht throu+h to inailities to understand our true motivations& nconscious motivation is a part of our everyday “commonsense”vie? of the mind& @e ?ould all, 8 thin., reco+niAe the truth of such statements as, “8 realiAe no? that it ?as really frustration ?ith myself thatmade me so an+ry ?ith him&” / +ood e9ample of the falliility of first3person direct access is the feelin+ of ein+ depressed ut not .no?in+?hy& Jou have immediate access to that feelin+ and no one else has& To that e9tent it is inaccessile to others and infallile& Ho?ever, someone?ho .no?s you ?ell mi+ht .no? that it is caused y an9iety aout somethin+ unpleasant comin+ up& Jou mi+ht then say, “Jes, 8 suppose it is

ecause of that” ometimes, ?e can ecome intuitively a?are that our first3person ascription is not as different from third3person ascription as?e usually suppose& 8ma+ine that you are discussin+ ?ith your spouse or partner ?hether or not you should do somethin+ in the future& Theymi+ht say, “@ell you didn>t enKoy the similar thin+ that you did last month&” Jou reply, “ut that ?as different in some ?ays and so 8 thin. thatit ?on>t e li.e that this time&” They retort, “Jou al?ays say that and 8>m never convinced” and you conclude, “Maye, ut 8>m fairly sure thistime 8>ll e ri+ht, ” and so on& That sounds li.e =uite a plausile conversation to me& /nd it is noticeale that there is not much difference et?eenthe first3 and third3person ascription contained in it& oth are est +uesses related to proailities ased on past ehavior& 8n fact, if there is a

difference, the third3person ascription sounds if anythin+ rather more confident than the first3person sort& These +aps in our a?areness ofourselves can affect our perceptions of our ehavior& 8 recently heard of someone ?ho thou+ht that he had een e9tremely rude to a collea+ue?hen he told her that he could not do somethin+, ecause he ?as Kust +oin+ to a Ko intervie?& 8n fact he had een perfectly polite to her, had



+iven her the information that she ?anted, and had not mentioned the intervie?& Bven ?hen told this, he ?as still convinced that he had referredto the intervie?& His mental state ?as so over?helmin+ that he ?as not a?are of the ehavior that had resulted from it&

earle has helpfully descried at least three ?ays in ?hich ?e can e mista.en aout our o?n mental events self3deception, ?hen the a+ent has amotive or reason for not admittin+ to himself or herself that he or she is in a certain mental

31!63

state (for e9ample, shame at +ettin+ an+ry) misinterpretation (for e9ample, thin.in+ that our feelin+ for someone amounted to love and laterdiscoverin+ that ?e ?ere mista.en) and inattention, ?hen ?e do not notice until later that our states of mind have chan+ed in some ?ay (fore9ample, not noticin+ for a ?hile that ?e no lon+er love someone) (155!, 1$;#$5)& 8n discussin+ first3person error, many have referred to the+ray area et?een the honest mista.es of earle>s second and third cate+ories and the dishonesty of the first& “Dno? thyself 8f 8 .ne? myself 8>drun a?ay, ” said Roethe& Henry 4avid Thoreau thou+ht that it is “as hard to see one>s self as to loo. ac.?ards ?ithout turnin+ round&” tevenPin.er reminds us, uncomfortaly, that sometimes ?e have “+limpses of our o?n self3deception& @hen does a ne+ative remar. stin+, cut deep,hit a nerveI @hen some part of us .no?s it to e true& 8f every part .ne? it ?as true, the remar. ?ould not stin+ it ?ould e old ne?s& 8f no partthou+ht it ?as true, the remar. ?ould roll off ?e could dismiss it as false” (155;, $!:)& /ntonio 4amasio emphasiAes that sometimes “?e use

our minds not to discover facts ut to hide them& @e use part of the mind as a screen to prevent another part of it from sensin+ ?hat +oes onelse?here” (!000, !")&

Mista.es aout our mental functionin+ are often associated ?ith Freudian psychoanalysis& Ho?ever, this is not the end of the story& /s M8TBCindicates, in addition to the “misrepresentations of one>s o?n mental states discovered y i+mund Freud, other ?or. & & & sho?s thatintrospective Kud+ments fre=uently result from confaulation& People literally invent mental states to e9plain their o?n ehavior in ?ays that aree9pected or acceptale& 4aniel 4ennett (1551) in effect see.s to +eneraliAe this findin+ y ar+uin+ that all introspective reports can e treated asreports of useful fictions& & & & /t est, introspection is one tool amon+ many for learnin+ aout the mind” (*osenthal 1555, $!0)& The reference tofictions is a reminder of ho? often real3mind discourses turn to the lan+ua+e of narrative to illustrate ho? the mind ?or.s& This is 4ennetthimself “/m 8 sayin+ ?e have asolutely no privile+ed access to our conscious e9perienceI -o, ut 8 am sayin+ that ?e tend to thin. ?e aremuch more immune to error than ?e are& People +enerally admit, ?hen challen+ed in this ?ay aout their privile+ed access, that they don>t have

any special access to the causes and effects of their conscious e9periences&&&& ut althou+h people may say they are claimin+ authority only aoutthe isolated contents of their e9periences, not their causes and effects, they often overstep their self3imposed restraints” (1551, %")& He ma.es theimportant distinction that 8 referred to earlier et?een the direct e9perience of immediate consciousness that only the



31!%3

first person has direct access to and the ascription of reasons for the state of mind and motives for and intentions of the resultin+ action& 8n thelatter case, the picture is much more lurred& @e may .no? that ?e feel depressed, ut the first3person ascription involved in attriutin+ thereasons for this state of mind is often much less easy& 8n any case, as 4ennett points out, the distinction et?een the state and the causes of it can e difficult to maintain in practice&

The assumption that direct first3person ascription has a privile+ed status that is denied to the apparently more indirect third3person ascription issometimes referred to as Cartesianism, follo?in+ the introspective methodolo+y employed y 4escartes in his -editations& (Ho?ever, it should e noted that this lael is often disputed y scholars ?ho claim that it is an unnecessarily reductive vie? of 4escartes> actual ar+uments&) Many philosophers and psycholo+ists no? ar+ue that the sort of privile+ed first3person access that is implied y the term Cartesianism is an illusionand that the sole interpretative device that ?e have for e9aminin+ our o?n internal mental states is a theory of mind that is ased on ouroservation of others& -0(CS adopts a alanced vie? on the =uestion of introspection “elf3.no?led+e can arise in many ?ays& TraditionalCartesian mentalism treated the mind as fully transparent and open in all its si+nificant properties to a faculty of conscious introspection orreflection, ?hich ?as conceived of y later empiricists as a form of inner perception& Thou+h introspection is no? re+arded as fallile,incomplete, and theory3laden, it nonetheless remains a maKor source of self3.no?led+e” (van Rulic. 1555, ;:%)&

8f ?e turn no? to the implications of this deate for narrative theory, ?e see that Moni.a Fluderni. perceptively oserves that “to ?rite one>so?n life re=uires a sustained /u+ustinian effort to construct from the random succession of rememered scenes & & & aQ ?ell3structured tale ?ithteleolo+ical shape& ther people>s lives, parado9ically, are .no?ale and tellale much more easily” (155%, $;)& This ar+ument can eintri+uin+ly compared to 4aniel 4ennett>s su++estion that introspections are useful fictions& 4ennett illustrates his point ?ith this account of people>s ehavior in the laoratory& He tells us that “there are circumstances in ?hich people are Kust ?ron+ aout ?hat they are doin+ and ho?they are doin+ it& 8t is not that they lie in the e9perimental situation, ut that they confaulate they fill in the +aps, +uess, speculate, mista.etheoriAin+ for oservin+&&&& To sum up, suKects are un?ittin+ creators of fiction” (1551, 5$)& Fluderni.>s description of “a ?ell3structured tale?ith teleolo+ical shape” and 4ennett>s description of useful fictions oth ac.no?led+e the indirect, ascriptive =uality of first3person testimony&/lthou+h Fluderni. is discussin+

31!;3

fi i l i h i i il li d hi d l hi l f l i h i h hi h



non3fictional narrative, her point is easily applied to third3person novels& This neat reversal of our usual assumptions aout the ease ?ith ?hichindividuals can e9plain the ?or.in+s of their o?n minds, as opposed to the minds of others, interestin+ly echoes the philosophical ar+ument thatthird3person ascriptions of mental states are Kust as important as first3person ascriptions to our ac=uisition of the concept of consciousness&

8t is, of course, true that narratolo+ists have al?ays ac.no?led+ed that characters deceive themselves and that ?hat is contained in the innerspeech that is reported in the mode of direct thou+ht is not necessarily to e relied upon as an accurate report of the actual states of affairs in themental domain of the story?orld& ut my purpose in reemphasiAin+ the point is to place it in the different conte9t that is provided y the ?holear+ument of this oo.& To +ive an idea of the scale of the paradi+m shift that is re=uired, have a loo. at the follo?in+ three oservations y riMar+olin in ?hich he sets out ?ith characteristic clarity the assumptions on ?hich the traditional narratolo+ical account of first3 and thirdpersonascription is ased “Bach narrative individualQ identifies himself from inside a center of consciousness in an immediate, non3inferential ?ay?hich is not +rounded on pulic evidence, especially not odily criteria” (1556a, !6# !%) “/ asic convention of literary narrative is that every personaliAed spea.er has direct, immediate access to his o?n mental states ut not to those of his coa+ents, ?hich he must infer (fallily) fromtheir intersuKectively accessile ehavior and statements” (!000, 655) and “8n the actual ?orld ?e can .no? aout another person>sdecisions &&& re+ardin+ himself only throu+h his pulic claims to this effect” (1556a, !%)&

/s 8 have said, ?hile it is true that ?e have immediate access to some parts of our o?n current mental ?orld, in other ?ays ?e have less access

to our minds that other persons do& 8 may thin. that 8 am an easy3+oin+ .ind of person ?ith a sunny disposition, ut everyone else may say that 8am +rumpy and difficult to live ?ith& o 8 accept, ?ith difficulty, that there may e a lot of truth in ?hat they say and try to e etter ehaved&/m 8 not then identifyin+ myself in an inferential ?ay that is +rounded on pulic evidenceI Ta.e Pip in 8reat (pectations& The ?hole novel is uilt on the fact that he is fallile aout his mental states (for e9ample, his snoery and feelin+s of shame to?ard Eoe)& iddy, on the other hand,.no?s the ?or.in+ of Pip>s mind much etter than Pip himself does& he and Eoe simply ?ait till Pip .no?s himself etter& @ith re+ard toMar+olin>s third =uote, surely ?e often .no? aout people>s decisions from oservin+ their ehavior& 8f you say, “That>s not really 9no,in# , ”then ?hat aout the possiility of insincere or simply mista.en first3person reports aout

31!"3

the motives for our o?n decisionsI The capacity for error in the analysis of our mental states applies particularly to perceptions of our motives

for the actions that ?e ta.e& This is ?hy it is such an important part of the role of the narrator to supplement the self3conscious, and possily self3servin+, flo? of inner speech ?ith analyses in thou+ht report that can supply an alternative and more reliale account of the true motivation forcharacters> actions&

1!5



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"

#he Social ,ind

Chapter $ considered a ?ide ran+e of mental phenomena ?ithin the traditional internalist perspective on the mind, althou+h at several points andespecially in the sections on emotion, action, and ascription, 8 referred to the social conte9t ?ithin ?hich minds have to e considered& Thischapter ?ill no? develop the ar+ument further y e9plorin+ the implications of an eternalist vie? of the mind& 8t ?ill start ?ith a +eneralovervie? of the e9tent to ?hich thou+ht is social, pulic, and oservale& 8t then pursues this approach in four specific directions third3personascription, purposive thou+ht, dialo+icality, and situated thou+ht& 8 also try to sho? that the social mind is the suKect of a +ood deal of narrativediscourse and that an a?areness of it is a sustantial aid to our understandin+ of the suKect matter of novels&

The terms internalism and eternalism correspond to the suKective first7intersuKective first distinction that ?as descried in chapter 1, section 1& -0(CS defines internalism (or individualism) in the follo?in+ terms “8ndividualists vie? the distinction et?een the psycholo+ical states of

individuals and the physical and social environments of those individuals as providin+ a natural asis for demarcatin+ properly scientific, psycholo+ical .inds& Psycholo+y in particular and the co+nitive sciences more +enerally are to e concerned ?ith natural .inds ?hose instances

end at the oundary of the individual” (@ilson 1555a, :5;)& 8t then defines eternalism as follo?s “Those reKectin+ individualism on empiricalmethodolo+ical +rounds have appealed to the situated or emedded nature of co+nition, see.in+ more +enerally to articulate the crucial role thatan or+anism>s environment plays in its co+nitive processin+” (@ilson 1555a, :5")& perer and Hirschfeld re+retfully conclude that too often,ho?ever, “these t?o perspectives are adopted y scholars ?ith different trainin+, very different theoretical commitments, and therefore a limited?illin+ness and aility to interact fruitfully” (1555, c9v)& 8t ?ill e clear, 8 thin., that 8 elon+ very firmly to the e9ternalist tendency& -arrativetheory tends to adopt an internalist perspective on fictional minds, and so an e9ternalist vie? may e

of value in providin+ some alance& 8 am sure, thou+h, that, unli.e real3mind theorists, narrative theorists of oth persuasions ?ill e ?illin+ andale to interact fruitfully&

The .ey to this chapter, and indeed the ?hole oo., is contained in the final ?ords of earle>s oo., he /ediscovery of the -ind “?e need to

rediscover the social character of the mind” (155!, !$")& earle su++ests that the role of society in the study of consciousness is seriouslyne+lected ut concedes that “8 do not yet .no? &&& ho? to analyse the structure of the social element in individual consciousness” (155!, 1!")&



d t l t i t . l hi d t li ti t ti l th t i ” (155% "0) Th i f d



desperately tryin+ to .eep#y lushin+ and tremlin+ or s?eatin+, to mention only the most ovious cases” (155%, "0)& The issue of odylan+ua+e is one that recurs fre=uently in novels& Pip can see, can directly e9perience, Eoe>s discomfort ?hile +ivin+ him tea in his rooms (4ic.ens15%6, !$1#$;)& The pulic nature of thou+ht is as true of pure co+nition as it is of emotions such as +uilt and emarrassment& 8n the Hitchcoc.film Dial - for -urder , the villain, played y *ay Milland, is led into a trap in ?hich he ?ill etray himself if, ?hile standin+ in the hall?aytryin+ to ?or. out ?hat has happened to his spare .ey, he rememers that it is still under the stair carpet& @e literally see the villain>s mind at?or. as he carefully thin.s throu+h the steps that ?ill lead him to loo. for the .ey under the stair carpet and so prove his +uilt&

-ear the end of his remar.ale and eautifully ?ritten oo. he !eelin# of What ;appens, /ntonio 4amasio discusses the privacy of personale9perience and consciousness& He says that he is often as.ed ?hether ?e ?ill eventually e ale to +ain access to each other>s e9periences andconcludes, “My ans?er to the =uestion has lon+ een no, and my opinion has not chan+ed” (!000, :06)& He +oes on to e9plain the reasons for hisopinion, and in the conte9t of current neuroscience, in so far as 8 can Kud+e, they appear to ma.e perfect sense& Ho?ever, at the very e+innin+ ofhis oo., 4amasio tells a story that in contrast illustrates the apparent accessiility of consciousness to others& He descries ho? from his office?indo? he sees an old man tryin+ to +et to a ferry efore it leaves “He finally reaches the ship& He clims ?ith difficulty the tall step needed to+et on the +an+plan. and starts on his ?ay do?n to the dec., afraid of +ainin+ too much momentum on the incline, head movin+ ris.ly, left andri+ht, chec.in+ his surroundin+s and see.in+ reassurance, his ?hole ody seemin+ly sayin+, 8s this itI /m 8 in the ri+ht placeI @here to ne9tI/nd then the t?o men on dec. help him steady his last step, ease him into the cain ?ith ?arm +estures, and he seems to e safely ?here he

should e& My ?orry is31:!3

over& The ship departs” (!000, 6)& 4amasio maintains that consciousness “is an entirely private, first3person phenomenon ?hich occurs as part ofthe private, first3person process ?e call mind” (!000, 1!)& Ln the other hand, he also points out that consciousness and mind are “closely tied toe9ternal ehaviors that can e oserved y third persons& oth ?isdom and the science of the human mind and ehavior are ased on thisincontrovertile correlation et?een the private and the pulic#first3person mind on the one hand, and third3person ehavior, on the other”(!000, 1!#1:)& o, in a sense, as this passa+e sho?s, our minds can e perfectly visile to others& /s he ?atched from his ?indo?, 4amasio.ne? ?hat ?as +oin+ on in the old man>s mind& Jou may say that he ?as only inferrin+ elief from the old man>s ehavior and that this is sho?n y his use of the ?ord “seemin+ly&” This is true& ut, as 8 as.ed in the previous chapter, do ?e al?ays 9no, ?hat is +oin+ on in our o?n mindsI

upposin+ someone close to 4amasio said to him, “8t>s clear to me that you ?ere so interested in that old man ecause he reminded you of yourfather” and 4amasio had then replied, “4o you thin. soI That never occurred to me& Jou may e ri+ht” This conversation does not soundimplausile, does itI 8t is the sort of thin+ that people re+ularly say& o the =uote sho?s that, in practice, 4amasio is more confident than he

appears to thin. he is aout the ?or.in+s of another mind and the plausiility of the ima+inary conversation sho?s that it is possile that



appears to thin. he is aout the ?or.in+s of another mind and the plausiility of the ima+inary conversation sho?s that it is possile that4amasio may e less confident than he appears to thin. aout the ?or.in+s of his o?n mind&

There is a famous scene in the herloc. Holmes story “The *esident Patient” in ?hich Holmes and @atson are sittin+ in silence in their study&Then Holmes concludes @atson>s line of thou+ht for him& @atson, “suddenly realisin+ ho? he had echoed the innermost thou+hts of my soul”(15"1, $!:) is +ratifyin+ly thunderstruc.& 8t transpires that Holmes ?as ale to follo? @atson>s silent thou+ht processes y ?atchin+ his eyemovements and constructin+ a plausile narrative ased on ?hat he had een loo.in+ at& Jou may thin. that this is a parlor3tric. that is suitaleonly for pulp fiction& o ta.e a loo. at the character of 2ady 4eadloc. in 6lea9 ;ouse, ?ho is +iven to lon+ and lonely self3communin+s and?ho in a different sort of novel mi+ht have een the suKect of detailed, direct presentations of her consciousness& 8n such a case, ?e ?ould proaly e presented ?ith her feelin+s of +uilt aout her dead lover and her lon+3lost dau+hter and so on& Ho?ever, as she is actually in a verydifferent sort of novel, this is ho? the narrator descries her in a very early sta+e in the narrative “he supposes herself to e an inscrutaleein+, =uite out of the reach of and .en of ordinary mortals#seein+ herself in her +lass, ?here indeed she loo.s so& Jet, every dim little starrevolvin+ round her, from her maid to the mana+er of

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the 8talian Lpera, .no?s her ?ea.nesses, preKudices, follies, hau+htinesses, and caprices and lives upon as accurate a calculation and as nice ameasure of her moral nature, as her dressma.er ta.es of her physical proportions” (15;1, 65)& /s usual, a alance is re=uired& Her dispositionsand many of her states of mind are accessile to others her secret feelin+s aout her lover and dau+hter are not& 8n some ?ays she is asinscrutale as she thin.s she is in many other ?ays, she is not&

Further alance is provided y the follo?in+ passa+e, ?hich amusin+ly descries the falliility of third3person ascription ased on physical and ehavioral clues& The hero of (pitaph for a Spy y the +reat thriller ?riter Bric /mler is sittin+ in a restaurant rehearsin+ the appearance that he?ants to +ive durin+ a forthcomin+ confrontation ?ith an adversary

-o, too clumsy& Perhaps a moc.in+ smile ?ould e est& 8 e9perimented ?ith a moc.in+ smile and ?as in the middle of my fourth attempt ?henthe ?aiter cau+ht my eye& He hurried over an9iously&

“There is somethin+ ?ron+ ?ith the co= au vin, MonsieurI” (15"$, 6$)

8t is clear then that a +ood deal of fictional narrative is ased on the fact that thou+ht can e pulic and availale to others as ?ell as private and



8t is clear then that a +ood deal of fictional narrative is ased on the fact that thou+ht can e pulic and availale to others as ?ell as private andaccessile only to ourselves& /s the Proust narrator remar.s in ?ann>s @ay, “it is only ?ith the passions of others that ?e are ever reallyfamiliar, and ?hat ?e come to discover aout our o?n can only e learned from them& pon ourselves they react only indirectly” (155%, 16$)&i+nificantly, i+mund Freud ?as also interested in the pulic nature of thou+ht& 8 say this ecause it mi+ht have een thou+ht that his analysis ofthe inaccessiility of motives and reasons for action ?ould ma.e such an interest unli.ely& ut he ?rote that “hQe that has eyes to see and ears tohear may convince himself that no mortal can .eep a secret& 8f his lips are silent, he chatters ?ith his fin+ertips etrayal ooAes out of him at every pore& /nd thus the tas. of ma.in+ conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one ?hich it is =uite possile to accomplish” (=uoted inCohn 1555, 61)&

@ith re+ard to the mental event7state dichotomy, ?e can dra? a distinction et?een those states of mind that e9tend over time and that may ecome very apparent to those ?ho .no? us ?ell or may e ?ell hidden and the immediate and inner flo? of thou+ht that can e private andinaccessile unless revealed, for e9ample, in an uncontrolled reaction to events& Ta.e this e9ample from +anity !air that 8 used in chapter $,section 6 “/?ay ?ent Reor+e, his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement at the ne?s so lon+ loo.ed for, so sudden ?hen it came” (155$, !5!)& Thereare three different time scales here The lon+est, “so

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lon+ loo.ed for” could ?ell refer to a very pulic state of mind& Presumaly, Reor+e Lsorne ?ould have revealed his lon+in+ for attle to hiscollea+ues and family y his ehavior and speech& The middle timescale is “so sudden ?hen it came, ” and Reor+e>s feelin+ of the suddenness ofthe ne?s may also have een visile to others& The shortest time scale is “his nerves =uiverin+ ?ith e9citement, ” and this sounds as thou+h it?ould also e visile to others& /n e9cited state of mind ?ill usually result in e9cited ehavior& Lr ta.e this e9ample “Her presence used toe9cruciate Lsorne” (155$, !"!)& @hat is the ori+in of this .no?led+eI 8s it possile to .no? this fact aout the story?orld ?ithout the privile+ed and direct access of the omniscient narrator to characters> mindsI 8t is possile for the reader to read this statement as strai+htfor?ardthou+ht report of Reor+e>s mind& B=ually plausily, ho?ever, it can e read as a description of Reor+e>s ehavior and therefore as informationthat could e availale to other characters in the story?orld& *ememer @itt+enstein>s =uestion aout ?hether a statement is a report of ehavioror of a state of mind& The test for this uncertainty is to ima+ine ?hether another character (that is, ?ith no direct access to his mind) could saythose ?ords& 8 ?ould su++est that in this case it is perfectly possile to ima+ine another character ma.in+ this statement ased on oservation of

his ehavior& The more the distinction et?een fictional mind and action is lurred, the more it can e seen that the real oKect of study is themind in action&

The inner7outer alance is a very noticeale characteristic of -0(CS Most of us ?ould proaly thin. that a oo. called an (ncyclopaedia of



The inner7outer alance is a very noticeale characteristic of -0(CS & Most of us ?ould proaly thin. that a oo. called an (ncyclopaedia of

the Co#nitive Sciences ?ould e concerned primarily ?ith the neuroscience of the rain, ?ith neurons, a9ons, dendrons, synapses,neurotransmitters, and the rest& Lviously, there is a +ood deal in the volume on the physical composition of the rain& Ho?ever, it is perhapssurprisin+ ho? much of the oo. is also devoted to the role of social conte9t and the deate aout the pulic7private mind& rian Cant?ellmith>s entry in -0(CS on “ituatedness7Bmeddedness” descries ho? the classical vie? of the mind sees it as individual, rational, astract,detached, and +eneral, ?hile the ne? approach sees it as social, emodied, concrete, located, en+a+ed, and specific (1555, ;%5)& The currentsituation in co+nitive science “points to a paradi+m shift under?ay thatQ locates human lan+ua+e in the human ody and postulates as itstheoretic atom the conversational dyad pairQ, rather than a monad individualQ ?ith a messa+e to transmit or receive&&&& The shift ?asforeshado?ed y &&& Gy+ots.y &&& ?ho analysed communicative events as developin+ simultaneously on an >inter3> as ?ell as an >intra3psychic plane> ” (4uncan 1555 $$0)& Blse?here in M8TBC, it is su++ested that the “com

31:63

ple9ity of the social environment led Hirschfeld (155%) to propose the e9istence of specialiAed .no?led+e structures dedicated to social +roupunderstandin+” (Hirschfeld 1555, 6"1)& Hirschfeld also refers to “mechanisms uni=ue to social reasonin+” (1555, 6"1)&

The issue of pulic thou+ht has een raised ?ithin possile3?orlds theory, althou+h the emphasis is more often on the individual at the e9penseof the social& For e9ample, 4oleel indicates that the “dialectic of social consciousness and private mind provides a fle9ile model forunderstandin+ motivation in the multiperson ?orld the pressure of the +roup enforces social factors, ut they have to e >internaliAed,>appropriated y the individual mind, in order to motivate the person>s actin+” (155", 10!)& 4oleel ac.no?led+es the inner7outer alance that isdescried in this chapter in his reference to “the dialectic et?een social consciousness and private mind&” Ho?ever, it seems to me that therestill remains a perceptile ias to?ard the private in the lan+ua+e that he uses& The individual consciousness is ta.en to e primary& 8t is the normthat is then modified y social factors& The picture of the mind that is painted in this chapter is intended to =uestion and even to su++est a reversalof these priorities&

-arrative theory tends to assume that characters in novels do not .no? ?hat other characters are thin.in+ and feelin+& Ho?ever, as ?e have seen, philosophers and psycholo+ists say ?e can .no? these thin+s& -arrators say ?e can& Lnce a+ain, narrative theory appears to e out of step&

Lviously, this is a matter of emphasis only& 8 ?ould +uess that everyone ?ould a+ree that sometimes ?e have reliale access to our o?nmotives and intentions and sometimes ?e do not and sometimes ?e have reliale access to the motives and intentions of others and sometimes?e do not& My point is simply that the paradi+m ?ithin narrative theory has up until no? een one of infallile and direct access to our minds

rather than first3person ascription / +ood e9ample of this emphasis is the follo?in+ remar. y the philosopher /lain (the pseudonym of Ymile



rather than first3person ascription& / +ood e9ample of this emphasis is the follo?in+ remar. y the philosopher /lain (the pseudonym of YmileChartier) =uoted y 4orrit Cohn “8n short, there is no room for intimacy in history at est it can rin+ men to life as ?e see them in life, al?aysma.in+ us move ac.?ards from their actions to their motives& The peculiarity of the novel is its intimacy, an intimacy that cannot e attested,that needs no proof, and that, in reverse of the historical method, ma.es actions real” (Cohn 1555, 16%)& This line of thin.in+ seems to su++estthat third3person ascription is less “real” than the direct access that narrators +ive us, that readers of novels do not have to move ac.?ard fromcharacters> actions to their motives, and that actions in historical narratives cannot e made “real&” 8 ?ould =uestion all of these assertions&

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4orrit Cohn refers riefly to the importance of conveyin+ character throu+h e9ternal description& 8n commentin+ on the nineteenth century, shedescries ho?, ?hile “prolon+ed inside vie?s ?ere lar+ely restricted to first person forms, third person novels d?elt on manifest ehavior, ?iththe characters> inner selves revealed only indirectly throu+h spo.en lan+ua+e and tellin+ +esture&&&& 8n most ?or.s y 4ic.ens, Tur+enev, Fontaneand other masters of the novel of manners, character portrayal is far more >conte9tual> than >intrinsic> ” (15;", !1#!!)& i+nificantly, ho?ever,Cohn adds that conte9tual character portrayal “moves in directions lyin+ outside the central compass of herQ study” (15;", !!)& he is e9plicitlyac.no?led+in+ that her suKect is the private and not the pulic mind& The pulic7private distinction is also ehind Mar+olin>s division et?een,on the one hand, the social, interactional, a+ential pulic role, the person in social space and, on the other hand, the mental, the self,

consciousness, self3consciousness, ?ill, and emotion (1556, :;5)& This is on the face of it a useful and ?or.ale distinction& Ho?ever, ?henever8 am analyAin+ fictional minds, 8 am struc. y the difficulties that 8 e9perience in practice ?hen tryin+ to .eep the social and the individual apart&Pip>s feelin+s aout himself are private, ut they are ased on, determined y, and +enerally enter into a variety of different relationships ?ith thefeelin+s aout him of Eoe and iddy, Miss Havisham, Bstella, and the other characters in the Rreat B9pectations story?orld& The opportunitye9ists for narrative theory to develop specialiAed .no?led+e structures and mechanisms that are uni=ue to social reasonin+ and that ?ill allo? itto come to a +reater understandin+ of ho? fictional social +roups ?or. and ho? individual fictional minds function ?ithin those social +roups&ome possiilities for uildin+ this sort of understandin+ are introduced in section 6 of this chapter and also in chapter ;& 8n my vie?, narratolo+yhas suffered from the limitation on the study of fictional minds that is implied y Cohn>s remar. aout the compass of her study& The fictionalmind does not have to e divided up in this ?ay& The internal7e9ternal distinction is an e9cessively simplistic perspective from ?hich to analyAemental functionin+& 8f ?e =uestion it, ?e can study the ,hole mind and also the social mind&

2 #hird&erson Ascription



2. #hird&erson Ascription

This section continues the discussion of ascription that e+an in the previous chapter ut ?ith the emphasis this time on the third person ratherthan the first person& The attriution to the character y the narrator of motives, dispositions, and states of mind is at the center of the process ofconstructin+ fictional minds and is central to the reader process of comprehendin+ te9ts& Thou+ht

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report is the chief mode for ascription& This section is closely lin.ed to the previous one as ?e have seen, the more pulic our thou+ht, the easierand more reliale third3person ascription ecomes& Bmpathy is the po?er of enterin+ into another>s personality and ima+inatively e9periencin+their e9periences& 8t is an essential part of the readin+ process, and this discussion ?ill, 8 hope, provide some theoretical ac.+round to thisaility& Consider this statement y Col?yn Trevarthen, in ?hich he compares the relative levels of reliaility of first3 and third3person ascription“Conscious monitorin+ of intersuKective motives is asymmetric in normal circumstances ?e are more a?are of others> feelin+s and intentionsthan of our o?n inner states” (1555, $1%)& Bven ?ith the enefit of earlier discussions, you may still e so ta.en aac. y this statement that you?ill ?ish to read it a+ain in order to chec. that you did not misread it& 8t states =uite aldly that third3person ascription is the more reliale .ind&8t does not say that reliaility varies sometimes one .ind is more accurate and at other times the other is& 8t says that “in normal circumstances”

the accuracy of our vie?s aout the mental states of others e9ceeds the accuracy of our vie?s aout our o?n mental states& uddenly, the ailitythat ?e have as readers to construct fictional minds out of a minimum of information does not seem =uite so e9traordinary&

-ot everyone develops the aility to ascrie mental states to others& Lne of the chief symptoms of autism is mind3lindness the inaility toreco+niAe that other people have minds& This is a severe and real form of the philosophical doctrine of solipsism, “the vie? or theory that only theself really e9ists or can e .no?n& -o? also, isolation, self3centeredness, selfishness” (LB4)& 4escartes> famous “Co+ito, er+o sum” is the mostfamous practical demonstration of the theoretical solipsistic methodolo+y& Ho?ever, solipsism also ta.es ?hat mi+ht e called a practical oroperational form& /utism is the most severe variety, ut it is also a ?ell3.no?n symptom of the milder /sper+er>s yndrome& 8n addition, there isthe very lar+e numer of people ?hose ehavior is so selfish that they appear not to elieve in the e9istence of other minds& 4rivin+ throu+h2ondon in the rush hour (or at any time, in fact) ?ill illustrate this point =uite forcily&

/ numer of philosophers have considered the role of ehavior in formin+ ?hat they call the third3person nature of consciousness& /ccordin+ tothem, it is a necessary condition of attriutin+ states of consciousness to oneself that one must e prepared to attriute them to others ecause ?ecannot learn ho? to ascrie mental states to ourselves only from our o?n case this aility depends on oservin+ other people>s ehavior& 8n a

familiar e9ample it is impossile to ac=uire the use of the phrase “in pain” solely from one>s o?n case Lne needs in addition to e ac=uainted



familiar e9ample, it is impossile to ac=uire the use of the phrase in pain solely from one s o?n case& Lne needs in addition to e ac=uainted?ith the pain ehavior of others& This means that

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pain ehavior is not merely a si+n of pain it constitutes to a lar+e e9tent the conditions under ?hich the phrase “in pain” has a use (Priest 1551,1;5#"0)& The emphasis that these philosophers place on the oservation and description of the ehavior of others, and the suse=uent ascription oth to ourselves and to others of the mental states that appear to e appropriate to that ehavior, has si+nificant implications for the role of thenarrator in presentin+ fictional minds& @hen the narrator states that a character is depressed, ?hat precisely is it that the narrator is descriin+IPhilosophers su++est that it is oth an internal state of mind and e9ternal ehavior& *ememer @itt+enstein>s =uestion& They point out that statessuch as depression and pain are partly felt and partly sho?n, partly under+one and partly e9hiited in ehavior& 8n the ?ords of the philosopherPeter tra?son, “<>s depression is somethin+, one and the same thin+, ?hich is felt, ut not oserved, y <, and oserved ut not felt y othersthan <” (1565, 105)& From this perspective, the distinction that is dra?n ?ithin narratolo+y et?een the narrator>s e9ternal descriptions of ehavior and the internal descriptions of mental states is no? prolematiAed& 8n practice it is often very difficult to say ?hether a particular phrase or sentence in a narrative te9t is thou+ht report or e9ternal description& Lnce it is understood that the mind e9tends eyond the s.in, theinner7outer distinction ecomes more and more difficult to sustain in every case&

The train of thou+ht descried earlier is deeply anti3Cartesian ecause it reverses the Cartesian, first3person vie? that one ta.es meanin+ fromone>s o?n case and then e9trapolates it to others& Third3person ascriptions are no? made conditions for first3person ascriptions& The need for alance is re=uired yet a+ain& 8t may e that Cartesians are ?ron+ to imply a certain autonomy for the self3ascriptive uses of statements relatin+ toconsciousness, ut it may also e that ehaviorists are ?ron+ to imply a similar autonomy for thirdperson uses& -either use is self3sufficient ecause each type of use depends upon the other (Priest 1551, 1"1)& This alance is characteristic of narrative discourse, ?hich typically containsa alance of direct access to internal states (the fictional e=uivalent of first3person descriptions) and surface descriptions of characters> ehavior(that is, third3person descriptions)& The alanced approach is potentially anti3Cartesian ecause an emphasis on ehavior ma.es it clear thatthou+ht is not only private and inaccessile ut also pulic and availale as it can e e9pressed in physical terms& Cartesian dualism, on the otherhand, involves the strict division of reality into either the physical or the mental& 8t is possile that @itt+enstein is the source of much of this anti3Cartesianism as, si+nificantly, the Philosophical 0nvesti#ations is preoccupied as 8 have said ?ith

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the difficulty of distin+uishin+ et?een descriptions of consciousness and of ehavior& earle is =uite e9plicit that his vie?s are also an attac. on



the difficulty of distin+uishin+ et?een descriptions of consciousness and of ehavior& earle is =uite e9plicit that his vie?s are also an attac. onCartesianism (155!, !6#!%, 1$5)& @hile a numer of thin.ers in various disciplines share this pulic, and therefore social, perspective onthou+ht, the speech cate+ory account appears to ?or. ?ithin the frame?or. of Cartesian dualism ecause of its strict division of narrative eitherinto descriptions of the mind or into descriptions of the ody&

@hile ar+uin+ a+ainst the doctrine of ehaviorism, earle contends that it is a mista.e to suppose that ?e .no? of the e9istence of mental

phenomena in others only y oservin+ their ehavior& The asis of our certainty that do+s are conscious ut cars are not is not ehavior utrather a certain causal conception of ho? the ?orld ?or.s& Lther?ise, the ehavior of cars could lead us to thin. that they are as conscious asdo+s& 8n his vie?, the ehavior of others only ma.es sense as the e9pression or manifestation of an underlyin+ mental reality ecause ?e can seethat the ehavior is caused y the mental (155!, !1#!!)& *eferrin+ to the alanced vie? of the mind ?ith ?hich this chapter is preoccupied, he points out that, ?here our .no?led+e of other minds is concerned, ehavior y itself is of no interest to us& *ather, earle maintains, it is thecomination of ehavior, to+ether ?ith the .no?led+e of the causal underpinnin+s of that ehavior that forms the asis of our .no?led+e of otherminds (155!, !!)& This alance et?een oservation of ehavior and a?areness of consciousness is as essential to the analysis of presentations offictional minds as it is to the study of real minds& 8n the ehaviorist narratives of Brnest Hemin+?ay, *aymond Chandler, and 4ashiell Hammettin ?hich very little direct access to minds is +iven, the ehavior of the characters only ma.es sense ?hen it is read as the manifestation of anunderlyin+ mental reality& Furthermore, the reader uses a variety of information aout a character from ?hich to infer the underlyin+ mental

reality that over the course of the novel ecomes that character>s emedded narrative& The reader is ale to construct the continuin+ consciousnessof a character simply from descriptions of ehavior, even ?hen no direct access is +iven to that consciousness& The reader of /ebecca .no?s a+ood deal aout the mind of *eecca ?ithout ever meetin+ her&

earle ta.es a vie? of the mind that is different from some of the other theorists that 8 am discussin+& He repeatedly dra?s attention to ?hat hecalls the first3person, suKective ontolo+y of minds& He does this in order to emphasiAe the reality of our immediate consciousness of our o?nmental states& earle stresses that it is a mista.e to suppose that the ontolo+y of the mental is oKective and that the methodolo+y of a science ofthe mind must concern itself only ?ith

