limitation - criminal complaint

8/13/2019 Limitation - Criminal complaint

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.829 OF 2005

Mrs. Sarah Mathew Appellant

Versus

The Institute of Cardio VascularDiseases by its Director Dr. K.M. Cherian !rs. "espondents

WITH

Special #ea$e %etition &Crl.' (os.)*+,-)*++ of /01

M2s. 3T Media #td. !rs. %etitioners

Versus

State &4o$t. of (CT of Delhi' "espondent

WITH

Special #ea$e %etition &Crl.' (o.),*5 of /01

M2s. 3industan Media Venture#td. !rs. %etitioners

Versus


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"estraint Act< 09 9 after the e?piry of one year fro8 the

date on which the offence is alle7ed to ha$e been

co88itted. The three-:ud7e ;ench held that since8a7isterial action in the case before it was beyond the

period of one year fro8 the date of co88ission of the

offence< the Ma7istrate was not co8petent to ta=e

co7ni>ance when he did in $iew of bar under Section 9 of the

Child Marria7e "estraint Act< 09 9. Thus< there was

apparent conflict on the @uestion whether for the purpose of

co8putin7 the period of li8itation under Section 5*+ of the

Code of Cri8inal %rocedure< 09,1 &for short !" C#.P.C. B' in

respect of a cri8inal co8plaint the rele$ant date is the date

of filin7 of the co8plaint or the date of institution of

prosecution or whether the rele$ant date is the date on

which a Ma7istrate ta=es co7ni>ance. The two-:ud7e ;enchance of an

offence after the e?piry of the period

specified therein.

13 (2007) 2 SCC 230

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f. Chapter FV of the Cr.%.C. sets out procedure

to be followed in respect of co8plaints filed

directly to a Ma7istrate. It reflects a well laidout sche8e which en$isa7es Eudicial

application of 8ind to be a pre-re@uisite for

initiation of proceedin7s. The definition of

the ter8 co8plaintB contained in Section

&d' also 8a=es this e$ident. Thus< initiation

of proceedin7s in cri8inal law can only be

upon ta=in7 co7ni>ance. It is clear< thereforeance as

en$isa7ed by Chapters FIV and FV after

e?piry of period of li8itation. 3ence< the date

for purpose of li8itation would be the date of

ta=in7 co7ni>ance. Mere filin7 of a co8plaint

does not result in co7ni>ance bein7 ta=en< for

the law re@uires the court to apply its 8ind

Eudicially e$en before decidin7 to issue

process.

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7. There was no period of li8itation under the old

Cr.%.C. A lon7 delay led to serious ne7li7enceon the part of the prosecutin7 a7enciesance

is ta=en. Section 5*+ of the Cr.%.C. is clear

and una8bi7uous and it bars ta=in7

co7ni>ance of an offence< if on the date of

ta=in7 co7ni>ance the period prescribed

under Section 5*+& ' of the Cr.%.C. has

e?pired. Japani Sahoo < therefore< does not

lay down the correct law.

+. 4ist of sub8issions of Mr. Sidharth #uthra< learned

Additional Solicitor 4eneral< appearin7 for the respondent

State &(CT of Delhi' in S#% &Crl.' (os. )*+,-)*++ of /01 and

S#% &Crl.' (o. ),*5 of /01.

28 (2008) 13 SCC 22929 1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP)

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a. Bharat Kale lays down the correct law and

not Krishna Pillai .

b. #e7islati$e history of Chapter FFFVI indicates

its obEect.

c. Sta7e of process is not to be 8ista=en for

co7ni>ance. Co7ni>ance indicates the point

when a court ta=es Eudicial notice of an

offence with a $iew to initiatin7 process in

respect of the offence G S.K. Sinha/ Chief

nfor'ement 3ffi'er v.


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co7ni>ance ( Bh)shan K)mar2 . Sta7e of

process is not rele$ant for the purpose of

co8putin7 li8itation under Section 5*+ of theCr.%.C.

d. Chapter FFFVI has to be read as a whole. To

understand the sche8e of this Chapter

reference 8ay be 8ade to


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!n condonation of delay reference 8ay be

8ade to Sharad'handra Don0re .

f. Ta=in7 co7ni>ance is not dictated by the

prosecution of the co8plaint or police report

but is predicated upon application of Eudicial

8ind by the Ma7istrate which is not in the

control of the indi$idual institutin7 the

prosecution. If date of ta=in7 co7ni>ance is

considered to be rele$ant in co8putin7

li8itation< the act of the court can preEudice

the co8plainant which will be a7ainst the

8a?i8 the acts of courts should not

preEudice anyoneB. G od0er v. Comptoir

D s'ompte De Paris ": , .

