linguistic tradition 2006-06-02

The Indian Tradition of Linguistics and Pāṇini

Rama Nath Sharma

May 29, 2006

Table of ContentsI: Pāṇini, Katyāyana, and Patañjali..................................................... 1

0. Introduction.................................................................................. 11. The Sūtrapāṭha (SP) ...................................................................6

A. The Śiva-sūtras (Śs).............................................................. 13B. The Dhātupāṭha (DP) ........................................................... 16C. The Gaṇa-pāṭha (GP) ...........................................................16D. The Uṇādi-sūtra (Us)............................................................. 17E. The Phiṭsūtras (Phs).............................................................. 18F. The Liṅgānuśāsana (Lā)........................................................ 18

2. The Vṛtti texts............................................................................ 193. The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali..................................21

A. The Mahābhāṣya as vyākhyāna............................................21B. Vyākaraṇa: śabda, artha and śabdārtha-sambandha........... 27

4. The Prakriyā texts......................................................................325. The Siddhānta texts...................................................................39

A. Śabda and Śabda-brahman.................................................. 39B. Pratibhā................................................................................. 40

II: Domain, Recurrence and Reference.............................................431. Rules and Operations................................................................ 432. Domain, Recurrence and Reference......................................... 48

A. Domain and Recurrence........................................................51B. Reference to Antecedents, and Referential index.................57

3. Names and conventions from the Controlling Domain (CD)......61A. Technical Names (saṃjñā).................................................... 62B. Major Interpretive Rules........................................................ 68

III: Rule Interaction and Application.................................................. 701. sāmānya, viśeṣa and śeṣa........................................................ 702. General blocking considerations............................................... 74

A. The ākaḍārīya proposal of vipratiṣedha................................ 76B. The ābhīya proposal of suspension.......................................87C. The tripādī proposal of suspension....................................... 88

3. The Derivational System of the Aṣṭādhyāyī...............................93

A. The tiṄ affixes:...................................................................... 95B. The sUP affixes:.................................................................... 95

4. Summary of the Derivational Mechanism................................113A. Fully derived words (pada).................................................. 113B. Bases (prakṛti) .................................................................... 113C. Affixes (pratyaya)................................................................ 114D. Levels of Derivation:............................................................ 115E. Terms (assigned for exiting the Obligatory Domain)........... 116F. Conventions:........................................................................ 117

IV: Modern Studies On Pāṇini......................................................... 119V: Select Bibliography..................................................................... 131VI: Notes and References............................................................... 141

I: Pāṇini, Katyāyana, and Patañjali Page 1

I: Pāṇini, Katyāyana, and Patañjalicatvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādādve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya /tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravītimaho devo martyā āviveśa //

0. Introduction*

Indian theorists of language believe in the divine origin of speech (vāk).1 They begin with something which is not only physical and direct (pratyakṣa) but is also received by auditory instrumentalities and, in the process, is perceived by buddhi ‘high intelligence.’ Perception by buddhi is the function of mind (manas). Reception by auditory instrumentalities is associated with the function of vital air (prāṇa). It is buddhi which mediates between manas and prāṇa, and as a result, vāk, i.e., buddhyārūḍha-śabda ‘word-on-mind,’ comes into articulation.2 This articulation of vāk has its source in nāda (noise) which, at the initiation of prāṇa and through efforts (prayatna) of karaṇas ‘speech-organs’ at specific places (sthāna) results in dhvani ‘sound’, itself a modification (vikāra) of outgoing lung-air (śvasana). It is stated that vāk is a modified form of prāṇa,3 immobile, located at the mūlādhāra in the form of bindu encompassing the śabda-brahman and is most commonly known as primary speech (parā-vāk).4 A modification of this vāk by the time it reaches nābhi ‘navel’ is known as paśyantī, though still internal and perceived only by the mind. This same internal vāk, again only perceived by mind, is known as intermediate (madhyamā) when it reaches the heart (hṛt). When reaching the oral cavity and hitting the dome of the mouth it gets yet another modified name (vaikharī). This is what is commonly known as fully externalized speech, i.e., dhvani, and this is what the listener receives with his auditory instrumentalities. It is this same dhvani which strikes the listener’s inner ears and excites his pratibhā ‘intuitive perception,’ the receiving intellect of the sphoṭa ‘that from which meaning bursts forth.’ The buddhi of the listener which remains on a par with the buddhi of the speaker then leads to cognition of meaning mediated by pratibhā . Accepting that the buddhi of the listener is on a par with the buddhi of the speaker amounts to saying that the word of the speaker remains on a par with the word of the listener. That is, the word-on-mind (buddhyārūḍha-śabda) of the speaker (vaktā) already remains on the mind of the listener (śrotā). Needless to say here that whatever dhvani strikes the listener's ear, in turn, leads to cognition of meaning, is not any incoherent jumble of sounds but, instead, is an analog of meaningful utterances (śabda) rendered in

I: Pāṇini, Katyāyana, and Patañjali

the form of dhvani for conveying the sense of the word-on-mind of the speaker. Patañjali characterizes speech as follows:

catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādādve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya /tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravītimaho devo martyā āviveśa // 'his are four horns, three feet, two heads,there are seven hands of his;three-way tied this bull roars,the great god entered (us) mortals'

Ṛk-saṃhitā (4/58/3)The great god of this verse is recognized as śabda-brahman. It is

brahman in the śabda-tatva ‘word-principle’ which is imperishable, is without any beginning and end, manifested in meaningful object-form, from whence proceeds the evolution of the cosmos.5 The four horns refer directly to four vāk, i.e., parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī, and indirectly to sUP 'that which ends in a sūP,' tiṄ 'that which ends in a tiṄ,' upasarga 'preverbs, prefixes' and nipāta 'indeclinable, particle.' The three feet are bhūta 'past,' bhaviṣyat 'future' and vartamāna 'present.' The two heads are the two kinds of words nitya 'eternal' and kārya 'those which are brought about, derived.' The seven hands are prathamā, etc., nominal endings (vibhakti). The vṛṣabha 'bull,' the one who showers all desires as clouds do, is tied at three places, i.e., uras 'chest,' kaṇṭha 'throat' and śiras 'head,' and he roars.6

The subject matter (upajīvya) of grammar, i.e., speech (vāk), itself has been accorded a divine status. The tradition claims that vāk is the essence of man and Vedic ṛk is the essence of vāk.7 Bhartṛhari (6 AD), in his Vākyapadīyam, reveres grammar as a smṛti ‘canonical code,’8 and recognizes the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya (Mbh.) of Patañjali (2 B.C.) as the source for knowledge of all theoretical constructs.9 The Brāhmaṇas, Saṃhitās, Upaniṣads and earlier classical literary texts such as the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, all attest to the fact that vyākaraṇa, by their time, had already become a well-established discipline of learning. Patañjali recognizes that a brāhmaṇa initiate, after his initiation, was required to study grammar.10 It comes as no surprise then to see grammar accepted as one of the Vedāṅgas, a field of study to be pursued as a must. Note that Patañjali, while stating that grammar was included in the curriculum of young brāhmaṇa initiates, uses the expression purākalpa etad āsīt 'it was like this in ancient times.'

The utterances of Vedic Sanskrit formed the basis for śabdopadeśa 'instruction about words' by Vedic Indians first with extraction of individual


constituent padas 'fully derived words' from continuous indivisible (akhaṇḍa) utterances and then subjecting the extracted pada to analysis in terms of bases (prakṛti) and affixes (pratyaya). This extraction of individual padas was aptly named padapāṭha 'recitation of individual padas,' as against the more commonly available indivisible recitation known as the saṃhitāpāṭha 'recitation of Vedic utterances with no extraction of individual padas from their continuous recitation in close proximity (saṃhitā).' This systematic extraction of individual padas from the saṃhitā texts required, at the least, some understanding of grammatical categories and operations with reference to which individual padas could be established. Given the nature and importance of the Vedic texts it is no surprise that linguistic studies in ancient India centered around them. The prātiśākhyas are considered Vedic grammars, though some of them also include discussion on meters (chandas) and phonetics (śikṣā). It is very well known that ancient Indians excelled in their study of phonetics, and phonology. There was also a brief period when intellectual endeavors were focused on etymological explanations (nirvacana). Yask's nirukta is a classic example of nirvacana. Durgācārya (Mīmāṃsaka I:261-262), claims that there were fourteen texts of the nirukta (caturdaśaprabhedam). Yask himself mentions 13, 14 scholars. Note that Nirukta is a commentary on nighaṇṭu which, by itself is a dictionary of Vedic words presented in three sections. The first section, namely naighaṇṭuka, is a collection of 1341 synonyms. The second section is called naigama with 279 words of multiple meanings and uncertain etymology. The third section is daivata with 151 names of divinities. This brings the total number of words in Nighaṇṭu to 1771.

There are references in Pāṇini to five kinds of texts which I suspect all made representation of grammatical knowledge:

i. dṛṣṭa 'seen, revealed': a text which is not man made (apauruṣeya) but is revealed, instead. Consider 4.2.7 dṛṣṭaṃ sāma 'revelation of sāman hymn' and 4.2.8 vāmadevāḍ ḍyaḍḍyau ca 'the taddhita affixes ḌyaḌ and Ḍyau occur after the syntactically related nominal stem ending in the tṛtīyā 'instrumental,' namely Vāmadeva, when the derivative denotes 'revelation of sāman received by Vāmadeva;

ii. prokta 'stated with excellence': a text which is made for explanation to students (4.3.10 tena proktam 'elucidated with excellence by him'). Note that a prokta text could be both an original text, or one made by some other scholar. For example, pāṇininā proktaṃ pāṇinīyam, anyena proktā māthureṇa proktā māthurī vṛttiḥ 'a text which was elucidated by Pāṇini; made by someone elucidated by Māthura';


iii. upajñāta, 'a text which was perceived by the author by his own intellect.' Mīmāṃsaka informs that in such texts one includes the description of some aspect of a prokta text in an entirely brilliant way;

iv. kṛta, a text which is made by the author in its entirety;v. vyākhyāna, a text which explains and elucidates a text with notes and

commentaries.The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini is a text of the prokta 'stated with excellence'

style.A careful look at the developmental aspect of representation of knowledge

in ancient India reveals a sustained effort towards structuring knowledge into a format most conducive, not only toward maintaining rigor and preserving content, but also toward explaining it for those who most needed to be enlightened. History of India in general, and her intellectual history in particular, could not have changed this drastically for a better had it not been due to the birth of the Buddha. The discipline of grammar similar to many other branches of learning, for example Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and the Śrauta, Gṛhya and Kalpa Sūtras, got its knowledge represented in the format of the sūtra style (Sharma, 2002: 1-2). Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, i.e., the recitation of his sūtras (sūtrapāṭha), excelled all competition in the field. Looking at the excellence of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a grammatical system one would rightly assume that the A of Pāṇini must have developed as part of a very rich grammatical tradition.

A sūtra was considered a formulaic statement representing a thread of idea with brevity and precision (Limaye 1974:36).11 Its goal was to capture generalizations extracted from usage, and facilitate derivation of correct words. But this brevity and precision was not accomplished at the expense of clarity. Since grammatical rules were formulated with brevity, and within the perspective of a meta-theory, sūtras certainly needed explanations. It is to explain a sūtra with a statement which best captured the true intent of its formulator that the development of another style of literature, namely vṛtti, could not be helped. A vṛtti 'paraphrase' statement was keyed into a sūtra to facilitate proper understanding of the sūtra, again with brevity. A vṛtti thus accepted a sūtra as its focus, or symbol (pratīka), for formulation of its statement.

Since a correct interpretation of sūtras demanded extreme caution in weighing questions of under-application, over-application, and in extremely few instances no application at all, a vṛtti was subjected to deeper scrutiny. This gave rise to a vast body of very brief and focused statements generally known as vārttikas. A vārtika examined a sūtra from the express point of view of what is stated (ukta) by a rule, what is not stated (anukta) by a rule, and what has been poorly stated (durukta), by a rule (uktānuktadrukta-cintakatvam vārttikatvam). A


fairly substantial number of vārttikas which were formulated by Kātyāyana on the sūtras of Pāṇini are found in the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. These vārttikas have become synonymous with what we know as vārttikas. A vārttika, by way of accepting a sūtra as its focus, puts a sūtra to test.

The discourse style of the Mahābhāṣya accepts vārttikas as pratīka 'focus (symbol)' and offers its deliberations (vyākhyāna) by first introducing a topic and then discussing the same in view of questions (praśna), answers (uttara), refutations (ākṣepa) and resolutions (samādhāna), all illustrated with examples (udāharaṇa) and counter-examples (pratyudāharaṇa). The bhāṣya thus takes the vārttika as its pratika 'focus' and presents its discussion of a sūtra in view of examples and counter-examples. A bhāṣya thus, by way of accepting a vārttika as its focus, again puts a sūtra to test. This interlocking dependency of focus on sūtra, vṛtti and bhāṣya also became the main style of representation of knowledge in many other branches of learning in ancient India (Sharma 2002:6). The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali is considered the first ever serious attempt to present a successful theory of linguistics, especially grammar.

These focus-driven deliberations also gave rise to two other kinds of texts which, in the field of grammar, are recognized as : prakriyā and siddhānta. The prakriyā texts aim on presenting the corpus of the sūtras of Pāṇini in a new arrangement, so that placement of rules, their explanations and illustrations could prove most conducive to applied aspect of grammatical derivation (prakriyā). The tradition of prakriyā texts begins with the Rūpāvatāra of Dharmakīrti followed by the Prakriyā-kaumudī of Rāmacandra. It reaches its peak in the Siddhānta-kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita which, in turn becomes the source for an abridged Sārasiddhāntakaumudī and a middle-length Madhyasiddhānta-kaumudī, both made by Varadarāja. Varadarāja's own Laghu-kaumudī brings this rich tradition of prakriyā to a full circle.

The siddhānta texts focused more on topics of theoretical interest and presented them in such an in-depth analytical manner that set standards of grammar in the tradition of Pāṇini. The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari is the single most important text on Philosophy of Language. Bhartṛhari accepts that all theoretical constructs of the tradition of Pāṇini have their source in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are revered as three sages, and according to the dictum of yathottaraṃ munīnāṃ prāmāṇyam, each subsequent sage enjoys relatively greater authority pramāṇa, making Patañjali the supreme authority in matters pertaining to Pāṇini. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa are three important authors in the development of the Siddhānta literature. All these siddhānta texts, by their own admission, discuss


and explain the principles established by the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali.

The Vākyapadīya (VP) of Bhartrhari (AD 5), Vaiyakaranasiddhāntakārikā of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, Vaiyākaranabhūṣana of Kaunḍabhaṭṭa (AD 17), itself being a commentary on the Vaiyakaranasiddhantakarika of Bhattoji Dlksita, and Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūṣā of Nageśabhaṭṭa (Nageśa; AD 17-18), with a short and very short (laghu; paramalaghu) version, are important text of the Siddhānta literature. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita's Śabda-kaustubha and Nāgeśa's Laghu and Bṛhacchabdenduśekhara, and Paribhāṣenduśekhara (PŚ) are other important texts on issues in Siddhānta.

kiṃcit sāmānyaviśeṣaval lakṣaṃaṃ pravartyam yenālpenayatnena mahato mahataḥ śabdaughān pratipadyeran /

Mahābhāṣya (I:6)It has been explained that the Sanskrit grammatical tradition is a focus

driven tradition where representation of linguistic knowledge has been made in the text formats of sūtra, vṛtti, vārttika, bhāṣya, prakriyā and siddhānta. It should be noted that the text of a preceding format style serves as focus for the text of the succeeding format style. We thus will accept that a sūtra has word (śabda) as its focus. A vṛtti will similarly have the sūtra-pāṭha (SP) as its focus. For a bhāṣya discussion we must also have a vārttika as focus. A sūtra, along with its vṛtti and related vārttikas, should form the focus for prakriyā texts. A siddhānta text generally has the final view of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali as its focus, especially for offering detailed formulations, and facilitating a comparatively better understanding. I shall next present the developmental history of Sanskrit grammatical tradition under subsections the Sūtra-pāṭha, the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, Vṛtti, Prakriyā and Siddhānta. I shall discuss the Mahābhāṣya after a short introduction to the Sūtra-pāṭha before the Vṛtti, Prakriyā and Siddhānta literature, in this order simply because Patañjali enjoys the most authority in the tradition. Besides, the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali includes discussions on every aspect of grammatical literature of the three sages (trimuni).

1. The Sūtrapāṭha (SP) śabda-pramāṇakā vayam yac chabdaāha tadasmākaṃ pramāṇam 'we believe in the authority of word, whatever the word says is our authority'

(Mahābhāṣya I:41)Pāṇini appears with his Aṣṭādhyāyī (henceforth the A) at a stage when

intellectual pursuits of speech theoreticians had moved to the stage of analyzing words as part of utterances, used as means of communicating ideas. That Pāṇini


chose to formulate a limited body of serially and/or otherwise ordered limited number of sūtras to account for the infinity of utterances of the Sanskrit language was no accident. For, the sūtra-style of describing reality in the realm of knowledge had become well-established. It is true that Pāṇini's A stands as the single most remarkable treatise in the field of grammatical speculation. However, it will be a mistake to believe that the technique of capturing generalizations, i.e., of (usage of) speech by formulating general (sāmānya) rules of grammar (lakṣaṇa) along with related particulars (viśeṣa) which necessarily include exceptions (apavāda) and negations (pratiṣedha), was something newly developed by Pāṇini. Instead, his A developed as a remarkable body of sūtras presenting the most complete grammar of the Sanskrit language, or for that matter, of any past or present language of the world, as what can now be called the culmination of a rich tradition of grammatical speculation. A tradition which may have started with the padapāṭha technique of textual rendition as opposed to a corresponding saṃhitāpāṭha and which after a brief preoccupation with the etymologies of individual words and utterances may have moved toward preparing some solid foundations. It is claimed, and to a larger extent correctly, that there were 85 known grammarians prior to Pāṇini. We find references in the A to pre-Pāṇinian grammarians, for example, Āpiśali, Kāśyapa, Gārgya, Gālava, Bhāradvāja and Śākaṭāyana , whose works constituted the formative stages of this aspect of grammatical speculation. Unfortunately, the works of these grammarians, except for a few references, are not available.

Pāṇini's date is still a matter of some debate among scholars. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are revered as the three sages of grammar (trimuni) where each subsequent in order enjoys comparatively greater authority (yathottaraṃ munīnāṃ prāmāṇyam). We are in a much better position to determine the time of Patañjali which is generally accepted as 150 B.C. Kātyāyana's time is generally accepted as 3rd B.C. It is a fact that Patañjali organized his Mahābhāṣya around the vārttikas of Kātyāyana. A leadtime of 100 to 150 years for Kātyāyana after Pāṇini, or for that matter before Patañjali, is thus reasonable.

The vārttikas of Kātyāyana were primarily formulated around what is, is not, if it is, how it is or is not, an under-representation, over estimation, no representation, or wrong representation, of usages of the Sanskrit language. We find that usages of Pāṇini's time differ from those of the times of Kātyāyana's. It will be a mistake to accept that usages not accounted for by Pāṇini were due to Pāṇini's oversight. For it is hard to believe that such a meticulous observer would have missed such usages. We must then accept such usages as innovations. For such innovations to become established in usage we must offer some time. It


is because of this that we accept Pāṇini to have flourished at least 150 years prior to Kātyāyana. This observation can also be backed by linguistic development on the subcontinent.

The A consists of a little over four-thousand brief, but algebraically condensed sūtras ‘threads,’ commonly referred to as rules. A rule is formulated to apply. But more importantly, a rule is to be formulated with a minimum of syllables (svalpākṣaram), is supposed to be unambiguous (asandigdham), should carry only the essence (sāravat) of what is to be stated, should be all-encompassing (viśvatomukham), should be unstoppable in its application (astobham) and should be creatively new (anavadya). These grammatical rules are generally verb-less statements structured around a subject and its corresponding predication.

The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini is a cumulative listing (recitation; pāṭha) of nearly four thousand grammatical rules (sūtra-pāṭha; the SP), arranged in eight chapter-books (adhyāya) of four quarters (pāda) each. Śrīśachandra Chakravartī (1919), based on a verse cited in the preface of his edition of the Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi, a commentary on the Kāśikā-vṛtti (the KV) of Vāmana-Jayāditya (7A.D.), claims that the total number of rules in the A, which none other than Pāṇini himself formulated, was three thousand nine hundred ninety-six (3,996).The total number of rules as discussed by the Kāśikā-vṛtti comes to about 3981. A difference of fifteen rules can be easily accounted for by noting that the authors of the KV included atha śabdānuśāsanam 'here commences instruction of words,' the first aphorism of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali as a sūtra. They also included the fourteen Śiva-sūtras as sūtras. It is still a matter of great debate whether atha śabdānuśāsanam should be accepted as the opening statement of the A of Pāṇini. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1973: 209-11) effectively demonstrates that atha śabdānuśanam should be accepted as the first statement of the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

I have already shown that the structure of a discussion in the Mahābhāṣya requires a unit of focus. If this is accepted then what other than atha śabdānuśāsanam could effectively serve as unit of focus for initiating discussion on rules of the A as discussed in view of focus driven discussions of the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. The total number of rules in the Siddhāntakaumudī (the SK) of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita comes to be about 3976.This difference of five sūtras between the KV and the SK can be explained by the fact that the SK omits four sūtras from the fourth quarter of the fourth book (adhyāya), and one sūtra from the fourth quarter of the sixth book. The exact number of the sūtras of the A thus varies. A rule of the A is referred to by three numbers separated by two periods, following the convention of b.q.n where b = book number, q = quarter number


and n = number of rule. Thus, consider 1.1.1 vṛddhir ādaic which, with its numbers read backward, refers to the first rule of the first quarter of the first book.

What follows is a summary listing of rules relative to topics discussed:

Adhyāya I:(a) rules dealing with major definitions and interpretations(b) rules dealing with certain extensional provisions, and more definitions(c) rules dealing with assignment of the terms: ātmanepada and

parasmaipada(d) rules dealing with assignment of only one name (saṃjñā) per

nominatum (saṃjñin)(e) rules dealing with assignment of kāraka categories

Adhyāya II:(a) rules dealing with formation of compounds (samāsa)(b) rules dealing with nominal inflectional endings (sUP; vibhakti)(c) rules dealing with number and gender of compounds (d) rules dealing with replacements introduced to roots

Adhyāya III:(a) rules dealing with derivation of roots ending in affixes saN, etc.(b) rules dealing with the derivation of forms ending in affixes termed kṛt(c) rules dealing with the derivation of forms ending in affixes termed tiN

Adhyāya IV-V:(a) rules dealing with derivation of forms ending in affixes termed sUP(b) rules dealing with derivation of forms ending in the feminine affixes

ṬāP / CāP / ḌāP, and ṄīP / Ṅīṣ / ṄīN(c) rules dealing with derivation of forms ending in affixes termed taddhita

'patronymics'Note that adhyāya one presents basic terms, conventions and concepts

which relate to proper understanding of the grammar, and its function.The second adhyāya mostly dwells on extraction of padas from sentences, to be subsequently subjected to analysis in terms of bases and affixes. This adhyāya also deals with formation of compounds, and introduction of nominal endings which are subject to deletion if forming part of a compound. Adhyāyas three through five deal with placement of affixes after two major bases: dhātu (3.1.91 dhātoḥ # 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ; 1.3.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ); and prātipadika (4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt # 1.2.45 arthavad adhātur...; 1.2.46 kṛt-taddhita-samāsāś ca). Each one of these bases also yields a complex derived


base: those which end in affixes -saN, etc., in case of verbal roots (dhātu; 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ), and those which end in affixes termed kṛt, or taddhita, or else are termed samāsa 'compound' (1.2.46 kṛt-taddhita-samāsāś ca), in case of nominal stems. Finally, a base termed prātipadika can yield another set of six bases as characterized with ṅyāp 'ending in the feminine affixes marked with Ṅī and āP' of rule 4.1.1 ṅyāpprātipadikāt).

Why did Pāṇini not include derivation of compounds in adhyāya four? After all, compounds are nominal bases derived with affixes termed kṛt (3.4.67 kartari kṛt) and taddhita (4.1.76 taddhitāḥ). Pāṇini includes the description of compounds in the domain of rules where only one term ekasaṃjñā 'one term' could be assigned (1.4.1 ākaḍārād ekā saṃjñā). Elsewhere, class-inclusion (saṃjñā-samāveśa) is the norm. There are some operational difficulties, for example, LUK-deletion of nominal endings from within compounds (2.4.71 supodhātuprātipadikayoḥ) which I shall not discuss here.

Adhyāya VI-VII:(a) rules dealing with doubling (dvitva; 6.1.1 ekāco dve...)(b) rules dealing with samprasāraṇa (6.1.13 ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam...)(c) rules dealing with change in quality of sounds, in close proximity

(6.1.72 saṃhitāyām )(d) rules dealing with introduction of augment (āgama; 6.1.134

suṭkātpūrvaḥ) sUṬ(e) rules dealing with accentuation (6.1.155 anudāttaṃ padam ekavarjam)(f) rules dealing with phonological operations relative to a presuffixal base

(aṅga; 6.4.1 aṅgasya)(g) rules dealing with further operations relative to affixes, augments, etc.

Adhyāya VIII:(a) rules dealing with doubling relative to a pada (1.4.14 sup-tiṅ-antaṃ

padam)(b) rules dealing with accent relative to a pada(c) rules dealing with additional operations relative to a pada(d) rules dealing with miscellaneous operations relative to a non-pada.Note that adhyāyas six through eight offer operations mostly dealing with

change in the sound qualities, modifications (vikāra) introduced to shapes of bases, namely dhātu (1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ, 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ), prātipadika (1.2.45 arthavad...,1.2.46 kṛt-taddhita-samāsāś ca), aṅga (1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis...), bha (1.4.18 yaci bham), pada (1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam), accentuation (svara), and others. These operations, as we will see in detail, are carried out with reference to formal units such as prātipadika 'nominal


stem,' dhātu 'verbal root,' aṅga (1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi...; 6.4.1 aṅgasya), bha (6.4.129 bhasya), taddhita (6.1.161 taddhitasya), samāsa (6.1.220 samāsasya), and pada (8.1.16 padasya), etc.

The sections of rules prior to books 3-5 deal with what the tradition calls vākyavibhajyānvākhyāna 'analysis based on extraction of individual pada from sentences.' These extracted padas are then subjected to analysis in view of bases (prakṛti) and affixes (pratyaya). Of course, in view of rules of adhyāya three through five. Relevant phonological and morphophonemic operations, including accentuation, follow through rules of adhyāya six through eight. This listing of the content of the A in eight books of four quarters each pretty much follows the sequential order of rules. There is no fixed number of rules in individual quarters, or in the combined total number of rules in a given chapter-book. Pāṇini places the rules of the A in select contexts. Individual rules which are bunched together with other rules and are thus placed in a given context can be viewed as sharing a single context. Placement of rules in a shared context can be identified as placing them in domains with shared context. It is in this sense that Pāṇini places his rules in domains. All listings of rules in domains with shared contexts can be considered physical insofar as their physical placement at a given place in the A is concerned. However, there are listings of certain very large domains which are of consequence beyond their mere physical placement. Consider for example the following rule:

8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham 'that which follows from here (atra) onwards is considered as if suspended (asiddham) in view of application of that which precedes (pūrva)'

Rules which are listed prior to the first rule of the second quarter of the eighth book of the A are hereby clearly identified as forming a larger group of their own, namely the sapāda-saptādhyāyī , the first seven books of the A with an additional quarter (pāda) of adhyāya eight. Rules which are headed by 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham also form a domain of their own, namely the tripādī 'the last three quarter books.' This dual application of suspension (asiddhatva) which is extended (atidiśyate) to rules both within and beyond the tripādī is made possible by the use of the twin qualifications of pūrva 'prior' and atra 'here,' in a rule strategically placed as domain heading with impact on domains of rules which both precede and follow. That is, this provision of suspension which is characterized with the two words, namely pūrva 'prior, preceding' and atra 'here,' has consequences not only for rules which precede the tripādī but also for rules which follow within the tripādī. The first provision of suspension is extended to rules of the tripādī as a whole, in view of application of rules of the Sapāda-saptādhyāyī which precede the tripādī. The second provision of suspension is


extended to subsequent rules of tripādī in view of application of its own prior rules. More about it in connection with rule-interaction. There is one domain of rules headed by 8.1.16 padasya which not only straddles between domain boundaries but also serves as a bridge between the sapāda-saptādhyāyī and the tripādī. This domain covers a fairly substantial number of rules all the way up to, and including 8.3.55 apadāntasya mūrdhanyaḥ. Consequently, rules governed by 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham which are also governed by 8.1.16 padasya are considered suspended in view of application of rules governed by 8.1.16 padasya and listed within the sapāda-saptādhyāyī.

The A of Pāṇini has been mostly preserved through a remarkable oral tradition which has meticulously preserved the Vedas with their minutest details of accentuation. It is believed that Pāṇini himself taught certain sūtras to his students in two or more different ways (ubhayathā hy ācāryeṇa śiṣyāḥ...). Different ways of teaching rules to students in different parts of the country with different teachers could have resulted in variant readings. These readings became part of rules of the A, especially since they adhered to its style of rule-formulation, interpretation, order and application.

There are proposals, for example yoga-vibhāga 'split-interpretation of a rule,' whereby the tradition presents and accepts a split-reading of a rule. These can also serve as a source of variation in reading of a sūtra. A split-interpretation facilitates carrying over, or blocking, of anuvṛtti, and opens up an opportunity for reinterpretation of nominal endings of rule-constituents. Kāśikā accepts nine split-interpreted rules from the Mahābhāṣya and lists them as eighteen separate rules. This in turn becomes a major source of variation. Another major source of variation in reading a sūtra could be a vārttika proposal of Kātyāyana, whereby a proposed vārttika, or a part of it, can be accepted as inserted in the wording of a rule. Here again the Kāśikā-vṛtti has read many vārttikas, or some parts therefrom, as part of a sūtra.

The following are recognized as primary sources for variation in the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī : (i) transmittal of the A through oral tradition; (ii) Pāṇini's own two-way teaching of a sūtra; (iii) split-interpretation (yoga-vibhāga) of rules; (iv) acceptance of variant readings by the authors of vṛttis; (v) a vārtitka, or a part therefrom, as part of a sūtra; (vi) listing of a sūtra as part a gaṇa; (vii) acceptance of elements from other traditions.

Significant efforts have already been made by Saudāminī Bahulikar (1972), Ram Shankar Bhaṭṭācārya (1966:360-76), Śrīnārāyaṇa Miśra (1969), and Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1973) to study variant readings in the text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Bahulikar proposes a core of sūtras which Pāṇini formulated and to which further additions were made. Rule relation and hierarchy of application is


so intrinsic to the structure of the A that accepting a smaller core to which additions were subsequently made by others is hard to accept. This same goes for some recent proposals about non-Pāṇinian authorship of the taddhita section of grammar. The A has to be accepted as what is available now. Of course, some interpolations, for example the vārttikas of Kātyāyana, and some pre-Pāṇinian elements must be recognized. Bhaṭṭācārya (1966: 61-78) has offered some yuktis 'clues' whereby Pre-Pāṇinian elements could be identified. The text of the Aṣṭādhāyī which is available today is fairly established, and variation in reading of sūtras is not much of a consequence, fortunately because three major texts, namely the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, the Kāśikā-vṛtti of Vāmana-Jayāditya and the Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, are readily available. Note, however, that a variant reading which does not function in unison within the unified structure of the A towards accomplishing its intended goal is rejected, mostly for not being in tune with the practice of rule formulation, interpretation and application of Pāṇini (cf. sidhyaty apāṇinīyaṃ tu bhavati).

I must now discuss the following texts which are generally not considered part of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, but whose contribution towards effective functioning of the Aṣṭādhyāyī cannot be questioned.

A. The Śiva-sūtras (Śs)It is stated that Pāṇini has prefaced his A with fourteen formulaic rules

which are generally known as the Śivasūtras. These perhaps also illustrate one of the oldest, and very effectively used, techniques of forming abbreviations. Pāṇini lists the inventory of Sanskrit sounds (varṇa-samāmnāya ) by means of these fourteen sūtras such that individual sūtras represent classes of sound within the larger inventory of sounds. Each individual sūtra contains items listed in a particular order with the last sound of each sūtra being a non-list element. A term of abbreviation can thus be formed by taking any item on the list and combining it with any non-item on the list. The term of abbreviation thus formed will represent itself as well as all sounds that intervene (1.1.73 ādir antyena sahetā). Consider for example the following listing of the Śivasūtras where I represent the non-list items in each sūtra in capital letters. The -a vowel which, with the exception of one in Śs 5, is inserted between consonants is intended for ease of articulation:


Vowels

1. a i u Ṇ

2. ṛ ḷ K3. e o Ṅ

4. ai au C

Consonants

5. ha ya va ra Ṭ

6. la Ṇ

7. ña ma ṅa ṇa na M

8. jha bha Ñ

9. gha ḍha dha Ṣ

10. ja ba ga ḍa da Ś

11. kha pha cha ṭha tha ca ṭa ta V

12. ka pa Y

13. śa ṣa sa R

14. ha L

A subgroup of this listing formed by the Śś 1-4 is referred to by aC, an abbreviation term formed with a combined with the following non-list item, in this case C, to represent a as well as all intervening sounds listed prior to the dummy symbol C. Pāṇini uses the term aC for vowels in general. This he also uses for representation of classes of vowels homogeneous with individual constituents of the abbreviation. Thus a can represent represent a, a, ā, etc. The order of elements listed in the Śs is as follows:

(1) Vowels (Śs 1-4)(a) simple (Śs 1-2)(b) complex (Śs 3-4)

(2) Consonants (Śs 5-14)(a) semivowels (Śs 5-6)(b) nasals (Śs 7)(c) stops (Śs 8-12)

(i) voiced aspirates (Śs 8-9)(ii) voiced non-aspirates (Śs 10)(iii) voiceless aspirates (Śs 11)(iv) voiceless non-aspirates (Śs 12)

(d) spirants (Śs 13-14)


Let us return to rule 6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci with its three terms iK, yaṆ and aC, which represent (i, u, ṛ, ḷ), (y, v, r, l), and (all vowels) in this order, respectively. The understanding that yaṆ comes in place of iK occurring when aC follows comes from the following sūtras:

1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyoga 'a ṣaṣṭhī 'genitive' (when not interpretable otherwise) denotes (the relationship) in place of '1.1.66 tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya 'a specification made with saptamī 'locative' denotes an operation to take place on what precedes'Thus, a sound denoted by the abbreviate term yaṆ occurs (as a

replacement) in place of the other denoted by iK, when occurring followed by a sound denoted by aC. But there is still a problem. What sound denoted by yaṆ should occur to replace one of the four sounds denoted by iK? Pāṇini provides for a resoloution to this problem by rule 1.3.10 yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām 'equivalency of elements specified as replacement in two sets of equal number of elements is assigned following their order of enumeration.' That is, i, u, ṛ, ḷ are replaced by y, v, r, l, respectively, in accord with the order of their enumeration in two sets of equal number of sounds denoted by iK and yaṆ.

Pāṇini's method of forming terms of abbreviation with the help of the Śs can yield a vast number of abbreviations. However, the Aṣṭādhyāyī uses only 41 abbreviations as summarized by the following vārttika proposal:

ekasmān ṅañaṇavaṭā dvābhyāṃ ṣastribhya eva kaṇamāḥ syuḥ /jñeyau cayau caturbhyoraḥ pañcabhyaḥ śalau ṣaḍbhyaḥ //'one (abbreviatory term) each with Ṅ, Ṇ, Ñ, V, Ṭ;two with Ṣ; three each with K, Ṇ, M ; four each with C, Y;five with R and six each with Ś, L'If we treat the a of Śs 6 as an anunāsika it, as has been advocated by the

Kāśikāvṛtti (KV ) and the Siddhāntakaumudī (SK), we will get an additional abbreviation, namely rA~. There are two more abbreviated terms caY and ñaM, where the first is attested by vārttika III (ad 8.4.88: cayo dvitīyaḥ śari pauṣkarasādeḥ), and the second by the Uṇādisūtra (1/114 ñamantāḍ ḍaḥ). This brings the total number of terms of abbreviation to forty-four (Sharma, 2002:35-36).

B. The Dhātupāṭha (DP) Pāṇini, in the Aṣṭādhyāyī , makes some provisions with reference to a

group of forms he names dhātu : 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ, 2.4.72 adiprabhṛtibhyaḥ śapaḥ, 2.4.75 juhotyādibhyaḥ śluḥ, 3.1.25


satyāpa...curādibhyo ṇic , 3.1.27 kaṇvādibhyo yak, 3.1.69 divādibhyaḥ śyan, 3.1.73 svādibhyaḥ śnuḥ, 3.1.77 tudādibhyaḥ śaḥ, 3.1.78 rudhādibhyaḥ śnam, 3.1.79 tanādikṛñbhya uḥ, 3.1.81 kryādibhyaḥ śnā. These rules introduce augments (vikaraṇa), and require deletion or doubling (dvitva). There are other rules which introduce placement of affixes and other operations with reference to verbal roots (dhātu). The tradition attests to the listing of the following ten groups of roots in this order: (1) bhvādi, (2) adādi, (3) juhotyādi, (4) divādi, (5) svādi, (6) tudādi, (7) rudhādi, (8) tanādi, (9) kryādi and (10) curādi. The texts which enumerate roots of the Sanskrit language are generally referred to as the dhātupāṭha (DP ) 'recitation of roots.' The text and authorship of the DP itself is controversial. Did Pāṇini receive the DP from the tradition, or did he compose one himself for use in the Aṣṭādhyāyī ? Was the DP he received from the tradition same as the one he used in his Aṣṭādhyāyī? Are meaning entries of roots of the DP post-Pāṇinian? There are differences of opinion on these questions among scholars. However, given close correspondences between listing of root-groups in the DP and those cited in the grammar, scholars generally agree on the existence of a DP which Pāṇini used in formulating his Aṣṭādhyāyī. Did Pāṇini prepare his own DP, or did he accept one made available to him by the tradition? I tend to believe that he prepared his own DP without any meaning entry. It is hard to believe that Pāṇini received a text of the DP from the tradition in a form made ready for use in his Aṣṭādhyāyī, in a manner he so desired to use.