31$03

oKectively oservale ehavior& 8n his vie?, mental phenomena are essentially connected to suKective consciousness and so the ontolo+y of themental is essentially a first3person ontolo+y& y contrast, it seems to me, fictional minds must al?ays y definition have a third3person ontolo+y&/s fictional minds do not e9ist e9cept y the semiotic operations of readin+ te9ts, it is only the reader ?ho can have an a?areness of a fictional

mind, and that a?areness can oviously only e third3person (althou+h it ?ill ta.e account of the first3person testimony of characters as +iven in



d, a d t at a?a e ess ca ov ous y o y e t d pe so (a t ou+ t ? ta e accou t o t e st pe so test o y o c a acte s as + vethe mode of direct thou+ht)& / fictional mind can only e constructed y means of third3person ascription& Ho?ever, 8 still thin. that earle>s perspective is valuale in this conte9t ecause it pic.s out very clearly an essential first3person element in the readerly process& The empathy ofthe reader is directed to?ard and focused on the first3person sensations of the character and so the reader must e9perience the “oKective”story?orld as far as possile from the various suKective vie?points of the characters ?ho inhait the story?orld&

8n a stri.in+ly perceptive phrase, earle says (of real minds), “@hen ?e study him or her, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me that is him or her”(155!, !0#!1)& /nd earle>s point is as true of fictional minds as it is of real minds& @hen ?e study Bmma, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me thatis Bmma& o, ?hen ?e are studyin+ the Bmma story?orld, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is that ?orld as suKectively e9perienced y Bmma and also assuKectively e9perienced y Dni+htley, y Miss ates, and so on& The fictional te9t is primarily seen not as the representation of an oKectivestory?orld, ut as the interconnection of all of the suKective emedded narratives of all the characters ?ho inhait that fictional ?orld& @hen ?estudy the fictional mind of, say, 2yd+ate in Middlemarch, ?e do not simply study the episodes of his inner speech that are presented in the threespeech modes& @e study the story?orld of the novel as it is e9perienced from his suKective point of vie?& 8t is y these means that ?e study the?hole of his mind in action& @hen ?e study 2yd+ate in this ?ay, ?hat ?e are studyin+ is the me that is 2yd+ate& This point is really arestatement in different terms of a.htin>s vie? that the novel should e a polyphony of independent, suKective voices, and not a monolo+icaland oKective representation of others y a dominant narrator& 8 pursue this point in section $ of this chapter&

/s is no? clear, the primacy of first3 or third3person ascription forms a .een deate ?ithin the disciplines of philosophy and psycholo+y& Ln theone hand, some philosophers claim that “in some circumstances some mental states of others can e the oKects of direct perception” (Heal 1556,60)& This approach is, as 8 have said, associated ?ith the later @itt+enstein of the Philosophical

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0nvesti#ations& tephen 2& @hite refers to the possiility that “our access to the other suKects> a+ential characteristics may e at least as direct asour access to their oKective ma.eup&&&& 8f this +eneral approach can e sustained, then the =uestion ho? ?e can ascrie mental properties to anoKectively characteriAed other is misleadin+& From the a+ential perspective the prolem is rather one of ac=uirin+ a more oKective conception oth of one>s partner and of oneself ” (1555, ;:$)& This vie? lin.s closely ?ith @itt+enstein>s position that meanin+ is not inner, mysterious,

private, and psycholo+ical, ut outer, evident, pulic, and ehavioral& Ln the other hand, some theorists such as earle appear to privile+e first3 person authority& Pin.er remar.s that ?e “mortals can>t read other people>s minds directly& ut ?e ma.e +ood +uesses from ?hat they say, ?hat?e read et?een the lines, ?hat they sho? in their face and eyes, and ?hat est e9plains their ehavior& 8t is our species> most remar.ale talent”

(155;, ::0)& 4espite his ?arm ?ords aout the remar.ale =ualities of third3person ascription, he seems to indicate that he +ives primacy to first3



( , ) p = p p , + p y person .no?led+e& /s stated earlier, /ntonio 4amasio adopts a similar perspective& He oserves that the “study of human consciousness re=uires oth internal and e9ternal vie?s” (!000, "!) and that the “solution of the method prolem posed y the privacy of consciousness relies on anatural human aility, that of theoriAin+ constantly aout the state of mind of others from oservations of ehaviors, reports of mental states, andcounterchec.in+ of their correspondences, +iven one>s o?n comparale e9periences” (!000, ":#"$)&

Confusin+ly, ?hat is, in essence, the same deate also ta.es place in the completely different terminolo+y of ,hat it>s li9e and *ualia that 8referred to in the previous chapter& 8n 15;$, the philosopher Thomas -a+el ?rote a famous article entitled “@hat 8s 8t 2i.e to e a atI” (8t is thesuKect of some very amusin+ literary e9ercises in hin9s . . . !001, 50#5%Q, the novel y 4avid 2od+e aout the suKect of this oo.# consciousness, co+nitive science, and the novel&) 8n it, -a+el ar+ued that the “?hat it>s li.e” =uality of a at>s consciousness is not accessile tothird3person ascription& @e can never .no? “?hat it>s li.e” to e a at& 8n the same ?ay, ?e can never .no? “?hat it>s li.e” to e someone else&The distinctive =uality of =ualia as e9perienced y one individual is inaccessile to others& Ho?ever, as you mi+ht e9pect, others disa+ree& 8n particular, 4aniel 4ennett is =uite lunt “-a+el claims that no amount of third3person .no?led+e could tell us ?hat it is li.e to e a at, and 8flatly deny that claim” (1551, $$!)& 4ennett claims that such .no?led+e is possile y means of a methodolo+y foriddin+ly entitledheterophenomenolo#y, ?hich he defines as “a method of phenomenolo+ical description that can (in principle) do Kustice

31$!3to the most private and ineffale suKective e9periences ?hile never aandonin+ the methodolo+ical scruples of science” (1551, ;!)& 4ennettconcludes that ?hen “?e arrive at heterophenomenolo+ical narratives that no critic can find any positive +rounds for reKectin+, ?e should acceptthem#tentatively, pendin+ further discoveries#as accurate accounts of ?hat it is li.e to e the creature in =uestion” (1551, $$:#$$)&

Jet another deate e9ists ?ithin psycholo+y and philosophy on the nature of third3person ascription ?ith a completely different terminolo+y& 8t iscalled the theory3theory7simulation deate& nder the theory$theory, “normal adult human ein+s possess a primitive or >fol.>3psycholo+icaltheory thatQ postulates theoretical entities#in this case, mental states#and contains la?s ?hich relates the mental states to one another and toe9ternal stimuli (on the input side) and actions (on the output side)& @hen 8 predict ?hat someone ?ill do, or e9plain ?hy they have donesomethin+, 8 do so y deployin+ this theory” (4avies and tone 1556, !)& -o one su++ests that ?hat people use is a self3conscious and fully

?or.ed theory& /ll a+ree that it is used intuitively and non3consciously& Much of the theory3theory has a social ori+in ?e do not Kust ?or. it outfor ourselves independently of others& @e ac=uire it from our family, our friends, our education, and the +eneral social and cultural consensus?ithin ?hich ?e have een socialiAed&

/ccordin+ to the alternative account of the simulation theory, “human ein+s are ale to predict and e9plain each others> actions y usin+ the



+ y, + p p y +resources of their o?n minds to simulate the psycholo+ical aetiolo+y causationQ of the actions of others& o, instead of ein+ theoriAers, ?e are simulators& @e are mental simulators, not in the sense that ?e merely simulate mentation, ut in the sense that ?e understand others y usin+ ouro?n mentation in a process of simulation” (4avies and tone 1556, :)& imulation is not ima+inin+ me in that situation it is ima+inin+ ein+ theother in that situation& 8t means pretendin+ to have the same initial desires, eliefs, and other mental states as the other person& @e feed these intoour inferential co+nitive mechanism that then +enerates further mental states& For e9ample, a practical reasonin+ mechanism ?ill +enerate a

choice or decision& @e then ascrie to the other an occurrence of this state& Predictions of ehavior proceed similarly& @e run our decision3ma.in+ system off3line& 2i.e the application of the theory3theory, simulation is a completely social activity in the very ovious sense that it isconcerned ?ith attemptin+ to simulate the minds of others&

/n e9ample that is often used in the deate concerns a missed plane (Rold

31$:3

man 1556, 1";)& T?o people arrive at the airport thirty minutes after the scheduled departures of their separate fli+hts& />s fli+ht left on time, ut>s fli+ht ?as delayed and left only five minutes efore& -inety3si9 percent of those =uestioned said that ?ould e more upset than /& The

=uestion is, Ho? did the respondents arrive at their ascriptionsI /s 8 have pointed out on a numer of occasions, real3mind theorists arethemselves ?ell a?are of the many su++estive parallels ?ith fictional minds& *oert M& Rordon as.s, “4oes narrative (includin+ film narrative)create emotional and motivational effects y the same processes that create them in real3life situationsI” (1555, ;%%)& The missed plane doesindeed sound li.e a scene from a Hitchcoc. film&

oth the theory3theory and the simulation theory can also e applied to firstperson as ?ell as third3person ascription& /ccordin+ to simulationtheorists, ?e run our decision3ma.in+ system off3line in order to attempt to predict ho? ?e ?ill react to certain situations in the future&/ccordin+ to theorytheorists, first3person simulation theory is mista.enly ased on t?o aspects of the Cartesian theory of introspection(completeness and infalliility) that arise from the alle+edly privile+ed nature of access to first3person states& Ho?ever, in their vie?, self3.no?led+e is as much of a theory as the .no?led+e of others, and theories can e partial and fallile& pea.in+ personally from the results of myo?n introspections, for ?hat they are ?orth, the theory3theory of firstperson introspection seems very plausile to me& Ho?ever, in order to

remain consistent ?ith the lo+ic of my ar+ument, 8 should stress that my theory mi+ht e partial and fallile

/ common reaction to this deate is to dout the validity of the distinction et?een theory3theory and simulation and to ar+ue that simulation is



y y y +simply the means y ?hich ?e arrive at a theory& /ll ?e can ever have is a theory ?hat varies is the ?ay in ?hich ?e +et to that theory, and thatis a purely empirical =uestion& imulation needs theory and theory needs simulation& imulation re=uires a theoretical asis and theory re=uiresan empirical asis& To+ether, they form a coherent account of ascription& This alanced approach illuminates t?o sides of the activities of thereader of fictional te9ts& Ln the one hand, the reader must have a .ind of asic fol. theory aout ho? minds ?or.& 8t is on this asis that ?e .no?that motives and dispositions can e ascried to others& Ln the other hand, readers also simulate in their o?n minds the specific dilemmas faced

y characters in novels& @hen readin+ 8reat (pectations, most readers ?ill, 8 ?ould +uess, as. themselves, “Ho? ?ould 8 feel if 8 ?ere Pip, ane?ly made +entleman ?ho found out that 8 ?as ein+ supported not y a ?ellred lady ut y a convictI” 8n the Kar+on of the deate, readers?ill run their

31$$3

action plannin+ system off3line in order to simulate the ?or.in+s of Pip>s mind& Pursuin+ the point further, off3line thin.in+ aout mentalfunctionin+ is central to our understandin+ of novels& Ho? can the narrative of 8reat (pectations e comprehended e9cept y the .ind of trainof thou+ht descried earlierI imulation is concerned ?ith seein+ the ?orld from another>s perspective& This is ?hat the reader has to do forfictional minds& The fictional ?orld cannot e understood e9cept from the point of vie? of the characters& The plot of (mma can e descried asBmma e9periencin+ the story?orld in one ?ay, Dni+htley e9periencin+ the story?orld in another ?ay, Mr& Blton e9periencin+ the story?orld inyet another ?ay, and so on& The story?orld is the amal+amation of all these different, individual, suKective, and aspectual story?orlds& Thereader has to use oth their theory of mind and their aility to simulate the mentation of others to follo? all of the different individual narrativesand, therefore, the ?hole narrative&

Much of the theory3theory7simulation deate is concerned ?ith the co+nitive development of children& /ccordin+ to /lison Ropni., the theory3theory position on this issue is that children “develop a succession of theories of the mind that they use to e9plain their e9perience and the ehavior of themselves and others& 2i.e scientific theories, these intuitive or naNve theories postulate astract coherent mental entities and la?s,and they provide predictions, interpretations, and e9planations& The theories chan+e as the children confront counterevidence, +ather ne? data,and perform e9periments& Lne conse=uence of this vie? is that the philosophical doctrine of first3person authority is incorrect our .no?led+e ofour minds is as theoretical as our .no?led+e of the minds of others” (1555, "$0)& Ln the other hand, the simulationists have a different approach

“/ second area of developmental research as.s ?hether children ascrie mental states to themselves efore they ascrie them to others& Gersionsof the simulation theory committed to the vie? that ?e reco+niAe our o?n mental states as such and ma.e analo+ical inferences to others> mental

states seem to re=uire an affirmative ans?er to this =uestion other versions of the theory seem to re=uire a ne+ative ans?er& ome e9periments



su++est a ne+ative ans?er, ut deate continues on this =uestion” (Rordon 1555, ;%6)&

@ithin the deate, continual reference is made to some empirical false3elief tests that have een +iven to children& These tests are used ecause psycholo+ists have found that very youn+ children have difficulty understandin+ the fact that the eliefs of others can e false& 8f very youn+children .no? that 9 is the case, they cannot comprehend the possiility that others mi+ht mista.enly thin. that y is the case& Lviously, there is

a point in the co+nitive development of

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youn+ children ?hen they come to understand the e9istence of false eliefs& The purpose of the tests is to find out ?hen this typically happens“8n one e9periment, for e9ample, children sa? a closed candy o9& @hen they opened it, it turned out that there ?ere pencils inside it, rather thanthe candy they had een e9pectin+& The children ?ere as.ed ?hat another person ?ould thin. ?as in the o9 at first, efore they opened it& Threeyear3olds consistently said that the children ?ould thin. there ?ere pencils in the o9& They did not understand that the other person>s eliefcould e false” (Ropni. 1555, ":5)& o, in a series of ?ell3.no?n tests, children are sho?n person P puttin+ an oKect L in place /& /fter Pleaves, L is relocated in place & o P has a false elief that L is still in place / ?hen in fact it is no? in place & @hen as.ed ?here P ?ill loo.for L ?hen he comes ac., children a+ed under four ?ill ?ron+ly say they are unale to infer a false elief& Children a+ed over four ?illtypically +ive the ri+ht ans?er, /, althou+h the Kury is out on ?hether this is ecause they have developed a theory of mind or ?hether they havesimply +otten etter at simulation&

“8nfants demonstrate that they perceive persons as essentially different >oKects> from anythin+ nonlivin+ and nonhuman” (Trevarthen 1555, $1%)&Children have to develop a sense of others& They have to ecome accustomed to the fact that the ?orld is aspectual it is perceived under differentaspects& ome people ?ill ?ron+ly thin. that there is candy in the o9 others ?ill .no? that there are pencils& ome people ?ill thin. that oKectL is in place /, some in place & These eliefs e9ist independently of the actual presence of candy or pencils& To function efficiently, ?e have toappreciate, if only fleetin+ly, ?hat the ?orld is li.e for people ?ho thin. differently aout it from us& 8n the same ?ay, readers read novels yseein+ the story?orld as aspectual different characters e9perience the story?orld differently& Pip and Ma+?ich have shoc.in+ly disparatee9periences of their reunion& -arratives cannot e understood unless the story?orld is understood as a comple9, ever3chan+in+ intermin+lin+ of

the individual narratives of the various characters in it& -orman Freeman discusses ?hether or not “youn+ preschool children can compute ana+ent>s false elief in the conte9t of computin+ the a+ent>s action$plan” (1556, "!)& / character>s action plan can only e understood in terms ofthat character>s ?hole emedded narrative&

This empathetic activity can e thou+ht of as a .ind of adult play& /ccordin+ to 4ere. olton, play “can e used to e9periment ?ith diverse



circumstances, emotions, eliefs, capacities, tas.s to try out perspectives and activities different from the child>s o?n& The play is in a space et?een reality and the ima+ination&

31$%3

The e9periments are neither in reality nor in thou+ht alone the simulations are neither on3 nor off3line” (1556, !!0)& This sounds very li.e theactivity of readin+ novels& The role of perspectives is crucial to oth play and readin+& 8n oth, ?e try out different perspectives to see ?hat theyare li.e& @e enter the minds of characters necessarily in order to follo? the plot& ut it is more than that ?e do it ecause it is enKoyale and ecause it is +ood for us& 8n findin+ out more aout the minds of others, ?e find out more aout ourselves&

To summariAe, there is a +roup of interrelated deates ?ithin philosophy and psycholo+y aout the relative reliaility of our .no?led+e of ouro?n minds and our .no?led+e of the minds of others& There is a ?ide ran+e of vie?s and a consensus has not emer+ed& Lf course, all of this mayseem to the s.eptical reader to e a very elaorate statement of the ovious sometimes ?e are ?ron+ aout our mental life and sometimes ?e areri+ht aout the mental life of others& ut there is more to it than that& 8 ?ant to emphasiAe the e9istence of this deate in order to sho? that manytheorists in the fields relatin+ to real minds do not re+ard first3person ascription as the norm from ?hich ?e sometimes accurately depart& Theyre+ard third3person ascription as the norm from ?hich first3person ascription is derived& @hile 8 am certainly not =ualified to add to that deate, 8?ould li.e to su++est that the ease ?ith ?hich readers are ale to employ third3person ascription in order to uild up a stron+ sense of fictionalminds at ?or. su++ests, at the very least, that it is an e9tremely po?erful tool& Ho?ever, my main conclusion is that confident and cate+orical pronouncements aout the nature of fictional minds should not e made in i+norance of the rich, insi+htful, and e9citin+, ut also e?ilderin+,arcane, and difficult deates on the nature of real minds&

3. #he De)elopment of &urposi)e #hought

This section and the ne9t ?ill consider fictional minds in the conte9t of the ?or. of four *ussian theorists 2ev Gy+ots.y and /le9ander 2uria on psycholin+uistics in this section and Mi.hail a.htin and Galentin Golosinov (possily a pseudonym for a.htin) on discourse analysis in thene9t& /ll four share the dominant characteristic of *ussian thou+ht follo?in+ the 151; revolution a functional emphasis on the social nature of

thou+ht and on the pulic nature of apparently private mental life& Gy+ots.y remar.ed that every thou+ht “fulfils a function, solves a prolem”(15"%, !1")& He felt that, in order to e9plain the hi+hly comple9 forms of human consciousness, one must +o eyond the individual& Lne mustsee. the ori+ins of conscious activity and ehavior not in the recesses of the rain or in the depths of the human spirit ut in the e9ternal

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processes of social life and in the historical forms and practices of human e9istence (2uria 15"!, !6)& For a.htin, a sin+le consciousness is acontradiction in terms consciousness is in essence multiple& He relates this approach more specifically to discourse analysis ?hen he ar+ues that“veral discourse is a social phenomenon” (15"1, !65)&

This theme is developed in a satisfyin+ and lo+ical ?ay across a numer of different disciplines& Gy+ots.y made the initial rea.throu+h in thelate 15!0s and early 15:0s ?ith his theory of the development of inner speech in onto#enesis (in this conte9t, the co+nitive development ofchildren)& 2uria then developed this insi+ht y relatin+ it to a lar+e numer of different areas in psycholo+y and psycholin+uistics& To+ether, they provide a scientific perspective on the more sociolo+ical, political, discursive, and literary treatments of the social asis of thou+ht in the ?or. ofGolosinov and a.htin& Golosinov dra?s out some of the philosophical and political implications in his theories of the dialo+ic nature of theutterance and relates these implications to analyses of various forms of discourse& a.htin ta.es this approach one sta+e further durin+ hisdiscussions of the te9ts of 4ostoevs.y and others& He uses the asic theoretical underpinnin+ provided y the other three in order to redefine theta9onomies of fictional discourse and to raise a numer of more +eneral issues relatin+ to the novel& The insi+hts of a.htin on, for e9ample,dialo+icality and doulevoiced discourse enefit from ein+ seen ?ithin the psycholin+uistic conte9t of Gy+ots.y and 2uria&

8n Gy+ots.y>s vie?, children are, from the very e+innin+, social ein+s& Gy+ots.y ar+ued that children use social speech ri+ht from the start, oth for communicatin+ ?ith others and for solvin+ prolems (2uria 15"!, 106)& peech is a prolem3solvin+ tool& 2uria contends that for thechild any mental act e+ins as a material action such as the manipulation of an oKect& 2ater, inner speech creates the possiility of co+nitiveaction such as the formation of concepts& Therefore, volitional acts such as the manipulation of oKects are mediated y the co+nitive structuresformed in inner speech& 8n this ?ay, and as descried in more detail later, mental action is seen as a process that is social in ori+in and structure(2uria 15"!, 10%)& 8n 2uria>s vie?, lan+ua+e has a third function in addition to its co+nitive function (the need to formulate thou+ht) and itscommunicative function (the communication of information in pulic speech) its directive function, the role of inner speech in monitorin+ andcontrollin+ our actions& He comments that the ?ord not only reflects reality, it also re+ulates our ehavior (15"!, 50)&

8n their analysis of onto+enesis, Gy+ots.y and 2uria point out that the com

31$"3

municative ehavior of the mother, such as laelin+ and pointin+ +estures, focuses the child>s attention y sin+lin+ out one particular oKect from



other, e=ually attractive parts of the environment& The child>s attention ceases to oey the rules of natural and patterned refle9es and e+ins to esuordinated to the speech of the adult& The mother>s speech therey ecomes a stron+ social stimulus that +ives rise to a stale and orientin+response in the child and that inhiits the child>s more elementary and instinctive responses& They ar+ue that the care+iver>s speech does not +ainthese po?ers immediately& The formation in the child of the directive function that is characteristic of adult inner speech +oes throu+h a lon+ anddramatic development (2uria 15"!, 50#51)& 4urin+ the ne9t sta+e of co+nitive development, the child transforms the interpsycholo+ical activity

of the relationship to the mother into his or her o?n intrapsycholo+ical process of self3re+ulation& This is ?hen the child learns to spea. and e+ins to +ive veral commands to him or herself& This speech is e9ternal and out loud, ut it is still private speech in the sense that its purpose isnot communication ?ith others, ut re+ulation of oneself& Private speech is the term used for directive speech that is out loud& 8nner speech is theterm used for directive speech that later +oes in?ard and ecomes silent& /t first, this out loud private speech accompanies the child>s activity& /ta later sta+e, it precedes it, therey enalin+ the child to plan activity in advance (2uria 15"!, "5#50)& Private speech ecomes an important toolfor self3re+ulation as children use lan+ua+e to plan, +uide, and monitor their activities& 8n the earliest sta+es of private speech, it cannot e clearlydifferentiated in either its form or its function from social, communicative speech& The formal and functional differentiations et?een there+ulatory and the communicative roles occur only +radually& Ho?ever, as the /merican psycholin+uist Euan *amireA emphasiAes, the crucial point is that Gy+ots.y and 2uria estalished that out loud, private speech is the “overt and oservale precursor of covert, inner speech or veralthin.in+” (155!, 155)&

Gy+ots.y ar+ues that this private speech disappears at aout the a+e of five ?hen inner speech e+ins to develop& From this, ?e can infer that private speech ecomes inner speech& This is part of the transition from the collective activity of the child to more individualiAed ehavior&Ho?ever, the functions of private speech and the later inner speech are the same& Gy+ots.y stresses that in oth cases they do not merelyaccompany the child>s activity, they serve mental orientation and conscious understandin+, and therey help to overcome difficulties (15"%, !!% #!")& Gy+ots.y states that speech for oneself ori+inates throu+h differentiation from speech ?ith others& /lthou+h the child>s first speech isspeech to others, private speech derives from this early communicative speech& Lnce this

31$53

division of function occurs, the structural and functional =ualities of private speech ecome more mar.ed as the child develops& 8n other ?ords,

private speech ecomes more and more different from communicative speech as time +oes on& /t three years old, there is no difference et?een private and social speech& /t seven years old, they are totally dissimilar& /s the child +ro?s older, the vocaliAation of private speech ecomes



of a “form of life” is really a restatement in different terms of the *ussian emphasis on the social situatedness of consciousness& The thou+ht andl f th i di id l i t f d il i t d t d th i l t hi h th l Th i th ht d l



lan+ua+e of the individual arise out of, and are necessarily oriented to?ard, the social +roup to ?hich they elon+& Their thou+ht and lan+ua+ecan only e +rasped in terms of an understandin+ of the ?ays in ?hich that social +roup functions and the means y ?hich individuals ?ithin theculture relate to one another& 8f ?e do not understand the form of life of the lion, ?e ?ill not understand its lan+ua+e& 8f ?e do not understand theforms of life that e9ist in the story?orlds of fictional characters, ?e ?ill not fully understand their inner lan+ua+e, their use of co+nitive tools, ortheir intermental relations ?ith other characters&

The le+acy of Gy+ots.y>s thou+ht is a fruitful one “His insi+ht that historical, cultural, and institutional conte9ts condition learnin+ yidentifyin+ and e9tendin+ the child>s capacities animates several ecolo+ical approaches in psycholo+y” (perer and Hirschfeld 1555, c99iii)& Hisinfluence on a ?hole school of psycholin+uists such as the /merican Eames @ertsch is immeasurale& For e9ample, recent ?or. ?ith youn+children “su++ests that the notion +roup may developmentally precede the notion of self” (Hirschfeld 1555, 6"0), and such ?or. is deeplyinfluenced y Gy+ots.y& Gy+ots.y>s influence also has implications for the first3 and third3person ascription deate referred to earlier& 8f thenotion of a +roup developmentally precedes the notion of self, then it seems at least possile that the aility to ascrie mental phenomena toothers could precede the hi+hly self3conscious process of ascriin+ them to oneself&

8t is @ertsch>s vie? that the discipline of psycholo+y seems less capale than ever of providin+ a coherent account of the human mind& 8n hisvie?, psycholo+ists .no? a +reat deal aout isolated mental processes and s.ills ut seem incapale of +eneratin+ an overall picture of mentalfunctionin+& Therefore, they have very little to say aout ?hat it means to e human in the modern ?orld

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(1551, 1)& @ertsch holds that one e9ample of an attempt to provide a coherent account can e found in the ?or. of *ussian scholars et?een therevolution of 151; and the talinist pur+es of the mid 15:0s& He su++ests that theorists such as Gy+ots.y and a.htin tried to deal ?ith practicalissues that e9tended across disciplinary oundaries& /s a result, they comined ideas from a ran+e of ?hat are no? considered as =uite separatedisciplines (@ertsch 1551, $#6)& 8t is ?elcome ne?s that the interdisciplinary approach that @ertsch advocates is no? ein+ employed y avariety of postclassical narrative theorists&

4. Dialogic #hought



The revity of this section is not a fair reflection of a.htin>s importance in the study of the fictional mind& Ln the contrary, this section is shortonly ecause a.htin>s theories have ecome ?ell .no?n and ?ell accepted, and the purpose of this oo. is, as 8 have said, to introduce someunfamiliar ideas into narrative theory& The previous section concentrated on the psycholin+uistic approach of Gy+ots.y and 2uria to the =uestionof inner speech& This section ?ill roaden the perspective and include some of the more +eneral discursive and literary ideas that are contained in

the ?or. of Golosinov and a.htin&

8 ?ill start ?ith Golosinov>s notion of the utterance& The term is intended to convey the fact that every speech event, oth e9ternal and innerspeech, ta.es place in a social conte9t, has an actual or potential audience, and, ultimately, has a political meanin+& 8t is an element in the never3endin+ dialo+ue et?een individuals in a social +roup& Therefore, the technical issues relatin+ to such phenomena as inner speech can only efully understood ?ithin the ?ider social conte9t& For e9ample, Golosinov ar+ues that it is only y ascertainin+ the forms of ?hole utterances andthe forms of dialo+ic speech that li+ht can e shed on the forms of inner speech (15;:, :")& The perspective introduced y the use of the term the

utterance is important ecause it relates internal consciousness to pra+matics, the study of the various uses of speech in their social anddiscursive conte9ts, and therefore y e9tension also to the study of characters> motives, teleolo+y, and plot& For this reason, it is necessary toe9amine precisely ho? the inner utterance is situated ?ithin, and is oriented to?ard, the social +roup ?ithin ?hich it ta.es place& Lne interface is@itt+enstein>s notion of forms of life& The lan+ua+e and thou+ht of an individual can only e understood y studyin+ the ?hole form of life ofthat individual& /nother interface is action the point at ?hich characters> emedded narratives meet in pulic and social conte9ts& These perspectives emphasiAe the dialo+ic nature of characters> emedded narratives and the nature of the fictional story?orld as

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a attle+round ?ithin ?hich the thou+hts and actions of individuals contend and clash&

Golosinov>s position is that the ?ord is al?ays oriented to?ard an addressee& 8n the asence of a real addressee, as in the internal ?ord of innerspeech, the presupposed addressee is a normal representative of the spea.er>s social +roup& o, each person>s inner ?orld and thou+ht has itsstailiAed social audience that comprises the environment in ?hich reasons, motives, and values are fashioned (Golosinov 15;:, "6#"%)&

Golosinov>s use of the term audience must e understood in =uite a ?ide sense not literally, as passive recipients of another>s ?ord, ut more?idely as the other participants in the relationships that the character forms in the story?orld& The lan+ua+e used y Golosinov to descrie

individual consciousness encoura+es the analyst of the fictional mind to loo. eyond particular mental events ta.en in isolation and to e9aminethe hole conte t of mental action in the stor orld This is the dialo+ic relationship et een conscio snesses to se a.htin>s term



the ?hole conte9t of mental action in the story?orld& This is the dialo+ic relationship et?een consciousnesses, to use a.htin>s term&

/ccordin+ to a.htin, consciousness never +ravitates to?ard itself ut is al?ays found in intense relationship ?ith another consciousness& 8n this?ay, every e9perience, every thou+ht that a character has, is internally dialo+ic, filled ?ith stru++le, and is open to inspiration from outside itself&8t is never concentrated simply on itself, ut is al?ays accompanied y a continual side?ays +lance at another individual& He ar+ues that every

thou+ht senses itself to e from the very e+innin+ a reKoinder in an unfinished dialo+ue (15"$, :!)& His “dialo+ic ima+ination, ” to use the title+iven to a collection of his essays, is a lo+ical culmination of Gy+ots.y>s and 2uria>s theories on the ori+in and function of inner speech andGolosinov>s stress on the social situatedness of the utterance& a.htin descries his notion of the dialo+ic or polyphonic novel y notin+ that thechief characteristic of 4ostoevs.y>s novels is the +enuine polyphony that results from a plurality of independent, unmer+ed, and fully validvoices and consciousnesses& @hat unfolds in his novels, accordin+ to a.htin, is not a multitude of characters and fates e9istin+ in a sin+leoKective ?orld that is illuminated y a sin+le authorial consciousness& (This is the monolo#ic novel &) *ather, there are a numer ofconsciousnesses ?ith e=ual ri+hts and each ?ith its o?n ?orld comined ut not mer+ed in the events of the story?orld (a.htin 15"$, %)& (Thisis the dialo#ic novel &) a.htin means y his use of the term voices not Kust a mi9ture of different le9ical re+isters or speech patterns, ut also aclash of ?orld3vie?s and ideolo+ical positions& For e9ample, he states that a social lan+ua+e is a concrete, sociolin+uistic elief system thatdefines a distinct identity for itself& 8n ?hat a.htin calls an authentic novel (a synonym for the

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dialo+ic and polyphonic novel), the reader can sense ehind each utterance the elemental force of social lan+ua+es ?ith their internal lo+ic andinternal necessity (15"1, :6%)& a.htin lin.s this approach to the notion of the utterance y su++estin+ that, ?ithin the arena of every utterance,an intense interaction and stru++le et?een one>s o?n ?ord and the ?ord of another>s is ?a+ed, a process in ?hich they oppose or dialo+icallyinter3animate each other (15"1, :6$)&

These ideas are of +reat importance to the emedded narrative approach to fictional minds& They sho? that a.htin conceives of polyphony notsimply as a comination of the characteristic speech patterns of the various characters in the story?orld, ut as the presentation of the ideolo+icalstru++le et?een the various ?orld vie?points of individuals ?ithin a social +roup& He also sees the narrator as en+a+ed in this stru++le and not

aloof from it& For e9ample, he comments that the speech of another, once enclosed in a conte9t such as a narrative and no matter ho? accuratelydescried, is al?ays suKect to certain semantic chan+es& The conte9t that emraces another>s ?ord is responsile for its dialo+iAin+ ac.+round(a.htin 15"1, :$0)& 8t is in this ?ay that narrators are al?ays en+a+ed ?ith, and therey alterin+ the meanin+ of, the discourses of their

characters& These ideas form the ac.+round to a.htin>s famous notion of doule3voiced discourse& The comple9 meanin+s that a.htinattaches to his notions of the ?ord the utterance dialo+icality and polyphony all overlap to a considerale e9tent ?ith the theory of emedded



attaches to his notions of the ?ord, the utterance, dialo+icality, and polyphony all overlap to a considerale e9tent ?ith the theory of emeddednarratives oth the dialo+ic approach and the emedded narrative approach situate individual consciousness in its social conte9t use a functionalapproach to?ard characters> minds analyAe the ?hole of a character>s mind and not Kust his or her inner speech estalish throu+h discourseanalysis precisely ho? this is achieved in narratives and sho? ho? the novel can e seen as an interconnection of the emedded narratives, ordialo+ic consciousnesses, of its various characters&

8t is necessary here to refer to an important methodolo+ical issue that arises from the monolo+ic7dialo+ic distinction& 8n After 6a9htin, 4avid2od+e su++ests that a.htin started ?ith the vie? that the novel ?as asically monolo+ic for most of its history and ecame dialo+ic ?ith4ostoevs.y& Ho?ever, over time, accordin+ to 2od+e, he chan+ed his vie? and came to re+ard the novel as inherently dialo+ic from the e+innin+, seein+ the pre34ostoevs.ian novel as already a dialo+ic type of literary discourse& 2od+e ?rites of a.htin>s first formulation of thenotion of the polyphonic novel (in the early mono+raph Problems of Dostoevs9y>s Art ) that “?Qhat then seemed to him to e a uni=ue

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innovation of 4ostoevs.y>s &&& he later came to thin. ?as inherent in the novel as a literary form” (1550, !!)& /s an e9ample of the latter position,in the essay “4iscourse in the -ovel” a.htin states that there are t?o distinct lines of development ?ithin the history of the novel& The secondline, to ?hich elon+ the +reatest representatives of the novel as a +enre, incorporates hetero#lossia (yet another synonym for dialo+icality, polyphony, and authenticity) into a novel>s composition and fre=uently resists alto+ether any unmediated and pure authorial discourse (15"1,:;6)& 8 ?ould a+ree ?ith 2od+e that a.htin never =uite mana+ed to reconcile these t?o accounts (1550, 65)& 8t seems to me that Problems of

Dostoevs9y>s Poetics is still, despite his second thou+hts, fairly close to his ori+inal position that the dialo+ic and polyphonic novel e+an ?ith4ostoevs.y& 8t is ?ritten in an intensely prescriptive manner, clearly re+ardin+ 4ostoevs.y>s ?or. as intrinsically superior to the ?or. of others ecause it is dialo+ic in nature ?hile the others are essentially monolo+ic& Ho?ever, li.e others, 8 am usin+ his ?or. at a very astract andtheoretical level ?ithout referrin+ to his vie?s on particular novelists or historical developments e9cept ?here necessary&

The field of vision is one of the most important aspects of the relationship et?een the narrator and the characters in a narrative& a.htin>s position is that the information contained in the discourse should e presented not ?ithin the sin+le field of vision of the narrator, ut ?ithin the

various fields of vision of a variety of characters& 8n a crucially important statement, he contends that these individual fields of vision#this plurality of consciousness centers#?hich are not reduced to a sin+le ideolo+ical denominator, comine in the hi+her unity of the polyphonicnovel (15"$, 1%)& 8n estalishin+ the importance of the narrator>s democratic treatment of the characters> various fields of vision, a.htin is

emphasiAin+ that the narrator should not have any surplus of vision over and aove that ?hich is availale to the characters& His point is usuallyre?orded as sayin+ that it is desirale for narrators to use internal focaliAation rather than Aero focaliAation or omniscient narration Ho?ever 8



re?orded as sayin+ that it is desirale for narrators to use internal focaliAation rather than Aero focaliAation or omniscient narration& Ho?ever, 8thin. that the concept of the field of vision can e e9tended in other, e=ually interestin+ ?ays& Eust as a.htin>s concept of the ?ord can ere?orded in terms of emedded narratives, so can the notion of the field of vision& The ?ord of a character does not Kust mean a re+ional accent,and the field of vision does not simply mean visual perception& 8t means each character>s .no?led+e, eliefs, perceptions, memories, haits ofthou+ht, intentions, purposes, and plans& 8t is each character>s ?hole mind in action& 8t is ?hat determines a character>s actions and ?hat is then

modified y

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the conse=uences of those actions& 8t is the story of the narrative as it e9ists in the mind of each character& The narrative can therefore e analyAedin terms of the intersectin+, evolvin+, and conflictin+ fields of vision that comprise it&

a.htin>s theories have implications for the study of teleolo+y ecause they appear to do?n+rade its importance or at least redefine the term in a?ay that is very different from its normal use& Ln the face of it, he seems to e very dismissive of the notions of plot and desi+n& He states thatthe ordinary pra+matic lin.s at the level of plot#?hether oKective or psycholo+ical#are insufficient ecause they presuppose that charactershave ecome fi9ed elements in the narrator>s desi+n& uch lin.s ind and comine finaliAed ima+es of people in the unity of a monolo+ically perceived ?orld& a.htin states of 4ostoevs.y that the ultimate clamps that hold his ?orld to+ether are different ecause the fundamental eventthat is revealed in his novels does not lend itself to an ordinary pra+matic interpretation of plot (15"$, ;)& a.htin>s point is that, ?hen charactersare not oKects of authorial discourse ut suKects of their o?n, they are not e9hausted y the usual functions of characteriAation and plotdevelopment (15"$, ;)& There is nothin+ merely thin+3li.e, no mere matter, no oKects, there are solely suKects (a.htin 15"$, !:;)& 8t is difficultto comine suKects into a plot structure ?ithout compromisin+ their suKectivity ecause they ?ould then ecome simply elements in a narrativeframe?or.& This dan+er can e avoided if the idea of plot includes some notion of the multiplicity of characters> discourses and therefore ecomes a more or+anic and fle9ile concept than the traditional approach& Part of the competence that is re=uired of the reader is to enter thestory?orld of the narrative and therey ta.e part in the illusion that fictional characters are individuals ?ith as much freedom and autonomy ofmovement as real people have& /t the same time, readers .no? that the narrative is a semiotic construction and that its endin+ has een predetermined& o, it is possile to ar+ue that the reader must e ale to maintain simultaneously the t?o irreconcilale elements of freedom and

teleolo+y and that this aility is an inescapale and essential component of the aility to read novels& 8t could e ar+ued that monolo+ic novels arethose in ?hich readers ?ill find that desi+n predominates over freedom& 8n dialo+ic novels, readers ?ill find that a satisfyin+ alance et?een the

t?o elements can e maintained& Freedom can e discovered y readers> constructions of characters> emedded narratives desi+n can ediscovered y readin+ the novel as a comination of those emedded narratives



discovered y readin+ the novel as a comination of those emedded narratives&

To summariAe, the ?or. of the four *ussian theorists provides part of the theoretical asis for a ne? approach to?ard the analysis of presentations of

