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•The Past as Prologue: Understanding Why There Was No American Blitzkrieg in 1942

•The Current Inter-War Period: Where to from here?

•Transforming Army Ground Forces: What Does Transformation Really Mean?

•The Path to Change: New Joint Operational Concepts

•What is the LRSG Organizational Concept?

•Summary

LRLRLRSGSGSG

Concepts for Transformation from Breaking the Phalanx: A Briefing for

The Raytheon Corporation

Briefing Outline

Presented by Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, US Army

Why Was there No American Blitzkrieg in 1942?

• In a period of fiscal constraint, and in the absence of compelling threats, the Army between 1919 and 1939:

– Focused on traditional roles—re-fought the last “successful” war or, in the British Case, the Empire - constabulary force

– Tried to advance the Single Service way of fighting

– Endeavored to preserve status quo

– Fought for budget share

– Tinkered on the margins - no real innovation

– Experimented with the familiar

– Until recently promoted BG George Marshall became Chief of Staff, the top leadership cloned itself—those who did not conform vanished!

Would More $ Have Made a Difference?• Traditional view: Tight budgets and Congressional/public

apathy responsible for Army not being ready for World War II

• Another view: Congress was disinterested in what was happening inside the Army and fiscal constraints were significant, but given the institutional realities in the interwar U.S. Army, it is likely that:

– The Ground Army would have pressed to fill personnel authorizations and fought for more end strength

– The Air Army would have built more bombers and bomber formations

Intellectual—not exclusively fiscal—deficits were responsible for the state of the U.S. Army in 1941.

• Today’s service paradigms create frames of reference that:– Prescribe the shared strategic view and values, as well as

the “proper” methods, tools, techniques, and approaches to problem solving within and among the services

– Provide a way in which services view themselves--how “the service” fights its war

– Govern how the services deal with each other and with other agencies—limits “jointness”

– Delineate the questions—and many of the answers—that are acceptable to services, but this may inadvertently restrict civilian control and policy implementation!

• Very few officers in the U.S. Army doubted—much less challenged—the ruling paradigm during 1920-39.

• Are senior officers in today’s Army very different?

A New inter-war period began in 1989!

What is Happening Right Now?• “Practical” technologies are those that do not disturb the

institutional inheritance. Alternative systems and concepts are rejected early!

But the Strategic Environment has Changed! This is a function of many factors including society and technology.

All future military operations, including warfighting, will be joint, expeditionary and combined in character!

To cope with the new environment, today’s Army must reorganize existing assets to operate differently, regardless of the mission - war, crisis, or peace support!

But the US Army, grounded as it is in the distant and recent past (Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia),

is ill-equipped to deal with a complex future

So, where do we go from here?

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LRLRSGSG

What Reconnaissance Discovers, Strike Destroys!

Concepts for transformation from Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century

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Briefing OutlineWhat did Kosovo Tell us About the Army?

Transforming Army Ground Forces

What is a Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (LRSG)?What is the LRSG Organizational Concept?

LRSG Reconnaissance Elements and Systems

LRSG Stand-Off Attack Complex

LRSG Equipment List and Required Sorties

LRSG Training-Readiness System

LRSG in the Joint Strike Force with USMC elements

LRSG and the Air Force Expeditionary Force

LRSG Proposed Stationing in the United States

Summary + Back-Up Slides

What Did the Kosovo Crisis Tell Us About Today’s Army?

• Plans for Future Army (IBCT/FCS-based Objective Force) look too much like the Army today.

• WW II style Divisions Too Slow, Too Centralized; Not organized for rapid deployment within JTF.

• Must Reorganize force within a new Joint Operational Architecture to fight Joint!

• Mix of Air and Sea lift will get Army Forces to the fight Quick!

• Must organize Army to conduct any mission the NCA assigns - WARFIGHTING or Peace Support Operations on short notice!

Create a new Army through organizational change to

achieve rapid deployability and real Joint Warfighting

Capability.

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•Armies confuse transformation with recapitalization. Re-capitalization of old structures with new equipment is not transformation.

•Armies transform when they successfully exploit new technology, new operational concepts, new organizations, as well as new approaches to training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power.

•Today’s US Army must transform in a way that creates powerful synergies with the new technologies and concepts fielded by air and naval forces.

The Key to Transformation: Fielding new forces for Joint Warfighting with new, superior capabilities!

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xxxx

xxx

xx

x

II

I

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint

Operational Area)

(Conduct Tactical

Maneuver)

(FIGHT!)

CORPS HEADQUARTERS

(Joint Capable)DIVISION HQTRS

(Joint Plugs)

Brigade HQTRS

Battalion Task Force

Company-Team Platform (tank)

ARMY HQTRS

Transformation Treats Army’s WW II Single Service Legacy Structure as a Constant

Six echelons of C2 to

direct the soldiers who

fight!

Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - Too Expensive to Modernize - Too Vulnerable to WMD!