7. Krishna Pillai relates to Section 9 of the

Child Marria7e "estraint Act< 09 9 which is a

special law and which pro$ides for a

li8itation for ta=in7 co7ni>ance and could

32 (1870-71) VII Moor !.S. 314

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e?clude the application of Chapter FFFVI

and< hence< Section 5,1 of the Cr.%.C. and

perhaps in such facts there was no referenceto Section 5,1 of the Cr.%.C. Si8ilar is the

$iew in P.P. #nnikrishnan & Anr. v.

P)ttiyottil Alik)tty & Anr. "" .

h. It is settled law that Sections 5 and ) of the

Cr.%.C. create an e?ception for special laws

with special procedures. Krishna Pillai was

in the conte?t of specific li8itation period

where Section 5,1 of the Cr.%.C. had no

application. Thus< it cannot be considered or

applied to interpret Sections 5*+ and 5,1 of

the Cr.%.C. as they stand. !n the contraryance on the date when the co8plaint

was filed. Therefore< the co8plaint cannot be said to bebarred by li8itation. This Court @uoted the followin7

obser$ations of the Eud78ent of the Constitution ;ench in

A. . Ant)lay v. amdas Srini$as 6ayak ?Ant)lay

@175; Case "+ E

!hen a private complaint is filed" the court hasto examine the complainant on oath save in thecases set out in the proviso to #ection $%% Cr&C

After examining the complainant on oath andexamining the witnesses present" if any" meaningthereby that the witnesses not present need notbe examined" it would be open to the court to

'udicially determine whether a case is made out

for issuing process. !hen it is said that courtissued process" it means the court has takencognizance of the offence and has decided toinitiate the proceedings and a visiblemanifestation of taking cognizance process isissued which means that the accused is calledupon to appear before the court.

This Court obser$ed that co7ni>ance has assu8ed a

special 8eanin7 in our cri8inal Eurisprudence and the abo$e

e?tract fro8 Ant)lay @175; Case indicates that filin7 of a

35 (1984) 2 SCC 500

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co8plaint is not ta=in7 co7ni>ance and what e?actly

constitutes ta=in7 co7ni>ance is different fro8 filin7 a

co8plaint. This Court obser$ed that since the 8a7isterialaction in the case before it was beyond the period of one

year fro8 the date of co88ission of the offence< the

Ma7istrate was not co8petent to ta=e co7ni>ance when he

did in $iew of the bar under Section 9 of the Child Marria7e

"estraint Act< 09 9.

0/. ;efore discussin7 Bharat Kale < it is necessary to 7o to

ashmi K)mar Smt.2 on which reliance is placed in

Bharat Kale . In that case< the @uestion was whether the

co8plaint filed by the co8plainant-wife a7ainst the husband

under Section 5/* of the I%C in Septe8ber< 099/ was ti8e

barred. The offence under Section 5/* of the I%C is

punishable with i8prison8ent which could e?tend to three

years or with fine or with both. Therefore< under Section

5*+&1' of the Cr.%.C.< the li8itation period for the said

offence is three years. It was ur7ed by the counsel for the

husband that the e$idence of the co8plainant-wife recorded

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under Section // of the Cr.%.C. establishes that in !ctoberance of an offence so as to defeat the case of the

co8plainant.

0 . In Japani Sahoo < the co8plainant therein filed a

co8plaint in the court of the concerned Ma7istrate alle7in7

co88ission of offences punishable under Sections 0*0< 95ance could

ha$e been ta=en by the court after the period of one year of

li8itation prescribed for the offences punishable under

Sections 95 and 1 1 of the I%C. The 3i7h Court held that

the rele$ant date for decidin7 the bar of li8itation was the

date of ta=in7 co7ni>ance by the court and since co7ni>ance

was ta=en after the period of one year and the delay was not

condoned by the court by e?ercisin7 power under Section

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5,1 of the Code< the co8plaint is liable to be dis8issed. !n

appeal< this Court referred to another well =nown 8a?i8

nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi( which 8eans that acri8e ne$er dies . This Court elaborately discussed the

sche8e of Chapter FFFVI of the Cr.%.C. and after followin7

Bharat Kale held that it is the date of filin7 of co8plaint or

the date on which cri8inal proceedin7s are initiated which is

8aterial.