C. The Gaṇa-pāṭha (GP) The GP is an ordered listing of sets of nominal stems to which Pāṇini

makes frequent references in his Aṣṭādhyāyī. These sets are of two kinds: those which present a closed list of nominals, and those which present an open-ended list of nominals. The authorship of the GP is again debatable. Jinendrabuddhi (Nyāsa ad Kāśikā 5.3.2 kiṃ sarvanāma...) questions the Pāṇinian authorship of GP. He also states that some parts of the GP are also post-Kātyāyana. Jinendra's statements on the GP are in many ways self-contradictory. Cardona (1976:166) correctly observes that the GP was presupposed by rules of the sūtrapāṭha (SP). If the GP was presupposed by the SP then Pāṇini must have had a version of the GP so that he could use it in the SP. Whether or not Pāṇini received the GP from the tradition is not the right question. The right question is: how much of the available GP differs from the GP used by Pāṇini, and what part of it precedes Pāṇini. Besides questions about the authorship of the GP, there are other questions about order, listing, and meanings of listed nominals. Cardona takes up various points raised in connection with rule 1.1.27 sarvādīni


sarvanāmāni. He mentions that, in addition to regular listings under sarva, etc., mention must also be made of three rules 1.1.34 pūrvaparāvara dakṣiṇottarāpādharāṇi..., 1.1.35 svam ajñātidhanākhyāyām and 1.1.36 antaraṃ bahiryogopasaṃvyānayoḥ. For, Katyāyana objects to the inclusion of these rules in the SP because their purpose is served by their inclusion in the listing of the GP. Patañjali concludes that these rules are required in the SP for optional replacement of JaŚ with Śi.

D. The Uṇādi-sūtra (Us)The uṇādi 'uṆ, etc.' are affixes used to derive nominal stems. There are

two versions of the uṇādi available: the pañcapādī 'that which consists of five sections' and the daśapādī 'those which consist of ten sections.' The authorship of the sūtras is also debatable. Pāṇini mentions the uṇādi in two of his rules: 3.3.1 uṇādayo bahulam 'uṆ, etc., are used variously,' and 3.4.75 tābhyām anyatroṇādayaḥ 'the uṇādi words are used outside the denotation of apādāna and sampradāna.' The first rule introduces the uṇādi affixes after verbal roots variously (bahulam). Thus, we get kṛ + uṆ → (kāru + u) sU → kāruḥ 'artisan.' The second rule states that the uṇādi affixes can also be introduced to denote a kāraka other than sampradāna 'dative' and apādāna 'ablative.' These two rules attest that the SP of Pāṇini presupposed the uṇādi affixes. There are additional rules in the SP which also attest to the existence of the uṇādi. Consider 3.4.74 bhīmādayo' pādāne and 7.3.85 jāgro' vicaṇnal..., where the second rule orders -ar as a replacement for the ṛ of jāgṛ. This replacement is, however, not allowed before affixes such as vi. But the problem is that Pāṇini does not introduce affix vi in his SP. It is an uṇādi affix presupposed by Pāṇini. Scholars generally believe that Pāṇini did not formulate the uṇādi sūtras. He may have had a version of the uṇādi affixes made available to him by the traditon. It is most unlikely that he accepted that version for use in his SP without any changes of his own.

E. The Phiṭsūtras (Phs)The Phs is a small treatise that deals with accentuation of linguistic forms

not developed through any process of derivation. This treatise gets its name from its first sūtra, phiṣaḥ which assigns a final high pitch accent. Cardona (1976:174-77) discusses editions and texts of this treatise along with question of authorship. It is generally believed that some text of the Phiṭsūtras was known to Kātyāyana and Patañjali. It was composed by Śantanu who certainly antedates Pāṇini.


F. The Liṅgānuśāsana (Lā)This treatise deals with assignment of gender based on structure and

meaning of nominals. The text of this treatise consists of nearly 200 aphorisms enumerating items under the headings of feminine (strīliṅga), masculine (puṃliṅga), neuter (napuṃsaka), feminine-masculine (strīpuṃsaka) and variable (aviśiṣṭaliṅga). Finally, there is also a set of nominals which can be used in all three genders. Patañjali states that (I:382, ad 2.1.36: liṅgam aśiṣyaṃ lokāśrayatvāl liṅgasya) gender should not be taught because of its dependence on usage. But there is evidence to suggest that Pāṇini did discuss gender. Consider rules 3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin, 3.3.18 puṃsi saṃjñāyāṃ ghaḥ prāyeṇa and 3.3.114 napuṃsake bhāve ktaḥ which constitute al least the indirect evidence. For direct evidence one must consider rules such as 2.4.26 paraval liṅgaṃ dvandvatatpuruṣayoḥ 'the gender of dvandva and tatpuruṣa compounds is assigned based on the final compound constituent.' Most scholars do not accept that Pāṇini formulated the text of Lā. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1973:II:256ff) believes in the Pāṇinian authorship of the Lā (Sharma, 2002: 41).


2. The Vṛtti textsIt has been stated that vṛtti takes sūtra as its focus, and tries its best to

explain the sūtra with brevity, and as intended by the author, not any less not more. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka (1972:435-37), based upon internal evidence from the Mahābhāṣya and its commentary Pradīpa by Kaiyaṭa, claims that there were at least four or five vṛttis on the Aṣṭādhyāyī which predate Patañjali. Since there are statements in the Mahābhāṣya claiming certain sūtras were explained differently by Pāṇini, Mīmāṃsaka concludes that Pāṇini must have composed his own vṛtti. The pre-Patañjalian authors of vṛttis include names such as Vyāḍi, Kuṇi and Māthura. Mīmāṃsaka discusses forty-three vṛttis in all, thirty-eight of them by their authorship.

The Kāśikāvṛtti (7 AD) is regarded as the third most important grammatical text after the Aṣṭādhyāyī and the Mahābhāṣya. Commentators explain its name either by interpreting it as kāśiṣu bhavā ’brought about at Kāśī’, or kāśayati prakāśayati sūtrārthān ’that which illuminates the meaning of sūtras’. It is generally believed that this vṛtti was written by Vāmana and Jayāditya (7 AD). The vṛtti on the first five adhyāyas is believed to have been written by Jayāditya. Vāmana is supposed to have written the vṛtti on the last three adhyāyas. Let us consider the opening kārikā verses of the Kāśikā-vṛtti:

vṛttau bhāṣye tathā dhātunāmapārāyaṇādiṣu /viprakīrṇasya tantrasya kriyate sārasaṃgrahaḥ //1//iṣṭyupasaṃkhyānavatī śuddhagaṇā vivṛtagūṭhasūtrārthā /vyutpannarūpasiddhir vṛttir iyaṃ kāśikā nāma // 2 //vyākaraṇasya śarīraṃ pariniṣṭhitaśāstrakāryam etāvat /śiṣṭaḥ parikarabandhaḥ kriyate' sya granthakāreṇa // 3 //The opening verses of Kāśikā describe its features as: (i) that which

summarizes principal views scattered all over in the vṛttis, bhāṣya, dhātupārāyaṇa ’enumeration of roots’, and nāmapārāyaṇa ‘listing of nominals in groups ’, etc.; (ii) that which includes iṣṭi ’desiderata’, upasaṃkhyāna ’addenda’, śuddhagaṇa ’correct listing of groups (gaṇa)’, and (iii) that which unfolds hidden meanings of rules (vivṛtagūḍhasūtrārthān) and offers systematic derivation of forms (vyutpannarūpasiddhiḥ). We also know from Kāśikā that it includes vārttikas of Kātyāyana and iṣṭis 'desiderata' of the Mahābhāṣya. This is the standard corpus of grammar made for carrying out its processes.

Haradatta states that the words iṣṭi and upasaṃkhyāna are used as an upalakṣaṇa for supplementary statements which are made by focusing close to the context of a rule to capture goals which may not have been gathered by the rule itself. (PM ad Kāśikā: sūtreṇāsaṃgṛhītaṃ lakṣyaṃ yena saṃgṛhyate


tadupalakṣaṇam iṣṭyupasaṃkhyānagrahaṇam. tena vaktavyādīnām api grahaṇam). An iṣṭi (iṣyata iti ) 'desideratum' so that the functional scope of a sūtra could be saved from over-application (atiprasaṅga-vāraṇa). An upasaṃkhyāna is a properly worded statement closely following the context of a sūtra. It is a vārttika statement which explains some not so stated application of a sūtra and generally saves it from non-application (avyāpti), as against an iṣṭi which generally saves a sūtra from over application (ativyāpti). Kaiyaṭa (in the paspaśā) accepts that iṣṭis are primarily responsible for use of the adjective mahā to the bhāṣya of Patañjali.

Since Kāśikā is a fairly late text and clearly summarizes views from diverse sources with a desire to gather all available materials, its content goes far beyond the expected content of a vṛtti. Kāśikā offers its vṛtti on 3,981 sūtras which also include atha śabdānuśāsanam, in addition to fourteen pratyāhāra-sūtras. There are four major sources of variation in the reading of its sūtras: rule-splitting (yoga-vibhāga); reading of a vārttika as sūtra; inclusion of all, or a part, of a vārttika as part of a sūtra; addition to, or deletion from, a sūtra. Kāśikā accepts nine sūtras and lists them as eighteen, via yogavibhāga. There are ten instances where a vārttika has been listed by Kāśikā as sūtra. There are sixteen instances where Kāśikā reads part of a vārttika into a sūtra. There are several sūtras where Kāśikā is influenced by Cāndra and Kātantra. Most of these influences are acknowledged in the form of modification of a sūtra or rendition of a statement in the form of an iṣṭi or vārttika. Kāśikā also makes provisions for deriving compounds such as cauraghātī ‘thief-killer‘, under the condition of kutsā ‘censure‘ (3.2.86 karmaṇi hanaḥ), parallel to mātulaghātī ‘killer of maternal uncle‘. Cāndra and Kātantra both make provisions for formation of these compounds. Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita do not make any efforts to account for these formations. Perhaps because there interpretation of sūtras 2.2.3 dvitīyatṛtīya... and 3.2.86 karmaṇi hanaḥ could still accommodate formation of these compounds. Now consider examples such as candramukhī / candramukhā ‘moon-faced‘; mṛdvaṅgī / mṛdvaṅgā ‘soft-limbed‘; sugātrī / sugātrā ‘beautiful-bodied‘; snigdhakaṇṭhī / snigdhakaṇṭhā ‘soft-voiced‘ for whose formation Kāśikā offers inclusion of aṅga ‘limb‘, gātra ‘body‘ and kaṇṭha ‘throat (voice)‘ in the body of rule 4.1.54 svāṅgāc copas`arjanād... Haradatta acknowledges that the author of the vṛtti put some extra efforts to accommodate these derivatives of the feminine affix ṄīS because popularity of usage (Padamañjarī ad Kāśikā: aṅga-gātra ityādi bhāṣye‘ nuktam apy etat prayoga-bāhulyād vṛttikāreṇoktam). Kāśikā must be commended not only for its efforts towards offering judicious explanations to Pāṇinian sūtras but also for offering accomodations in their formulation in tune with the post-Patañjalian Sanskrit


usage. Kāśikā selects its examples from diverse sources. The Mahābhāṣya, Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa, Kirātārjunīyam, Suśruta and Caraka are important sources for classical usage. The Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi (9 AD) and Padamañjarī of Haradatta (11 AD) are two important commentaries on Kāśikā (Sharma, 2002: 18).

Mention must also be made of the Bhāṣāvṛtti of Puruṣottamadeva (12 AD) which draws heavily from the Kāśikāvṛtti, and from the Bhāgavṛtti of Vimalamati (8 AD). This last is not available. Puruṣottama only includes rules dealing with classical Sanskrit usage. Still, he excludes any discussion of accent rules. Though he arranges the sūtrapāṭha of Pāṇini into eight adhyāyas with four quarters each, he further groups the sūtras into sections with headings indicating nature of rules and operations. Puruṣottama has a real flavor for brevity,12 though he thus takes a lot for granted. He does not make any explicit statements about anuvṛtti, unless it becomes necessary. He, quite often, presents elements of anuvṛtti in a manner that facilitates proper interpretation of individual rules. Puruṣottama mentions vārttikas without mentioning their source, though occasionally, he cites such sources as Kātyāyana, gaṇasūtra, eke ‘someone‘, smṛti ‘tradition‘, Vararuci and Saunāga. Examples of Bhāṣāvṛtti are varied, and are chosen for clarity and frequency in usage. Puruṣottama normally does not offer any counter-examples. He tries to explain the sūtras with straightforward paraphrases using minimum of words. The Bhāṣāvṛtti can serve as a ready reference for interpretation of rules and relevant examples. It, however, can be used only by those who are well versed in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. This description of the vṛtti texts is made short since these texts, particularly the Kāśikāvṛtti, make extensive use of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya.

3. The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjalivyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattiḥna hi sandehād alakṣaṇam /

(Mahābhāṣya I:43)

A. The Mahābhāṣya as vyākhyānaIt is stated that a sūtra is formulated with brevity and precision, though

certainly not at the expense of clarity. This explicitness condition in rule formulation requires the use of terms and symbols within some meta-linguistic perspective. Rules are placed in contexts where a lower level rule expects reading of a higher level rule, or a part there from, for its correct interpretation. Although rules of grammar are placed in a serial order there application does not


have to follow this serial order either within, or outside, the quarters or books where they are placed. Then there is always a possibility of conflicting and / or differing interpretations, and interpretations which may not be free of doubts(sandeha). It is in view of this, and many other difficulties, that a sūtra was interpreted as a sentence. For interpreting a sūtra as a sentence one needs to reconstruct the context of a rule by bringing elements and rules from elsewhere close to this context. This in turn was not an easy task. The vārttikas of Kātyāyana were instrumental in selecting a topic, or focus, for his exposition on the sūtras of Pāṇini. For, Kātyāyana examines a sūtra in terms of its intended meaning and application in view of under application, over application, or very rarely, no application at all.

Patañjali arranges his vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya in 85 āhnikas 'day-sessions.' The total number of sūtras which Patañjali comments upon in the Mahābhāṣya is 1713. Sarma states there were an additional 275 sūtras to which Kātyāyana and Patañjali made references to. Sarma (1968:53-54) presents a tabular listing of the total number of 4293 vārttikas which Kielhorn established. The idea that the Mahābhāṣya accepts Kātyāyana's vārttikas as focus for its vyākhyāna thus clearly gets established. But there is yet another question. Is 4,293 a correct number for vārttikas of Kātyāyana? Why did Kātyāyana not offer vārttikas on other sūtras? This is not an easy question. First of all, vārttikas are available as part of the Mahābhāṣya. Kielhorn effectively shows how they can be recognized by treating an immediately following paraphrase of Patañjali as a clue. However, not all varttikas recognized by this method are accepted by commentators. Perhaps Kātyāyana did not find it necessary to introduce vārttikas to other rules or perhaps vārttikas on rules not treated by Patañjali have been lost as the Mahābhāṣya is their only extant source. That Kātyāyana wrote vārttikas for only one-third of the sūtras of Pāṇini is hard to believe. It is my thinking that Kātyāyana may have formulated vārttikas on other rules but Patañjali did not accept them for discussion perhaps because of lack of interest. The selection and treatment of a varttika depended entirely on how it fit in the structure of vyākhyāna, and what it could contribute towards better understanding of the sūtra on hand.

Patañjali accepted a vārttika for his comment only if it could contribute something either towards understanding the meaning of a sūtra, or towards understanding some functional aspect of grammar. A vyākhyāna of Patañjali was more like a test of the sūtras of Pāṇini, of course, by way of testing the vārttikas of Kātyāyana. There was, however, a big difference in the style of presentation, and predictability of its results. Katyāyana had already stated the results of his inquiry. Patañjali structured his arguments in the unique style of a dialog with


questions (praśna), illustrations (dṛṣṭānta), examples (udāharaṇa), counter examples (pratyudāharaṇa), answers (uttara), objection (ākṣepa), doubts (sandeha), and resolution of doubts (samādhāna), carefully leading the reader towards the final view (siddhānta). For, the intent of a sūtra could not be properly understood without vyākhyāna 'exposition' which, in turn, was explained as 'that which includes example, counter-example, and vākyādhyāhāra 'reconstructing elements expected for completion of meaning.' Note in this connection that the vyākhyāna of Patañjali has not only facilitated proper understanding of the sūtras of Pāṇini, but has contributed many proposals which have become part of the grammatical tradition. The paribhāṣās 'interpretive conventions' of the Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgeśa, and the vārttikas of Kātyāyana are two such excellent proposals. Patañjali presents his vyākhyāna in a very simple and lyrical style of prose which, by all accounts, carries much deeper meaning. One of the most striking features of his vyākhyāna is his keen observation of reality of the outside world especially as it bears upon reality of the inside world of grammar. His discussions of utsarga 'general,' viśeṣa 'exception,' śeṣa 'residual,' pratiṣedha 'negation,' atideśa 'extension,' niyama 'restriction' and asiddha 'suspension' rules regularly draws parallels from the outside world. Devadatta, Yajñadatta, Viṣṇumitra and Kauṇḍinya are most famously cited individuals when it comes to illustrations focusing on folk maxims (laukika-nyāyas) and injunctions.

It has been stated that a vārttika is generally marked with the predication of vācyaḥ '...is to be stated.' But there are many other vārttikas where this predication is missing. Consider tyajeś ca (ad rule 3.3.90 yajayāca...) which is listed as tyajipūjitaś ca by the Kāśikāvṛtti. The Mahābhāṣya marks it with upasaṃkhyānam as ṇyatprakaraṇe tyajer upasaṃkhyānam. There are other rules where a vārttika is marked with upasaṃkhyānam. Consider rule 3.2.78 supy ajātau ṇinis tācchīlye where we find sādhukāriṇy upasaṃkhyānam 'should be mentioned when the sense is sādhukārin' a vārttika marked with upasaṃkhyānam.

iṣṭyupasaṃkhyānavatī vivṛtaghūḍhasūtrārthā /vyutpannarūpasiddhir vṛttir iyaṃ kāśikā nāma //1//

(Kāśikāvṛtti I:1)It has been explained that the words iṣṭi and upasaṃkhyāna are used as

an upalakṣaṇa for supplementary statements which are made by focusing close to the context of a rule to capture goals which may not have been gathered by the rule itself. The two words upasaṃkhyānam and vācyaḥ are used in connection with identification of vārttikas. What is the difference between the usage of the word upasaṃkhyāna and vācyaḥ? Let us consider a couple of vārttika proposals:


1. ṇyantānāṃ bhādīnām upasaṃkhyānam 'mention must be made of bhā, etc., when ending in Ṇi' (ad 8.4.34 nabhābhūpūkamigamipyāyīvepām)

2. tīyasya ṅītsūpasaṃkhyānam (ad 5.2.54 dves tīyaḥ).The word upasaṃkhyāna may be explained as upa samīpataḥ

samyaktayā khyānam kathanam 'properly stating something close to ...' If one carefully looks at the question 'close to what,' or 'close to what a statement is properly to be made,' one finds that, in vārttika one, this closeness is understood with the verb roots bhā, bhū, pū, kami and gami, etc. As far as the second vārttika is concerned, the closeness of the upasaṃkhyāna is interpreted in relation to the words dvi and tri. The Ācārya assigned the term sarvanāman to dvi and tri read in the group of nominals listed in the group headed by sarva 'all.' Note that affix tīya is introduced after dvi and tri termed sarvanāman under 5.2.54 dves tīyaḥ and 5.2.55 treḥ samprasāraṇaṃ ca . This assignment of the term sarvanāman made to dvi and tri ending in affix tīya is what can be called upasaṃkhyāna. We find this same situation in the first vārttika where closeness is related with bhā, bhū, etc. As against this, we understand that a vārttika marked with vācyaḥ makes a provision independently.

One may find the same vārttika differently stated. Thus, consider 5.4.77 acaturavicaturasucatura... where we find the vārttika, caturo' c prakaraṇe tryupābhyām upasaṃkhyānam 'mention in this context of aC should be made after catur when used in combination after tri and upa.' The Siddhānta-Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita phrases this vārttika as tryupābhyāṃ caturo' j iṣyate 'aC is desired after catur used in construction after tri and upa.' These vārttika proposals facilitate the derivation of the same forms tricatura and upacatura. Now, could the second vārttika also be confused with iṣṭi 'desideratum'? Perhaps not in the SK. But, elsewhere, for example it mab be confused with iṣṭi. A lack of the usage of vācyaḥ and upasaḥkhyānam may clearly indicate the status of an iṣṭi. The status of a vārttika should clear up any confusion. Note that where three or more vārttikas are introduced under a rule vācyam is generally used to mark only the first. Now consider parau vraje ṣaḥ padānte, a vārttika under 8.2.30 coḥ kuḥ where vācyam is not used. This vārttika, among other things, requires replacement in ṣ at the end of the pada when vraj is used in construction with pari .' It is stated that since the statement could only be construed with bhavati, vācyam is not used. That is, whether or not a vārttika is marked with vācyam, upasaṃkhyānam, or an absence of them both, also depends on the context.

It is generally believed that Patañjali defends the Ācārya against Katyāyana, and while doing that he also puts the vārttikas to test, especially with the belief that whatever is there in the vṛtti or vārttika is indeed already there in the sūtras. Accepting this view leads him to either refute a vārtika or explain it in


a manner that offers a new meaning supporting the correctness of the sūtra in its entirety. Consider the vārttika yaṇaḥ pratiṣedho vācyaḥ 'let negation of yaṆ be stated.' Pātañjali interprets vācyaḥ as vyākhyeyaḥ 'to be explained' , and in accord with that he starts explaining the negation of yaṆ by bringing jhalaḥ from rule 8.2.26 jhalo jhali. He now refutes the vārttika with a provision of deletion of jhaL occurring at the end of a consonant cluster (saṃyogānta). For, since yaṆ (y, v, r, l ) is not included within the denotation of the symbol of abbreviation, namely jhaL, the vārttika is not needed. By offering the vārttika on a rule the author of the vārttika forces the author of the Mahābhāṣya to think. By offering the refutation of a vārttika by way of a different interpretation of the vārttika, Patañjali reinforces our belief in the faultless formulation of Pāṇini, the Ācārya. People still have the impression that Kātyāyana formulated his vārttikas to find fault with the sūtras of Paṇini. However, since this is not true of all the vārttikas, and especially not of those which were rejected by Patañjali, this view should be abandoned. By focusing more on the vārttikas which Patañjali accepted and which seek certain modification in a sūtra or its scope, people consider Kātyayana an antagonist of Paṇini. They also think that Patañjali was the champion defender of Pāṇini against Kātyāyana. Kielhorn (1963:52) is correct in observing that "Pāṇini has suffered more at his [Patañjali's] hands than at those of the vārttikakāra's". Patañjali has not only rejected many vārttikas of Kātyāyana but he has also rejected many sūtras of Pāṇini. But Patañjali holds the Ācārya in the highest esteem. Consider his claim (Mbh. I:128) that 'the Ācārya (Pāṇini) himself is the authority (pramāṇa); ...it is not possible, even for a single sound segment, to be anarthaka 'non-meaningful.'

Kātyāyana shows great respect for the Ācārya. His vārttikas must be accepted as complementary to the discussion of the bhāṣya, and to the sūtras of the Ācārya. For, they play a pivotal role in the structuring of arguments of the bhāṣya discussion. There are many vārttikas which Patañjali accepted for discussion but ended up rejecting them. Many of those vārttikas forced the author of the bhāṣya to arrive at some satisfactory resolution to problems raised by them. It is in these contexts that Patañjali offers some brilliant resolutions. Consider his frequent resort to the technique of yoga-vibhāga 'rule-splitting,' against acceptance of the vārttika proposal (cf. 3.1.67 sārvadhātuke yak; 3.1.85 vyatyayo bahulam; 3.3.14 lṛṭaḥ sad vā; 4.3.1 yuṣmadasmador anyatarasyāṃ khañ ca; 6.1.102 prathamayoḥ pūrvasavarṇaḥ, etc.). There are other aspects of rule interpretation, for example tantra (1.3.3 halantyam, 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham),13 transposition of nominal endings (vibhakti-vipariṇāma), interpretation of compounds (tapuruṣa versus bahuvrīhi) and types of negation


(prasajya versus paryudāsa pratiṣedha), etc., where vārttikas contribute towards resolution of a problem, via their own rejection.

A varttika forms part of this complex argument structure by serving as a pratīka. After the paraphrase of a vārttika is presented, its discussion with illustrations by means of arguments supported with examples and counter-examples proceeds. The tradition recognizes three participants in the discussion: the student (śiṣya), teacher's aide (ācāryadeśīya) and teacher (acārya). The tradition also makes references to a participant who knows only part of the truth (ekadeśin) and another who offers the final view (siddhāntin). It is to be remembered here that identifying the statements of these participants is often difficult. The bhāṣya discussions seem to be structured around two basic issues: that which is given as established, and whether or not which is given as established should be accepted.

Note that raising doubts against aspects of formulation, interpretation and application of a sūtra, by way of statements such as the vārttikas, was not an uncommon practice, especially for a text with the format of a vyākhyāna where a topic of discussion was systematically brought towards some final resolution, with the help of differing opinions supported by examples and counter examples. This can be likened to the test of a sūtra. The Mahābhāṣya, aided by vārttikas which form focus of its vyākhyāna, does it commendably, though its ultimate goal is exposition of a sūtra. One should understand the role of vārttikas only with reference to structure of the bhāṣya and its corresponding discussion. Joshi (1969: iii-iv) characterizes the discussion of the Mahābhāṣya as a 'sustained argument and identifies its pattern as consisting of 'question (objection)- answer.' Since an objection has to be refuted or affirmed based on its examination in light of examples and counter-examples, an objection may have counter-objections which again may be refuted or reaffirmed.

Patañjali clearly states that a sūtra cannot be fully understood without vyākhyāna ‘exposition.’14 Simply extracting padas and presenting a paraphrase meaning of a sūtra cannot be considered vyākhyāna. It must also be complemented with examples (udāharaṇa), counter-example (pratudāharaṇa) and missing elements for completing a sūtra as a sentence (vākyādhyāhāra).15 One may have some doubt about the correct meaning or function of a sūtra but this could not make a rule deficient. Removal of doubt is one of the main purposes of vyākhyāna. Consider the question of formation of the abbreviated symbol aṆ, in the context of two Ṇ-elements of the Śiva-sūtras 1. aiuṆ and 6. lÃṆ. There is doubt whether the abbreviated symbols aṆ and iṆ are formed with the Ṇ, of Śs. 1 or of 6. If aṆ is formed with Śs. 1 it would represent only three vowels a, i, and u; it would represent 14 sounds a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ, e, o, ai, au, h, y, v, r, l


if aṆ is formed with the Ṇ of Śs. 6. This kind of doubt also can be raised with the formation of the abbreviated symbol iṆ. Patañjali presents an analysis of all rules where aṆ is used, and with evidence, declares that only one aṆ, namely of 1.1.69 aṇudit savarṇasya cāpratryayaḥ, is formed with the Ṇ of Śs. 6. All other abbreviated aṆ symbols are formed with the Ṇ of Śs. 1 (cf. aṇuditsavarṇasyeti etat parihāya pūrveṇa aṇgrahaṇaṃ pareṇa iṇgrahaṇam iti vyākhyāsyāmaḥ). As far as the abbreviated symbol iṆ is concerned it is formed with the Ṇ of Śs. 6, in all instances. The bhāṣya has made an interesting observation in this connection. Pāṇini made use of Ṇ, Ṅ,Ñ and M as an it in the Śiva-sūtras. Why did he not use N as an it in Śs. 6. This would have taken care of the confusion. The answer: Pāṇini did not desire the use of N as an it.

B. Vyākaraṇa: śabda, artha and śabdārtha-sambandhaThe Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali is not only considered the first serious

attempt ever to systematically discuss linguistic ideas on grammar in the Indian tradition but is also the most successful one. Each idea is presented, explored and tested in the broader context of a linguistic analysis which the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini best represents. The Mahābhāṣya opens its first day-session, namely the paspaśāhnika, with introduction to the śāstra of grammar as śabdānuśāsana 'instruction of words.' He further explains that śabdānuśāsana aims on offering instruction of words of both the Classical language as well as of the Vedic. He informs that in earlier times brāhmaṇa initiates were taught grammar as part of their curriculum soon after initiation. This practice, however, was lost around the time of Patañjali. These initiates found no use for grammar, especially since they (thought they) could understand the Vedic words from the Vedas, and they could easily learn the words of the bhāṣa , the spoken language, from the usage. What then was the use of studying grammar?16 Patañjali states here that the Ācārya formulated his grammar especially for removing their confusion. Teaching about words of the Classical, as well as of the Vedic, language thus becomes the primary purpose of formulating the śāstra of grammar. Patañjali outlines five main purposes of studying grammar:17

i. rakṣā 'preservation of the Veda,' where knowledge of correct word, its meaning, deletion (LOPA), augment (āgama), replacement (ādeśa) and sound modification (varṇa-vikāra) which also includes accent (svara) not only brings merit to individuals but also facilitates preservation of the Vedas. It was believed that a person who fully understood the meaning as well as modification in sounds of the Vedic words, alone, could preserve the Vedas (cf. lopāgamavarṇavikārajño hi samyag vedān paripālayiṣyati).


ii. ūha, where reasoning derived from study of grammar enables one to select forms based on usage. This ūha can be found in bases, affixes, nominal endings, gender and person, etc. For, the mantras of the Veda are not cited with all endings in all genders (cf. na sarvaiḥ liṅgaiḥ na ca sarvābhiḥ vibhaktibhiḥ vede mantrā nigaditā).

iii. āgama 'Veda ; the tradition,' where Patañjali recalls that grammar is considered primary (mukhya) among the six aṅgas 'branches of study' of the Vedas. An effort made towards study of grammar, the primary, indeed bears fruits (pradhānaṃ ṣaṭsu aṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam pradhāne ca kṛto yatnaḥ phalavān bhavati).

iv. laghu 'economy' , where Patañjali claims that there is no briefer (laghu) means other than grammar whereby one could understand words correctly with their meaning (na cāntareṇa vyākaraṇaṃ laghunopāyena śabdāḥ śakyā vijñātum).

v. asandeha 'absence of doubt': whereby study of grammar is recommended for resolution of doubts (cf. asandehārthaṃ ca adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam). Consider, for example, the compound sthūlapṛṣatī 'big-variegated' which can be interpreted as a karmadhāraya 'that which is big and variegated,' as well as a bahuvrīhi 'he whose variegated ones are big.' As a karmadhāraya-tatpuruṣa it is marked anudātta at the end; as a bahuvrīhi it will retain the accent of its initial constituent (cf. yadi pūrvapada-prakṛtisvaratvaṃ tato bahuvrīhiḥ atha antodāttatvaṃ tatas tatpuruṣa iti). A person who has not studied grammar cannot figure out this difference in meaning.

Patañjali mentions that one should not use corrupt words (apaśabda). The demons (te' surāḥ)18 had to face defeat because they used corrupt speech. Use of corrupt speech is strictly forbidden. Use of corrupt speech during sacrifice is punishable by prāyaścitta 'atonement.' It is therefore recommended that one should not use corrupt speech. Studying grammar saves one from use of corrupt speech. A single word correctly understood and properly used fulfills all desires in heaven, and here in this world.19 A word is considered correct in one meaning; when used with the denotation of a different meaning it is considered incorrect.20 Consider for example aśva 'horse' which is not used correctly when articulated as asva 'absence of any possession.' A word can become duṣṭa 'corrupt' when not articulated with right pitch or sound (svarato varṇato vā), or when used with incorrect meaning (mithyāprayuktaḥ).21

This all emphasizes two inter-related things: (i) one should study grammar for knowledge of correct (sādhu) words; (ii) one should use correct words because there is merit (dharma) in use of correct words. A statement with (i) and


(ii) put together will be (iii) use of a word with knowledge of its correctness brings merit. But knowledge of correct word also implies knowledge of incorrect words. A grammarian who knows correct words also knows incorrect words. Does a grammarian accrue demerits on account of his knowledge of incorrect words? No, because he only knows them he does not use them. A person who does not know correct words and, because of his ignorance, uses them incorrectly accrues demerits. A person who uses words with knowledge of the śāstra of grammar accomplishes dharma.22 Use of words with understanding of grammar, alone, constitutes the means of accomplishing dharma.

A question is raised whether grammar should teach correct words, incorrect words, or correct and incorrect words both. Since a single word has many corrupt counterparts, and also since teaching of correct words is comparatively more economical, grammar teaches correct words. Consider gauḥ which has many corrupt (apabhraṃśa) counterparts, for example gāvī, goṇī, gotā, gopotalikā, etc. Besides grammar should teach only what is desired (iṣṭa). How should this teaching of correct words proceed? Teaching words by way of their individual enumeration, namely pratipada-pāṭha, is here mentioned as one of the methods used by Bṛhaspati, an ideal teacher, for teaching grammar to Indra, an ideal student. But this method of studying grammar was pursued for a thousand heavenly years with no end in sight. What to talk of today when, if a person lives for long, he only lives for a hundred years. Patañjali concludes that this method of pratipada-pāṭha is no means at all (anabhyupāya eṣa).23

Patañjali again raises the question, 'how else should words be understood.' He states that rules with general and particular properties be formulated so that this vast ocean of words could be understood with little effort.24 A general (utsarga) rule is to be formulated based on generalization to which a particular (viśeṣa) rule could be related by way of being an exception (apavāda). Consider, for example, 3.2.1 karmaṇy aṇ 'affix aṆ is introduced after a verbal root when used in construction with a pada denoting object (karman), whose related exception is 3.2.3 āto' nupasarge kaḥ 'affix Ka is introduced after a verbal root ending in -ā, and not used with any pre-verb, when a pada denoting karman occurs in construction.' A question is then raised about the meaning of constituent words which enter into the formulation of general and particular rules. That is, whether their meaning is jāti 'class' or individual (vyakti). It is both since the Ācārya formulates his rules both ways (ubhayathā). Consider 1.2.58 jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām and 1.2.64 sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau.

Patañjali next introduces a statement of his own as focus: siddhe śabdārthasambandhe, whereby śabda, artha and śabdārtha-sambandha are


considered nitya 'permanent.' It is further stated that nitya is not only that which stays fixed (avicāli), does not go through modification (vikāra), or does not get destroyed (naśyati). It is also that whose essence (tatva) stays even after it goes through destruction. Consider the property (dharma) of pot-ness (ghaṭatva) which remains even after the pot (ghaṭa) is destroyed. That is, jāti 'class property' remains even after vyakti 'individual' gets destroyed. But how is it known that śabda, artha and śabdārtha-sambandha are nitya? We know it from loka 'usage.' That is, it is not known from grammatical analysis. A grammarian teaches śabda-sādhutva 'correctness of words.' Knowledge of śabdārtha 'word meaning'It is in this context that Patañjali introduces the concept of nityatā 'eternality.' That which stays fixed (dhruva), does not go through any modification and does not get destroyed is called kūṭastha-nitya. The other is called pravāha-nitya 'eternal in flow.' Simply put, the 'the eternal in flow' is one bounded by time and space (deśa-kāla). It should be remembered here that kāla itself shares the two aspects of eternal. Nāgeśa explains nitya as akṛtaka 'not brought about,' i.e., 'that which cannot be brought about, produced or affected by grammar (vyākaraṇāniṣpādyatva).' Kaiyaṭa (Pradīpa under 3.4.67 kartari kṛt) states that Pāṇini formulated his grammar by accepting śabdārtha-sambandha as eternal. In view of pravāhanityatā it can be viewed as arbitrariness. A grammarian does not have any control over the goal of his analysis (lakṣya). He enjoys control over his rules (lakṣaṇa), insofar as they can capture the usage. Rules of grammar are formulated for capturing the nature of usage and not to dictate the reality of usage. Rules of grammar are subservient to reality of usage (lakṣyaparatantratvāt lakṣaṇaṇasya, Pradīpa 5.2.80). Word, meaning and their relationship exists prior to the formulation of grammar; their understanding does not have to necessarily come from grammar. Grammatical analysis informs about correctness of words (śabda-sādhutva); it does not control correctness. Consider someone going to a potter's and asking him, 'make a pot, I wish to use it.' This may be the reality of the outside world. It certainly is not true in the world of grammar. It is 'not like the one who, wishing to make use of a pot, goes to the pot-maker and says: “Make me a pot, I am going to make use of it,” does one who, wishing to use words, go to the grammarians and say: “Make (me) words, I am going to use them.”25 This clearly establishes the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini as a grammar which could not be called prescriptive. When Pāṇini states 6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci 'let iK be replaced with yaṆ when aC follows,' he does not dictate this replacement (Bhattacarya, 1966, (Bhattacarya, 1966: 214). He simply states that 'a replacement in yaṆ in place of iK when aC follows' is seen in usage. It also means that Pāṇini is not the creator (karttā) of words. He only recalls (smarttā) them from usage.


