limeres v. limeres, alaska (2016)

7/25/2019 Limeres v. Limeres, Alaska (2016)

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/limeres-v-limeres-alaska-2016 1/25

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC R EPORTER.

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

RENEE.LIMERES,

Appellant,

v.

AMYW.LIMERES,

Appellee.

)) SupremeCourtNo.S-15489

SuperiorCourtNo.3AN-11-09292CI

OPINION

No.7081–February12,2016

)))))

)))

AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,ThirdJudicialDistrict,Anchorage,AndrewGuidi,Judge.

Appearances:ReneE.Limeres,prose,Nenana,Appellant.David W. Baranow, Law Offices of David Baranow,

Anchorage,forAppellee.

Before: Stowers,ChiefJustice,Fabe,Winfree,Maassen, andBolger,Justices.

FABE,Justice. MAASSEN,Justice,withwhomWINFREE,Justice,joins,dissenting.

I. INTRODUCTION

Acouplewiththreechildrendivorcedafter15yearsofmarriage. In2012

thesuperiorcourtorderedthefathertopayroughly$1,500permonthinchildsupport.

Thischildsupportcalculationreliedonthesuperiorcourt’sfinding,basedontheparties’

testimonyattrial,thatthefather’sincomewas$40,000annuallydespitehisself-reported

financialdocumentsshowingsignificantlylessincome. Thefatherappealedandwe

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



affirmedthesuperiorcourt’sfindingsandsupportorderinearly2014.1 Beforethat

appealwasresolved,thefatherseparatelymovedtomodifyhissupportobligation,filing

similarself-reportedfinancialdocumentsandarguingthathisactualincomewasless

than$10,000peryearasshownonhis2013taxreturn.Thesuperiorcourtdeniedhis

motiontomodifywithoutanevidentiaryhearing.Italsoawardedclosetofullattorney’s

feestothemotherdespitethefactthatsheraisedherfeerequestinheroppositiontothe

motiontomodifyandnevermadeaseparatemotionforfees. Thefatherappealsthe

denial ofhis motion tomodifyhis childsupportobligationwithoutanevidentiary

hearing. Healsoappealsthesuperiorcourt’sawardofattorney’sfeesintheabsenceof

amotionforfees.

Weaffirmthesuperiorcourt’sdenialofthefather’smotiontomodifychild

supportwithoutahearingandconcludethatanevidentiaryhearingwasnotrequired

becausethefatherpresentednonewevidencethatwouldrequireahearing. Butitwas

errortoawardattorney’sfeeswithouteitherrequiringthemothertofileamotionforfees

oradvisingthefatherthathehadarighttorespondtothefeerequestmadeinthe

mother’soppositionbrief. We thereforevacatethesuperiorcourt’sfeeawardand

remandtogivethefatheranopportunitytorespond.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

Thisappealmarksthesecondtimewehavebeenaskedtoreviewthechild

supportdeterminationmadebythesuperiorcourtinthiscase. Theunderlyingfacts

remainthesameasthosewedescribedinthefirstappeal:

AmyandReneLimeresweremarriedin1997andhadthreechildrentogether.Amyisanattorney;Renehasmademoney

from a variety of self-employment activities, includingguiding, writing articles about the outdoors, and selling

1 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291(Alaska2014).

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books.ThecoupleseparatedinJuly2011,andAmyfiledfordivorce.... Thecourtheldatwo-daydivorceandcustodytrialinJuly2012. Followingtrialitgrantedtherequesteddivorceandawardedsolelegalandphysicalcustodyofthethreechildren to Amy. Thecourt found that Rene’s netannualincomewas$40,000andthathewasobligatedtopaychildsupportof$1,514permonthretroactivetoAugust1,2011.... Renefiledamotionforreconsideration,whichthe[superior]courtdenied. Reneappeal[ed].[2]

AlthoughRenewasrepresentedbycounselduringtheinitialdivorceproceeding, 3hehas

representedhimselfinthesubsequentproceedings.

Inthefirstappeal,Renechallengedthesuperiorcourt’s“determinationof

hischildsupportobligations...[and]itsdenialofattorney’sfees,”amongotherissues.4

Weaffirmedthesuperiorcourt’sorderonallissues.5 Mostrelevanthere,weobserved

that“Renetestifiedattrialabouthis‘generationofsubstantialfunds,inthehundredsof

thousandsofdollars,intermsofbooksales,inventoryonhand,royaltiesandguiding

fees.’”6 Thenthreemonthsaftertrial,“Renesubmittedhis2011taxreturnsandaChild

SupportAffidavit thatshowed incomeof$8,426.82.”7 Facedwith this conflicting

evidence, the superior court found that Rene earned “at least $40,000 annually.”8

Reviewingforclearerror,wedeclinedtooverturnthesuperiorcourt’sfinding:“[G]iven

2 Id. at295.

3 Id. at302.

4 Id. at294-95.

5 Id. at295.

6 Id. at297.

7 Id.

8 Id. at296.

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Rene’searliertestimony,”weexplained,“wecannotsaythat thecourtclearlyerredwhen

itfoundhisyearlyincometobeapproximately$40,000despitewhathereportedonhis

incometaxreturn.”9 Wealsoconcludedthatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterrindenying

additionalattorney’sfeestoReneafteraninitialawardofinterimfees,inconnection

withthedivorceproceedings,underAS25.24.140(a)(1). 10

PriortoourMarch2014decision,Renefilednumerousmotionstostay

enforcementofthesuperiorcourt’ssupportorder,tomodifyhissupportobligation,and

toexpeditethesuperiorcourt’sconsideration.Thesuperiorcourtdeniedthesemotions.