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fictional minds in novels& /n essential element in this initial theoretical ?or. is the social asis of thou+ht& /nother is the purposive and directivenature of consciousness& /n occurrence of inner speech is an utterance, a socially situated, pra+matic element in the continuous dialo+ue thate9ists et?een all individuals in a social +roup ecause it is an e9pression of an individual>s needs, desires, ?ishes, and hopes as defined a+ainstthose of others& 8t is not possile to have intentions, purposes, and plans ?ithout specifyin+ them in terms of the competin+ intentions and plansof others& The ?or. of Gy+ots.y and 2uria on real minds can e used for this purpose as can the ?or. of Golosinov and a.htin on fictionalminds in narrative discourses&

". #he ,ind Beyond the Skin

Jou may rememer that 8 first used this stran+e phrase in chapter 1, section !& 8 did so then so that it ?ould revererate in your mind until thetime came to e9plain its meanin+ in more detail here& Gariants of the phrase have appealed to a numer of theorists “The s.in is not thatimportant as a oundary” (& F& .inner 15%$, "$) “The net?or. is not ounded y the s.in ut includes all e9ternal path?ays alon+ ?hichinformation can travel” (ateson 15;!, :15) “8 try to dissolve the oundaries of the s.in and present navi+ation ?or. as a system of interactionsamon+ media oth inside and outside the individual” (Hutchins 1556, 9vii) and “once the he+emony of s.in and s.ull is usurped, ?e may eale to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the ?orld” (Clar. and Chalmers 155", 1")& 8n +oices of the -ind (1551), the /merican psycholin+uist, Eames @ertsch has e9tended the ?or. of Gy+ots.y and a.htin y usin+ the notion of mediated action to e9plain ho? the mindcan e9tend eyond the s.in& Mediated action involves thou+ht ?ith the aid of tools& 8n this section, 8 ?ill refer initially and very riefly to onetool, lan+ua+e, ecause this topic has een e9plored in considerale detail already& /fter a rather lon+er discussion of the second tool, physicallydistriuted co+nition, 8 ?ill devote more space to the third and most important for my purposes socially distriuted thou+ht or intermental

thin.in+&

/ fundamental assumption of @ertsch>s sociocultural approach to mind is that ?hat is to e descried and e9plained is human action& People arevie?ed as comin+ into contact ?ith and creatin+ their surroundin+s as ?ell as themselves throu+h the actions in ?hich they en+a+e (@ertsch



vie?ed as comin+ into contact ?ith and creatin+ their surroundin+s as ?ell as themselves throu+h the actions in ?hich they en+a+e (@ertsch1551, ")& His is an approach to ho? the mind actually ?or.s in practice in the real ?orld& 8t ta.es the study of thou+ht out of the laoratory andinto the sorts of situations in ?hich actual thou+ht ta.es place& @ertsch stresses that oth Gy+ots.y and a.htin elieved

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that it is social and communicative practices that +ive rise to mental functionin+& He =uotes Gy+ots.y>s remar. that “the social dimension ofconsciousness is primary in time and in fact& The individual dimension of consciousness is derivative and secondary” (1551, 1:)& Thesociocultural approach that Eames @ertsch applies to real minds can e used to analyAe fictional minds& @ertsch points out that his approach e+ins ?ith the assumption that action cannot e separated from the milieu in ?hich it is carried out and that any analysis of it must e lin.ed insome ?ay to specific cultural, historical, and institutional factors (1551, 1")& Lnce a fictional mind is vie?ed as a suKective narrative that isemedded in the discourse that descries the ?hole story?orld of the novel, then an analysis of that mind must necessarily lin. it to the cultural,historical, and institutional aspects of the story?orld& Characters are elements in a fictional structure and have no meanin+ outside of it& Thecharacter of Bmma is simply a part of the structure of (mma& This can, in a sense, e re+arded as the social dimension of fictional consciousness&Lf course, the character of Bmma is understood y the reader to have private thou+hts, ut this individual dimension of the character>sconsciousness is derivative and secondary ecause Bmma>s private thou+hts ac=uire meanin+ only as part of the story?orld of Bmma&

@ertsch refers to the mind as a .it of mediational tools such as lan+ua+e and he ar+ues that the mind e9tends eyond the s.in in several ?aysthrou+h the notion of mediated action (1551, 1$)& He emphasiAes that mental functionin+ is shaped or even defined y the mediational means thatit employs& Bven ?hen individuals thin. in isolation, it is inherently social ecause it ta.es place ?ith the help of mediational tools such aslan+ua+e and also other tools such as computers or numer systems& Lf these, oviously the shared social process of lan+ua+e is the mostimportant tool (@ertsch 1551, 1$#16)& The diversity of these tools e9plains the hetero+eneity of veral thin.in+ and the co+nitive pluralism thatcan e found oth across and ?ithin different cultures& The tool .it approach allo?s +roup and conte9tual differences in mediated action to eunderstood in terms of the array of mediational means to ?hich people have access and in terms of their patterns of choice in selectin+ a particular means for a particular occasion (@ertsch 1551, 5:#5$)& / study of characters> mental functionin+ necessarily entails a study of themediational tools, includin+ lan+ua+e in the form of inner speech, that they use to achieve their ends& For e9ample, as 8 e9plained in chapter $,

-eumann points out in her analysis of Pride and Pre1udice that BliAaeth ennet>s mind is presented as hi+hly veral, intelli+ent, rational,articulate, and self3conscious& y contrast, 2ydia ennet>s mind is visual, unselfconscious, and inarticulate (15"%, :"$)& Put in @ertsch>s

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terms, 2ydia>s mediational tool.it is very different from and much more limited than BliAaeth>s tool.it&

Co+nition is the act or process of .no?in+ and ac=uirin+ .no?led+e, and physically distributed co#nition or situated co#nition can e defined asfollo?s “ituated co+nition and learnin+ is the study of co+nition ?ithin its natural conte9t& This perspective emphasiAes that individual minds

usually operate ?ithin environments that structure, direct, and support co+nitive processes& 8tQ ar+ues that the nature of co+nitive processin+ isuni=uely determined ?ithin its conte9t, and that it cannot e studied in isolation ?ithout destroyin+ its definin+ properties&&&& The socialenvironment also influences co+nition throu+h the presence of other minds to influence, assist, mislead, demonstrate, =uestion, and raise other perspectives” (eifert 1555, ;%;)& The psycholo+ist Bd?in Hutchins “has demonstrated ho? the co+nitive processes involved in flyin+ a plane donot ta.e place Kust in the pilot>s head ut are distriuted throu+hout the coc.pit, in the memers of the cre?, the control panel and the manuals”(perer and Hirschfeld 1555, c99iv)& -ote ho? the physically distriuted aspects (the coc.pit, the control panel, and the manuals) areconsidered to+ether ?ith the socially distriuted aspects (the other memers of the cre?)& /lthou+h they can e difficult to separate in comple9environments, it should e orne in mind that they are lo+ically distinct&

For the moment then, 8 ?ill stay ?ith physically distriuted co+nitive systems the use of the environment as an aid to co+nition& This does not Kust mean ta.in+ the environment as it is in order to aid co+nitions, it means in addition creatin+ an environment that acts as efficiently as possile as such an aid& /s Hutchins says in Co#nition in the Wild (1556), “the environments of human thin.in+ are not >natural> environments&They are artificial throu+h and throu+h& Humans create their co+nitive po?ers y creatin+ the environments in ?hich they e9ercise those po?ers”(1556, 9vi)& 4istriuted co+nitive systems consist in the main of co#nitive artifacts, ?hich are “physical oKects made y humans for the purposeof aidin+, enhancin+, or improvin+ co+nition” (Hutchins 1555, 1!%)& 4avid Herman has ta.en the notion of co+nitive artifacts in an une9pectedand thou+ht3provo.in+ direction in “tories as a Tool for Thin.in+” (!00:) y ar+uin+ that narrative itself is a mediational tool and a co+nitiveartifact& 8n fact, he +oes further, and in ar+uin+ that narrative “rid+es self and other, ” he su++ests that it is a tool or artifact that aids the sociallydistriuted or situated co+nition that 8 ?ill discuss later& 8n Herman>s ?ords, narrative teaches me “that 8 do not .no? my ?orld if 8 considermyself someho? outside of or eyond that ?orld” (!00:, 1"6)&

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4aniel 4ennett puts situated co+nition at the center of human co+nition +enerally y su++estin+ that the primary source of our intelli+ence is our“hait of off$loadin# as much as possile of our co+nitive tas.s into the environment itself#e9trudin+ our minds (that is, our mental proKects and

activities) into the surroundin+ ?orld, ?here a host of peripheral devices ?e construct can store, process, and re3represent our meanin+s,streamlinin+, enhancin+, and protectin+ the processes of transformation that are our thin.in+” (155%, 1:$# 6)& For e9ample, the laelin+ of



streamlinin+, enhancin+, and protectin+ the processes of transformation that are our thin.in+ (155%, 1:$ 6)& For e9ample, the laelin+ ofoKects and our use of them as landmar.s reduce the co+nitive load on perception and memory& 4iscussin+ such tools as address oo.s, paperand pens, liraries, noteoo.s, and computers, 4ennett asserts that a “human mind is not only not limited to the rain ut ?ould e ratherseverely disaled if these e9ternal tools ?ere removed” (155%, 1$$)& /s a vivid e9ample of situated co+nition, he points out that old people oftenfunction much etter ?hen they are still in their old home rather than in the ne? and unfamiliar environment of a nursin+ home ecause of the

presence of “ultrafamiliar landmar.s, tri++ers for haits, reminders of ?hat to do, ?here to find the food” and so forth& 4ennett>s conclusion isthat “tQa.in+ them out of their homes is literally separatin+ them from lar+e parts of their minds” (155%, 1:"#:5)& The concept of situatedco+nition is a lot more than the simple acceptance of the fact that ?e use tools& 8t is a reco+nition of the fact that our minds e9tend eyond the oundary of our s.in and encompass the co+nitive tools that ?e use& ltimately, our minds are distriuted co+nitive systems& /t the time of my?ritin+ these ?ords, the computer that 8 am usin+ is as much a part of my mind as the neurons, a9ons, and synapses in my rain& 8n fact, even?hen 8 stop typin+, this @ord document ?ill remain a part of my mind& Considerin+ ho? much effort my mind has put into it, ho? could it not eI

8n alAac>s (u#enie 8randet , the old miser, Bu+enie>s father, is a +ood e9ample of a situated or distriuted co+nitive system& His house, hisestate, his elon+in+s, and his hoard of +old comprise his mind in action& @ithout them, his mind ?ould shrivel to nothin+& 8n a sense, they are

him& There are a numer of different ?ays in ?hich the physically distriuted =uality of fictional minds can e e9pressed in the discourse& Lne isthe mode of free indirect perception& The use of this mode emphasiAes that events in the physical story?orld are aspectual they are e9perienced y characters& o physical events do not e9ist in isolation from characters> perceptions and resultin+ co+nitions, they e9ist in relation to them&/spects of the physical ?orld ecome part of the individual narratives of the characters ?ho are perceivin+ them& The minds of those charactersare e9tended in this ?ay to include ?ithin them the physical phenomena of the story?orld&

31%03

Clar. and Chalmers dra? out an important implication of the concept of situated co+nition& They e9plain that there is a +ro?in+ ody of researchin co+nitive science in ?hich co+nition is “often ta.en to e continuous ?ith processes in the environment& Thus, in seein+ co+nition as e9tended,one is not merely ma.in+ a terminolo+ical decision it ma.es a si+nificant difference to the methodolo+y of scientific investi+ation” (155", 10)&

8n fact, one can ta.e their point further& The decision ?hether to consider the mind as somethin+ that is ounded y the s.in and that ma.es useof tools or ?hether to consider the mind as somethin+ that e9tends eyond the s.in and that includes tools ?ithin its meanin+, is not simply amethodolo+ical choice& 8t determines ?hat is considered as a le+itimate suKect for study& @ithin narrative theory, re+ardin+ fictional minds as

e9tended ma.es a si+nificant difference to the methodolo+y of analysis of novels& 8n particular, it materially affects ?hat is considered as ane9ample of presentation of consciousness& 8 mention in my discussion of the novel +ile 6odies in chapter ; that many of my e9amples of



e9ample of presentation of consciousness& 8 mention in my discussion of the novel +ile 6odies in chapter ; that many of my e9amples of presentations of fictional minds ?ould not e considered as e9amples of fictional thou+ht at all ?ithin the speech cate+ory paradi+m&

8 ?ill no? e concerned ?ith socially rather than physically situated or distriuted thou+ht& This notion is a fundamental element in @ertsch>sconceptual frame?or.& He states, for e9ample, that the terms mind and mental action can e used aout +roups of people as ?ell as individuals

(@ertsch 1551, 1$)& o, it is appropriate to say of +roups of people that they thin. or that they rememer& /s @ertsch puts it, a dyad (that is, t?o people ?or.in+ as a system) can carry out such functions as prolem solvin+ on an intermental plane (1551, !;)& This is intermental thou+ht, asopposed to intramental thou+ht, ?hich is individual thin.in+&

Clar. and Chalmers, for the ul. of their illuminatin+ essay, discuss the physically distriuted co+nition of tools such as computers andnoteoo.s to illustrate their case& Ho?ever, they then as., “@hat aout socially e9tended co+nitionI Could my mental states e partly constituted y the states of other thin.ersI @e see no reason ?hy not, in principle& 8n an unusually interdependent couple, it is entirely possile that one partner>s eliefs ?ill play the same sort of role for the other as a noteoo. plays for a sufferer of memory lossQ” (155", 1;)& ocially e9tendedco+nition seems to me to e a necessary element in the ?ider notion of +enerally e9tended co+nition& 8n fact, 8 ?ould +o further than Clar. andChalmers& They are limitin+ their e9ample to an unusually interdependent couple ecause they are as.in+ ?hether an individual>s mental statescan e

31%13

partly constituted y another>s& Ho?ever, ?e could also as. a much less ri+orous =uestion such as, Can t?o or more minds form a co+nitive unitof ?hatever sort, ho?ever casual and ephemeralI 8f ?e +o do?n that road, then this much more open and inclusive approach ?ill, 8 thin., produce a rich and su++estive ody of evidence& The numerous e9amples of socially e9tended fictional thou+ht from +ile 6odies that arediscussed in chapter ; are simply the start of the research pro+ram&

Jou may rememer that 8 said in chapter $, section 6 that the ?or. done there on states of mind ?ould +ain added si+nificance later ?hen anemphasis on dispositions rather than immediate consciousness ?ould ma.e the idea of the e9tended mind more palatale& Clar. and Chalmers

pursue the role of states of mind in the notion of socially e9tended thou+ht y e9plorin+ the concept of an etended self “4oes the e9tended mindimply an e9tended selfI 8t seems so& Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the oundaries of consciousness my dispositional eliefs,for e9ample, constitute in some deep sense part of ?ho 8 am& 8f so, then these oundaries may also fall eyond the s.in&&&& @e areQ est re+arded

as an e9tended system, a couplin+ of iolo+ical or+anism and e9ternal resources& To consistently resist this conclusion, ?e ?ould have to shrin.the self into a mere undle of occurrent states, severely threatenin+ its deep psycholo+ical continuity” (155", 1")& 8 ta.e the notion of the



, y + p p y + y ( , )e9tended self another sta+e further later in pursin+ the notion of ?hat 8 call situated identity&

@hat Clar. and Chalmers call the etended mind , other theorists call intersub1ectivity, a term that ?as introduced in chapter 1& Trevarthen definesintersuKectivity as “the process in ?hich mental activity#includin+ conscious a?areness, motives and intentions, co+nitions, and emotions#is

transferred et?een minds &&& itQ manifests itself as an immediate sympathetic a?areness of feelin+s and conscious, purposeful intelli+ence inothers&&&& Ln it depends cultural learnin+, and the creation of a >social reality> of conventional eliefs, lan+ua+es, rituals, and technolo+ies” (1555,$16#1%)& For e9ample, perer and Hirschfeld retell Eames @ertsch>s story of ho? his dau+hter had lost her shoes and ho? he helped her torememer ?here she had left them& @ertsch uses the story to as., @ho rememered in this caseI “He didn>t since he had no prior informationaout the shoes> location, nor did his dau+hter since she ?as unale to recall their location ?ithout his intervention” (1555, c99iv)& For the purpose of findin+ the shoes, @ertsch and his dau+hter comprised a sin+le co+nitive unit&

The e9tended mind can usefully e related to the theories e9plored in the previous t?o sections& Jou may rememer that Gy+ots.y and 2uriaar+ue that

31%!3

initially the voluntary act is shared y t?o people as the child first encounters social speech in the form of the command of the adult& Thelan+ua+e of the commands of others then develops into commands to the self, first in e9ternal speech, then in inner speech (2uria 15"!, "5)&Therefore, the directive function in speech develops out of the speech of another the self3commandin+ speech of the child emer+es out of thecommands of the care+iver& This is a particularly si+nificant e9ample of intermental thin.in+ ecause Gy+ots.y and 2uria are ar+uin+ that thevery first e9amples of thou+ht in the child are intermental and not as one mi+ht have e9pected intramental thin.in+& 8t is easy to see ho?Golosinov and a.htin developed their theories of the utterance and dialo+icality from the scientific asis provided y Gy+ots.y and 2uria& Putin a.htinian terms, Gy+ots.y and 2uria>s ar+ument is that in onto+enesis thou+ht arises out of the child>s dialo+ical relationship ?ith itscare+iver& @e need to understand the ?ays in ?hich our .no?led+e and our s.ills are constructed y our dealin+s ?ith others and thetechnolo+ical and cultural ?es in ?hich ?e live, ?or., thin., and communicate& The prolem of unravelin+ ?hat is involved in a child>s

learnin+ to master a culture and the technolo+y it +enerates is concerned ?ith interactions& Throu+h interactin+ ?e learn ho? to do thin+s and ?erealiAe ?hat needs to e done& Lf the various types of representations used in the myriad different prolem3solvin+ e9ercises that ?e have tone+otiate, some are internal and in our heads, some e9ist out in the ?orld, and some are in the heads of others& @hat ?e have to do is to e9plore

the many ?ays in ?hich these three types of information flo?, mer+e, alter, and interact and to e9plore ho? co+nition depends on these variousrelationships& /nd everythin+ that is said here is as true of fictional minds as it is of actual minds&



p y +

B9amples of intermental thin.in+ ?ere contained in the discussions in chapter :, section $ on the consensus and presupposition sufunctions ofthou+ht report& This intermental thin.in+ y +roups is often more po?erful than individual intramental thou+ht& For e9ample, t?o people doin+ across?ord to+ether ?ill, especially if they .no? each other>s minds ?ell, do etter that the sum of their individual, separate efforts& The notion of

intermental thin.in+ is oviously essential to analyses of fictional presentations of close relationships such as friendship, family ties, and,especially, marria+e& These relationships may e re+arded as intermental systems in the sense that the reader may have the e9pectation that thethin.in+ of the characters ?ho ma.e up the relationship ?ill e shared on a re+ular asis, althou+h it is often the role of the narrator to frustratethat e9pectation& 8t could e plausily ar+ued that a lar+e amount of the suKect matter of novels is the formation and rea.do?n of intermental

31%:3

systems& The importance that ?e attach to this aspect of fiction is hauntin+ly and movin+ly conveyed y this description of a marria+e inPynchon>s he Cryin# of 2ot $5 “2i.e all their inailities to communicate, this too had a virtuous motive” (155%, :0)&

The notions of situated co+nition, co+nitive artifacts, and distriuted co+nitive systems contriute sustantially to our a?areness of theimportance of culture in influencin+ the relations et?een individuals and their ?orld& perer and Hirschfeld>s vie? is that co+nition “ta.es place in a social and cultural conte9t& 8t uses tools provided y culture ?ords, concepts, eliefs, oo.s, microscopes, and computers” (1555,c9v)& 8n fact, they +o on to define culture in co+nitive terms& /ccordin+ to ?hat they term an epidemiolo#ical approach to culture, “cultural factsare not mental facts ut distriutions of causally lin.ed mental and pulic facts in a human population& More specifically, chains of interaction# of communication in particular#may distriute similar mental representations and similar pulic productions (such as ehaviors and artefacts)throu+hout a population& Types of mental representations and pulic productions that are stailiAed throu+h such causal chains are, in fact, ?hat?e reco+niAe as cultural” (1555, c99ii)&

Bd?in Hutchins dra?s the same conclusion re+ardin+ culture as the one dra?n earlier re+ardin+ Clar. and Chalmers>s more narro?ly conceivednotion of e9tended co+nition ho? you conceive of an oKect of study determines ?hat you consider as a le+itimate oKect of that study& 8f you

define the study too narro?ly, you may miss important aspects of it& For e9ample, the “ideational definition of culture prevents us from seein+that systems of socially distriuted co+nition may have interestin+ co+nitive properties of their o?n&&&& Qocial or+aniAational factors often produce +roup properties that differ consideraly from the properties of individuals& Clearly, the same sorts of phenomena occur in the co+nitive

domain” (Hutchins 1556, 9iii)& Jou may e thin.in+ that noody ?ould disa+ree ?ith an ac.no?led+ement of the importance of the socialaspects of life& ut there is more to it than that& The temptation is to re+ard the individual aspects as primary and the social as secondary, aleit a



p p + p p y y,vitally important additional element& This chapter is as.in+ ?hether the opposite may e true the social is primary and the individual issecondary& For e9ample, Hutchins emphasiAes that the study of situated or distriuted co+nition is not simply an optional add3on, studied afterthe more central mind ,ithin the s.in has een analyAed& 8n referrin+ to his oo. on a ship>s navi+ational system, ?hich he considers as ane9ample of a socially and physically distriuted co+nitive sys

31%$3

tem, Hutchins hopes to sho? that “human co+nition is not Kust influenced y culture and society, ut & & & is in a very fundamental sense a culturaland social process& To do this 8 ?ill move the oundaries of the co+nitive unit of analysis out eyond the s.in of the individual person and treatthe navi+ation team as a co+nitive and computational system” (1556, 9iv)& (This is another si+htin+, y the ?ay, of the “s.in” trope that ?asillustrated at the e+innin+ of this section&) Clar. and Chalmers reinforce Hutchins>s point “Lnce ?e reco+niAe the crucial role of theenvironment in constrainin+ the evolution and development of co+nition, ?e see that e9tended co+nition is a core co+nitive process, not an add3on e9tra” (155", 1!)& This ar+ument can e related to narrative theory& For e9ample, in ;eterocosmica, 4oleel starts his discussion ofstory?orlds ?ith a chapter on sin+le3person story?orlds efore +oin+ on to consider multiperson story?orlds in a later chapter& 8n the li+ht of theearlier discussion, a su++estion that the order of chapters should have een reversed may seem =uite plausile&

ri Mar+olin has done valuale pioneerin+ ?or. on +roup narratives and he has dra?n attention to a numer of si+nificant aspects of therelationships et?een individuals and cultures& For e9ample, his ?or. on +roups has sho?n ho? misunderstandin+s or radically differentunderstandin+s of the same data y people from different +roups, usually referred to as “culture clash” or “different ?ays of vie?in+ the ?orld, ”can profitaly e redescried in terms of dissonant co+nitive cate+ories and modes of reasonin+& 8t is at this point, in his vie?, that the individualand social dimensions of co+nition e+in to shade into each other& ut it is important not to limit unnecessarily the scope of this insi+ht& 8 amar+uin+ that it is not Kust at the point of culture clash that the individual and social dimensions of co+nition e+in to shade into each other, utthat the shadin+ process e+ins from the very start of our lives and that ?e are to a lar+e e9tent constituted y this process&

@hile criticiAin+ the ne+lect of action y the disciplines of lin+uistics and psycholo+y, @ertsch ar+ues that the role of mediational tools such as

lan+ua+e can only e properly understood if they are considered as part of the concept of action& These tools have no ma+ical po?er in and ofthemselves& There is a ?idespread tendency in several disciplines to focus on lan+ua+e and other si+n systems in isolation from their mediational potential& 8n his vie?, this means that si+n systems have ecome astracted from human action (1551, 115)& 8n order to put fictional action in the

sociocultural settin+ that @ertsch advocates, 8 ?ill summariAe his typolo+y of action and illustrate it ?ith e9amples, all in thou+ht report, from“The History of the -un” y /phra ehn& @ertsch>s



31%63

five types of action (in part derived from the ?or. of EZr+en Haermas) are these

a& eleolo#ical action& / person attains an end or rin+s aout the occurrence of a desired state y choosin+ the means that have the promiseof ein+ successful in a +iven situation and applyin+ them in a suitale manner& The central concept is that of a decision amon+ alternativecourses of action, ased upon an interpretation of the situation, in order to realiAe an end (@ertsch 1551, 5#10)& The teleolo+icalimplications of emedded narratives are e9plored in chapter %, section :& B9ample “8saella &&& thou+ht it time to retrieve the flyin+ lover,and therefore told Datteriena she ?ould the ne9t day entertain at the lo? +ate, as she ?as ?ont to do” (155$, 1%!)&

& Dramatur#ical action& / person evo.es in their pulic audience a certain ima+e or impression of themselves y purposefully disclosin+their suKectivity& Bach a+ent can monitor pulic access to the system of their o?n intentions, thou+hts, attitudes, desires, feelin+s, and soon& Thus, the presentation of the self does not si+nify spontaneous, e9pressive ehavior, it styliAes the e9pression of their e9perience ?itha vie? to the audience& / person typically carries out this impression mana+ement ?ith strate+ic +oals#as in type a#in mind (@ertsch1551, 10)& / character>s mana+ement of other characters> impressions of them is an important element in the ?ay in ?hich his or her mind?or.s in action& 8mpression mana+ement is one of the points at ?hich different characters> emedded narratives enmesh those of the

mana+er and those of the mana+ed& 8t is possile to see this type, alon+ ?ith the others, as specific aspects of type a, in that they are allmeans to attain an end& B9ample “Jet still she dissemled ?ith a force eyond ?hat the most cunnin+ practitioner could have sho?n, andcarried herself efore people as if no pressures had lain upon her heart” (155$, 1%1)&

c& Normatively re#ulated action& This refers not, as a and do, to the ehavior of solitary individuals, ut to memers of a social +roup ?hoorient their action to common values or the norms that otain ?ithin a social +roup& The individual may comply ?ith or may violate a particular norm or +eneraliAed e9pectation of ehavior (@ertsch 1551, 11)& This is a very clear statement of the social situatedness ofaction, and it is also a very precise statement of the plots of a lar+e numer of novels in ?hich prota+onists initially comply ?ith and thenviolate the social norms of the story?orld& B9ample “The rest of the nuns e+an to as. Henault of ne?s &&& and he, & & & to conceal the present affair, endeavoured to assume all the +aiety he could” (155$, 1%6)&

31%%3d& Communicative action& This is the interaction of at least t?o persons& The actors see. to reach an understandin+ aout the present

situation and future plans in order to coordinate their actions y ?ay of a+reement (@ertsch 1551, 11, follo?in+ Haermas 15"$, "%)&This is a restatement ?ithin a different conte9t of the notion of intermental thin.in+& 8t is si+nificant that there is very little difference in



practice et?een the t?o terms intermental action and intermental thin9in# & B9ample “they oth resolved to +et up ?hat ?as possile fortheir support” (155$, 1%5)&

e& Mediated action& This type can e seen as a more sophisticated restatement of type a& 2i.e type a it is +oal3directed, ut it does not assumethat the appropriate focus of analysis is the solitary individual or that there is a neat separation et?een means and ends& 8t ta.es account

of the fact that human action typically employs mediational means such as tools and lan+ua+e that shape the action in essential ?ays(@ertsch 1551, 1!)& Characters ma.e use of a ?ide ran+e of mediational tools in effectin+ their actions, one of ?hich is the use of the toolof inner speech in mental action& B9ample “This ?as the deate& he rin+s reason on oth sides a+ainst the first, she sets the shame of aviolated vo?” (155$, 1%%)&

8t is noticeale that most of these e9amples can e used to illustrate more than one type of action& This su++ests that, althou+h @ertsch refers tothem as alternative types of action, it may e more accurate to descrie them as, potentially, different perspectives on the same action& @ertschrelates all of them to situated and intermental thin.in+ y pointin+ out that oth individual actions and the actions of small +roups arecomponents in the life, not Kust of that individual or +roup, ut also of the ?hole social system& 8ntermental actions and the social interactions thatma.e them possile are defined and structured y the roader social and cultural system (@ertsch 1551, $;)& 8n the same ?ay, the actions offictional individuals and +roups can only e understood y reference to the ?hole social and cultural system that comprises the story?orld of the

novel&

Gan 4iK. has supplied a philosophical perspective on this issue& He refers to communicative or intermental action as interactions et?een severala+ents that include all forms of cooperative social ehavior such as the use of lan+ua+e (15;%, !5%)& The simplest e9amples are those cases ?heret?o a+ents to+ether accomplish the same action ?hile havin+ the same intention& More comple9 are the cases ?here the intended actions are thesame ut ?here the purpose is different, and so the action is done for different reasons& /lternatively, the

31%;3

purposes may coincide, ut the actions are different& For e9ample, the Koint action may e preparin+ dinner, ut each a+ent fulfils different tas.s

?ithin the overall action& ome actions can e carried out y either one or more a+ents, ?hile others, such as marryin+ or fi+htin+, must have atleast t?o a+ents (van 4iK. 15;%, !5")& Fictional actions can e analyAed in the same ?ay& 8nteraction is oviously relevant to the construction of

plot in narrative fiction& @hen characters underta.e Koint actions, their emedded narratives overlap durin+ the e9tent of their Koint purpose efore diver+in+ a+ain&



8 ?ill conclude this section y introducin+ the concept of situated identity& 8n the thriller 8iotto>s ;and y 8ain Pears, the narrator tells us of theherodetective “For the last ten days, it seemed, everyody he>d met had een tellin+ him to ma.e up his mind& He>d never really thou+ht ofhimself as ein+ so feele, ut maKority opinion seemed a+ainst him” (!000, !6;)& o, ?hich is itI 8s he as decisive as he thin.s, or is he as

indecisive as everyone else seems to thin.I @hich is more reliale, his o?n first3person ascription of the attriute of decisiveness or the third3 person ascription to him of indecisivenessI /n aspect of his identity is under consideration, ut ho? is it to e determinedI @here is his identitysituated, in his o?n vie?s aout himself or in the vie?s of othersI

o far in this section 8 have discussed the ideas of real3mind theorists on mediational tools, physically distriuted co+nition, socially situatedthou+ht, intermental thin.in+, and situated action& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to end y ma.in+ a very stron+ claim derived from these conceptualtools that 8 shall call situated identity& This idea ?ill underpin much of the discussion in the ne9t t?o chapters& 8f you ?ant to find out aout anaspect of someone>s mind, say ?hether or not they are selfish, ?ho do you as.I Certainly not Kust them, ecause you .no? that you cannot esure that you ?ill +et a complete ans?er& elfish people are not li.ely to admit to ein+ selfish& /lso, unselfish people may e so laceratin+lyself3critical that they mi+ht admit to ein+ selfish ?hen everyone else ?ould disa+ree& (There seems to e a .ind of eni+n Cretan liar type of parado9 at ?or. there&) @e are all reluctant to ta.e someody>s ?ord for the ?or.in+s of their o?n mind, and this seems to me to e a tacit

admission that there is a stron+ sense in ?hich our mind is distriuted amon+ those other people ?ho have an ima+e of us in their minds& Ho?else can ?e say that someone is selfish ?hen there is no representation of selfishness in their mindI This ima+e is in the minds of others, ut ?eare attriutin+ it to this particular mind& urely then, our identity is distriuted amon+ the minds of others& The concept of situated identity is alsoclearly related to the =uestion of action& 8n a sense ?e are not so much ?hat ?e say ?e are, ut ?hat ?e do& /ction is

31%"3

pulic and so is a fairly reliale, thou+h not infallile, asis on ?hich other individuals can Kud+e the ?or.in+s of our minds& (Lf course, there isstill room for a +ood deal of dout an apparently hostile act mi+ht result from hostility ut mi+ht also e a result of shyness&) 4urin+ the ul. of8reat (pectations, Pip is noticealy lac.in+ in self3a?areness& Lnly a small part of his ?hole identity is contained ?ithin the ?or.in+s of his

o?n mind& His identity is distriuted amon+ all the various Pips that e9ist in the minds of iddy, Eoe, Bstella, Miss Havisham, and so on and thatare ased on their Kud+ments of his actions&

Conclusion



8 ?ould as. you no?, havin+ read this chapter and the previous one, to flic. ac. to chapter : for a moment& 8f the deates descried there do notno? seem a lon+ ?ay a?ay, and rather eside the point, then these t?o chapters ?ill have failed in their purpose& /ll that 8 have read in the real3mind discourses of philosophy, psycholo+y, psycholin+uistics, and co+nitive science has convinced me that ?e can come to a fuller and deeperunderstandin+ of the construction of fictional minds only y ma.in+ e9tensive use of them& Clifford ReertA stresses that thin.in+ is “primarily an

overt act conducted in terms of the oKective materials of the common culture, and only secondarily a private matter& 8n the sense oth ofdirective reasonin+ and the formulation of sentiment, as ?ell as the inte+ration of these into motives, man>s mental processes indeed ta.e place atthe scholar>s des. or the footall field, in the studio or lorry3driver>s seat” (155:, ":)& -o? that chapters $ and 6 have placed fictional thin.in+ atthe scholar>s des., the footall field, in the studio, and lorry driver>s seat, the ne9t t?o chapters ?ill consider in more detail the precise means y?hich ?e can study this thin.in+&

31%53

/

#he *ictional ,ind

%. Summary

/s 8 e9plained at the e+innin+, chapters ! and : oth focused on e9istin+ narratolo+ical approaches to?ard fictional minds& Chapters $ and 6considered the implications of real3mind discourses for fictional minds and laid the theoretical asis for a ne? approach for this area of narrativetheory& This chapter and the ne9t chapter ?ill no? outline the ne? approach& This one ?ill descrie it in +eneral terms y, in part, recapitulatin+some of the findin+s of the previous four chapters, and chapter ; ?ill develop it further in three specific directions& -e9t thou+h, it may e a +oodidea at this pivotal point in the oo. to see some of the ideas discussed so far in action& 8 ?ill analyAe t?o very small pieces of narrative discoursein order to summariAe the current position&The first passa+e is from (mma the narrator is descriin+ Bmma>s feelin+s aout Fran. Churchilla& -ot that Bmma ?as +ay and thou+htless from any real felicity it ?as rather ecause she felt less happy than she had e9pected& & he lau+hedc& ecause she ?as disappointedd& and thou+h she li.ed him for his attentions, and thou+ht them all, ?hether in friendship, admiration, or playfulness, e9tremely Kudicious,

they ?ere not ?innin+ ac. her heart&e& he still intended him for her friend (155%, :0$)&



of direct thou+ht and free indirect thou+ht& For e9ample, dispositions are most easily presented in thou+ht report&

! h i f h h f d l l i f id i f f i d h i l 9 f



!& he passa#es consist of thou#ht report of a dense: comple layerin# of a ,ide variety of states of mind that comprise a causal net,or9 of

reasons and motives for actions&

oth e9tracts illustrate the purposive, re+ulative role of mental functionin+ in plannin+, directin+, and monitorin+ our actions and contain the

e9pressions of short3 and lon+3term intentions, plans, +oals, motives, and reasons for action& lifil is e9ercisin+ his mind on plannin+ ?hat to do?ith /ll?orthy>s fortune& Bmma>s mental functionin+ relates more to the mana+ement of her relationships ?ith others& The narrator of (mma

presents the causal net?or. of reasons and motives ehind this mana+ement ?ith +reat s.ill and sensitivity& 8 ?ill analyAe this presentation of thecausal net?or. in some detail no? ecause it is an e9ample of the .ind of standard thou+ht report of states of mind that has een ne+lected ynarratolo+y ut that contains a +ood deal of information aout fictional mental functionin+& This information ecomes clearly visile ?ithin the paradi+m that 8 am advocatin+& The follo?in+ discussion refers to the passa+e from Bmma&

8n part a, in Kust t?enty3three ?ords, the narrator refers to four states of mind +ay and thou+htless felicity ein+ less happy and an e9pectationof happiness& The t?o present states (+ay and thou+htless, and ein+ less happy) are compared to the t?o others& Lne of these is counterfactual(felicity), and the other refers to the past (e9pectation of happiness)& The fact that she is +ay and thou+htless is +iven a counterfactual or ne+ativee9planation as it is not due to the non3e9istent state of felicity& Then, the de+ree of her current state of happiness is defined y reference to the

past as it is less than her e9pectation had een& 8n addition, a causal relationship is estalished et?een the t?o present states& he is +ay andthou+htless ecause her current level of happiness is less than she had, in the past, e9pected& Ln the face of it, this is a parado9, althou+h themeanin+ emer+es in part d&

The name indicative description may e +iven to descriptions of actions that appear to indicate an accompanyin+ state of mind& This term ise9plained further in chapter ;, section !& “he lau+hed” () is indicative description ecause it relates to ehavior, lau+hter, that +enerallyindicates an amused state of mind& Ho?ever, it is an important function of the device of indicative description that it can e an inaccurateindicator of actual states of mind& The lau+hter may result from a itter or sardonic state of mind& 8n this case, the lau+hter