Grammarians present the analysis of correct words by imagining (kalpanayā) their constituency in bases (prakṛti) and affixes (pratyaya) guided by the principle of anvaya 'concurrent presence' and vyatireka 'concurrent absence,' and by formulating general (utsarga), exception (apavāda) and residual (śeṣa) rules with related option (vibhāṣā), negation (pratiṣedha), restriction (niyama) and extension (atideśa), which, in turn, would capture usage by way of derivation (niṣpatti). Nāgeśa is quick to remind us that this analysis based on kalpanā 'imagination' has its validity only in the domain of grammar (śāstramātra-viṣayam). Since rules are formulated based on generalizations extracted from usage, and also since the scope of usage is very wide, a grammarian must find some standard norm of usage to facilitate determination of correctness. Patañjali states that the usage of the śiṣṭa 'wise, learned' should be accepted as the standard norm for usage. He identifies them as 'those brāhmaṇas who live in this home of the āryas, whose grain is only one little earthen pot, who are not greedy, who do not seize upon a cause and who, on account of something or the other, have gone to the end of some branch of learning, or other. This summary description of a śiṣṭa is based largely on nivāsa 'residence in Āryāvarta and ācāra 'conduct,' notions many would consider non-linguistic. One must remember here that ācāra and 'going to the end of one branch of learning' with no ulterior motive whatsoever, not only attest to their use of correct words but also affirms their excellence.26

Grammarians accept that a word without meaning and a meaning without word does not exist. This makes śabda and artha inseparable. A word is that by means of whose articulation one properly comprehends its meaning. A word, in the outside world of usage, is accepted as sound which makes meaning comprehended. But since sound disappears quickly, and also since sound is simply the quality of word (śabda-guṇa), sound cannot only not be accepted as nitya 'eternal, permanent,' it cannot be accepted as that which expresses meaning. What expresses meaning is the the expressive power of word (śabda-śakti). The locus of this expressive power of word is sphoṭa 'that from which meaning bursts forth.' Identification of words within sentences, and of sounds with bases and affixes makes matters worse because meaning of a sentence, and for that matter of words, is not the sum total of meaning of their constituent units. Furthermore, a concurrent signification of meaning via experience of individual sound segments, and for that matter their combinations brought about by their sequential arrangement, cannot facilitate cognition of meaning. A disappearance of v from vṛkṣaḥ cannot account for the original meaning of vṛkṣaḥ. A switch of y, k, s in yūpaḥ, sūpaḥ and kūpaḥ may not be accepted as a significant variable in the denotation of meaning since it will render ūpaḥ


vacuous.27 If one argues that recall of combinations will be made possible based on experience supported by memory, and hence, combinations of individual sound segments can be accepted as expressive, we will still face difficulties. For, saraḥ and rasaḥ, since they are composed with the same set of individual sound segments, may appear to denote the same meaning. For, memory will furnish an identical set of impressions for sounds which compose these utterances. There is absolutely no one to one correspondence between formal units of sentences, their constituent words, and corresponding units of meaning. We, however, see that a whole is meaningful if its parts are also meaningful. Combinations are meaningful if individuals in combination are also meaningful. A whole of people with eyes is certainly capable of seeing things as the individual does. We also see that a whole does not denote any meaning if its parts do not. A single grain of sesame contains oil so also does a heap of sesame. But individual parts of a chariot do not posses gati 'movement' as the chariot does. Grammarians accept the sphoṭa of indivisible sentence (akhaṇḍa vākya-sphoṭa) as principal. Grammarians, at least for heuristic and analytic reasons, accept the sphoṭa of component parts of sentences. In all practicality, the grammar of the three sages analyzes utterances of the Sanskrit language as an expression in sound of the word-on-mind (buddhyārūḍha-śabda) of the speaker guided by his intent to speak (vivakṣā). The domain of grammar encompasses infinite utterances of the language from dhvani to sphoṭa. Study of meaning, and for that matter its cognition, falls outside of the scope of grammar. Grammar is limited to lakṣya ‘usage’ and laksaṇa ‘rules.’28

4. The Prakriyā textskaumudī yady āyāti vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ /kaumudī yadi nāyāti vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ // The Rūpāvatāraḥ of Dharmakīrti (11 AD) is considered the first in the

prakriyā ‘derivation’ tradition of the grammar. This tradition of applied texts focused on derivations, and to a larger extent, claimed to be relatively easier to comprehend. This ease of comprehension was brought about by rearranging the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī and thereby limiting their corpus to varying lengths with placement of blocks of rules in the order of a functional hierarchy most conducive to grammatical pedagogy. Rūpāvatāraḥ discusses only 2, 664 rules, where its focus shifts from details of interpretation to rule application and types of derivation. The notion of prakaraṇa ‘context‘ which Pāṇini developed, and which guided him in placement of his rules in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, was modified. A prakaraṇa in Pāiṇini was conceived in view of physical placement of rules, their application and interpretation, especially as it related to context sharing


(ekavākyatā) among rules. The prakriyā statements were not worded like vṛttis. They were worded more for facilitating rule-application and less for guidance in interpretation. Paraphrases were offered such that the operational context of a rule was easily understood. This, with exception to the vṛtti of the SK of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in many ways ended up compromising with the precise interpretation of rules. The Rūpāvatāraḥ consists of two parts, the first divided into ten avatāras ‘manifestations‘: saṃjñā ‘technical terms‘, saṃhitā ‘close proximity between sounds‘,vibhakti ‘inflectional endings‘, avyaya ‘indeclinable‘, strīpratyaya ‘feminine affixes‘, kāraka, samāsa ‘compounds‘, and taddhita ‘secondary suffixes‘. The second part of Rūpāvatāraḥ has three major divisions (paricchedas): sārvadhātuka (3.4.13 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam), ārdhadhātuka (3.4.114 ārdhadhātukaṃ śeṣaḥ), and kṛt (3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ). Each division is further classified into sections (prakaraṇas). The entire second part is presented under the general title of dhātupratyayapañcikā.

Rāmacandra (AD 14) by his prakriyākaumudī (PK) brought some respectability to this new arrangement of rules and some serious focus to its pedagogical purpose. It not only standardized the format of prakriyā texts, but also served as a link between the old school of grammar (prācīna-vyākaraṇa) and the new (navya-vyākaraṇa). It borrowed from the other schools of grammar, and was heavily influenced by the Kāśikāvṛtti. The number of sūtras in the PK was far greater than the number of sūtras in the Rūpāvatāraḥ. It thus comes as no surprise when Rāmacandra accepts:

ānantyāt sarvaśabdā hi na śakyante’ nuśāsitum /bālavyutpattaye’ smābhiḥ saṃkṣipyoktā yathāmatiḥ //‘because they are infinite in number, all words could possibly not be instructed; (hence) they have been discussed by me in summary, as I see fit for the benefit of making beginners conversant (in grammar)' Rāmacandra (AD 17), similarly to Dharmakīrti, focuses primarily on sūtras

dealing with the classical language. However, he has a small section at the end dealing with prakriyā in the Vedic. Additionally, many Vedic rules have been included elsewhere in accord with contextual needs. The division of sections is also elaborate but does not vary in substance from the Rūpāvatāraḥ. Rāmacandra does not follow the arrangement of Rūpāvatāraḥ when it comes to dealing with derivations of forms ending in affixes denoted by the term tiṄ (3.4.77-78 lasya-tiptasjhi...). He discusses verbal paradigms with reference to group of roots (gaṇa) and whether they are marked for endings termed ātmanepada, parasmaipada, or both. This arrangement became standard for later prakriyā texts. Rāmacandra takes a lot for granted. His explanations of sūtras are very brief and his statements concerning context of a sūtra, or its


application, is still briefer. His examples are limited in number and when discussing derivations, he considers many details understood. However, Rāmacandra‘s organization is very good. It was a lack of explanatory details plus influence of other grammatical systems which subjected Rāmacandra to severe criticism by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. The PK was saved from still more criticism with help from of its commentary Prasāda of Viṭṭhala, a grandson of Rāmacandra. The PK, even though harshly criticized for some of its interpretations, became the standard text for the Siddhāntakaumūdī (SK) of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (AD 1590). The Pāṇinian tradition had to wait for Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita who, by his Siddhāntakaumudī (SK), not only brought perfection to the prakriyā tradition but also established the SK as a theoretical marvel. A marvel that rooted out all competition and brought the Pāṇinian tradition to a full circle. Bhaṭṭoji had an eye for meticulous details. He accepted the authority (prāmāṇya) of the three sages (munitrayī), especially of Patañjali, though his work has greatly benefited from the Kāśikā-vṛtti and Rāmacandra‘s Prakriyākaumudī. Bhaṭṭoji successfully tried to include practically everything essential for understanding the sūtras. His treatment of the sūtras is very brief, but very insightful, precise yet thorough and comprehensive. Unlike the Rūpāvatāraḥ and PK, he includes all the sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. If one rearranges his treatment of sūtras in the Pāṇinian order and edits some remarks to fit in places, one can arrive at a vṛtti which far exceeds in quality than all other vṛtti and prakriyā texts combined. Bhaṭṭoji not only accepts the authority of Patañjali but also vigorously defends his final conclusions against views expressed by post Patañjalian commentators.

Bhaṭṭtoji has organized his SK in two parts (Sharma, 2001:26-27): his first part deals with sandhi, samāsa and affixes introduced by rules of books four and five of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. He introduces a new section of interpretive rules after the saṃjñā 'names' section of rules. He similarly introduces one new section of prakṛtibhāva ‘non-sandhi‘ after sandhi and two new sections of sarva-samāsaśeṣa ‘residual domain of compounds‘ and samāsāśrayavidhi ‘operations with compounds as substratum’, after the description of samāsa. Bhaṭṭoji also includes separate sections for treatment of Vedic accent, as well as the accent of affixes, compounds and roots. What is surprising is his inclusion of two sections, one dealing with the uṇādi affixes and the other dealing with the Phiṭsūtras. Since the SK treats all rules of Pāṇini, his treatment of the taddhita affixes is also very elaborate. The fact that Bhaṭṭoji interrupts his treatment of the kṛt (3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ) affixes with his description of the uṇādi affixes is most surprising. They are not related to verbal derivatives only. Why did he not put them right after the taddhita section. Locating the Phiṭsūtras close to sections dealing with accent is not out of place.


Bhaṭṭoji, in the second part of his SK, proceeds with description of verbal paradigms arranged in accord with classification of roots in ten groups (gaṇa). This is in consonance with Rāmacandra’s procedures, though Bhaṭṭoji offers a very comprehensive description. He provides nearly every significant detail ranging from classification of roots to their meanings and paradigmatic forms. A discussion of rules dealing with the causal affix (ṆiC), desiderative (SaN), intensive (yaṄ), deletion of yaṄ (yaṅluk) and denominatives (nāmadhātu) follows. Bhaṭṭoji then brings up the discussion of active (ātmanepada) and middle (parasmaipada) verbal inflectional endings. The presentation of impersonal (bhāva), passive and reflexives follows. Since affixes denoted by the abbreviation tiṄ are replacements of LA-affixes, rules dealing with placement of tiṄ in consonance with description of LA-affixes is offered. The SK draws its examples from traditional sources which also include the Mahābhāṣya and Kāśikā. Most of his examples are presented in their modified forms in tune with classical literary sources. He also follows PK in relating his examples to Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa. Thus, he cites kṛṣṇāya tiṣṭhate gopī ’the gopī waits for Kṛṣṇa’ parallel to the Kāśikā’s tiṣṭhate kanyā chātrebhyaḥ ’the girl waits for the students’.

It has been stated that Rūpāvatāraḥ, Prakriyākaumudī and Siddhāntakaumudī all shared the goal of presenting the description of the sūtrapāṭha of Pāṇini as it facilitated proper understanding of the process of derivation (prakriyā). Bhaṭṭoji went far beyond accomplishing this goal. His SK enjoyed immense respect and popularity. He himself wrote a commentary on the SK under the title Prauḍhamanoramā. Yet another commentary was written by Vāsudeva Dīkṣita (AD 18). Jñānedra Sarasvatī, subsequently, wrote a very fine commentary on Prauḍhamanoramā under the title of Tattvabodhinī. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa wrote his commentary on the the kārikā verses of Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta under the title of Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra. The Śabdenduśekhara, both long (bṛhat) and short (laghu), are two very learned commentaries on the SK by Nāgeśabhaṭṭa (AD 18), one of the last of giants in the great tradition of Pāṇini. The Laghukaumudī of Varadarāja (AD 1620) is a short (laghu) text considered the last in the great prakriyā tradition. It is primarily intended for beginners so that they can understand grammar with ease.

Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's brilliant explanations of the grammatical tradition of the trimuni 'three sages' established him as the muni 'sage' of the new school of grammar (navya-vyākaraṇa). In addition to the SK, he also authored Śabdakaustubha, after carefully studying the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. He not only considered the sūtras which were discussed by Patañjali but also considered those which were devoured by the proverbial she-goat (ajābhakṣita). That is , those which were not commented upon by Patañjali. The


Vaiyākaraṇa-sidhānta-kaumudī represents the pinnacle of excellence of grammatical knowledge. Note that the Bhattoji has not only collected all the sūtra, vārttika, iṣṭi, gaṇa-sūtra, etc., deemed necessary for proper interpretation of the sūtras of Pāṇini, but has also shown their justification(aucitya). A single sentence expression of excellence of SK could be: the vṛtti of SK under each sūtra packs the principle which Patañjali arrives at by careful analysis of a sūtra. It is because of this excellence that the Kaumudī (SK) is held in highest esteem by the neo-grammarians:

kaumudī yady āyāti vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ /kaumudī yadi nāyāti vṛthā bhāṣye pariśramaḥ //'it is futile to work hard on the bhāṣya if one understands the kaumūdī; it is (equally) futile to work hard on the bhāṣya if one does not understand the kaumudī'Let us consider some examples:The vṛtti of rule 1.1.11 īdūdeddvivacanaṃ pragṛhyam reads īd-ūd-ed-

antaṃ pragṛhyaṃ syāt 'let that which ends in ī T, ūT and eT be termed pragṛhya' . The examples are: harī etau / viṣṇū imau. What ends in ī here is the ī of harī, made possible by vyapadeśivadbhāva 'treatment of secondary (final -ī) as principal (the ī which ends in -ī )'; what is dual is also the ī itself, made possible by pūrvāntavadbhāva 'treatment as final of what precedes.' That is, we get har(i + au → ī) = harī via homogeneous long replacement similar to the preceding -i (pūrva-savarṇa-dīrgha). This same way we will call the -ū of viṣṇū as the dual ending in ū. In the earlier case we cannot identify hari as ending in ī because it cannot be called dual (dvivacana). Although based on the interpretive convention of pratyaya grahaṇe tadantā grāhyāḥ 'a specification made with an affix should be taken to mean as 'ending in that affix,' the word dvivacanapratyaya should mean 'that which ends in an affix with the signification of the dual,' dvivacana will not be interpreted here as meaning 'ending in an affix with the signification of the dual.' For, the assignment of the term pragṛhya is here made on the basis of the indicator, 'saṃjñāvidhau pratyayagrahaṇe tadantagrahaṇan nāsti 'if a specification is made with a pratyaya in the context of an operation relating to assignment of a name, the affix is not interpreted as referring to that which ends in the affix.' If it was possible, harī of the earlier example could have been easily treated as not only ending in ī but also ending in the dual. For, ī is dual based on its treatment as final of the preceding (pūrvāntavadbhāva). It is contexts such as these that grammarians of the new school emphasize on memorization, and recall (upasthiti), of the vṛtti of Baṭṭoji Dīkṣita under each sūtra.

Bhaṭṭoji also has a penchant for citing even shorter forms of Pāṇinian sūtras. Consider ako' ki dīrghaḥ 'long in place of a vowel denoted by the


abbreviatory term aK when another denoted by aK follows,' which he offers as the 'better said (suvacam)' version 6.1.101 akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ. He intends to explain that given dadhi + atta, etc., there would not be any homogeneous long replacement (savarṇa-dīrgha-ādeśa), especially when yathāsaṃkhya is brought for paraphrase. For, in the yathāsaṃkhya 'assignment of equivalence in the order of enumeration' interpretation, we will get the long replacement when -i follows. Note that there are 30 kinds of ṛ, i.e., 18 of ṛ and 12 of ḷ, all termed savarṇa 'homogeneous.' Thus, ṛ when followed by ḷ, for example in hotṛ ḷkāraḥ, will yield a replacement in long (dīrgha).There will not be a long replacement for ī and ś even when one assigns the term savarṇa to ī with ś, against the negation of 1.1.10 nājj halau. For, even though i is savarṇa with ś, ś cannot be part of the denotation of aK. If the ś was the savarṇa with the short -i, it would have become part of the denotation of aK. If the sūtra is kept as formulated, i.e., akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ, the long replacement cannot be blocked in harī śayāte, without the anuvṛtti of aci 'when a vowel denoted by aC follows.'

Bhaṭṭoji offers some brilliant resolutions to contexts where a sūtra cannot apply even when the application of the same is made available. Consider why 8.4.45 yaro' nunāsike' nunāsiko vā cannot apply to caturmukhaḥ 'he who has four faces.' He states: sthānaprayatnābhyām antaratame sparśe caritārthe vidhir iyam rephe na pravartate 'since this operation has found its justification with application to stops most proximate in view of place and manner of articulation, it does not apply in the context of repha (r).' This rule applies to contexts of etan murāriḥ and etad murāriḥ where a stop has to be replaced with a nasal. It does not aply when the -r in caturmukha has to be replaced with a nasal. For, there are two kinds of items to be replaced by a replacement in anunāsika 'nasal': sparśa 'stops and nasals beginning with the k-series to the p-series); and sparśetara 'those which are other than sparśa.' A replacement in anunāsika, for example in place of -d will be -n). In these instances the sthāna 'place of articulation' and prayatna 'manner of articulation' of the item which is replaced (sthānī; for example -d) and the item which replaces (ādeśa; for example -n), both, will be the same. If the context of replacement relates to any sound other than sparśa (for example where one has to replace -r with -ṇ) only the place, i.e., mūrdhā 'cacumina,' will be the same, and not the manner of articulation. One can still argue here for application of the sūtra based on its formulation which, in turn, qualifies it for application. On this Dīkṣita could say that: if the item to be replaced is most proximate (antaratama) as against simply an item for replacement (sthānī; for example -r), the replacement must come in place of the most proximate. This is what is indicated with the reading of antaratame in sthāne' ntaratame, the locative ending reading. It is stated that the saṃhitā


recitation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is like1.1.50 sthāne' ntaratamaḥ uraṇraparaḥ. Thus, sthāne' taratamaḥ uraṇ raparaḥ and sthāne' ntaratame uraṇ raparaḥ both readings are correct. The meaning with the locative ending reading of sthānentaratame will be: a replacement comes in place of the item which is most proximate.' We will thus get a replacement in place of sparśa, etc., and not in place of repha (r).

It is stated that Bhaṭṭoji has brought together all rules related to a single context in one place, facilitating their comprehension all at once. There are other examples similar to caturmukhaḥ. Consider for example bhavatāt where, since tātAṄ is marked with Ṅ as an it, it should come as a replacement in place of the final sound segment (antyādeśa). But total replacement (sarvādeśa) of -tu by tātAṄ wins application because of consisting of more than one sound segment (anekāltvāt). For, the general provision of 'consisting of more than one sound segment, and being marked with Ś as an it (anekālśit)' and its corresponding exception (apavāda; 1.1.52 alo' ntyasya ) have become equal in strength (samabala 'equal in strength'). It is interesting to note here that the question of equal strength does not arise in the context of a general and its related particular. For, a general rule applies leaving aside the scope of application of its related particular. The question of samabala 'equal strength' arises in the context of rules which enjoy their scope of application elsewhere (anyatra). But in that case a subsequent rule wins scope of application based on vipratiṣedha 'conflict of equal strength where the rule which is subsequent in order of enumeration wins' (1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam). While the SK presented a very brilliant explanation of rules and process of derivation, it no doubt dealt some serious blow to the genius of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, especially to its mechanism whereby reconstruction of a single (sentence) context (ekavākyatā) of rules scattered all over the grammar was accomplished. By rearranging the Pāṇinian rules, the SK, though with a very noble goal, ended up ignoring the very fine mechanism of derivation Pāṇini so meticulously established. Nevertheless, the SK of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is brilliant, and hence, it became the primary text for studying grammar in the traditional circles.


5. The Siddhānta textsanādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram /

vivartato' rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ // (VP I :1)

A. Śabda and Śabda-brahmanIt has been stated that the siddānta texts accept the theoretical constructs

(siddhānta) of Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, and then explain, elucidate them as established view. They have generally addressed issues with focus on śabda 'word,' artha 'meaning' and śabdārtha-sambandha 'relation of word and meaning.' Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīyam is a text which goes far beyond the realm of grammar. It establishes śabda-tattva 'word-principle' as brahman : This anādi-nidhana brahman is kūṭastha-nitya 'eternal fixed,' and avicālī 'never moving' and avikārī 'not subject to modification.' I have already mentioned this view of the eternal (nitya). The Veda is the primary vivarta 'manifestation' of Brahman, and it is also its first imitation (anukāra) . One can also say that the Veda is pratipādaka 'the manifest' and the brahman is pratipādya 'that which is made manifest.' The idea of Brahman and Śabda-brahman is not based on any difference (bheda) between the two:

prāptyupāyo' nukāraś ca tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ /eko' pyanekavartmeva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak // (VP I:5)This kārikā verse implies that as practice of dāna 'giving,' and conduct

with tapas 'austerity' and brahmacarya 'celibacy' facilitates abhyudaya 'auspicious rise,' that same way one attains brahma with cleansing of mind attained by studying the Veda and by following a conduct approved by the Veda. The brahman of the Vedāntin can thus be attained by means of the Veda. Further, bṛhatvāt bṛṃhaṇatvāc ca ātmā brahmeti gīyate 'because of being pervasive and also because it receives growth in many different ways, the ātman itself is called brahman.' Note that brahman is kūṭastha-nitya 'eternally fixed,' as against ātman which, identified with brahman as its manifestation, is bounded within time and space. It still is nitya 'eternal' but in the flow of time and space (pravāha-nitya). When this same brahman of the ātman is made manifest by articulated sounds it is called the śabda-brahman 'word, the supreme,' not any different from the brahman of the Vedāntin. Grammarians accept that an utterance expresses its meaning only when abstracted as entities different from their counterparts rendered in the form of dhvani. Thus, the word gauḥ is expressed by its word-form (dhvani) g-au-ḥ to cognition of the substance (meaning), gau, qualified with dew-lap, etc. We thus see that there is a word indivisible which expresses itself in the form of dhvani. This is the word which


becomes buddhyārūḍha when the speaker has the intent to speak (vivakṣā). This is the word which splits into two: primary word and its sound counterpart. It is the sound counterpart of an utterance which is expressed in the form of dhvani. There is a further split into two at the time of sphoṭa when the sound counterpart of the primary word splits into its form and meaning. It is the bursting forth of the locus of power of word in the form of dhvani which thereby makes the meaning manifest. Sphoṭa by way of its serving as locus of power of word expressed by dhvani is thus the primary source for cognition of meaning.This description of buddhyārūḍha-śabda, sphoṭa, pratibhā and cognition of meaning (artha-sampratyaya) necessarily gives the impression of a process. Accepting it as a process may also imply some sort of a sequence. Grammarians accept sphoṭa as a flash of meaning and hence with no sequence. It is pratibhā which enjoys the status of prime instrumentality in cognition of meaning.

B. PratibhāGrammarians use pratibhā as vākyārtha 'meaning of a sentence.' This

comes about as a result of articulation of the words of a sentence. It is thus stated:

vicchedagrahaṇe' rthānāṃ pratibhā' nyaiva jāyate /vākyārtham iti tām āhuḥ padārthair upapāditām // VP I:43//It is stated that when a sentence is articulated, meanings of individual

words ending in sUP and tiṄ appear separately. With these individual meanings brought forth separately, appears a special kind of perception (buddhi) which is called pratibhā. There are two phrases in the above kārikā, namely pratibhā' nyaiva and padārthair upapāditām, which need special attention. That is, pratibhā is nothing but perception, or a particular kind of intellect. It has been characterized with idantvena 'in this way' or tantvena ' in that way,' and anākhyeya 'not explainable.' But it has been established by pratyātmavṛtti. That is, after hearing the same sentence different kind of pratibhā would arise in the mind, or in the opinion of the naiyāyikas, in the ātman of listeners. But this pratibhā could not be correctly described by the agent (kartṛ), i.e., the listener (śrotṛ), or the experiencing person. This is similar to the experience of sweetness (mādhurya) of grapes (drākṣā), or molasses (guḍa), which cannot be exactly described. They all say that those things are sweet (madhura). This same applies to pratibhā which can be experienced but which cannot be explained to others. Since meanings of individual words first appears separately, and then pratibhā perceives them as unified into one, we can say that pratibhā unites the meaning of individual words. This pratibhā can also be viewed as constituting the scope of signification of individual word meanings. For, it is brought about by


separate appearance of individual meanings and is thus established in every sentence in the form of all sentential meanings (sarva-vākyārtha-svarūpatā; kārikā 145). The sphoṭa which facilitates cognition of meaning and which is made manifest by dhvani is generally recognized as consisting of eight kinds:29 (i) varṇa-sphoṭa, (ii) pada-sphoṭa, (iii) akhaṇḍa-pada-sphoṭa, (iv) vākya-sphoṭa, (v) akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa, (vi) varaṇa-jāti-sphoṭa, (vii) pada-jāti-sphoṭa, and (viii) vākya-jāti-sphoṭa. These eight types of sphoṭa are based primarily on the notion that individual sound segments and any whole brought about by their combination are meaningful. But since sounds occur in a sequence and they quickly disappear, cognition of meaning bursting forth from a flash of sphoṭa with no sequence is hard to accept. This same is in many ways true of any divisible whole brought about by combination of sounds. A concurrent signification of meaning, via experiences of individual sound segments, and for that matter of their conglomeration, is thus not possible. Mostly because of non-disappearance (anivartakatā) of mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) among units of sounds and words that the akhaṇḍa-sphoṭa 'a whole with no part' of a vākya qualified with class properties (jāti) is considered principal (mukhya) and real (vāstavika). All other types of sphoṭas are considered imagined (kalpita) and unreal (avāstavika). They have been accepted for the express purpose of carrying out the processes of grammar. I must, however, mention yet another two-way classification of sphoṭa as nirāvaraṇa (external) and sāvaraṇa (internal). The first can be recognized as the cidrūpa-brahma, the supreme with the form of pure intelligence. That is, he by whose illumination this all gets illuminated (tasya bhāsā sarvam idaṃ vibhāti ). The sphoṭa-tatva parallel to parāvāk is often characterized as nirāvaraṇa. The sphoṭa-tatva parallel to paśyantī and madhyamā, etc., is characterized as sāvaraṇa-sphoṭa.

Cognition of meaning is directly related with expression of reality via linguistic usage. It has been observed that language is not always competent to fully express reality. Contrarily, language also expresses non-reality. A clear view of reality is always obstructed by what is commonly known as avidyā ’ignorance’. A true cognition of meaning should not only be entrusted with mind and intelligence (buddhi) but must also be free of errors. A true cognition, in this sense, is noumenal. A phenomenal perception may ultimately, through series of errors, lead to true cognition. Bhartṛhari shows how a series of errors leave progressively clearer saṃskāras which, in turn, lead to true cognition. One may mistakenly assume a rope to be a serpent. A single negation in the form of ’this is not a snake’ can remove illusion for some. But a similar illusion where a tree is taken for an elephant can be removed through a series of errors of perceptions. The object of perception in these series of errors will always be the tree. The eye


will be constantly perceiving the tree as an elephant. When one gets very close to the tree the object of perception and the form of the object of error will become one. There is no error and the true cognition (yathārtha-jñāna) of tree has thus been accomplished. Each error in the series of perceptions leaves a progressively clearer perception. Recall here that a reduction in distance cannot be accepted as the cause of true cognition. For, even at a distance, though with greater concentration, a person can accomplish true cognition of tree. Cognition of meaning via sphoṭa can also be likened to the idea of progressively clearer residual impressions of saṃskāras. It must, however, be noted that sphoṭa is a uniquely singular indivisible entity with no sequence. It strikes as a flash of meaning and travels with the speed of sound. It is instantaneous in all aspects (Sharma, forthcoming).

II: Domain, Recurrence and Reference Page 43

II: Domain, Recurrence and Referencena videśasthamiti kṛtvato nānāvākyaṃ bhavati /

videśastham iti sad ekavākyaṃ bhavati /Mahābhāṣya (II:178)

1. Rules and OperationsThe Aṣṭādhyāyī is a system (śāstra) of nearly four thousand rules (sūtra),

distributed over eight books with four quarters (pāda) each. Since rules are structured with utmost brevity and algebraic condensation, and also since the explicitness condition of their formulation demands clarity and no confusion, Pāṇini chose to present them within the frame-work of a meta-linguistic theory most conducive to their interpretation and application. He not only formulated his rules with terms and symbols, but also furnished them with some interpretive conventions whereby, with systematic application of rules, one would present a formal analysis of correct Sanskrit usage. It has been stated that grammar focuses on correct usage of the language, and with the technique of anyvaya and vyatireka, extracts padas 'words' from utterances. A system of rules and operations are then formulated for analysis of those words by imagining bases, affixes and subsequent operations, thereby accomplishing their derivation (niṣpatti). Grammar thus becomes a system (śāstra) of rules (lakṣaṇa) whose goal is to fully understand correct usage (lakṣya).

Rules of grammar have been likened to rain clouds which shower indiscriminately over land and water, both (parjanyavat lakṣaṇāni bhavanti). However, this is the reality of the outside world. Here in the inside world of grammar rules must be formulated with their clearly defined scope of application so that they can capture the reality of usage. It is with this idea in mind that Paṇini formulates general (utsarga) rules tied in with related particulars (viśeṣa) and residuals (śeṣa). Next he formulates rules which offer related options (vikalpa), and make relevant negative (niṣedha), restrictive (niyama) or extensional (atideśa) provisions. It is in this sense that grammar, in the Pāṇinian parlance, is considered a set of rules (lakṣaṇa) which, with their application to a network of utterances with imagined constituency of specific bases and affixes, lead to the derivation of correct words (lakṣya).

Rules are generally operational (vidhi) in nature. Since Pāṇini formulates them with reference to a meta-theory, he could not afford not to formulate rules which assign names (saṃñā) to forms (śabda-rūpa) and offer their interpretation, along with interpretation also of rules and their function. Rules which assign names (saṃjñā), offer interpretive conventions (paribhāṣā), and make restrictive

II: Domain, Recurrence and Reference

(niyama) or extensional (atideśa) provisions, facilitate application of operational rules. A summary list of rule types is as follows:

(i) A heading (adhikāra) rule serves as heading of a domain and interior domain in the sense that it carries over either in its entirely, or in part, to lower level rules of its domain or interior domain. Consider 3.1.93 dhātoḥ which is to be carried over to all rules of its domain (up to the end of the third adhyāya, and including 3.4.117 chandasy ubhayathā) for their proper interpretation.

(ii) A technical rule assigns a name (saṃjñā) to some grammatical entity. Consider 1.1.1 vṛddhir ādaic and 1.1.2 adeṅ guṇaḥ which assign the names vṛddhi and guṇa to the two sets of vowels ā, ai, au and a, e, o, in this order. Pāṇini assigns nearly one hundred technical terms (saṃjñā), either to a linguistic form (śabda-rūpa), its meaning (artha), or to a sound quality (dhvani-guṇa).

(iii) A rule of interpretation (paribhāṣā) regulates proper interpretation of a given rule or application. Consider 1.1.3 iko guṇavṛddhī which explains that whenever a replacement operation is specified with the express use of the term guṇa and vṛddhi, replacements must come in place of a vowel denoted by the abbreviated term iK (i, u, ṛ, ḷ). The tradition, in addition to these, also accepts quite a few interpretive conventions which were implicitly assumed (jñāpaka-siddha) by Pāṇini, or were accepted based on norms of the outside world of usage (nyāya-siddha). The Paribhāṣendu-śekhara (PŚ) of Nāgeśa is an important text for reference.

(iv) A rule of operation (vidhi) directs an operation to be performed on an input. Consider 6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci which orders a replacement denoted by the abbreviate term yaṆ (y, v, r, l) in place of an iK (i, u, ṛ, ḷ) when a vowel (aC) follows.

(v) A niyama rule attaches some restrictive provision to the scope of application of a given rule. Consider 1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā which restricts the assignment of a single name to an entity in the domain of eka-saṃjñā (1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā, through 2.3.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye). Note that class-inclusion (saṃjñā-samāverśa) of technical names is the norm, elsewhere.

(vi) A pratiṣedha 'negation' rule counters an otherwise positive provision made by a rule of grammar. Consider 1.1.29 na bahuvrīhau which negates the assignment of the term sarvanāman to items listed in the group headed by sarva 'all,' etc., when combined in a bahuvrīhi compound. This rule thus negates the positive provision made by rule 1.1.27 sarvādīni sarvanāmāni. There are two kinds of negations: prasajya-pratiṣedha where the negative is construed with the verb, yielding absolute negation; and paryudāsa where the negative is construed with the noun yielding a negation with the meaning of similar to but different from (tadbhinna-tatsaṛdśa). Consider abrāhmaṇa which could be interpreted to mean


either 'not a brāhmaṇa, at all,' or someone similar to but different from a brāhmaṇa, for example a kṣatriya.

(vii) An atideśa 'extension' rule transfers a certain property to the application of a rule which it previously did not have. An extensional rule generally widens the scope of application of a definitional or operational rule. An atideśa where affix vatI is explicitly stated is called śrutātideśa, as against arthātideśa where sense of extensional vatI is inferred. For, example consider 1.2.5 asaṃyogāl liṭ kit which transfers the property of being a Kit 'marked with K as an it ' to a non-Kit replacement of LIṬ, initially not marked with P as an it (Pit). This is an extensional provision made for a named item, and thus is called saṃjñātideśa. An atideśa which applies to a sthānī 'item to be replaced,' for example of rule 1.1.56 sthānivad ādeśo' nalvidhau, is called sthānyātideśa. Similarly, the extensional provision of 1.2.51 lupi yuktavad vyaktivacane whereby similar status is extended is called yuktātideśa. Extensional rules are further classified into two categories of kāryātideśa (1.1.21 ādyantavad ekasmin) and rūpātideśa (1.1.59 dvirvacane' ci) whereby either a function, or a form, is extended to the scope of application of a rule. Four general categories are also recognized as śāstrātideśa 'extension of rule; 4.2.34 kālebhyo bhavavat),' tādātmyātideśa 'extension of identity; 2.1.2 sub āmantrite parāṅgavat svare),' nimittātideśa 'extension of condition; 1.3.62 pūrvavat sanaḥ)' and vyapadeśātideśa 'extension of designation; 1.1.21 ādyantavad ekasmin).'

(viii) A rule which offers options is termed vibhāṣā 'option' (1.1.4 na veti vibhāṣā). The tradition recognizes three kinds of options: prāpta 'that which is made available; 1.3.77 vibhāṣopapadena pratīyamāne), aprāpta 'that which is not made available;1.2.3 vibhāṣorṇoḥ)' and prāptāprāpta 'fixed; that which is made available, and not made available, both; 6.1.30 vibhāṣā śveḥ).'

(ix) A rule which provides forms as derived, with no indication of their derivation by way of bases, affixes and rule applications is called nipātana (3.2.26 phalegrahirātmambhariś ca). There are three goals which nipātana rules accomplish: aprāptiprāpaṇa, providing something not made available by any other rule; prāpti-vāraṇa 'blocking something which is made available,' and adhikārtha-vivakṣā, indicating something additional.' The function of an operational rule is to facilitate derivation with its application.

Operations can be generally recognized as follows:(1) Placement of an affix (pratyaya), whereby an affix is introduced after a

base at the beginning of a derivation. Consider 3.1.91 dhātoḥ (read with 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.2 paraś ca, 3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca and 3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau) and 3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ, whereby affix LAṬ is introduced after a verbal root when the action is located at the current time. Note that pañcamī 'ablative,' for


example in dhātoḥ of 3.1.91, generally forms the left condition of placement operations. Rule 3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham specifies the cooccurrence condition under which an affix could be introduced after a verbal root (dhātoḥ). In addition to 3.1.93 dhātoḥ, there are two other rules which specify bases for placement of an affix:

(i) 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt whereby an affix is introduced after a nominal stem, or after a form which ends in the feminine affixes (4.1.3 striyām) marked with Ṅī and āP (ṄīP, ṄīṢ, ṄīN; ṬāP, CāP, ḌāP) and

(ii) 4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā whereby a taddhita (4.1.76 taddhitāḥ) affix is introduced after first among syntactically related words (pada). Affixes introduced after these bases can be called placement affixes.

(2) Addition (vikaraṇa), whereby an affix is introduced under the left condition of a root with the right condition of an affix. Consider the introduction of ŚaP (3.1.68 kartari śap) after a verbal root when a sārvadhātuka affix (3.1.113 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam) with the denotation of agent (kartari) follows (3.1.67 sārvadhātuke). Also consider 3.1.69 divādibhyaḥ śyan (ŚyaN), 3.1.73 svādibhyaḥ śnuḥ (Śnu), 3.1.77 tudādibhyaḥ śaḥ (Śa), 3.1.78 rudhādibhyaḥ śnam (ŚnaM), 3.1.79 tanādikṛñbhyaḥ uḥ (u) and 3.1.81 kryādibhyaḥ śnāḥ (Śnā) and 3.1.86 liṅyāśiṣy aṅ (aṄ). Introduction of all formal elements made after the base (prakṛti), and before the placement affix, can be considered part of this process of addition. One may also include additions made to a string at the stage of aṅga (1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi prtytyaye' ṅgam). Consider 6.1.71 hrasvasya pitikṛti tuk, 7.1.47 ktvo yak, 7.1.50 ājj aser asuk, 7.1.52 āmi sarvanāmnaḥ suṭ, 7.1.54 hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ and 7.1.58 idito num dhātoḥ, whereby tUK, yaK, asUK, sUṬ, nUṬ and nUM are introduced as augments. Doubling (6.4.1 ekāco dve prathamasya) and iteration (8.1.1 sarvasya dve) can also be recognized as addition. However, they come late in the derivational process.

(3) Replacement (ādeśa) is a major operation whereby a linguistic form can be replaced, in part or whole, by another which also includes zero. This operation is carried out with clear understanding of what is replaced (sthānin) and what comes as a replacement (ādeśa). That which is to be replaced is generally marked with the genitive (ṣaṣṭhī; 1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā ). The replacement itself is marked with the nominative. The right condition of replacement is generally locative (saptamī; 1.1.66 tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya). Consider ikaḥ yaṇ aci = iK 6/1 yaṆ 1/1 aC 7/1 where 6/1 is genitive singular, and 7/1 locative singular. This could also be represented as a rewrite rule: iK→yaṆ / aC 'let iK be replaced with yaṆ in the environment of aC'


A replacement could be ordered for a linguistic form, for example, a base, affix, sound, or a vocalic sequence. Rule 1.3.10 yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām and 1.1.50 sthāne' ntaratamaḥ guide selection of equivalent replacement for item to be replaced. The first rule applies to items offered in two sets of equal number. The equivalence here is to be determined based on order of enumeration of items in the sets. Rule 1.1.50 sthāne' ntaratamaḥ requires a replacement (ādeśa) to be most similar to what it replaces (sthānin).This close similarity is identified as close similarity in meaning (arthakṛt), sthānakṛta 'place of articulation' and sound quality (guṇakṛt). An operation, in the process of derivation, could also be found internally (antaraṅga) or externally (bahiraṅga) conditioned. An internally conditioned operation is preferred for application against one which is externally conditioned. It should be noted that replacement operations also cover what is generally known as modification (vikāra).

(4) Deletion (LOPA) can also be treated as replacement, total (sarvādeśa) or partial (ekadeśa). A total replacement can come in place of one, or two items, in the form of a single item or a zero. It is for this reason that LOPA is defined as non-appearance (1.1.60 adarśanaṃ lopaḥ). It can also be used as a cover term for deletion.

Now consider the following rules:1.1.61 pratyayasya lukślulupaḥ1.1.62 pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam1.2.49 luktaddhitaluki1.2.51 lupiyuktavad vyaktivacane2.4.71 supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ2.4.75 juhotyādibhyaḥ śluḥ6.1.10 ślauThe first rule assigns the term LUK, ŚLU and LUP to deletion of an affix

(pratyaya). The third rule limits the scope of deletion by LUK of certain taddhita affixes, and a constituent termed upasarjana of a compound. But the term LUP must be used, instead, for deletion of a taddhita affix whose derivatives retain their original number and gender (yuktavadbhāva). The scope of affixal deletion by LUK is more general. For it applies after leaving aside the scope of application of LUK and ŚLU. Incidentally, ŚLU-deletion is consequential for doubling (dvitva) of 6.1.10 ślau. LUK is generally used for deletion of affixes termed vibhakti. A LOPA-deletion applies after leaving aside the scope of application of deletion by LUK, ŚLU and LUP. These terms are mutually exclusive insofar as deletion with their express use of terms is concerned.