InresponseRenefiledoveradozenmotionstoreconsider,whichthesuperiorcourtalso

denied. Mostrelevanthere,inJanuary2013Renefiledamotionformodificationof

childsupportbasedonhisallegedmaterialchangeofcircumstances. Renesupported

this motion withdocuments similar to those he had presented during the divorce

proceedingsjustafewmonthsearlier:Hefiledanewchildsupportguidelinesaffidavit

andhislatesttaxreturn(nowfor2012)showinganincomeof$5,770.93,allfromself-

reportedbusinessprofitsandhisPermanentFundDividend(PFD). Thesuperiorcourt

denied this motion for modification in July 2013. Rene’s subsequent motion for

reconsiderationallegedthathewasentitledtoanevidentiaryhearingontheevidencehe

hadpresented,butthetrialcourtdeniedreconsiderationinAugust2013.

Five months later, in January 2014, Rene filed a second motion for

modificationofchildsupport. Thatmotionisthesubjectofthecurrentappeal. Along

withthis2014motionformodification,Renealsofiledanothertaxreturnandchild

support guidelines affidavit, now showing his financial information for 2013 and

claiminganannualincomeof$7,120,entirelyfromself-reportedbusinessprofits.Rene

9 Id. at297.

10 Id. at302.

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also submitted a sworn affidavit alleging financial hardship in an effort “to enter

additionalevidenceintothe[r]ecordtosupport[his]claimthatthecurrentobligation

[was]notbasedonarealisticassessmentof[his]currentearningcapacity.”Theaffidavit

claimedthatRenehadnomorebookslefttosell“noranyfundstoprintmore”andthat,

becauseofchildsupportliensagainsthim,hislowcreditscoremadeitimpossiblefor

himtoborrowmoneytoprintmorebooks. Rene’saffidavitalsostatedthat,despitethe

factthathehad“aggressivelysoughtadditionalemploymentwitheverylocalbusiness,”

hehadonlybeenabletosecurepart-timeworkthat“barelypa[id]enoughfor[him]to

surviveon.”

AmyopposedRene’smotiontomodifyhissupportobligation. Inher

oppositionbriefshequestionedtheveracityofRene’sreportedincomeof$7,120from

his2013taxreturn,whichsheassertedwas“necessarilyinaccurateonitsface.” She

suggestedthatitwasnonsensicalforRenetobe “earn[ing]lessthanone-halftheAlaskan

minimumwagerateforasingleindividualworkingafull-time,40hourworkweek.”

AmyalsochallengedRene’sassertionthathehadnomorebookstosell,giventhatRene

hadreceivedthewholebookinventoryinthesuperiorcourt’spropertydivisionyet

reportednobooksaleprofitsonhis2013taxreturn. Amystatedthat“Renewould

apparentlyleaveittothisCourttodetermineonwhichoccasion(orboth)hedidperjure

himselfastothevalue/proceedsoftheseassets.” AmyconcludedbynotingthatRene’s

“allegedproofsofhismostrecentde minimis earnings...straincredibilitywellpastthe

burstingpoint.”

AmyalsoassertedthatRene’smotiontomodifysupportwas“devoidof

merit”and“frivolousinnature.”Amythusrequested,inheroppositionbrief,an“awardofactualattorney’sfees[underAlaskaCivilRule82]andadditionalsanctionspursuant

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toAlaskaCivilRule...11.”11 Amystatedthatshehadincurredattorneyexpensesfor

“[a] totalof2.5 hoursattorney timeat $225.00perhour . . . to pursue anddraft

oppositionandrelatedpleadings,foratotalof$562.50.” ButAmydidnotattachany

billingstatementstosupportthatfigure,nordidshefileaseparatemotiontorequest

attorney’sfeesasnormallyrequiredunderCivilRule82.RenedidnotrespondtoAmy’s

substantiveargumentsorthequestionofattorney’sfees.

On February 4, 2014, the superior court denied Rene’s motion for

modificationofsupport. Atthesametime,withoutrequiringthatAmymakeaseparate

motionforattorney’sfees,thecourtawardedAmy$500inattorney’sfeesbutdeclined

toimposeRule11sanctions“forthefilingofaplainlymeritlessandfrivolousmotion.”

Rene then filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he was entitled to an

evidentiary hearingonhis motion tomodify support and contesting the award of

attorney’sfeesintheabsenceofamotionforfeesunderCivilRule82. Themotionfor

reconsiderationwasdenied,andRenenowappeals.

11 Incasesnotinvolvingamonetaryjudgment,CivilRule82generallyallowstheprevailingpartytorecoverpartialattorney’sfees. AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b)(2). Therule allows enhanced fees upon consideration of certain factors listed in the rule,including full attorney’s fees for “vexatious or bad faith conduct” underRule82(b)(3)(G). CivilRule11requiresattorneysandunrepresentedpartiestocertifythatthepleadingsandmotionstheyfileare“notbeingpresentedforanyimproper

purpose,suchastoharass,causeunnecessarydelay,orneedlesslyincreasethecostof

litigation.” AlaskaR.Civ.P.11(b)(1). Wehaveinterpretedittoauthorizesanctionsagainstpartieswhoviolatetherule. Alaska State Emps. Ass’n v. Alaska Pub. Emps.

Ass’n,813P.2d669,671(Alaska1991)(citing Keen v. Ruddy,784P.2d653,658(Alaska1989)).