01. At the outset< we 8ust deal with the criticis8 le$eled

a7ainst Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo that they place

undue reliance on le7al 8a?i8s. It was ar7ued that le7al

8a?i8s can neither e?pand nor delete any part of an

e?press statutory pro$ision< nor can they 7i$e an

interpretation which is directly contrary to what the pro$ision

stipulated. Their operation can be e?cluded by statutes but

operation of statutes cannot be e?cluded by le7al 8a?i8s.

05. It is true that in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo this

Court has referred to two i8portant le7al 8a?i8s. 6e 8ay

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add that in


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09)/< there are pro$isions prescribin7 period of li8itation for

prosecution of offences< there was no 7eneral law of

li8itation for prosecution of other offences. The approachof this Court while dealin7 with the ar7u8ent that there was

delay in launchin7 prosecution< when in the Cri8inal

%rocedure Code &0+9+'< there was no 7eneral pro$ision

prescribin7 li8itation< could be ascertained fro8 its

Eud78ent in The Assistant Colle'tor of C)stoms /

Bom*ay & Anr. v. %. . Mel$ani & Anr. 1* . It was ur7ed

before the 3i7h Court in that case that there was delay in

launchin7 prosecution. The 3i7h Court held that the delay

was satisfactorily e?plained. 6hile dealin7 with this

@uestion< this Court held that in any case prosecution could

not ha$e been @uashed on the 7round of delay because it

was not the case of the accused that any period of li8itation

was prescribed for filin7 the co8plaint. 3ence the co8plaint

could not ha$e been thrown out on the sole 7round that

there was delay in filin7 the sa8e. This Court further

obser$ed that the @uestion of delay in filin7 co8plaint 8ay

36 AIR 1970 SC 962

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be a circu8stance to be ta=en into consideration in arri$in7

at the final $erdict and by itself it affords no 7round for

dis8issin7 the co8plaint. This position underwent a chan7eto so8e e?tent when Chapter FFFVI was introduced in the

Cr.%.C. as we shall soon see.

0*. It is pertinent to note that the #i8itation Act< 09*1 does

not apply to cri8inal proceedin7s e?cept for appeals or

re$isions for which e?press pro$ision is 8ade in Articles 005ed that pro$idin7 pro$ision of

li8itation for prosecution of cri8inal offences of certain type

in 7eneral law would< in fact< be 7ood for the cri8inal Eustice

syste8. The #aw Co88ission noted that the reasons to

Eustify introduction of pro$isions prescribin7 li8itation in

7eneral law for cri8inal cases are si8ilar to those which

Eustify such pro$isions in ci$il law such as li=elihood of

e$idence bein7 curtailed< failin7 8e8ories of witnesses and

disappearance of witnesses. Such a pro$ision< in the opinion

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of the #aw Co88ission< will @uic=en dili7ence< pre$ent

oppression and in the 7eneral public interest would brin7 an

end to liti7ation. The #aw Co88ission also felt that thecourt would be relie$ed of the burden of adEudicatin7

inconse@uential clai8s. %ara7raph 5.1 is 8aterial. It reads

thus

$/.0 1 )n civil cases" the law of limitation inalmost all countries where the rule of law prevails"

2urists have given several convincing reasons to 'ustify the provision of such a law3 some of thosewhich are e+ually applicable to criminal

prosecutions may be referred to here45

678 he defendant ought not to be called on toresist a claim when evidence has been lost"

memories have faded" and witnesses havedisappeared.

6$8 he law of limitation is also a means ofsuppressing fraud" and per'ury" and +uickeningdiligence and preventing oppression.

608 )t is in the general public interest that thereshould be an end to litigation. he statute oflimitation is a statute of repose.

6/8 A party who is insensible to the value of civilremedies and who does not assert his own claimwith promptitude has little or no right to re+uirethe aid of the state in enforcing it.

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698 he court should be relieved of the burden ofad'udicating inconse+uential or tenuous claims.