31;!3

is =uite comple9& 8t appears to e real lau+hter ut ?ith an amivalent, rather itters?eet =uality that suits the parado9ical nature of her thou+ht processes&

The state of mind in part c, disappointment a+ain has a causal function it is +iven as a reason or e9planation for the action of lau+hin+ and isanother apparent parado9& The use of the feelin+ of disappointment here reinforces the issue of the inaccurate e9pectations that ?ere descried in

t



part a&

8t is possile to identify si9 more e9plicit states of mind in the t?enty3seven ?ords in part d, to+ether ?ith one implicit state, ma.in+ a total oft?elve in t?o short sentences& The e9plicit states are li.in+ for Churchill +enerally in particular, li.in+ for his friendship for his admiration or

for his playfulness elief that his ehavior is Kudicious and the feelin+ or elief that her heart is not ein+ ?on ac.& The state of mind that isimplied y all of these, ut not e9plicitly stated, is the feelin+ of relief that her heart is not ein+ ?on ac.& The causal relationships et?eenthese states are comple9& The li.in+ for him is caused y the elief in the Kudiciousness of his ehavior& This pair of states is in turn caused y thethree possile or hypothetical e9planations for his ehavior admiration, feelin+ of friendship, and feelin+ of playfulness& (Lf course, Bmma ismista.en, and the primary motive for his ehavior is the desire to create a smo.escreen that ?ill conceal his secret en+a+ement to Eane Fairfa9&)Ho?ever, the use of the ?ord “thou+h” alances all of these states a+ainst the elief that her heart is not ein+ ?on ac.& This is the e9planationfor the disappointed e9pectations conveyed y parts a, , and c& Finally, the state of relief (that her heart is not ein+ ?on ac.) that is implied ythe ?hole sentence is the elated e9planation for the t?o apparent parado9es&

Part e is the statement of an intention to act in a particular ?ay to?ard Churchill in the future& The function of the previous t?o sentences has een to present the causal net?or. of states of mind that e9plains this intention&

:& he narrators refer to 6lifil>s and (mma>s actions and behavior as ,ell as to their consciousness&

The description of Bmma>s mind includes action (lau+hter), ehavior (?hich is +ay and thou+htless), and an intention to act (that is, to treatChurchill as a friend)& The acts that lifil performs to further his interests are .ey in+redients in his narrative& 8n fact, the =uoted passa+e is ineffect a list of actions and intentions to act, for e9ample, calculations of the siAe of the fortune, intentions to alter the house, and proKections formany other schemes& The relationship et?een action and consciousness is e9plored y the philosophy of action, ?hich is concerned ?ith thedifference et?een, on the one hand, ?illed actions and, on the other hand, mere doin+s, happenin+s, and events& 8t analyAes the mechanism

31;:3

of action the intricate relationships et?een the various mental operations such as intentions, purposes, motives, and +oals and the resultin+ physical ehavior& 8t follo?s from such a perspective that narratolo+ical e9aminations of fictional action need not involve Kust the study of

physical actions on the story level, it should also entail the systematic analysis of presentations of mental action in the discourse& The psycholo+ist Eon Blster discusses the role of the emotions in mental functionin+ and, specifically, ?hether or not emotions such as an+er can

l d d “ ti t d i ” (1555 %0 %1 !"1 ":) B > id d lifil> i i ht l f h ti



properly e re+arded as “action tendencies” (1555, %0#%1, !"1#":)& Bmma>s pride and lifil>s avarice mi+ht e e9amples of such actiontendencies& 8rrespective of the outcome of the deate on real minds, this notion is one of the ?ays in ?hich te9ts can e interro+ated to find outho? narrators and readers lin. to+ether presentations of immediate mental events such as e9plicitly laeled or implicitly su++ested emotions,dispositions, and descriptions of physical ehavior into causal chains y means of such concepts as motives, intentions, and reasons for action&

$& oth passa+es are clear e9amples of the socially situated and dialo+ic nature of consciousness&

Bmma>s and lifil>s thou+hts are inescapaly part of their social conte9t& 8n particular, the t?o minds are seen as active, social, and pulicdialo+ues ?ith others& lifil>s plans for the future include anticipations of, and therefore calculations aout, the minds of others and are aoutsuch social issues as class and money& Bmma>s dialo+ue is discussed later& Mi.hail a.htin e9plored ?ith +reat sensitivity the inherently dialo+icnature of the inner utterance& He sho?ed that our thou+ht consists to a +reat e9tent of responses to and anticipations of the thou+ht of others& 8t isconditioned y the culture in ?hich ?e live and is, therefore, in an important sense, a social and pulic dialo+ue ?ith others& His theories of thesocial nature of consciousness reveal that there are ?ays in ?hich inner speech is not really inner at all& 8t is a voice that is part of the continuin+dialo+ue that ?e have ?ith other individuals in the culture ?ithin ?hich ?e live& Lur thou+ht is in many ?ays social, pulic, overt, andoservale& / postclassical perspective on the construction of fictional minds should e concerned ?ith this comple9 relationship et?een the

inaccessiility to others of a character>s thou+ht and the e9tent to ?hich the same thou+ht is pulicly availale to others in the story?orld&

This relationship is very clearly sho?n ?hen a character is anticipatin+, speculatin+ on, reconstructin+, misunderstandin+, evaluatin+, reactin+ to,and actin+ upon the thou+ht of another& Bmma>s thou+hts are in a fundamentally misconceived dialo+ue ?ith ?hat she ima+ines to e Churchill>sthou+hts& /s

31;$3

Proust>s narrator remar.s, “our social personality is a creation of the thou+hts of other people” (155%, !0)& Bmma, ?ith Churchill>s assistance, hascreated a social personality for him that e9ists in a comple9 and interestin+ relationship ?ith the rest of his mind& For e9ample, he enKoys the+ame playin+ and the dissemlin+ that is involved in his flirtation ?ith Bmma& To e+in the process of considerin+ Churchill>s ehavior in termsof the concept of mediated action, his “attentions” can e re?ardin+ly analyAed in terms of @ertsch>s five types of socially situated action (1551,5#1!)& His action is teleolo+ical in that it is +eared to the realiAation of a desired end it is dramatur+ical ecause it involves impression

mana+ement of an audience it is normatively re+ulated as it ?or.s ?ithin the social and moral norms that otain ?ithin the social +roup it iscommunicative as Churchill is tryin+ to +ive Bmma a misleadin+ perception of his situation and, finally, it is mediated ecause the ends referredto earlier are mediated throu+h his use of the tools of lan+ua+e and ehavior



to earlier are mediated throu+h his use of the tools of lan+ua+e and ehavior&

2. #he ContinuingConsciousness *rame

8n chapter !, section $ 8 discussed the relationship et?een co+nitive science and narrative theory& My purpose ?as to uild on the lar+e amountof hi+hly ori+inal and thou+ht3provo.in+ ?or. that has een done recently on the application of co+nitive science techni=ues to a ?ide ran+e ofissues relatin+ to narrative comprehension& 8 am thin.in+ particularly of such scholars as 4avid Herman (155;, !00!, !00:), Manfred Eahn(155;, 1555a), Mar. Turner (1551), Rilles Fauconnier (155;), Moni.a Fluderni. (155%), and Catherine Bmmott (155;)& This section ?ill attemptto relate some co+nitive science notions to the specific area of reader comprehension of fictional minds& This is a companion section to thefollo?in+ one on emedded narratives& Here 8 am ar+uin+ that ?e are ale to read a character>s mind as an emedded narrative y applyin+ ?hat8 call the continuin#$consciousness frame&

Co+nitive science can e applied to the construction of fictional minds y helpin+ narrative theory to analyAe the cues that enale readers tocreate the effect of characters> mental functionin+& *eaders use a ?ide ran+e of co+nitive frames and scripts in order to interpret te9ts&pecifically, the emedded narrative approach can plausily e restated in terms of recent applications of frame theory to narrative ecause a .ey

frame is the ascription of consciousness to narrative a+ents& The reader uses e9istin+ or prestored .no?led+e of other minds in the actual ?orld inorder to process the emer+ent .no?led+e that is supplied y fictional3mind presentations& The ?or. that ?e put into constructin+ other real minds prepares us as readers for the ?or. of constructin+ fictional

31;63

minds& ecause fictional ein+s are necessarily incomplete, frames, scripts, and preference rules are re=uired to supply the defaults that fill the+aps in the story?orld and provide the presuppositions that enale the reader to construct continually conscious minds from the te9t& Fore9ample, Herman has su++ested that “current research indicates that ?e ?ould do ?ell to as., not Kust aout story structure as such, ut aout the patterned, nonrandom ?ays in ?hich readers and listeners tend to impute structure to certain strin+s of events presented in discourse” (1555a, ")&The processin+ strate+ies that are used y readers to infer characters> inner lives are a central ?ay in ?hich structure is imputed to strin+s ofevents& The reader collects to+ether all of the isolated references to a specific proper name in a particular te9t and constructs a consciousness thatcontinues in the spaces et?een the various mentions of that character& The reader strate+y is to Koin up the dots& /s readers ?e stron+ly prefer to

read a te9t for ma9imum co+nitive payoff& @e al?ays try to +et as much information as ?e can from a te9t& This much is ?ell .no?n& ut, in particular, the readin+ process is very creative in constructin+ coherent and continuous fictional consciousnesses from ?hat is often a areminimum of information @e fre=uently finish novels ?ith a stron+ sense of the individual personality of a particular character Ho?ever if ?e



minimum of information& @e fre=uently finish novels ?ith a stron+ sense of the individual personality of a particular character& Ho?ever, if ?e?ere to ta.e the troule to count up the specific references to that character in the te9t, ?e mi+ht e surprised at ho? little there is in the te9t on?hich ?e have ased our vivid impressions& o the =uestion is, Ho? can ?e tal. more informatively aout this process of the reader brin#in#

somethin# to the novelI

The processin+ of fictional minds, and in particular the applications of the various frames and suframes relatin+ to thou+ht, action, conte9t,causation, and so on are idirectional and interactive in that the information flo?s are oth top3up and ottom3do?n& / character frame isestalished on meetin+ them or hearin+ of them for the first time (this is top3do?n)& 8t is then fed y specific information aout the characterfrom the te9t (this is ottom3up)& The reader then sets up some initial hypotheses (top3do?n) that are modified y further information (ottom3up) and so further refined and so on& Minds are mapped from the source domain (the real mind of the reader and in particular their .no?led+e ofother minds) to the tar+et domain of the story?orld ?ithin ?hich the reader perceives the fictional minds to function&

/n e9ample that is used y the co+nitive scientists *o+er chan. and *oert /elson illustrates very clearly ho? the applications of thecontinuin+consciousness frame ?or.s& They maintain in Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin# (15;;) that there has een “increasin+reco+nition that conte9t is of over?helmin+ importance in the interpretation of te9t& 8mplicit real3?orld

31;%3

.no?led+e is very often applied y the understander, and this .no?led+e can e very hi+hly structured& The appropriate in+redients fore9tractin+ the meanin+ of a sentence, therefore, are often no?here to e found ?ithin the sentence” (15;;, 5)& They then illustrate this point ?iththe follo?in+ e9ample “The policeman held up his hand and stopped the car&” Their conclusion is that “sQomeho? in understandin+ thissentence ?e effortlessly create a driver ?ho steps on a ra.e in response to seein+ the policeman>s hand& -one of the intermediate lin.s arementioned in theQ sentence” (15;;, 5)&

Ho?ever, it seems to me that ?e can +o further than chan. and /elson do in revealin+ the asis of our understandin+ of the sentence, ?hich isthat the reader has to use the availale information to try to create the consciousnesses of oth the policeman and the driver& This inferential process mi+ht perhaps proceed alon+ the follo?in+ lines the policeman perceived the car the policeman came to the elief that he should stopthe car the policeman decided to stop the car the policeman then undertoo. the action of holdin+ up his hand the driver perceived the

policeman holdin+ up his hand the driver understood the meanin+ of this si+n the driver came to the elief that he should comply ?ith the si+nthe driver decided to put on the ra.es and the driver then undertoo. the action of puttin+ on the ra.es& omeho?, to e9tend chan.>s and/elson>s conclusion in understandin+ this sentence ?e effortlessly create the supposed mental functionin+ of the policeman and the driver



/elson s conclusion, in understandin+ this sentence, ?e effortlessly create the supposed mental functionin+ of the policeman and the driver&Comprehension is simply not possile unless ?e have availale to us hypothetical versions of the minds of the actors that appear to account forthe events descried& (@e may e ?ron+ of course, ut that is another issue&) @e do not Kust create the driver, ?e create the driver>s mind and the policeman>s mind& -arrative is in essence the presentation of fictional mental functionin+&

Lf course, it is not necessary to ma.e these steps e9plicit in such laorious detail durin+ actual readin+ conditions& ecause the process is usuallyautomatic, as chan. and /elson say, frames and scripts “let you leave out the orin+ details ?hen you are tal.in+ or ?ritin+, and fill them in?hen you are listenin+ or readin+” (15;;, $1)& The tas. of the analyst ?ho ?ishes to add ac. in the orin+ details is to “rea. do?n a sentenceinto its minimal meanin+ units” (15;;, 1%)& 8n chapter ; 8 ?ill e attemptin+ to rea. do?n a numer of the sentences in +ile 6odies into some ofthe minimal meanin+ units that relate to the maintenance of characters> consciousnesses& 8 ?ill e9plain this process, ?hich 8 refer to as decodin#

action statements into consciousness statements, more fully then& chan. and /elson e9plain that their approach “is oriented to?ards handlin+actions y +oal3oriented humans& Prolems in representin+

31;;3

inner affective life &&& are issues still to e dealt ?ith as ?ell& @e are not ready to handle novels, in other ?ords” (15;;, 1%;#%")& 8 elieve thatthere are ?ays of rid+in+ the +ap et?een the t?o discourses of co+nitive science and narrative fiction and that if not co+nitive scientists, thenat the very least narratolo+ists usin+ the techni=ues of co+nitive science, are ready to handle novels& Ho?ever, if co+nitive science terminolo+y isto e inte+rated successfully into narrative theory, it ?ill e necessary first to deepen and enlar+e our understandin+ of the central role thatfictional minds play in the functionin+ of narrative& Manfred Eahn (155;) successfully inte+rates the co+nitive science terminolo+y of frames andslots into FranA tanAel>s three narrative situations (15"$), ut the other frames that can e applied durin+ the readin+ process should not efor+otten&

/s the policeman e9ample sho?ed, the attempt to isolate the asic elements of fictional3mind construction is similar to the need to ma.e ase9plicit as possile every step of an artificial intelli+ence (/8) pro+ram& Computers are completely literal machines that do only ?hat they aree9plicitly as.ed to do and are not ale to use any initiative& 8f there is a +ap, they do not fill it& This is ?hy /8 pro+rams loo. so odd to readers?ho use a +ood deal of initiative and creativity in Koinin+ up the dots ?ithout conscious thou+ht& The decodin+ of action statements intoconsciousness statements is almost li.e ?ritin+ an /8 pro+ram on ho? to read a narrative& @hen all the immensely sophisticated ?or. that the

reader does in constructin+ mental processes from surface descriptions is made as e9plicit as possile, the results necessarily loo. very stran+e&/s teven Pin.er remar.s, “rQoot desi+n is a .ind of consciousness3raisin+& @e tend to e lasO aout our mental lives” (155;, 1")& To the realreader the implied reader and the model reader should no? perhaps e added “the root reader”



reader, the implied reader, and the model reader should no? perhaps e added the root reader

The continuin+3consciousness frame that is re=uired for constructin+ fictional minds from narrative is interestin+ly similar to 4aniel 4ennett>sconcept of the intentional stance, ?hich he claims is re=uired for the construction of real minds and ?hich he defines as “the strate+y of

interpretin+ the ehavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, ?hatever) y treatin+ it as if it ?ere a rational a+ent ?ho +overned its >choice> of>action> y a >consideration> of its >eliefs> and >desires&> &&& The intentional stance is the attitude or perspective ?e routinely adopt to?ards oneanother” (155%, !;)& The ?or.in+ hypothesis that visily coherent ehavior is caused y a directin+ consciousness in the actual ?orld is used ye9tension in the application of the continuin+3consciousness frame to the story?orld& oth are a ?ay of relatin+ the present event or action to past re+ularities and patterns of events and to e9pectations re+ardin+ future patterns&

Much has een ?ritten aout the influence of past and future on the present

31;"3

?or.in+s of real minds& Eohn McCrone discusses the point that, “ein+ dynamic, the rain could rin+ the full ?ei+ht of a lifetime>s e9perience to

ear on each moment as it ?as ein+ lived” (1555, !%")& The past is rou+ht to ear on the present in order to produce the future& /s 8 saidearlier, 4aniel 4ennett points out that the tas. of a mind is to “produce future&” This line of thou+ht rin+s us a+ain to a functional perspective on+oal3directed action& The psycholo+ist Philip Eohnson32aird “has ar+ued that the plannin+ and control of intentional action re=uires a self modelthat e9plicitly represents one>s +oals, ailities, options, and current state” (van Rulic. 1555, ;:%)& 8t is si+nificant that chan. and /elson in a rief di+ression on fictional minds continue the functional approach to?ard +oal3oriented activity that is characteristic of their approach to realminds& They oserve that “in stories ?ith a lot of conte9tual information aout the main character &&& there are many e9pectations aout li.elyevents thatQ are ased on detailed .no?led+e of the +enesis and nature of particular +oals” (15;;, 10!)& chan. and /elson also refer to the“personal scripts” (15;;, %!) of the actors in a narrative, and it is these scripts that determine ?hich aspects of the story?orld are perceived ythose actors& Jet another perspective on this past3present3future relationship is provided y the homeostasis7homeodynamics distinction that isused in neuroscience& Homeostasis descries those aspects of the rain that maintain it in a steady state and ensure continuity et?een the past, present, and future& ;omeodynamics descries those aspects of the rain that allo? it to cope ?ith chan+e& The reader understands fictionalminds as containin+ oth homeostatic and homeodynamic features that allo? the minds to maintain stasis and cope ?ith chan+es to theenvironment& Cues re+ardin+ these features are also important for readers ?hen follo?in+ the chan+es and also the re+ularities and uniformities

in characters> emedded narratives& /s ?ith 4amasio>s notions of the core self and the autoio+raphical self (chapter $, section 6), charactershave to remain stale entities (apart from perhaps certain fantasy, science fiction, and postmodern narratives), ut they also have to chan+e inorder to stay interestin+



order to stay interestin+&

The remainder of this section reflects the fact that a numer of narrative theorists have referred to aspects of the continuin+3consciousness framefrom ?ithin their o?n theoretical frame?or.s& Paul *icoeur remar.ed that narrative is “the operation that dra?s a confi+uration out of a simple

succession” (15"$, %6)& @hat 8 am considerin+ are ideas that su++est that the .ey to the resultin+ confi+uration is the continuin+ consciousnessesof the characters in the narrative& /s 8 have said, Moni.a Fluderni. puts e9perientiality at the center of the perspective on narrative that shedescries in o,ards a Natural4 Narratolo#y&

31;53

/lso, Mie.e al e9plains the difference et?een the t?o editions of her oo. Narratolo#y (15"6, 155;) in terms of a ne? and +ro?in+ emphasison suKectivity “This attention paid to suKectivity is, indeed, the asic tenet of the theory presented in this oo.” (155;, 11)& B& M& Forster dre?a famous distinction in Aspects of the Novel et?een a story and a plot& Forster>s terminolo+y is no? rather confusin+, and his point is perhaps est stated in *icoeur>s terms as the distinction et?een a succession of events (Forster>s “story”) and a narrative (Forster>s “plot”)& Forster statedthat he “defined a story as a narrative of events arran+ed in their time se=uence& / plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis fallin+ on

causality& >The .in+ died and then the =ueen died> is a story& >The .in+ died and then the =ueen died of +rief> is a plot& The time se=uence is preserved, ut the sense of causality overshado?s it” (!000, ";)& Forster relates the issue of causality very clearly to the presentation ofcharacters> minds& The cause of the second event, the =ueen>s death, is a state of mind the =ueen>s +rief& The ar+ument of this oo. is that the paradi+ms for the causal lin.s that create a narrative are events and states in characters> minds& Ho?ever, it is possile that Forster overestimatesthe importance of the e9plicit reference to the Wueen>s state of consciousness& The difference et?een the e9plicit “of +rief” version and theimplicit non3specific version is perhaps not as +reat as Forster appears to su++est& 8 am sure that most readers, if +iven the “story” version, ?ould provide the appropriate fictional3mind construction for themselves and turn it into a “plot&” They ?ould assume that the Wueen had died of +rief ecause the Din+ had died& This is precisely the sort of +ap that readers are adept at fillin+&

*uth *onen, Catherine Bmmott, Mena.em Perry, and, of course, Marie2aure *yan are amon+ the narrative theorists ?ho have addedsustantially to our .no?led+e of ho? readers create story?orlds +enerally and also the characters that inhait them& @ith re+ard to the physicalaspects of story?orlds, *onen mentions as e9amples of the uses made y readers of asic real3?orld .no?led+e the fact that ?e .no? ?ithouthavin+ to e told e9plicitly y the te9t that the la?n on ?hich Mrs& *amsay sits in o the "i#hthouse is outside the house and not inside it and



the reader can plausily interpret the character>s suse=uent ehavior& This process is understood etter ?hen ?e ma.e e9plicit the centrality offictional minds&



31"13

8n tryin+ to follo? characters> mental functionin+, readers must ma.e a series of inferences& /s Mena.em Perry points out, most of the

information that a reader derives from the te9t is “not e9plicitly ?ritten in it rather it is the reader himself ?ho supplies it y the mere fact ofchoosin+ frames& This is not limited merely to sutle information such as comple9 causal connections or the secret motives of characters, utinvolves even elementary components of the >reality> to ?hich the te9t refers&&&& Most of ?hat the reader infers from the te9t, it ?ill e discovered,is the reader>s o?n +ap3fillin+” (15;5, $6)& He also stresses that this is a continuous and evolvin+ process “The reader of a te9t does not ?aituntil the end efore e+innin+ to understand it, efore emar.in+ upon its semantic inte+ration&&&& Lf course, inferences in the initial sta+es arenecessarily tentative” (15;5, $%)& @hat *onen, Bmmott, and Perry have in common is a desire to stress that the impressive story?orld3creatin+ailities of readers are not limited to sophisticated and sutle understandin+s of the deep meanin+s of te9ts ut are concerned ?ith apparently asic and simple3soundin+ issues such as .no?in+ that la?ns occur outside houses& This is ?hat Perry refers to as “elementary components” ofthe actual ?orld& This understandin+ of the importance of readers> co+nitive s.ills in ein+ ale to understand te9ts on even the most elementarylevel mar.s a hu+e advance in our .no?led+e of narrative comprehension& Ho?ever, there is the dan+er that theorists, in order to stress thema+nitude of the tas. facin+ the reader in comprehendin+ a te9t, may tend to emphasiAe the more oviously elementary components of reality at

the e9pense of issues such as comple9 causal connections and secret motivations& Jet, comple9 causal motivations and secret motivations arealso elementary components of story?orlds& For e9ample, Perry is concerned ?ith the hypotheses and frames ?ith ?hich the reader constructsthe story?orld of @illiam Faul.ner>s short story “/ *ose for Bmily&” ut ?hat Perry does not ma.e e9plicit is that the hypotheses and framesthat he descries nearly all relate to fictional mental functionin+ in +eneral and to the construction of Bmily>s mind in particular (15;5, :61#6$)&

8n her article, “The Modal tructure of -arrative niverses” (15"6), Marie2aure *yan descries “an >al+orithm> for the co+nitive processin+ ofnarrative discourse” (15"6, ;60#61) in this ?ay “/ pro+ram ?ith this aility to form hypotheses, chain events ac.?ards, reconstrue +ame3 plans, and revise its representation of past states or events ?ould fulfill one of the most amitious proKects of te9tual semiotics it ?ould capture #as tanley Fish & & & puts it# >the temporal flo? of the readin+ process> and the >successive responses of the reader> as he +oes throu+h the te9t”(15"6, ;6:#6$)& @hat is of particular interest

31"!3

here is her use of the term #ame$plans& This is an e9plicit reco+nition that co+nitive frames are crucially related to the mental functionin+ ofcharacters their +oals, desires, plans for achievin+ them, and so on& The psycholo+ist /lan Par.in points out that the reader has a +oal ?henaddressin+ a te9t to achieve a representation of the te9t that is coherent at oth the local and +loal level, at the level of oth microstructure and



+ p + ,macrostructure (!000, !$0)& 8t is the representations y readers of the mental functionin+ of characters that ties to+ether the microstructural levelof specific mental events and particular actions ?ith the macrostructural level of lon+3term plans and +oals& The ne9t section ?ill address therelationship et?een microstructural and macrostructural issues in more detail&

3. 0m'edded !arrati)es

The emedded narrative approach has underpinned many of the ar+uments advanced so far throu+hout this oo., so this section ?ill summariAesome of the points made to date, lin. the concept to the continuin+3consciousness frame, pic. out a fe? of the issues raised y Marie32aure*yan>s ori+inal ?or. on it, and develop some of its teleolo+ical implications& The relationship et?een the continuin+3consciousness frame andthe notion of emedded narratives is this the former is the means y ?hich ?e are ale to construct fictional minds the latter is the result of thatconstruction& Bmedded narratives are the product of the application of the continuin+3consciousness frame to the discourse& The term embedded

narratives is intended to convey the point that the reader has a ?ide ran+e of information availale ?ith ?hich to ma.e and then revise Kud+ments aout characters> minds& The three suframes of the continuin+3consciousness frame that are descried in chapter ; are Kust some ofthe ?ays in ?hich this ?ide ran+e of information is otained& First thou+h, 8 ?ish to continue the discussion started in section 1 of this chapter on

the lifil and Bmma passa+es& Jou ?ill rememer that 8 made four comments on the t?o passa+es& Here is one more&

6& hese pictures of the minds of 6lifil and (mma that are contained in the t,o passa#es form part of their embedded narratives&

/ .ey mediational tool for the study of fictional minds can e found ?ithin the story3analysis side of narratolo+y& 8t is Marie32aure *yan>s notionof emedded narratives, ?hich 8 am e9tendin+ y applyin+ it to discourse analysis and usin+ it to mean the ?hole of a character>s mind in actionthe total perceptual and co+nitive vie?point ideolo+ical ?orldvie? memories of the past and the set of eliefs, desires, intentions, motives, and plans for the future of each character in

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the story as presented in the discourse& 8t is a narrative ecause it is the story of the novel as seen from the limited, aspectual point of vie? of asin+le character& oth passa+es may e called narratives ecause ?e see the story?orlds of Bmma and om 7ones from the limited co+nitive and



U a +ood deal of our mental functionin+ is counterfactual in natureU there is a net?or. of causal mental events ehind our actions, and many of the action descriptions in narrative discourse ma.e the

e9istence of this net?or. clear



U ascription has an important role to play in assessin+ the nature of this net?or., and it ta.es the form of first3person as ?ell as third3person

ascriptionU the use of the ?ord embedded stresses the situatedness of our mental functionin+

U the story?orld is aspectual it is seen from the points of vie? of the characters in it and it is, in a sense, the amal+amation of the varioussu?orlds of the characters> minds andU it is an open concept that stresses the ?ide variety of information, oth pulic and private, that is availale for the process of constructin+

fictional minds&

8 thin. that the emedded narrative approach is valuale for a numer of reasons it is a detailed precise approach to the ?hole of a particularfictional mind that avoids the fra+mentation of previous approaches it vie?s characters> minds not Kust in terms of the presentation of passive, private inner speech in the modes of direct or free indirect thou+ht, ut in terms of the narrator>s positive role in presentin+ characters> socialmental functionin+, particularly in the mode of thou+ht report and it hi+hli+hts the role of the reader, the process y ?hich the reader constructsthe plot y means of a series of provisional conKectures and hypotheses aout the emedded narratives of characters&

The term embedded narrative is in a sense simply a lael for an approach that has al?ays een used y literary critics in practice ut that has notyet een sufficiently theoriAed& /s 8 said in chapter !, the material that is covered y the term has een cate+oriAed separately ?ithin narrativetheory under a numer of different headin+s consciousness representation, focaliAation, characteriAation,

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and so on& The usefulness of the emedded narrative lael is that it encoura+es a detailed, precise, functional, and inclusive approach to?ard the?hole of a fictional mind& 8t clarifies the process y ?hich the reader constructs a series of encounters ?ith a particular fictional mind intosomethin+ that is coherent and continuous& Currently, there is a hole in literary theory et?een the analysis of consciousness, characteriAation,and focaliAation& Lddly, as 8 hope to have sho?n, a +ood deal of fictional discourse is situated precisely ?ithin this analytical +ap&

8t may appear that 8 am stretchin+ the term narrative too far and overe9tendin+ its scope to the point ?here it ceases to e useful& Ho?ever, 8?ould ar+ue that the use of the phrase has +reat value ecause it focuses attention on the teleolo+ical value of the information that te9ts provide

on fictional minds& Characters are oviously different from real people in that they e9ist only ?ithin a narrative structure& The detail on fictionalminds provided in te9ts +ains si+nificance ?ithin that structure, and the use of the ?ord narrative is intended to dra? attention to this point& 8t isnoticeale that there is no? a +ro?in+ interest ?ithin a numer of real3mind disciplines in the role of narrative in thou+ht& This trend stren+thens



+ + p + +an identification of the t?o concepts&

Manfred Eahn dra?s attention to “the spreadin+ insi+ht that a person>s perceptions are already informed y internal narrative >scripts> ” (1555,

1")& 4aniel 4ennett refers to the self as a “center of narrative +ravity” (for e9ample, 1551, $10, $1")& sin+ a variety of metaphors, theoristsfrom various disciplines have su++ested that life plans are scripted on fairy3tale patterns and that in a sense ?e are all novelists& For e9ample“Story is a asic principle of Mind& Most of our e9perience, our .no?led+e, and our thin.in+ is or+aniAed as stories” (Turner 155%, v)& Reoffrey@hite considers the issue from an anthropolo+ical point of vie? “The relevance of prototype schemas for emotional understandin+ follo?s fromthe ?ider salience of narrative as an or+aniAin+ principle in ethnopsycholo+ical thou+ht +enerally&&&& /mon+ the many types of narrative used torepresent and communicate social e9perience, >life stories> appear to e an especially salient +enre across cultures&” He notes, ho?ever, that thereis “some evidence that Buro3/merican cultures tend to >pac.a+e> e9perience in the form of individualiAed life stories more than many non3@estern cultures that do not value or elaorate individual self3narrative” (1555, !";)& 2i.e so many of the comparisons made ?ithinanthropolo+y re+ardin+ the differences et?een @estern culture and other cultures, this line of in=uiry ma.es it easy to understand ?hy the novelhas developed into an important art form that is identified ?ith the @est&

31"%3

/s 8 have said, the term embedded narratives e9presses a.htin>s vision of the novel as a polyphony of independent voices and his vie? thatreaders should re+ard characters not as oKects ut as suKects& @ertsch comments that a.htin follo?ed the collectivist orientation of *ussianculture and assumed that meanin+ ?as al?ays ased in +roup life (1551, %")& *eaders e9perience the suKectivity of characters> emeddednarratives and realiAe that the events in the story?orld are aspectual& The same oKect or event ?ill e e9perienced under a different aspect yanother character or y the same character at a different time& Much of the sense of the situated and conte9tual nature of consciousness isconveyed y Golosinov>s notion of the utterance and, in particular, a.htin>s concept of voice& 8n fact, the notion of voice has a +ood deal incommon ?ith the concept of emedded narratives& oth are the concrete e9pression of the ideolo+ical vie?point and total ?orld3vie? of fictionalcharacters& Ho?ever, 8 prefer the term embedded narrative to the term voice for t?o reasons First, it is more complete as it conveys, at least tome, more of a sense of the action and ehavior of characters in addition to their co+nitive, ideolo+ical, and perceptual vie?point& econdly, it ismore accurate as it conveys, a+ain at least to me, a clearer sense of a discursive construct, an element in narrative discourse& ecause of this, it

invites analysis of the means y ?hich the narrator constructs and the reader reads a particular fictional character& y contrast, the notion of voiceinvites the analyst to see the fictional mind as more of a +iven&



ome approaches to the role of narrative in thou+ht adopt a functionalist perspective on the issue& This is a particularly interestin+ e9ample“emodied a+ents can inventively e9ploit facts aout their physical circumstances to avoid e9plicit representation and reasonin+&&&& MQost humanactivity, rather than implementin+ preconceptualiAed plans, consists of incessant, creative improvisational moiliAation and appropriation of the

vast array of resources that environments re+ularly ma.e availale& -ot only do people rarely >fi+ure it all out in advance> &&& their stories should e understood not as veridical reports of ho? activity comes to e, ut as after3the3fact reconstructions ?hose role is to retrospectively renderactivity intelli+ile (and perhaps accountale)” (mith 1555, ;;0)& These insi+hts relate closely to the discussion on first3person ascription inchapter $, section "& The reports that people +ive of their thou+ht processes are not necessarily reliale& @e tend to create narratives for ourselvesin order to ma.e intelli+ile ?hat has happened to us& /ntonio 4amasio reminds us that the narrative mind has a use not Kust for the past, ut alsofor the future “The chan+es ?hich occur in the autoio+raphical self over an individual lifetime are not due only to the remodelin+ of the lived past that ta.es place

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consciously and unconsciously, ut also to the layin+ do?n and remodelin+ of the anticipated future” (!000, !!$)& 4amasio>s last point there

interestin+ly echoes 4ennett>s ar+ument that the purpose of the mind is to “produce future&” rian McHale has dra?n attention to the need for afunctional approach ?ithin literary theory in a ?ay that reinforces the remar.s y real3mind theorists that 8 =uoted in the section on functionalismin chapter $ “/ functionalism ?ould not or+aniAe ta9onomies, ut ?ould e9plain teleolo+ies it ?ould not define ?hat, astractly, sentences are, ut rather ?ould +ive an account of ?hat sentences do, ?hat, in particular conte9ts, they are there for ” (15":, $$)& 8 hope that this study ?ill +o alittle ?ay to?ard fulfillin+ McHale>s pro+ram ?ithin the specific field of fictional minds&

Marie32aure *yan defines her concept of embedded narratives as “any storyli.e representation produced in the mind of a character andreproduced in the mind of the reader” (15"%, :!0)& 8 have consideraly e9tended the meanin+ of the term y placin+ it in the conte9t of the parallel discourses descried in this study and, therefore, y usin+ it to refer to all aspects of the fictional mind& *yan e9plains that for a discourseto evo.e a story?orld, it must rin+ a universe to life and convey to the reader the sense that at the center of this universe there resides an actualor real ?orld, a realm of factual states or events& This ?orld is understood y the reader to e inhaited y intelli+ent ein+s ?ho produce avariety of mental representations such as eliefs, ?ishes, proKections, intents, oli+ations, dreams, and fantasies& Ta.en to+ether, these mentalconstructs constitute the private domain of characters (*yan 15"%, :!0)& 8t is *yan>s vie? that the study of emedded narratives is “most

re?ardin+ in +enres ?ith the most canonical plot structures, such as fol. tales, spy stories, soap operas, tra+edies, and comedies of errors&” ut,she ventures, the concept “can also find useful applications in the modern novel, possily the least canonical of all narrative +enres” (15"%, :!%)&This seems to me to e an unnecessarily tentative vie? of the value of the approach& 8 have tried in this study to demonstrate that a more fluid and



fle9ile use of the notion can e of +reat value in analyAin+ all novels, includin+ sutle and difficult modern novels such as he Cryin# of "ot %B&

*yan presents an astonishin+ly comple9 analysis of a sin+le3para+raph /esop fale usin+ the emedded narrative techni=ue, and Fluderni.

comments very +enerously on this aspect of *yan>s ?or. as follo?s “/n interestin+ proposal that si+nificantly develops the analysis of plottin+is Marie32aure *yan>s essay &&& thatQ stresses characters> intentions and plans as ?ell as their ?ishes and hopes, and the effect of these on possile plot development& 8ncorporatin+ these several

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layers of fictional virtualities, the model provides for a more comple9 account of narrative in process than traditional plot analysis allo?s& Jeteven *yan>s account uses a simple te9t, a fairy tale, as its oKect of analysis#a move that &&& puts in dout a possile application to the novel”(155%, 6%)& 8n an endnote to her comment, Fluderni. =ualifies it some?hat to concede that in fact “applicaility to the novel is hindered forreasons of te9tual len+th#it is not (in principle) reKected& Marie32aure *yan>s approach ?ould e hi+hly useful in the analysis of individualscenes of chapters of a novel” (155%, :"$)& /s 8 have su++ested, it is inappropriate to tal. simply in terms of simple te9ts, +enre novels, and

analyses of sin+le scenes in novels& / necessarily simplified version of the notion of emedded narratives can e applied to the teleolo+icalstructures of the ?hole ran+e of complete novels& @hen *yan>s =uasi3scientific and technical method is applied in this ?ay, it +ains in readth,insi+ht, fle9iility, and heuristic po?er ?hat it may lose in scientific ri+or and completeness&

8t may e ?orth stressin+ a+ain here the point that 8 made in chapter 1, section 6 re+ardin+ the ran+e of novels that 8 have in mind& ecause myinterest is in consciousness, you may have een tempted to thin. that 8 re+ard as my paradi+m the “consciousness novel” or the “stream ofconsciousness novel&” This is not the case& 8 am concerned ?ith the role of consciousness in all novels& Here is an illustration& 8n Te9t @orlds(1555), Paul @erth discusses a ?ell3.no?n interior monolo+ue novel, @illiam Faul.ner>s he Sound and the !ury& /s @erth points out, “?e canre+ard the character frames of enKi, Wuentin and Eason as oth uildin+ up representations of their inner ?orlds, and also as providin+ vanta+e points from ?hich commonly e9perienced events are vie?ed&&&& @e can re+ard them, then, as three separate te9t ?orlds, representin+ a set ofoverlappin+ circumstances&&&& Lur privile+e as readers is to e ale to e9perience separate >realities> vicariously” (1555, :::)& 8t seems to me thathis term tet ,orlds can, in this conte9t at least, e re+arded as a synonym for the term embedded narratives& oth emphasiAe the centrality offictional minds to the readin+ process& Ho?ever, there is a dan+er that the force of this insi+ht ?ill e reduced if it is thou+ht that it should e

applied only to stream of consciousness novels& @erth ma.es the point aout the te9ts ?orlds of enKi>s, Wuentin>s, and Eason>s minds that“Faul.ner presents the three ?orlds >ra?,> as it ?ere there is no narrative envelope ?ithin ?hich the three stories unfold they are simply presented one after the other” (1555, :::)& This is true& ut it should e emphasiAed that the constructions of fictional minds as te9t ?orlds



occurs in all narratives and not Kust those (stream of consciousness) narratives

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in ?hich the ?orlds happen to e presented “ra?” and apparently unmediated& The minds of Bmma, 2yd+ate, and lifil, ?hich are all“processed” and hi+hly mediated, are Kust as much te9t ?orlds as the minds of enKi, Wuentin, and Eason&