This four-way use of terms of deletion not only clearly marks the general (sāmānya) and particular (viśeṣa) scope of deletion but also serves as a guide for recoverability of deletion. Consider the following two rules in this connection:

1.1.56 sthānivad ādeśo' nalvidhau 'a replacement (ādeśa) is treated as if what it replaced (sthānin), except when an operation entails original sound segments'

1.1.62 pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam 'an operation conditioned by an affix is carried out even when the affix goes through deletion; but not when deletion is accomplished in relation to an aṅga with express mention of terms which contain LU (LUK, ŚLU, LUP ;1.1.63 na lumatāṅgasya)'

(5) it-deletion: An it is a sound, or sequence of two sounds, which is tagged to some word-form introduced in this grammar for the first time (upadeśa). These tagged sounds are termed it, and subsequently made to go through it-deletion of rule 1.3.9 tasya lopaḥ. Consider the following rules:

1.3.2 upadeśe ' j anunāsika it 'a nasalized vowel in upadeśa (first citation) is termed it '

1.3.3 halantyam 'the final consonant (haL) of a form in upadeśa is termed it'

1.3.4 na vibhaktau tusmāḥ 'the final tU (a consonant of the t-series), s, and m of a vibhakti (1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca) in upadeśa, is not termed it '

1.3.5 ādir ñiṭudavaḥ 'the initial ÑI, ṬU and ḌU of a form in upadeśa is termed it '

1.3.6 ṣaḥ pratyayasya 'the initial Ṣ of an affix in upadeśa is termed it '1.3.7 cuṭū 'the initial cU (a consonant of c-series) and ṭU (a consonant of

ṭ-series) of an affix in upadeśa is termed it '1.3.8 laśakv ataddhite 'the initial L, Ś and kU (a consonant of k-series) of

a non-taddhita affix in upadeśa is termed it'1.3.9 tasya lopaḥ 'non-appearance (adarśana) of that which is termed it '

2. Domain, Recurrence and ReferenceIt has been stated that rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī are placed in distribution

over eight chapters (adhyāya) of four quarters (pāda) each. This arrangement of rules is made in accord with contextual relation among rules. A context qualified with general properties would require rules to be placed within a general context. A context qualified with particular properties would similarly require rules to be placed within a particular context. Contexts which may be qualified with residual properties would be considered as remainder of the general context. Placement


of rules in a serial order within the adhyāyas and pādas forms the physical context of rule placement. Patañjali alludes to the functional context of rules when he says that, 'simply because two rules are placed at different places in the grammar it does not mean that they are different; they share a single sentence relationship (ekavākyatā), even though placed at different places.' This establishes a kind of dependency relation among rules. Rules which share such dependency relation can be accepted as forming a functional context.

It is generally agreed that proper understanding of a rule is possible only when one considers the exposition of the learned (PŚ1: vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi sandehād alakṣaṇam). It is in this sense that Pāṇinīyas accept the notion of ekavākyatā 'single sentence-ness' for interpretation of a rule. A rule in its physical context can be interpreted as a single sentence rather easily. To interpret a rule as a single sentence in its functional context is not so easy. For, that rule could not be properly understood unless the single sentence interpretation of its physical context is brought close to its functional context of application. Now consider two interpretive conventions (PŚ2-3) which both are complementary to each other, and which scholars consider operative in the Aṣṭādhyāyī :

(i) yathoddeśaṃ saṃjñā-paribhāṣam(ii) kāryakālaṃ saṃjñāparibhāṣamThese two views about interpretation of technical names (samjñā), and

interpretive conventions (paribhāṣā), are called yathoddeśa 'not going beyond the place where taught' and kāryakāla 'taught at the place where operative.' A student may like to understand a rule, for example 1.1.2 adeṅ guṇaḥ, right at the place where it is taught in the grammar. Some other student may like to understand this rule where, for example, rule 6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ is taught with the use of the term guṇa. He understands 1.1.2 adeṅ guṇaḥ as a rule which assigns the name guṇa to aT and eṄ. He also learns that eṄ, per 1.1.71 ādir antyena sahetā with reference to inventory of sounds listed by the Śiva-sūtra, is an abbreviated symbol used with the denotation of e and o. An understanding of 1.1.70 taparas tatkālasya further explains that a specification made with -t (which I show here with the uppercase T ) denotes duration (kāla) of 'that which is used with T .' He thus understands that guṇa is a name (saṃjñā) assigned to vowels a, e, and o. Rules 1.1.3 iko guṇavṛddhī, 1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā and 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya, similarly teach him that 'a specification made with the genitive (ṣaṣṭhī) means 'in place of' (that which is specified with the genitive),' and 'a specification made with the ablative (pañcamī) means 'after' (that which is specified with the ablative).' In addition, a replacement ordered with express mention of the terms guṇa and vṛddhi must come in place of a vowel denoted by


the abbreviated symbol iK (1.1.3 iko guṇvṛddhī). It is at the time of understanding the function (kārya), and thereby application of rule 6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ, that his saṃskāra 'memory impressions' of understanding 1.1.2 adeṅ guṇaḥ, 1.1.3 iko guṇavṛddhī, 1.1.70 taparas tatkālasya, 1.1.71 ādir antyena sahetā and 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya must be brought close to the context of 6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ, for its proper interpretation and application. The ablative of āT and the term guṇa, must serve as a mark (liṅga) for reconstruction of the full context of this rule by memory so that its application could be accomplished. Note that this rule is put in the domain (adhikāra) of 6.1.72 saṃhitāyām, where saṃhitāyām 7/1, aci 7/1 (6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci) and ekaḥ 1/1 pūrvaparayoḥ 6/1 (6.1.84 ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ) must be carried over to its context. The locative (saptamī ) of aci 7/1 and the genitive dual (ṣaṣṭhī dvivacana) of pūrvaparayoḥ 6/2 must also serve as marks for reconstructing memory impressions of rules 1.1.3 iko guṇavṛddhī, 1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā and tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya. This, in turn, facilitates his full understanding of rule 6.1.87. I now quote single sentence interpretation of this rule from the Kāśikāvṛtti :

avarṇāt paro yo' c aci ca pūrvo yo avarṇaḥ tayoḥ pūrvaparayoḥ avarṇācoḥ sthāne eko guṇādeśo bhavati'a single replacement termed guṇa comes in place of both, the (guṇa) vowel which follows a, and the (guṇa vowel) a which precedes it, within the scope of saṃhitā 'close proximity between sounds'It is clear from the preceding discussion that the two interpretive

conventions, namely yathoddeśa and kāryakāla, are considered operative in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It is important to note in this connection that technical names (saṃjñā) and interpretive conventions (paribhāṣā) are not independent insofar as their function is concerned. They are intended for operational rules placed all over the grammar, and hence, must present themselves close to the context of application (vidhi) of other rules. Haradatta ( Padamañjarī on Kāśikā, under 8. 2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham) has the following verses:

saṃjñāḥ pararthāḥ atyantaṃ paribhāṣāś ca tadvidhāḥ /'samjñā 'names' are always intended for others, and the paribhāṣā 'interpretive conventions' are also this same way;na svātantryeṇa tās tasmāt kāryāvagatihetavaḥ//'they therefore do not make their function known independently;anekasya pradhānasya śeṣabhūtā bhavantv iti /'they then be residual (śeṣa) to many independent ones;etāḥ kevalam ācāryaḥ pṛthagdeśā upādiśat //'the teacher himself taught them at different places'


vidhivākyais tu saṃhatya yatra tatra sthitair api /'having approched the operational rules placed all overbodhayantyaḥ svakāryāṇi naikapūrvāḥ parā imāḥ //'making their function known, these are not one prior to the other which follows'I shall next discuss the yathoddeśa view of interpreting a rule as a single

sentence (ekavākyatā) in the context of its placement in domains. The kāryakāla view of interpreting a rule in its functional context will be discussed under 'Reference to antecedent.'

A. Domain and RecurrenceIt has been stated that rule 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham is responsible for the

two-fold division of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as follows:(I) The sapāda-saptādhyāyī 'rules of the first seven adhyāyas with rules of

the first quarter of adhyāya eight';(II) the tripādī 'rules of the last three quarters of adhyāya eight.' This functional division is accepted because rules of the tripādī are

considered suspended (asiddha) in view of application of rules which precede it within the sapāda-saptādhyāyī. Rules placed subsequently in order within the tripādī are also considered suspended in view of application of rules which precede them in the tripādī . The last domain of rules headed by 8.1.16 padasya not only straddles between the two broader sections of the Aṣṭādhyāyī but also serves as a bridge between the sapāda-saptādhyāyī and the tripādī. The domain of 8.1.16 padasya, which extends all the way up to, and including 8.3.55 apadāntasya mūrdhanyaḥ, covers a fairly substantial number of rules covered by the domain headed by 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham.

The following are major domains of rules in the sapādasaptādhyāyī:(1) The Controlling Domain (CD):All rules beginning with 1.1.1 vṛddhir ādaic through rule 2.2.38 kaḍārāh

karmadhāraye.(1.1.1vṛddhir ādaic... through (1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam...;(1.4.23 kārake -1.4.54 tatprayojakohetuścaḥ)

(2) The domain of Samāsa, vibhakti, and LUK-deletion: (2.1) samāsa (2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ(2.1.3 prāk kaḍārāt samāsaḥ(2.1.4 saha supā...2.2.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye));


(2.3.1 anabhihite - 2.3.73 caturthī -sukhārthahitaiḥ).(3) The Obligatory Domain of affixes (pratyayaḥ ;OD):

{(3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.2 paraś ca,3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca,3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau ...);(3.1.91 dhātoḥ...3.4.117- chandasy ubhayathā);(4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt...(4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...)(4.1.3 striyām – 4.1.75 āvaṭyāc ca)(4.1.76 taddhitāḥ - 5.4.160 niṣpravāṇiś ca)(4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā)))

(4) The Domain of saṃhitā(6.1.72 saṃhitāyāmthrough 6.1.154 pāraskaraprabhṛtīni ca saṃjñāyām)

(5) The Domain of aṅga(6.4.1 aṅgasya (6.4.129 bhasya) 7.4.9 ī ca gaṇaḥ))

(6) Domain of pada (8.1.16 padasya -8.3.55 apadāntasya mūrdhanyaḥ)

(7). The Domain of Suspension (asiddhatva), the tripādī :(8.2.1 pūrvatrasiddham to 8.4.68 a a iti)

It has been stated that a rule (sūtra) or its part (sūtraikadeśa), when marked with svarita, is carried over (anuvartate) to lower level rules for their proper interpretation (1.1.11 svaritenādhikāraḥ). A domain heading would thus be marked with svarita so that it could be carried over to all rules placed within that domain, via process of recurrence (anuvrtti). Individual rules, or their parts, can also be marked with svarita to indicate anuvṛtti. That is, whatever is carried via anuvṛtti is an adhikāra, marked with svarita. It is very difficult to know how far an adhikāra carries, especially since the svarita marks are mostly lost (Mahābhāṣya I:272). Larger adhikāras could be identified by change of an adhyāya, pāda or topic (prakaraṇa). Incompatibility of carried over elements, with those to which they may be carried over to, serves as a good indicator for canceling anuvṛtti. Finally, an element which is carried over with the use of ca 'and' would generally cancel its subsequent anuvṛtti.

Heading rules with terms and symbols used in the nominative (3.1.1 pratyayaḥ; 3.4.1 dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ), ablative (pañcamī; 3.1.91 dhātoḥ; 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt), genitive (ṣaṣṭhī; 6.1.223 samāsasya, 6.4.1 aṅgasya, 6.4.129 bhasya, 8.1.16 padasya) and locative (saptamī; 2.3.1 anabhihite, 3.2.111 anadyatane laṅ, 3.2.84 bhūte, 3.2.1 karmaṇi aṇ, 6.1.72 samhitāyām) are good indicators of domain headings, not only for indicating possibility of rule


application, but also prompting inputs for possible rule application. Patañjali mentions three types of adhikāras: one, like a lamp, though set in one place, illuminates the entire room; another, by means of a ca, is carried to subsequent rules; and a third carries to each and every rule governed by it. This three-way distinction implies that certain adhikāras literally are carried via anuvṛtti, or by means of ca, while others are treated only as though carried. The paribhāṣās such as 1.4.1 ā kaḍārad ekā saṃjñā ,1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam, 2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ , etc., are not carried over.

Haradatta (PM ad Kāś 1.4.23 kārake) mentions six types of adhikāras: name (samjñā), qualifier (viśeṣana), substituend (sthānin), base (prakṛti), condition (nimitta) and substitute (ādeśa). The examples which he cites are: 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 4.2.92 śese, 6.1.84 ekaḥ pūrvaparayoḥ, 4.1.1 ṅyāpprātipadikāt, 6.4.46 ārdhadhātuke and 8.3.35 (apadāntasya) murdhanyaḥ. Four inflectional endings mark these adhikāras: prathamā 'the first nominative,' pañcamī 'the fifth ablative,' ṣaṣṭhī 'the sixth genitive' and saptamī 'the seventh locative'; saṃjñā technical names' and ādeśa 'replacement' are marked with the nominative (prathamā); viśeṣaṇa 'qualifier' and nimitta 'cause, condition' with the locative (saptamī). A genitive (ṣaṣṭhī) generally marks the sthānin 'that which is to be replaced' while prakṛti 'base' is generally marked with the ablative (pañcamī). It should be remembered here that these remarks on adhikāras generally apply to heading rules. Adhikāras function in many ways: they introduce a term (3.1.1 pratyayaḥ), specify a domain (1.4.23 kārake), offer a locally valid interpretation, or define the context of an operation. Consider rules 1.4.56 prāg rīśvarān nipātāḥ, 1.4.83 karmapravacanīyāḥ, 2.1.5 avyayībhāvaḥ, 2.1.22 tatpuruṣaḥ, 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.95 kṛtyāḥ and 4.1.76 taddhitāḥ which assign terms.

The idea of placing rules in domains such that a larger domain of rules contains one or more interior or sub-interior domains is crucial to the system of placement of rules in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Rules within a domain, interior domain, or sub-interior domain, are arranged such that a lower level rule expects a higher level rule to contribute towards its proper interpretation. The process of anuvṛtti is localized within a domain, and is unidirectional. However, there are instances where commentators invoke anuvṛtti of a part of a lower level rule for interpretation of a higher level rule. There are also instances where anuvṛtti skips over a few rules and applies to a rule as needed. This kind of anuvṛtti is called maṇḍūka-pluti 'frog's leap.'

Let us examine the following controlled listing of the Obligatory Domain (OD) headed by 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ :

3.1.1 pratyayaḥ 'affix'3.1.2 paraś ca 'and (occurs) after'


3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca 'and is marked with udātta at the beginning'3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau 'an affix denoted by sUP, and that which is

marked with P as an it, is marked with anudātta '3.1.91 dhātoḥ 'after that which is termed dhātu '3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham 'that which is there (tatra) in the

domain of dhātoḥ, specified with saptamī 'seventh triplet of nominal endings,' is termed upapada 'conjoined pada'

3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ 'an affix which, under this governing heading of dhātoḥ, is other than a tiṄ is termed kṛt '

3.1.94 vā' sarūpo 'striyām 'a formally dis-similar affix introduced as an exception under this governing heading of dhātoḥ blocks its general counterpart, only optionally, except for an exception introduced within the sub-domain of 3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin '

3.1.95 kṛtyāḥ prāṅ ṇvulaḥ 'affixes introduced prior to introduction of ṆvuL (3.1.133 ṇvultṛcau) are termed kṛtya'

3.1.132 cityāgni citye 'the words citya, and agnicityā are derived via nipātana'

3.2.84 bhūte 'when the action is denoted in the past' 3.2.122 puri luṅ cāsme 'affix LUṄ occurs, optionally to LAṬ, after a verbal

root when this same occurs in construction with purā, and is not used in construction with sma, when the action is denoted in a past which is non-current'

3.3.18 bhāve 'affix GhaÑ occurs after a verbal root when bhāva 'root-sense' is denoted'

3.3.112 ākrośe nañy anih 'affix ani occurs after a verbal root used in conjunction with naÑ 'not' with the denotation of action in the feminine when ākrośa 'anger' is denoted'

4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt 'an affix occurs after that which ends in an affix marked with Ṅī (ṄīP / ṄīṢ /ṄīN) and āP (CāP / ṬāP / ḌāP), or after that which is termed a nominal stem (prātipadika)'

4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣṭābhyām... 'affixes sU; au, Jas; am, auṬ, Śas; Ṭā, bhyām, bhis; Ṅe, bhyām, bhyas; Ṅas I, bhyām, bhyas; Ṅas, os, ām; Ṅi, os, suP, occur after that which ends in an affix marked with Ṅī and āP, or after that which is termed a nominal stem'

4.1.3 striyām 'when feminine is denoted'4.1.76 taddhitāḥ 'the taddhita affixes...'4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā 'a taddhita affix occurs after the first

among syntactically related words (padas)'4.1.83 prāg divyato' ṇ 'affix aṆ prior to dīvyati...'


5.4.1 prāg vahateṣ ṭhak 'affix ṭhaK prior to vahati...'The above listing clearly shows that rules 3.1.2 through 3.1.4 are not

included in any one of the interior domains. These rules together with 3.1.1 form the FC (Functional Context ) of this domain of affixes. Two interior domains headed by 3.1.91 dhātoḥ and 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt have been shown here with some of their interior domains. Also note that rules 3.1.92, 3.1.93 and 3.1.94 form the FC of the interior domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ. A heading may define the right or left context of an operation; consider, for example, 3.1.91 dhātoḥ 4.1.1 nyāp-prātipadikāt and 4.1.82 samarthānām... which specify bases after which certain affixes can be introduced. Similarly, 6.3.1 alug uttarapade and 2.4.35 ārdhadhātuke provide clear illustration of an adhikāra rule defining the right context of an operation. Many headings specify conditions of placement of affixes, state an operation, or simply define the scope of a domain. Rules 2.4.35 ārdhadhātuke, 4.2.92 śeṣe, 6.1.72 samhitāyām, 3.2.123 varttamāne laṭ, 3.2.84 bhūte, 3.3.18 bhāve exemplify these functions. A distinction must be maintained between the anuvṛtti of the heading rule of a domain or interior domain, and the anuvṛtti of a rule which is placed subsequently within an interior domain.

Let us now consider rule 3.1.62 acaḥ karmakartari. It is formulated with two words acaḥ and karmakartari. The following is the single sentence interpretation of this rule from the Kāśikā-vṛtti, with indications of word endings, i.e., 1/1 (nominative singular), 5/1 (ablative singular), 6/1 (genitive singular) and 7/1 (locative singular), and English translation:

ajantād (5/1) dhātoḥ (5/1) parasya (6/1) cleḥ (6/1) pratyayasya (6/1) karmakartari (7/1) taśabde (7/1) parataś ciṇādeśo (1/1) bhavaty (verbal pada) anyatarasyām (7/1)‘affix CLI is optionally replaced with affix CiṆ when the former occurs after a verbal root ending in a vowel (aC) and when -ta, a replacement of LUṄ with the signification of object turned agent (karmakartṛ), follows‘ This eleven word paraphrase interpretation of a two word-rule adds only

two new words from the outside, i.e., bhavati ‘becomes‘ and paratas 'when following,' where parataḥ is used to indicate the right condition and bhavati is used for completing the paraphrase sentence. All other words are brought close to this rule from other rules by reconstructing its context, via anuvṛtti, or with reference to other definitional and interpretation rules of the grammar. I have already listed eight rules which are brought close to the context of this rule. There are still many more rules which must be brought close to this rule. For example, rules which introduce LA-affixes and help select their replacements (in this context -ta). We also need rules which define terms such as karman and kartṛ . Finally, we need rules such as 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya, 1.1.66 tasminn


iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya and 1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā which interpret operational contexts in view of specifications made by nominal endings. These rules, however, do not come via anuvṛtti. They are brought close to this rule by way of their memory impressions for its interpretation as a single sentence (ekavākyatā).The idea is to have a mechanism whereby all rules which may be necessary for interpretation and application of a single rule could be brought close to its context from wherever they may be in the grammar. It neatly ties in with the two traditional views of rule interpretation: yathoddeśa-pakṣa ‘understanding a rule at the place where it is taught in the grammar’ and kāryakāla-pakṣa 'understanding a rule at the place where its application is taught.'

The technique of anuvṛtti plays a big role in bringing domain and sub-domain headings, and also rules or their part(s), close to a rule within a given domain for its proper interpretation as a single sentence (ekavākyatā). All other rules which may be needed for a single sentence interpretation of a rule are brought close to its context via reconstruction of memory impressions (saṃskāra) of those rules. Anuvṛtti is domain specific where in consonance with the yathoddeśa view, element(s) of a higher level rule are brought close to the context of a lower level rule for its single sentence interpretation. Reconstruction of memory impressions close to the context of a rule from the outside of its domain largely falls within the kāryakāla view. I shall next show how memory impressions are brought close to the context of a rule for its single sentence interpretation.

The kārya-kāla view whereby rules necessary for proper interpretation of a rule are brought close to its context from the outside of its interior domain entails reconstruction of definitional (saṃjñā) and interpretation (paribhāṣā) rules. These rules are generally placed within the first adhyāya of the Aṣṭādhyāyī which I have listed above as the Controlling Domain (CD) of grammar. It is my understanding that rules of definition (saṃjñā) and interpretation (paribhāṣā) control the system of derivation of this grammar. A rule of definition and interpretation is brought close to its functional context by process of reference. Use of a definitional term and symbol, and also the use of a mark (liṅga) of an interpretive convention, sets the process of reference in motion. A reference made with the use of a definitional term and symbol to a constant antecedent may be referred to as constant reference. A reference made with the use of relative-correlative pronouns yad 'that which' and tad 'that' may be referred to as variable reference. Furthermore, a reference made with yad and tad is generally made to an interpretative convention. These references are largely made to rules of the Controlling Domain (CD), except for some domain specific definitions and


interpretive rules. Consider rules such as 2.1.3 samāsaḥ, 2.1.5 avyayībhāvaḥ, 2.2.19 upapadam atiṅ, 2.1.22 tatpuruṣaḥ, 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ, 3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham and 3.2.1 karmaṇi aṇ, whereby terms such as samāsa, avyayībhāva, upapada, tatpuruṣa and dhātu are assigned. The next to the last rule, for purposes of an operation within the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ, characterizes an upapada (2.2.19 upapadam atiṅ) as that which is placed with the locative ending (saptamī). Pāṇini needed this rule so that he could facilitate the interpretation of rule 3.2.1 karmaṇi 7/1 aṆ 1/1, read with 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.2 paraś ca, 3.1.3 ādy udāttaś ca, 3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau, 3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham, as 'affix (pratyayaḥ) aṆ is introduced after (paraś ca) a verb root (dhātoḥ) used in construction with a pada (upapada) denoting karman (karmaṇi 7/1.' Needless to say, upapada 'conjoined pada not ending in a tiṄ ' serves as a mark (liṅga) for reference to antecedent.

B. Reference to Antecedents, and Referential indexA controlled listing of rules necessary for deriving pacati 'he cooks,' where

terms and symbols are shown within brackets < >, is presented for ease of reference:

1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ <dhātu>1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam <laḥ>1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam <taṄ /āna>1.4.101 tiṅas trīṇi trīṇi prathamamadhyamottamāḥ1.4.102 tāny ekavacanadvivacanabahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ

<tiṄ>1.4.103 supaḥ <sUP>1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca <vibhakti>3.1.67 sārvadhātuke yak <sārvadhātuke yaK>3.1.68 kartari śap <ŚaP>3.1.91 dhatoḥ (3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.3 paraś ca) <dhātoḥ>3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham 3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ <laṭ>3.2.124 laṭaḥ śatṛśānacāv aprathamāsamānādhikaraṇe3.2.126 lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ <hetu>3.2.127 tau sat <sat>3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ

<laḥ karmaṇi bhāve akarmakebhyaḥ>3.4.77 lasya <lasya>3.4.78 tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mib-vas-mas-ta-ātām-jha-thās-āthām-

dhvam-iḍ-vahi-mahiṇ <tiṅ>


3.4.113 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam <tiṄ /Śit>3.4.114 ārdhadhātukaṃ śeṣaḥ <ārdhadhātukam>Now consider rule 3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ which introduces affix (pratyaya

1/1 paraḥ 1/1) LAṬ 1/1 after a verb root (dhātu 5/1), here pac 'to cook,' under the denotation condition of action located at the current time (vartamāna 7/1). Rules 3.4.77 lasya and 3.4.78 tiptasjhi... then apply on pac + LAṬ. Rule 3.4.78 introduces a set of 21 elements denoted by the abbreviated symbol tiṄ. We recognize tiṄ as a replacement of LAṬ 'that which contains LA' by interpreting the genitive (ṣaṣṭhī) of lasya as a mark of interpretive rule 1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā to mean sthāne 'in place of.' However, application of rule 3.4.78 tiptasjhi... is problematic. How should one go about replacing LAṬ with a tiṄ? How should one select one tiṄ out of a set of eighteen? We do not know anything about affix LAṬ either. Recourse is thus taken to reconstruct references to their antecedents. This reconstruction will bring the following rules close to the context of application of rule 3.4.77 lasya and 3.4.78 tiptasjhi...:

(i) <LAṬ> <tiṄ>3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ

<laḥ 1/3 karmaṇi 7/1 bhāve 7/1 akarmakebhyaḥ 5/3>'the La-affixes are introduced after a transitive root when karman 'object' and kartṛ 'agent' are denoted; they are introduced after an intransitive root when kartṛ and bhāva 'root-sense' are denoted.

1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam <laḥ 6/1>'that which comes in place of a LA is termed parasmaipada'

1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam <taṄ /āna>'a replacement of LA in taṄ and āna is termed ātmanepada'

1.4.101 tiṅas trīṇi trīṇi prathamamadhyamottamāḥ'each triad if tiṄ is termed pratham 'third person,' madhyama 'second person' and uttama 'first person'

1.4.102 tāny ekavacanadvivacanabahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ<tiṄ>

'individual (elements of each triad) is termed ekavacana singular,' dvivacana 'dual' and bahuvacana 'plural,' respectively'

Selection of tiP (3.4.77 tiptasjhi...) as a replacement of LaṬ (3.4.77 lasya) with the help of reconstruction of antecedents of LA /tiṄ via process of reference yields: pac + (LAṬ→tiP) = pac + tiP. Note in this connection that the ṣaṣṭhī, saptamī and pañcamī of rules also brought interpretive rules 1.1.49, 1.1.66 and 1.1.67 close to the context of these rules. Now consider the following rules which assign the terms sārvadhātuka and ārdhadhātuka:


3.4.113 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam <tiṄ > <Śit >'an affix denoted by tiṄ, or marked with Ś as an it, is termed sārvadhātuka'

3.4.114 ārdhadhātukaṃ śeṣaḥ <ārdhadhātukam>'an affix other than a tiṄ, or one marked with Ś as an it, is termed ārdhadhātuka'

3.1.67 sārvadhātuke yak <sārvadhātuke yaK>'affix yaK is introduced after a verb root when an affix termed sārvadhātuka follows'

3.1.68 kartari śap <ŚaP>'affix ŚaP is introduced after a verb root when an affix termed sārvadhātuka, with the denotation of kartṛ,follows'

These rule applications will yield pac + ŚaP + tiP which, after deletion of Ś and P (it-deletion) will yield pacati, a pada 'that which ends in affixes denoted by the abbreviate symbol sUP and tiṄ ' (1.4.15 suptiṅantam padam). Note that the process of reference which brought rules facilitating selection of ti for derivation of pacati from pac + LAṬ has produced a string of terms and symbols in the process. It is important to note that rules are brought close to application of a rule by process of reference to antecedents. These antecedents are terms and symbols used in those rules. A referential index of these terms and symbols can be made for each derivation. The referential index (RI) of pacati can thus be presented as follows:

(ii) <dhātu 1.3.1><LAṬ (pratyaya, akarmaka, karma, bhāva) 3.1.1, 3.2.123, 3.4.69, 1.4.99><tiṄ (parasmaipada, ātmanepada ; prathama, madhyama, uttama;

ekavacana, dvivacana, bahuvacana, vibhakti) 1.4.99-104)><sārvadhātuka, ārdhadhātuka 3.4.113, 3.1.114><ŚaP (kartṛ, sārvadhātuka 3.1.67-68; pada 1.4.14 >A similar reconstruction of rule context by process of reference is

witnessed in deriving odana + am = odanam, a pada which ends in a sUP. Now consider the following rules which I reproduce here from the Obligatory Domain (OD):

4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt 'an affix occurs after that which ends in an affix marked with Ṅī (ṄīP / ṄīṢ /ṄīN) and āP (CāP / ṬāP / ḌāP), or after that which is termed a nominal stem (prātipadika)' <prātipadika>

4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣṭābhyām... 'affixes sU; au, Jas; am, auṬ, Śas; Ṭā, bhyām, bhis; Ṅe, bhyām, bhyas; ṄasI, bhyām, bhyas; Ṅas, os, ām; Ṅi, os, suP, occur after that which ends in an affix marked with Ṅī and āP, or after that which is termed a nominal stem' <sUP>


4.1.3 striyām 'when feminine is denoted'4.1.76 taddhitāḥ 'the taddhita affixes...'Rule 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt heads an interior domain within the

Obligatory Domain (OD) headed by 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ. Rules 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.1.76 head their interior domains within the domain headed by 4.1.1. This domain requires a prātipadika 'nominal stem,' or a form which ends in an affix marked with Ṅī and āP, as its input. A prātipadika (1.4.14 arthavad...) is that which is meaningful (arthavat) but is not a root (adhātuḥ) or affix (apratyayaḥ). If a choice of prātipadika is made as input to the domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadika, and rule 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ... is selected for application, reference to rules 1.4.103 supaḥ and 1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca, etc., will be made to enable selection of nominal endings. The interpretive heading of the vibhakti section of grammar makes a restrictive provision about selection of nominal endings (sUP). It states that selection of an ending such as dvitīyā 'accusative,' is made to denote karman, only when karman is not expressed otherwise (2.3.1 anabhihite). This is a major selectional restriction rule, especially for making the selection of a replacement of tiṄ for expressing kartṛ, karman and bhāva. If a choice to express kartṛ or karman is made at the time of selecting a tiṄ-replacement of LAṬ, etc., the same could not be expressed with a nominal ending under the restrictive provision of 2.3.1 anabhihite. The expression of karman 'object' with dvitīyā 'accusative' nominal ending -am, will subsequently yield odana + am = odanam 'rice,' a pada which ends in a sUP. This -am will be introduced after odana with the understanding that the kartṛ of the sentence is selected for denotation with -ti introduced as a replacement for LAṬ of pacati, under the selectional restriction condition of 2.3.1 anabhihite. If a selection is made to express karman with a replacement of LAṬ, instead, the resultant verb form will be pacyate. Since the karman will be already expressed with the verb, kartṛ will then be expressed with tṛtīyā 'instrumental.' The nominal ending prathamā would then be introduced after odana with the denotation of the nominal stem notion (prātipadikārtha). The sentence would then be a passive, for example, odanaḥ pacyate sūdena 'rice is cooked by the cook,' parallel to the active sentence sūdaḥ pacaty odanam 'the cook cooks rice.' It is to be noted here that these selectional manouvers are built into the system of the Aṣṭādhyāyī to connect derivatives which may have a single source. The referential index of odanam could be presented as follows:

(iii) sUP # 4.1.1-4.1.2<prātipadika, vibhakti, dvitīyā, ekavacana> 1.2.45, 1.4.103-104, 2.3.1-

2.3.2


I shall, in the section of derivation, show how referential indexes are reconstructed to guide strings for possible rule application in different domains. What follows is a select list of interpretive and definition rules for reference.

3. Names and conventions from the Controlling Domain (CD)This select list of technical names (saṃjñā), abbreviatory symbols

(pratyāhāra), and interpretive conventions (paribhāṣā), is presented here for reference. They have been selected from the first adhyāya which I call the Controlling Domain. I have also included here some definition and interpretive rules which are placed outside adhyāya one. The terms and interpretive conventions of adhyāya one can be called global as against local whose placement and function is domain specific. Consider rule 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ which assigns the term dhātu to roots which have their source in the dhātupāṭha (DP). Rule 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ assigns the term dhātu to derived roots, outside adhyāya one, well wihtin the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ. Its placement and function is thus local. Note that technical names are assigned to sound segments, their groups, or to a unit or units of a string, either at the base level of the input or at the level of placement of an affix, or at some stage in derivation. Definitions and terms are also assigned to both notional and grammatical relations. I shall show in the derivation section how technical terms not only facilitate access to domains but also locate rules for possible application.

A. Technical Names (saṃjñā)(1) vṛddhir ādaic (1.1.1)

'āT (the vowel ā of long duration; 1.1.73 taparas tatkālasya) and aiT (ai and au; Śs 4) are assigned the term vṛddhi'

(2) adeṅ guṇaḥ (1.1.2)'aT (the vowel a of short duration (1.1.73 taparas tatkālasya) and eṄ (e and o; Śs 3) are named guṇa'

(3) halo' nantarāḥ saṃyogaḥ saṃyogaḥ (1.1.7)'the name saṃyoga is assigned to a sequence of consonants not articulated with any intervening vowel'

(4) mukhanāsikāvacano' nunāsikaḥ (1.1.8) 'a sound pronounced through mouth and nose at once is termed anunāsika'

(5) tulyāsyaprayatnaṃsavarṇam (1.1.9) 'a sound which shares similar effort of articulation at the same place of


articulation in the oral cavity is termed savarṇa 'homogeneous' with the other'

(6) īdūded dvivacanaṃ pragṛhyam (1.1.11) 'a dual word-form which ends in ī and ū is termed pragṛhya'

(7) dādhāghv adāp (1.1.20) 'roots which yield forms in dā 'to give' and dhā 'to place, put' (ḌūdāÑ, ḌūdhāÑ, dāṆ, do, deṄ, dheṬ) with the exception of dāP 'to cut' and daiP 'to clean,' are termed ghu

(8) taraptamapau ghaḥ (1.1.22) 'affixes taraP and tamaP are assigned the term gha '

(9) 1.1.23 bahugaṇavatuḍati saṃkhyā (1.1.23) 'bahu, gaṇa, and forms which end in affixes vatUP (5.2.39 yat tad etebhyaḥ...) and Ḍati (5.2.24 kimaḥ...) are assigned the term saṃkhyā '

(10) ṣṇāntā ṣaṭ (1.1.24) 'a number word which ends in ṣ and ṇ is assigned the term ṣaṭ'

(11) niṣṭhā (1.1.26) 'affixes Kta and KtavatU are assigned the term niṣṭhā '

(12) sarvādīni sarvanāmani (1.1.27) (13) svarādinipātam avyayam (1.1.37)

'words enumerated in the list headed by svar 'heaven, sun,' and also those termed nipāta, are termed avyaya '

(14) śi sarvanāmasthānam (1.1.42) 'Śi (a replacement of the nominative plural ending Jas, and of the accusative plural Śas after a neuter nominal stem) is termed sarvanāmasthāna '

(14a) suḍ anapuṃsakasya (1.1.43) 'A sUṬ (sU, au, Jas; am, auṬ; 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣṭābhyām...) which occurs after a non-neuter nominal stem is termed sarvanāmasthāna '

(15) na veti vibhāṣā (1.1.44) 'na vā 'or not' is termed vibhāṣā 'option' .

(16) ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam (1.1.45) 'the replacement of a vowel denoted by iK (Śs 1-2; i, u, ṛ, ḷ ) which comes in place of a consonant denoted by yaṆ (Śs 5-6; y, v, r, l ) is termed samprasāraṇa '

(17) adarśanaṃ lopaḥ (1.1.60)'non-appearance is termed LOPA'

(18) pratyayasya lukślulupaḥ (1.1.61) 'non-appearance of an affix is termed LUK / ŚLU / LUP '


(19) aco' tyādi ṭi (1.1.64) 'that (a formal unit) which is formed with last among vowels of a form is termed ṭi 'penultimate'

(20) alo' ntyāt pūrva upadhā (1.1.65) 'that (a sound) which precedes the final sound segment of a formal unit is termed upadhā '

(21) vṛddhir yasyācām ādis tad vṛddham (1.1.73) 'that (a word) whose first among vowels is a vṛddhi is termed vṛddha'

(21a) tyad ādīni ca (1.1.74) 'words enumerated in the list headed by tyad 'he, she, it' are also termed vṛddha '

(22) ūkālo' jj hrasvadīrghaplutaḥ (1.2.27) 'a vowel with the duration of u (ekamātrika 'one mora'), ū (dvimātrika 'two mora') and u3 (trimātrika 'three mora') is termed hrasva, dīrgha and pluta, respectively.'

(23) uccair udāttaḥ ' (1.2.29) 'a vowel which is articulated with high pitch at its place of articulation is termed udātta '

(24) nīcair anudāttaḥ (1.2.30) 'a vowel which is articulated with low pitch at its place of articulation is termed anudātta '

(25) samāhāraḥ svaritaḥ (1.2.31) 'a vowel which is articulated with a combination of high-low pitch at its place of articulation is termed svarita'

(26) apṛkta ekāl pratyayaḥ (1.2.41) 'an affix which is formed with a single sound segment (aL) is termed apṛkta '

(27) tatpuruṣaḥ samānādhikaraṇaḥ karmadhāraya '(1.2.42) `'a tatpuruṣa compound which is formed with its constituents in syntactic coordination (samānādhikaraṇa) is termed karmadhāraya.

(28) prathamānirdiṣṭaṃ samāsa upasarjanam (1.2.43) 'that (a constituent word) which is specified with prathamā 'first triplet of nominal endings; nominative' in the formation of a compound is termed upasarjana '

(29) arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam (1.2.45) 'that (a word-form) which is meaningful (arthavat), but is other than a verbal root (dhātu) and affix (pratyaya), is termed prātipadika 'nominal stem'


(30) 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ) 'items listed in the sets headed by the one beginning with bhū 'to be, to become' are termed dhātu; also items terminating in affixes saN etc., (3.1.32 sandy anta dhatavaḥ).