The #aw Co88ission stated its case for e?tendin7

li8itation to ori7inal prosecutions as under

$/.77 5 )t seems to us that there is a strong casefor having a period of limitation for offences whichare not very serious. :or such offences"considerations of fairness to the accused and theneed for ensuring freedom from prosecution aftera lapse of time should outweigh otherconsiderations. -oreover" after the expiry of acertain period the sense of social retribution losesits edge and the punishment does not serve the

purpose of social retribution. he deterrent effectof punishment which is one of the most importantob'ectives of penal law is very much impaired ifthe punishment is not inflicted promptly and if it is

inflicted at a time when it has been wiped off thememory of the offender and of other persons whohad knowledge of the crime.

%ara7raphs 5.01< 5.05< 5. /< 5. < 5. 1< 5. 5overnment or anyother authority is re+uired" in accordance with there+uirements of any law for the time being inforce" then in computing the period of limitationfor taking cognizance of the offence" the period ofsuch notice or" as the case may be" the timere+uired for obtaining such consent or sanction"shall be excluded.

$/.$? 5 As illustrations of impediments causedby the conduct of the accused" we may refer to hisbeing out of )ndia" and his absconding orconcealing himself. ,unning of the period oflimitation should be excluded in both cases.

0,. The :oint %arlia8ent Co88ittee &J !" JPC ' accepted

the reco88endations of the #aw Co88ission for prescribin7

period of li8itation for certain offences. The rele$ant

para7raphs of its report dated 1/200209, read as under

Cla)ses ;- to ; " ne$ 'la)ses2 F heseare new clauses prescribing periods of limitationon a graded scale for launching a criminal

prosecution in certain cases. At present" there isno period of limitation for criminal prosecution and

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a Court cannot throw out complaint or a policereport solely on the ground of delay althoughinordinate delay may be a good ground forentertaining doubts about the truth of the

prosecution story. &eriods of limitation have been prescribed for criminal prosecution in the laws ofmany countries and the Committee feels that itwill be desirable to prescribe such periods in theCode as recommended by the *aw Commission.

Among the grounds in favour of prescribing thelimitation may be mentioned the following4

7. As time passes the testimony of witnessesbecome weaker and weaker because of lapse ofmemory and evidence becomes more and moreuncertain with the result that the danger of errorbecomes greater.

$. :or the purpose of peace and repose it isnecessary that an offender should not be keptunder continuous apprehension that he may be

prosecuted at any time particularly because with

the multifarious laws creating new offences many persons at some time or the other commit somecrime or the other. &eople will have no peace ofmind if there is no period of limitation even for

petty offences.

0. he deterrent effect of punishment isimpaired if prosecution is not launched and

punishment is not inflicted before the offence hasbeen wiped off the memory of the personsconcerned.

/. he sense of social retribution which is one ofthe purposes of criminal law looses its edge afterthe expiry of a long period.

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9. he period of limitation would put pressureon the organs of criminal prosecution to makeevery effort to ensure the detection and

punishment of the crime +uickly.

he actual periods of limitation provided for in thenew clauses would" in the Committee(s opinion beappropriate having regard to the gravity of theoffences and other relevant factors.

As regards the date from which the period is to becounted the Committee considered has fixed thedate as the date of the offence. As" however thismay create practical difficulties and may alsofacilitate an accused person to escape punishmentby simply absconding himself for the prescribed

period" the Committee has also provided thatwhen the commission of the offence was notknown to the person aggrieved by the offence orto any police officer" the period of limitation wouldcommence from the day on which the

participation of the offender in the offence firstcomes to the knowledge of a person aggrieved by

the offence or of any police officer" whichever isearlier. :urther" when it is not known by whomthe offence has committed" the first day on whichthe identity of the offender is known to the personaggrieved by the offence or to the police officermaking investigation into the offence.

he Committee has considered it necessary tomake a specific provision for extension of timewhenever the court is satisfied on the materialsthat the delay has been properly explained or thatthe accused had absconded. his provision wouldbe particularly useful because limitation forcriminal prosecution is being prescribed for thefirst time in this country.