This is my final comment on the lifil and Bmma passa+es ?ith ?hich 8 e+an this chapter

%& 6oth passa#es have a teleolo#ical si#nificance&

The /usten passa+e has a si+nificant teleolo+ical purpose ?ithin the functionin+ of Bmma>s emedded narrative& The superficiality and self3deception that it conveys ?ill cause the collision et?een Bmma>s and Dni+htley>s emedded narratives and those of others such as Churchill that?ill ultimately determine the teleolo+ical shape of the narrative& The concepts of motive and intention have a pivotal role in this line of in=uiry

ecause they lin. the mass of consciousness that is contained in emedded narratives ?ith its visile and overt e9pression in ehavior and action&This is the point at ?hich characters pulicly en+a+e ?ith, and conflict ?ith, each other throu+hout the events that ma.e up the story& 8 refer toteleolo+y here ecause readers read the plot of a novel as the comination of the concrete e9pressions of the emedded narratives of all of itsvarious characters the thou+hts they thin. and the actions they ta.e& The teleolo+ical approach to the presentation of mind in narrative fictionforms a conceptual frame?or. ?ithin ?hich te9ts can e analyAed to sho? ho? particular e9amples of access to characters> minds contriute tothe presentation of the plot3formin+ process& @ithin the discourse, the contents of characters> minds in the story are presented directly ?hen thenarrator needs to provide e9plicit e9planations for their emedded narrative that are re=uired in addition to descriptions of their ehavior&Lviously, the narrator cannot +ive the reader continued and total direct access to the minds of all the characters& *eaders infer their continuedmental processes from all of the availale evidence& From this steady flo? of information, the reader constructs the initial hypotheses andunderta.es the comple9 sets of modifications that readin+ involves& The reader then a++re+ates each character>s emedded narrative from thediscourse to form that reader>s story& *eaders read plots as the interaction of characters> emedded narratives&

8 referred earlier to Bmma>s need to reconstruct Churchill>s emedded narrative once she hears of his secret en+a+ement& From the point of vie?of the reader, there is a parallel process of construction and reconstruction& The reader is presented ?ith a narrative for Churchill (as the availaleflirt) that is refracted, in the main, throu+h the prism of Bmma>s perception of him&



31503

Ho?ever, the reader is forced in the li+ht of the revelation at the end of the oo. to reconstruct Churchill>s “actual” emedded narrative (as thesecretly en+a+ed, resourceful manipulator) and to aandon the earlier narrative that he had successfully presented to Bmma and also to the reader&This readin+ process re=uires the reader in effect to recreate the ?hole story?orld of the novel& Fictional minds are semiotic constructs that form part of an overall narrative pattern& They are elements in a plot as ?ell as centers of consciousness& / sli+htly different approach is ta.en yFluderni. “/ctants in my model are not defined, primarily, y their involvement in a plot ut, simply, y their fictional e9istence&&&& TQheiractin+ necessarily revolves around their consciousness, their mental center of self3a?areness, intellection, perception and emotionality” (155%,!%)& ut surely fictional characters e9ist to e in a plot& oth aspects are essential& The notion of emedded narratives appears to me to e ane9citin+ and re?ardin+ ?ay out of this narratolo+ical dualism& The study of a character>s emedded narrative is a study of their consciousnessand, simultaneously, a study of the conte9t of that consciousness& 8t is the study of fictional thin.in+ and actin+ to+ether ?ith, and in conflict?ith, other consciousnesses and is, therefore, the study of the plot& @hen a fictional consciousness is vie?ed as the story?orld as e9periencedfrom a particular vie?point, it ecomes difficult to drive the .ind of ?ed+e that Fluderni. envisa+es et?een the different aspects of that

consciousness&

4irect presentations of a character>s consciousness in any of the three modes are used y the narrator to +ive access to that emedded narrative?hen the narrator needs to do so in order to provide any e9planation that is necessary in addition to descriptions of that character>s actions& Thenarrator ?ill +ive inside vie?s of an emedded narrative ?hen it appears that other evidence relatin+ to that fictional mind is insufficient for thereader to follo? its ?or.in+s& *yan oserves that a study of fairy tales sho?s that unrealiAed emedded narratives tend to e fully e9pressed ythe narrator in order to rescue them from olivion& Ln the other hand, actualiAed emedded narratives are li.ely to remain implicit ecause there?ould then e duplication ?hen the events of the story?orld ?ere retold (*yan 15"%, :!")& / detailed e9amination of a numer of novels ?ouldestalish ?hether *yan>s su++estion is +enerally true of comple9 fiction& 8n a famous paralipsis (?ithholdin+ of information) in (mma, thenarrator decides not to +ive access to a character>s successfully realiAed emedded narrative, thou+h for reasons different from those su++ested y*yan& 4urin+ Fran. Churchill>s rief conversation ?ith Eane Fairfa9 in chapter $:, the reader is delierately and pointedly not +iven any access

to his thou+hts,

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ecause the narrator does not ?ish to reveal their secret en+a+ement& @hen Eane Fairfa9 spea.s, Fran. Churchill “made no ans?er, merelyl . d d d i i i ” (155% :0") Th l h i i l i i h d h i h h



loo.ed, and o?ed in sumission” (155%, :0")& The narrator can conceal the true situation only y not +ivin+ the reader access to their thou+hts&8nstead, the narrator uses surface description and misleadin+ indicative ehavior such as the description of his speech to her as “+rave&” y theend of the narrative, the reader .no?s that this ?as misleadin+ ecause the +rave ehavior ?as not indicative of a +rave state of mind at all ut

?as intended to conceal his playful and conspiratorial thou+hts& Lviously, the teleolo+ical shape of the narrative ?ould have een very differentif the narrator had informed the reader at that point of the true nature of his emedded narrative&

/lthou+h direct access is fre=uently +iven to Bmma>s mind in chapter $:, there are only t?o occasions on ?hich other minds (Miss ates>s andMr& Dni+htley>s) are directly vie?ed& Ho?ever, these t?o occasions are si+nificant ecause they come at crucial points in the development ofBmma>s education, or in other terms, in the modifications to her emedded narrative that ?ill e necessary for the conclusion of the plot to ereached& The first is Miss ates>s reaction to Bmma>s insult “her meanin+ & & & urst on her” (155%, :0%) and the second is Dni+htley>s mista.envie? of Bmma>s feelin+s durin+ the =uarrel that they have aout the insult “He had misinterpreted” her feelin+s (155%, :10)& The first sho?s thediver+ence of another character>s emedded narrative from Bmma>s o?n, and the conflict that arises from her lind and selfish pursuit of her+oals& The second is the lo+ical conse=uence of this diver+ence& @ithin Dni+htley>s emedded narrative, Bmma is spoiled and self3centered andis not at that moment capale of remorse for hurtin+ Miss ates& /s their narratives conflict, Dni+htley fails to read the si+ns of her chan+e of

heart& ecause of this, the reconciliation of their narratives is postponed for convenient and teleolo+ical reasons until the end of the narrative&Considered in functional terms, other minds are dipped into in order to illuminate Bmma>s dilemmas&

8t is possile to construct a +reatly simplified teleolo+ical model for the information that is used y the reader durin+ this process, ?hichsummariAes the material e9plained in the previous chapters as follo?s

desires and eliefs [ intentions and motives [ inner speech and selfre+ulation [ decisions [ action and ehavior [ lon+ term plans and +oals[ emedded narratives [ character [ plot

This is simply an initial attempt at a model that ?ill necessarily e modified as more ?or. is done alon+ the lines su++ested y this oo.&

everal e9amples of ?hat mi+ht e called teleolo#ical consciousness can e

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found in he Cryin# of "ot %B& 8 mean y this phrase the use of thou+ht report y the narrator to lin. the character>s consciousness to thet l l i l h f th ti ft ti it i h il h ti f hi B l i l d “ f L di th l id



teleolo+ical shape of the narrative, often y presentin+ it in a heavily schematic fashion& B9amples include “o e+an, for Ledipa, the lan+uid,sinister loomin+ of The Tristero” (155%, :%) “Trystero& The ?ord hun+ in the air as an act ended and all li+hts ?ere for a moment cut hun+ inthe dar. to puAAle Ledipa Maas, ut not yet to e9ert the po?er over her it ?as to” (155%, 61) “he could, at this sta+e of thin+s, reco+niAe

si+nals li.e that, as an epileptic is said to” (155%, %%) and “he +lanced do?n the corridor of Cohen>s rooms in the rain and sa?, for the very firsttime, ho? far it mi+ht e possile to +et lost in this” (155%, %%)& These e9amples can e read alon+ a scale of character consciousness& They start?ith the narrator addressin+ the reader re+ardin+ the plot over the head of the character as it ?ere and end ?ith the character herself ecomin+a?are of the shape of the narrative in ?hich she is actin+& This is sho?n most clearly in the follo?in+ e9ample ?hen in the clima9 to the novelLedipa addresses herself alone& he methodically lists the four possile e9planations for the situation in ?hich she finds herself and thereysummariAes the plot of the narrative “Bither you have stumled indeed, ?ithout the aid of 24 or other indole al.aloids, on to a secret richnessand concealed density of dream&&&& Lr you are hallucinatin+ it& Lr a plot has een mounted a+ainst you&&&& Lr you are fantasyin+ some such plot&&&&Those, no? that she ?as loo.in+ at them, she sa? to e the alternatives& Those symmetrical four” (155%, 11;#1")&

Finally, in commentin+ on the interpretive activity of readers ?hile constructin+ emedded narratives, *yan introduces an interestin+ perspective y relatin+ it to our roles in real life& he comments that in a dramatic performance the spectator reads the plot into the +estures and utterances

that are oserved on the sta+e in an attempt to rationaliAe the ehavior of the characters& he then su++ests that the same interpretive activity is performed on data in real life “Eust as ?e read a plot into a play, ?e may form a story out of private e9periences or out of personally recordedoservations” (*yan 1551, !%6)& /s the various theorists =uoted earlier told us, ?e construct a story out of our o?n life& @e have to form storiesin order to ma.e our lives coherent& 8t is y these stories that ?e live& Lur lives are narratives that are emedded in the social conte9t ?ithin?hich ?e function& pecifically, there is the conte9t of other narratives& Lur lives do not Kust consist of the sin+le emedded narrative that ?econstruct for ourselves& 8n addition, ?e are urdened, or lessed, ?ith the .no?led+e that alternative emedded narratives e9ist for all of us?ithin the emedded narratives of all of those ?ho .no? us&

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4. #he Storyworld

8n chapter !, section ! 8 riefly considered the application of possile3?orlds theory to narratolo+y& The purpose of this section is to apply theti f fi ti l t ld ifi ll t th i f fi ti l i d



notion of fictional story?orlds more specifically to the issue of fictional minds&

#he aspectual nature of the storyworld

4oleel contends that it is “?orlds ?ith persons or, etter, persons ?ithin ?orlds that +enerate stories” (155", ::)& Chapter 6 tried to sho? thatour minds are social and that the norm for mental functionin+ is multiperson ?orlds& This means that it is the relationships et?een persons that+enerate stories& tories are +enerated y the conflicts et?een persons, and the conflicts are caused y the fact that the story?orld is aspectual&Bach character sees the story?orld under a different aspect or from a different point of vie?& 8f they did not, there ?ould e no conflicts and nostories& Crucially, fictional minds, once created and then re3created ?ith each ne? hypothesis, are themselves aspectual& They e9ist, or are seenfrom a certain aspect, ?ithin the minds of the other characters in the novel& The same +oes for physical events, apart from mar+inal e9amplessuch as narrator3supplied information on ac.+round events in historical novels& 8t is for this reason that it ?ould perhaps e etter in +eneral torefer to story?orld events as e9periences&

/lthou+h the point developed earlier is a simple one, 8 thin. that a +ood deal of narrative theory is structured in such a ?ay that one can easily

lose si+ht of it& 4oleel asserts that the factual domain of the fictional ?orld is split into these t?o sudomains “fully authenticated, yauthoritative narrative, and collectively authenticated, y consensual fictional persons> accounts& /s to the virtual domain, the domain of possiles that remain nonauthentic, it divides into private domains, the eliefs, visions, illusions, and errors of individual fictional persons”(155", 161)& This is completely true, ut is there not also a sense in ?hich all fictional mental life is virtualI From the point of vie? of anindividual mind, the distinction et?een eliefs that are shared y others and those that are not shared y others may not e apparent to theindividual, or at least not to e+in ?ith& oth sorts ?ill simply e eliefs& /s for eliefs that have een certified as true y the narrator, and thosethat have not, the earlier point is even more apt& The character can never .no? ?hich is ?hich& oth sorts, narrator3certified and non3narrator3certified, ?ill al?ays e simply eliefs for that character& This is not a trivial point& The aesthetic appeal of a plot is a function of the richness andvariety of the various aspects under ?hich the story?orld is perceived y the characters in that ?orld& 8n Marie32aure

315$3

*yan>s terms, this is the domain of the virtual& /ll of those aspects are virtual and suKective in the sense that they form a part of a character>s elief system, includin+ those that are made “real” and “oKective” y the statements of the narrator and those that are shared ?ith othercharacters&



8 said at the e+innin+ of the discussion of fictional3?orlds theory in chapter !, section ! that the theory arose out of the philosophical concept of possile ?orlds and that this notion had developed as a tool to consider various technical issues in philosophy& Lne of those technical issues is

relevant to the discussion here& 8t is the distinction dra?n y the philosopher Rottlo Fre+e et?een sense and reference& Put very crudely, thereference of an oKect or entity is the “oKective” meanin+ of it that holds true under all circumstances and in all possile ?orlds& -ames are ri+iddesi+nators (to use aul Drip.e>s phrase) that e9press the reference of a sentence& Sense relates to the various “suKective” descriptions of anoKect or entity that can affect the truth or falsity of a sentence in various ?ays ?hen they are sustituted for its name& For e9ample, the name“Eocasta” is a ri+id desi+nator that e9presses the reference to that person& Garious descriptions of or senses for the entity “Eocasta” include “TheWueen of Thees” and “the mother of Ledipus&” o, it is true to say that “Ledipus ?ished to marry Eocasta” it may or may not e true to say that“Ledipus ?ished to marry the Wueen of Thees” (he ?ould have to .no? that she ?as the Wueen of Thees, and he may not care ?hether she isor not) it is oviously false to say that “Ledipus ?ished to marry the mother of Ledipus&” /+ain, very crudely, the same distinction can ee9pressed y usin+ the technical philosophical terms, etension (correspondin+ to reference) and intension (correspondin+ to sense)&

My purpose in mentionin+ this astruse ar+ument here is to point out that 4oleel ma.es use of the sense7reference and intension7e9tension

distinctions in ;eterocosmica to refer to the aspectuality of the fictional ?orld& He e9plains that a fictional ?orld can e “structured intensionallyin many different ?ays y different intensional functions& 8n this thesis, a feature of Fre+e>s >sense> is reflected a variety of senses can eassociated ?ith one and the same referent, the various senses >illuminatin+> the referent>s different aspects” (155", 1$1)& Put very simply, thesuKective side of oth pairs (sense and intensionality) account for the aspectual nature of the story?orld reality& 4ifferent characters e9periencethe oKective reference or e9tension of the story?orld under a variety of different suKective intensional senses or aspects& The tra+edy of thenarrative of edipus /e derives from the fact that Ledipus ?ished to marry Eocasta ut ?as horrorstruc. ?hen he found that he had married hismother&

31563

0ncyclopedias

4oleel refers to the cognitive element in the role of the reader as an encyclopedia “Bncyclopedia as shared communal .no?led+e varies ?ithcultures social +roups historical epochs and for these reasons relativiAes the recovery of implicit meanin+” (155" 1;;) This is the real ?orld



cultures, social +roups, historical epochs, and for these reasons relativiAes the recovery of implicit meanin+ (155", 1;;)& This is the real3?orldencyclopedia or store of .no?led+e that readers possess and that they rin+ to te9ts in order to comprehend them& Dno?in+ that la?ns occuroutside houses and that the istine Chapel is in *ome are e9amples of elements in a reader>s actual3?orld encyclopedia& Ho?ever, 4oleel then

+oes on to e9plain that, in order to “reconstruct and interpret a fictional ?orld, the reader has to reorient his co+nitive stance to a+ree ?ith the?orld>s encyclopedia& 8n other ?ords, .no?led+e of the fictional encyclopedia is asolutely necessary for the reader to comprehend a fictional?orld” (155", 1"1)& The reader>s real3?orld encyclopedia has to e modified in order to create the story?orld& My actual3?orld encyclopediacontains the fact that a.er treet is in the center of 2ondon& My story?orld encyclopedia contains the “fact” that herloc. Homes lives in a.ertreet& 4oleel calls this the fictional encyclopedia “Dno?led+e aout a possile ?orld constructed y a fictional te9t constitutes a fictionalencyclopedia” (155", 1;;)&

Ho?ever, this is only part of the story& The fictional encyclopedia is the totality of possile .no?led+e aout a story?orld& 8n addition, characterseach have their o?n fictional encyclopedias that are much smaller than the total one& -ot all of the characters in the Conan 4oyle stories ?ill.no? that herloc. Holmes lives in a.er treet& @e can refer to these as internal encyclopedias the encyclopedias that all fictional characters possess aout their story?orld and that are different from the reader>s story?orld encyclopedia& /s 4oleel points out, “cQ o+nitive relations#

the .no?led+e and eliefs of each person aout the other memers of the a+ential constellation#play a maKor role in the a+ents> decisionma.in+, plans and strate+ies” (155", 101)& The co+nitive relationship et?een a character and the story?orld (that is, ho? much the character.no?s aout the story?orld) and the co+nitive relationship et?een the reader and the story?orld are oth .ey elements in the narrative process&4oleel e9plores several of the implications arisin+ from characters> co+nitive relations&

The modal system of .no?led+e, i+norance and elief imposes epistemic order on the fictional ?orld&&&& The person of the fictional ?orld is anepistemic “monad, ” perceivin+ himself or herself, other persons and the entire ?orld from a definite and distinct vanta+e point& The person>s practical reasonin+ and, conse=uently, his or her actin+ and interactin+

315%3

are to a hi+h de+ree determined y this epistemic perspective, y ?hat the a+ent .no?s, is i+norant of, and elieves to e the case in the ?orld&&&&Bpistemic modalities release their story3+eneratin+ ener+y ecause of uneven distriution of .no?led+e amon+ the fictional persons& Theepistemic imalance produces the asic epistemic narrative, the story ?ith a secret (mystery story)&(155", 1!%)



There are several si+nificant insi+hts in this passa+e& The list in 4oleel>s second sentence is particularly useful “himself, ” so first3person.no?led+e of inner states is not necessarily more reliale than third3person .no?led+e (see chapter 6) “other persons, ” hence the importance of

the concept of douly emedded narratives (see chapter ;) “the entire ?orld, ” hence the importance of internal encyclopedias 4oleel>sreference to practical reasonin+ and interaction sho?s the importance of aspectuality to the social and purposive nature of fictional mentalfunctionin+ and finally, he usefully relates epistemic aspectuality to the teleolo+y of plot (see the previous section)&

Ho?ever, it seems to me to e a mista.e to limit these insi+hts to particular .inds of narrative& 8n the remar. =uoted earlier, 4oleel refers to themystery story& He later comments that “eQpistemic =uest can also e perceived at the core of the ildun+sroman” (155", 1!;)& ut it is importantto reco+niAe that it is not Kust in mystery stories and the ildun+sroman that epistemic imalance is a si+nificant +enerator of plot& 8t is true of allnarratives& 8s there a novel that you .no? of in ?hich every character .no?s ?hat every other character .no?sI Riven the aspectuality offictional ?orlds, that state of affairs must e impossile& This necessary imalance is as true, and as teleolo+ically si+nificant, of Henry Eames asit is of, say, the thriller ?riter Patricia Hi+hsmith&

Marie32aure *yan also ma.es the same point aout the aspectual nature of the story?orld and, in particular, the epistemic imalance et?eencharacters and readers& he oserves that “the reader>s representation of the actual ?orld of a fictional universe is much more accurate (thou+husually more limited) than the representation of the characters ?ho must ase their .no?led+e on their o?n empirical e9perience” (15"6, ;!1)& / part of this process is the need to reorient one>s co+nitive stance in order to a+ree ?ith all the characters> encyclopedias& 8t is not possile tofollo? the plot other?ise& Jou can try an e9periment yourself in order to test the validity of this ar+ument& Choose a novel#any novel#and riefly summariAe the plot in your mind& Then see ?hether any elements of your summary are not dependent on the sort of co+nitive andemotional empathy that 8 am discussin+& My +uess is that there ?ill e very fe?&

315;3

aps

8 referred in chapter ! to the various +aps that arise et?een oth the story and the discourse on the one hand and on the other hand thestory?orld Bven the most detailed story and the most e9haustive discourse can only ever e a very partial and limited description of the ?hole



story?orld& Bven the most detailed story and the most e9haustive discourse can only ever e a very partial and limited description of the ?holestory?orld& There are +aps in the information provided in the story ecause ehind that story there e9ists the theoretical postulate of a story?orldthat contains the missin+ information& The story is necessarily incomplete ecause it can never list every possile fact aout the story?orld& 8t is

the function of the discourse to assist the reader to fill in those +aps in the story that appear to the reader to e si+nificant& To do this readers needstrate+ies for dealin+ ?ith the necessary incompleteness of fictional ein+s& These strate+ies are contained in the frames, scripts, and so on thatare necessary for comprehension of a te9t& /s *uth *onen indicates, the “reliance on a frame of reference can e9plain ho? a te9t, characteriAed y a paucity of information aout its ?orld, rhetorically overcomes the incompleteness of its constituent oKects” (15"", 61!)& The aspectualnature of perception that 8 discussed earlier can e related to the role of the reader as much as to the activities of characters& Fictional people are perceived y the reader under a particular aspect, ?hich is the e9plicit description in the discourse and ?hat is not made e9plicit under that particular aspect is indeterminate& 8t is then part of the competence of the reader to fill in the +aps y creatin+ more aspects under ?hich thecharacter may e implicitly or hypothetically perceived&

Ho?ever, ?e have to e careful to ensure that the lan+ua+e that ?e use aout the incompleteness of possile ?orlds accurately fits the specificcase of fictional minds& For e9ample, the first sentence of *uth *onen>s “Completin+ the 8ncompleteness of Fictional Bntities” (the title itself is

revealin+) is this “Fictional entities are inherently incomplete ecause it is impossile to construct a fictional oKect y specifyin+ itscharacteristics and relations in every detail” (15"", $5;)& ut is it possile to specify in every detail the characteristics and relations of real

mindsI *onan>s ans?er is that in “reality, as opposed to fiction, +aps are filled y reference to a complete, fully detailed and, at least in principle,availale oKect” (15"", $5;)& o, *onen appears to e ar+uin+, it is possile to arrive at a complete and fully detailed description of a real mind&Bven ?ith the “in principle” caveat, this seems a stran+e ?ay to tal. aout real minds& 8t is possile that *onen and the other possile3?orldstheorists are thin.in+ aout such features of fictional ?orlds and real ?orlds as eye color and the numer of children that 2ady Maceth had&These are issues that are easy to decide& Ta.e other e9amples The to?n ?here Bmma lives may or may not e ased on the

315"3

real to?n of Bpsom in urrey& Bmma may or may not e five feet si9 inches& Her eyes may or may not e lue& These thin+s are indeterminate in

the (mma story?orld& Ln the other hand, they are easily determined in the actual ?orld& @e tend to .no?, or can easily find out, ?here ?e are&@e can see the hei+ht and the eye color of ourselves and of others& Ho?ever, minds oth real and fictional seem to me to e some?hat different&



.no?I /s 8 Kust said, ?e are ?ith them some of the time ut they are asent at other times& 4o not real asences e=uate to fictional +apsI @hen?e see them a+ain ?e +enerally attempt to reconstruct ?hat they have een doin+ since ?e last sa? them in order to ?or. out rou+hly ho? theyare feelin+ no?& @e reconstruct their narrative& Jou ?ill rememer that the point of the falseelief tests for children that are used in thetheory7simulation deate (chapter 6 section !) is to test ho? children can construct continuin+ consciousnesses follo?in+ the asence or “+ap” of



theory7simulation deate (chapter 6, section !) is to test ho? children can construct continuin+ consciousnesses follo?in+ the asence or +ap ofthe person in the test& This process is surely very similar to the activities of readers& @e rin+ to the readin+ process our real3?orld .no?led+e ofho? to fill +aps and construct narratives for actual people&

Finally, the emphasis in the thou+ht of the social theorists that ?as discussed in chapter 6 is on environment and conte9t& This is another ?ay in?hich parallels can e dra?n et?een our construction of real people and readers> constructions of fictional people& The point is often made,=uite ri+htly, that characters are only elements in a story or plot they have no e9istence outside of that conte9t& *eal people are oviouslydifferent, ut are they that differentI @e too e9ist only in a social conte9t& 8t is rare for individuals to find themselves in the sin+le3person ?orldsthat 4oleel descries& Lur minds are reconstructed (ri+htly or, ?e may often feel, completely ?ron+ly and unfairly) ?ithin the minds of others,and this process forms the social conte9t ?ithin ?hich ?e function& 8 must emphasiAe that 8 am not denyin+ that fictional people are differentfrom real people& 8 am simply sayin+ that, in descriin+ the undeniale differences, ?e must not +ive an unrealistic picture of ho? real minds?or., and ?e must also ac.no?led+e the e=ually undeniale similarities et?een real minds and fictional minds&

3!003

#he limits of storyworlds

/s descried in section ! of this chapter, the continuin+3consciousness co+nitive frame has a default value or slot the reader assumes that thecharacter>s consciousness ?ill continue et?een mentions of them in the te9t unless informed other?ise, say, ecause of e9ceptionalcircumstances such as amnesia, a coma, or a death and return to life or some such ma+ical event& 8 am not concerned in this oo. ?ith the ran+eof values that arise from confounded e9pectations (for e9ample, as in science fiction, fantasy, or postmodernist narratives)& My study relates tothe sorts of fictional minds that are contained in all .inds of narratives& B9ceptional consciousnesses could perhaps e the suKect of a furtherstudy& This rin+s me to a concern that 8 have re+ardin+ the limits of story?orlds&

Possile3?orlds theorists emphasiAe the independence and autonomy of possile ?orlds from the actual ?orld& 8t can sometimes seem as thou+h

there is no limit to the e9tent of story?orlds& 4oleel maintains that “tQ e9tual poeisis &&& constructs fictional realms ?hose properties, structures,and modes of e9istence are, in principle, independent of the properties, structures, and e9istential mode of actuality” (155", !:)& ein+

independent from the real ?orld means that they are not constrained y the actual structure of the real ?orld& Hence, hi+hly ima+inativeliteratures such as science fiction, fantasy, utopias, postmodernist te9ts, and so on are possile&

Ho?ever, from my perspective, a very important limit to the e9tent of story?orlds su++ests itself& This is the need to descrie fictional minds



Ho?ever, from my perspective, a very important limit to the e9tent of story?orlds su++ests itself& This is the need to descrie fictional mindsen+a+in+ in mental functionin+& To read narrative coherently, the reader must posit the e9istence of continuin+ consciousnesses that can emodythe various causal net?or.s ehind the actions of the characters in the narrative& This ?ill surely e as necessary of the inhaitants of Pluto in ascience fiction story as it is of the people ein+ descried in a +rittily realistic “faction” narrative& There are certain sorts of ma+ical minds thatare conceivale those capale of BP, mind readin+, tele.inesis, and so on& ut if one loo.s at the fundamentals of cause and effect, mentalevents causin+ actions, and so on, these differences e+in to loo. rather superficial& Lf course, the causal connections ?ill often e very different,and these differences ?ill form the interest of the narrative& ut the differences are small in the conte9t of the po?erful operation of the asicframe& 8t is never a +ood idea to underestimate the in+enuity of narrative theorists ?here challen+es re+ardin+ the nature of narrative areconcerned& -evertheless, 8 ?ill su++est this test 8s it possile to thin. of a narrative for ?hich the continuin+3consciousness

3!013

frame is inapplicaleI My ?easelly caveat here is to concede that it mi+ht e possile to construct some sort of tortured e9ample of a sciencefiction or postmodern narrative, ut a pretty poor specimen of narrative it mi+ht ?ell e& 8n practice, even fictional realms are very much tied to

the properties of the actual ?orld& Fictional minds, even on Pluto, have to operate very much li.e actual minds&

(8n fact, 4avid Herman has su++ested as a possile e9ception to my su++ested rule a very compellin+ narrative& 8t is Christopher -olan>s film -emento, in ?hich the events are focaliAed throu+h the main character ?ho suffers from short3term memory loss& To ma.e matters moreconfusin+, his story is told ac.?ard& Ho?ever, it seems to me that it is precisely the vie?er>s aility to use the continuin+3consciousness framein order to construct, eventually and ?ith difficulty, an emedded narrative for this character that imposes coherence on ?hat ?ould other?ise ean incomprehensile e9perience&)

/ helpful perspective on the issue of the limits of story?orlds comes from an une9pected source& 8n M8TBC, perer and Hirschfeld su++estthat reli+ious representations ?or. ?ell ?hen “a alance et?een counterintuitive and intuitive =ualities is reached& / supernatural ein+ ?ithtoo fe? une9pected =ualities is not attention demandin+ and thus not memorale& Lne ?ith too many une9pected =ualities is too information rich

to e memorale” (1555, c99i)& This point applies e=ually ?ell to science and fantasy fiction& 8n oth cases there has to e in place a sufficientnumer of appropriate consciousness frames and suframes for the narrative to e comprehensile& /s F& B& parshott noticed, “either the place

and the participants are conceived on the model of familiar types, in ?hich case the element of fantasy ecomes scarcely more than decoration, orthe story ecomes thin and schematic, ecause ?e cannot tell ?hat sort of ac.+round to provide for ?hat ?e are e9plicitly told” (15%;, 6,=uoted in Pavel 15"%, %0)&



Thomas Pavel lists a numer of the elements that he su++ests are indispensale to the sort of ac.+round that he has in mind& He ?rites that

every period, no matter ho? diverse and sophisticated its functional arran+ements, seems to have at its command a certain numer ofindispensale elements&&&& irth, love, death, success and failure, authority and its loss, revolution and ?ar, production and distriution of +oods,social status and morality, the sacred and the profane, comic themes of inade=uacy and isolation, compensatory fantasies, and so much more, areal?ays present, from early myths and fol.tales to contemporary literature& Chan+es of taste or shifts of interest seem to affect the inventory only

3!0!3

mar+inally& ince ?e need an alien space in ?hich to deploy the ener+y of the ima+ination, there have al?ays een and al?ays ?ill e distantfictional ?orlds#ut ?e may also use close fictional ?orlds for mimetic purposes, in order to +ather relevant information or Kust for the pleasureof reco+nition& (15"%, 1$;#$")

Pavel>s list of indispensale elements seems to me to e completely convincin+& Ho?ever, 8 thin. it ?ould e a +ood idea to e9tend the point& 8do not thin. that it is Kust the inventory of themes that stays pretty much the same it is also the asic co+nitive frames relatin+ to fundamentalfictional ?orld construction& 8t seems to me that these frames impose a asic uniformity on fictional ?orlds that is necessary in order for us to eale to access them& 4espite the daAAlin+ variety and ima+inativeness of fictional ?orlds, they all, even science fiction ?orlds, have to e“conceived on the model of familiar types” for us to enter them& 8f ?e cannot use real ?orld frames to reconstruct them, they ?ill remainunintelli+ile& *yan>s principle of minimal departure, ?hich 8 referred to in chapter !, section !, comes into play here& The departures re=uired forfictional minds are not as radical as their surface variety ?ould su++est& 4istant fictional ?orlds are, 8 thin., closer to us than they may at firstappear&

Ln a more +eneral point, Pavel>s final sentence seems to me to e indicative of a rather ?orryin+ +ulf et?een possile3?orlds theorists and otherreaders& 2iterary critics and +eneral readers read novels “to +ather relevant information” (the social history side of literary criticism) and also “for

the pleasure of reco+nition” (the feelin+ that the fictional minds ehave Kust li.e real minds)& ut the ?ord “Kust” is revealin+& 8t seems totrivialiAe a lar+e amount of people>s reactions to novels& @hat is the interest in readin+, say, (mmaI 8s it not for the many, detailed, and comple9

correspondences and other relationships et?een the (mma ?orld and the real ?orldI The +atherin+ of information and the pleasure ofreco+nition, if these t?o phrases are interpreted ?idely enou+h, are at the heart of the readin+ process& 8 am sure that possile3?orlds theorists?ould not deny this, ut it does not appear that it is often said e9plicitly& To say this is certainly not to suscrie to a naNvely mimetic or realistvie? of fiction& *eaders +ather information aout and +ain the pleasure of reco+nition from fictional minds in distant fictional ?orlds, Kust as



+ + p + , Kmuch as they do from close ones&

Conclusion

/s 8 ?rite this, ne?s has Kust een announced that a lar+e +roup of novelists has een as.ed to vote on the +reatest novel of all time and that the?inner

3!0:3

is Cervantes>s Don uiote& 8t is often said that all novels derive from this, the first +reat novel& /s the poll sho?s, many thin. even no? that it isstill the +reatest novel& 8t is, therefore, very satisfyin+ to see that it is particularly ?ell suited to an emedded narrative analysis& The point of thenovel is that the narrative that 4on Wui9ote constructs for himself is re+ularly in conflict ?ith the narratives of the other characters in thestory?orld in a variety of different ?ays& He sees +iants ?here they see ?indmills& /t every point in the novel, he constructs the reality of the

story?orld differently from others ecause he aspectually interprets every event in a ?ay that ensures that it coheres ?ith his emedded narrative&

3!0$3

1

#he *ictional ,ind in Action

%. Background

This chapter ?ill e9pand on the asic conceptual frame?or. for the analysis of fictional minds that ?as descried in the previous chapter anddevelop it in some of the ?ays that ?ere su++ested y the e9plorations of the ?hole mind in chapter $ and, in particular, the social mind inchapter 6& 8 ?ill e9plore three maKor suframes of the main consciousness frame the relationship et?een thou+ht and action (section !),

intermental or +roup or shared thin.in+ (section :), and ?hat 8 am callin+ douly emedded narratives, the representations of characters> mindsthat are contained ?ithin the minds of other characters (section $)& /ll three utiliAe fundamental aspects of our real3?orld .no?led+e of the

mental functionin+ oth of ourselves and of others& These suframes are certainly not the only ones, ut 8 have chosen them ecause they sho?the mind eyond the s.in in action& They contain a numer of areas of interest that, althou+h the terminolo+y is no? ecomin+ rathercumersome, one mi+ht lael sub$subframes& @ithin the thou+ht and action suframe, 8 discuss the decodin+ of action statements, the thou+ht3action continuum, indicative description, causation, and local and teleolo+ical motivation and ?ithin the +roup3thin.in+ suframe 8 discuss norm



, p , , + + p +estalishment and maintenance, +roup conflict, and intramental assent and dissent& The unfamiliar terms are e9plained later& These discussions?ill e illustrated mainly y e9amples from Bvelyn @au+h>s +ile 6odies& The novel, ?ritten in 15:0, is aout a +roup of “ri+ht Joun+ People”?ho attend an endless round of parties in 2ondon& The main character is /dam, ?hose fiancOe, -ina, calls off their en+a+ement ecause shemeets someone else ?ith more money& The novel ends ?ith a shoc.in+ chan+e of tone& Rloal ?ar is announced, and ?e last see /dam?anderin+ around a desolate attlefield&

The rest of this section is ta.en up ?ith a fe? introductory remar.s that may e of assistance to you ?hen readin+ the rest of the chapter&

Beha)iorist narrati)e

8n chapters $ and 6 8 referred occasionally to the concept of behaviorism in psycholo+y and philosophy, particularly ?hen discussin+ third3personascription& ehaviorism is a psycholo+ical method that uses the oKective oservation of other people as the asis for theories and conclusions,and so is hi+hly reliant on the reliaility of ascriptions of mental states to others& The concept of behaviorist narrative is derived from this asic

sense of the term, and in this chapter 8 ?ill e usin+ e9amples from a particular ehaviorist narrative, +ile 6odies& 8 chose it ecause of theapparently unpromisin+ nature of its presentations of consciousness& The reader strate+y of Koinin+ up the dots is particularly important in thecase of this sort of narrative ?here the readin+ process has to e very creative in constructin+ fictional minds from less information than isavailale in other types of narrative& The Dictionary of Narratolo#y defines behaviorist narrative as an “oKective narrative a narrativecharacteriAed y e9ternal focaliAation and thus limited to the conveyance of the characters> ehavior (?ords and actions ut not thou+hts andfeelin+s), their appearance, and the settin+ a+ainst ?hich they come to the fore (>The Dillers>)& 8n this type of narrative, the narrator tells less thanone or several characters .no? and astains from direct commentary and interpretation” (Prince 15";, 10)& 8t is ?ell .no?n that “pure” ehaviorist narrative is difficult if not impossile to find& There are even different vie?s on the e9tent to ?hich Hemin+?ay>s self3consciouse9periments in this mode, such as the short stories “The Dillers” and “Hills 2i.e @hite Blephants, ” are purely ehaviorist& This is an ar+umentthat 8 ?ould prefer to avoid& 8 ?ill simply su++est that ehaviorism in narrative is a tendency to?ard the features descried y Prince and that+ile 6odies is an illustration of that tendency& (/ll the pa+e references in the e9amples are to the 155% Pen+uin edition&)

My +uess is that most readers of the novel ?ould say that they ?ere struc. y ho? little direct access is +iven to characters> minds& @hat littlethere is tends to consist of a fe? ?ords of thou+ht report discreetly inserted into accounts of the happenin+s in the story?orld