(31) upadeśe' j anunāsika it (1.3.2) 'a nasalized vowel in initial citation (upadeśa) is termed an it '

(32) halantyam(1.3.3) 'a final consonant in initial citation is also termed it '

(33) na vibhaktau tusmāḥ (1.3.4) 'a tU 'consonant of the t-series), s and m of a vibhakti 'inflectional endings' in initial citation is not termed it'

(34) ādir ñiṭuḍavaḥ '(1.3.5) 'an initial ÑI, ṬU and ḌU in upadeśa is termed an it '

(35) ṣaḥ pratyayasya (1.3.6) 'the initial ṣ of an affix in upadeśa is termed it '

(36) cuṭū (1.3.7) 'the initial cU (consonant of the c-series), or ṬU (consonant of the ṭ-series) of an affix in upadeśa is termed an it '

(37) laśakv ataddhite (1.3.8) 'the initial L, Ś, and KU (a consonant of the t-series) of a non- taddhita affix in upadeśa is termed it '

(38) tasya lopaḥ (1.3.9) 'non-appearance (deletion) of that which is termed an it '

(39) yūstryākhyau nadī (1.4.3) 'forms which end in ī and ū, and are used with the denotation of feminine, are termed nadī '

(40) neyaṅuvaṅsthānāv astrī (1.4.4) 'forms which terminate in ī and ū and denote feminine are, with the exception of strī, not termed nadī when they go through a replacement in iyAṄ and uvAṄ '

(41) vā' mi (1.4.5) 'forms which terminate in ī and ū and denote feminine are, with the exception of strī, optionally not termed nadī when they go through a replacement in iyAṄ and uvAṄ and occur before ām 'genitive plural'

(42) ṅiti hravaś ca (1.4.6) 'forms which terminate in a short i and u, relative to the denotation of feminine are, with the exception of strī, not optionally termed nadī, when they go through a replacement in iyAṄ and uvAṄ and an affix marked with Ṅ as an it follows'


(43) śeṣo ghy asakhi (1.4.7) 'the remainder of forms which end in i and u, except for sakhi 'friend,' are termed ghi '

(44) patiḥ samāsa eva (1.4.8) 'the word pati 'husband, lord, master' is termed ghi only when it occurs in a compound'

(45) ṣaṣṭhīyauktaś chandasi vā (1.4.9) 'the word pati, in the Vedic, is optionally termed ghi when this same is used in combination with a pada ending in the genitive (ṣaṣṭhī )'

(46) hrasvaṃ laghu (1.4.10) 'a short vowel (hrasva) is termed laghu 'light.'

(47) saṃyoge guru (1.4.11) 'a short vowel when occurring before a saṃyoga 'consonant cluster' is termed guru 'heavy'

(48) dīrghaṃ ca (1.4.12) 'a long (dīrgha) vowel is also termed guru.

(49) yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi pratyaye' ṅgam (1.4.13) 'a form beginning with that after which an affix is introduced is termed aṅga when the affix follows'

(50) suptiṅantaṃ padam (1.4.14) 'a form which ends in a sUP (4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...) or tiṄ (3.4.78 tiptasjhisipthastha...) is termed pada'

(51) naḥ kye (1.4.15) 'a form which ends in -n is termed pada when affixes KyaC (3.1.8 sup ātmanaḥ kyac), KyaṄ (3.1.11 kartuḥ kyaṅ salopaś ca) or KyaṢ (3.1.13 lohitādi...) follow.

(52) siti ca (1.4.16) 'a form is also termed pada when an affix marked with S as an it follows'

(53) svādiṣv asarvanāmasthāne (1.4.17) 'a form is termed pada when a svādi (affixes enumerated under 4.1.2 svaujas... through 5.4.151 uraḥ prabhṛtibhyaḥ kap) affix which is other that one termed sarvanāmasthāna (sU, au, Jas; am, auṬ) follows'

(54) yaci bham (1.4.18) 'a form is termed bha when a svādi affix other than a sarvanāmasthāna beginning with y or a vowel (aC ) follows'

(55) tasasu matvarthe (1.4.19) 'a form which ends in -t or s is termed bha when an affix denoting the sense of matUP follows'


(56) dhruvam apāye' pādānam (1.4.24) 'a kāraka which is dhruva 'fixed' is termed apādāna when movement away (apāya) is denoted'

(57) karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam (1.4.32) 'a kāraka whom the agent (kartṛ) intends (as the goal) by (means of) his action is termed sampradāna'

(58) sāddhakatamam karaṇam (1.4.42 ) 'a kāraka which, more than anything, serves as a means is termed karaṇa'

(59) ādhāro' dhikaraṇam (1.4.45) ' a kāraka which serves as locus (ādhāra) of action is termed adhikaraṇa '

(60) kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma (1.4.49) 'a kāraka which the agent most wishes to reach is termed karman'

(61) svatantraḥ kartā (1.4.55) 'that which is svatantra 'independent' is termed kartā 'agent'

(62) tatprayojako hetuś ca (1.4.55) 'the instigator kāraka of kartṛ is also termed hetu 'cause'

(63) prāg rīśvarān nipātāḥ (1.4.56) 'items enumerated hereafter prior to adhirīśvare are termed nipāta 'particle' (1.4.56)

(64) upasargāḥ kriyāyoge / gatiś ca (1.4.58; 1.4.59) 'a nipāta, listed in the group headed by pra, is termed upasarga when used with a verb; it is also termed gati'

(65) karmapravacanīyāḥ (1.4.97) 'items termed nipata which are enumerated up to adhirīśvare are termed karmapravacanIya '

(66) laḥ parasmaipadam (1.4.99) 'replacements of LA (4.1.78 tiptasjhi...) are termed parasmaipada'

(67) tiṅas trīṇi trīṇi prathamamadhyamottamāḥ (1.4.101) 'each triad of tiṄ is termed prathama, madhyama and uttama '

(68) taṅānāv ātmanepadam (1.4.100) 'replacements of LA denoted by taṄ, and also āna , are termed ātmanepada '

(69) tāny ekavacana-dvivacana-bahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ (1.4102) 'elements of triads of tiṄ are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other'

(70) supaḥ (1.4.103) 'elements of triads of sUP are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other'


(71) vibhaktiś ca (1.4.104) 'triads of sUP, and tiṄ, are termed vibhakti'

(72) paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṃhitā (1.4.109) 'most proximity between sounds is termed saṃhitā'

(73) virāmo' vasānam (1.4.110) 'cessation of speech is termed virāma '

(74) prāk kaḍārāt samāsaḥ (2.1.3) 'samāsa, prior to kaḍāra (2.1.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye)

(75) avyayībhāvaḥ (2.1.15) 'that samāsa is termed avyayībhāva '

(76) tatpuruṣaḥ 'the samāsa is termed tatpuruṣa ' (2.1.22) (77) dviguś ca (2.1.23) 'it is also termed dvigu'(78) saṃkhyāpūrvo dviguḥ (2.1.52)

'the samāsa termed tatpuruṣa is also termed dvigu'(79) śeṣo bahuvrīhiḥ (2.2.23)

'the remainder samāsa is termed bahuvrīhi ' (80) cārthe dvandvaḥ (2.2.29)

'a samāsa which denotes the sense of ca 'and' is termed dvandva'(81) sā' mantritam (2.3.48)

'a vocative which denotes sambodhana 'address' is termed āmantrita'(82) ekavacanaṃ sambuddhiḥ (2.3.49)

'a singular of that which denotes sambodhana is termed sambuddhi '(83) pratyayaḥ 'an affix' (3.1.1)(84) tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham (3.1.92)

'that which is cited in the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ is termed upapada '(85) kṛt 'a kṛt' (3.1.93)(86) kṛtya 'affixes termed kṛtya ' (3.1.95) (87) tau sat (3.2.127)

'affixes Śatṛ and ŚānaC are termed sat ' (88) tiṅśit sārvadhātukam (3.4.113)

'affixes denoted by the abbreviated symbol tiṄ, and those marked with Ś as their it are termed sārvadhātuka'

(89) ārdhadhātukaṃ śeṣaḥ (3.4.114) 'the remainder of affixes is termed ārdhadhātuka '

(90) taddhitāḥ (4.1.76) 'affixes termed taddhita '

(91) apatyaṃ pautraprabhṛti gotram (4.1.162) 'a grandson and any offspring thereafter is termed gotra '


(92) te tadrājāḥ (4.1.172) 'the taddhita affixes which denote a gotra are termed tadrāja '

(93) pūrvo' bhyāsaḥ (6.1.4) 'the first element of doubling is termed abhyāsa '

(94) ubhe abhyastam (6.1.5) 'they both are termed abhyasta '

(95) tasya paramāmreḍitam (8.1.2) 'the second element of doubling is termed āmreḍita '

B. Major Interpretive Rules1.1.3 iko guṇavṛddhī 'a substitute termed guṇa and vṛddhi comes in place

only of a vowel denoted by iK when it is introduced with express mention of the term guṇa and vṛddhi'

1.1.46 ādyantau ṭakitau 'a linguistic element marked with Ṭ and K is introduced as initial and final, respectively, to that for which it is specified'

1.1.47 mid aco ' ntyāt paraḥ 'that which is marked with M as an it is introduced after the last vowel'

1.1.48 ec ig hrasvādeśe 'a vowel denoted by iK alone comes as a substitute in place of eC (e, o, ai, au)'

1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā ‘a specification made with the sixth (ṣaṣṭhī) triplet of nominal endings means ’in place of’ (that which is used with the genitive), provided the context does not permit an interpretation otherwise‘

1.1.50 sthāne' ntaratamaḥ 'that which comes 'in place of' must be most similar'

1.1.51 ur aṇ raparaḥ 'an aṆ which comes in place of ṛ is automatically followed by r '

1.1.52 alo ' ntyasya 'a substitute comes in place of the final sound (aL) of that which is specified with the genitive'

1.1.53 ṅic ca 'a substitute marked with Ṅ as an it also comes in place of the final sound segment'

1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya 'a substitute specified for a following element comes in place of its initial sound'

1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya 'a substitute which is formed with more that one sound, or is marked with Ś as an it, replaces the form in toto '

1.1.62 pratyayalope pratyayalakṣaṇam 'an operation conditioned by an affix applies even when the affix goes through deletion by lopa '


1.1.63 na lumatāṅgasya 'but not when deletion relates to an aṅga, and is accomplished with the term which contains lu (LUK, ŚLU and LUP)'

1.1.65 tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya ‘a specification made with the seventh triplet of nominal endings (saptamī) indicates for an operation to apply on what precedes’

1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya ’a specification made with the fifth triplet of nominal endings (pañcamī) indicates for an operation to apply on what follows’

1.1.68 svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā 'a word-form, except for that which is a name (saṃjñā), only denotes its form (rūpa)'

1.2.28 acaś ca 'replacements specified with hrasva, dīrgha and pluta come only in place of a vowel (aC)'

1.3.10 yathāsaṃkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām ‘equivalency of items enumerated in a set of equal number of elements must be determined in accord with the order of their enumeration in sets’

III: Rule Interaction and Application

III: Rule Interaction and ApplicationRule-interaction and Blocked-blocker Relationship

(bādhya-bādhakabhāva)

pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścāc cotsargāḥ /prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayam utsargo abhiniviśate //

Mahābhāṣya (ad 2.3.46)

1. sāmānya, viśeṣa and śeṣaPatañjali, in the paspaśāhnika of the Mahābhāṣya, states that a class of

rules of grammar should be formulated based on generalization, so that the vast oceans of words could be properly understood. This class of rules will consist of general (utsarga) and their related particulars (viśeṣa ). A general rule, since it is to be formulated with certain generalizations made about its scope of application, must yield to its related particulars which would necessarily require delineation of their own particular scope of application. A particular rule is thus formulated with particular properties relative to generalized properties. A general rule is supposed to pervade its scope of application in its entirety. It is in this sense that it is called vyāpaka (pervader). Since a particular rule is formulated with particular properties relative to the general, the scope of application of a particular must then be extracted from within the scope of its general counterpart. A related particular is called pervaded (vyāpya), since its scope of application is to be carved out from within the general scope of its corresponding utsarga, the pervader (vyāpaka). A rule whose subjecthood is delimited by properties of that which is pervaded is called particular (viśeṣa). A rule whose subjecthood is delimited by properties common to that which pervades is called utsarga. An utsarga for reasons of its subjecthood’s delimitation by common properties is called blocked (bādhya). A particular for reasons of its subjecthood’s delimitation by properties of pervaded is termed a blocker (bādhaka). The relationship between a particular (viśeṣa) and its related general counterpart (utsarga) is thus characterized as pervaded-pervader (vyāpya-vyāpaka).

Rules whose application cannot be captured within the related class of general and particular have been classed as residual (śeṣa). Consider rule 2.2.23 śeṣo bahuvrīhiḥ, where the Bhāṣya (ad 2.2.23) raises questions about the exact meaning of śeṣa 'remainder.' Does śeṣa refer to remainder of words whose compound formation is yet to be stated; does it refer to meanings with reference to which compound formation remains to be stated; and does śeṣa

III: Rule Interaction and Application Page 71

refer to a type of compound which remains to be stated. It is clear from the Bhaṣya discussion, especially in view of some related vārttika proposals, that none of the above interpretations are free of problem. However, if one pays close attention to the context of this rule a general antecedent for śeṣa is not difficult to find. A similar residual proposal is made by rule 2.3.50 ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe, whereby a genitive ending is introduced to denote a residual (śeṣa) meaning. This residual meaning could be understood as any meaning which may fall outside the scope of meanings stated by rules beginning with 2.3.2 karmaṇi dvitīyā through 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇa-vacanamātre prathamā , etc. This residual meaning, close to the context of the genitive, is recognized as sva-svāmi-sambandha 'owner-owned relationship,' etc. A residual would thus fall outside of the applicational scope of general and related particulars. For, it refers to a proposal which is yet to be made, close to its context (upayuktād anyaḥ śeṣaḥ).

It is generally believed in the Pāṇinian parlance that a general rule yields the scope of application to its related particular. It is in this sense that the Mahābhāṣya on rule 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅga-parimāṇavacanamātre prathamā states that a general rule applies by leaving aside the scope of application of its related particular (pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścāc cotsargāḥ / prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayam utsargo abhiniviśate). The Bhāṣya further adds that an exception does not wait for its application till the time a general rule has applied. Kaiyaṭa sums up the two views associated with this: (i) for separation of domains of application, an exception applies first. An utsarga then applies in the domain left-over by the exception. In the second view, an utsarga applies by carefully leaving aside the scope of application of its related exception. It is in this sense that the blocked-blocker (bādhya-bādhaka) relationship between a particular and its corresponding general is also likened to one between nirūpya 'ascertained' and nirūpaka 'ascertainer.'

Let us consider the following rules:1.3.3. halantyam1.3.4 na vibhaktau tusmāḥOur first rule assigns the term it to a final consonant in upadeśa. Our

second rule denies assignment of the term it to a final consonant when this same happens to be a consonant of the t-series, or is -s, or else, is -m, contained within a vibhakti (sUP-tiṄ). The scope of application of rule one is delimited by the general property of final consonant-ness. This property of final consonant-ness is also present within the scope of application of our second rule. However, this general scope of application is delimited with some particular properties of final consonant-ness, i. e., consonants of the t-series, -s and -m. If we follow the


maxim of pervasion (vyāpti-nyāya ) we can say that the general scope of application of our first rule 1.4.3 halantyam is shrunk from within by the scope of particular final consonant-ness properties common to the general properties. It is in this sense that the scope of application delimited by particular properties common to the general properties is called vyāpya (pervaded). The scope of application delimited by the general properties is likewise called vyāpaka. A rule which is delimited by particular properties of vyāpya is called particular (viśeṣa) , in relation to its corresponding general (utsarga). Our first rule is thus a general rule (utsarga). Our second rule is one of its related particulars (viśeṣa).

It is generally accepted that a particular rule blocks application of its general counterpart (sāmānyasya bādhako viśeṣaḥ). That is, an exception (apavāda) always blocks application of its corresponding general (utsarga). That is why we accept the maxim of dadhi brāhmaṇebhyo dīyatām takraṃ kauṇḍinyāya 'let curds be given to the brāhmaṇas and butter-milk to Kauṇdinya.' The general gifting of curds (dadhi-dāna) must here be blocked by the particular gifting of butter-milk (takra-dāna). Note that this blocking of gifting of curds (dadhi-dāna) by gifting of butter-milk (takra-dāna) is possible only when gifting of curds to Kauṇḍinya is possible (sati sambhave bādhaḥ), and only when it would be impossible (asambhava) to make these two gifts both at the same time (yugapad). This kind of blocked-blocker relationship obtains only where rules of the same class (sajātīya) are involved. It will naturally not obtain where the injunction is stated by dadhi brāhmaṇebhyo dīyatāṃ kambalaṃ kauṇḍinyāta ‘let curds be given to the brāhmaṇas and a blanket to Kauṇḍinya’. The question of blocking of a general rule by its particular counterpart does not arise since no possibility of its concurrent application with its corresponding particular exists.

I shall now briefly mention two interpretive conventions from the Paribhāṣenduśekhara :

(PŚ 63): pūrvaṃ hy apavādā abhiniviśante paścād utsargāḥ'an exception applies first; a general rule applies thereafter'(PŚ 64): prakalpya cāpavādaviṣayaṃ tata utsargo' bhiniviśate'an utsarga comes to mind for application even prior to review of the scope of application of related exception'A person whose sight is set only on lakṣya (goal; word in derivation) is

called lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka 'he whose eyes are set on goal of derivation.' A person whose sight is set only on the lakṣaṇa 'rule,' is called lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka. A lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka has both the general (utsarga) as well as its related exception, both, available. He first thinks about the scope of application of the utsarga. Once he is fairly sure that the apavāda 'exception' does not have any possible scope of application, he facilitates application of the utsarga and


accomplishes the goals in question. If the application of utsarga is not facilitated by leaving aside the scope of application of the exception then he will be faced with problem of application. For, when one thinks about application of possible utsarga, application of related exception also becomes possible.'

A lakṣyaikacakṣuṣka is always focused on lakṣya and hence he not only imagines the lakṣaṇa which can efficiently accomplish the derivation of the lakṣya but also facilitates its application. He simply looks at the lakṣya, and even without reviewing the scope of application of the exception, knows where the exception should find its scope of application, as against the utsarga. He thus goes on side stepping the scope of application of the exception rule even without reviewing its scope of application, and thus accomplishes his goal of derivation by means of application of utsarga. Although, in this view, he need not remember the exception rule but still he applies rules in consonance with the prakriyā of the śāstra. For, this is how he would accrue dharma. It is, therefore, stated that 'an utsarga comes on mind for application before any review of the scope of application of its related exceptions. These are the generally accepted views on rule-interaction relative to a general (utsarga) and its related particular (apavāda). I shall here not discuss instances where the tradition talks about absence of blocked-blocker relationship between an exception and its related general. Let us now consider how an exception blocks its general counterpart, only optionally.

The two rules which define the scope of this interaction type are as follows:

3.1.94 vā' sarūpo striyām 'a formally dissimilar affix, in this domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ, blocks the application of its general counterpart only optionally, though with the exception of an affix of the interior domain headed by 3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin '3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin 'affix KtiN is introduced after a verbal root (dhātoḥ) when the derivative is to denote bhāva 'root-sense,' and a kāraka other than kartṛ in the feminine.'Rule 3.1.94 vā' sarūpo striyām offers a limited optional blocking of a

general rule by its particular counterpart with its own exception. This interaction is not only specific to utsarga and apavāda but is also specific to one apavāda against the other. It is operative only in the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ. It is only operative in connection with affixes which are not similar in form (asarūpa). It is not operative in connection with formally dis-similar affixes of the interior domain headed by 3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin.

Now consider the following rules:


3.1.97 aco yat ' affix yaT is introduced after a verbal root which ends in a vowel' 3.1.124 ṛhalor ṇyat 'affix ṆyaT is introduced after a verbal root which ends in ṛ (short / long), or in a consonant'Our first rule specifies a verbal root which ends in a vowel, including ṛ. It is

thus a general rule. Our second rule specifies a verbal root which ends in ṛ. It clearly causes shrinkage (saṃkucana) of the scope of the first rule. It is thus an exception. Affixes which are being introduced by these two rules are both similar in form. Note that formal similarity of affixes, or any lack there off, should be determined independently of their it-elements. Affixes yaT and ṆyaT would thus not be considered formally dis-similar. The question of optional blocking by ṆyaT, of yaT, would thus not arise. Affix ṆyaT will block application of yaT, as an exception (apavāda).

Next consider rules 3.1.133 and 3.1.135:3.1.133 ṇvul-tṛcau 'affixes ṆvuL and tṛC are introduced after a verb root'3.1.135 igupadhajñāprīkiraḥ 'affix Ka is introduced after verbal roots which (i) have an iK-vowel in their upadhā 'penultimate position,' or are formed with jñā 'to know,' prīÑ 'to please' and kṝ 'to scatter'The first rule introduces two affixes namely ṆvuL and tṛC. Since they both

cannot be introduced concurrently (yugapat), one would introduce them in turn (paryāya). The second rule introduces affix Ka which is formally dissimilar (asarūpa) to both Ṇvuḷ and tṛC. These two rules both are also placed within the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ. They both also meet the condition of not being included within the sub-domain headed by 3.3.94 striyāṃ ktin. Affix Ka can thus optionally block application of affixes ṆvuL and tṛC. I shall not discuss here the three proposals which all negate optional blocking proposal of rule 3.1.94 vā''sarūpo' striyām. I shall also not discuss instances where a prior exception (purastāpavāda) blocks application of an immediately following general rule, and not any subsequent (purastāpavādā anantarān vidhīn bādhante nottarān).

2. General blocking considerationsRule-interaction has been studied in the literature from the point of view of

possibility of rule application (prāpti-sambhava). Once this possibility of application is ascertained in a context, we look at the context and give some serious consideration towards establishing the blocked-blocker relationship (bādha-cintā). Rules whose possibility of application is ascertained in a given context are called sāvakāśa (with valid scope of application). If two rules A and B become applicable in a given context Z, a concurrent application of both rules is impossible. There are two possibilities:


(i) Apply rules A and B in turn (paryāya), or (ii) Apply only one rule by blocking the application of the otherHere are some generally established blocking considerations:(1) B blocks the application of A if B is a particular (viśeṣa) related to its general (utsarga) counterpart A;(2) The ākaḍārīya proposal of vipratiṣedha 'conflict among rules of equal strength' whereby B blocks the application of A if B is subsequent (para) in the order of enumeration (1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā and 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam).(3) The ābhīya proposal of rule suspension (asiddhatva) of 6.4.22 asiddhavad atrābhāt.(4) The tripādī proposal of rule (8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham ) suspension (asiddhatva). (5) B blocks the application of A if B may be rendered without any scope of application (niravakāśa).(6) B blocks the application of A if B is obligatory (nitya).(7) B blocks A if B is internally conditioned (antaraṅga), as against A which is externally conditioned (bahiraṅga).(8) B blocks A if B is placed higher in relative hierarchy of rules in interaction. Consider the following interpretive convention of relative blocking from the Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgeśa: pūrvaparanityāntaraṅgāpavādānāmuttarottaraṃ balīyaḥ 'prior (pūrva), subsequent (para), obligatory (nitya), internally conditioned (antaraṅga) and exception (apavāda), are considered more powerful in this order.'I shall discuss, in turn, three of the proposals from the preceding list of

eight blocking considerations: the ākaḍārīya proposal, the ābhīya proposal, and the tripādī proposal. These express provisions closely relate to the the utsargāpavāda dichotomy of (1) general (sāmānya), particular (viśeṣa) and residual (śeṣa), already discussed. I prefer not to discuss the last two proposals separately because (5) would be covered under (2), and (6) offers nothing new accept for the established hierarchy. Detailed aspects of all could be referred to the Paribhāṣenduśekhara of Nāgeśa.

A. The ākaḍārīya proposal of vipratiṣedhaPāṇini presents the following two rules: 1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā 'a single name (saṃjñā) is assigned to a nominatum (saṃjñin), up to 2.2.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye'


1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam'apply the rule which is subsequent in order when a conflict arises'The first rule is a domain heading, and as such, it governs rules which

have been enumerated prior to rule 2.2.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye. Rules of this domain are generally referred to with the qualifier ākaḍārīya 'placed within the domain extending up to 2.2.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye.' The domain itself is aptly described as that of ekasaṃjñā 'one name. Kāśikā raises a question, 'what then is that one name (kā punar asau)'? It answers, 'that which is subsequent (parā) in order of enumeration, and is also that which (if not assigned) is rendered without any scope of application (yā parā anavakāśā ca).' Kāśikā further adds that this statement is made for making a restrictive provision (niyama) of assignment of one name alone (ekaiva saṃjñā). For, elsewhere in this grammar, class-inclusion of names (saṃjñā-samāveśa) is the norm. Rule 1.4.1 specifies two things, (i) rule 2.2.38 kaḍārāḥ karmadhāraye forms the extent (avadhi) to which this domain is valid, and (ii) anavakāśatva and paratva are two conditions required for assignment of a single name. It is to be noted here that a rule which would otherwise become anavakāśa.

Kāśikā explains the word vipratiṣedha as tulya-bala-virodha 'conflict of equal strength (between rules).' It futher explains with a bhāṣya statement, 'where two rule-contexts (prasaṅgau) with their valid scope, elsewhere (anyārthau), qualify for application in a single context (ekasmin), concurrently (ugapat ). The conflict of equal strength (tulya-bala-virodha) is then a context of rule application where two rules with their valid scope of application (sāvakāśatva), elsewhere, qualify for concurrent application. Since an application in turn (paryāya) would yield different results, and also since a concurrent application is not possible, the rule which is subsequent (param) in order of enumeration wins application. Since equal strength (tulya-bala) between rules is determined on the basis of anyatra sāvakāśatva 'valid scope of application, elsewhere,' it then becomes the condition for selection of a subsequent rule for application. We thus find a set of two conditions, namely (i) paratva and (ii) anyatra sāvakāśatva, under which a rule in conflict of equal strength (tulya-bala) could win application. These sets of two conditions clearly yield two kinds of vipratiṣedha, namely saṃjñā-vipratiṣedha and saṃjñetara vipratiṣedha. A word of caution is in order here. This two way classification of vipratiṣedha does not mean that saṃjñā-vipratiṣedha would obtain only where both anavakāśā and parā conditions are met. It could also obtain where two names become applicable based on tulya-bala-virodha. Kāśikā reads the word parā with anavakāśā to make it clear. Since class-inclusion of names is the norm in grammar, the question of tulya-bala-virodha between names is hard to accept. It


is for this reason that tulya-bala-virodha in this section of ekasaṃjñā is imagined for carrying out the process of grammar. Why did Pāṇini not state anavakāśā 'that which may be rendered without any scope of application'? Pāṇini did not state anavakāśā because it would have amounted to stating the obvious. For, an anavakāśa obligatorily blocks application of a competing rule, irrespective of considerations of order of rules in this grammar. Looking at the two sets of conditions of two types of vipratiṣedha, we can rightly figure out paratva as a single condition operative in all cases of vipratiṣedha. Pāṇini anticipated the conflict among two rules of naming (saṃjñā), and thereby placed the anavakāśā rules subsequently in order to resolve conflict. Kāśikā simply identifies anavakāśā as parā. Pāṇini, when ordering his rules, anticipated conflicts of both kinds (i) where one rule, which he ordered subsequently, would be in danger of becoming vacuous, and (ii) where both rules have their proven context of application, elsewhere. A rule which wins application is ordered subsequently to the other in both instances of conflict.

The Bhāṣya has also discussed a different reading of rule 1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā. This reading is given as prāk kaḍārāt paraṃ kāryam. Since rule 1.4.1 ā kaḍārād ekā saṃjñā makes a restrictive provision, and it is a niyama. A change in the wording of this rule with paraṃ kāryam would make kārya to refer to saṃjñā-kārya. The reading of paraṃ kāryam would turn this rule into a vidhi 'operation.' Additionally, rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam would simply read as vipratiṣedhe ca, of course, with the anuvṛtti of paraṃ kāryam. It should be noted here that accepting this second reading would not change anything. It may make the process of derivation somewhat cumbersom. The first rule of the second reading would still facilitate blocking of a prior name (pūrvā saṃjñā) on the basis of anavakāśatva and paratva. The second rule of the second reading would facilitate blocking of the prior saṃjñā by the parā, on the basis of vipratiṣedha. This discussion also makes it clear that the use of ca in vipratiṣedhe ca, of the second reading, would save it from becoming a parisaṃkhyā. A niyama where sense of eva 'only' is read with the subject (uddeśya) is called parisaṃkhyā. For, this would have limited the scope of para-kārya to only those contexts where the condition of vipratiṣedha would obtain.

Now consider the following sentences:(i) dhanuṣā śarair vidhyati 'pierces with a bow'(ii) gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ 'he milks the cow milk'(iii) kaṃsapātryāṃ bhuṅkte 'he eats in the white copper plate'(iv) yavebhyo gāṃ vārayati 'wards the cow off the barley'(v) kūpād andhaṃ vārayati 'wards the blind off the water-well'(vi) agner māṇavakaṃ vārayati 'wards the child off the fire'


(vii) dhanur vidhyati śaraiḥ 'the bow pierces with arrows'(viii) sādhv asinā chinatti devadattaḥ 'Devadatta cuts beutifully with the sword' (ix) sadhv asiś chinatti 'the sword cuts beautifully'(x) devadattaḥ sthālāyāṃ odanaṃ pacati 'Devadatta cooks rice in a pot'(xi) sthālī pacati 'the pot cooks'(xii) odanaḥ pacati 'rice cooks'The term karman, in sentence (ii), is assigned to go, because of go

serving as the 'most desired kāraka by the agent' (1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma), in view of the action denoted by dohana 'milking.' But payaḥ can also be viewed as īpsitatama 'most desired' in view of this action. Since the use of -tamaP, would dictate the assignment of the term karma only to one kāraka, namely go, payas 'milk' could only be viewed as ipstita 'desired.' It can thus not be assigned the term karman by 1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma. Rule 1.4.51 akathitaṃ ca would then apply to payas for assignment of the term karman. Notice that go can also qualify here for assignment of the term apādāna, based on its being dhruva 'fixed' (1.4.24 dhruvam apāye ' pādānam), with reference to apāya 'movement away' of payas 'milk.' But since rules 1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma and 1.4.51 akathitaṃ ca are both subsequent rules, as compared with 1.4.24 dhruvam apāye' pādānam, they will effectively block assignment of the term apādāna to go and payas. This same way, assignment of the term apādāna will be blocked by karaṇa (1.4.45 sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam) in (i) dhanuṣā vidhyati, and by adhikaraṇa (1.4.49 ādhāro' dhikaraṇam) in (iii) kaṃsapātryāṃ bhuṅkte.

Now consider sentences (iv) yavebhyo gāṃ vārayati, (v) kūpād andhaṃ vārayati and (vi) agner māṇavakaṃ vārayati, where the assignment of the term apādāna is blocked in connection with go 'cow,' andha 'blind' and māṇavaka 'child,' by karman. Note here that the term karman of go, andha and māṇavaka blocks the assignment of the term apādāna, based on the condition of īpsitatamatva 'most desired-ness.' The assignment of the term apādāna to yava 'barley,' kūpa 'water-well' and agni 'fire' is made by 1.4.27 vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ 'that which is desired in connection with an action having the signification of vāraṇa 'warding off.' That is, yava, kūpa and agni are īpsita, as against go, andha and māṇavaka which are īpsitatama. Why can we not assign the term karman of 1.4.51 akathitaṃ ca to yava, kūpa, and agni, similarly to payaḥ of sentence (5)? The assignment of the term apādāna of 1.4.27 vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ would then be rendered without any scope of application (anavakāśa).

The tradition also accepts vivakṣā 'intent to speak' as an important variable, especially in connection with assignment of the kāraka names


(vivakṣātaḥ kārakāṇi bhavanti ). Thus, sentences (ix), (xi) and (xii) have their named agent expressed with the third person singular verbal ending -ti. Since the agent is thus expressed, asi 'sword,' sthālī 'plate' and odana 'rice' are, under the selectional restriction of 2.3.1 anabhihite, used with the nominative singular (prathamā; ) to only express their nominal stem notion (prātipadikārthaḥ 2.3.46 prātipadikārtha...). Note that vivakṣā, because of its control in the hands of the speaker, may appear problematic for rules of grammar to capture. But since grammar presents the analysis of correct words, and also since vivakṣā must also meet the condition of śabda-sādhutva 'correctness of usage,' the task of the grammarian becomes somewhat easier. It is the competence of asi, sthālī and odana to serve as karaṇa, adhikaraṇa, and odana, that enables them to be spoken of as agents, irrespective of whether they are to be expressed by the verbal ending.

Now consider the the following sentences:(xiii) tvaṃ pacasi 'you cook'(xiv) tvaṃ cāhaṃ ca pacāvaḥ 'you, and also I, cook'(xv) aham pacāmi 'I cook'(xvi) saḥ pacati 'he cooks'(xvii) ehi manye rathena yāsyasi yātas tena te pitā 'you think 'I will go by the chariot,' your father is already gone with it' These sentences outline restrictions in selection of verbal endings as

stated by rules as follows:1.4.105 yuṣmady upapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāniny api madhyamaḥ 'a madhyama 'second triplet of verbal endings' is used when yuṣmad 'second personal pronominal (yuṣmad),' whether explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, shares co- referential relation with it';1.4.107 asmady uttamaḥ 'an uttama 'third triplet of verbal endings' is used when asmad 'first personal pronominal (asmad),' whether explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, shares co-referential relation' with it;1.4.108 śeṣe prathamaḥ 'a prathama 'the first triplet of verbal ending' is used when the remainder 'third personal pronominal (tad ),' whether explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, shares co-referential relation with it.'1.4.108 prahāse ca manyopapade manyater uttama ekavac ca 'and when teasing (prahāse), a madhyama 'second triplet of verbal ending' is used after a verb root when verbal root man 'think' occurs in construction; the uttama 'first personal pronominal (asmad), whether explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, is, additionally, used in the singular.'Rules 1.4.105 yauṣmady upapade... and 1.4.7 asmady uttamaḥ have their

independent scope of application in sentences (xiii) and (xv). They both find their


scope of application in sentence (xiv). It is in view of rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam that rule 1.4.107 asmady uttamaḥ wins application on the basis of paratva 'subsequent in order of enumeration.' Sentence (xvii) is a special case where an added condition of cooccurrence is at work, in addition to prahāsa 'teasing.'

The tradition accepts the scope of application of vipratiṣedha valid thoughout the sapāda-saptādhyāyī. Some recent studies would rather have the scope of vipratiṣedha limited to the domain of ekasaṃjñā. Proposals have also been put forward to reject the idea of vipratiṣedha altogether, and bring instances of vipratiṣedha under the scope of general and particular rules (utsargāpavāda). I accept the traditional interpretation of these rules, especially since accepting any opinion against the Bhāṣya runs considerable risk. Accepting instances of vipratiṣedha as exception would necessitate changing the utsargāpavādabhāva of the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

Let us now consider the following rules:1.4.10 hrasvaṃ laghu1.4.11 saṃyoge guruRule 1.4.10 hrasvaṃ laghu assigns the term laghu (light) to a short vowel

(hrasvam). Rule 1.4.11 assigns the term guru (heavy) to a short vowel which occurs before a consonant cluster (saṃyoga). The term hrasva is defined as a vowel used with the duration of one half of a mora (ekamātrika; 1.2.27 ūkālo’ jj hrasva-dīrgha-plutaḥ). That same hrasva is here qualified for assignment of the terms laghu and guru. These two terms both will become applicale to the -i of śikṣ ‘to instruct’ and bhikṣ ‘to ‘beg’ in deriving śikṣā ‘ instruction’ and bhikṣā ‘ begging’. If the term guru is not uniquely assigned to -i of śikṣ and bhikṣ, rule 3.4.103 guroś ca halaḥ could not introduce affix a, and hence, 4.1.2 ajādy-ataṣ ṭāp could not introduce affix TāP. Moreover, with no application in śikṣā and bhikṣā, rule 1.4.11 saṃyoge guru will be rendered without any scope of application. It is in this sense that the term guru will become anavakāśa. Kāśikā notes that a term which may otherwise be in the danger of becoming vacuous, and which is also subsequent in order of enumeration, is desired to win application. Thus, parā and anavakāśā become two conditions under which a single term could be assigned.

Let us now return to 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryām. It is explained as a niyama provision, though not as the type of parisaṃkhyā 'specific exclusion.' That is, in the parisaṃkhyā view, a subsequently enumerated rule could be applied by blocking a prior rule, only when a situation of vipratiṣedha arises. That is, eva ‘ only’ has to be construed with the subject (uddeśya), in this case vipratisedhe. As against this, a niyama provision would only allow the operation


of a subsequently enumerated rule to block the opration of a prior rule when a situation of vipratiṣedha arises. The word eva, in this view, will be construed with the predicate paraṃ kāryam ‘ apply the subsequent’, to yield the meaning: param eva kāryam ‘apply only that which is subsequent’. Since two rules in conflict are both competent (sāmarthya) to apply in a single context, they are considered tulya-bala 'equal in strength.' There competence to apply simultaneously derives from the fact that none of the two rules in conflict could be rendered without any scope of application. For, they already have their independent scope of application (sāvakāśatva), elsehwere. Rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam, thus, resolves the conflict of simultaneous application in favor of the rule which is subsequent in order of enumeration. These two rules are both considered equal in strength because they both have their independent scope of application (sāvakāśa), elsewhere.

Let us now turn to the following interpretive conventons:1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī stāneyogā ‘ a genitive (not interpretable otherwise in a context) means in place of’ 1.1.52 alo’ antyasya ‘ an operation obtains on the final sound of that which is specified with the genitive’1.1.53 ṅic ca ‘ that which is marked with Ṅ as an it, also comes in place of the final sound segment’1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya ‘ an operation in place of that which follows applies to its initial’ 1.1.55 ankālśit sarvasya ‘ that which consists of more than one sound, and which is marked with Ś as an it comes in place of the final sound’ 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya ‘a specification made with the ablative (pañcamī) requires an operation to obtain on that which immediately follows’Note that these interpretive conventions all regulate loci of replacement

operations. Rule 1.1.52 alo ntyasya is a general rule to which 1..154 ādeḥ parasya is an exception. It is for this reason that application of rule 1.1.52 alo’ antyasya does not find any scope of application relative to provisions of rules 8.4.61 udaḥ sthāstambhoḥ pūrvasya and 7.1.29 śaso na. Rule 1.1.53 ṅic ca is similarly an exception to 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya. But 1.1.55 anekālśitsarvasya is an exception to not only 1.1.52 alo’ antyasya but also to 1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya , of course, read with 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya . A separate formulation of 1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya, as against a formulation such as tasmād ity uttarasyādeḥ, was made to facilitate its meaning as follows:

'an operation which is specified with the ablative (pañcamī ) is to be performed in place of the initial of that which immediately follows'


Now consider 2.4.52 aster bhūḥ whereby as is replaced with bhū , in view of 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya, an exception. But now consider rules 7.1.29 aṣṭābhya auś whereby auŚ comes as a total replacement (sarvādeśa) of 1.1.67 anekālśitsarvasya, against the initial-replacement proposal of 1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya. Commentators recognize that, in the application of rules such as 7.1.9 ato bhis ais, we find a situation of conflict between these two exceptions. Rule 1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya would require -ais to replace only the initial sound of -bhis. Rule 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya would require -ais to replace -bhis in toto. Rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam resolves the conflict in favor of total replacement (sarvādeśa) of the subsequent rule 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya. One need not doubt here that a non-application of 1.1.55 will make its condition of anekāltva 'many sound-ness' vacuous (vyartha). A formulation of 1.1.53 ṅic ca as an exception to 1.1.55 anekālśit sārvasya is evidence enough to justify the condition of anekāltva. In fact, anekāltva should be considered most conducive towards establishing equal-strength (tulya-balatā) status of 1.1.55 anekālśitsarvasya, against 1.1.54 ādeḥ parasya.