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New Operational Concepts that Drive Transformation Must Be Joint!

Transformation cannot be single-service in orientation.

Thus, the critical question that must be asked in the context of Army Transformation is:

“What capabilities can the Army field in the future that the Joint Commander is likely to need?”

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The LRSG is designed to confer the capability for decisive operational maneuver on a JTF in a no-notice, come-as-you are world!

The LRSG is designed to merge its maneuver and strike capabilities with a JTF to conduct decisive attack, mobile defense, economy of force or peace support (crisis response) operations.

The Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is a Global Joint Asset!

•The LRSG is a fundamentally new “all arms” battlegroup, equipped to exploit lethal, cutting edge technology within a new joint operational framework.

•The LRSG concept was first outlined in Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, January 1997.

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LRSG Has Fewer Echelons - A Faster Decision Cycle - And Is Cheaper to Modernize

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ARMED RECON

CMD (C4I) &

CONTROLSPT

2,250 Troops

700 Troops

450 Troops

700 Troops

600 Troops

•3 Groups should be CONUS-based and ready on a rotational basis for immediate global deployment.•Equipment sets could be leased up to 8 years.

This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is designed to move by USAF aircraft anywhere in the world in 72 hours!

LRSG5,000 Troops

COMBAT MOBILITY

STRIKE

Brigadier General Commands LRSG

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The LRSG Mobilizes Fighting Power that is Proportionally Greater than its Size Indicates!

A R M E DR E C O N

S T R I K E

C O M B A TM O B I L I T Y

C M D ( C 4 I ) &

C O N T R O L

S P T

Twice the Maneuver Strength of a Conventional Maneuver brigade task force!=

The striking power of a conventionalartillery brigade!=Engineer troops to breech obstacles, minesand sustain the offensive.=The power to conduct independentoperations for more than a few days!=

Robust command structure, IWSR, Cruise Missile & NBC defense within a new Joint Operational Architecture!

=

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SYSTEMS IN THE LRSG STRIKE FORMATION

Non-Line-Of-SightSystem BatteryUnmanned Aerial Vehicles

Over-the-Horizon AttackSystems Taifun (attack UAV)

Stand-Off AttackBattery(6) MLRS (ATACM) Systems

(6) Crusader SOA Systems

Target Acquisition Battery(Radars)

Aviation ATTACK CO:(6) UH60 Aircraft

(4) MD 600 Armed Scouts

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•The (3) LRSGs are involved in one of three 180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs predictable.

•Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under Service control. [Status C1]

•Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War contingencies. [Status C1]

•Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave. [Status C4]

The LRSG Arrives Ready to Fight!

Applied to the Army at large, this approach creates a pool of (3) 40,000 man ready, CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Corps that can deploy 24 hours a day,

seven days a week to fight, deter or conduct any mission the NCA direct.

LRSG Deployment Readiness in the Group-based Force Structure

RECONSTITUTIONRECONSTITUTION

PHASEPHASE

(2)(2)AIRBORNE-AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTAIR ASSLTGROUPSGROUPS

(1) LIGHT(1) LIGHTRECON-RECON-STRIKESTRIKEGROUPGROUP

(4) COMBAT(4) COMBATMANEUVERMANEUVER

GROUPSGROUPS

(1) AVIATION(1) AVIATIONSTRIKESTRIKEGROUPGROUP

DEPLOYMENTDEPLOYMENTPHASEPHASE

CINC CONTROLCINC CONTROL

(2)(2)AIRBORNE-AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTAIR ASSLTGROUPSGROUPS

(1) LIGHT(1) LIGHTRECON-RECON-STRIKESTRIKEGROUSGROUS

(4) COMBAT(4) COMBATMANEUVERMANEUVER

GROUPSGROUPS

(1) AVIATION(1) AVIATIONSTRIKE GROUPSTRIKE GROUP

CONUS-BASEDCONUS-BASED

CLOSE COMBATECHELON

TRAINING-READINESS

PHASEARMY CONTROLARMY CONTROL

AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTGROUPS

LIGHTRECON-STRIKEGROUPS

COMBATMANEUVER

GROUPS

(2)AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTGROUPS

(1) LIGHTRECON-STRIKEGROUP

(4) COMBATMANEUVER

GROUPS

AVIATIONSTRIKEGROUPS

(1) AVIATIONSTRIKE GROUP

ARMY CONTROLARMY CONTROL

SIX MONTHS SIX MONTHS SIX MONTHS

OverseasOverseasPresencePresence

(1)

AIRBORNE-AIR

ASSAULTGROUP

(3)

COMBATMANUEVER

GROUPS

(1)

AVIATIONSTRIKEGROUP

ARMYFORCES IN

ROK,EUROPE &

SWA.

NONE.

ALL LRSGsARE CONUS-

BASED

CONUSCONUS

LRSG

X

Phase I: MEU Seizes Airstrip 50 kilometers from the port city.