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III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

“Weuseourindependentjudgmenttodecidewhetheritwaserrornotto

holdanevidentiaryhearing.”12 Thisgeneralprincipleappliesequallyinthecontextof

motionstomodifychildsupport:“Wereviewdenovowhetheramovingpartyhasmade

aprima facieshowingsufficientto justifya custodyorchild supportmodification

hearing.”13 Thuswe“willaffirmadenialofamodificationmotionwithoutahearingif,

inourindependentjudgment,...theallegationsaresogeneralorconclusory...asto

createnogenuineissueofmaterialfactrequiringahearing.” 14

“Wereviewanawardofattorney’sfeesforabuseofdiscretion,”15soafee

award“willnotbedisturbedonappealunlessitis‘arbitrary,capricious,ormanifestly

unreasonable.’”16 However,“[w]hetherthesuperiorcourtappliedtheappropriatelegal

standardinitsconsiderationofafeepetitionpresentsaquestionoflawthatwereview

denovo.”17

12 Routh v. Andreassen,19P.3d593,595(Alaska2001); see also Hartley v.

Hartley,205P.3d342,346-47(Alaska2009).

13 Hill v. Bloom, 235 P.3d215,219 (Alaska2010)(alterationsomitted)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999)).

14 Id. (secondalterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington,984P.2dat3).

15 Martin v. Martin,303P.3d421,424(Alaska2013)(citing McDonald v.

Trihub,173P.3d416,420(Alaska2007)).

16 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296(Alaska2014)(quoting Fergusonv. Ferguson,195P.3d127,130(Alaska2008)).

17 Powell v. Powell ,194P.3d364,368(Alaska2008)(citing McDonald ,173P.3dat420).

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Finally,“[w]ereviewforabuseofdiscretion‘decisionsaboutguidanceto

aproselitigant.’”18 “Anabuseofdiscretionexistswhenapartyhasbeendeprivedof

asubstantialrightorseriouslyprejudicedbythelowercourt’sruling.” 19

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rene’sMotionForModificationOfChildSupport,FiledOnlyFiveMonthsAfterTheDenialOfHisPreviousMotionForModification,

DidNotRequire ANew Evidentiary HearingBecause ItDidNot

ProvideSubstantiallyNewEvidence.

Renehasargued,bothinhismotionforreconsiderationbeforethetrial

courtandonappealhere,thatthesuperiorcourterredindenyinganevidentiaryhearing

onhismotiontomodifychildsupport. Becausethisargument raisesa legal issue

relatingtothenecessityofholdinganevidentiaryhearing,weaddressthisquestionde

novo.20

AlaskaCivilRule90.3(h),whichgovernsthemodificationofchildsupport

orders, provides for modification “upon a showing of a material change of

circumstances.”21 Therulestatesthat“[a]materialchangeofcircumstanceswillbe

presumedifsupportascalculatedunder[Rule90.3]ismorethan15percentgreateror

lessthantheoutstandingsupportorder.” 22 Buttheburdenisonthemovingpartyto

18 Greenway v. Heathcott , 294 P.3d1056,1062(Alaska2013)(quotingShooshanian v. Dire,237P.3d618,622(Alaska2010)).

19 Limeres,320P.3dat296(quoting Azimi v. Johns,254P.3d1054,1059(Alaska2011)).

20 Routh v. Andreassen,19P.3d593,595(Alaska2001).

21 AlaskaR.Civ.P.90.3(h)(1).

22 Id.

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makeaprimafacieshowingthatthispresumptionapplies.23 Thus,while“[t]rialcourts

must take [into account] all evidence necessary to accurately reflect the parties’

economic reality,”24 a motion to modify child support may be denied without an

evidentiaryhearingwhenthemovingpartyhas“notpresentedsufficientevidenceof

permanentlyreducedincometoshowamaterialchangeincircumstances.”25 Inother

words,wehaveemphasizedthat“[a]hearingisnotrequiredwhenthereisnogenuine

issueofmaterial fact. ‘Generalizedallegationsoffactual issues that other record

evidenceconvincingly refutes’ donotcreategenuineissuesofmaterial fact.”26 In

addition,wehaveheldthataparty’s“bareclaim,”eveninaswornaffidavit,doesnot

createadisputeofmaterialfact.27

Moreover, to create an issue of material fact, a party must present

substantiallynew evidenceshowingchangedcircumstances—notsimply“additional

23 See Hill v. Bloom,235P.3d215,219(Alaska2010)(reviewing“[w]hetheramovingpartyhasmadeaprimafacieshowingsufficienttojustify...achildsupport

modificationhearing”(firstalterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999))).

24 Routh,19P.3dat595-96(quoting Adrian v. Adrian,838P.2d808,811(Alaska1992)).

25 Hill ,235P.3dat217.

26 Wilhour v. Wilhour ,308P.3d884,888(Alaska2013)(internalcitationandalterationomitted)(quoting Acevedo v. Burley,944P.2d473,475(Alaska1997)).

27 Epperson v. Epperson,835P.2d451,453&n.4(Alaska1992)(holdingthataparty’s“bareclaim”thatthecustodialparenthadlowlivingexpensesdidnotcreateagenuineissueofmaterialfact); see also Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11(“Withoutmoreinformation,. ..[a]bareassertion... isinsufficienttowarrantanevidentiaryhearing.”).

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evidencebolstering...previouslyadducedevidenceandarguments.” 28 Weaddressed

thisissuein Hill v. Bloom,acaseanalogoustothepresentone,whereaparentsimilarly

movedformodificationofchildsupportonthebasisofallegedlylow,self-reported

businessincomejustafewmonthsaftertheinitialchildsupportdetermination.