Note that wherever 1.1.53 ṅic ca finds its scope of application, rule 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya also finds its scope of application. Rule 1.1.53 ṅic ca blocks the application of 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya at the strength of being an exception. Thus, under the provision of avaṅ sphoṭāyanasya, etc., Ṅ as an it accomplishes replacement in place of the final sound (alo’ ntya), as against total replacement. But now consider the derivation of jīvatāt of jīvatād bhavān and jīvatāt tvam 'may you live long' where given jīv + a + ti, 3.4.86 eruḥ replaces the -i of -ti with rU) to yield jīv + a + tu. Rule 7.1.35 tuhyos tātaṅ (read with 1.1.53 ṅic ca) now applies to replace the final -u of -tu with tātAṄ. But this replacement will yield a wrong form *jīvattāt. The correct form jīvatāt could only be derived by applying this replacement in toto in accord with 1.4.55 anekālśit sarvasya. Recall that 1.1.53 ṅic ca is an exception to 1.1.55 anekālśit sarvasya. A situation of conflict is resolved here by favoring application of 1.4.55 anekālśit sarvasya, a subsequent rule, against its corresponding prior rule 1.1.53 ṅic ca. I shall not add any further discussion to this context of apavādatva and paratva for fear of expatiation (prapañca).

Let us now consider the following rules:7.3.101 ato dīrgho yañi‘an aṅga-final -a is replaced with its long counterpart when a sārvadhātuka affix beginning with a sound denoted by the abbreviatory term yaÑ follows’ 7.3.102 supi ca‘an aṅga-final -a is replaced with its long counterpart, also when an affix


termed sUP beginning with a sound denoted by the abbreviatory term yaÑ follows’7.3.103 bahuvacane jhaly et‘the final -a of an aṅga is replaced with -e, instead, when an affix termed sUP beginning with a sound denoted by the abbreviatory term jhaL follows with the denotation of plural’The Mahābhāṣya finds a situation of vipratisedha in the application of

rules 7.3.102 supi ca and 7.3.103 bahuvacane jhaly et. These two rules both have their independent scopes of application in the derivation of vṛksābhyām / plakṣābhyām and vṛkṣeṣu / plakṣeṣu, respectively. They both become concurrently applicable in the context of vṛkṣebhyaḥ / plakṣebhyaḥ. the Bhāṣya rules in favor of application of replacement in -e based on vipratiṣedha (etvaṃ bhavati vipratiṣedhena). This happens to be one of the clearest statements in the Mahābhāṣya relative to resolution of a conflict based on paratva. There is no additional discussion about it, either by Kaiyaṭa, or by Nāgeśa. The condition of bahuvacane ‘ when the denotation is plural’ not only brings 7.3.103 bahuvacane jhaly et on a par with 7.3.102 supi ca in terms of equality of strength (tulya-balatā) but also enables it not to be treated as an exception (apavāda). It would thus not be able to carve out its domain of e-replacement (etva) from within the general scope of long-replacement (dīrgha). That is, it cannot render any shrinkage in the scope of application of rule 7.3.102 supi ca. For, it could not be interpreted as sharing the vyāpya-vyāpaka relationship with 7.3.102 supi ca. An independent scope of application of these two rules, elsehwere, cannot establish any absence of vyāpti. The question of anavakāśatva thus also does not arise. For, in the context of non-applicability of that, we find the absence of application of that (tad aprāpti-viṣaye’ vakāśābhāvaḥ). This is how sāvakāśatva and paratva impair a relationship between utsarga and apavāda. This is how two rules of equal strength (tulya-bala) come into conflict of concurrent application. But since the result of their application, unlike the odanaseka 'soaking of rice' of dadhidāna 'gifting of curds' and takra-dāna 'gifiting of butter-milk,' is not going to be the same, blocking of a long-replacement must here be accomplished by etva 'replacement in -e ' on the basis of paratva.

Now consider the following rules:4.1.95 ata iñ 4.1.114 ṛṣyandhaka-vṛṣṇikurubhyaś ca4. 1.122 itaś cāniñaḥRule 4.1.95 introduces affix iÑ after a syntactically related nominal stem

ending in -a and used with the genitive, denoting an offspring (apatya). Rule 4.1.114 introduces affix aṆ (ṛṣy-aṇ) after a syntactically related nominal stem


used with the signification of a sage (ṛṣi), andhaka, vṛṣṇi and kuru. Rule 4.1.122 itaś cāniñaḥ introduces affix ḍhaK after a syntactically related nominal stem which ends in i (though not of iÑ) and is formed with two vowels. Rule 4.1.122 itaś cāniñaḥ blocks application of aṆ of 4.1.114 ṛṣyandhakavṛṣṇi... in favor of affix ḍhaK, on the basis of paratva. The examples are āttreyaḥ and naidheyaḥ where atri and nidhi both denote a sage. Can 4.1.122 ṛṣyandhaka... block the application of 4.1.95 ata iñ? No, because 4.1.114 ṛṣyandhaka is an exception enumerated in-between (madhye) and, hence, it can only block application of 4.1.95 ata iñ. This is what the interpretive convention of madhyepavādāḥ pūrvān vidhīn bādhante nottarān supports. A similar blocking on the basis of paratva can also be witnessed in application of rules 4.1.153 udīcāṃ iñ and 4.1.157 udīcāṃ vṛddhād agotrāt, where kāriṣeṇiḥ (son of Karisena) and nāpitāyaniḥ are offered as respective examples. But affixes iñ and phiÑ of these two rules may also become applicable in the derivation of napitāyaniḥ (son of a barber) when the nominal stem denotes an artisan. Affix iÑ could have its independent scope of application in the derivation of tantuvāyiḥ (son of a weaver), where as phiN could have its independent scope of application in deriving āmraguptāyaniḥ (a descendant of Āmragupta).

Affixes aṆ and cha are two important affixes in the taddhita section which illustrate many aspects of blocked-blocker relationship. Kāśikā lists the following rules whose application is blocked by cha of 4.2.114 vṛddhāc chaḥ on the basis of paratva (avyayatīrarūpyottarapadodīcyagrāma-kopadhavidhīṃs tu paratvād bādhate):

4.2.104 avyayāt tyap4.2.106 tīrarūpyottara...4.2.109 udīcyagrāmāc ca4.2.110 prasthottarapada...(i) where cha blocks tyaP in ārātīyaḥ (found nearby);(II) where cha blocks affixes añ and ña of 4.2.106 tīrarūpyottarūpyotttarapadāt..., in vāyasatīrīyaḥ;(iii) where cha blocks añ of 4.2.109 udīcyagrāmāt in vāḍavakārṣīyaḥ ; and cha, again, blocks aṆ of 4.2.110 prasthottarapada-, in aulūkīyaḥ.Let me now present one more rule-interaction from the taddhita section.

Consider the following two rules: 4.2.4 lub aviśeṣe whereby a taddhita affix introduced after a syntactically related nominal stem ending in the instrumental (tṛtīyā), goes through deletion via LUP when the time of conjunction of a constellation with the moon is not specific. Our next rule 4.2.6 dvandvāc chaḥ introduces affix cha in deriving rādhānurādhīyaḥ. Rule 4.2.4 subjects affix cha through deletion via LUP. It will be blocked on the basis of paratva. Rule 4.2.4


lub aviśeṣe cannot be declared anavakāśa since it has its valid scope of application, elsewhere. Besides, it will block aṆ through deletion since it is an exception in between (madhye pavādāḥ pūrvān vidhīn bādhante nottarān). This obviously will be a blocking of anticipated deletion based on paratva. That is why, cho lopaḥ paratvāc chrūyata eva 'cha-deletion (4.2.4 lub aviśeṣe) is heard on the basis of its subsequent enumeration’. There are some other aspects of vipratiṣedha which I shall not discuss here for fear of expatiation (prapañcha).

It is stated that for obtaining desired results, under the provision of rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam, relative to conflict among two rules of equal strength (vipratiṣedha), one should interpret para 'subsequent' as iṣṭa 'desired.' What desired goal is to be accomplished, and where is it enumerated by the author of the vārttika. Thus: vṛddhyautvatṛjvadbhāvaguṇebhyo num pūrvavipratiṣedhena (vārttika, ad 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau) 'augment nUM is introduced on the basis of pūrva-vipratiṣedha, by blocking vṛddhi, replacement in au, treatment as if ending in tṛC, and guṇa.'

(i) vṛddhi 'replacement in a vowel termed vṛddhi,' autva 'replacement in au' and tṛjvad-bhāva 'treatment as if ending in affix tṛC.' An example of vṛddhi is offered in atisakhinī , a bahuvrīhi compound paraphrased as atyadhikāḥ sakhāyaḥ yasya tat kulam 'that clan whose there are more than many companions.' Note that the compound can also be interpreted as a tatpuruṣa with the paraphrase sakhāyam atikrāntaṃ yat kulam tat atisakhi kulam 'a clan that has transgressed a companion.' A tatpuruṣa interpretation with this paraphrase would occasion application of 5.4.91 rājāhaḥsakhibhyṣ ṭac, thereby producing the undesired derivate *atisakham. It is therefore advised that a bahuvrīhi interpretation be accepted. We will thus get atisakhi + (au→Śī, 7.1.19 nupuṃsakāc ca) = atisakhi + ī. Now comes rule 7.1.92 sakhyur asambuddhau which, by extending status as marked with Ṇ' to ī after atisakhi, occasions application of replacement in vṛddhi. This undesired vṛddhi is therefore blocked by accepting introduction of augment nUM of 7.1.73 iko' ci num vibhaktau, on the basis of pūrvavipratiṣedha. We thus get atisakhi + nUM + ī → atisakhinī.

Let us now consider the locative singular form vāri + Ṅi → vāriṇi, where 7.3.119 ac ca gheḥ may apply to derive a wrong form *vārau, similar to the correctly derived form harau parallel to hari + Ṅi. Here again, rule 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau is preferred for application on the baiss of pūrva-vipratiṣedha thereby yielding vāri + nūM + Ṅi → vāri + (n→ṇī) → vāriṇi. Note here that once nUM is introduced, rule 7.3.119 ac ca gheḥ cannot apply. For, its condition of application will be impaired by nUM which will now be interveningvāri and Ṅi.

Now consider priyāḥ kroṣṭāraḥ yasya kulasya tat priyakroṣṭu-kulam where, in the nominative plural derived from priyakroṣṭu + Jas, we may find application


of tṛjvadbhāva 'treatment as if ending in tṛC' of 7.1.95 tṛjvat kroṣṭuḥ. Note here that there is no assignment of the term sarvanāmasthāna (1.1.42 śi sarvanāmasthānam) in the neuter (napuṃsaka), but, given priyakroṣṭu + (Jas→Śi ) = priyakroṣṭu + Śi, Śi cannot be denied assignment of the term sarvanāmasthāna. Besides, there is no vidhi or niṣedha for assignment of the term sarvanāmasthāna in the neuter. Note here that the augmentation of nUM by rule 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau is also applicable here. Rule 7.1.95 tṛjvat kroṣṭuḥ is subsequent in order of enumeration but its proposal of treatment as ending in tṛC will be blocked in favor of nUM of rule 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau, again in favor of application of nUM on the basis of pūrva-vipratiṣedha. We thus get priyakroṣṭūni 'a clan to which jackals are dear'

(ii) numaciratṛjvadbhāvebhyo nuṭ pūrvavipratiṣedhena (vt ad 8.2.22 rāt sasya): 'nUṬ is to be favored for application against (i) nUM; against (ii) replacement in r, and (iii) also against treatment as if ending in affix tṛC (tṛjvadbhāva), based on pūrva-vipratiṣedha'

Now consider the following examples:(i) vāri + ām → vārīṇām, where the two augments nUṬ (of 7.1.54

hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ) and nUM (of 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau) both become applicable. The desired form vārīṇām can be derived only with the application of nUṬ, based on pūrva-vipratiṣedha. This will yield the the form vāri + (nUṬ→∅) ām = vāri + nām. A long replacement for the short of vāri can now be accomplished with application of 6.4.3 nāmi to accomplish vārī + nām. A replacement in ṇ (ṇatva; 8.4.1 raṣābhyāṃ no ṇaḥ samānapade) would finally produce vārīṇām 'genitive plural of the neuter vāri (water).' A preference for application of nUM of 7.1.73 iko' ci vibhaktau would yield (vāri + nUṬ) + ām where, in the absence of the following nām, -i of vāri could not be replaced with its long counterpart.

(ii) tisṛ + ām = tisṛ + ṇām, where augment nUṬ of 7.1.54 hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ is favored for application on the basis of pūrvavipratiṣedha, to block application 7.2.100 aci ra ṛtaḥ. This offers us tisṛ + nām where long replacement for the short ṛ of tisṛ cannot be accomplished because of negation of 6.4.4 na tisṛcatasṛ... Our desired form will be tisṛṇām with replacement in ṇ (ṇatva).

(iii) kroṣṭu + ām → kroṣṭūnām where the tṛjvadbhāva proposal of 7.1.95 tṛjvatkroṣṭuḥ is optionally made available to kroṣṭu + ām by rule 7.1.97 vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣv aci. This optional provision of tṛjvadbhāva is, however, blocked on the basis of pūrvavipratiṣedha, in favor of application of augment nUṬ of rule 7.1.54 hrasvanadyāpo nuṭ. We thus get the genitive plural form in kroṣṭūnām.


B. The ābhīya proposal of suspensionPāṇini makes this extensional (ātideśika) proposal of suspension

(asiddhatva) under rule 6.4.22 asiddhavad atrābhāt whereby what follows there onwards is considered as if suspended. The phrase ā bhāt 'up to bha' (6.4.29 bhasya)' is used to specify the domain (viṣaya) of this extensional suspension (ātideśika-asiddhatva), aptly called ābhīya since it covers all rules included within the domain of 6.4.1 bhasya, through the end of adhyāya six. Note that the word atra 'here' is generally used in the sense of asmin 'in here.' This general meaning will then refer to operations (kārya) stated within this domain of bha (ābhīya). The word atra restricts the scope of such operations to rules contained within the domain ending with the last rule of 6.4.129 bhasya (ābhīya). What operations within this domain of rules will be treated as asiddha? It is explained that an operation of this domain will be treated as asiddha if another operation of this domain is to be performed and if both operations share the same condition of application (samāna-nimitta; Kāś: atreti samānāśraya-pratipatyartham). Consider the derivation of śādhi 'second person singular imperative active of śās 'to instruct' for illustration. We get śās + (LOṬ → siP) → śās + ŚaP + siP → śās + (ŚaP→∅) + si(P→∅) → śās + (si→hi) = śās + hi, where hi replaces si (3.4.87 ser hy apic ca), itself a replacement of LOṬ, and ŚaP goes through delettion by LUK (2.4.72 adiprabhṛti…). A replacement in śā is then ordered for śās before hi (6.4.35 śā hau) to produce śā + hi. It is at this stage that 6.4.101 hujhalyo her dhiḥ becomes applicable. But there is a problem. This replacement in dhi must come in place of hi when hi occurs after a sound denoted by jhaL. Recall that śā, by way of replacing śās, has removed jhaL, i.e., s, which occurred before hi. Since these replacements, i.e., śā and dhi, both are accomplished by rules contained within this domain, a śā-replacement can be treated as asiddha in accomplishing a replacement in dhi. That is, our string will still be śās + hi., as far as the application of 6.4.101 hu jhalyo her dhiḥ is concerned. Thus, we get (śā←śās + (hi→dhi)) = śā + dhi = śādhi. A similar situation is also involved in deriving edhi from (as + LOṬ→siP) → as + si, where a of as is deleted by 6.4.111 śnasor allopaḥ and sa + hi gets its s replaced with e (6.4.119 dhvasor eddhāv…) to produce e + hi. Rule 6.4.101 hujalyo her dhiḥ now applies to replace hi with dhi, with the understanding that e (etva) as a replacement is asiddha. Thus we get (e←s + (hi→dhi)) = edhi.

Now consider the derivation of āgahi and jahi, both second person singular imperative active forms of ā-gam and han, where si has replaced LOṬ, and ŚaP has again been deleted. Additionally, the m of gam has been deleted (6.4.37 anudāttopadeśa…), and han has been replaced with ja (6.4.36 hanter jaḥ). Rule 6.4.105 ato heḥ then becomes applicable to āga + hi and ja + hi to


delete hi. Note that this deletion is required after an aṅga (1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis…) which ends in -a. This rule application will produce undesired (aniṣṭa) forms: *āga and ja. The desired forms, i.e., āgahi and jahi, could be derived only if deletion of m (after ga) and replacement in ja (of han) is treated as asiddha. This asiddhatva will make the aṅga end in a consonant. That is, hi could then not be deleted. This is how we can get the desired forms āgahi and jahi.

C. The tripādī proposal of suspensionRule 8.2.1 is an adhikāra, and hence, it carries through all rules

enumerated up to the end of this book-chapter (adhyāya). Whatever is stated hereafter should remain suspended in view of what precedes this rule. Thus, in view of application of the preceding seven and one quarter-chapters (sapāda-saptādhyāyī ) of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, its last three quarter-chapters of rules are considered suspended (asiddha). A following rule, here in this section of the last three quarters (tripādī ), is also to be considered suspended (asiddha) in view of what precedes in here (Kāś: ita uttaraṃ cottara uttaro yogaḥ pūrvapūrvatrāsiddho bhavati = asiddhavad bhavati). What is the meaning of asiddho bhavati ' is considered suspended.'? It does not (un)do what is already established (Kāś: siddhakāryaṃ na karotīty arthaḥ).

Now the question: 'what is the thing which becomes suspended (asiddha)'? Is this a rule (śāstra), or an operation (kārya) performed by that rule? This brings two notions of asiddhatva 'suspension': (i) śāstrāsiddhatva 'suspension of rule(s)' and kāryāsiddhatva 'suspension of operation(s).' The first view will accept a rule (śāstra; lakṣaṇa) as asiddha 'suspended.' The second view will consider an operation (kārya) performed by a given rule (śāstra) asiddha. This asiddhatva should be interpreted as śāstrāsiddhatva, because 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham is a rule (śāstra) where atra 'here' denotes an extent (avadhi) in relation to pūrva 'prior,' an obligatory avadhimat 'that which is bounded by an extent.' The word pūrva would thus denote the śāstra 'rule.' The asiddhatva of 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham relates to the notion of suspension of rules (śāstrāsiddhatva). What about the notion of suspension of kārya 'operation'? The idea of the suspension (asiddhatva) of kārya can be gotten only secondarily, by way of suspension of the śāstra which is primary (mukhya).

Why is śāstrāsiddhatva 'suspension of rule' considered primary (mukhya)? Because śāstrāsiddhatva is stated within rules by means of explicit statements (sanniveśa-viśeṣa-yogitvāt). When a rule (śāstra) becomes asiddha, the cognition which is generated by, and about, that particular śāstra also becomes asiddha. An operation which is carried out on the basis of cognition of a


particular śāstra also becomes asiddha when cognition of that śāstra becomes asiddha. This is the order in which this notion of asiddhatva can be effectively understood. The asiddhatva of 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham is thus accepted as suspension of rules (śāstrāsiddhatva). Neo-grammarians such as Nāgeśa and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita accept this view. Earlier grammarians, which also includes the authors of the Kāśikāvṛtti, accept the kāryāsiddhatva view.

The tradition finds it rather difficult to accept suspension of rules. How could a śāstra, which has been stated and hence has attained the status of something established (siddha), be considered unestablished (asiddha). A pot (ghaṭa) will never become a piece of cloth (paṭa), no matter how many times someone calls it a piece of cloth. How can sun (sūrya) become non-sun (asūrya)? But how should one go against Pāṇini's own words (vacana). It is at the strength of Pāṇini's own formulation (vacana-sāmarthya) that commentators are willing to accept the śāstra, not exactly as asiddha but, as if asiddha 'suspended-like' (asiddhavat). That is, they extend (atidiśanti) the status of suspension (asiddhatva) to what is established (siddha). This is how an operation which is carried out by a rule, and which is siddha, will become asiddha(vat) 'as if not established.'

This rule, similar to 4.2.92 śeṣe, is not only a lakṣaṇa 'rule' but is also a vidhi 'operation.' It is an adhikāra since it has to be carried to rules contained within the last three quarters (tripādī) of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It is also a vidhi since it provides for some new operation. How do you get these two meanings of adhikāra and vidhi from this single rule. One may resort to tantra, a technique which Patañjali (ad 1.3.3 halantyam) describes as: sakṛd uccaritatve sati bahvarthabodhakatvam tantratvam 'tantra is an interpretive technique whereby a word articulated just once denotes more than one meaning.' Consider the paraphrases of this rule, when read with the obligatory param 'that which follows':

(a) pūrvatra kartavye sati param asiddham bhavati 'in view of application of that which is 'prior' (pūrvam; the sapāda-saptādhyāyī), that which is 'subsequent' is treated 'as if suspended (asiddham; the tripādī)'(b) pūrvatra kartavye sati param asiddham bhavati 'in view of application of that which is 'prior' in rules of the tripādī 'last three quarters of rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī,' that which is 'subsequent' is treated 'as if suspended' (asiddham).The first interpretation will make this rule vidhi 'operational.' The second

interpretation, since it is to be read as part of subsequent rules, will make it an adhikāra 'governing rule.' Still, this rule is primarily an adhikāra. Incidentally, how can one read param in this rule when it is not explicitly stated in the rule? We can


read param 'that which follows' because pūrvam 'that which precedes,' as in pūrvatrāsiddham, is a relative term and has an obligatory expectancy relationship (nitya-sambandha) with param.

This statement of asiddhatva is made for purposes of negating (pratiṣedhārtham) an operation with 'replacement' (ādeśa) as its condition (nimitta; Kāś: tad etad asiddhatva-vacanaṃ ādeśalakṣaṇa-pratiṣedhārtham). It is also made for purposes of accomplishing application of a rule with sthānī 'substituendum, i.e., that which is displaced by a substitute,' as its condition (Kāś: utsargalakṣaṇa-bhāvārtham ca). Consider asmai uddhara, the dative singular form of idam 'this' followed in close proximity by uddhara, where 6.1.78 eco' yavāyāvaḥ replaces the ai of asmai with āy. The y of āy then goes through deletion of 8.3.19 lopaḥ śākalyasya. We thus get asm(ai→āy) uddhara → asmā(y→∅) uddhara = asmā uddhara. Note here that 6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ may find its scope of application on asmā uddhara. This will yield a wrong form *asm(ā→u→o)ddhara → *asmoddhara. Rule 6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ cannot apply here since 8.3.19 lopaḥ śākalyasya will be treated as asiddha. That is, deletion of y will be accepted as not having taken effect. Similar examples with a replacement in āv, for au of dvau and ādityau, can be found in dvau atra → dvā atra and asau ādityaḥ → asā ādityaḥ. Of course, with deletion of v of au→āv, again by 8.3.19 lopaḥ śākalyasya. Note here that 6.1.100 akaḥ savarṇe drghaḥ may become applicable to dvā atra and asā ādityaḥ which, in turn, may produce unacceptable results *dv(ā+a → ā)tra → *dvātra and as(ā+ā → ā)dityaḥ → *asādityaḥ. Here again, the suspension of 8.3.19 lopaḥ śākalyasya will remove the condition of application of 6.1.100 akaḥ savarṇe drghaḥ. Consequently, we will get dvā atra and asā ādityaḥ. That is, when a following rule is treated as asiddha in close context of a preceding rule, an operation carried out by it is treated as if asiddha, even more so (PM: yadā hi pūrvaśāstrasannidhau paramaśāstram asiddham, tadā tatpratipāditaṃ kāryaṃ sutarām asiddhaṃ bhavati). The preceding are examples where an operation conditioned by a replacement is negated (ādeśa-lakṣaṇa-pratiṣedha).

Let us now consider amuṣmai, amuṣmāt and amuṣmin, the dative, ablative and locative singular forms of adas 'that,' which illustrate accomplishment of an operation conditioned by items to be replaced (utsarga-lakṣaṇa-bhāva). Recall that, given adas + (Ṅ)e, the s of adas is replaced with a (7.2.102 tyadādīnām aḥ). The resultant sequence of two a vowels of ada (s→a) + (Ṅ)e = adaa + (Ṅ)e, is then replaced with a single a (6.4.94 ato guṇe). The e of Ṅe is also replaced with smai, under the condition of a pronominal aṅga ending in a (7.1.14 sarvanāmnaḥ smai). Rule 8.2.20 adaso' ser… then applies on ada + smai to replace its d with m and a with u. We thus get: a(d→m) + (a→u) + smai =


amusmai. An application of 8.3.59 ādeśapratyayayoḥ then replaces the s of amusmai with ṣ. We thus get amuṣmai. We similarly get amuṣmāt and amuṣmin, where the ablative and locative singular endings ṄasI and Ṅi are replaced with smāt and smin, respectively (7.1.15 ṅasiṅyoḥ smātsminau). Recall that the final a of ada, which gets replaced with u of 8.2.20 adaso' ser…, forms the left condition (nimitta) of replacement in smai, smāt and smin. These replacements cannot be accomplished unless 8.2.20 adaso' ser…, and thereby its effect, is not considered suspended. The a at the end of ada is clearly an item which, when replaced with u, removes the substituendum of which u. Restoring this subsituendum, via asiddhatva, facilitates application of replacements such as smai, smāt and smin (Kāś: utvasyāsiddhatvāt smāyādayo bhavanti).

The Mahābhāṣya discusses the purpose of establishing this asiddha section as follows:

(i) to facilitate application of a rule characterized as general (utsarga-lakṣaṇa-bhāvārtham) and

(ii) to negate the application of a rule characterized with a replacement (ādeśalakṣaṇa-pratiṣedhārtham).

The word utsarga in the first purpose refers to a general rule in relation to a particular which displaces it. By inference, this utsarga, in the present context, refers to a substituendum (sthānī) which is replaced by its corresponding replacement (ādeśa). An illustration of the first can be found in the derivation of śādhi and edhi where a replacement in dhi after jhaL is facilitated. The second is illustrated by derivational details of āgahi and jahi where deletion by LUK is negated on the basis of asiddhatva.

Now some questions. If the last three quarter-rules (tripādī) of the Aṣṭādhyāyī are considered asiddha 'suspended' in view of application of the preceding sapāda-saptādhyāyī, then what is the purpose of specifications made here with pañcamī 'ablative,' ṣaṣṭhī 'genitive' and spatamī 'locative.' For, rules dealing with these specifications will all become asiddha 'suspended' in view of application of 1..1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā, 1.1.66 tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe… and 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya. It is stated that, based on the kāryakāla 'formulation of a rule when it is intended to apply' view, these rules will not be considered asiddha in view of application of specific naming (saṃjñā) and interpreting (paribhāṣā) rules. The notion of pūrva 'prior' and para 'subsequent,' especially with reference to asiddhatva 'suspension,' cannot apply to them. It is stated that naming and interpretive rules are meant for facilitating applications of other rules. There is no pūrva 'prior' or para 'subsequent' applicational constraint on them because they indicate their functions only when brought close to applicational context of other rules. It is important to note that naming and interpretive rules (saṃjñā-


paribhāṣā) abandon their sequential order dictated by their placement in grammar and, instead, follow their applicational order. They apply in the order of anticipated applications. Nyāsa (ad Kāśikā) illustrates this point with multiple examples of rule application and concludes that naming and interpretive rules cannot be considered suspended.

Recall that, in a conflict of equal strength (vipratiṣedha) between a prior (pūrva) and a subsequent (para) rule, that which is subsequent in order wins (1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam). What happens to this interpretive rule in relation to 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham? If one accepts the kāryakāla view, this interpretive rule will also present itself at the time of application of 8.2.1 pūrvatrāsiddham. This interpretive rule of vipratiṣedha, since a subsequent rule which competes (sparddhate) against a prior rule is considered asiddha in view of its application, does not find scope (Kāś: 'vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam' ity eṣā tu paribhāṣā yena pūrveṇa lakṣaṇena saha sparddhate, paraṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tat prati tasyāsiddhatvān na pravartate). Consider the two derivates of ṆyaT, i.e., (vi-sphur + ṆyaT) + sU → visphoryam and (ava-gur + ṆyaT) + sU → avagoryam, where application of guṇa (7.3.86 pugantalaghūpadhasya ca) cannot be blocked by application of dīrgha 'long replacement'(8.2.77 hali ca) on the basis of subsequent order of enumeration (paratva). For, 8.2.77 hali ca will be treated as asiddha in view of application of 8.2.26 pugantalaghūpadhasya ca. The question of conflict between rules of 'equal strength' (tulyabalatā) thus does not arise.

If it is said that a subsequent operation is considered suspended when a prior operation is to be performed, a subsequent exception will become suspended in view of application of a prior (pūrva) general (utsarga) rule. Consequently, the gh of 8.2.32 dāder dhātor ghaḥ will become suspended in the derivation of dogdhā and dogdhum. The ḍh of ho ḍhaḥ (8.2.31), in turn, will become applicable. It is therefore said that in applying a general rule, even though placed subsequently, an exception (apavāda) is not considered suspended. This is accepted at the strength of Pāṇini's own statement. Why can they not be applied in turn at the strength of the Pāṇinian statement? This will save the Pāṇinian statement from becoming vacuous. This is not acceptable. Although an exception could be applied in turn, optional application of gh by 8.2.33 vādruhamuha… will become vacuous (cf. Nyāsa ad Kāś.).

This shows how an exception always blocks application of its corresponding general rule. The very formulation of an exception will become useless if it is placed susbsequently for suspension in view of a prior general rule (Kāś: apavādasya tu parasyāpi utsarge kartavye vacanaprāmāṇyād asiddhatvaṃ na bhavati).


3. The Derivational System of the AṣṭādhyāyīIt has been stated that language is a set of sentences. Grammar is

likewise a set of limited number of ordered rules formulated with brevity, based on generalizations extracted from the usage. Rules are placed in the grammar in an order which not only captures anticipated interaction among rules, but also facilitates their application in a manner most conducive towards realizing intended goals (lakṣya). The goal of grammar is to derive correct words (śabda-niṣpatti) of the language. The tradition uses the word 'word' (śabda) in the general sense of an utterance which, given its basic purpose of serving as means of communication, can be referred to as a sentence. A word in its technical sense is accepted as fully derived, a pada which ends in two sets of affixes, namely sUP and tiṄ (1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam). This yields two pada types, subanta 'that which ends in a sUP, and tiṅanta 'that which ends in a tiṄ.' Recall that this grammar imagines constituency of words in bases (prakṛti) and affixes (pratyaya), and as a result of operations (kārya) carried out with application of rules on input strings, yields a fully derived word. There are two types of bases, namely prātipadika 'nominal stem' and dhātu 'verb root':

1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam 'a non-root and non-affix word-form (śabda-rūpa) which carries a meanig (arthavad) is termed prātipadika 'nominal stem.1.2.46 kṛttaddhitasamāsāś ca 'a word form which ends in affixes termed kṛt (3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ) and taddhita (4.1.76 taddhitāḥ), or which is termed samāsa (2.1.3 prāk kaḍārāt samāsaḥ), is also termed prātipadika 'nominal stem.'1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ 'word-forms which are listed in groups headed by bhū 'to be, become,' and its likes, are termed dhātu.3.1.33 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ 'word-forms which end affixes saN, etc., are also termed dhātu .'Note that nominal stems (prātipadika), and verb roots (dhātu) will be here

considered as base-input (prakṛti). Affixes which are introduced after base-inputs are classified into three groups of (i) ṄyāP 'those which are formed with a common Ṅī (ṄīP /ṄīṢ /ṄīN ) and āP (CāP /ṬāP /ḌāP ), (ii) Vibhakti : 'nominal inflectional endings (sUP)' and 'verbal inflectional endings (tiṄ),' (iii) kṛt (3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ) and taddhita (4.1.76 taddhitāḥ). Now consider the following rules:

3.1.7 dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkād icchāyāṃ vā (san) 'affix saN is, optionally, introduced after a verb root used with the denotation of object of iṣ 'to desire, wish,' provided its agent (kartṛ) is the same as the agent of iṣ.'


For example, kartum icchati → cikīrṣati, where cikīrṣa 'to wish to do' is a root derived with affix saN, introduced after the verbal root ḌukṛÑ 'to do.' This derived base input can then get access to the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ whereby cikīrṣa, with introduction of LAṬ → tiP, and ŚaP would yield cikīrṣati, a verbal pada.

3.1.8 supa ātmanaḥ kyac 'affix KyaC is, optionally, introduced after a pada which ends in a sUP, and is used with the denotation of an object wished for one's own (ātmanaḥ).'For example, ātmanaḥ putraṃ icchati → putrīyati, where putrīya 'to wish a

son of one's own' is a root derived with affix saN introduced after putra + am, a pada ending in sUP.

3.1.91 dhātoḥ 'after a verb root'3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ 'affix LAṬ is introduced after a verb root when

action is denoted at the current time'3.4.77 lasya 'in place of that which is formed with a LA '3.4.78 tiptasjhi-sipthastha-mivbasmas-tātāṃjhathāsāthāṃ- dhvamiḍvahimahiṅ 'the affixes tiP, tas, jhi, etc.' For example, pac + LAṬ → tiP → pac + ŚaP + tiP = pacati, a verbal pada which ends in a tiṄ.

A. The tiṄ affixes:ekavacana'singular'

dvivacana'dual'

bahuvacana'plural'

parasmaipada 'active'

prathama tiP tas jhi 3rd person

madhyama siP thas tha 2nd person

uttama miP vas mas 1st person

ātmanepada 'middle'

prathama ta ātām jha 3rd person

madhyama thās āthām dhvam 2nd person

uttama iṬ vahi mahiṄ 1st person

4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt 'an affix is introduced after that which ends in an affix, formed with Ṅī and āP (ṬāP/CāP/ṬāP; ṄīP/ṄīṢ/ṄīN), or after that which is termed a prātipadika (nominal stem)'


4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣṭābhāyāṃbhisṅebhyāṃbhyasṅasosāṃ-ṅyossup 'an affix denoted by sUP is introduced after that which ends in an affix formed with Ṅī and āP, or after that which is termed a prātipadika '

B. The sUP affixes:ekavacana'singular'

dvivacana'dual'

bahuvacana'plural'

prathamā sU au Jas 'nominative'

dvitīyā am auṬ Śas 'accusative'

tṛtīyā Ṭā bhyām bhis 'instrumental'

caturthī Ṅe bhyām bhyas 'dative'

pañcamī ṄasI bhyām bhyas 'ablative'

ṣaṣṭhī Ṅas os ām 'genitive'

saptamī Ṅi os suP 'locative'

4.1.3 striyām 'an affix is introduced after a nominal stem when feminine is denoted'4.1.4 ajādyataṣ ṭāp 'affix ṬāP is introduced after a nominal stem...'4.1.5 ṛnnebhyo ṅīp 'affix ṄīP is introduced after a nominal stem extracted from the group headed by aja 'goat,' or one which ends in -a'4.1.76 taddhitāḥ 'affixes termed taddhita...'A form which ends in the feminine suffixes ṬāP, ṄīP, etc., is not assigned

the name prātipadika. It, however, gains access to the domain domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt as a base-input again since its suffix is marked with ṅyāP. This time it must opt for application of 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ..., whereby, with introduction of sUP, it subsequently yields a pada.

4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā 'a taddhita affix, namely aṆ (read with 4.1.83 prāg dīvyato'aṇ) is introduced after the first among syntactically related nominal pada.'Consider upagu + Ṅas, a nominal pada which, with introduction of the

taddhita affix aṆ, yields aupagava, a nominal stem. This nominal stem must now get access to the domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt, whereby, with introduction of sUP (4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...) it yields aupagavaḥ 'male descendant of Upagu' , a nominal pada. Noteṇ however, that a base-input ending in a taddhita affix may gain access to the domain of 4.1.3 striyām for yielding a nominal base ending in a feminine affix. The output of this application will then go for access to the


domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt for application of 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ... This clearly establishes the cyclic nature of these domain accesses.

It is clear from the definitions of nominal stems and roots that they each have two sets of forms, simple and derived. A nominal pada which ends in a sUP can also serve as a base input for introduction of -taddhita affixes under the provision of rule 4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā. This will still yield a nominal stem, and with the introduction of a sUP would yield a nominal pada. A kṛt affix can be introduced after a verbal base under the cooccurrence condition of a nominal pada, whereby a form which ends in a kṛt affix is termed a nominal stem. For example, kumbhakāra 'pot-maker' which is a derived nominal stem. This can access the domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt, where with the introduction of sU of 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ... it yields kumbhakāraḥ, a nominal pada. A pada which ends in a sUP can also be combined with another, also ending in a sUP, to yield a compound (2.1.3 saha supā; samāsa), again termed a nominal stem. Affixes saN, etc., can be introduced after a base-input termed dhātu, whereby a form which ends in them is again termed dhātu, a derived verb root. An affix of this class, for example KyaC, can also be introduced after a nominal pada, for example putra + am, under some cooccurrence condition to yield putrīya, a verba root. This verb root can then yield a verbal pada, for example putrīyati 'he wishes a son of his own.' Finally, affixes formed with the two shared elements Ṅī and āP are introduced after a nominal stem to yield yet another complex base-input. Note that this sets of six base-inputs which denote feminine are not classed as a nominal stem, or verb root. They are, characterized as ending in affixes formed with Ṅī and āP, instead.

This controlled description of a fully derived word by way of bases (prakṛti), affixes (pratyaya) and operations (kārya) may give the impression to many that the Aṣṭādhyāyī is a morphological grammar, even more so because a pada is its final output. It is true that Pāṇini accepts pada as the final output of his grammar. But his pada ends in a sUP, or in a tiṄ. (1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam). These sUP and tiṄ affixes which come as terminal elements in a pada are introduced after bases which carry meaning. The sUP and tiṄ affixes themselves express meanings both grammatical and notional. The meaning of a base is always notional. Grammatical and notional meanings are expressed by affixes, including sUP and tiṄ . For example, consider nara + sU + odana + am → naraḥ odanam, and pac + LAṬ → pac + ŚaP+tiP = pac + a + ti = pacati = naraḥ odanaṃ pacati 'the man cooks rice,' where affix LAṬ is introduced after pac, a verbal base-input. Rule laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ states that a LA-affix is introduced after a transitive (sakarmaka) verb root when kartṛ 'agent' and karman 'object' are denoted. This same LAṬ can also be introduced after an


intransitive (akarmaka) verb root when kartṛ and bhāva 'root-sense' are denoted. The -ti of pacati is selected as a replacement of LAṬ with the choice of expressing kartṛ 'agent.'