(1) he told her that she loo.ed li.e a fashion dra?in+ ?ithout the clothes& -ina ?as rather pleased aout that& (%")



( ) + p ( )

8n fact, this is the only direct access that is +iven to -ina>s mind, ?hich is si+nificant as she is an important character in the novel& @e see a littleof /dam>s inner life ut very little of the other characters>, and this lac. of access creates a faintly disturin+ impression& 8n fact, the novel has ecome associated ?ith its famous chapter 11, that, apart from “/dam ran+ up -ina” and “2ater

3!0%3

-ina ran+ up /dam, ” consists in its entirety of forty3three very short episodes of unta++ed speech&

8 am not =uestionin+ the +eneral validity of the behaviorist lael& -either, in vie? of the narrative>s distinctive features of pure dialo+ue,attenuated characteriAation, and minimal motivation, am 8 =uestionin+ the application of the lael to +ile 6odies& My point is merely that ehaviorist narratives contain a +ood deal more information aout fictional minds than has +enerally een appreciated& pecifically, 8 hope tosho? that this particular discourse is saturated ?ith meanin+s that are closely related to the inner lives of characters& / character>s name is a space

or a vacuum into ?hich readers feel compelled to pour meanin+ characteristics, dispositions, states of mind, causations& *eaders ta.e even themost apparently uninformative references to characters as cues to construct attriutes& Ho?ever, much of this process can only e theoriAed ydefamiliariAin+, laelin+, and so ma.in+ visile some of the hitherto ne+lected devices that enale readers to understand ho? fictional mindsfunction ?ithin the conte9t of their story?orlds&

nner speech direct thought and free indirect thought

8 ?ill say a little aout inner speech and the speech cate+ories at this point efore discussin+ the three suframes& There is very little evidence inthe novel of the presence in characters> minds of inner speech& Lne reason for this is that the use of direct thou+ht necessarily entails innerspeech, and there is very little direct thou+ht in the novel& @hat little there is consists of Kust a fe? rather inconse=uential and uninformative?ords such as these “ >More troule for imon> thou+ht /dam” (;%) “ >Has he +iven all to his dau+htersI> thou+ht /dam” (11") and “(>@hat

indeedI> thou+ht /dam)” (1%6)& Lf course, the t?o other modes of thou+ht report and free indirect thou+ht can also e used to represent innerspeech& 8n the case of the relatively small numer of episodes of free indirect thou+ht, some appear to represent inner speech and some do not& 8

=uote a lar+e numer of episodes of thou+ht report, and almost all of them appear to me to descrie states of mind such as desires, emotions,dispositions, eliefs, and attitudes rather than inner speech&

The follo?in+ discussion of free indirect thou+ht anticipates some of my main ar+ument, ut it is placed here ecause of the intense interest in



this particular speech cate+ory& There are t?o aspects to the use of free indirect thou+ht in +ile 6odies that are concerned ?ith the mind eyondthe s.in& First, the follo?in+ +rammatical form occurs on no less than nine occasions

3!0;3

(!) (a) 8t ?as a?ful ?hen Mrs /pe ?as li.e this& (") & 8t ?as so difficult& ($0)c& 8t had een an a?.?ard moment& ("6)d& 8t ?ould e a?.?ard& (11:)e& 8t seemed odd& (115)f& 8t ?as all li.e one of those cainet meetin+s& (";)+& 8t ?as clearly +oin+ to e a ad crossin+& (;)h& 8t seemed odd that a man so ul.y could e so elusive& (5")

i& 8t ?as clearly suitale that he should marry efore he ?as thirty& (10")

/lthou+h it is not apparent from this heavily truncated presentation, these sentences, ?ith the e9ception of e9amples !+ and !h, occur in theconte9t of some form of social a?.?ardness& The character has internaliAed the social norms that he or she perceives to e appropriate to theoccasion and is emarrassed y the dan+er that they mi+ht e trans+ressed& The intimate lin. et?een social norm and individual consciousnessis particularly ?ell illustrated y e9ample !i, a sentence of free indirect thou+ht that occurs in a passa+e of thou+ht report of Bd?ard Throin+>smind& 8t ta.es place t?o para+raphs after this description of the social conte9t in ?hich the character is thin.in+

(:) 8t ?as +enerally understood that no? Bd?ard Throin+ ?as ac. these t?o ?ould ecome en+a+ed to e married& (10")

This episode of consensus thou+ht report is a statement of reinforcement of the social norm of marria+e that is unmista.aly echoed in the free

indirect thou+ht in e9ample !i& 8t is clear that the norms of the social consensus have een very efficiently internaliAed and that Throin+>smental functionin+ has een severely constrained y the pulic conte9t ?ithin ?hich it occurs&

econd, the te9t contains some e9amples of intermental free indirect thou+ht& 8 ?ill start ?ith some mar+inal cases, and +o onto some moredefinite e9amples& The second sentence in the follo?in+ e9ample could e a comment y the narrator

($) / profusion of men in plus3fours ?ere havin+ “=uic. ones” efore the start& There ?as no nonsense aout not smo.in+& (1$1)



8t could, ho?ever, also e a free indirect renderin+ of the collective consciousnesses of the users of the ar& 8n the ne9t e9ample, a lon+ list ofvarious features of the physical conte9t, clearly focaliAed throu+h a +roup of people, is follo?ed y this statement

(6) There ?as nothin+ for it ut to +o ac. to the ar& (1$")

/+ain, it is possile to interpret this statement as a narratorial Kud+ment on the

3!0"3

situation ut e=ually possile to re+ard it as the collective decision of the +roup e9pressed in free indirect thou+ht& The follo?in+ three e9amplesare made less ami+uous y the use of e9pressive devices%& (-o one had ?arned them that there ?as a motor race on their hotel ill ,as a shoc.&) (1::)

;& and at last they all ?ent to ed, very tired, ut fairly contented, and oh, ho? they ?ere itten y u+s all that ni+ht& (1:!)"& The an+els cro?ded to+ether disconsolately& 8t ?as a?ful ?hen Mrs /pe ?as li.e this& My, ho? they ?ould pinch Chastity& (")The e9pressive emphasis on the italiciAed “,as” allo?s e9ample % to e plausily interpreted as free indirect thou+ht rather than thou+ht report&The same +oes for “oh ho?” in e9ample ;, ?hich is perhaps indeterminate et?een thou+ht and speech& 8n e9ample " the collective action(cro?din+) and the collective feelin+ or sensation (ein+ disconsolate) is follo?ed first y a free indirect presentation of their a?areness of thereason (Mrs /pe>s ehavior) for the action and the accompanyin+ state of mind (see e9ample !a), and second y a free indirect presentation oftheir intention to act in response y pinchin+ Chastity& Free indirect perception (or internal focaliAation) also has a +roup form “ut there ?as nosi+n of Miss *uncile” (16!)&The final e9ample is particularly interestin+ for the s.illful ?ay in ?hich the narrator alternates et?een collectivethou+ht report in e9amples 5a and 5c, collective free indirect speech in 5, and collective free indirect thou+ht in e9ample 5d5& (a) Their flashes and an+s had rather a dis=uietin+ effect on the party, causin+ a feelin+ of tension, ecause everyody loo.ed ne+li+ent

() and said ?hat a ore the papers ?ere, and ho? too li.e /rchie to let the photo+raphers come, (c) ut most of them, as a matter of fact,

?anted dreadfully to e photo+raphed and the others ?ere froAen ?ith unaffected terror that they mi+ht e ta.en una?ares (d) and thentheir mamas ?ould .no? ?here they had een ?hen they said they ?ere at the icesters> dance, and then there ?ould e a ro? a+ain,

?hich ?as so ehaustin# , if nothin+ else& ($6)Conte$tual thought report

/lmost all of the direct access ?ith ?hich 8 am concerned for the rest of this chapter consists of contetual thou#ht report & 8 am usin+ this term



for the short, unotrusive sentences, phrases, or even sin+le ?ords that descrie an aspect of a character>s mind and that are often comined ?ithdescriptions of action or

3!053

conte9t& This device often refers to intentions to act or motives for action and is, therefore, purposive and e9planatory in nature& 8n discussin+ astory from he Decameron, @ayne C& ooth refers to its use as “fre=uent#thou+h y modern standards certainly shallo?#inside vie?s” ofcharacters> thou+hts (15";, 1!)& Most of the follo?in+ e9amples illustrate the comple9ity of the relationships et?een conte9tual thou+ht report,action, and conte9t& The three are often ine9tricaly lin.ed, and so it can e a very artificial operation to lift conte9tual thou+ht report out of thesentence that contains it& This inseparaility is an illustration of the centrality of consciousness to narrative that Moni.a Fluderni. has stressed so persuasively& pecifically, many of the follo?in+ e9amples contain a reference to the social and physical conte9t ?ithin ?hich the mentalfunctionin+ ta.es place, althou+h a numer have een cut for reasons of space& The follo?in+ sentence uses t?enty3t?o ?ords to descrie not Kust mental states, ut also several facts aout the physical environment ho? the +roup are positioned, the fact that they have a oo. in front of

them, and the movement of Mrs /pe

(10) Their heads ?ere close to+ether and they ?ere so deeply en+rossed in the story that they did not hear Mrs /pe>s entry& ("0)

ometimes the reference to the conte9t accompanies the action or consciousness description

(11) /dam sat in the ac. of the car ?ith Miles, ?ho ?as clearly put out aout his friend>s lac. of cordiality& (1:")

/t other times, the conte9t is contained ?ithin the description

(1!) They ?ent do?n the hill feelin+ uoyant and detached& (1$6)



This is a description of an action, ut it +oes further in identifyin+ the accompanyin+ mental processes than a statement such as “They stood ehind the curtain, ” that leaves more ?or. for the reader to do in decidin+ ?hy they are standin+ there& 8t can e decoded in consciousness termsas follo?s the three a+reed that it ?as in their interest to conceal themselves from someone, realiAed that it ?as possile for them to do so, anddecided to+ether to ta.e the action of hidin+& 8n this ?ay, the reader as part of the process of understandin+ narratives has to translate passa+es of

i d i i i i d d i i i h f “ h l i l” l / 8 id i h $ i i i ifi h hil h f



action description into mind description in the manner of a “psycholo+ical” novel& /s 8 said in chapter $, it is si+nificant that philosophers oftendiscuss action in terms of ho? onloo.ers to an action ?ould reasonaly interpret it& This perspective is very similar to the role of the reader inconsiderin+ the motives ehind and the reasons for a character>s actions&

@hen ?e e9plain an action y +ivin+ the reason for it, ?e often redescrie the action y placin+ it in its conte9t& The descriptions of the physicalconte9t and the causal net?or. ehind the fictional ehavior are sometimes identical

(16) People had cro?ded into the nder+round station for shelter from the rain& (!5)

8n Kust t?elve ?ords, the narrator descries the action, the physical conte9t in detail (the rain, the station, and the cro?d), and the fact that thisconte9t is the reason for the action of shelterin+& Ho?ever, many narrative statements re=uire a +ood deal more decodin+ than e9amples 1$ and16& For e9ample, some convey information aout more than one consciousness

(1%) Here an atmosphere of +reater +eniality prevailed& (1$1)

3!113

4ecoded, this mi+ht mean that the consciousnesses of the individuals in the +roup are open and ?elcomin+ and are enKoyin+ the atmosphere& 8tmi+ht also mean that the consciousness of anyone comin+ in ?ould feel ?elcome and at home& -arratorial statements such as e9amples 1% and1; mi+ht seem a lon+ ?ay from a study of the presentation of consciousness

(1;) Jou see, that ?as the .ind of party /rchie ch?ert>s party ?as& ($:)

ut as ?ith e9ample 1%, ?hen e9ample 1; is decoded, ?e find that that it is precisely aout consciousness& 8t is sayin+ that ?ithin the story?orld

of the narrative this is ?hat the fictional minds of the +roup of characters that comprised the party thou+ht, felt, perceived, e9perienced ?hen

they ?ere present in the social and physical conte9t of the party& Mental functionin+ is al?ays present ho?ever oli=ue the e9plicit reference toit&

The distinction et?een action and non3action is fre=uently not clear, illustratin+ the point that it is the mental process, not the physicalh i h i ifi i



movement, that is the si+nificant issue

(1") This time no3one trouled to pic. them up& (16)

The asence of action, such as not pic.in+ somethin+ up, can e as much of an action as a physical movement, particularly ?hen the nature of theintention is specified, as in this case& @hen non3action is delierate, it is an action&

(15) They ?ere very late for the film -ina ?anted to see, and that set them ac. a+ain& They didn>t spea. for a lon+ time& (;%)

-ot spea.in+ is a non3action that amounts in a conte9t such as this to a very si+nificant action&

#he thoughtaction continuum

Tal. of decodin+ action statements into consciousness statements can, ho?ever, e misleadin+ if it +ives the impression that, not?ithstandin+ theintimate and comple9 connections et?een the t?o, thou+ht and action are easily separale& They are not, and many of the statements in fictionalnarratives inhait the lar+e +ray area et?een the t?o& 8 shall refer to this phenomenon as the thou#ht$action continuum, and it is one of the .eysenses in ?hich the mind e9tends eyond the s.in& @itt+enstein>s =uestion (“8s this a report aout his ehavior or his state of mindI” 156", 1;5Q)is particularly relevant here&

(!0) /dam undressed very =uic.ly and +ot into ed -ina more slo?ly arran+in+ her clothes on the chair and fin+erin+ the ornaments on thechimney piece ?ith less than her usual self3possession& /t last she put out the li+ht& (%")

This passa+e, ?ith the e9ception of the phrase “?ith less than her usual self

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possession, ” consists of ?hat mi+ht e called si#nificant action the reader is provided ?ith enou+h conte9tual information to appreciate thesi+nificance of /dam actin+ very =uic.ly and -ina actin+ more slo?ly& The reader can speculate ?ith assurance aout ?hat mental eventsaccompany these t?o actions ecause he or she .no?s that they are aout to +o to ed to+ether for the first time /dam is ea+er and -ina isnervous& Ho?ever, the phrase “?ith less than her usual self3possession” is in the +ray area et?een thou+ht and action& @itt+enstein>s =uestion is

i t th d t d i ti th f -i > h i d f h t t f i d



appropriate ecause the ?ords appear to e a description oth of -ina>s ehavior and of her state of mind&

8 ?ill illustrate the thou+ht3action continuum ?ith a study of the speech ta+ advers in +ile 6odies& Prince defines ?ords such as these asattributive discourse “The discourse accompanyin+ a character>s (direct) discourse and specifyin+ the act of the spea.er or thin.er & & & and(sometimes) indicatin+ various dimensions or features of the act, the character, the settin+ in ?hich they appear etc” (15";, ;)& The purpose ofthis discussion is to apply a co+nitive perspective to the =uestion, @hat precisely is ein+ attriutedI The advers listed are descriptions ofactions in the sense that they descrie the manner in ?hich speech acts are performed, ut they can also e re+arded as conte9tual thou+ht reportas they provide important information aout the functionin+ of characters> minds& The descriptions can e placed at various points alon+ thethou+ht3action continuum (and readers mi+ht ?ell disa+ree ?ith the su++ested placin+s)& 8n some cases, at the thou+ht end of the spectrum, astate of mind is directly and oviously indicated& uKect to the conte9t sho?in+ that the indication is ironic and therefore misleadin+, these casesseem strai+htfor?ard

Triumph “said 2ottie triumphantly” (:$)

4esperation “said Eane>s father desperately” ($5), “he shouted desperately” (1:5)

/n+er or annoyance “said the stran+er crossly” ("%), “said the Colonel crossly” (1;5), “said the Colonel crossly” (1!%), “said the Prime Ministersharply” (11!)

itterness “said Father *othschild itterly” (";)

/n9iety “as.ed the armaid an9iously” (1$!)

Thou+htfulness “repeated Mr enfleet thou+htfully” (!;)

Rentleness “said Father *othschild +ently” (111), “said /dam +ently” (1%$)

8n other cases, perhaps in the middle of the spectrum, one mi+ht say that a state of mind is indirectly indicated

3!1:3

@i h t i t “ id /d i l ” (;!)



@ish to +ive encoura+ement “said /dam encoura+in+ly” (;!)

/sentmindedness “said the Colonel dreamily” (1"$), “said Mr Henderson mechanically” (1%)

Garious ne+ative feelin+s “said Miss *uncile severely” (1$%), “said the drun. MaKor distantly” (161), “he said rather stiffly” (1%:), “repeatedMiss *uncile firmly” (1$%)

2ac. of concern “said Mr 8saacs airily” (1!:)

Ho?ever, at the action end of the spectrum, there are some very interestin+ e9amples in ?hich the adver appears to relate primarily to themanner of spea.in+

“said the Reneral hospitaly” (1"") “said Miss *uncile rather faintly” (1:1) “said the Matron archly” (16%) “he hinted dar.ly” (!0) “she as.ed

plaintively” (;5) “said /dam in no particular manner” (!;)

These e9amples appear to contain a lar+er element of narratorial Kud+ment and seem to re=uire more ?or. from the reader, than the others& 8n particular, althou+h the real3?orld .no?led+e that ?e rin+ to te9ts tells us +enerally ?hat they mean as action descriptions (?e 9ind$of .no??hat an “arch” tone of voice sounds li.e), their si+nificance in terms of the character>s consciousness can e unclear ?hen ta.en out of conte9t&/s a conse=uence, the accompanyin+ state of mind is not ovious and has to e inferred from the surroundin+ narrative& These cases also raiseissues related to focaliAation and free indirect perception& Lther characters ?ill e listenin+ to the Reneral and Miss *uncile and ?ill eunderstood y the reader as perceivin+ the various tones of voices as “arch, ” “dar., ” and so on& These advers need not simply e reports of thespea.in+ characters> minds, they can also e read as reports of the listenin+ characters> minds&

ndicati)e description

*eaders use the preference rule system in readin+ actions& That is, they prefer to use the default of the indicated mental state unless otherevidence that is contained in the conte9t indicates other?ise& 8 am +ivin+ the name indicative description to a description of an action thatappears to indicate an accompanyin+ state of mind /s 8 have said it is not easy to distin+uish et?een such



appears to indicate an accompanyin+ state of mind& /s 8 have said, it is not easy to distin+uish et?een such

3!1$3

descriptions and thou+ht report, as in chapter !5 of (mma, “everyody had a urst of admiration on first arrivin+” (155%, :0:)& To apply@itt+enstein>s =uestion a+ain, 8s this a report of their ehavior or their state of mindI The ?ord “admiration” could refer to their thou+ht processes or to their ehavior& 8n a sense, it is descriin+ a pulic event, ut there is a private side& The phrase “a urst of admiration” could meanthat they felt +enuinely admirin+ or that they ?ere only ehavin+ in an admirin+ ?ay, possily insincerely out of politeness& 2ater, Mr @eston isreferred to as “cheerful&” This is another indicative description that may conceal a different state of mind from that indicated& /lthou+h ?e arenot told e9plicitly, ?e can +uess from the conte9t of the o9 Hill picnic that the cheerful ehavior may e accompanied y a rather stressed stateof mind& 8t is possile to apply ?hat mi+ht e called the opposite thou#ht test to an action description of this sort& This means as.in+ ?hether thestate of mind that appears to e implied y the action is in fact present in the story?orld& The character mi+ht e thin.in+ the opposite of ?hat isimplied y the description of the action& 8n the case of polite ehavior, it is clearly possile for the character to e havin+ anythin+ other than

polite thou+hts& 8n Bmma the politeness of the actions of all the characters ut Bmma to?ard Miss ates does not necessarily entail less impatientfeelin+s to?ard her +arrulousness& 8t is often for the reader to decide& 8ndicative descriptions only indicate and do not conclusively estalish thestate of mind that ?ould normally e associated ?ith the ehavior& The use of misleadin+ indicative description is characteristic of heavily ironicnovelists such as Eane /usten and Bvelyn @au+h&

8ndicative descriptions tend to occur in the middle of the thou+ht3action continuum& They can e identified ?hen the ans?er to @itt+enstein>s=uestion is unclear& Ta.e this e9ample

(!1) nsteadily, ut ?ith rene?ed hope, the passen+ers had disemar.ed& (15)

8n the case of “?ith rene?ed hope” and “had disemar.ed, ” the ans?er to @itt+enstein>s =uestion is strai+htfor?ard the former is conte9tual

thou+ht report that refers to a state of mind and the latter is ehavior& ut ?hat aout “unsteadily”I 8 ?ould su++est that the ans?er to the

=uestion is not ovious& Ln the one hand, it is a description of the manner in ?hich the action of disemar.in+ is performed on the other hand, itappears to indicate that the action is accompanied y a sensation or feelin+ of unsteadiness&

(!!) then rose & & & the despairin+ voices of Mrs /pe>s an+els, in fre=uently ro.en unison, sin+in+, sin+in+, ?ildly, desperately, as thou+h theirhearts ?ould rea. in the effort and their minds lose their reason (1! 1:)



hearts ?ould rea. in the effort and their minds lose their reason& (1!#1:)

3!163

Here, the description of the action of unison sin+in+ is follo?ed y indicative description the t?o advers “?ildly” and “desperately” descrie a=uality in the sound ut also appear to indicate the accompanyin+ state of mind of ?ild desperation& Ho?ever, it is y no means certain that thisstate of mind does e9ist ?ithin the reality of the fictional story?orld& The uncertainty is reinforced y the e9plicitly modal nature (“as thou+h”) ofthe ne9t indicative description& 8t seems too far3fetched to suppose that the an+els really are sufferin+ ro.en hearts and lost reason& 8t is perhaps est understood as a comment y the narrator on the +eneral states of mind or dispositions of the an+els, ?hich has a validity eyond their mentalstate at that particular time&

The ironic possiilities of misleadin+ indicative description are e9tensive (!:) the CafO *oyal ?as cro?ded and overflo?in+& Bveryone ?as ein+ thorou+hly cross, ut only the most sarcastic and overearin+ ?ere +iven tales, and only the +ross and outra+eous ?ere +iven food& (160)

tartin+ ?ith the physical conte9t, four +roups are descried “everyone, ” the “sarcastic and overearin+, ” the “+ross and outra+eous, ” and thestaff ?ho are puttin+ up ?ith this ehavior& This last +roup is understood, li.e the car driver in the chan. and /elson e9ample (chapter %,section !)& “Cross” is usually used to refer to a state of mind, ut everyone “ein+” cross sounds more li.e a description of ehavior ?ith anelement of calculation aout it& This suspicion is confirmed y the rest of the sentence, ?here the mental states present in those +ettin+ tales andthen food are not necessarily the ones indicated& Their states of mind are proaly related more to a cold3looded decision to use this sort of ehavior in order to +et ?hat they ?ant& This difference results in misleadin+ indicative description&

/ +ood deal of t?entieth3century narration is characteriAed y a reluctance to ma.e the decodin+ of action too e9plicit and a disinclination to usetoo much indicative description or conte9tual thou+ht report& @ayne ooth mentions that in the manuscript of Stephen ;ero, Eames Eoyce>s earlyversion of A Portrait of the Artist as a Eoun# -an, Eoyce ori+inally ?rote that tephen put his spoon throu+h the ottom of his e++shell an+rily

and then deleted the ?ord “an+rily” (15";, 5;)&

Causation

Lne of the most important functions of conte9tual thou+ht report is to present e9planations for ehavior, reasons for action, the causal net?or.sthat are present ehind apparently simple action descriptions& B9plicit motivations are also provided y ?hat 8 shall call cue$reason ?ords suchas “for ” “caused ” “so ”



as for, caused, so,

3!1%3

and “to&” 8n e9ample 16, the ?ord “for” cues the reader to read the clause follo?in+ it as an e9plicit and sufficient reason for the action& 8ne9ample !$, the physical conte9t is a+ain +iven as the reason for the ehavior

(!$) 8t ?as this last movement that caused the most havoc amon+ the passen+ers& (11)

(!6) o they all had another drin.& (:%)

(!%) Then they ?ent a?ay to intervie? some more drivers& (1::)

8mplied or indirect motivation is even more interestin+& 8n this case, everyone is relieved that a punishin+ly orin+ film has finished

(!;) @hen the reel came to an end everyone stirred lu9uriously& (1;")

The use of “?hen” instead of the cue3reason ?ord “ecause” leaves the motivation for the action teasin+ly implicit&

(!") There ?as a hush all over the course, and the refreshment tent e+an to empty =uic.ly& (1$1)

The first part of the sentence can e decoded as a delierate non3action that is caused y the race ein+ aout to start& The ne9t action is alsocaused y the same reason, ut it is very different ecause here there is a clear intention& The cue3reason phrase “to see the race” is understood&

(!5) Lutside this rin+ clustered a +roup of predatory little oys ?ith auto+raph alums and lea.in+ fountain pens& (1:6)

The use of the ?ord “clustered” and the narratorial comment of “predatory, ” to+ether ?ith the circumstantial evidence of the auto+raph alumsand the pens all imply that this is not a random +roup and that they are +athered to+ether for a common purpose& Ho?ever, the informationre+ardin+ the purpose is +iven y implication& 8t is not spelled out that they are ?aitin+ to collect auto+raphs& ut, ecause the purpose is so clearto the reader, it is easy to overloo. the fact that it is merely implied and never e9plicitly stated&



The causal net?or.s surroundin+ actions can e suKect to re+ressive =uestionin+& For e9ample in the case of e9ample 16 one can as., “Jes, ut?hy did they shelterI” “ecause they did not ?ant to +et ?et&” “@hy notI” “ecause it is uncomfortale&” /nd so on& These motivations tend to+et lar+er and lar+er, ut the chain is not infinite ecause it tends to end in a fairly unans?erale motive such as “8 ?ant to e happy&” Bven ?henthe motivation for an action appears to e e9plicitly provided, the reader often still has to fill in the implicit chains in the reasonin+& Thecharacters in +ile 6odies are va+ue, s.etchy, and attenuated ecause the cues for the reader tend to e short3term, specific, and localiAed& @hen,for e9ample, a character is descried as sayin+ somethin+ “thou+htfully, ” this does not necessarily imply that the reader should read that

3!1;3

person as a thou+htful character the ?ord may e si+nificant only for the effects to e otained in that particular scene& There is a +ood deal of?hat mi+ht e called local motivation of this sort, e9planations and reasons for actions that are specific to the particular conte9t& There is almostnone of the etended or teleolo#ical motivation that readers re=uire in order to uild up a full, detailed, and coherent sense of character& This

asence means that there is more for the reader to do& 8t is not possile to e too do+matic aout this issue as one reader may find conte9tualclues to e localiAed ?hile another may e more resourceful in usin+ them to uild up a coherent account of a character& Havin+ said that, thefollo?in+ sentence is clearly an unusual e9ample of teleolo+ical motivation as opposed to local motivation

(:0) 8t hurt /dam deeply to thin. much aout -ina& (16%)

This simple statement derives much of its po?er and impact from the fact that there is no other description of such deep feelin+ in the novel&

tron+ vivid characteriAation and clear teleolo+ical shape rely on i+ and important motivations such as love or money that can propel a ?holenarrative& @ea., haAy characteriAation tends to e associated, it seems, ?ith local and specific motivation& 8t is a notale characteristic of Gileodies that these lar+er motivations are almost never made e9plicit& This +ives the narrative its hi+hly distinctive =uality of aimless and restless

desperation&

3. ntermental #hought

This section ?ill consider the second suframe of the continuin+3consciousness frame intermental or Koint, shared, or communal thou+ht asopposed to intramental, or individual thin.in+& Jou may rememer that Eames @ertsch>s e9planation in chapter 6, section 6 that “the notion ofmental function can properly e applied to social as ?ell as individual forms of activity” (1551 !;) and that “the terms mind and mental action



mental function can properly e applied to social as ?ell as individual forms of activity (1551, !;), and that the terms mind and mental action

can appropriately e predicated of dyads that is, pairsQ and lar+er +roups as ?ell as of individuals” (1551, 1$)& nsurprisin+ly, +iven his ?or. onthe formation of the social mind, 2ev Gy+ots.y noticed a vivid e9ample of fictional intermental thin.in+ in Tolstoy>s Anna Farenina& Hecommented that +ood e9amples of the condensation and reduction of e9ternal speech are found in the novels of Tolstoy, ?ho demonstrated thatfor people livin+ in close psycholo+ical contact communication y areviated speech is common (15"%, !:%#:")& He ?as referrin+ in particular to the famous scene in ?hich Ditty and 2evin ?rite out only the initial letters of the ?ords that they ?ish to say, and the otherunderstands perfectly&

3!1"3

8 ?ill refer riefly to the ?or. of t?o theorists on fictional +roups efore e9plainin+ ho? intermental thin.in+ ?or.s in practice in +ile 6odies&Pioneerin+ research has een done y 2uomir 4oleel and ri Mar+olin on the notion of +roups ?ithin the possile3?orlds paradi+m& 8n ;eterocosmica, 4oleel is very informative aout the dynamics of ?hat he calls multiperson ,orlds “The vast maKority of stories &&& are

+enerated in multiperson ?orlds” (155", 5%) “The semantics of narrative is, at its core, the semantics of interaction” (155", 5;) and “Thea+ential constellation is not only a precondition of interactin+ ut also its scope (space)” (155", 5")& He e9plains that the “e9istence of +roups andsocial or+aniAation +ives rise to collective consciousness& 8ts co+nitive form is socially ased .no?led+e” (155", 101)& This .no?led+e includes“lan+ua+e, cultural archetypes, racial and ethnic eliefs, reli+ious creeds, ideolo+ies, and scientific .no?led+e” (155", 101)& 4oleel also ma.esthis important distinction et?een informally coordinated +roups and formal or+aniAations “8nformal coordination prevails in communities,+roups ?hose collective actin+ is >a function of individual actions> & & & its structure and modes correspond to those defined for interaction et?een persons&&&& 8n contrast, formal or+aniAation motivates social actin+ in institutions, ?hich impose a numer of supraindividual constraintse9plicitly formulated re+ulations, ?ell3defined po?er hierarchy, charted division of laour, specific role distriution, and, last ut not least,reinforcin+ social representations (le+itimiAin+ ideolo+ies, identifyin+ emlems, and so on)” (155", 111)& ri Mar+olin sets out in t?o articles(“Tellin+ Lur tory on >@e> 2iterary -arratives, ” and “Tellin+ in the Plural from Rrammar to 8deolo+y”) a typically ri+orous andcomprehensive account of the portrayal of lar+e or+aniAations or cultures in a ?ide ran+e of fictions& He calls these fictions ,e4 narratives in

order to stress that they are first3person rather than third3person narratives& This is the sort of or+aniAation that 4oleel and Mar+olin have inmind “/ mammoth or+aniAation li.e this#it emodies too much e9perience& 8t possesses in fact a sort of +roup mind” (4ic. 1555, $6)&

/s my interest in +roups in narrative is very different from 4oleel>s and Mar+olin>s, 8 should start y ma.in+ the differences e9plicit 8 am moreinterested in “they” (third3person plural) narratives than in “?e” (first3person plural) narratives 8 am also more interested in informal small+roups than in formal lar+e or+aniAations 8 ?ill e e9plorin+ a very fluid and fle9ile notion of a +roup as any a++re+ate of characters, includin+a pair and even includin+ people ?ho may not e particularly close, ut ?ho are, for ho?ever short a period, thin.in+ intermentally and 8 am asinterested in the ne+ative +roup



interested in the ne+ative +roup

3!153

dynamics of conflict and fra+mentation as in the positive dynamics of +roup solidarity and Koint identification&

The e9tent of the difference in approach can e +au+ed from the fact that Mar+olin feels that the case of a character spea.in+ aout some +roupof ?hich she or he is a memer is “ui=uitous, trivial and of no si+nificance for our purposes” (155%, 1!:)& He is here descriin+ e9actly the sortof area that 8 thin. is ?orth investi+atin+& @ithin my perspective, the role of +roups in narrative is not mar+inal& 8n fact, it is central, +iven thatmost novels are aout the conflicts et?een individuals and the social +roups to ?hich they elon+& oth 4oleel and Mar+olin have prioritiAedlar+e or+aniAations, ut some very interestin+ ?or. can e done in the middle of the individual7collective continuum ?here individuals relate toeach other in pairs or other small +roups& Mar+olin states in the openin+ para+raph of “Tellin+ in the Plural” that “+roups or collective a+ents areoptional elements in literary narratives, and ?hen they do occur, they usually occupy a ac.+round or secondary role” (!000, 65!)& This is not

the case ?ithin the informal, small +roup perspective that 8 am adoptin+&8n Mar+olin>s vie?, the “tension et?een individual and collective levels of description reaches its clima9 in the representation of mental activityor e9perientiality &&& since mental activity is essentially and inalienaly individual” (!000, %0$)& 8 hope that it is clear y no? that this remar.comes from an intellectual tradition that is very different from the intersuKective, e9ternalist perspective that informed chapters $, 6, and %& /ninevitale conse=uence of this internalist, suKective first approach is that the difficulties involved in the concept of Koint thin.in+ are heavilyoverestimated& The e9amples of intermental thou+ht in +ile 6odies that are contained in this chapter do not seem to me to e at all prolematical&@hat could e simpler than “They decided to +o”I /lso, 8 am not sure that 8 accept the firm distinction that is implied here et?een Koint actionand Koint thou+ht (that is, the former is easier to represent in discourse than the latter)& 8n practice, descriptions of the t?o in fictional narrativesare li.ely to amount to the same thin+& Eoint action re=uires at least a measure of Koint thin.in+, and Koint thin.in+ ?ill often result in Koint action&Mar+olin states that the “+eneral feelin+ of >?e3ness> or >us>&&& can in principle e descried from the outside in the third person plural, especially

in literature&&&& ut a more effective, immediate and convincin+ manner of e9pressin+ this refle9ive dimension is to let its possessors spea. for

themselves” (155%, 1!")& The very different tradition that 8 referred to earlier is a+ain evident here& @ithin the social mind paradi+m, it is not atall clear ?hy it is only “in principle” that +roups can e descried in the third person& @hy cannot a +roup

3!!03



e descried perfectly ade=uately y the usual .ind of omniscient narrator usin+ the third3person ascription that ?as e9plained in chapter 6,section !I 8t is li.e sayin+ that any individual character can in principle e descried y a thirdperson narrator, ut it is more effective,immediate, and convincin+ to let the character spea. for him or herself in the first person&

Mar+olin emphasiAes the importance of the individual memer>s sense of a +roup (for e9ample, 155%, 1!"), ?hereas my focus of interest ise=ually related to the sense of a +roup that can e possessed y outsiders or even another +roup& Lutsiders loo.in+ at a ureaucracy tend to see itin monolithic terms and re+ard the people ?ho ?or. in it as rootic adherents to a sin+le and infle9ile ureaucratic line& Ho?ever, ?or.in+?ithin a ureaucracy as 8 do, 8 see that life inside one is really fra+mented, diffuse, and incoherent& 8 am sure that this is true of many other lar+eor+aniAations& 8 am also particularly interested in the conflicts et?een individuals in +roups that Mar+olin illuminatin+ly discusses in a passa+eon intra+roup conflict (!000, %05)& Bvelyn @au+h>s -en at Arms is in part aout the conflictin+ feelin+s of the prota+onist to?ard his re+iment&They include affection, a feelin+ of elon+in+, and so on, ut also e9asperation, dis+ust, and eventually a feelin+ of fallin+ out of love ?ith it&Lviously, the other soldiers in the story have e=ually amivalent feelin+s to?ard the re+iment and to?ard each other& Mar+olin refers to the fact

that a numer of individual actions carried out simultaneously do not necessarily constitute +roup action ecause the participants may e actin+independently of each other (!000, 65$)& This is true& Ho?ever, 8 ?ould li.e to e9plore the cases that are mar+inal from this perspective ecause8 ?ould li.e to see ho? far the concept of intermental action can e pushed& This ?ould mean, for e9ample, as.in+ ?hat it is aout a particularsocial or physical conte9t that mi+ht cause individuals to underta.e simultaneous individual actions, and ?hether the ans?er to that =uestionsho?s that there is a +ray area et?een +roup actions and connected individual actions&

@ith this conte9t in mind, 8 no? ?ish to consider more systematically the second suframe of shared or +roup thin.in+& 8 say “moresystematically” ecause 8 have already een implicitly discussin+ this device in some detail in the previous sections& 8 am sure that you ?ill havenoticed that a lar+e numer of the e9amples of thou+ht and action +iven earlier#e9amples : to 10, 1!, 1$ to 15, and !1 to !5#?ere e9amples ofintermental thin.in+& / a.htinian emphasis on the shared, social, and dialo+ic nature of mental functionin+ is after all clearly suitale to a novelthat is e9plicitly concerned ?ith

(:1) all that succession and repetition of massed humanity&&&& Those vile odies& (10$)

3!!13

Communicati)e action

Lne of the terms in Eames @ertsch>s fivefold typolo+y of situated action that 8 discussed in chapter 6, section 6 ?as communicative action& This



L e o t e te s Ea es @e tsc s ve o d typo o+y o s tuated act o t at d scussed c apte 6, sect o 6 ?as co u cat ve act o & snotion is closely lin.ed to the concept of intermental thin.in+& 8 ar+ued in the previous section that fictional thou+ht and action descriptions forma continuum and this ar+ument ?or.s particularly ?ell in the case of intermental action and thou+ht& /s Clar. and Chalmers su++est, if their

ar+ument is “ta.en seriously, certain forms of social activity mi+ht e reconceived as less a.in to communication and action, and as more a.in tothou+ht” (155", 1")& 8n other ?ords, action descriptions can ?ithin the situated thou+ht paradi+m e easily and informatively reconceived asconsciousness descriptions& For these reasons, 8 am not +oin+ to ma.e a hard and fast distinction et?een intermental thin.in+ andcommunicative action& Ho?ever, althou+h communicative action clearly re=uires intermental functionin+, and core or paradi+matic intermentalthin.in+ is Koint or cooperative decision ma.in+, 8 have ?idened my use of the term to include Koint states of mind and other interestin+ mar+inalcases such as ?hat mi+ht e called conflicted or competitive actions (such as =uarrellin+)& 8ntermental thin.in+ and communicative action can oth e lin.ed to the emedded narrative approach y ein+ re+arded as Koint or mer+ed emedded narratives&

This is a core e9ample of +roup decision ma.in+

(:!) @hen they reached the pits they decided they ?ere hun+ry& 8t seemed too far to clim up to the dinin+ tent, so they ate as much of themechanic>s lunch as Miss *uncile>s ci+arette had spared& (1$;)

This is paradi+matic functional intermental thin.in+ ecause it involves an initial shared decision, a Koint perception (of distance), a shared Kud+ment (re+ardin+ the distance), and, finally, a +roup decision to act& The cue3reason ?ord “so” ma.es e9plicit the communal motivation forthe communicative action&

(::) Lutside his door, t?o very limp detective ser+eants had deserted their posts& (1!)