Inthatcase,Hillhadpresentedherlatestfinancialdocumentsshowinga

decreaseinincomefromthebusinesssheowned,andattrialshehadarguedthather

decreaseinincomewaspermanent. 29 Thetrialcourtfoundinsteadthatthedecreasewas

an“aberration”and orderedher to paychildsupportbasedonher earlier, higher

income.30Justfivemonthsafterthisevidentiaryhearing,Hillmovedformodification

ofherchildsupportobligations,arguingthathercontinuedlowincomeconstituteda

changedcircumstance.31 Hillsupportedthismotionwithaswornaffidavitandbusiness

summariesshowingherincomefortheprecedingsixmonths. 32 Yetthesuperiorcourt

foundthatthisevidencewasnotenoughtoconstitutenewinformationforthepurpose

ofrequiring anevidentiaryhearing—despite the fact that itwas technically new

evidence—becauseitwascompletelyconsistentwiththeinformationshehadrecently

presentedattrial.33 Weagreed: “ThisevidenceofHill’sactualincome. ..wasnot

presented to thesuperiorcourt in the [prior]hearing, so in thatsenseitwasnew

evidence,butitwasentirelyconsistentwiththeevidenceandargumentsthatHilldid

28 Hill ,235P.3dat219.

29 Id. at217-18.

30 Id. at218.

31 Id.

32 Id. at218,219.

33 Id. at218.

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presenttothecourtatthehearing,”andthusweheldthatthesuperiorcourtdidnoterr

indenyinganevidentiaryhearing. 34

Wealsoemphasizedthatonlyfivemonthshadpassedbetweentheinitial

childsupportdeterminationandHill’smotiontomodifychildsupportbasedonchanged

circumstances.35 Wesuggested that,withoutdrawing“abright lineestablishing a

minimumperiodoftimethatapartymustwait...before...fil[ing]amotiontomodify

support,”36 averyshorttimeframetendstomakeitlesslikelythatanewevidentiary

hearingwouldberequired.37 Accordingly,weheldthatthesuperiorcourthadnoterred

indenyingHill’smotionwithoutconductinganewevidentiaryhearing:

Given the relatively brief passage of time between theFebruary2008evidentiaryhearingandtheJuly2008motiontomodify,andgiventhattheevidencepresentedinsupportof the motion tomodify was essentially the same as theevidencepresentedintheevidentiaryhearing,wecannotsaythat the court clearly erred in concluding that Hill had

presentednonewevidenceforthepurposeofconsideringhermotiontomodifychildsupport.[38]

Theessenceofthisconclusionisthatnohearingisrequiredwhereapartyfilesevidence

attrialandthen,shortlythereafter,refilesthesameorsimilarinformationinanattempttoclaimchangedcircumstances.

34 Id. at219-20.

35 Id. at218,220.

36 Id. at218.

37 See id. at220(“Hill’sactualincomeforthefirsthalfof2008didnotmakeaprimafacieshowingformodificationofchildsupportgiventherelativelyshortamountoftimethatpassedbetweentheevidentiaryhearingandthemotiontomodify.”).

38 Id. at219.

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Thisanalysisappliesequallyinthecurrentcase. Renearguesthatthe

evidencehepresentedcreatesanissueofmaterialfactwithregardtohislevelofincome

andhisearningcapacity. Reneexplainsthatheprovided(1)a taxreturnandchild

supportaffidavitshowingthathisself-reportedannualincomewaswellbelowthelevel

determinedbythesuperiorcourt,and(2)anaffidavitattestingthathehadsoldoutofhis

supplyofbooks(aprimarysourceofincomeforhim),hadsustainedaleginjuryina

snowmobileaccidentthatreducedhisearningcapacity,andhad“aggressively”sought

employmentbuthadonlybeenabletosecureapart-time,minimum-wagejob. Rene

contendsthatthestatementabouthisbookinventory“wasnotseriouslychallenged”by

Amy,nordidAmypresenta“cogentargument...todispute”histestimonyabouthis

newpart-timejob.

Amy counters that Rene is not entitled to “repetitive and successive

hearings”ontheproperamountofchildsupport“simplybecausehehasprovided...tax

returnstothecourt.” Weagree. Under Hill v. Bloom,noneoftheevidenceRene

presentedwassufficienttocreateadisputeofmaterialfactbecauseitdidnotofferany

substantiallynewinformationbeyondwhathehadrecentlypresentedattrial.

First, the short timeline of Rene’s successive motions supports the

conclusionthatanewevidentiaryhearingwasnotrequiredhere. Inthatrespect,this

caseechoes Hill ’ssuggestionthatthe“briefpassageoftimebetweenthe...evidentiary

hearingandthe...motiontomodify”counselsagainstrequiringanewevidentiary

hearing.39 RenefiledhisfirstmotiontomodifychildsupportinJanuary2013,justtwo

and a half months after the initial trial and determination of child support in

November2012.Afterbriefingbytheparties,thesuperiorcourtdeniedRene’smotioninJuly2013. Reneimmediatelyfiledamotionforreconsiderationinwhichheargued

See id.

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39



thathewasentitledtoanevidentiaryhearing,whichthesuperiorcourtdenied. Justfive

monthsafterthat,inJanuary2014,Renefiledthemotiontomodifychildsupportthatis

nowbeforeusonappeal.Moreover,atthetimeoffiling—notwithstandingthelarge

numberofmotionsfiledintheinterveningperiod—onlyslightlymorethanayearhad

passedsincetheinitialdivorcedecreeandchildsupportorder.Theshortpassageoftime

betweeneachofthesestagesthuspointstowardtheconclusionthatanewhearingisnot

required.

Furthermore,theevidenceRenefiledwithhismotionwassubstantially

equivalenttotheevidencehehadrecentlypresentedattrial. First,thetaxreturnand

childsupportguidelinesaffidavitthatRenesubmittedwithhis2014motiontomodify

wereverysimilartothedocumentshehadsubmittedtothecourtinthedivorcetrialand

inhis2013motiontomodifysupport. Thenewlysubmittedtaxreturnandchildsupport

affidavitmirroredhisearliersubmissionsinbothcharacterandcontent:The2011tax

returnsubmittedinthedivorcetrialshowedatotalincomeof$8,427comingentirely

fromself-reportedbusinessprofitsandRene’sPFD,whilethe2013taxreturnshowed

atotalincomeof$7,120solelyfromself-reportedbusinessprofits.