Phase II: LRSG Deploys to Secure Airstrip. (Assumes C17/C5A availability).

Phase III: LRSG and MEU secure Port for use by follow-on Marine/Army Forces (Maritime Prepositioning Force) [Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)].

NCA Direct a Carrier Battlegroup (CVBG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to position off the coast of the N. African State.

Setting: Crisis in the Mediterranean. Competing factions position cruise missiles and air defense technology in a port on North African coast to deny access to US forces.

LRLRLRSGSGSG

                        

X XARG MEU,,, (-)

TLAGX

ARGX

MEUX

,,,

ABCT

X

AEF

JMTFXXX

TLAGX

JFETFXX

JSTFXX

CVWCVBGX X

SLOCPG MPWX X

MPS-1

XXX

Pre-positioned MEB

CVWCVBGX X SLOCPG MPW

X X

MPS-1

XXX

Pre-positioned MEB

JSDTFXX

APS-1

XX

Pre-positioned HBDE

LRSG

X

,,,

LRSG

Joint Maritime Task Forcefor Forcible Entry on Day (N+10)

An LRSG Integrated into a

Marine-Based JTF!

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The LRSG in Joint Operations with an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)

When Army elements are visible to Air Force, as well as Naval Strike Forces, the LRSG operates in new ways:

Linking the LRSG to the AEF concept facilitates air space control on the Joint level.

Under JFACC command, the LRSG can contribute to AEF success in the halt phase of future crises and conflicts!

LRSG can conduct deep operational maneuver to key operational objectives bypassing or selectively attacking enemy elements immobilized by air, space and missile power.

LRSG Strike assets complement, not duplicate AEF/Naval strike efforts.

-Beyond suppressing or destroying enemy air defense and missile assets, LRSG strike assets are effective when immediate responsiveness is required, in complex terrain, when collateral damage is a factor or in poor visibility.

During the 1999 Kosovo Crisis, the threat of air attack did not deter the Yugoslav Regime. The

arrival of an LRSG in January might have made a difference to Belgrade’s calculus.

BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

SARAJEVO

SFOR

AOR

SKOPJE

TIRANA

THESSALONIKI

MONTENEGRO

BULGARIA

VJ Corps

XXX49,000 troops

355 Tanks

500 BMPs/BTRs

900 Artillery Systems

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Fort Irwin, California

Fort Bliss, Texas

Fort Bragg, North

Carolina

Where the Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups Should Be Stationed

• This positions the LRSGs where they can train; and where USMC Command Elements for MEU/MEBs train and organize for deployments.

•Alaska could also provide a Joint Training/Maneuver site.

• Near C17/C5A capable air fields.

29 Palms, California

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

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The LRSG is designed to contribute to a quick, decisive outcome in Joint Force operations!

The nation needs Army warfighting forces that deploy rapidly with the combat power, Joint C4ISR operational architecture, doctrine, training, equipment and readiness essential to joint operations under CINC control.

The US Army should field (3) Light Recon-Strike Groups where Joint training with the USMC and USAF can occur regularly.

Equipment should be leased! Technology is moving too fast. In (8) years, new equipment with new weapon systems will be needed.

Summary of Key Points

Adopting the Combat Group organization in the LRSG breaks the WW II paradigm and sets the stage for Army-wide reform, reorganization and genuine transformation.

Compression of division and brigade into new echelon to achieve fewer C2 nodes and deep/close/rear functionality is critical to integration with other service components in the JTF.

This begins the process of organizing, training and equipping the Army to conduct warfighting, crisis response, peace support operations or any mission the NCA assign, anywhere in the world!

Summary of Key Points (Continued)

LRLRLRSGSGSG

Figure 6-8.

LRSG Complements USMC Organization for Combat

Marine Expeditionary BrigadeRegimental Landing Team(5291 marines - ashore portiononly)

Equipment: 414 light andarmored vehicles & 136 trucks3 battalionsAAV Bn (-) with 108 AAVsLAV Co (+) with 25 LAVsAT Cap with:

28 TOWs 36 Javelin 244 Predator

Arty Bn with (18) 155 mmHowitzers (Towed)

Tank Co with 14 M1A1s

LRSG: (5,000 soldiers)

Equipment: 569 armored andwheeled vehicles, 52 helicopters +(100) 463L Pallets in [7] Battlegroups

3 Armed Recon Squadrons with (81)AGS, (126) FCS-Tracers, (27) SP120mm Mortar X 2, (36) armed MD 600s(RAH66 Surrogates), (6) UH60s C2and refuel/rearm

1 Strike with (9) HIMARS/ATACM, (400)UCAVs, (4) MD 600s, (6) armed UH60s

1 Combat Mobility BN with (24) ACEs+ (6) FCS-Tracers

1 C4I Squadron with Joint C4ISRplugs, (14) AGS + [1] SupportSquadron