Contained ?ithin this description of a Koint action of desertion is the Koint decision to ta.e that action& “4eserted” ma.es the mental processesmuch clearer than a simple description of mere physical movement& The shared feelin+s or emotions (for e9ample, sensations of tiredness and

feelin+s of resentment) that presumaly caused the decision to leave are not made e9plicit ut can e inferred from the conte9t& 8n the ne9t case,

the advers used in the description emphasiAe that this is very conscious communicative action and that the individuals are clearly a?are that it isa Koint enterprise

3!!!3



(:$) Then they all pinched her all over, ut precisely and Kudiciously, so as not to distur her ?in+s or halo& (;5)

The follo?in+ passa+es move a?ay from core functional intermental decision ma.in+ in various ?ays& For e9ample, some intermental thin.in+ iscounterfactual

(:6) The +atecrashers ?ondered ?hether it ?ould not have een etter to have stayed at home& ("6)

(:%) The race ?as not due to start until noon, ut any indecision ?hich they may have felt aout the employment of the ne9t fe? hours ?assettled for them y the local police& (1:%)

B9ample :% descries a counterfactual intermental state of mind& The +roup mi+ht have e9perienced, ut did not in fact e9perience, the state ofmind of indecision& The reason ?hy the indecision did not occur is then +iven&

Here are illustrations of conflicted communicative action (:;) He and -ina ?ere lunchin+ at BspinoAa>s and =uarrellin+ halfheartedly& (51)

and competitive communicative action

(:") (a) The others ?ere Kostlin+ one another ?ith their lu++a+e, () tryin+ to attract the Customs officers (c) and lon+in+ for a cup of tea& (15)

These actions clearly differ from the cooperative actions descried in e9amples :! to :$& 8n e9ample :", the Koint mental event of the attempt toattract attention ma.es it clear that the passen+ers have all ta.en the decision delierately to Kostle one another in order to +ain an advanta+e&Competitive action is intermental in the sense that the individuals are united in reco+niAin+ the need to en+a+e in this action& 8t is also ?orthnotin+ that the same considerations re+ardin+ @itt+enstein>s =uestion, the thou+ht3action continuum, and the nature of action apply Kust as much

to Koint action as to sin+le a+ent action& B9ample :"a is a description of odily movement, ut can it e called an action as it is presumalyunintentionalI B9ample :"c is thou+ht report of a state of mind& ut ?hat is e9ample :"I 8t is @itt+enstein>s =uestion a+ain 8s it a report of

ehavior or of a state of mindI 8t is important to note also that e9ample :" has a causal function it is the reason for the Kostlin+, and it is theintention to +et off the oat =uic.ly& The potential comple9ity of competitive intermental thou+ht is clearly demonstrated in a +ame of chess& Fora +ood chess player, the attempt to construct the proale thou+ht processes of the opponent can stretch to a very lar+e numer of moves ahead&

4escriptions of the shared perceptions and states of mind that cause and



p p p

3!!:3

emer+e from Koint actions such as emotions, feelin+s, and sensations are very common

(:5) 8t ?as not a really +ood evenin+& The lon+ drive & & & chilled and depressed them, dissipatin+ the +aiety ?hich had flic.ered ratherspasmodically over Rin+er>s dinner& (10:)

This is a description of the thou+hts and feelin+s of a +roup in very astract terms& The ?ord “evenin+” in the first sentence functions as ametonymy for “the +roup of people spendin+ the evenin+ to+ether&” The passa+e descries shared emotions and feelin+s such as the sensation of ein+ chilled, the state of mind of ein+ depressed, and the previous state of mind of +aiety& /lthou+h this sort of thin.in+ is different fromfunctional decision ma.in+, it is the product of a shared +roup dynamic& The individuals are e9periencin+ the same states of mind ecause of the

common situation in ?hich they find themselves& ee also e9amples 1!, 1%, 1;, and $%& Rroup veral action is common “/ll teams ?ereconfident of victory, they said” (1::)&

-ot all +roups are intermental& 8t may e that individuals simply happen to share eliefs or feelin+s that have not een ?or.ed out to+ether orcaused y the same +roup dynamic& 8n e9ample $0 it is not clear ?hether there is intermental a+reement et?een Chastity and 4ivine 4iscontentor ?hether they intramentally happen to thin. the same thin+

($0) /t intervals letters arrived from uenos /ires in ?hich Chastity and 4ivine 4iscontent spo.e rather critically of 2atin /mericanentertainment& (5!) ($1) (Many doctors, thus diverted, spent an enKoyale day ?ithout apparent preKudice to their patients&) (1:;)

B9ample $1 refers to t?o +roups, ut as discrete individuals and not as intermental +roups& /lthou+h the reason for the doctors> and patients>

states of mind happens to e the same, they are not cooperatively shared&

+elationship with intramental thinking

8n a sense, intermental thin.in+ is simply the a++re+ate of the individual, intramental consciousnesses that ma.e up the +roup& Ln the other hand,intermental thin.in+ is often more than the sum of its parts, and this difference can sometimes e =uantified& My partner and 8 actively cooperateon the ans?ers to a ?ee.ly =uiA (every aturday in the 8uardian ne?spaper) and re+ularly +et scores of si9 to ei+ht out of ten, compared to a



y = ( y y p p ) + y + + p proale a++re+ate of individual scores of aout t?o or three& The intermental dividend is clearly sustantial& The po?er of intermental thou+ht isclearly related to the concept of syner+y,

3!!$3

?hich specifies that a comined effect is +reater than the sum of the parts and that increased effectiveness and achievements are produced ycomined action and cooperation&

8n e9ample $!, an intramental state of mind, ein+ moved, is put in an intermental conte9t ecause all the other listeners are moved as ?ell

($!) The /merican ?ho, li.e all the listeners, had een profoundly moved y the e93Din+>s recitation& (::)

ometimes, an individual description ecomes intermental ?ith the introduction of others such as, in this case, co3conspirators($:) Father *othschild ?as conspirin+ ?ith Mr Lutra+e and 2ord Metroland& ("!)

The narrator chooses a form of ?ords that +ives the ?ei+ht to Father *othschild rather than sayin+, “The three ?ere conspirin+, ” therey cuein+the reader to surmise that he is the most enthusiastic conspirator& 8ntermental thou+ht report is sometimes necessarily appro9imate& 8n an e9amplesuch as “They all fell ac. in amaAement, ” it seems li.ely that some individuals ?ould e more amaAed than others& 8t may e necessary in somecases of intermental thou+ht to develop a division et?een the core and the periphery, ?hich ?ould indicate that some individuals had thespecified mental states to a +reater de+ree than others& Ln a related point, +roups are sometimes specified ?ith a leader

($$) The old ri+ade, led y Mrs lac.?ater, thre? themselves ?ith relish into an or+y of liti+ation& (5!)

/ stran+e .ind of leadership occurs ?hen /dam ?or.s as a +ossip columnist

($6) ar+uin+ that people did not really mind ,hom they read aout provided that a .ind of vicarious in=uisitiveness into the lives of others ?assatisfied, /dam e+an to invent people& (5$)

The activities of /dam>s creations then e+in to respond to the pulic>s reception of them as real people& ymiotically, the fictional creationsthen influence readers> actual ehavior, ?hich in turn modifies their actions and so on& /dam>s mind is in a a.htinian dialo+ue ?ith ?hat he



anticipates, correctly, the pulic mind to e& His ?holly fictitious narratives ta.e on a life of their o?n and achieve a .ind of reality ?ithin thestory?orld that is ased on the dialo+ic relationship et?een /dam>s intramental thou+ht processes and the pulic>s intermental mind&

8n one scene, three characters are descried as ($%) maintainin+ a moody silence& (160)

This phrase implies three separate conscious decisions to remain silent, and the resultin+ non3action maintains the +roup dynamic& “Moody”indicates the

3!!63

shared reason for the silence& The ne9t three passa+es contain very comple9 interrelationships et?een intermental and intramental thin.in+&B9ample $; occurs efore and e9ample $" after /dam and -ina ma.e love for the first time

($;) (a) ut this raised a =uestion in oth their minds () that had een unotrusively a+itatin+ them throu+hout the Kourney& (c) -either saidanymore on the suKect, (d) ut there ?as a distinct air of constraint (e) in the 4aimler from Pulorou+h on?ards& (%;)

/n intermental event is descried in e9ample $;a, ut e9ample $; ma.es it clear that it is ased on previously e9istin+ or latent states of mind(of uncertainty and apprehension re+ardin+ the possiility that they mi+ht e ma.in+ love that ni+ht)& “notrusive” refers to the fact that theirstate of mind had not made itself ovious in their ehavior& B9ample $;c is non3action that arises from a conscious intermental decision not to doanythin+& B9ample $;d can e decoded as /dam is e9periencin+ a feelin+ of constraint -ina is e9periencin+ the same feelin+ and an oservercould tell from their e9ternal ehavior that they ?ere e9periencin+ that feelin+& B9ample $;e is the physical conte9t&

($") (a) They treated each other =uite differently () after their ni+ht>s e9periences& (c) /dam ?as inclined to e e+otistical and despondent (d)

-ina ?as rather +ro?n up and disillusioned and distinctly cross& (;%)

The action in e9ample $"a is intermental in the sense that their thou+hts and actions have chan+ed as a unit& The reason for the chan+es +iven ine9ample $" consists of a Koint e9perience& Ho?ever, in e9amples $"c and $"d, their reactions are intramentally different& “4espondent” isclearly a state of mind& “B+otistical” is sli+htly different ecause it has more of the =uality of a ehavior description and also a Kud+ment y thenarrator& “8nclined to e” puts these mental states in the conte9t of /dam>s ?hole personality& /s re+ards -ina>s reactions, @itt+enstein>s=uestion is unans?erale&



($5) (a) /dam and Miles and /rchie ch?ert () did not tal. much& (c) The effects of their drin.s had no? entered on that secondary sta+e,

vividly descried in temperance handoo.s, ?hen the momentary illusion of ?ell3ein+ and e9hilaration +ives place to melancholy, indi+estionand moral decay& (d) /dam tried to concentrate his thou+hts upon his sudden ?ealth, ut they seemed unale to adhere to this hi+h pinnacle, andas often as he impelled them up, slithered ac. helplessly to his present physical discomfort& (1$5)

The listin+ of the individuals in e9ample $5a seems si+nificant, pavin+ the ?ay for the pro+ression in this passa+e from intermental tointramental thou+ht

3!!%3

and the eventual disinte+ration of the +roup later in the narrative& B9ample $5 is si+nificant action it soon ecomes clear ?hy they did not feelli.e tal.in+& B9ample $5c is +roup thou+ht report that descries a typical process of consciousness as it applies in this case to these threeindividuals& B9ample $5d is intramental thou+ht report that is standard in most novels ut comparatively rare in this one& /dam>s thou+ht processes are preoccupied, as this discussion has een, ?ith the importance of physical conte9t&

The thriller ?riter 4onna 2eon is very +ood at conveyin+ the intimate e and flo? of the intermental unit of a marria+e that is not e9plored in+ile 6odies& For e9ample, “he lau+hed at the Ko.e contempt for Freud and all his ?or.s and pomps ?as part of the intellectual +lue that heldthem to+ether” (155;, !:6) “He stood at the door and ?atched her turn a pa+e& The radar of lon+ marria+e caused her to turn to him” (155%,1!") and “/s if she had read his thou+hts, she ans?ered” (155%, 5")&

roup norms

The foundation for a +ood deal of the ?or. done in this chapter has een laid y possile3?orlds theorists and social thou+ht analysts, and this is particularly true of +roup norms& /s 4oleel remar.s, “sQocial representations and collective emotions are essential for +roup cohesion, splittin+



(6:) (a) There ?ere aout a doAen people left at the party () that hard .ernel of +aiety that never rea.s&&&& (c) “Lf course there>s al?ays the*itA” said /rchie&&&& ut he said it in the tone of voice that made all the others say, (d) no, the *itA ?as too, too orin+ at that time of ni+ht&&&& (e)oon someone ?ould say those fatal ?ords, “@ell, 8 thin. it>s time for me to +o to ed &&&” (f) and the party ?ould e over& ($%)

This passa+e e+ins ?ith narrative description in e9ample 6:a& B9ample 6: is a sutly ?orded comment or Kud+ment y the narrator on thei d f h h l fi i ll h ll h h d f i f h i i l d



minds of the ?hole +roup& uperficially, they are +ay ut all the other ?ords apart from “+aiety” convey a sense of their aimlessness anddesperation& This is the consensus in action& The action in e9ample 6:c can e decoded as follo?s he intended that his action ?ould have an

effect on their minds that ?ould e the opposite to the surface meanin+ of the ?ords and cause them to come to the same decision re+ardin+ anintention to act as he has (that is, to +o else?here)& B9ample 6:d is intermental free indirect speech, similar to the +roup free indirect thou+ht that8 referred to in an earlier section& B9ample 6:e is a statement y the narrator that one of the +roup ?ill come to an intramental decision to leaveand so destroy the intermental consensus& B9ample 6:f descries the conse=uences of e9ample 6:e& ocial norms are al?ays liale to etrans+ressed y individuals, and the fatal ?ords are a potentially norm3rea.in+ intramental action& uch dissent

3!!"3

is characteristic of many aspects of the relationship et?een intermental and intramental thin.in+&

4issentin+ action can e comically inadvertent

(6$) Then Mrs Melrose /pe stood up to spea.& / hush fell in the +ilt allroom e+innin+ at the ac. and spreadin+ amon+ the chairs until onlyMrs lac.?ater>s voice ?as heard e9=uisitely articulatin+ some details of 2ady Metroland>s past& ("$)

ut, in e9ample 66, the same act, rea.in+ a socially a+reed silence, =uite delierately defies the consensus

(66) ut suddenly on that silence virant ?ith self3accusation, ro.e the or+an voice of Bn+land, the huntin+ cry of the ancien re#ime& & & “?hat adamned impudent ?oman” she said& ("6)

ometimes, inter3+roup conflict ?ill re=uire adroit social mana+ement y others

(6%) it is only a very confident hostess ?ho ?ill invite oth these sets to+ether at the same time& ("1)

Lviously, intramental dissent can also ta.e place amon+ the norm3reinforcement of core, collaorative intermental decision ma.in+

(6;) /fter further discussion the conclusion ?as reached that an+els ?ere nurses, and that ecame the official rulin+ of the household& ut thesecond footman ?as of the opinion that they ?ere Kust >youn+ persons&> (;5)

Th fi l f i l hi .i hi h 8 i h d i i h fli h i h h i l li h d



The final aspect of intermental thin.in+ to ?hich 8 ?ish to dra? attention is the +roup conflict that can arise ?hen the social norms estalished yt?o or more +roups are incompatile

(6") They stopped for dinner at another hotel, ?here everyone +i++led at Miss *uncile>s trousers& (1!5) (65) T?o little /merican cars had failedto start their team ?or.ed desperately at them amid derisive comments from the cro?d (1$!)

These e9amples may seem rather trivial, ut the ne9t is representative of the social fissures that are such a mar.ed feature of the novel

(%0) The real aristocracy &&& had done nothin+ aout comin+ in fancy dressQ& They had come on from a dance and stood in a little +roup ythemselves, aloof, amused ut not amusin+ ($$)

8n descriin+ the self3conscious conflict and hostility et?een the small +roup (the aristocrats) and the lar+er +roup (the rest of the party), the passa+e is an interestin+ e9ample of ho? focaliAation can chan+e in Kust four ?ords “amused ut not amusin+&” “/mused” descries theconsciousness of the aristocrats

3!!53

“?e are amused in a superior sort of ?ay at the rest of the party&” “/musin+” descries the state of mind of the rest of the party “they are verysuperior ut ?e do not find them amusin+&”

Ln occasions the reader can e9perience a e?ilderin+ly comple9 mOlan+e of different intermental +roups, ?hich also contains very mar.ed+roup conflict and hostility

(%1) (a) From the ?indo? the an+elsQ could see the +uests arrivin+ for the party& () 8n spite of the rain =uite a lar+e cro?d had collected &&& (c) tocriticiAe the cloa.s ?ith appreciative “oohs” and “ahs” or contemptuous sniffs&&&& (d) The ri+ht Joun+ People came poppin+ all to+ether&&&& (e)

ome “+atecrashers” ?ho had made the mista.e of comin+ in Gictorian fancy dress (f) ?ere detected and repulsed& (+) They hurried home tochan+e for a second assault& (h) -o one ?anted to miss Mrs /pe>s deut& (i) ut the an+els ?ere rather uneasy& (;")

B9ample %1a consists of intermental free indirect perception the an+els are ?atchin+ the other +roups& 8n e9ample %1, the cro?d is a second+roup of ?hom ?e are told the circumstances under ?hich they too. the decision to come& B9ample %1c is communicative action, and thedK ti d t d i it i di ti f th i t t f i d Th t t f f th i i



adKectives used to descrie it are indicative of the accompanyin+ states of mind& The contempt of one +roup for another is an oviousmanifestation of +roup conflict& B9ample %1d descries the action of a third +roup& B9ample %1e consists of a fourth +roup and their action of

comin+ in Gictorian dress& Ho?ever, the fact that they come ?ron+ly dressed ma.es it clear that there is a fifth +roup, understood ut norm3re+ulatin+, ?ho had decided that it ?as the ?ron+ dress& The norm3re+ulatin+ +roup, still unnamed, ta.es the action in e9ample %1f of detectin+and repulsin+ the +atecrashers& 8n e9ample %1+, the +atecrashers then ta.e the decision to follo? another course of action ?ith the intention ofevadin+ the norm re+ulators& 8n e9ample %1h, the reason +iven for the course of action in e9ample %1+ +ives information aout the state of mind(anticipation, e9citement, and so on) of all the +roups so far referred to& Finally, in e9ample %1i, the focus is narro?ed a+ain, and ?e are ac.?ith a very specific piece of intermental thou+ht report related to the first +roup mentioned&

4. Dou'ly 0m'edded !arrati)es

8n this section 8 am e9tendin+ the concept of emedded narratives y lin.in+ it to the notion of situated identity that 8 discussed in chapter 6,section 6 in order to develop the third suframe& This is the douly emedded narrative a

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character>s mind as contained ?ithin another character>s mind& The claim that 8 ma.e y usin+ the term situated identity is that a fictionalcharacter>s identity consists, not Kust of his or her o?n emedded narrative, ut of all the douly emedded narratives of ?hich he or she is thesuKect& Here is an e9ample of a douly emedded narrative “The mind of the youn+ 2ord of Rlenvarloch ?as filled ?ith anticipation, not themost pleasant, concernin+ the manner in ?hich he ?as li.ely to e received y the Monarch & & & and he ?as, ?ith the usual mental an9iety ofthose in such a situation, framin+ ima+inary =uestions from the Din+, and over3toilin+ his spirit in devisin+ ans?ers to them” (cott 15;:, 1:$)&8n this passa+e, -i+el (2ord of Rlenvarloch) is ima+inin+ ?hat sort of reception he ?ill +et from Din+ Eames 8 ?hen he arrives at the Court& Hisemedded narrative is in a future3oriented, counterfactual mode and is tryin+ to anticipate future events y containin+ ?ithin it another emedded

narrative# that of the Din+& This vie? of the Din+>s mind can therefore e called a doubly embedded narrative& *yan>s term for this phenomenonis recursive embeddin# (15"6, ;!:)&

“He tried to put his mind inside *our.e>s caper” (Connelly 155:, :::)& This sentence occurs in a thriller in ?hich the detective finally realiAesthat *our.e, an F8 a+ent, is in fact the villain& The detective attempts to vie? the story?orld from a different aspect not any more from anaspect that assumes that *our.e has een helpin+ the murder investi+ation ut from an aspect that accepts that he is the murderer& /ll the previous events have to e reinterpreted y the detective and also, if possile, y the reader& The detective and the reader do this y puttin+ theirmind inside *our.e>s caper, y tryin+ to create a narrative of the story?orld from his aspectual vie?point @hy did he commit the first murderIH did h l hi i l tI @h did h .ill i I / d 8t i i t l t i th l t h th d t ti d hi



Ho? did he conceal his involvementI @hy did he .ill a+ainI /nd so on& 8t is a pivotal moment in the plot ?hen the detective aandons his previous attempt to construct the old 83that3is3*our.e inside his o?n mind, and tries to reconstruct a ne? one& o, ?e have an emedded

narrative, the detective>s, that contains ?ithin it a vie? or an interpretation of another emedded narrative, *our.e>s& Ho?ever, as ?ith previousinsi+hts relatin+ to the ?or.in+s of +enre fiction, this point need not e limited to a particular +enre& All fiction is read y means of doulyemedded narratives& (mma has the po?er that it has ecause it is propelled y Bmma>s douly emedded narrative of Dni+htley& he ?ondersaout ?hat ima+e Dni+htley has of her in his mind, and she cares desperately aout ?hat it is&

/ll this is also true of real minds& @e have narratives of others that are more

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or less detailed, more or less accurate, more or less prone to chan+e& B=ually, people vary in the e9tent to ?hich they attempt to control thenarratives that others have of them, and, of course, they vary in the e9tent to ?hich these attempts are successful& /s 8 said in chapter !, section $,chan. and /elson maintain that in a role theme, “a particular actor>s +oals are determined y his role&&&& Lnce a role theme is invo.ed, it sets upe9pectations aout +oals and actions” (15;;, 1:!#::)& The social role that ?e ac=uire as it is formed ?ithin the emedded narratives of others ecomes part of our situated identity& Lur o?n +oals and actions are necessarily influenced y the e9pectations of others& Those people ?ho, fore9ample, dress flamoyantly and say they do not care ?hat others thin. of them are the ones ?ho, in reality, care most&

8ncredily, douly emedded narratives even occur in the animal .in+dom& 8n Finds of -inds, 4aniel 4ennett e9plains the “thin.in+” ehind a ird>s decision to distract a predator from its chic.s “8>m a lo? nestin+ ird, ?hose chic.s are not protectale a+ainst a predator ?ho discoversthem& This approachin+ predator can e epected soon to discover them & & & unless 8 distract it it could e distracted y its desire to catch and eatme, ut only if it thou+ht there ?as a reasonale chance of its actually catchin+ me (it>s no dummy) it ?ould contract Kust that elief if 8 +ave itevidence that 8 couldn>t fly anymore 8 could do that y fei+nin+ a ro.en ?in+, etc” (155%, 1!!)& /s 4ennett remar.s, it defies credence “to

suppose that any ird +oes throu+h anythin+ li.e the solilo=uy here& Jet that solilo=uy undoutedly e9presses the rationale that has shaped the ehavior, ?hether or not the ird can appreciate the rationale” (155%, 1!!)& The rationale that 4ennett descries is ased on the ird>s

assumptions aout and predictions of another creature>s ehavior& 8n ?hatever form that it ta.es, the ird>s co+nitive functionin+ is ased on some.ind of douly emedded narrative&

@ith re+ard to fictional minds, ri Mar+olin dra?s a clear and useful distinction et?een the ori+inal or “real” characters ?ho e9ist in thestory?orlds of third3person narratives and the “versions” of these characters ?ho e9ist in the elief ?orlds of other characters& He descries thisdifference as et?een ontolo+ical and epistemic versions (155%a 11$ 16) That is the ori+inal is “real” ?ithin the ontolo+y of the story?orld



difference as et?een ontolo+ical and epistemic versions (155%a, 11$#16)& That is, the ori+inal is “real” ?ithin the ontolo+y of the story?orld,?hile the versions e9ist only ?ithin the epistemic elief ?orlds of the other characters& 8t is perhaps ?orth d?ellin+ on this distinction for a ?hile

from a situated identity perspective& 8ma+ine that you are tryin+ to estalish the personality or mind of a character& 8f the narrator says that he is,say, mean, then that is ontolo+ically clear& ut ?hat aout the cases ?here the “real” character says that he is +enerous, ut his versions are meanin the sense that all the other characters thin. that he is meanI 8f it is clear

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that the reader ?ill find him mean also, then there is an interestin+ sense in ?hich the ontolo+ically real character is less real than theepistemolo+ical versions& @hat 8 ?ish to do is to =uery ?here “the mind” occurs ecause recursive emeddin+ can often e more accurate thanthe ori+inal emedded narrative& o it can e true to say of character />s mind that he has an an+ry disposition if this characteristic is contained?ithin the douly emedded narratives of , C, and 4 ut an+rily denied y / himself& /s in real life, characters are continually attemptin+ toreconstruct aspects of the minds of others y the process of third3person ascription, even in the asence of specific cues such as e9ternal action&This is amusin+ly illustrated ?hen underreaction leads to the “ & & & ?hatI & & & @H/TI &&&” syndrome& (This is the situation that you often see insitcoms ?hen an uneasy character reacts more and more frenAiedly to another character simply starin+ at them&)

/n informative ?ay to loo. at narratives is to e9amine the distance et?een a character>s vie? of their o?n emedded narrative and the doulyemedded narratives of others relatin+ to that character& Bmedded narratives and the douly emedded variety relate in interestin+ ?ays& Fore9ample, they may coincide or they may e diver+ent if diver+ent, the douly emedded narrative can e more accurate (Dni+htley>s of Bmmain Bmma) or less accurate (Pip>s of Miss Havisham as his enefactress in Rreat B9pectations) the vie?s of the reader mi+ht chan+e on therelationship (as in the latter case almost certainly and the former case possily)& ometimes douly emedded narratives are rich and detailed(4orothea>s of Casauon in -iddlemarch) and sometimes arely e9istin+ (as in all the characters in +ile 6odies)& The interest of many novels isto see ho? the various emedded and douly emedded narratives inter?eave, mer+e, conflict, ecome reconciled, and so on& *ich and comple9

patterns result&

Lne ?ay to divide intramental and intermental douly emedded narratives is as follo?s an individual thin.in+ aout another individual anindividual thin.in+ aout a +roup a +roup thin.in+ aout an individual and a +roup thin.in+ aout another +roup& everal of the e9amples of thefour cate+ories from +ile 6odies that are considered in the follo?in+ discussion could Kust have easily een used in the conte9t of the discussionof the intermental thin.in+ in the previous section& The .ey to the fictional minds in +ile 6odies is that there is a +ood deal of intermentalthin.in+ ut very little evidence of douly emedded narratives& There is very little indication of the e9istence of one character in the mind ofanother The follo?in+ e9amples tend to e rather mar+inal and fleetin+ cases that are very ne+ative in content There is no evidence of a douly



another& The follo?in+ e9amples tend to e rather mar+inal and fleetin+ cases that are very ne+ative in content& There is no evidence of a doulyemedded narrative that is sustained in any richness or depth over the ?hole

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of the novel& The lac. of douly emedded narratives demonstrates some very solipsistic states of mind the comination of this and the amountof intermental thin.in+ vividly conveys the sensation of ein+ alone in a cro?d& The lac. of e9plicit and continued douly emedded narrativescontriutes sustantially to the callous and unfeelin+ =uality of the novel& Follo?in+ the discussion of a fe? e9amples from +ile 6odies, 8 ?illconclude this section ?ith some much richer e9amples of douly emedded narratives ta.en from three other novels&

0ndividual$individual & This is a +ood e9ample of prototypical douly emedded narrative

(%!) /dam ?as =uite pleased to lunch ?ith imon alcairn, thou+h he .ne? there must e some sli+htly sinister motive ehind this suddenhospitality& (;1)

8t is one character speculatin+ aout the motives of another character>s action in the conte9t of that second character>s ?hole mind& “/dam sat inthe ac. of the car ?ith Miles, ?ho ?as clearly put out aout his friend>s lac. of cordiality (1:")”& is another rare e9ample& /dam>s mental eventis the a?areness of Miles>s mental event discomfiture at a third party>s unfriendly ehavior and so, possily, unfriendly state of mind& o, threeindividual emedded narratives enmesh&

(%:) 8t ?as aout no? that /dam rememered that he ?as en+a+ed to e married& (!")

This is a douly emedded narrative that, +iven that it is a man thin.in+ aout his fiancOe, is of a disturin+ly casual and attenuated variety&

Lne e9ample turns out to e amusin+ly counterfactual& (%$) 8t ?as fortunate, Mr enfleetQ reflected, that none of the authors ever came acrossthe senior partner, that eni+n old +entleman&&&& He often ?ondered in his uneasy moments ?hat he ?ould find to say ?hen *ampole died& (!;# !")

Mr& enfleet is ?orryin+ ecause he has created a fictitious douly emedded narrative of the eni+n Mr *ampole as a avaricious old tyrant inorder to scare the authors into acceptin+ unreasonale contractual terms His concern is related to the conflict et?een this fictitious douly



order to scare the authors into acceptin+ unreasonale contractual terms& His concern is related to the conflict et?een this fictitious doulyemedded narrative and the real douly emedded narrative that he has of the authors ?ho, he anticipates, ?ill e difficult to control ?hen the

fictitious one ends& Mr enfleet>s state of mind is reminiscent of a.htin>s notion of the ,ord ,ith a side,ays #lance the uneasy anticipation ofthe conflictin+ vie?point of another&

8n a scene et?een 2ady rsula and her mother (11$), the t?o discuss her marria+e prospects ?ithout any meetin+ of minds at all& The mother issimply

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not listenin+ to her dau+hter>s douts and mis+ivin+s& There is, therefore, a conspicuous and si+nificant asence of the .ind of +enuine andaccurate douly emedded narrative that the reader ?ould e9pect in this sort of situation& The mother is completely solipsistic and is ma.in+ noattempt to reconstruct ?ithin her o?n mind ?hat her dau+hter>s thou+hts mi+ht e& That is the charitale e9planation& The other is that she has

done this and is i+norin+ the result& 8t is not clear ?hich&

0ndividual$#roup& This character is thin.in+ in typically ne+ative terms aout the +roup or set to ?hich she elon+s

(%6) Lne day she ?ould surprise them all, thou+ht Miss Mouse& ($$)

8n e9ample %%, an individual is thin.in+ aout himself as part of a pair and ma.in+ decisions aout actions in the future& They are ironic ecausethey are mista.en

(%%) @hen -ina and he ?ere married, he thou+ht, they ?ould often come do?n there for the day after a really serious party& (%1)

8roup$individual & The e9amples of this sort of douly emedded narrative tend to e rather ne+ative& This one is oviously rather callous



sur+eon, Mr 2yd+ate& 8 am told he is ?onderfully clever he certainly loo.s it#a fine ro? indeed” (15;;, %1)& Mrs Cad?allader replies that “Heis a +entleman&&&& He tal.s ?ell” (15;;, %1)& 2ady Chettam a+rees that he is “really ?ell connected&&&& Lne does not e9pect it in a practitioner ofthat .ind” (15;;, %!)& Mrs Cad?allader then notices that 4orothea roo.e “is tal.in+ cotta+es and hospitals ?ith him&&&& 8 elieve he is a sort of philanthropist” (15;;, %!)& o, ?hat do ?e find out aout him in the t?enty3one lines of te9t efore ?e meet himI @e learn that he is apparentlyyoun+, clever, +ood3loo.in+, a ?ell3connected +entleman, someone ?ho tal.s ?ell, a sort of philanthropist, and innovative and successful& These?ords on the pa+e ?ill no? e transformed y the reader into an already pre3e9istin+ ima+inary individual ?ith a past that is part of the



?ords on the pa+e ?ill no? e transformed y the reader into an already pre e9istin+ ima+inary individual ?ith a past that is part of the -iddlemarch story?orld& His emedded narrative started t?enty3five odd years a+o, and the reader is no? en+a+ed in reconstructin+ it&

This conversation is lar+ely a consideration of 2yd+ate>s mind& ome features are oviously related to his mental life ein+ clever, philanthropic,and successfully innovative& Lthers are sli+htly more indirect “tal.in+ ?ell” is a description of ehavior that implies a series of mental attriutessuch as cleverness, confidence, a?areness of others, and so on& ein+ a +entleman is yet more indirect ut presumaly has implications for the?ay the mind ?or.s& 8n addition to these e9plicit =ualities, it is also part of the competence of the reader to construct, this time y indirect means,some aspects of 2yd+ate>s mental life that are implicit in ?hat ?e have een told& 2et us say, for e9ample, havin+ these =ualities ma.es it li.elythat he is not only self3confident and amitious ut also altruistic, ima+inative, and idealistic& The reader is usin+ material on 2yd+ate>s social and pulicly availale mind that has een refracted throu+h the conflictin+ ?orld

3!:%3

vie?s of the t?o different emedded narratives of Mrs Cad?allader and 2ady Chettam& His mind e9ists in their minds& Their minds areinteractin+ ?ith, conflictin+ ?ith, and interro+atin+ the constructions that they have formed of his mind& They disapprove of his ein+ oth a+entleman and a doctor and also of the fact that he is a doctor ?ith ideas aout the advancement of medicine& /lthou+h the characters do note9plicitly speculate aout the causal net?or. ehind 2yd+ate>s ehavior, there is an implicit puAAlement over the motives that a +entleman ?ouldhave for ?antin+ to ecome a doctor& 2yd+ate>s o?n motivation ecomes more e9plicit in the direct access to his mind later in the passa+e& 2aterevents appear to sho? that the vie?s of the t?o characters ?ere fairly accurate in their discussions of 2yd+ate>s mind& /nd, to use a familiar utsi+nificant phrase, there are some respects in ?hich he may not “.no? his o?n mind&” 8n the ne9t chapter 2yd+ate is scornful aout the possiility of losin+ his alance and fallin+ in love, and ?e find out later that this is precisely ?hat 2yd+ate does do&

/ +roup3+roup douly emedded narrative occurs in an apparently trivial incident in another of Bvelyn @au+h>s novels, Men at /rms& The

prota+onist, Ruy Crouchac., has arrived in a ne? /rmy camp as part of a +roup of officers from the arrac. camp& /t the dinin+ tale they seeanother +roup of officers from the 4epot camp that they do not .no?& The t?o +roups do not spea.&

Crouchac.Q ?as the first to +o& oon after him the 4epot atch rose from the tale& Lne or t?o of them hesitated, ?onderin+ ?hether theyou+ht not to spea. to the ne?comers, ut y no? all heads at the arrac. atch tale ?ere ent over their plates& The moment passed efore it?as reco+niAed&

“Matey astards, aren>t theyI” said arum3mith& (15%$, "5)



2ater, the narrator reports that “There ?as no enmity et?een the t?o +roups ut there ?as little friendship& They continued as they had e+un,

eatin+ at separate tales and inhaitin+ separate edrooms” (15%$, 5:)& 8t seems to me that the discourse conveys in a sensitive and carefulmanner a typical prolem in social relations& / trivial incident, li.e t?o people not ac.no?led+in+ each other in the corridor the first time they pass, achieves an importance completely out of proportion to its true si+nificance ecause it can e so difficult to put it ri+ht on suse=uentoccasions& / coldness can soon arise for no other reason than the initial a?.?ardness& 8n these situations, emedded narratives are not Kustdouled, they are tripled, =uadrupled, and so on, and so on& 8n fact, ?hen it comes to social emarrassment, emedded narrative +ro?th is

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proaly e9ponential& “He>ll thin. that 8 thin. that he thin.s that 8 thin. &&&” /s a child 8 read a /eader>s Di#est story in ?hich a man +oes to orro? a ?i+ from a nei+hor for some amateur theatricals& @hile he ?al.s he thin.s of all the reasons ?hy his nei+hor ?ill not ?ant to lend it,a fe? reasons ?hy he ?ill, yet more and even stron+er reasons ?hy he ?ill not, and so on& @hen the man +ets there and his nei+hor opens thedoor, the man shouts, “Deep the damn ?i+, then 8 never ?anted it any?ay” The difference in the -en at Arms case is that the difficulty is ein+e9perienced y t?o +roups& /lthou+h the passa+e is eautifully understated, anyone ?ho is prone to this sort of prolem ?ill e9perience aninstant and uncomfortale thrill of reco+nition on readin+ the ?ords, “the moment passed&” /nd this thrill ?ill in no ?ay e diminished y thefact that ?hat is ein+ descried here is intermental and not intramental douly emedded narratives&

8 ?ill conclude this chapter ?ith an individual3individual douly emedded narrative& 8 said in chapter 1 that the follo?in+ passa+e ?as the .indof fictional mental functionin+ that 8 ?as interested in and that 8 very much hoped that ?hen you read it a+ain here more of its full si+nificance?ould e revealed

runetti ?atched as Murino asored this information, then ?aited as the other man e+an to consider ?hat his visile response should e& /ll of

this too. only seconds, ut runetti had een oservin+ the process for decades and ?as familiar ?ith it& The people to ?hom he presentedhimself had a dra?er of responses ?hich they thou+ht appropriate, and part of his Ko ?as to ?atch them as they sifted throu+h them one at a

time, see.in+ the ri+ht fit& urpriseI FearI 8nnocenceI CuriosityI He ?atched Murino flip throu+h them, studied his face as he considered, thendiscarded various possiilities& He decided, apparently, on the last&

“JesI /nd ?hat ?ould you li.e to .no?, CommissarioI” (2eon 155%, 155)

ecause 8 hope that ?hat 8 am no? +oin+ to say is completely predictale, 8 ?ill .eep it rief& The passa+e presents the ?hole of runetti>s mind



ecause 8 hope that ?hat 8 am no? +oin+ to say is completely predictale, 8 ?ill .eep it rief& The passa+e presents the ?hole of runetti s mindin action, includin+ states of mind such as dispositions and eliefs and also emotions& oth characters are employin+ purposive mental

functionin+& Murino>s mind is pulic and social ecause runetti>s third3person ascriptions of mental states to Murino are successful and accurate&The presentation of runetti>s ?hole mind contains elements of characteriAation (for e9ample, runetti>s familiarity ?ith the process)& /ll theinformation on the t?o minds that is made availale in this passa+e forms part of runetti>s emedded narrative and also of Murino>s& Thestory?orld is aspectual ecause ?e e9perience Murino from

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runetti>s aspectual point of vie?& The passa+e has an important teleolo+ical value in that it affects the end of the story& The t?o characters areen+a+ed in competitive intermental thin.in+ each is tryin+ to out3thin. the other& 8t is clear that runetti>s emedded narrative contains ?ithin itan accurate douly emedded narrative for Murino& Finally, Murino>s identity is situated some?hat closer to runetti>s vie? of him than to hiso?n vie? of himself&

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*urther Applications

8 see this oo. as ein+ the first of a pair& This one constructs the theoretical frame?or. ?ithin ?hich the ne9t one ?ill illustrate more fully the?hole of the social mind in action& The purpose of this chapter is to descrie in outline the proposed content of the second oo.&

Chapter 1, section $ referred to a numer of issues that could not e considered ?ithin the limits of this study ut that ?ould enefit from further

e9amination ?ithin the perspective that 8 have advocated& 8 ?ill riefly discuss t?o particularly fruitful applications the historical approach andthe implications of some of the counterintuitive aspects of co+nitive science& The ?hole of the social mind in action ?ithin fictional te9ts can e

e9plored further in a numer of different directions for e9ample, ho? fictional minds are constructed in the first3person novel ho? fictionalminds are constructed ?ithin fictional te9ts of different historical periods ho? fictional minds are constructed ?ithin various +enres of fictionho? real minds are constructed in historical narrative ho? real7fictional minds are constructed in the roman a clef and ho? fictional minds areconstructed in plays and films& This pro+ram of study is clearly more than a lifetime>s ?or.& Bach of these issues deserves separate full3len+thtreatment& The priority that 8 ?ill no? consider in a little detail is the historiciAed approach to?ard the constructions of fictional minds ?ithindifferent historical periods&



p

/ possile frame?or. for the diachronic study of fictional minds mi+ht consist of the close te9tual analysis of passa+es from some e9amples ofthe follo?in+ the ile (oo.s from oth the Lld and -e? Testament) classical narratives early modern narratives ei+hteenth3century novelsnineteenth3century “classic realist” novels late3nineteenth3century “reflector” novels t?entiethcentury modernist novels t?entieth3centuryformally conservative novels and t?entieth3century postmodernist novels& The purpose of the study ?ould e to e+in to su++est some ans?ersto the follo?in+ t?o =uestions @hat are the features of the fictional3mind constructions of a particular historical period that are characteristic ofthat period and different from other periodsI @hat are

the similarities in fictional3mind constructions that otain across some, most, or all periodsI The t?o =uestions are e=ually important& 8 stress this ecause it has een the fashion for some time in literary theory to loo. primarily for the differences et?een various phenomena& Ho?ever,co+nitive science has sho?n that it can e e=ually informative to loo. also for asic underlyin+ similarities&This historiciAed course of studymi+ht proceed alon+ the follo?in+ linesa& 8t ?ould e+in ?ith the study of a ?ide ran+e of pre3novel and early novel te9ts in order to see ?hat remained constant and ?hat chan+ed

in the presentation of characters> ?hole minds over a lon+ period of time& The analysis ?ould attempt to sho? ho? readers of thesenarratives uild up a sense of characters> minds throu+hout their full len+th& 8t ?ould set out in detail all the evidence that is madeavailale to the reader on characters> emedded narratives& The analysis ?ould then attempt to demonstrate ho? the plots of thesenarratives comprise the a++re+ate of their emedded narratives&

& The study ?ould then e9amine the deate on the formation of the early Bn+lish novel that is referred to later& This is the point at ?hich thee9tended use of the direct3access device +ave rise to the self3conscious e9amination of its epistemolo+ical and ethical implications&

c& 8t ?ould then analyAe a small numer of classic te9ts such as (mma, -id dlemarch, and The /massadors in order to put into practice themethodolo+y descried in sta+e a& The importance of this part of the study is that it ?ould sho? ho? narratives ?or. once the full ran+eof naturaliAed devices is in place and efore they ecome self3consciously prolematiAed&

d& Finally, the study ?ould e e9tended to the modernist and postmodernist novel, in order to analyAe their hi+hly self3conscious reactionsa+ainst the norms for mind presentations that ?ere estalished in the nineteenth century& For e9ample, it may e ?orth pursuin+ the

notion that postmodernist te9ts playfully disrupt the causal flo? of consciousness, motives, and action that ?as estalished as part of thenineteenth3century norm ho?ever, this study ?ould attempt to find out not only ?hat chan+es ?ere rou+ht aout y the modernist and postmodernist pro+rams ut also ?hat remained constant in ?hole mind presentations&

/s an e9ample of the sort of historical research that 8 envisa+e, 8 ?ill tal. riefly aout sta+e & The follo?in+ =uotes seem to form the possile asis for a historiciAed vie? of the study of the minds presented in the early Bn+lish novel



y p y +

@e e men and nat aun+els, ?herfore ?e .no?e nothin+e ut y out?arde si+nifications& (ir Thomas Blyot, =uoted in McDeon 15";, 1:!)