Inadditiontothefactthattheamount ofreportedincomeishighlysimilar

acrosstheseyears,thenatureoftheincomeisalsoidentical,inthatRene’snon-PFD

incomeconsistsentirelyofself-reportedbusinessearnings. Totheextentthatitdiffers

atallfromhisearlierfilings,Rene’slatesttaxreturnactuallyprovideslessinformation

byfailingtoincludeaScheduleCshowingthedetailsofhisbusinessearnings. And

Rene’snewchildsupportguidelinesaffidavit,liketheaffidavithesubmittedduringthe

divorcetrial,simplymatchestheamountofincomereportedonthecorrespondingtaxreturn. So,likein Hill ,thisevidence“wasentirelyconsistentwiththeevidenceand

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arguments”thatRenedidpresenttothecourtattrial. 40 Thesuperiorcourthadalready

foundRene’sself-reportedtaxreturnandchildsupportaffidavittobelesscrediblethan

histestimonysuggestingamuchhigherincome,andweupheldthatfinding.41 Now,

becauseRene’sostensiblynewtaxreturnshows“essentiallythesame”amountand

source of income as the tax return already considered at trial, it fails to present

sufficiently new evidence to create a dispute of material fact warranting a new

evidentiaryhearing.42

NordoesRene’s supplemental affidavitprovidesufficientevidenceto

requireanewhearing.Wehavepreviouslyheldinthechildsupportcontextthat“acourt

maydenyahearingwherethemovingpartymakesonlybareassertions...thatfailto

createagenuineissueofmaterialfact.” 43 In Hill ,these“bareassertions”includedHill’s

swornstatementthatshehadbeendiagnosedwithakidneydisorderrequiringsurgery.

Becauseshedidnotprovideinformationaboutthecostsorrecoverytimeforthesurgery,

the court concluded that “Hill’s medical condition [did]not cross the evidentiary

thresholdtorequireanevidentiaryhearing.” 44 Here,similarly,Reneofferednoevidence

beyondhisownunsupportedassertionsthathehad“nomorebigbooks...left”tosell,

“nor any funds to print more,” and that he had “aggressively sought additional

employment”butcouldonlysecureapart-time,minimum-wagejob.

40 See id.

41 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296-97(Alaska2014).

42 See Hill ,235P.3dat219.

43 Ward v. Urling ,167P.3d48,53n.18(Alaska2007); see also Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11.

44 Hill ,235P.3dat220n.11.

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WhilethedissentconsidersRene’sassertionstobehighlysignificant,it

fails to address or distinguish our conclusion in Hill v. Bloom that this type of

unsupportedclaimdoesnotjustifyanewhearing. ThedissentemphasizesthatRene’s

assertionsdifferedfromthemoregeneralizedstatementsthatfailedtojustifyahearing

inWard v. Urling .45 ButinWard wedidnotactuallydecidethequestionwhetheran

evidentiaryhearingwasrequiredorindicatewherethelinemightbedrawn. Insteadwe

simply“note[d]thatit[was]highlyquestionablewhetherWardwas...entitledtoan

evidentiaryhearing,”46 makingnofurtherpronouncementsastowhatwould justifya

hearing.In Epperson v. Epperson,similarly,weconcludedthatgeneralstatementswere

insufficienttojustifyahearingbutdidnotdrawahardlinebeyondwhichahearingis

required.47 Andin Hill weconcludedthateventhemorespecificcontentionsmadeby

Hillfailedtorequireahearing.48 SoalthoughRene’sstatementsaboutdiminishedbook

salesprovidedmoredetailthanthestatementsinWard and Epperson,Rene—like

Hill—providedlittle informationandnodocumentationto supporthisassertions.Thus,

weconcludethatRene’s“bareassertion[s],”madewithoutanysupportinginformation,

are“insufficienttowarrantanevidentiaryhearing.” 49

Renenowclaimsthathealsoofferedinformationaboutasnowmobile

injurythatforcedhimtomisspartofhisbook-sellingseason.Infact,Renemadethis

assertioninseveralaffidavitspertainingtothe2013motiontomodifychildsupport.By

45 Dissentat24-25.

46 167P.3dat53n.18.

47 835P.2d451,453,n.4(Alaska1992).

48 235P.3dat219,220n.11.

49 See id. at220n.11.

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contrast, his 2014 affidavit did not mention this fact, let alone provide further

informationtosupportit.Similarly,Renenowinvitesthecourt“tofullyinvestigate[his]

finances,”andhemadeasimilarofferinearlierproceedingsbeforethesuperiorcourt.

Butheneitherprovidedanyfurtherfinancialdocumentationnormentionedthisofferat

thetimeofhis2014motiontomodifysupport. Sotheseassertions,too,failtomeetthe

barforrequiringanevidentiaryhearing.

Insum,giventhesimilarityoftheevidencepresentedateachofthese

stages,coupledwiththeshortpassageoftime betweeneachstage,weconcludethatRene

wasnotentitledtoanewevidentiaryhearingatthetimeofhis2014motiontomodify

support.

B. ItWasErrorToAwardNear-FullAttorney’sFeesWithoutAMotion

ForFeesAndWithoutAdvisingReneOfHisRightToRespond.