This choice of expressing kartṛ with -ti has consequence for selecting the nominal inflectional ending sUP after nara and odana which happen to be the named kartṛ and karman of the sentence. Now consider rule 2.3.1 anabhihite which makes a restrictive provision for selection of sUP. This rule would allow the slection of a sUP only when the denotatum of sUP is not already expressed. The dvitīyā ekavacana 'accusative' ending -am of sUP which is selected for introduction after odana expresses the named object (karman) of pac . This is made possible because the -ti of pacati has expressed kartṛ, and the karman is not already expressed (2.3.1 anabhihite; 2.3.2 karmaṇi dvitīyā). The choice to express kartṛ by 2.3.18 kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā was not allowed in case of nara, the named agent of the sentence, because the -ti of pacati has already expressed it. It is for this reason that the prathamā-ekavacana 'nominative singular' ending of 2.3.46 prātipadikārtha... had to be introduced after nara to express nothing but the sense of the nominal stem (prātipadikārtha). If a choice is made to express the karman with the verbal pada at the time of selection of tiṄ, a replacement of LAṬ, rule 2.3.1 anabhihite would not allow introduction of -am after odana to express the karman. The nominative singular ending sU would be then introduced after odana to express its nominal stem notion. The kartṛ of the sentence would then be expressed by 2.3.18 kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā. The sentence would then be nareṇa odanaḥ pacyate, a passive counterpart of the active naraḥ odanaṃ pacati. This clearly shows that a pada in pāṇini expresses grammatical and notional relations in a sentence. Furthermore, its derivation must adhere to certain selectional restrictions which bear upon the derivation of a sentence as a whole. I shall subsequently show how derivation of complex bases is related closely to expression of kartṛ, karman and bhāva, thereby yielding complex sentential strings. This expression of kartṛ, karman, and bhāva directly relates to derivation of simple and complex sentences, and the derivational paths the strings follow.

Pāṇini derives words (pada; 1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam) by first extracting them from sentences, and then by analyzing their constituency in terms of bases and affixes. A formal string of base(s) and affix(es) is then processed through a network of rule applications to yield a fully derived pada. Since a pada necessarily carries an impression of grammatical and notional relations, and such relations are part of sentential meaning, a pada shares dependency relationship with a sentence. A pada cannot be fully derived without reference to its syntactic context. It thus becomes necessary for grammar to first present an


abstract syntactic representation of a sentence. Since action (kriyā) forms the central denotatum of a Sanskrit sentence, its abstract syntactic representation is presented as an action-complex with participants, namely the kārakas. Pāṇini sets up six kāraka categories, namely apādāna, sampradāna, karaṇa, adhikaraṇa and kartṛ, in this order. A select listing of the kāraka domain headed by 1.4.23 kārake is as follows:

1.4.23 kārake 'when that which is doing'1.4.24 dhruvam apāye' pādānam 'apādāna is a kāraka which is dhruva when apāya 'movement away from' is denoted' 1.4.25 'apādāna is also the kāraka which serves as 'source of fear' when the action is denoted by roots having the signification of bhī 'to fear' and trā 'to protect'1.4.27 vāraṇārthānām īpsitaḥ 'apādāna is also the kāraka which is 'desired' when the action is denoted by roots having the signification of vāraṇa 'to ward off' 1.4.32 karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam 'sampradāna is a kāraka whom the agent intends to reach as goal' 1.4.33 rucyarthānāṃ prīyamāṇaḥ 'sampradāna is also the kāraka who is pleased when action is denoted by roots having the meaning of ruci 'to please'1.4.37 krudhdruherṣyāsūyārthānām yaṃ prati kopaḥ 'sampradāna is also the kāraka towards whom anger is directed when action is denoted by roots having the meaning of krudh 'to be angry,' druh 'to wish harm to,' īrṣyA 'not to tolerate' and asūya 'to find fault'1.4.42 sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam 'a kāraka which serves as the 'most instrumental means (of accomplish action) is termed karaṇa'1.4.44 parikrayaṇe sampradānam anyatarasyām 'a kāraka is optionally termed sampradāna when parikrayaṇa 'hiring on stipulated wages' is denoted'1.4.45 ādhāro' dhikaraṇam 'a kāraka which serves as ādhāra 'locus, substratum' is termed adhikaraṇa'1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma 'a kāraka which is most desired by the agent is termed karman'1.4.50 tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam 'a kāraka which, likewise, is not desired by the agent is also termed karman'1.4.51 akathitaṃ ca 'a kāraka which remains unstated thus far is also termed karman'1.4.54 svatantraḥ karttā 'a kāraka who is independent (svatantra) is termed kartṛ 'agent'


1.4.55 tatprayojako hetuś ca 'a kāraka which serves as prayojaka 'promptor' of the agent is termed hetu, and also kartṛ'Note that agent (kartṛ) is a kāraka which is independent of all other

kārakas in the sense that the action (kriyā) must necessarily have it as a participant. All other kārakas are named by the action depending on its own nature. It is not necessary for all six kārakas to participate in accomplishment of all actions. It is also not necessary that a speaker may not look at the role of a given kāraka as that of some other. Consider the following sentences where apādāna could not be brought as a participant kāraka:

(1) bhṛtyaḥ vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ odanaṃ pacati kumbhakārāya 'the servant cooks rice in a pot with wood in the forest for the pot-maker'

(2) bhṛtyena vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ odanaḥ pacyate kumbhakārāya 'rice is cooked in a pot with wood in the forest for the pot-maker by the servant'

These two sentences are related in the sense that (1) is a action, and the other its passive counterpart. Since Pāṇini derives them with a common string, I shall present the abstract conceptual structure (CS) of the active, namely the first sentence. A CS would constitute an action-complex where <action> will be central. Each CS will obligatorily have at least one participant, namely agent <kartṛ>, who will bring other participating kārakas into action, if the speaker so desires.

Let us now return to the CS of sentences (1):CS1: bhṛtyaḥ vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanam pacati 'x engages in accomplishing the action named y (softening) intended for z at a place named r in m, a receptacle'This sentence has five participants in its action complex, where since the

agent is expressed with the verbal pada pacīati. In fact pacati, by itself, can be accepted as a single pada sentence with its third person singular agent already expressed. I shall next show the derivation of pacati 'he / she / it cooks,' along with the derivation of other padas of the sentence (1).

Participant(s) <kartṛ>Action <viklitti 'softening'>(3) pacati 'he cooks'step #1pac 'to cook' <dhātu / sakarmaka>1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥstep #2pac → pac + LAṬ3.1.91 dhātoḥ{3.1.1 pratyayaḥ


3.1.2 paraś ca,3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca,3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau} <anudātta>#1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya <pañcamī>3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ <LAṬ>'affix LAṬ is introduced after a verb root when action is denoted at the

current time'3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ

<kartṛ>'a LA-affix is introduced after a transitive (sakarmaka) verb root when kartṛ

'agent' and karman 'object' are denoted; it is introduced after an intransitive (akarmaka) verb root when kartṛ 'agent' and 'bhāva' are denoted'

→ pac + LAṬ<dhātu / sakarmaka / pratyaya / anudātta /vartamāna / kartṛ / LAṬ>step #3pac + (LAṬ → tiP ) = pac + tiP3.4.77 lasya 'in place of that which is formed with LA (LAṬ)'#1.1.49 ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā <ṣaṣṭhī>3.4.78 tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mip-vas-mas-ta-ātām-jha-thās-āthām-

dhvam-iḍ-vahi-mahiṅ'→ pac + tiP <tiṄ ># tiṄ-selection1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam 'a LA-replacement is termed parasmaipada '

<tiṄ / parasmaipada> 1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam 'replacements of LA denoted by taṄ, and

also āna, are termed ātmanepada '<tiṄ-ātmanepada>

1.4.102 tāny ekavacana-dvivacana-bahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ'elements of triads of tiṄ are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other'

<ekavacana>1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca <vibhakti>

'triads of sUP, and tiṄ, are termed vibhakti'1.4.107 tiṅas trīṇi trīṇi prathamamadhyamottamāḥ 'each triad of tiṄ is

termed prathama, madhyama and uttama'<prathama...>

1.4.108 śeṣe prathamaḥ 'a prathama 'the first triplet of verbal ending' is used when the remainder, i.e., tad 'third personal pronominal,'


whether explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, shares co-referential relation with it.'

<prathama>step #4pac + tiP → pac + ŚaP + tiP <ŚaP>3.4.113 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam 'that which is a tiṄ, or is marked with Ś as an

it, is termed sārvadhātuaka'<sārvadhātuka>

3.1.67 sārvadhātuke yak 'yaK is introduced after a verb root when an affix termed sārvadhātuka follows'

<sārvadhātuka>#1.1.66 tasminn iti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya3.1.68 kartari śap 'affix ŚaP is introduced after a verb root when a

sārvadhātuka with the denotation of kartṛ follows'<sārvadhātuka>

→ tiṄ-selection→ pac + (Ś→∅) a (P→∅) + ti (P→∅)step #51.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padampac +a + ti → pacati 'he /she / it cooks' <pada>Referential Index<dhātu / sakarmaka / pratyaya / anudātta /vartamāna / kartṛ / LAṬ / tiṄ /

prathama / ekavacana / pada>Let us now return to the derivation of (3) pacati, our base-input pac

activates the grammatical device and is assigned the term dhatu. by rule 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ of the Controlling domain (CD; adhyāya one). It is then sent for scanning domain headings in the Obligatory domain (OD; adhyāya three through five) of the grammar for possible rule application. It locates the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ for possible rule application because dhātoḥ is the heading (adhikāra) of the domain and it also contains the term dhātu with which the base input is identified. Term assignment thus guids a base-input in locating domain of possible rule application. Further scanning of this domain, especially in view of its CS marker of <vartamāna> 'current time,' facilitates application of rule 3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ. This rule must be interpreted with the obligatory anuvṛtti of 3.1.1 pratyayaḥ, 3.1.2 paraś ca, 3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca and 3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau. For these form the rule-context of the larger domain of which 3.1.91 dhātoḥ is an interior domain. This is how 3.1.123 vartamāne laṭ yields the meaning, 'affix (pratyaya) laṭ is introduced after the transitive (sakarmaka) verb root pac when action is accomplished at the current time (vartamāna); it is also marked with


udātta at the beginning (3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca). Since rule 3.1.91 dhātoḥ is marked with pañcamī 'ablative,' rule 1.1.67 tasmād ity uttarasya becomes operative. This assures that affix laṭ is introduced not just after (3.1.2 paraś ca) pac , but 'immediately after' pac.

Our string pac + LAṬ must now scan the domain looking for application of a rule guided by introduction of the term LAṬ. We find rule 3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ whereby we learn that a LA-affix is introduced after an intransitive verb root when kartṛ and karman are to be denoted. Our string pac + LAṬ, where pac is marked with <sakarmaka> and LAṬ is marked with <pratyaya, initial udātta (3.1.1-3.13), + kartṛ, + karman (3.4.69)>, now moves to the application of rules 3.4.77 lasya and 3.4.78 tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mip-vas-mas... where it is faced with the problem of selecting one tiṄ-element out of eighteen. Recourse must now be taken to reconstruction of referential index tigerred by the terms LA(Ṭ) and tiṄ whereby rules 1.4.99, 1.4.100, 1.4.102, 1.4.104, 1.4.107 and 1.4.108 are brought close to application of rule 43.4..77 and 3.4.78. This is how we select tiP, an active (parasmaipada) third personal (prathama) singular (ekavacana) ending (vibhakti) with the denotation of kartṛ 'agent.' Two things must be noted here: (i) selection of -ti is made on the basis of choiced expression of kartṛ 'agent' with reference to 3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ; (ii) the anudātta accent assigned to LAṬ in view of 3.1.2 ādyudāttaś ca must be replaced with the anudātta of 3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau, based on P as an it of tiP. The following is the summary representation of tiṄ-selection:

1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam <parasmaipada>1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam <ātmanepada>1.4.101 tiṅastrīṇitrīṇiprathamamadhya... <prathama>1.4.102 tāny ekavacana-dvivacana... <ekavacana>1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca <vibhakti>1.4.108 śeṣe prathamaḥ <prathama>1.4.22 dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane <ekavacana>The -ti of our string pac + (LAṬ→ti (P→∅) = pac + ti is now assigned the

term sārvadhātuka by rule 3.4.113 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam. This triggers the reconstruction of the term <sārvadhātuka> which, via reverse scanning, leads to application of rule 3.1.68 kartari ŚaP read with 3.1.67 sārvadhātuke yak. This rule introduces affix ŚaP after the verb root pac under the right condition of a sārvadhātuka affix, namely -ti, used with the denotation of kartṛ 'agent.' Notice that rules 3.4.78 tiptasjhisipthastha.. which introduces -ti is in the fourth quarter of adhyāya three. Rule 3.1.68 kartari śap which introduces ŚaP is placed in the first quarter of adhyāya three, even before 3.1.91 dhātoḥ within whose domain


3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ introduced affix LAṬ. The selection of -ti, via reconstruction of LAṬ and tiṄ, not only helps the selection of -ti but also facilitates application of 3.1.68 kartari śap, by way of -ti as right condition of application. This application is made possible by reconstruction of the term <sārvadhātuka>. Our string pac + (Ś→∅)a(P→∅) + ti = pa + a + ti can exit this domain, and with assignment of new term in the Controlling Domain (CD), must gain access to domains of further rule application. A summary representation of terms which facilitated this derivation can be made in the form of a string with rule numbers as follows:

<dhātu / sakarmaka (1.3.1) / pratyaya (3.1.1) / anudātta (3.1.4) / vartamāna (3.2.123) /kartṛ (3.4.68) / LAṬ (3.2.123) / tiṄ (3.4.78) / parasmaipada (1.4.99) / prathama (1.4.101) / vibhakti (1.4.104) / ekavacana (1.4.12) / pada (1.4.14)>

(4) bhṛtyaḥ 'servant'Participant: <kartṛ>Action pac 'to cook' <viklitti / dhātu / sakarmaka /+ kartṛ>bhṛtyaḥ 'servant'step #1bhṛtya <prātipadika>1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam 'that which is

meaningful (arthavat), non-root (adhātuḥ) and non-affix (apratyayaḥ) is termed prātipadika'

1.4.53 svatantraḥ karttā; 'kartṛ is independent (svatantra)'→bhṛtya 'servant' <prātipadika; kartṛ>step #2bhṛtya → bhṛtya + sU4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt 'an affix occurs after that which is marked with

ṅyāp, or else is a nominal stem'4.1.2 su-au-jas-am-auṭ-śas-ṭā-bhyām-bhis-ṅe-bhyām-bhyas-ṅasi-bhyām-

bhyas-ṅas-os-ām-ṅi-os-sup 'the nominal endings sUP'→ bhṛtya + sU#sUP-selection2.3.1 anabhihite 'when not already expressed'2.3.64 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā'prathamā

'nominative' is used when sense of the nominal stem (prātipadikārtha), gender (liṅga) and number (vacana), alone, is to be expressed'

<prātipadika / kartṛ / sUP / sU / ekavacana>→bhṛtya + sU


1.4.22 dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane 'dvivacana 'dual' and ekavacana 'singular' occur when 'two-ness, duality' and 'one-ness, singularity' is to be denoted'

<ekavacana>1.4.100 ...trīṇi trīṇi... 'each triad...'1.4.102 tāny ekavacana-dvivacana-bahuvacanāny ekaśaḥ 'elements of

triads of tiṄ are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other'

<ekavacana>1.4.103 supaḥ 'elements of triads of sUP are termed ekavacana,

dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other' <sUP>1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca 'triads of sUP, and tiṄ, are termed vibhakti'step #3 <vibhakti>bhṛtya + s(U →∅) = bhṛtya + s1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi... <aṅga>6.4.1 aṅgasya (no rule application in the aṅga domain)1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam <pada>1.4.110 virāmo' vasānam <avasāna>1.2.41 apṛkta ekāl pratyayaḥ 'an affix formed with a single sound segment

is termed apṛkta' <apṛkta>step #48.1.16 padasya 'of that which is a pada' <pada>8.2.66 sasajuṣo ruḥ → bhṛtya + (s→r (U~→∅) →bhṛtya + r8.3.15 kharavasānayor visarjanīyaḥ <avasāna>→bhṛtya + (r→ḥ) = bhṛtyaḥ 'servant' <pada>Referential Index<prātipadika / kartṛ / vibhakti / prathamā/ sU / ekavacana / pada / avasāna

/ apṛkta>The derivation of pada (4) bhṛtyaḥ 'servant' begins with the base-input

bhṛtya which is assigned the term prātipadika by rule 1.2.46 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ... of the Controlling Domain (CD). Our string bhṛtya <prātipadika> is now sent to the Obligatory Domain (OD) for locating an interior domain where possibility of rule application is indicated by the term prātipadika. The interior domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadika is selected because the rule is formed with the term prātipadika in it. The application of rule 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣtābhyām... poses the problem of selecting one sUP affix out of twenty-one. Similar to tiṄ-selection of (1) pacati, recourse must be taken to reconstruct the referential index of sUP. The selection of the nominative (prathamā) singular (ekavacana)


ending (vibhakti) will be made by bringing the following rule close to its context via reconstruction of referential index of sUP:

1.4.102 tāny ekavacana-dvivacana-bahuvacanāny ekaśa 'elements of triads of tiṄ are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other' <ekavacana>1.4.103 supaḥ 'elements of triads of sUP are termed ekavacana, dvivacana and bahuvacana, one after the other' 1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca 'triads of sUP, and tiṄ, are termed vibhakti'1.4.22 dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane'ekavacana 'singular' and dvivacana 'dual' are used when singularity and duality is denoted'2.3.1 anabhihite 'when not expressed otherwise'2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā 'prathamā is introduced when nothing but the sense of the nominal stem (prātipadikārtha), gender (liṅga), measure (parimāṇa) and number (vacana) is denoted'Note here that this selection of -sU is made under the restrictive provision

of 2.3.1 anabhihite. This rule can allow the selection of a sUP if its denotaum is not already expressed otherwise. Since pacati has already expressed the named kartṛ of the sentence, bhṛtya must now be introduced with the nominative singular -sU to express nothing but its own sense (prātipadikārtha), per rule 2.3.46 prātipadikārthaliṅgaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā .' Our string bhṛtya + s (U→∅) is now sent to the Controlling domain where it is assigned the term pada (1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam). This term then facilitates scanning of domain headings beyond adhyāya five (Obligatory Domain), and thereby access to the domain of rules headed by 8.1.16 padasya. Rule 8.2.66 sasajuṣo ruḥ then replaces the -s with r (Ũ→∅), thereby yielding bhṛtya + r. This -r is then replaced with visarjanīya of rule 8.3.15 kharavasānayor visarjanīyaḥ . Note however that rule 8.3.15 turns the -s turned -r to visarga under the condition of -s termed apṛkta (1.2.41 apṛkta ekāl pratyayaḥ). We now have bhṛtya +(r→ḥ) = bhṛtyaḥ, a pada.

The derivational history of bhṛtyaḥ can be captured with the following string of terms of its referential index which guided the derivation:

<prātipadika (1.2.45) / kartṛ (1.4.53) / sUP (4.1.2) / vibhakti (1.4.104) / prathamā (2.3.46) / sU (4.1.2) /ekavacana (1.4.22 ) / pada (1.4.53) / avasāna (1..4.110 ) / apṛkta (1.2.41)>

(5) vana 'forest' <prātipadika; adhikaraṇa>1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt


1.4.45 ādhāro' dhikaraṇam#similar to step #2 of (4) bhṛtyah4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ... # sUP-selection2.3.1 anabhihite2.3.36 saptamyadhikaraṇe ca→vana + Ṅi →6.1.87 ād guṇaḥ (6.1.72 saṃhitāyām) (6) kāṣṭha 'wood' <prātipadika; karaṇa>1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prāipadikam4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt1.4.42 sādhakatamam karaṇam#similar to step #2 of (4) bhṛtyah4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...2.3.1 anabhihite2.3.18 kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā→ kāṣṭha + bhis 1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi pratyaye' ṅgam 6.4.1 aṅgasyakāṣṭha + bhis 7.1.9 ato bhis ais→ kāṣṭha (bhis→ais)kāṣṭha + ai(s→ḥ) →kāṣṭhaiḥ 'woods,' a pada(7) odana 'rice' <prātipadika; karman> 1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prāipadikam4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma#similar to step #2 of (4) bhṛtyah4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...→odana + am6.1.72 saṃhitāyām6.1.106 ami pūrvaḥ→odan(a+a→a)m = odanam= odanam 'rice,' a pada (8) sthālī <prātipadika; adhikaraṇa1.4.45 ādhāro' dhikaraṇam...(9) kumbhakārāya1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prāipadikam4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt


1.4.49 karmaṇā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam#similar to step #2 of (4) bhṛtyah4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...2.3.1 anabhihite2.3.13 caturthī sampradāne→ kumbhakāra + Ṅe1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi pratyaye' ṅgam 6.4.1 aṅgasya7.1.13 ṅer yaḥ→ kumbhakāra + (Ṅe→ya)= kubhakāra + ya 7.3.102 supi ca→ kumbhakār (a→ā ) + ya= kumbhakārāya(10) kumbhakāraḥ(a) ḌūkṛÑ → 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ <dhātu>→ 1.3.3 halantyam→ 1.3.5 ādirñiṭuḍavaḥ→1.3.9 tasya lopaḥ (it-deletion)(Ḍū→∅)kṛ(Ñ→∅) = kṛ(b) kṛ → 3.1.91 dhātoḥ1.1.62 asmād ity uttarasya3.1.1 pratyayaḥ3.1.2 paraś ca3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca <ādyudātta>3.2.1 karmaṇy aṇ <karman>3.1.92 tatropadama saptamīstham <upapada>

'that which is specified in this domain of dhātoḥ with the saptamī 'locative' is termed upapada 'conjoined pada'

3.4.67 kartari kṛt <kaṛtṛ>kṛ + a(Ṇ→∅) = kṛ + a (it -deletion)1.4.49 kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma <karman>2.3.1 anabhihite2.3.65 karṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti <karman / kartṛ>→kumbha + am→kumbha + ām kṛ + a2.2.19 upapadam atiṅ <upapada>2.1.3 prākkaḍārāt samāsaḥ <samāsa>→kumbha am kāra


1.2.46 kṛt-taddhitasamāsāś ca <prātipadika>2.4.71 supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ→kumbha + (am→∅) + kāra= kumbhakāra 'pot-maker'Our base input for deriving kumbhakāra is verb root kṛ 'to do, make' which

,in turn, is assigned the term <dhātu>. This serves as a mark for guiding the string for acces to the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ. Rule 3.2.1 karmaṇy aṇ then applies to introduce affix aṆ. The locative singular (saptamī-ekavacana) of karmaṇi of this rule serves as a mark for bringing rule 3.1.92 tatropapadaṃ saptamīstham 'that which is specified with a locative (saptamīstham) in this domain of dhātoḥ is termed an upapada 'a coinjoined pada.' If a choice is made to introduce affix aṆ after kṛ, a pada denoting karman must be brought close to this context of kṛ. Selection of a nominal ending with the denotation of karman must be made in consonance with the condition of 2.3.1 anabhihite 'not already stated, otherwise.' We realize that the affix which is to be introduced, namely aṆ, is a kṛt (3.4.67 kartari kṛt ) affix, and hence it would denote kartṛ. We may now select the genitive (ṣaṣṭhī) plural ending -ām of rule 2.3.36 kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti. Note that 2.3.36 allows genitive to denote katṛ or karman, when they are not already expressed otherwise, and when a kṛt (non-tiṄ; 3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ) affix follows in construction. This is what enables us to meet the condition of 2.3.1 anabhihite, and select genitive plural to express karman. The kartṛ is already expressed with kāra. The derivational string at this stage is: kumbha + ām kṛ + aṆ. It has the referential index of <dhātu, upapada, pratyaya, kṛt, ady udātta>. Rule 1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis tadādi pratyaye' ṅgam assigns the term aṅga. The string is sent to the domain of 6.4.1 aṅgasya where rule 7.2.115 aco' ñṇiti applies to replace ṛ of the aṅga with its vṛddhi counterpart ār. This application yields kumbha + ām k(ṛ→ār) a(Ṇ→∅) = kumbha + am kāra. The term upapada must now guide the derivation. Rule 2.2.19 upapadam atiṅ allows the formation of a compound (2.1.3 samāsaḥ) which yields kumbha + am + kāra. This string is then assigned the new term prātipadika 'nominal stem.' This leads to application of rule 2.4.71 supo dhātuprātipadikayoḥ whereby a sUP, here - am of kumbha + am + kāra, is subject to deletion by LUK. We now have kumbha (am→∅)kāra = kumbhakāra, a derived nominal base (prātipadika).

This completes the derivational history of fully derived words (padas) which form simple sentences. I have also shown the derivation of kumbhakāra which is a derived nominal base termed compound. I now produce the first two sentences which formed the basis of the preceding derivational description :

(1) bhṛtyaḥ vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ odanam pacati kumbhakārāya'servant cooks rice in forest in a pot with firewood for maker of pots'


(2) bhṛtyena vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanaḥ pacyate kumbhakārāya'rice is cooked by servant in forest in a pot with firewood for maker of pots'Since sentence (2) is the passive counterpart (karmavācya) of the first,

the grammar must have a mechanism whereby sentence (1) can be related with (2). Consider the the derivational string of sentence (1) at step where -ti is selected to replace LAṬ:

pac → pac + LAṬ <placement of affix>3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ 'current time'3.4.69 laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ{(sakarmaka (+kartṛ ) / (+karman))}→pac + ( LAṬ→ti) + pac + tiReferential Index<dhātu / sakarmaka / pratyaya / anudātta /vartamāna / kartṛ / LAṬ / parasmaipada / tiṄ / vibhakti / prathama / ekavacana>Notice that affix LAṬ is here introdced after a transitive (sakarmaka) verb

root under the condition of current time (vartamāna). Its selection is made with the intent of denoting kartṛ and karman. The selection of the vartamāna, kartṛvācya, prathama-puruṣa ekavacana vibhakti 'third person singular present indicative active ending' -ti is made with the choice of expressing kartṛ 'agent.' Since the kartṛ is already expressed here with -ti, rule 2.3.1 anabhihite can only allow the selection of prathamā vibhakti 'nominative singular' after bhṛtya, the named agent of the sentence (1) bhṛtyaḥ... pacati, to express its nominal stem notion (prātipadikārtha). The derived sentence is thus an active (kartṛvācya). The derivational system of the grammar relates active sentences with their passive counterparts at the level of tiṄ-selection. More accurately, at the time of making the choice of expressing kartṛ, karman and bhāva. If the choice is made to express the kartṛ, the sentence will be active:

(1) bhṛtyaḥ vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ odanam pacati kumbhakārāya If the choice is made to express the karman, instead, the sentence will be

passive:(2) bhṛtyena vane kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanaḥ pacyate kumbhakārāyaA decision to express karman with the replacement of LAṬ will not allow

-ti as a replacement. The referential index of LA would facilitate the selection of the ātmanepada 'middle' ending -te, as against the parasmaipada 'active' ending -ti (1.4.99-1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam). The selection of -te 'third person singular middle' will be made in accord with the following rule:

1.3.13 bhāvakarmaṇoḥ 'ātmanepada is introduced (as a replacement of LA) after a verbal root when bhāva 'root sense' and karman 'object' are denoted'


The term sārvadhātuka which was assigned to -ti of the active would still be assigned to -te of the middle, and would lead, via scanning, to 3.1.68 sārvadhātuke yak, as against 3.1.68 (sārvadhātuke) kartari śap, whereby affix yaK will be introduced. The instrumental ending -Ṭā (tṛtīyā; bhṛtya + Ṭā) must now be introduced after bhṛtya (2.3.18 kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā) to yield bhṛtyena because -te of the verb expresses the karman 'object.' Since the karman 'object' is now expressed by the verb, the singular nominal ending prathamā 'nominative' must be introduced after odana, the named karman of the sentence. We thus get the passive sentence:

(2) bhṛtyena vane odanaḥ sthālyāṃ pacyate kumbhakārāyaIt becomes clear that Pāṇini, by offering the choice of expression of kartṛ ,

karman and bhāva at the level of the LA-affix, derives related sentences such as active and passive. Sentences (1) and (2) illustrate the choice of expression of kartṛ and karman in relation to a transitive (sakarmaka) action. What if one has sentence (3) mūrkho hasati 'the idiot' laughs' where -ti is denoting the named kartṛ, and the nominative singular (sU) after mūrkha is expressing the sense of the nominal stem (prātipadikārtha). Since the verb is intransitive (akarmaka) it has only two choices of expression: kartṛ and bhāva. Incidentally, expression of bhāva is always made with the third person sinular. If one chooses to express bhāva with -te, unlike the karman of sentence (2), one would derive sentence (4) mūrkheṇa hasyate, 'the idiot laughs,' a non-passive where the -te of the verb is expressing bhāva 'root-sense.' Recall that there are two kinds of agents: svatantra kartṛ 'independent agent' (1.4.53 svatantraḥ karttā) and prayojaka-kartṛ 'instigator (causal) agent' (1.4.54 tatprojako hetuś ca). What if one wants to express the causal agent, as against, the independent one? This choice of expressing the causal agent is made available in connection with causal actions. Consider the following sentences:

(11) devadattaḥ kaṭaṃ karoti 'D makes a mat'(12) devadattena kaṭaḥ kriyate 'a mat is made by D'(13) devadattaḥ yajñadattena kaṭaṃ kārayati'D has Y make a mat'(14) devadattena yajñadattena kaṭaḥ kāryate'a mat is made by Y at the instigation of D'(15) yajañadattaḥ kaṭaṃ karoti, taṃ devadattaḥ prerayati'Y makes a mat, D inspires him'(16) devadattaḥ kaṭaṃ kurvantaṃ yajñadattaṃ prerayati 'D inspires Y while Y is making a mat'Note that sentence (13) is a causal sentence where the transitive action

names two agents. One must derive a causative verb root before selection of


LAṬ. For this, verbal root kṛ must, after term assignment by 1.3.1 bhūvādayo..., be sent to the domain of 3.1.22 dhātor ekāco halādeḥ... 'an affix is to be introduced after a verb root beginning with a consonant, and formed with a single vowel....' Rule 3.1.26 hetumati ca will introduce affix ṆiC after kṛ to yield k(ṛ→ār) ṆiC = kāri. Rule 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ will assign the term dhātu to kāri. It will now be sent to the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ, and selection of LAṬ, etc., would yield the active and passive sentences with their causal active and passive forms. Notice kurvantam, the gerundive nominal base kurvat derived form kṛ with introduction of affix tṛC (3.3.133 ṇvultṛcau). Now recall the derived nominal base kumbhakāra of sentence (1), used in the dative kumbhakārāya. The kāra of kumbhakāra is a constituent which enters the obligatory compound formation with kumbha + am. The obligatory nature of compound formation does not allow kāra to be used independently as a word with the denotation of its meaning kāra as in *kāraḥ gacchati 'the doer goes.' If one wants to express the meaning of 'doer,' one must follow a different path in derivation. One must then not introduce the LA-affix after the verb (whether derived or simple), and introduce a kṛt-affix, instead. This would facilitate derivation of forms such as karttā 'doer,' kāraka 'doer,' kurvat 'doing,' kṛta 'done,' kṛtavat 'did,' kṛtvā 'having done,' etc. Pāṇini offers the derivation of these forms by offeringdifferent domains of rule application. These domains are clearly marked with the choice of expression in case of verb roots. Derived bases such as kumbhakāra, and other compound bases are covered by 2.1.1 samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ.

The domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt has three interior domains marked by 4.1.2 svaujasṃauṭ..., 4.1.3 striyām and 4.1.76 taddhitāḥ. Rule 4.1.1 requires a nominal stem as an input. If the nominal stem opts for application of 4.1.2 it derives a fully derived word (pada). If it opts for access to the domain of 4.1.3 striyām it would yield a form ending in the feminine affixes. This resultant form must go again to the domain of 4.1.1 for application of 4.1.2, thereby to yield a pada. If the initial input accesses the domain of 4.1.76 taddhitāḥ, it would yield a nominal stem, and hence would seek access to the domain of 4.1.1 for application of 4.1. 2 yielding a pada. This pada, depending on its syntactic relation with another pada, can form an input to application in the domain of 4.1.82 samarthābhyām prathamād vā. The domain of 4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt is in many ways offers cyclic application for the nominal base inputs. The domains of 3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ and 3.1.91 dhātoḥ similarly offer applicational choices for verbal base inputs. This is how the Aṣṭādhyāyī derives simple and complex bases. This is how simple sentences are related with their complex counterparts.


It is clear from the preceding that the derivational mechanism of the Aṣṭādhyāyī requires Conceptual Structure (CS) of sentences for purpose of derivation. A CS represents an action complex where <action> is central. An action, depending on its nature, may name agent (katṛ), object (karman), Instrument (karaṇa), dative (sampradāna), ablative (apādāna), and locative(adhikaraṇa) as participants (kāraka). Note that agent (kartṛ) is the independent (svatantra) participant (kāraka), and hence is accepted as primary participant in the action complex represented by the CS. All other participants are brought into action at the call of the agent, and thus facilitate accomplishing the action. Verb roots represent action, and nominal stems represent participants. Other nominal stems which are inserted in the string make notional representation. All lexical entries in the string at this stage are recognized either as dhātu, or as prātipadika. Both the dhātu and prātipadika have two kinds each.

4. Summary of the Derivational MechanismThe derivational mechanism of the Aṣṭādhyāyī makes use of a network of

bases and affixes to derive padas with application of select operations.

A. Fully derived words (pada)A fully derived word which either ends in a sUP (4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ...), or

in a tiṄ affix is termed pada (1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam).

B. Bases (prakṛti) 1. Verb base <dhātu>(a) Simple Verbal base: Roots listed in the group headed by bhū 'to be,

become' and its likes, are termed dhātu (1.3.1 bhāvādayo dhātavaḥ). Examples: bhū 'to be, become,' pac 'to cook,' etc.

(b) Derived Verb base: Word forms which end in affixes saN, etc. (3.1.32 sanādyantā dhātavaḥ) are termed dhātu. Examples: jigamiṣa 'to wish to go,' putrīya 'wishes a son of his own,' pāci 'causative; to have someone cook.'

2. Nominal Bases <prātipadika>(a) Simple Nominal: Word forms which are meaningful (arthavad), non-

root (adhātuḥ) and non-affix (apratyayaḥ; 1.2.45 arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam) are termed prātipadika. Examples, harma, karma, yoga.

(b) Derived Nominal (strīpratyayānta): Word forms which either end in a kṛt, or in taddhita affix, or else, are compounds (samāsa; 1.2.46 kṛttaddhita-samāsāś ca). Examples: aupagava 'male descendant of Upago,' kumbhakāra 'pot-maker,' rājapuruṣa 'king's servant.'


There is one more derived nominal base which I would like to recognize as part of the derivational system:

(c) Word-forms which end in the feminine affixes CāP / ṬāP / ḌāP; ṄīP / ṄīṢ / ṄīN (4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt, 4.1.3 striyām).

C. Affixes (pratyaya)I shall here present the basic classification of affixes which are necessarily

brought into operations at important levels of derivation. The following order of their listing is preferred here for derivational reasons:

(i) LA-affixes:There are ten abstract LA-affixes which are replaced with tiṄ (3.4.78

tiptasjhi...), and also with affixes. Six of them are marked with -Ṭ: laṭ / liṭ / luṭ / lṛṭ / leṭ / loṭ; four are marked with -Ṅ: laṅ / liṅ / luṅ / lṛṅ (shown with upper case letters):

Marked with <Ṭ> Marked with <Ṅ>LAṬ (3.2.123 vartamāne laṭ) LAṄ (3.2.111 anadyatane laṅ)LIṬ (3.2.115 parokṣe liṭ) LIṄ (3.3.173 āśiṣi liṅloṭau)LUṬ (3.3.15 anadyatane luṭ) LUṄ (3.2.110 luṅ)LṚṬ (3.3.13 lṛṭ bhaviṣyati...) LṚṄ (3..3139 liṅnimitte lṛṅ kriyā...)LEṬ (3.4.7 liṅarthe leṭ...) LOṬ (3.4.162 loṭ ca)(ii) The tiṄ -affixes:The tiṄ-affixes are a set of eighteen verbal endings which are classed into

two sets of parasmaipada 'active' and ātmanepada 'middle' (1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam; 1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam)). Each set of three triads refers to the third (prathama), second (madhyama) and first persons (uttama), rerspectively. Individual forms in each triad refer to singular (ekavacana), dual (dvivacana) and plural (bahuvacana). They are also termed vibhakti (1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca). These tiṄ-affixes are generally replace LA-affixes (3.4.77 lasya, 3.4.78 tiptasjhi...), and are classified into two classes of sārvadhātuka and ārdhadhātuka (3.4.113-114 tiṅśit sārvadhātukam-ārdhadhātukaṃ...). They denote kartṛ and karman after a transitive (sakarmaka) verb root, and kartṛ and bhāva after an intransitive (akarmaka).

(iii)The kṛt -affixesThe non-tiṄ affixes which are introduced after verbal bases in the domain

of dhātoḥ 'after a verb root' are called kṛt (3.1.93 kṛd atiṅ). They are introduced with the general denotatum of kartṛ (3.4.67kartari kṛt).

(iv)The kṛtya affixes:The kṛtya-affixes are also introduced after verbal bases within the domain

of 3.1.91 dhāItoḥ, beginning with rule 3.1.95 kṛtyāḥ prior to rule 3.1.133


ṇvultṛcau. They represent a sub-set within the kṛt -affixes, and are also offered with theb denotation of bhāva 'root-sense' and karman 'object.'

(v)The sUP affixes:The sUP are a set of twenty-one vibhakti affixes classified into seven

triads where each triad has forms for singular, dual and plural (4.1.2 svaujasmauṭchaṣṭābhyām...). These are introduced after all nominal bases (prātipadika), and also after forms which end in the feminine affixes marked with ṅyāp (4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt). Note here that a form which ends in a kṛt or taddhita āf̄fix, or is a compound (samāsa), is also called a nominal stem.

(vi)The taddhita affixes:Affixes introduced in the domain of 4.1.76 taddhitāḥ are called taddhita.

They are introduced after all nominal bases (prātipadika), and also after forms which end in the feminine affixes marked with ṅyāp (4.1.1 ṅyāp-prātipadikāt). Additionally, they may be introduced after the first among syntactically related nominal padas (4.1.82 samarthānāṃ prathamād vā). There are two additional terms introduced for some of these affixes (gotra and yuvan).