36!$13

/ series of letters offersQ the only natural Lpportunity &&& of representin+ ?ith any Rrace those lively and delicate 8mpressions ?hich hin#s

present are .no?n to ma.e upon the Minds of those affected y them& (amuel *ichardson, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1$)

8t ?ould e an ill office in us to pay a visit to the inmost recesses of his mind, as some scandalous people search into the most secret affairs oftheir friends, and often pry into their closets and cupoards, only to discover their poverty and meanness to the ?orld& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in@att 156;, !;:)

/s to the present situation of her mind 8 shall adhere to the rule of Horace, y not attemptin+ to descrie it, from despair of success& (HenryFieldin+, =uoted in @att 156;, !;:)

8t is our province to relate facts, and ?e shall leave causes to persons of much hi+her +enius& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in @att 156;, !;:)

8t is not enou+h that your 4esi+ns, nay that your /ctions are intrinsically +ood, you must ta.e Care they shall appear so& 8f your 8nside e neverso eautiful, you must preserve a fair Lutside too& (Fieldin+ 1556, 5:)

@hether the insatiale Curiosity of this +ood @oman had carried her on to that usiness, or ?hether she did it to confirm herself in the +oodRraces of Mrs 6lifil & & & 8 ?ill not determine& (Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in 4oody 155%, 1$;)

he follo?s the Ma9im of Clarissa, of declarin+ all she thin.s to all the people she sees, ?ithout refflectin+ sicQ that in this Mortal state of8mperfection Fi+ leaves are as necessary for our Minds as our odies, as tis as indecent to she? all ?e thin. as all ?e have& (2ady Mary @ortleyMonta+ue of Harriet yron, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1$)

His ?as ut a .no?led+e of the outside of a cloc.?or. machine, ?hile yours ?as that of all the finer sprin+s and movements of the inside&(amuel Eohnson to arah Fieldin+ of her rother Henry Fieldin+, =uoted in pender 15"%, 1"6)



( + y +, = p , )

/ man must dive into the recesses of the human heart& (amuel Eohnson, =uoted in McDeon 15";, $1%)

8t is a mercy our thou+hts are conceald from each other& L if at our social tale ?e could see ?hat passes in each osom around ?e ?ould see.dens and caverns to shun human society& (ir @alter cott, =uoted in *oertson 155$, 1%6)

3!$!3

8 do not mean that -i+el literally said aloud ?ith his odily or+ans the ?ords ?hich follo? in inverted commas &&& ut that 8 myself choose to present to my dearest reader the picture of my hero>s mind, his reflections and resolutions, in the form of a speech, rather than that of a narrative&8n other ?ords, 8 have put his thou+hts into lan+ua+e& 8t isQ the most natural and perhaps the only ?ay of communicatin+ to the spectator ?hat issupposed to e passin+ in the osom of the characterQ& There are no such solilo=uies in nature it is true&&&& 8n narrative, no dout, the ?riter hasthe alternative of tellin+ that his persona+es thou+ht so and so, inferred thus and thus, and arrived at such and such a conclusion ut the solilo=uyis a more concise and spirited mode of communicatin+ the same information& (cott 15;:, !5$#56)

These remar.s sho? that a deate on the presentation of fictional minds e9isted durin+ and after the formation of the Bn+lish novel& 8n the termsused y Michael McDeon in his erudite and deeply impressive study, he ri#ins of the (n#lish Novel 'GGH)%G (15";), the vie?s sho? aclose interest in =uestions of truth (15";, !0)& They raise epistemolo+ical concerns aout ho? ?e can .no? the contents of other minds and, oncethey are .no?n, ho? they can e presented in narrative& They also reveal ethical douts aout ?hether such information should e presented inthis ?ay& The =uotes sho? clear evidence of stron+ feelin+& The inside vie? of the mind y the narrator is re+arded as a potentially po?erful andthreatenin+ force& 8t is considered to e stran+e, unfamiliar, and re=uirin+ Kustification& 2ater, in the nineteenth century, the device ecame easierto accept, more familiar, and not re=uirin+ Kustification& 8t ecame a convention& The *ichardson =uote is particularly interestin+ in its use of the

?ord “natural&” Ln this account, direct access to fictional minds is unnatural& Ho? did it ecome naturaliAedI

The deate aout ho? fictional minds can e presented, and also ?hether or not their contents should e revealed at all, illustrates very clearlyMcDeon>s notion of the fusion of ideolo+y and epistemolo+y in the construction of narrative (15";, !0)& Ho?ever, it is important to estalish precisely ?here Henry Fieldin+>s evident moral outra+e is directed 8s he sayin+ that the direct presentation of minds should not e attempted ecause it is trivial or ecause it is not possile, or othI Lne result of Fieldin+>s epistemolo+ical and ethical douts is the lar+e numer ofe9plicit paralipses (omissions of information y the narrator) relatin+ to the presentation of the mind in om 7ones& Here are some more e9amplesto add to the ones +iven earlier “@hether she really felt any 8nKury & & & 8 ?ill not say” (1556, :5%) “@hether she had for+iven him or



3!$:3

no, 8 ?ill not determine” (1556, %%) and more +enerally, “8 am not possessed of any Touchstone, ?hich can distin+uish the true from the false”(1556, $:) and usin+ the narratorial “?e, ” “?e never chuse to assi+n Motives to the /ctions of Men, ?hen there is any Possiility of our ein+mista.en” (1556, 1%5)& The epistemolo+ical s.epticism and the ethical douts are comined in the last remar. the former in the possiility of ein+ mista.en, the latter in the resultin+ moral oli+ation not to assi+n motives& These =uotes are not isolated e9amples& 8 have identified nearlyone hundred paralipses related specifically to fictional minds in om 7ones& Ho?ever, more analysis is re=uired efore it can e said ?ithconfidence that they relate to an ac.no?led+ement y the narrator of the uncertain nature of his .no?led+e aout characters> minds as opposed,say, to the author>s elaorate sense of irony&

/ny study of ho? the naturaliAation of the device of direct access to characters> minds developed et?een the e+innin+ of the early Bn+lishnovel and the assured and mature use of the device y Eane /usten, BliAaeth Ras.ell, and Reor+e Bliot mi+ht focus on the Rothic novel& Fore9ample, in Horace @alpole>s The Castle of Ltranto durin+ 8saella>s fli+ht from Manfred, the reader is +iven e9tended direct access to hermental state and the current of her immediate thou+hts, even includin+ some free indirect discourse (15"!, !!#!")& 8n vie? of the date of pulication (1;%$), the =uestion arises as to ?hether this presentation of her mind ?as a ne? development in the narrative fiction of the period&/fter all, the novel ?as pulished only fifteen years after om 7ones (1;$5)& 8t is necessary to estalish ?hether, +iven Rothic>s ovious interestin states of mind such as fear, an9iety, uncertainty, and curiosity, the Rothic novel played an important part in developin+ the presentation of themind in narrative fiction& This mi+ht e a ri+idly /n+lo centric perspective, and so account ?ould need to e ta.en of parallel, and perhapsearlier, developments in the French novel&

8 ?ill conclude this section ?ith a rief note on a specific theoretical issue& Fiction emodies ?hat#in the fields of co+nitive psycholo+y, the

philosophy of mind, and other co+nitive sciences#is .no?n as fol9 psycholo#y& This lael is intended to cover our standard, everyday,unthin.in+, “commonsense” assumptions aout ho? our minds and the minds of others ?or.& Fictional narrators employ fol. psycholo+y, and it

?ould e unreasonale to e9pect novelists to do other?ise& Ho?ever, some of the real3mind discourses that 8 have used =uestion some of the asic components of fol. psycholo+y& This is a recurrin+ tension and one that is not easy to resolve& 8t is possile at this sta+e only to refer to itand to ma.e it e9plicit& The consciousness deate is concerned not only

3!$$3



?ith fol.3psycholo+y notions of ho? ?e thin. ut also ?ith more counterintuitive versions of the process& /n e9treme e9ample of this sort of

theoriAin+ is 4ennett>s ar+ument in Consciousness (plained that there is no “Cartesian theatre” in ?hich a unified and sin+le flo? ofconsciousness ta.es place#?hat ?e e9perience as consciousness is merely an amal+am of the various “multiple drafts” that are produced acrossall of the different re+ions of the ?hole rain& /s soon as ?e ecome accustomed to this sensation, ?e e9perience it as a continuity ofconsciousness& Further thou+ht needs to e +iven to ?hether or not there is a place for such oviously non3fol.3psycholo+ical ideas in an analysisof fictional minds& For e9ample, it mi+ht e that fictional3mind constructions in oth the modernist and postmodernist novel are, as 4ennetthimself su++ests, interestin+ly consistent ?ith his ideas&

/nother counterintuitive co+nitive science theory that has implications for a study of fictional minds concerns ?hat is termed the fundamental

attribution error (F/B)& 8 said in chapter ! that the rich and comple9 relationship et?een dispositions and specific conte9ts, events, and so on isat the heart of the value of novel readin+& @e as. ourselves continually, Riven the sort of disposition that this particular character has, ho? ?illhe or she react in this specific situationI Ho?ever, the F/B theory casts dout on our accuracy in ?ei+hin+ up the relative importance of

disposition and conte9t ?hen attemptin+ to predict characters> reactions& The F/B is “the tendency of oservers to overestimate ho? muchanother>s ehavior is determined y the person>s stale traits” (Morris, /mes, and Dno?les 1555, $%)& That is, ?e tend to overestimate theimportance of a person>s character in findin+ an e9planation for the ?ay in ?hich they ehave in a particular situation and underestimate theimportance of the situation that they are in& Put crudely, the implication of the F/B is that different sorts of people in the same situation tend to ehave in the same ?ay and the same sorts of people in different situations tend to ehave in different ?ays& 8t is interestin+ to note, +iven thatthe novel is characteristic of @estern culture, that “findin+s that the F/B is stron+er in @estern, individualistic societies than in collectivistsocieties such as China seem to reflect different lay theories aout the autonomy of individuals relative to social +roups” (Morris, /mes, andDno?les 1555, $;)& The F/B is an unsettlin+ findin+ for literary criticism and narrative theory, oth of ?hich tend to e ased on the assumptionthat characters ehave in the ?ay that they do ecause of the personalities that they have& 8t is not often ?hile readin+ a novel that ?e say, “@ell,anyone ?ould have done ?hat she did” @e are more li.ely to say, “@ell, that>s typical of her to do that” 8n any event, ?hat are the implications

of the F/BI 4oes the ?hole practice of novel readin+ reinforce

3!$63

the errorI 8s that a ad thin+I Lviously 8 do not have ans?ers to these =uestions, ut perhaps they are ?orth mentionin+ at this point in order toac.no?led+e that the relationship et?een the co+nitive sciences and narrative theory mi+ht not all e plain sailin+&

Conclusion



8n one sense, as *& 4& 2ain+ says, ?e are invisile to each other& 8n another sense, the activities of our minds are perfectly visile to others in ouractions& The reader>s e9perience of the minds of characters in novels does not depend solely on the stran+e device of the narrator +ivin+ directaccess to the inner ?or.in+s of fictional consciousnesses& Eust as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from their ehavior, sothe reader infers the ?or.in+s of fictional minds and sees these minds in action from oservation of characters> ehavior and actions& -ovelscontain a ?ide variety of material or evidence on ?hich readers ase their conKectures, hypotheses, and predictions aout fictional minds& Theimportance of the ne? perspectives su++ested in this oo. is that in various ?ays fictional minds are seen not as private, passive flo?s ofconsciousness, ut as en+a+ed, social processes of mental action& The concept of emedded narratives is a .ey mediational tool ?ith ?hich toanalyAe this aspect of fictional minds& 8n particular, 8 have ar+ued that one of the most important of the frames used y readers to understand te9tsis the continuin+3consciousness frame& 8 have focused on three ne+lected suframes thou+ht and action, intermental thou+ht, and doulyemedded narratives& 8 have also attempted to sho? that analysis of a numer of su3suframes can reveal ho? much information on fictionalminds is availale to the reader even ?ithin a ehaviorist narrative such as +ile 6odies& 8 conclude y su++estin+ that ?hat is no? re=uired is the

application of this approach to a ?ide ran+e of other te9ts& 8t is possile that these devices are si+nificant constituents of all narrative discourses, ut further ?or. on this point is re=uired& @hen the social mind e9ists for those ?ho ?ould e9plain it, narrative theory ?ill understand etterho? characters do and under+o thin+s in the story?orld and ho? mental processes ta.e place in their natural haitat of the houseyard, themar.etplace, and the to?n s=uare ecause these are the places in ?hich the fictional mind e9tends eyond the fictional s.in&

ometimes you read a oo. that contains ar+uments that are in+enious& Jou thin. 8 am not sure that 8 follo?ed it all, ut 8 am sure that it must eri+ht& 8n any event, 8 certainly cannot thin. of any oKections to it& The person ?ho ?rote it must e rilliant ecause it ?as =uite difficult tofollo? in several places&

3!$%3



###& 15;1& 6lea9 ;ouse& Bdited y -orman Pa+e& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1"6:&)

###& 1556& ;ard imes& Bdited y Date Flint& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1"6$&)

Bliot, Reor+e& 15;;& -iddlemarch& Bdited y ert R& Hornac.& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu& 1";!&)



###& 155%& Adam 6ede& Bdited y Galentine Cunnin+ham& L9ford L9ford niversity Press& (Lri+& pu& 1"65&)

Fieldin+, Henry& 1556& om 7ones& !d ed& Bdited y heridan a.er& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu& 1;$5&)

Flauert, Rustave& 1560& -adame 6ovary& Translated y /lan *ussell& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1"6;&)

Hi+hsmith, Patricia& 15%"& Stran#ers on a rain& 2ondon Pan& (Lri+& pu& 15$5&)

Eoyce, Eames& 15"%& 5lysses& Corrected edition& Bdited y Hans @alter Raler& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 15!!&)

2eon, 4onna& 155%& Ac*ua Alta& 2ondon Macmillan&

###& 155;& he Death of !aith& 2ondon Macmillan&

###& !001& A Sea of roubles& 2ondon Heinemann&

2e?is, Matthe?& 155"& he -on9 & Bdited y Christopher Maclachlan& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1;5%&)

2od+e, 4avid& !001& hin9s . . . & 2ondon ec.er and @arur+&

Pears, 8ain& !000& 8iotto>s ;and & 2ondon HarperCollins&

Proust, Marcel& 155%& S,ann>s Way& Translated y C& D& cott Moncreiff and Terence Dilmartin& *evised y 4& E& Bnri+ht& 2ondon Ginta+e&(Lri+& pu& 15!!&)

Pynchon, Thomas& 155%& he Cryin# of "ot %B& 2ondon Ginta+e& (Lri+& pu& 15%%&)

cott, ir @alter& 15;:& The Fortunes of -i+el& t& /lans, Bn+land Panther& (Lri+& pu& 1"!!&)

###& 15;6& Lld Mortality& Bdited y /n+us Calder& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1"1%&)

155 di d h h l d d h l d i (L i 1"1 )



###& 1556& *o *oy& Bdited y Eohn utherland& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 1"1;&)

Thac.eray, @illiam Ma.epeace& 155$& Ganity Fair& Bdited y Peter 2& hillin+sur+& -e? Jor. -orton& (Lri+& pu& 1"$"&)

Thompson, Eim& !00!& The Reta?ay& 2ondon Lrion& (Lri+& pu& 156"&)

@alpole, Horace& 15"!& he Castle of tranto& Bdited y @& & 2e?is& L9ford L9ford niversity Press& (Lri+& pu& 1;%$&)

@au+h, Bvelyn& 15%$& -en at Arms& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 156!&)

###& 155%& +ile 6odies& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 15:0)&

@harton, Bdith& 15;5& he ;ouse of -irth& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin& (Lri+& pu& 150:&)

@hite, Bdmund& !001& he -arried -an& 2ondon Ginta+e&

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3!603

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3!613

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3!6!3

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3!6:3

15"" Narrative Discourse /evisited Translated y Eane B 2e?in 8thaca -J Cornell niversity Press



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Rerri+, *ichard E& 155:& (periencin# Narrative Worlds n the Psycholo#ical Activities of /eadin# & -e? Haven CT Jale niversity Press&

Rinsur+, *uth, and hlomith *immon3Denan& 1555& “8s There a 2ife after 4eathI TheoriAin+ /uthors and *eadin+ 7azz &” 8n Narratolo#ies

Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited y 4avid Herman& Columus Lhio tate niversity Press&

Roldman, /lvin E& 1556& “Bmpathy, Mind, and Morals&” 8n -ental Simulation (valuations and Applications, edited y Martin 4avies and Tonytone& L9ford lac.?ell&

Ropni., /lison& 1555& “T heory of Mind&” 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&Camrid+e M8T Press&

Rordon, *oert M& 1555& “imulation vs& Theory3Theory&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson andFran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

Rreimas, /& E& 15":& tructural emantics /n /ttempt at a Method& 2incoln niversity of -eras.a Press&

Haermas, EZr+en& 15"$& The Theory of Communicative /ction& Gol& 1& Translated y Thomas McCarthy& oston eacon&

Heal, Eane& 1556& “Ho? to Thin. /out Thin.in+&” 8n Mental imulation Bvaluations and /pplications, edited y Martin 4avies and Tonytone& L9ford lac.?ell&

He+el, Reor+ @ilhelm Friedrich& 15:1& he Phenomenolo#y of -ind & !d ed& Translated y E& & aillie& 2ondon /llen and n?in&

Herman, 4avid& 155;& “cripts, e=uences, and tories Blements of a Postclassical -arratolo+y&” PM2/ 11! (6) 10$%#65&

###& 1555a& “8ntroduction -arratolo+ies&” 8n Narratolo#ies Ne, Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited y 4avid Herman& ColumusLhio tate niversity Press&

###& 1555& “To?ards a ocionarratolo+y -e? @ays of /nalyAin+ -atural2an+ua+e -arratives&” 8n Narratolo#ies Ne, Perspectives on

Narrative Analysis edited y 4avid Herman Columus Lhio tate niversity Press



Narrative Analysis, edited y 4avid Herman& Columus Lhio tate niversity Press&

###& !00!& Story "o#ic Problems and Possibilities of Narrative& 2incoln niversity of -eras.a Press&

###, ed& !00:a& Narrative heory and the Co#nitive Sciences& tanford C/ C28 Pulications&

3!6$3

###& !00:& “tories as a Tool for Thin.in+&” 8n Narrative heory and the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y 4avid Herman& tanford C/ C28Pulications&

Hernadi, Paul& 15;!& “4ual Perspective Free 8ndirect 4iscourse and *elated Techni=ues&” Comparative "iterature !$ :!#$:&

Hirschfeld, 2a?rence /& 1555& “-aNve ociolo+y&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

Holyoa., Deith E& 1555& “Psycholo+y&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&Camrid+e M8T Press&

Hutchins, Bd?in& 1556& Co#nition in the Wild & Camrid+e M8T Press&

###& 1555& “Co+nitive /rtifacts&” 1555& 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&

Camrid+e M8T Press&

8n+arden, *oman& 15;:& he "iterary Wor9 of Art An 0nvesti#ation on the 6or$ derlines of Lntolo+y, 2o+ic, and Theory of 2iterature& Translated y Reor+e C& Rrao?icA& Bvanston 82 -orth?estern niversity Press&

8ser, @olf+an+& 15;"& The /ct of *eadin+& 2ondon *outled+e&

Eac.endoff, *ay& 15":& emantics and Co+nition& Camrid+e M8T Press&



Eahn, Manfred& 15":& “-arration as -on3communication Ln /nn anfield>s nspea.ale entences&” /vailale from http77???&uni3.oeln&de7 ]ame0! <1ahnI3.htm&

###& 155!& “Conte9tualiAin+ *epresented peech and Thou+ht&” 7ournal of Pra#matics 1; :$;#%;&

###& 155;& “Frames, Preferences, and the *eadin+ of Third Person -arratives To?ards a Co+nitive -arratolo+y&” Poetics oday 1" ($) $$1 #%"&

###& 1555a& “ >pea., friend, and enter> Rarden Paths, /rtificial 8ntelli+ence, and Co+nitive -arratolo+y&” 8n Narratolo#ies Ne,

Perspectives on Narrative Analysis, edited y 4avid Herman& Columus Lhio tate niversity Press&

###& 1555& “tanley Fish and the Constructivist asis of Postclassical -arratolo+y&” /vailale from http77???&uni3.oeln&de7]ame0!7Kahn559a&htm&

###& 1555c& “More /spects of FocaliAation *efinements and /pplications&” /vailale from http77???&uni3.oeln&de7 ] ame0!7Kahn55&htm&

Eames, @illiam& 15"1& he Principles of Psycholo#y& Gol& 1& Camrid+e Harvard niversity Press&

Eohnson32aird, Philip -& 1555& “Mental Models&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

3!663

Dosslyn, tephen M&, and Carolyn & *ain& 1555& “8ma+ery&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilsonand Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

Drip.e, aul& 15"0& Namin# and Necessity& L9ford lac.?ell&

2ain+, *& 4& 15%;& he Politics of (perience and the 6ird of Paradise& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin&



2eech, Reoffrey, and Michael hort& 15"1& Style in !iction A "in#uistic 0ntroduction to (n#lish !ictional Prose& 2ondon 2on+man&

2e?is, 4avid& 15;:& Counterfactuals& Camrid+e Harvard niversity Press&

2od+e, 4avid& 1550& After 6a9htin (ssays on !iction and Criticism& 2ondon *outled+e&

###& !00!& Consciousness and the -ovel Connected Bssays& 2ondon ec.er and @arur+&

2uoc., Percy& 15!1& he Craft of !iction& 2ondon Eonathan Cape&

2uria, /le9ander& 15"!& 2an+ua+e and Co+nition& -e? Jor. @iley&

Maloney, E& Christopher& 1555& “Functionalism&” 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive ciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

Mar+olin, ri& 15"%& “The 4oer and the 4eed /ction as a asis for CharacteriAation in -arrative&” Poetics Today ;(!) !06#!6&

###& 15";& “8ntroducin+ and ustainin+ Characters in 2iterary -arrative / et of Conditions&” Style !1 (1) 10;#!$&

###& 15"5& “tructuralist /pproaches to Character in -arrative The tate of the /rt&” Semiotica ;6(1#!) 1#!$&

###& 1550& “8ndividuals in -arrative @orlds /n Lntolo+ical Perspective&” Poetics oday 11 ($) "$:#;1&

###& 1556a& “Chan+in+ 8ndividuals in -arrative cience, Philosophy, 2iterature&” Semiotica 10; (1#!) 6#:1&

###& 1556& “Characters in 2iterary -arrative *epresentation and i+nification&” Semiotica 10% (:#$) :;:#5!&

###& 155%a& “Characters and their Gersions&” 8n !iction 5pdated heories of !ictionality: Narratolo#y: and Poetics, edited y Calin3/ndreiMihailescu and @alid Hamarneh& Toronto Toronto niversity Press&



###& 155%& “Tellin+ Lur tory Ln >@e> 2iterary -arratives&” "an#ua#e and "iterature 6 (!) 116#::&

###& !000& “Tellin+ in the Plural From Rrammar to 8deolo+y&” Poetics Today !1 (:) 651#%1"&

###& !00:& “Co+nitive cience, the Thin.in+ Mind, and 2iterary -arrative&”

3!6%3

8n Narrative heory and the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y 4avid Herman& tanford C/ C28 Pulications&

McCrone, Eohn& 1555& 8oin# 0nside A our /ound a Sin#le -oment of Consciousness. 2ondon Faer&

McHale, rian& 15;"& “Free 8ndirect 4iscourse / urvey of *ecent /ccounts&” PT2 : !$5#";&

###& 15"1& “8slands in the tream of Consciousness 4orrit Cohn>s ransparent -inds&” Poetics oday ! (!) 1":#51&

###& 15":& “nspea.ale entences, nnatural /cts 2in+uistics and Poetics *evisited&” Poetics oday $ (1) 1;#$6&

McDeon, Michael& 15";& he ri#ins of the (n#lish Novel: 'GG to )%G & altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins niversity Press&

###, ed& !000& heory of the Novel A ;istorical Approach& altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins niversity Press&

Morris, Michael @&, 4aniel /mes, and Bric Dno?les& 1555& “/ttriution Theory&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y*oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

-a+el, Thomas& 15;$& “@hat 8s 8t 2i.e to e a atI” The Philosophical *evie? ": ($) $:6#60&

-eel, ernhard& 1555& “Frame3ased ystems&” 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&



Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

-eumann, /nne @aldron& 15"%& “CharacteriAation and Comment in Pride and Pre1udice Free 8ndirect 4iscourse and >4oule Goiced> Gers ofpea.in+, Thin.in+, and Feelin+&” Style !0 (:) :%$#5$&

Latley, Deith& 1555& “Bmotions&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+eM8T Press&

Lne+a, usana, and EosO /n+el Rarcia 2anda, eds& 155%& Narratolo#y An 0ntroduction& 2ondon 2on+man&

L>-eill, Patric.& 155$& he !ictions of Discourse /eadin# Narrative heory& Toronto niversity of Toronto Press&

L>hau+hnessy, rian& 155;& “Tryin+ (as the Mental >Pineal Rland>)&” 8n he Philosophy of Action, edited y /lfred *& Mele& L9ford L9fordniversity Press&

Par.in, /lan& !000& (ssential Co#nitive Psycholo#y& Hove Psycholo+y Press&

Pascal, *oy& 15;;& he Dual +oice !ree 0ndirect Speech and 0ts !unctionin# in the Nineteenth Century (uropean Novel & ManchesterManchester niversity Press&

3!6;3

Pavel, Thomas R& 15"%& !ictional Worlds& Camrid+e Harvard niversity Press&

Perry, Mena.hem& 15;5& “2iterary 4ynamics Ho? the Lrder of a Te9t Creates its Meanin+s&” Poetics oday 1 (1#!) :6#%$, :11#%1&

Pin.er, teven& 155$& he "an#ua#e 0nstinct he Ne, Science of "an#ua#e and -ind & Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin&

###& 155;& ;o, the -ind Wor9s& Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin&

Poulet, Reor+es& 1566& “The Circle and the Centre *eality and -adame 6ovary&” Western /evie, 15 !$6#%0&



ou e , Reo +es& 566& e C c e d e Ce e e y d y& 5 6 %0&

###& 15%5& “Phenomenolo+y of *eadin+&” Ne, "iterary ;istory 1 (1) 6:#%"&

Priest, tephen& 1551& heories of the -ind & Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pen+uin&

Prince, Rerald& 15"!& Narratolo#y he !orm and !unctionin# of Narrative& erlin Mouton&

###& 15";& A Dictionary of Narratolo#y& 2ondon colar&

###& 155%& “-arratolo+y, -arratolo+ical Criticism, and Render&” 8n !iction pdated Theories of Fictionality, -arratolo+y, and Poetics,edited y Calin/ndrei Mihailescu and @alid Hamarneh& Toronto Toronto niversity Press&

Propp, Gladimir& 15%"& Morpholo+y of the Fol.tale& Translated y 2aurence cott& /ustin niversity of Te9as Press&

*amireA, Euan 4& 155!& “The Functional 4ifferentiation of ocial and Private peech / 4ialo+ic /pproach&” 8n Private peech From ocial8nteraction to Self$/e#ulation, edited y *afael 4iaA and 2aura er.& Hove and 2ondon Brlaum&

*eed, Bd?ard & 155%& Bncounterin+ the @orld To?ards an Bcolo+ical Psycholo+y& L9ford L9ford niversity Press&

*icoeur, Paul& 15"$& ime and Narrative& Gol& 1& Translated y Dathleen Mc2au+hlin and 4avid Pellauer& Chica+o niversity of Chica+o Press&

*immon3Denan, hlomith& 15":& Narrative !iction Contemporary Poetics& 2ondon *outled+e&

*oertson, Fiona& 155$& "e#itimate ;istories Scott: 8othic: and the Authorities of !iction& L9ford Clarendon&

*on, Moshe& 15"1& “Free 8ndirect 4iscourse, Mimetic 2an+ua+e Rames and the uKect of Fiction&” Poetics oday ! (!) 1;#:5&

*onen, *uth& 15""& “Completin+ the 8ncompleteness of Fictional Bntities&” Poetics oday 5 (:) $5;#61$&

###& 155$& Possible Worlds in "iterary heory& Camrid+e Camrid+e niversity Press&



y y + + y

*osenthal, 4avid M& 1555& “8ntrospection&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#$

3!6"3

nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

*ussell, ertrand& 15$0& An (n*uiry into -eanin# and ruth& 2ondon /llen and n?in&

*yan, Marie32aure& 15"6& “The Modal tructure of -arrative niverses&” Poetics oday % ($) ;1;#66&

###& 15"%& “Bmedded -arratives and Tellaility&” Style !0 :15#$0&

###& 1551. Possible Worlds: Artificial 0ntelli#ence: and Narrative heory& loomin+ton 8ndiana niversity Press&

###& 155;& “Postmodernism and the 4octrine of Panfictionality&” Narrative 6 (!) 1%6#";&

*yle, Rilert& 15%:& he Concept of -ind & Harmonds?orth, Bn+land Pere+rine&

chan., *o+er C&, and *oert P& /elson& 15;;& Scripts: Plans: 8oals: and 5nderstandin# An 0n*uiry into ;uman Fno,led#e Structures&Hillsdale -E Brlaum&

earle, Eohn *& 155!& The *ediscovery of the Mind& Camrid+e M8T Press&

eifert, Colleen M& 1555& “ituated Co+nition and 2earnin+&” 8n The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive ciences, edited y *oert /& @ilsonand Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

hort, Michael, Blena emino, and Eonathan Culpeper& 155%& “sin+ a Corpus for tylistics *esearch peech and Thou+ht Presentation&” 8n5sin# Corpora in "an#ua#e /esearch, edited y Eenny Thomas and Michael hort& 2ondon 2on+man&

.inner, & F& 15%$& “ehaviorism at Fifty&” 8n 6ehaviorism and Phenomenolo#y Contrastin# 6ases for -odern Psycholo#y , edited y T& @&



, y #y # f y #y , y

@ann& Chica+o niversity of Chica+o Press&

mith, rian Cant?ell& 1555& “ituatedness7Bmeddedness&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited y *oert /& @ilsonand Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

parshott, F& B& 15%;& “Truth in Fiction&” 7ournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism !% :#;&

pender, 4ale& 15"%& -others of the Novel GG 8ood Women Writers 6efore 7ane Austen& 2ondon Pandora&

perer, 4an, and 2a?rence Hirschfeld& 1555& “Culture, Co+nition, and Bvolution&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

3!653

tanAel, FranA& 15"$& A heory of Narrative& Translated y Charlotte Roedsche& Camrid+e Camrid+e niversity Press&

terelny, Dim& 1555& “2an+ua+e of Thou+ht&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

terner+, Meir& 15"!& “Proteus in Wuotation32and Mimesis and the Forms of *eported 4iscourse&” Poetics oday : (!) 10;#6%&

###& !001& “Ho? -arrativity Ma.es a 4ifference&” Narrative 5 (!) 116#!!&

tra?son, Ralen& 155;& “The elf&” 7ournal of Consciousness Studies& $ (6#%) $06#!"&

tra?son, P& F& 1565& 0ndividuals An (ssay in Descriptive -etaphysics& 2ondon Methuen&

Todorov, TAvetan& 15;;& Poetics of Prose& 8thaca -J Cornell niversity Press&

Trevarthen, Col?yn& 1555& “8ntersuKectivity&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co+nitive ciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C&



y K y y p f + y

Deil& Camrid+e M8T Press&

Turner, Mar.& 1551& *eadin+ Minds The tudy of Bn+lish in the /+e of Co+nitive cience& Princeton Princeton niversity Press&

###& 155%& The 2iterary Mind& L9ford L9ford niversity Press&

van 4iK., Teun /& 15;%& “Philosophy of /ction and Theory of -arrative&” Poetics 6 !";#::"&

van Rulic., *oert& 1555& “elf3Dno?led+e&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&Camrid+e M8T Press&

Golosinov, Galentin& 15;:& -arism and the Philosophy of "an#ua#e& Translated y 2adislav MateK.a and 8& *& Tituni.& 2ondon eminar&

Gy+ots.y, 2ev& 15"%& hou#ht and "an#ua#e& Translated y /le9 DoAulin& Camrid+e M8T Press&

@att, 8an& 156;& he /ise of the Novel & 2ondon Ho+arth&

@einer+, Henry H& 15"$& “Centers of Consciousness *econsidered&” Poetics oday 6 ($) ;%;#;:&

@erth, Paul& 1555& et Worlds /epresentin# Conceptual Space in Discourse& 2ondon 2on+man&

@ertsch, Eames G& 1551& +oices of the -ind A Sociocultural Approach to -ediated Action& Camrid+e Harvard niversity Press&

###& 1555& “Gy+ots.y, 2ev emenovich&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&Camrid+e M8T Press&

3!%03

@hite, Reoffrey& 1555& “Bthnopsycholo+y&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil&Camrid+e M8T Press&



@hite, Hayden& 15;"& ropics of Discourse (ssays in Cultural Criticism& altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins niversity Press&

###& 15";& he Content of the !orm Narrative Discourse and ;istorical /epresentation& altimore M4 Eohns Hop.ins niversity Press&

@hite, tephen 2& 1555& “elf&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil& Camrid+eM8T Press&

@ilson, *oert /& 1555a& “8ndividualism&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences , edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil,Camrid+e M8T Press&

###& 1555& “Philosophy&” 8n he -0 (ncyclopedia of the Co#nitive Sciences, edited y *oert /& @ilson and Fran. C& Deil, Camrid+eM8T Press&

@ilson, *oert /&, and Fran. C& Deil& eds& 1555& The M8T Bncyclopedia of the Co+nitive ciences& Camrid+e M8T Press&

@itt t i 2 d i 156" Phil hi l 8 ti ti L f d l . ll

libro fictional minds.completo

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