Renealsoarguesthatitwasimproperforthesuperiorcourttoaward

near-fullattorney’sfeestoAmygiventhatshedidnotfileamotionforfeesasrequired

byAlaskaRuleofCivilProcedure82(c). Becausethisquestionrelatestothesuperior

court’sdecisionnottoadviseaproselitigantofhisrighttorespondbeforegranting

attorney’sfees,“[w]ereviewforabuseofdiscretion.”50

AsRene correctly noted inhis motion for reconsideration before the

superiorcourtandnotesagainonappealhere,CivilRule82(c)providesthat“[a]motion

isrequiredforanawardofattorney’sfeesunderthisruleorpursuanttocontract,statute,

regulation,orlaw.” Thisrequirementgivestheopposingpartyachancetorespondto

See Greenway v. Heathcott ,294P.3d1056,1062(Alaska2013)(citingShooshanian v. Dire,237P.3d618,622(Alaska2010)).

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50



thefeerequest. Accordingly,“itiserrortoawardattorney’sfeesbeforetheopposing

partyhasanopportunitytorespond.”51

Rule82alsoprescribesaformulaforcalculatingattorney’sfees, specifying

thatacourtmayonlyvaryfromthestandardawardofpartialfeesafterconsidering

certainfactorslistedintherule.52 Aswerecentlyexplained,“[w]ehaveheldthatin

general,atrialcourthasbroaddiscretiontoawardRule82attorney’sfeesinamounts

exceedingthoseprescribedbythescheduleoftherule,solongasthecourtspecifiesin

therecorditsreasonsfordepartingfromtheschedule.”53 Yetwehavealsoclarifiedthat

“fullfeesmaynotbeawardedunderRule82(b)(3)exceptunderRule82(b)(3)(G),”54the

provisionfor“vexatiousorbadfaithlitigationconduct.” Therefore,“[a]Rule82(b)(3)

awardoffullfeesis‘manifestlyunreasonable’absentafindingofbadfaithorvexatious

conduct.”55

Here,Amymadenomotionforattorney’sfees.Instead,Amy’srequestfor

feeswascontainedwithinhermeritsbriefinoppositiontoRene’smotiontomodifychild

support.Amy’sopposition briefrequestedactualattorney’sfeesunderCivilRule82and

sanctionsunderCivilRule11.Italsobrieflystatedthatherlawyerhadworked“[a]total

of2.5hoursattorneytimeat$225.00perhour...foratotalof$562.50.” Thesuperior

courteffectivelytreatedthisrequestasanonconformingmotionforattorney’sfees,

51 Gallant v. Gallant ,945P.2d795,800(Alaska1997)(citing Bowman v. Blair ,889P.2d1069,1075(Alaska1995)).

52 See AlaskaR.Civ.P.82(b).

53 Kollander v. Kollander ,322 P.3d 897,907 (Alaska2014)(alterationsomitted)(quoting Johnson v. Johnson,239P.3d393,400(Alaska2010)).

54 Id. (quoting Johnson,239P.3dat403).

55 Id. (quoting Johnson,239P.3dat400).

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despitethefactthatnosuchmotionhadbeenmade,anditawarded$500ofactual

attorney’sfeestoAmy.56 Thusthesuperiorcourtawardednear-fullattorney’sfees

withoutanymotionforfees,andwithoutinformingRenethatitintendedtotreatthe

languageinAmy’sbriefasaseparatemotionforfees.

In Breck v. Ulmer weheldthatthecourtshaveadutyto“informaprose

litigantoftheproperprocedurefor theactionheor she isobviouslyattemptingto

accomplish.”57 Althoughoursubsequentcaselawhas“decline[d]toextend Breck to

requirejudgestowarnproselitigantsonaspectsofprocedurewhentheproselitigant

has failed to at least filea defective pleading,”58 wehavealso recognized special

circumstancesgivingrisetoaheighteneddutywhenthetrialcourtitselfdeviatesfrom

normalprocedures.Forinstance,in Bush v. Elkins,wherethesuperiorcourtremoved

a pro se litigant’s name from the casecaption and instructed him to cease filing

pleadings,weheld that“aduty to inform[theproseparty]ofhisabilitytofilea

response...arosefromthesuperiorcourt’sactions.” 59

56 AlthoughthesuperiorcourtfoundthatRene’smotionwas“meritlessandfrivolous,”itdeclinedtoimposeamonetarysanction. Itisunclearwhetherthephrase“meritlessandfrivolous”isintendedtoreflectafindingthatRene’smotionconstituted“vexatiousand bad faith conduct” justifying a possible full fee award underRule82(b)(3)(G). However,weneednotconsiderthatquestionherebecauseweconcludethattheenhancedfeeawardwasimproperonothergrounds.

57 Breck v. Ulmer ,745P.2d66,75(Alaska1987)(italicsomitted).

58 Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,768P.2d1097,1099(Alaska1989).

59 342P.3d1245,1254(Alaska2015).

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We considered the same question in Pedersen v. Blythe, a case that

presentedsimilarproceduralissuestothecurrentone.60 There,inrulingonamotionto

dismiss,thesuperiorcourtconsideredevidencebeyondthepleadings, therebyconverting

themotiontodismissintoamotionforsummaryjudgment,withoutinformingthepro

selitigantofthisproceduralshiftorgivinghimachancetoreply. 61 Weemphasizedthat

amotion forsummary judgment requires that opposingpartieshave a “reasonable

opportunity”torespond.62 Moreover,weexplained,“[t]he‘reasonableopportunity’is

particularlyimportantforproseparties,giventhattrialjudgesareobligatedtoinform

proselitigantsofproceduralrequirements”inthiscontext.63 Accordingly,weheldthat

“thesuperiorcourterredwhen,indecidingthemotiontodismiss,itconsideredmatters

outsidethepleadingswithoutadvisingPedersenofitsintenttodosoandgivinghima

reasonableopportunitytorespond.” 64

Amotionforattorney’sfeessimilarlyrequiresthat“theopposingparty[be

given]anopportunitytorespond.” 65 Yetinthecurrentcase,thesuperiorcourtconverted

Amy’soppositiontothemotiontomodifysupportintoamotionforattorney’sfees

withoutadvisingReneof“itsintenttodosoandgivinghimareasonableopportunityto

60 292P.3d182(Alaska2012).