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0+. "ead in the bac=7round of the #aw Co88issionBs

"eport and the "eport of the :%C< it is clear that the obEect of

Chapter FFFVI inserted in the Cr.%.C. was to @uic=en the

prosecutions of co8plaints and to rid the cri8inal Eustice

syste8 of inconse@uential cases displayin7 e?tre8e

lethar7y< inertia or indolence. The effort was to 8a=e the

cri8inal Eustice syste8 8ore orderly< efficient and Eust by

pro$idin7 period of li8itation for certain offences. In

Sar$an Sin0h < this Court stated the obEect of Cr.%.C in

puttin7 a bar of li8itation as follows

he ob'ect of the Criminal &rocedure Code in

putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions wasclearly to prevent the parties from filing casesafter a long time" as a result of which materialevidence may disappear and also to preventabuse of the process of the court by filingvexatious and belated prosecutions long after thedate of the offence. he ob'ect which the statutesseek to sub5serve is clearly in consonance with theconcept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article$7 of the Constitution of )ndia. )t is" therefore" ofthe utmost importance that any prosecution"whether by the #tate or a private complainantmust abide by the letter of law or take the risk ofthe prosecution failing on the ground oflimitation.

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09. It is e@ually clear howe$er that the law 8a=ers did not

want cause of Eustice to suffer in 7enuine cases. #aw

Co88ission reco88ended pro$isions for e?clusion of ti8eand those pro$isions were 8ade part of Chapter FFFVI. 6eance of an

offence after the e?piry of the period of li8itation< if it is

satisfied on the facts and in the circu8stances of the case

that the delay has been properly e?plained or that it is

necessary to do so in the interest of Eustice. Thereforeance when he applies

his 8ind or ta=es Eudicial notice of an offence with a $iew to

initiatin7 proceedin7s in respect of offence which is said to

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ha$e been co88itted. This is the special connotation

ac@uired by the ter8 co7ni>anceB and it has to be 7i$en the

sa8e 8eanin7 where$er it appears in Chapter FFFVI. Itbears repetition to state that ta=in7 co7ni>ance is entirely an

act of the Ma7istrate. Ta=in7 co7ni>ance 8ay be delayed

because of se$eral reasons. It 8ay be delayed because of

syste8ic reasons. It 8ay be delayed because of the

Ma7istrateBs personal reasons.

*. In this connection< our attention is drawn to the

Eud78ent of this Court in Sharad'handra Don0re . It is

ur7ed on the basis of this Eud78ent that by condonin7 the

delay< the Court ta=es away a $aluable ri7ht which accrues

to the accused. 3ence< the accused has a ri7ht to be heard

when an application for condonation of delay under Section

5,1 of the Cr.%.C. is presented before the Court. Keepin7

this ar7u8ent in 8ind< let us e?a8ine both the $iew points

i.e. whether the date of ta=in7 co7ni>ance or the date of

filin7 co8plaint is 8aterial for co8putin7 li8itation. If the

date on which co8plaint is filed is ta=en to be 8aterial< then

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if the co8plaint is filed within the period of li8itation< there

is no @uestion of it bein7 ti8e barred. If it is filed after the

period of li8itation< the co8plainant can 8a=e anapplication for condonation of delay under Section 5,1 of the

Cr.%.C. The Court will ha$e to issue notice to the accused

and after hearin7 the accused and the co8plainant decide

whether to condone the delay or not. If the date of ta=in7

co7ni>ance is considered to be rele$ant then< if the Court

ta=es co7ni>ance within the period of li8itation< there is no

@uestion of the co8plaint bein7 ti8e barred. If the Court

ta=es co7ni>ance after the period of li8itation then< the

@uestion is how will Section 5,1 of the Cr.%.C. wor=. The

co8plainant will be interested in ha$in7 the delay condoned.

If the delay is caused by the Ma7istrate by not ta=in7

co7ni>ance in ti8e< it is absurd to e?pect the co8plainant to

8a=e an application for condonation of delay. The

co8plainant surely cannot e?plain that delay. Then in such

a situation< the @uestion is whether the Ma7istrate has to

issue notice to the accused< e?plain to the accused the

reason why delay was caused and then hear the accused

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and decide whether to condone the delay or not. This would

also 8ean that the Ma7istrate can decide whether to

condone delay or not< caused by hi8. Such a situation willbe ano8alous and such a procedure is not =nown to law. Mr.