D. Levels of Derivation:The derivational mechanism of the Aṭādhyāyī primarily operates on two

levels of naming and expressing, with reference to the Action Complex (AC) of the Conceptual Structure (CS) of sentences:

(1) CS1:'x accomplishes the action of making y at the current time'bhṛtyaḥ ghaṭaṃ karoti 'servant makes a pot'AC1: <kartṛ> Action: <dhātu>Level 1: Naming: <term assignment>bhṛtya <kartṛ> Action: pac <dhātu><prātipadika / kartṛ> <dhātu / sakarmaka>1.2.45 arthavad... 1.3.1 bhūvādayo...Level 2: <domain access / affix placement>

<adhikāra / pratyaya>bhṛtya <kartṛ/ prātipadika> pac <dhātu/ sakarmaka>1.2.45 arthavad... 3.1.7 dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ...4.1.1 ṅyāp-prāt... 3.1.91 dhātoḥ4.1.2 svaujas...<sUP / prātipadika>

3.1.123 vartamāne laṭ <LAṬ>4.1.3 striyām <dhātu / laṭ / vartamāna>4.1.76 taddhitāḥ 3.4.77 tasya


4.1.82 samarthānāṃ 3.4.78 tiptasjhi... <tiṄ>

<rule Context>3.1.1 pratyayaḥ3.1.2 paraś ca3.1.3 ādyudāttaś ca3.1.4 anudāttau suppitau

<sUP-selection> <tiṄ-selection>

<agreement>1.4.99 laḥ parasmaipadam1.4.100 taṅānāv ātmanepadam1.4.101 tiṅas trīṇi trīṇi prathama....1.4.102 tāny ekavacana...1.4.103 supaḥ1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca1.4.105 yuṣmady upapade...1.4.106 prahāse ca manyopapapade...1.4.107 asmady uttamaḥ1.4.108 śeṣe prathamaḥ1.4.21 bahuṣu bahuvacanam1.4.22 dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane

E. Terms (assigned for exiting the Obligatory Domain)1.4.109 paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṃhitā <6.1.72 saṃhitāyām>1.4.13 yasmāt pratyayavidhis... <6.4.1 aṅgasya>1.4.14 suptiṅantaṃ padam <8.1.16 padasya>1.4.18 yaci bham <6.4.129 bhasya>Other terms, depending on the base-input, and inputs yielded by

individual applications, may be assigned to direct operations.

F. Conventions:(1) A base-input, i.e. dhātu and prātipadikā, when made input to the

controlling domain (CD; the first adhyāya of the grammar) activates this grammatical device with assignment of term (saṃjñā-kārya) to the base-input(s). For example, the assignment of the term <dhātu> to pac by 1.3.1 bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ, and of the term <prātipadika> to bhṛtya by 1.2.45 arthavad adhātur... This process can be called <Term Assignment>.


(2) A base-input must gain access to the Obligatory Domain (OD; adhyāya three through five) of the grammar for scanning of domain headings (adhikāra) for possible rule application. A heading formed with the term assigned to the base-input locates the domain for possible rule application. For example, pac, the base-input which is assigned the term <dhātu>, can opt for possible rule application in the domain of 3.1.5 guptijkidbhyaḥ san, 3.1.7 dhātoḥ..., and 3.1.91 dhātoḥ, if it meets required condition. Access to the domain of possible rule application is made fairly automatic by assignment of the term, this case ,<dhātu।> .

(3) Access to, and application of a rule within a domain, must be made in consonance with syntactico-semantic specification of the CS, and terms currently assigned. This is the reason why pac was sent to the domain of 3.1.91 dhātoḥ.

(4) Each time a definitional term and abbreviated symbol is introduced to the derivational string, recourse should be taken to scanning of the domain for possible explanation and application via reconstruction of referential index.

(5) A referential index of definitional terms and symbol must be reconstructed by scanning rules beginning with the Controlling Domain (CD) to the domain which triggers scanning. Terms and symbols of the referential index alone guide a string for further location of domains and thereby rule application.

(6) Operations directed by terms of the referential index must be performed in the order the terms and symbols appear on the index. Operations relative to term1 must be completed before an operation required by term2 is performed.

(7) The string must, after each application, be sent to the Controlling Domain (CD) for possible assignment of new term, and thereby termination of operation in that domain.

(8) The result of each application must be sent to the Controlling Domain (CD) which assigns a new term with reference to which scanning of domains for next possible domain access and rule-application.

IV: Modern Studies On Pāṇini Page 117

IV: Modern Studies On PāṇiniGoldstücker has admirably attacked Boehtlingk,but for Boehtlingk we forget Goldstücker;and Whitney had admirably attacked Pāṇini,but for Pāṇini we forget Whitney;I adore Boehtlingk because he reveals to us the spirit of Pāṇini;I adore Pāṇini because he reveals to us the spirit of India;I adore India because it reveals to us the Spirit, the Spirit.

Faddegon (Staal, 1972: 273)The preceding quote says a great deal about the state of the art in the so-

called Indological world of early Sanskrit studies in Europe. Faddegon stands at this crucial point in history of studies on Pāṇini, especially when not only a change in orientation towards linguistics for the better, but also a shift of venue from Europe to America was quite clearly on the horizon. Whitney would serve as the bridge as far as studies on Pāṇini were concerned. What Faddegon refers to in the above motto of his book, Studies on Pāṇini's Grammar (1936), as 'the spirit of Pāṇini ,' is what Boehtlingk called 'the genius of Pāṇini.' By this time, albeit even way before, Kielhorn had already produced his edition of the Paribhāsenduśekhara of Nāgeśa (1868-1874), and the Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (1880-1885). The Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, and the Kāśikāvṛtti, were, for all practical purposes, established as traditional sources. Boehtlingk brought out the final version of his German translation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī under the title of Pāṇini's Grammatik in 1887. Bhandarkar, Goldstücker and Kielhorn not only helped settle the texts, time and relationship between the three great sages of grammar, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, but their studies cleared the path for some serious studies of Pāṇini on the one hand, and of the Bhāṣya and the other traditional texts on the other. They offered some valuable insights into proper understanding of the Indian grammatical tradition in general, and structure of arguments of Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya with vārttikas, in particular. Kielhorn (1887; Staal, 1972:123-134) wrote his seventh and last article of the series of “notes” on the Mahābhāṣya which dealt with “Some Devices of Indian Grammarians”. This article was clearly focused on the Aṣṭādhyāyī, particularly with the goal of securing 'right interpretation and application of' Pāṇini's rules,' with reference, of course, to the devices 'other than regular Paribhāṣās' of the traditional grammarians. Kielhorn's examples and illustrations of jñāpaka 'indication,' nipātana 'an express application to derive a form where no application is otherwise made available,' anabhidhāna 'non-denotation of (a particular) meaning,' vivakṣā 'desire to speak,'

IV: Modern Studies On Pāṇini

yogavibhāga 'split-formulation of rules' , praśliṣṭa-nirdeśa 'a vocalic specification made with coalition,' and vyavasthita-vibhāṣā 'fixed option,' to just name only a few of major devices, greatly contributed towards interpretation of Pāṇini's rules. Many of the observations of Goldstücker were reviewed by Bhandarkar, and obviously there were some problems in Goldstücker's treatment of Pāṇini, but still his book, Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature (1965), was a good study.

Whitney wrote his Sanskrit Grammar based on literary usage which he prepared with meticulous details and great efforts. But his quasi-empirical (linguistic!) thinking was dulled by his adamant view of Pāṇini and native grammarians as prescritivists, as against his own statistical approach of preparing the corpus of grammar. Whitney was a linguist, and he was writing a grammar of the Sanskrit language, but he had very little patience for Pāṇini and native grammarians. This perhaps was the reason why he did not pay even the slightest attention to statements of Patañjali, though he recognized that Pāṇini should be studied by specialists, albeit not for teaching Sanskrit. He recognized the long tradition of grammar of the Hindus but he would not spare any praise for them. He considered brevity as the biggest weakness of Pāṇini, mostly because it hampered clear understanding of grammatical rules. He could not accept that Pāṇini's grammar was formulated based on generalizations extracted from usage. That this generalization formed the basis of formulation of rules within the broader relationship of sāmānya, viśeṣa and śeṣa was ignored by Whitney. That Pāṇini's grammar could not excercise any control on usage (loka), and also that the grammarian accepted word as authority (pramāṇa), was not acceptable to Whitney. The Aṣṭādhyāyī was a grammarian's grammar and was certainly not intended as a manual for teaching Sanskrit. It was intended as reference for the learned (śiṣṭāḥ; śiṣṭaparijñānārthā aṣṭādhyāyī). Since Whitney's grammar was written for teaching the Sanskrit language, and also since its corpus of data was based on availability of usage in the literature, there was hardly any chance for use of ingenuity in grammar insofar as predictability of usage was concerned.

Whitney completely ignored the Bhāṣya statements that grammar was a śāstra, and that it presented the analysis of correct words (sādhu-śabda) of the language, both Vedic and Classical, by positing bases and affixes extracted from utterances on the basis of imagination (kalpanā). In this sense Pāṇini's grammar was artificial, though the language which it strived to analyse was correct, as found in usage. Grammar had to be artificial because it was based on the analysis of words by imagining their constituency in terms of bases and affixes. Finally, scholars were not able to accept that Sanskrit was the vernacular language of Pāṇini. Leonard Bloomfield would later on realize that the language Pāṇini and Patañjali described was their own colloquial speech. Bloomfield


studied the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, though not in much detail, but he recognized it as “one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence.” He also noted that ''No other language, to this day, has been so perfectly described” (Staal, 1972:264).

This was the time when study of the Aṣṭādhyāyī was beginning to attract scholars for its study as a grammatical system, in its own right. This was as a result of recognition of Pāṇini's great ingenuity in formulating his grammar. But the question of brevity, and thereby lack of clarity in interpreting his rules still turned many off, and left them frustrated. But this could be only true as for as the area of rule formulation and interpretation was concerned. Very little progress was made in the area of rule interaction and derivation. In fact, scholars had not gone past the earlier observation of Max Müller's that, 'The grammatical system of Hindu grammarians is so peculiar, that rules which we should group together are scattered about in different parts of their manuals.' The study of the notion of ekavākyatā 'single-sentenceness' which Patañjali alluded to in his statement, 'simply because rules are placed at different places in the grammar does not mean they form separate sentences; there is a single sentence relationship even when rules are placed at different places' (Bhāṣya II: 178), had still to take us a longer way, beyond the bounds of anuvṛtti 'recurrence.' Pāṇini still had a great deal to say, of course, by way of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Now consider the following rather long statement of Boehtlingk, as quoted by Faddegon:

''The order of the sūtras may here and there seems strange to us, but it is planned and carried out in a consistent and admirable manner. A perfect conciseness and complete avoidance of all repetitions has been the aim of the author and without any doubt he has attained this. The more thoroughly one studies Pāṇini's grammar, the more one is struck by the acuteness and the successful mastery of the vast matter, shown in it. It is a kind a masterpiece of the first rank. The more recent grammars in which the unchangeable order of sūtras has been tampered with in order to string together everything bearing on the same matter, cannot be understood without the aid of the extensive commentaries, which of necessity continually refer to passages either long past by or not yet arrived at; indeed these grammars must be considered as failures....'

Boehtlingk (Staal, 1972: 275)Faddegon's remarks, made against Boehtlingk's above quotation, are very

insightful, especially as they stress the need for more serious studies into the system of Pāṇini's grammar:


“The reader, however, who reads Pāṇini for the first time, will be painfully struck by the fact that the text of the first chapters totally contradicts the assertion of Boehtlignk. Numerous references to later chapters are also needed here and are indeed given by Boehtlignk himself in his translation. And even these references are not sufficient in number. Already at the second chapter of the second book the reader is overwhelmed by its grammatical intricacies; and when he has finished the eight books, he only possesses a chaotic impression of details. The help afforded by Boehtlignk is insufficient in order to determine the merits of Pāṇini exactly; we want more insight into the total plan, the execution of details; and the idea underlying the pregnant form of expression.'

(Staal, 1972: 275)Faddegon did not have any problem with Boehtlingk's recognition of

Pāṇini as a genius. His observations did not even dispute Pāṇini's 'successful mastery of the vast matter.' He was against subscribing to simplistic view of understanding the order of rules in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. He perhaps also did not like Boehtlingk's sweeping remarks against the commentarial literature. Faddegon's remarks are excerpted from his Acta Orientalia article, “The Mnemotechnics of Pāṇini's Grammar I: The Śiva-sūtra,”. This article, despite some inaccuracies, clearly acknowleges the need for some serious liunguistic studies of Pāṇini's grammar by specialists. Faddegon 'though hardly known as a linguist he had sound judgement in linguistic matters (Staal, 1972:273).' This article should also be credited for making some insightful comments about the system of Pāṇini's grammar:

'Evidently Pāṇini tries in his analysis to separate the ideational aspect from the linguistic expression....'Faddegon chided the so called 'occidental linguists of the latter half of the

nineteenth century' who were 'misled' and who hoped 'to understand language through the exclusive study of its phonal and morphological aspect... as if the application and imitation of physics and a mechanistic psychology were the last word of moral science.' Feddegon's remarks were well placed, especially in view of his subsequent book, Studies on Pāṇini's Grammar (1939) where he discussed the system and structure of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Faddegon must be credited for leading a systematic study of the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a grammatical system. Buiskool, a pupil of Faddegon, republished his study on 'The Tripādī, being an English recast of pūrvatrāsiddham (An Analytical-Synthetical Inquiry into the System of the Last Three Chapters of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī ' in 1939. Staal (1972:273) rightly observes that Buiskool gave a penetrating analysis of


some of the fundamental techniques of Pāṇini's grammar, largely relating to the relative strength of rules and to the concept of asiddhatva.'

It was also shown during these times, and beyond any reasonable doubt, that the Aṣṭādhyāyī could not only be fully understood without help from the vast commentarial literature but must also be understood with the help of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, thereby the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya. With the text of the Mahābhāṣya fairly well established by Kielhorn with identification of vārttikas, and thereby the structure of arguments, it became quite possible to explain the intricasies of Pāṇini's formulations. Paul Thiema brilliantly showed it how in his studies Pāṇini and the Veda: Studies in the Early History of Linguistic Science in India (1935), and Pāṇini and the Pāṇinīyas (1956). His study of vārttika five (ad Pāṇini's 1.1.9 tulyāsyaprayatnaṃ savarṇam; Staal, 1972: 299-332) went beyond the Mahābhāṣya discussion by including the Kāśikāvṛtti of Vāmana-Jayāditya, the Siddhānta-kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita, and the Laghuśabdendu-śekhara of Nāgeśa, pretty much the entire Pāṇinian tradition. Theime's brilliance lies more in presenting the structure of traditional arguments, and thereby identifying clues for proper interpretation of issues on hand, than in offering their correct interpretation.

Noam Chomsky with his Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) presented a theory of linguistics which went against the Zellig Harris' theory of Phrase Structure Grammars (PSG). Harris himself had gone past the Constituent Analysis of morphemes, with common formal properties, and had already abandoned this same in favor of a String Analysis which would offer some middle ground between PSG and the Transformational Generative Grammar (TG). Three things became central to this Chomskyan revolution: grammatical theory, model of grammatical description, and transformations. This was quite a big step beyond PSG and discovery procedures of the Bloomfieldian or neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, or the so-called Finite State Grammars (FSG). Chomsky rejected PSG specially because it was found deficient in handling disjunctive dependency relationship natural to human languages. Chomsky listed some languages and, very effectively showed that natural languages fall outside the generative power of FSG (Sharma, 1978). TG clearly emphasize on a theory of language with explicitness condition of simplicity, and elegance. Elegance required grammar to be equipped with minimum metatheoretic formulations, based on generality. It also required power of predictability, in the sense that a model of grammatical description be able to generate infinity of correct sentences of the language with limited formulation of rules. Standards of correctness were based on the twin notions of grammaticality, and acceptability. Language for the first time was viewed as a set


of sentences. Grammar was likewise viewed as a set of limited number of ordered rules capable of generating infinity of sentences. This generative power of grammar accepted two levels of deep and surface structures, where deep structure would generate forms which could then be mapped into surface forms with the help of transformations. The idea of a deep structure was based on abstract semantico-syntactic representation of sententences.

Chomsky raised the issues of grammaticality and acceptability with the following sentences:

i. Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.ii. Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.

Whereas (i) is a perfectly grammatical English sentence, albeit semantically, it does not make much sense. This same, however, could not be said about sentence (ii) which reads sentence (i) in the reverse, and is grammatically not acceptable. It is not that the Indian tradition of Linguistics did not consider these issues. Consider the following sentences:

iii. eṣa bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpakṛtaśekharaḥ /kūrmakṣiracaye snātaḥ śaśaśṛṅgadhanurdharaḥ //‘there goes the son of a barren woman, his hair-top bedecked with sky-flower, having bathed with tortoise milk, carrying a bow made with rabbit's horns’

iv. agninā sinñcati pādapān devadattaḥ‘Devadatta waters plants with fire’

v. udahāri bhagini yā tvaṃ kumbhaṃ harasi śirasā anaḍvānaṃ sācīnaṃ abhidhāvantam adrākṣīḥ30

‘O, you sister, carrying a jar (of water by your) head, did you see any bull running sideways’

Sentence (iii) is perfectly grammatical though semantically unacceptable. Sentence (iv) is not any different than (iii). Sentence (v) illustrates some degree of in comprehension to which a listener-reader must be in tune with, especially as order of words in sentences is concerned. Since Sanskrit is a relatively word order free language, sentence (v) may have different renditions. These renditions depending on change of order of words could further play on the power of comprehension of an ideal reader-listener. A Pāṇinian would not only derive perfectly grammatical sentences such as the above, but would also resolve the problem of semantic unacceptability by accepting that such expressions of meaning are nothing but speaker's intent, backed by imagination (kalpanā). The grammar itself extracts grammatical elements, for example bases and affixes, based on imagination (kalpanayā padāni pravibhajya...). It is interesting to note in this connection that the notion of bi-uniqueness of


phonemes may be traced, though in a different context, to Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, more particularly to his discussion of yūpaḥ / kūpaḥ / sūpaḥ. This reminds us of the descriptive linguists idea of minimal pairs of utterances in contrast. Patañjali mentions them in connection with the question whether a part of an utterance, or the utterance as a whole, is responsible for denotation of meaning.

Vidya Niwas Mishra (1966) gets the credit for presenting a systematic study of descriptive techniques of Pāṇini. Mishra's presentation is based on traditional sources and is trustworthy. van Nooten (1967, 1970) essentially presented the morphology of active finite verbs by way of replacement techniques, and of vocalic declensions by way of high-lighting 'those sections of the grammar that function in the formation of the declensional paradigm.' van Nooten's detailed analysis presents materials 'to illustrate Paṇini's technique as applied to the structure of the Sanskrit active finite verb.' His detailed presentation is very informative. He may also be correct in conceiving Pāṇini's grammar as a machine, an automation, where the component parts of speech are selected on the initiative of an ordered mind....' van Nooten is aware that, after the selection of these categories, 'search for their manifestations' is undertaken. 'When these grammatical elements are adjoined in the correct order, their processing is taken over by the machinery of morphology, which drives them with inexorable certainty to the realization of the correct, pronouncable word or so the gramamr hopes.' van Nooten clearly understands two levels of naming and selection of named elements, but fails to not only recognize how, in what stage of derivation the grammar actually does that. He takes the selectional restriction rules for granted. This is where he misses the syntax of the morphology he has so ably presented. He misses the important role of rule 2.3.1 anabhihite, in the context of selection of tiṄ-replacements of a LA-affix; he also misses its role in the selection of lexicalization by sUP of rule 4.1.2 svaujasmauṭ... If he would have paid careful attention to 'how' and 'in what order' selection rules apply, he would have recognized the perspective of syntax in his derivation of paradigmatic forms.

Credit must go to J.F. Staal (1965) who, by drawing a 'comparison between the methods employed by the Greek mathematician Euclid and the Indian linguist Pāṇini,' drew considerable attention of linguists to Pāṇini's grammar. He discussed the Methodological Principles of the Sanskrit Grammarians, and showed those principles at work in his papers on 'Reification, Quotation and Nominalization' (1965) and 'Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini' (1969). These studies were clearly pursued in search of a model of grammatical description (perhaps in Pāṇini) similar to the transformational


generative grammar. This was the time when grammar would be fully established as a set of limited number of ordered rules capable of generating infinite number of sentences of language. Pāṇini would prove rather easy for comparison since his Aṣṭādhyāyī was certainly a set of limited number of ordered rules. Whether or not the Pāṇinian model could derive the infinity of correct Sanskrit senteces depended on a number of other things, for example the idea of 'deep' and 'surface' structures, and 'transformations.'

Kiparsky (1982), similar to Kiparsky and Staal (1969), posited four levels of Paṇinian derivational schema: (i) semantics, (ii) abstract syntax, (iii) surface structure and (iv) phonetics. Kiparsky, with reference to the derivation of devadattaḥ odanam pacati 'devadatta cooks rice,' plugs in lexical items, devadatta <masculine, singular>, odana <masculine, singular, goal>, pac <current time...>, with diacritics indicating morphological idiosyncracies. His string, at the abstract syntactic level, will also involve the kāraka and LAṬ. At the surface structure level devadatta and odana will have the nominative singular ending sU and accusative singular -am, respectively. The verbal surface string will have pac - ti. A Paṇinian would find this schema puzzling, especially in view of how Pāṇini would derive devadattaḥ odanam pacati. First of all Pāṇini does not begin with semantics and abstract syntax. The first two levels of Kiparsky's schema may well be identified as the deep structure of TG. Secondly, this deep structure will have to be very shallow as far as the Pāṇinian derivational mechanism is concerned. For, assignment of the kāraka categories, and their lexicalization in vibhaktis, whether verbal or nominal, is pretty much part of the derivational process which clearly operates at two levels of naming and expressing. Assignment of terms such as prātipadika and dhātu, and also aṅga, pada, and bha, even saṃhitā, to resultant formal strings, is also an important part of the derivational process. This aspect of derivational function cannot be ignored since terms not only facilitate access to domains of rule application, but also help locate and apply rules. Kiparsky's model is not a model similar to Pāṇini. It is a model developed on the line of TG to capture what Pāṇini's derivational mechanism does. If one compares the derivational process indicated by Patañjali, and appealed for adoption by interpretive conventions of kāryakāla and yathoddeśa (cf. this paper), one could clearly see vast differences between the Pāṇinian system and the TG. Since TG aimed for universals of grammar, and also since, in all seriousness, it lacked any evaluation procedure for classes of grammars, it failed. The TG model proposed for Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, by Staal and Kiparsky, was destined to be a failure.

Kiparsky in his book, Pāṇini as a Variationist (1979) made two interesting claims: (a) that Pāṇini made a three-way distinction in stylistic preferences


among variants marked by anyatarasyām, vā and vibhāṣā, and (b) that the Indian grammatical tradition starting with the time of Patañjali to reaching its peak its peak in Bhartṛhari, Nāgeśa and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, remained ignorant of these stylistic preferences, for the tradition with absolutely no dissenting voice whatsoever claims that Pāṇini used these three terms synonymously to denote optionality. Kiparsky attempts to systematically compare 'what Pāṇini's optional rules say with what Sanskrit authors do.' His evidence includes the Vedic usage, early Sanskrit literature, and also the language of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Based on his analysis of 156 rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, he groups Pāṇini's technical terms into two classes of 'Primitive' and 'Theoretical.' Options indicated by anyatarasyām and vā are accepted by him as 'Neutral' and 'Preferred'; options indicated by 'vibhāṣā' are termed 'Rare.' Kiparsky's book is rather well researched, and his presentation is methodical and persuasive. However, his arguements are not convincing enough, as more research is needed both in the collection of data and analysis of additional ways, for example ca, bahulam, ekeṣām, ubhayathā, Pāṇini uses to indicate option. Finally, some criteria must be developed to determine what Pāṇini means when he uses different terms. It is believed that an effort to assign different degrees of variation to each one of these termes, or their subgroups, will fail. Questions have been raised in connection with this study whether one should resort to 'bare reasoning,' or one should look at Pāṇini through the eyes of Patañjali. Irrespective of the question whether Patañjali would have liked us to use “his eyes with our brains,” the fact remains that without those eyes we shall remain forever blind (Sharma, 1982).

Systematic studies of Pāṇini's grammar, and of the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, especially towards the end of the decade of the nineteen-sixty, were pursued with great diligence and discipline by George Cardona and S.D. Joshi. Cardona systematically read nearly all significant books and papers, and presented his judicious reviews . He produced an excellent Survey of Research (1976) on Pāṇini, with by far the most detailed bibliography to date. He subsequently (1999) published a continuation of this work under 'Recent Researches on Pāṇinian Studies.' From 'Studies in Indian Grammarians, I...'(1969), and “Some principles of Pāṇini's Grammar” (1970) to 'Linguistic Analysis and Some Indian Traditions' (1983) and 'Pāṇini, his work and its Traditions, volume I, (1997),' Cardona was simply brilliant. His deep understanding of the tradition, and a keen sense of awareness about relevance of traditional views, enabled him to present scores of illuminating studies. The tradition of Pāṇini could not have found a more judicious appreciator, and evaluator, in the west with critical acumen comparable to that of George Cardona. His volume I (1997) is an excellent example where he has made


numerous innovative, though not controvertial, proposals dealing with rule formulation and interpretation. I shall not go into specific details of Cardona's writings for lack of space.

S.D. Joshi is equally brilliant, and a traditionalist, with the critical acumen of a siddhāntin, who would not settle without articulation, and possible resolution of doubts. His English translation of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya (with Roodbergen) is an excellent example of his deep penetrating analysis of issues relating to the vārttikas of Kātyāyana, and to Patañjali's own statements. Joshi produced nearly a dozen volumes of his translation of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, though he abandoned this study in favor of his English translation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. He has thus far produced nine small volumes on the Aṣṭādhyāyī where he has explained Pāṇinian formulations based primarily on the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya and the Kāśikā-vṛtti. Both in his papers, and books, Joshi has made some serious proposals, though at times very controversial. His paper on the siddha 'established' principle is one such serious proposal. His views that the taddhita section of Pāṇini's grammar is not authored by Pāṇini is well thought out, though still not free of problems. Joshi's proposal on the vipratiṣedha sūtra (1.4.2) claims to resolve two sets of problems at once: (a) whether or not the scope of application of 1.4.2 is limited to the ākaḍāra (1.4.1-2.2.38) section of the grammar, or is valid through the sapādasaptādhyāyī 'first seven chapter-books plus the first quarter of the eighth adhyāya of the Aṣṭādhyāyī,' as the tradition believes it to be the case, and (ii) that instances of vipratiṣedha could be accounted for by treating them as exceptions (apavāda). Joshi's proposals could not be simply brushed aside on the basis of not being in tune with the traditional views. These proposals need to be carefully studied and evaluated. For evaluation of the siddha principle one needs to compare it with the traditional views on rule formulation, interaction and application of rules, especially those which deal with the dichotomy of sāmānya, viśeṣa and śeṣa on the one hand, and the principle of asiddhatva and siddhatva on the other. As far as his proposal on treatment of vipratiṣedha as exception (apavāda) is concerned, one can not evaluate it unless details of Joshi's own definition of utsarga and apavāda are fully worked out, and are also tested against Pāṇini's own framework of sāmānya, viśeṣa and śeṣa.

Rama Nath Sharma (1987) published the first of his six-volumes study on the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. This volume presented the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a grammatical device consisting of a limited number of ordered rules capable of deriving the infinity of correct Sanskrit sentences. For the first time, Sharma introduced the idea of term assignment and referential indexes (1981, 1992) whereby the grammatical device could be activated, and strings could be


directed to access domains for possible rule application. He also recognized two levels of naming, with reference to the Conceptual Structure (CS) of a sentence, and expressing relative to lexicalization. It was also shown here how Pāṇini derives sentences by using word-derivation as a tool. Deriving sentences by way of words was simply a strategic decision. Sharma would, and rightly so, (cf. this paper) link the idea of referential indexes to the traditional interpretive conventions of 'yathoddeśa' and 'kāryakāla' which, in turn, have their source in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. In addition, Sharma presented some scanning conventions and traffic rules which still need further refinement, especially in relation to identification of markers of interpretive conventions, as found in the context of rule application. Sharma concludes that referential indexes not only activate the grammar, and help locate domains and rules for possible application, they also chart derivational paths for individual strings. It is this function of referential indexes which not only meets the predictability requirement of grammars, but also captures the creativity of the language. It cannot be out of place to state that the prakriyā order of arrangement of rules was accepted in view of functioning of the interpretive conventions of yathoddeśa and kāryakāla, to just name only the two.

Derivations in Pāṇini begin with Conceptual Structure (CS) of sentences where two levels of naming and expressing are mediated by lexicalization. It should be noted in this connection that basic ideas of this present paper largely derive from major statements of the Mahābhāṣya. Recall here the following two statements of Patañjali:

(i) na videśastham iti kṛtvato nānāvākyaṃ bhavati... 'rules do not become different simply because they are placed at different places in the grammar; they share a single-sentenceness relationship even though placed at different places in the grammar'(ii) kāryakālasaṃjñā paribhāṣamThe first statement anticipates the question: how are rules, placed

elsewhere in grammar, brought close to the context of a given application; the second rule anticipates another questions: how do we know which rules apply to what input, where? The idea of referential indexes guided by these two statements of Patañjali, answers these two inter-related questions, successfully. Sharma (2005; also this paper) revisited the interpretation of rule 1.4.2 vipratiṣedhe paraṃ kāryam whereby he recognized two kinds of vipratiṣedha, saṃjñā and saṃjñetara. He also showed how the scope of application of rule 1.4.2 is valid throughout the sapāda-saptādhyāyī, and how instances of vipratiṣedha could not be handled by the dichotomy of utsarga and apavāda. Sharma, through the years 1992-2003, published the second through sixth


volumes of his very large and ambitious study on the English translation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, where translation of individual rules were complemented with vṛtti, anuvṛtti, word boundary (padaccheda), indication of inflecitonal endings (vibhakti-nirdeśa), compounds (samāsa), examples (udāharaṇa), and detailed notes on issues of rule formulation, interpretation, order and application. Finally, Sharma, in these volumes, has presented complete derivational history of over three thousand examples.

The search for the genius of Pāṇini is still on. Scholars in the area of artificial intelligence and computation have shown considerable interest in the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a grammatical device. Shivamurthy Swamy (2006) has already posted the fifth version of his Gaṇakāṣṭādhyāyi, with information on rules of the Asṭādhyāyī, and nominal and verbal paradigms of Sanskrit words. Gerd Unruh, a Professor of Computer Science in Germany (personal communication), is actively engaged in preparing a software program for derivational system of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. In this day and age of automation, and continued sophistication of tools of communication, the future of Indian grammatical studies in general, and of the Aṣṭādhyāyī in particular, lies largely in the study of principles of rule formulation, interpretation, order and application which necessarily includes the study of its derivational system. Questions have been raised whether grammar should be accepted as science. Answers may vary, though not to any consequence for the Sanskrit grammar of Pāṇini. For, grammar in the Indian tradition is considered śāstra, and hence, researchers may fail to find any equivalent of modern science in this source of knowledge, the śāstra.

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Sharma, Rama Nath, The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. English Translation of Adhyāyas Four and Five with Sanskrit Text, Transliteration, Word-Boundary, Anuvṛtti, Vṛtti, Explanatory Notes, Derivational History of Examples, and Indices. Volume IV. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal., 1999.


Sharma, Rama Nath, "Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali: An Overview of Sanskrit Grammatical Tradition", in G. C. Pande, et al (eds.) The Dawn of Indian Civilization (up to C. 600 BC); Project of History of Indian Science, Culture and Philosophy, Vol. 1, Part I (pp. 747-758). New Delhi: Center for Studies in Civilizations., 1999.

Sharma, Rama Nath, The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. English Translation of Adhyāya Six with Sanskrit Text, Transliteration, Word-Boundary, Anuvṛtti, Vṛtti, Explanatory Notes, Derivational History of Examples, and Indices. Volume V. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal., 2001.

Sharma, Rama Nath, The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, Introduction to the Aṣṭādhyāyī as a Grammatical Device. Volume I (second edition). New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal., 2002.

Sharma, Rama Nath, The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. English Translation of Adhyāyas Seven and Eight with Sanskrit Text, Transliteration, Word-Boundary, Anuvṛtti, Vṛtti, Explanatory Notes, Derivational History of Examples, and Indices. Volume VI. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal., 2003.

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VI: Notes and References

VI: Notes and References

VI: Notes and References Page 139

* Many of my ideas about the content of this paper received better focus during my discussions with scholars, particularly Dr. Kutumba Shastri of the Rashtriya Samskrta Samsthana, Dr. Shashiprabha Kumar of the Jawaharlal Nehru University's Center for Special Sanskrit Studies, and Dr. Dipti Tripathi of the Sanskrit Department of Delhi University. Credit goes to Fulbright India for facilitation of their Scholar Grant (2005), and to Christopher Bopp for electronic presentation of this paper. The University of Hawaii's Research Council deserves special mention for supporting my research endeavors over past many years.

1. vāg vai brahma / tasyai vācaḥ satyameva brahma /(Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa 2/1/4/100)

2. ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyordhvaṃ samīraṇam /sthānānām abhighātaś ca na vinā śabdabhāvanām // (VP I:144)araṇisthaṃ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam /tadvac chabdo‘ pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnāṃ kāraṇaṃ pṛthak // (VP I:46)

3. vibhajya svātmano grantīn śrutirūpaiḥ pṛthag vidhaiḥ /prāṇo varṇān abhivyajya varṇeṣvevopalīyate // (VP 1:115)

4. parā vāṅ mūlacakrasthā paśyantī nābhisaṃsthitā /hṛdisthā madhyamā jjñeyā vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā // (Ambākartrī (ad VP I:142))

5. anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram /vivarte‘ rthabhāvena prakriyājagato yataḥ // (VP I.1)

6. catvāri śṛṅgāṇi catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyātopasarganipātāś ca / trayo asya pādās trayaḥ kālāḥ.../ dve śīrṣe dvau śabdātmānau nityaḥ kāryaś ca / sapta hastāso asya sapta vibhaktayaḥ / tridhā baddhas triṣu sthāneṣu baddha urasi kaṇṭhe śirasīti / vṛṣabho varṣaṇāt ṃ roravīti śabdaṃ karoti / ...mahān devaḥ śabdaḥ / martyā maraṇadharmāṇo manuṣyāḥ / tān āviveśa / mahatā devena naḥ sāmyaṃ yathā syāt / maho devo martyā̃ āviveśeti (Mahābhāṣya, I:17).

7. puruṣasya vāg raso vāca ṛgrasaḥ ṛcaḥ sāma rasaḥ sāmna udgītho rasaḥ / (Chāndogyopaniṣad 1/2/2)

8. sādhutvajñānaviṣayā seyaṃ vyākaraṇasmṛtiḥ/avicchedena śiṣṭānām idaṃ smṛtinibandhanam // (VP I:158)

9. kṛte' tha patañjalinā guruṇā tīrthadarśinā /sarveṣāṃ nyātabījānāṃ mahābhāṣye nibandhane // (VP II:479)

10. purākalpa etad āsīt / saṃskārottarakālaṃ brāhmaṇā vyākaraṇaṃ smādhīyate (Mahābhāṣya, I:22)

11. alpākṣaram asandigdhaṃ sāravad viśvatomukham /astobham anavadyañ ca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ // (Vāyupurāṇa)

12. Sharma (2003)


13. Sharma (2003:476-77)14. vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir na hi sandehād alakṣaṇam (Mahābhāṣya, I:29)15. na hi sūtrata eva śabdān pratipadyante / kiṃ tarhi / vyākhyānataś ca... / na

kevalāni carcāpadāni vyākhyānam.../ udāharaṇaṃ pratyudāharaṇaṃ vākyādhyāhāra ity etat samuditaṃ vyākhyānaṃ bhavati /

16. vedān no vaidikāḥ śabdāḥ siddhāḥ lokāc ca laukikāḥ / tasmād anarthakaṃ vyākaraṇam (Abhyankar 1978:292)

17. kāni punaḥ śabdānuśāsanasya prayojanānirakṣohāgamalaghvasandhāḥ prayojanam (Mahābhāṣya, I:8).

18. te' surāḥ helaya helaya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ / tasmād brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai nāpabhāṣitavai (Mahābhāṣya I:11).

19. ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyagjñātaḥ śāstrānvitaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati (Mahābhāṣya ad 6.1.84).

20. Note that the Mahābhāṣya uses many words for indicating asādhu 'incorrect' words, for example, apabhraṃśa, apaśabda, duṣṭa, mlecchita, mithyāprayukta, śiṣṭapratiṣiddha, apabhāṣita, etc. These words should be carefully studied for possible differences in understanding their contextual meanings.

21. yas tu prayuṅkte kuśalo viśeṣe śabdānyathāvad vyavahārakāle /so'nantam āpnoti jayaṃ paratra vāgyogavid duṣyati cāpaśabdaiḥ //(Mahābhāṣya, I:13)

22. śāstrapūrvakaṃ yaḥ śabdān prayuṅkte so' bhyudayena yujyate (Mahābhāṣya, I:41).

23. bṛhaspatir indrāya divyaṃ varṣasahasraṃ pratipadoktānāṃ śabdānāṃ śabdapārāyaṇaṃ provāca nāntaṃ jagāma ...kim punar adyatve yaḥ sarvathā ciraṃ jīvati sa varṣaśataṃ jīvati...tasmād anabhyupāyaḥ śabdānāṃ pratipattau pratipadapāṭhaḥ (Mahābhāṣya I:25). Note that 'one thousand heavenly years' is anecdotal (arthavāda). What Patañjali wants to emphasize is the futility of pratipada-pāṭha 'studying each and every word by enumeration.'

24. kiṃcit sāmānyaviśeṣaval lakṣaṇaṃ pravartyaṃ yenālpena yatnena mahato mahataḥ śabdaughān pratipadyeran / kiṃ tat ? utasargāpavādau...sāmānyenotsargaḥ kartavyaḥ tasya viśeṣeṇāpavādaḥ / tadyathā karmaṇy aṇ (3.2.1); āto' nupasarge kaḥ (3.2.3; Mahābhāṣya, I:25)

25. yathā ghaṭena kāryaṃ kariṣyan kumbhakārakulaṃ gatvāha: kuru ghaṭaṃ kāryam anena kariṣyāmīti na tadvac chabdān prayuyukṣamāṇo vaiyākaraṇakulaṃ gatvāha: kuru śabdān prayokṣya iti (Mahābhāṣya I:32).

26. etasmin āryadeśe ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā agṛhyamāṇakāraṇāḥ kiṃcid antareṇa kasyāścid vidyāyāḥ pāragās


tatrabhavantaḥ śiṣṭāḥ (Mahābhāṣya III:174).27. kūpaḥ sūpo yūpa iti / 'kūpa' iti sakāreṇa kaścid artho gamyate / 'sūpa' iti

kakārāpāye sakāropajane cārthāntaraṃ gamyate / 'yūpa' iti kakārasakāro' pāye yakāropajane cārthāntaraṃ gamyate / te manyāmahe 'yaḥ kūpe kūpārthaḥ sa kakārasya yaḥ sūpe sūpārthaḥ sa sakārasya yo yūpe yūpārthaḥ sa yakārasyeti (Mahābhāṣya I:102).

28. lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam (Mahābhāṣya, I:45).29. Sharma, (forthcoming)30. Limaye (1974:71)

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