61 Id. at185.

62 Id.

63 Id. (citingGenaro v. Municipality of Anchorage,76P.3d844,846(Alaska

2003)).

64 Id. at183.

65 Gallant v. Gallant ,945P.2d795,800(Alaska1997)(citing Bowman v.

Blair ,889P.2d1069,1075(Alaska1995)).

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respond.”66 Inlightofourcaselawonthisissue,weconcludethatitwaserrortoaward

attorney’sfeeswithoutamotionforfeesandwithoutnotifyingReneofhisrightto

respondtoAmy’srequestforfees.IfthesuperiorcourtchosetotreatAmy’smeritsbrief

asanonconformingmotionforfees,ithadadutytoinformReneofthisproceduralshift

andgivehimareasonableopportunitytorespond. 67

Rene’srighttorespondisparticularlyimportantinlightofthefactthat

AmyrequestedfullfeesunderRule82(c)andsanctionsunderRule11. Becausefull

attorney’sfeesareonlypermittedafterafindingof“vexatiousorbadfaithconduct,”

ReneshouldhavehadanopportunitytocontestAmy’sallegationthathismotionwas

“frivolous.” Indeed,therecordshowsthatRenedidcontestthisallegationinhismotion

forreconsideration,arguingthathismotionwas“areasonedandlegitimatecryfor

justice”andthatitwasnot“meritless”or“frivolous”becausehesubmitted“[s]ufficient

supportingevidence.” IfhehadbeenaffordedanopportunitytorespondtoAmy’s

requestforfees,Renemighthavemadethesesameargumentsinhisresponse. The

failuretoaffordRenethisopportunity,asReneargued,“representsa...violationofdue

process.”

Accordingly,wefindthatthesuperiorcourt’sfeeawardconstitutedan

abuseofdiscretion. Wethusvacatethesuperiorcourt’sorderofattorney’sfeesagainst

ReneandremandtogiveReneanopportunitytorespondtoAmy’srequestforfeesand

sanctions.

66

Pedersen,292P.3dat183.67 AlthoughAmycontendsthatthefeerequestinherbriefputRene“on

noticeoftherequestbeingmade,”thisargumentisbesidethepoint.EvenifRenecoulddiscernfromAmy’sbriefthatshewasrequestingfees,hehadnowayofknowingthatthecourtwouldtreatthisportionofthemeritsbriefasanindependentmotionforfees.

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Onremand,aftergivingReneanopportunitytorespond,thesuperiorcourt

may then decide whether an enhanced fee award is appropriate. In making this

determination, the superiorcourtshould follow the two-step process that wehave

describedinpastcases.Specifically,forafeeawardunderRule82(b)(3),thetrial“court

must first calculatewhataward isauthorizedunder the scheduleset forth inCivil

Rule 82[(b)(2)] and then state its reasons for deviating from that award.”68 A

Rule82(b)(3)awardoffullfeesismanifestlyunreasonableabsentafindingofbadfaith

orvexatiousconduct.69 Thesuperiorcourt’sdecisiononremand,therefore,shouldnot

only consider Rene’s response to Amy’s fee request but should also provide an

explanationforanyfeeawardthatdeviatesfromtheformulaspecifiedinRule82(b)(1).

Indeterminingwhethera litigant’sclaims“weremadevexatiouslyorinbad

faith,”wehavepreviouslyexplained,“[t]heissueisnotwhethertheywereultimately

unsuccessful,butwhethertheywerecollectivelyorindividuallysolackinginmeritthat

itispermissibleto inferthat[theparty]actedinbadfaithorengaged invexatious

litigationconduct.”70 SothefactthatRenedidnotprevailonthemeritsdoesnot

necessarilymeanhismotionwasfiledvexatiouslyorinbadfaith. Ifthesuperiorcourt

finds,evenafterconsideringRene’sresponse,thatthemotiontomodifysupportwas

vexatiousorinbadfaithwithinthemeaningofRule82(b)(3)(G),itshouldmakea

specificfindingtothateffect. Onlyaftersuchafindingwouldenhancedattorney’sfees

bewarranted.

68 Kowalski v. Kowalski,806P.2d1368,1373(Alaska1991)(citing Mullenv. Christiansen,642P.2d1345,1351(Alaska1982)).

69 Johnson v. Johnson,239P.3d393,400(Alaska2010).

70 Id. at401.

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V. CONCLUSION

WeAFFIRMthesuperiorcourt’sdenialofanevidentiaryhearingon

Rene’smotiontomodifychildsupport. WeVACATEthefeeawardandtheRule11

sanctionsandREMANDtothesuperiorcourttoaffordReneanopportunitytorespond

toAmy’srequestforfullattorney’sfeesandsanctions.

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MAASSEN,Justice,withwhomWINFREE,Justice,joins,dissenting.

Irespectfullydissentfromthecourt’sholdingthatitwasnoterrortodeny

anevidentiaryhearingonReneLimeres’smotiontomodifychildsupport.Ibelievethat

Renepresentedunrefutedevidencethatwassufficienttoraiseagenuineissueofmaterial

factaboutwhetherhehadsufferedapermanentreductioninhisincome. 1 Hewas

thereforeentitledtoahearing.