#uthra< learned A.S.4. sub8itted that use of disEuncti$e orB

in Section 5,1 of the Cr.%.C. su77ests that for the first part

i.e. to find out whether the delay has been e?plained or notance

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of an offence only if the co8plaint in respect of it is filed

within the prescribed li8itation period. 3e would< howe$erance is application of 8ind

by the Ma7istrate to the suspected offence< the subEecti$e

ele8ent co8es in. 6hether a Ma7istrate has ta=en

co7ni>ance or not will depend on facts and circu8stances of

each case. A dili7ent co8plainant or the prosecutin7 a7ency

which pro8ptly files the co8plaint or initiates prosecution

would be se$erely preEudiced if it is held that the rele$ant

point for co8putin7 li8itation would be the date on which

the Ma7istrate ta=es co7ni>ance. The co8plainant or the

prosecutin7 a7ency would be entirely left at the 8ercy of the

Ma7istrate< who 8ay ta=e co7ni>ance after the li8itation

period because of se$eral reasonsN syste8ic or otherwise. It

cannot be the intention of the le7islature to throw a dili7ent

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co8plainant out of the court in this 8anner. ;esides it 8ust

be noted that the co8plainant approaches the court for

redressal of his 7rie$ance. 3e wants action to be ta=ena7ainst the perpetrators of cri8e. The courts functionin7

under the cri8inal Eustice syste8 are created for this

purpose. It would be unreasonable to ta=e a $iew that delay

caused by the court in ta=in7 co7ni>ance of a case would

deny Eustice to a dili7ent co8plainant. Such an

interpretation of Section 5*+ of the Cr.%.C. would be

unsustainable and would render it unconstitutional. It is well

settled that a court of law would interpret a pro$ision which

would help sustainin7 the $alidity of the law by applyin7 the

doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applyin7 a

doctrine which would 8a=e the pro$ision unsustainable and

ultra vires the Constitution. & #.P. Po$er Corporation %td.

v. Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra '.

9. The conclusion reached by us is reinforced by the fact

that the #aw Co88ission in clause 5. / of its "eport< which

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we ha$e @uoted hereinabo$e< referred to Da) Dayal "7

where the three-:ud7e ;ench of this Court was dealin7 with a

Special Act i.e. the Merchandise Mar=s Act< 0++9. Section 0)of the Merchandise Mar=s Act< 0++9 stated that no

prosecution shall be co88enced after e?piration of one year

after the disco$ery of the offence by the prosecution. The

contention of the appellant was that the offence was

disco$ered on *25209)5 when he was arrested< and that< in

conse@uence< the issue of process on 2,209))< was

beyond the period of one year pro$ided under Section 0) of

the Merchandise Mar=s Act< 0++9 and that the proceedin7s

should therefore be @uashed as barred by li8itation. 6hile

repellin7 this contention< the three-:ud7e ;ench of this Court

obser$ed as under

?-. )t will be noticed that the complainant isre+uired to resort to the court within one year ofthe discovery of the offence if he is to have the

benefit of proceeding under the Act. hat meansthat if the complaint is presented within one yearof such discovery" the re+uirements of #ection 79are satisfied. he period of limitation" it should beremembered" is intended to operate against thecomplainant and to ensure diligence on his part in

39 AIR 1959 SC 433

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prosecuting his rights" and not against the court.Now" it will defeat the ob'ect of the enactment anddeprive traders of the protection which the lawintended to give them" if we were to hold that

unless process is issued on their complaint withinone year of the discovery of the offence" it shouldbe thrown out. )t will be an unfortunate state ofthe law if the trader whose rights had beeninfringed and who takes up the matter promptlybefore the criminal court is" nevertheless" deniedredress owing to the delay in the issue of processwhich occurs in court.

Thou7h< this Court was not concerned with the 8eanin7

of the ter8 ta=in7 co7ni>anceB< it did not accept the

sub8ission that li8itation could be 8ade dependent on the

act of the Ma7istrate of issuin7 process. It held that if the

co8plaint was filed within the stipulated period of one yearance is

8aterial 8ust be reEected.

19. It is true that the penal statutes 8ust be strictly

construed. There are< howe$er< cases where this Court has

ha$in7 re7ard to the nature of the cri8es in$ol$ed< refused

to adopt any narrow and pedantic< literal and le?ical

construction of penal statutes. GSee M)ralidhar Me0hra!

%oya & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & 3rs. ;" and

Kisan Trim*ak Koth)la & 3rs. v. State of

43 (1976) 3 SCC 684

77


78/82Page 78

Maharashtra ;; H. In this case< loo=in7 to the le7islati$e

intent< we ha$e har8oniously construed the pro$isions of

Chapter FFFVI so as to stri=e a balance between the ri7ht ofthe co8plainant and the ri7ht of the accused. ;esides< we

8ust bear in 8ind that Chapter FFFVI is part of the Cr.%.C.

limitation - criminal complaint

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