WhenRenefiledthemotiontomodify,hischildsupportwasbasedonthe

superiorcourt’s$40,000estimateofhis2011income. Aswedescribedinour2014

opinion, this estimate was based in large partonRene’s testimony at trial, which

conflictedwiththerelativelymodestincomeof$8,426.82disclosedbyhislate-filed

incometaxreturn.2 AtaninterimcustodyhearingRenehadestimatedhisannualincome

as$40,000or“closerto$38,000.”3 Attrialhetestified“abouthis ‘generationof

substantialfunds, in the hundreds ofthousands ofdollars, in terms ofbook sales,

inventoryonhand,royaltiesandguidingfees,andclaim[ed]tohaveprovidedatleast

$23,000.00,priortotheparties’separation,forthedirectneedsofthechildrenoverthe

courseofoneyear.’”4 Renewas“unwillingorunabletoprovidespecificsastothe

amountofmoneyhehadmadeinrecentyearsfromguiding,”buthedidgivenumbers

1 See Hill v. Bloom,235P.3d215,219(Alaska2010)(“We‘willaffirmadenialofamodificationmotionwithoutahearingif,inourindependentjudgment,thefactsalleged,evenifproved,cannotwarrantmodification,oriftheallegationsaresogeneralorconclusory...astocreatenogenuineissueofmaterialfactrequiringahearing.’”(alterationinoriginal)(quoting Harrington v. Jordan,984P.2d1,3(Alaska1999))).

2 Limeres v. Limeres,320P.3d291,296-97(Alaska2014).

3 Id.

4 Id. at297(alterationinoriginal).

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forhisbooksales,describingonebookthat“hesaidhadgeneratedbetween$273,000

and$364,000”ingrossrevenues;testifyingthat“thehardcovereditionofthesamebook

generatedrevenueof$22,000to$29,000”;andidentifyingtwootherbooksthathesaid

“generatedasmuchas$42,000and$17,000inrevenuesrespectively.” 5 Whatever

moneyRenemayhavemadefromguiding,itisclearthatthebooks—bothsalesofhis

owninventoryandroyaltiesfromsalesbyothers—wereasignificantsourceofincome

thathelpedjustifythesuperiorcourt’s$40,000estimate.

IagreethatRene’sJanuary2013motiontomodifychildsupport—with

whichhesimplysubmittedhis2012incometaxreturn,showinglittledifferencefromhis

reportedincomein2011—wasinadequatetoraiseagenuineissueofmaterialfactand

entitlehimtoanevidentiaryhearing. ButinhisJanuary2014motionRenepresenteda

differentcase.

By affidavit, Rene directly addressed his book-sales income source,

assertinginstraightforwardtermsthatitwasnolongerviable. Heattestedthathehad

“nomorebigbooks(AlaskaFishing)left,noranyfundstoprintmore”;thatbecauseof

damagetohiscreditrating“borrowingmoneytoprintmorebooksisnotanoption”;and

thathe“hadto‘giveaway’[his]latestbooktoaroyaltypublisherfor10%,”aratehe

impliedwastoo lowtogenerateanysignificant income. Idonotagreethatthese

statementsoffactwithclearfinancialconsequencescanbedismissedas“bareassertions

...thatfailtocreateagenuineissueofmaterialfact,”asthecourtdoestoday. 6

InWardv.Urling ,the“bareassertionsorgeneralizedallegations”thiscourt

foundlikelytobeinsufficienttojustifyahearingwerecharacterizedas“allegations

5 Id.

6 Opinionat14(alterationinoriginal)(quotingWard v. Urling ,167P.3d48,53n.18(Alaska2007)).

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[that]expressedlittlemorethan[thefather’s]ongoingdissatisfactionwiththecourt’s

previous factual findings pertaining to [the mother’s] income.”7 To support this

discussioninWard wecited Epperson v. Epperson,inwhichthefatherclaimedthatthe

motherhad“unusuallylowlivingexpenses”justifyingadeviationfromtheAlaskaCivil

Rule90.3childsupportformulabut“failedtosetforthspecificfactssubstantiatinghis

bareclaim,”nordidhe“specificallydispute”anyof theexpensesshelistedinher

financialdeclarationandChildSupportGuidelinesAffidavit.8 Here,incontrast,Rene

identifiedamajorsourceofhispastincomeandexplainedwhyitnolongerexisted;these

arenot“bareassertionsorgeneralizedallegations”likethosewehavefoundinsufficient

before.AndwhileRene’sstatementsoffactmaybesubjecttochallenge,Amyfiledno

evidenceinopposition,relyinglargely(asthecourtdoestoday)onthefactthatRenehad

attemptedmodificationbeforewithoutsuccess.9

BecauseRene’s2011incomewassubstantiallybasedontheavailabilityof

aparticularcommodity—books—forhimtosell,andbecauseheassertedbyaffidavit

thatthebooksweregoneandhelackedthefundstoprintmore,hedemonstrateda

genuineissueofmaterialfactastowhetherhisincomewaspermanentlyreduced. This

showingentitledhimtoanevidentiaryhearing. Ithereforedissentfromtoday’sopinion

affirmingthejudgmentofthesuperiorcourt.

7 Ward ,167P.3dat53n.18.

8 Id.; Epperson v. Epperson,835P.2d451,453n.4(Alaska1992).

9 AmycounteredRene’sclaimsaboutlostbook-salesincomesimplybyquestioningwhetherhecouldalreadyhavedepleted“theentiretyofthebookinventory”grantedhiminthedivisionofmaritalproperty. Evenifthisstatementfromanattorney’smemorandumhadevidentiaryvalue,itwouldsimplybetohighlightadisputeoverahighlymaterialissueoffact.

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limeres v. limeres, alaska (2016)

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