Guidance Note on Safety and Security of Survivors of Gender Based Violence in Humanitarian Settings in South Sudan

June 2015

Acknowledgements:

These guidelines have been developed under UNFPA support by the Consultant Ms. Orly Stern with inputs from GBV Sub-Cluster members. We hope that these guidelines will help to improved safety and security of the affected population in South Sudan, especially women and children.

Table of ContentsList of abbreviations42.Introduction53.The use and purposes of this Guidance Note64.GBV in South Sudan7GBV Safety and Security Programming in South Sudan74. The different programming contexts in South Sudan8Protection of Civilian Sites8Sites for Internally Displaced Persons8Host Communities85.Guiding principles for assisting GBV survivors in humanitarian settings9Do no harm9Ensure safety9Survivor centred approach9Empowerment9Confidentiality9Non-discrimination9Community based approach9Human Rights Approach106.GBV prevention107.Coordination108.Planning and preparedness11Situational Analysis and Context Analysis11Planning119.Providing safety and security to GBV survivors in South Sudan: The various options12SHORT-TERM OPTIONS13a. Targeted patrols13b. Holding of the perpetrator by UNMISS14c. Reporting GBV cases and threats to the police15d. Community hosting system for GBV survivor16e. Referral to medical facility for temporary shelter18f. Taking matter to the customary courts18LONGER-TERM OPTIONS19g. Temporary shelter / safe houses / safe shelter19h. File a case against the perpetrator in the court system21i. Relocation22j. Mediation23k. Psychosocial support23l. Reintegration in the community2410.Monitoring and Evaluation2511.Conclusion2512.List of Resources Used26Annex 1: Sample Referral Plan for the Selected Area/Site27Annex 2: Patrolling - Special cases like a GBV survivor at threat of further harm28

List of abbreviations

ARCAmerican Refugee Committee

CCCConfident Children in Conflict

CSOCivil Society Organisation

DRCDanish Refugee Council

GBV Gender Based Violence

GoSSGovernment of South Sudan

IDPInternally Displaced Persons

IMCInternational Medical Corps

INGOsInternational Non-Governmental Organisations

IRCInternational Rescue Committee

MGCSWMinistry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare

NGONon-Governmental Organisation

NRCNorwegian Refugee Council

Penal CodeSouth Sudan Penal Code Act 2008

PoCProtection of Civilian site

SGBVSexual and Gender Based Violence

SPUsSpecial Protection Units

SSNPSSouth Sudan National Police Force

UNUnited Nations

UNICEFUnited Nations Children’s Fund

UNFPAUnited Nations Population Fund

UNDPUnited Nations Development Programme

UNPOLUnited Nations Police

UNMISSUnited Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Introduction

Amongst the tragic effects of the renewal of hostilities in South Sudan, has been the rise in incidents of gender-based violence (GBV) and the disruption of services aimed at addressing these. Millions have fled their homes, with large numbers displaced in camps or host towns across the country. South Sudanese women and girls, removed from their homes, communities and the traditional structures that provided support, have found themselves increasingly vulnerable to GBV, often having little to protect them from continued threats of harm.

The forms of harm South Sudanese women face are varied. Sexual violence has risen, coming both from community members, as well as from armed actors and those embroiled in fighting. Sexual violence has been a consistent feature of the current crisis, with evidence of deliberate ethnically based targeting of and reprisals against women and girls.

Rates of domestic violence have also flourished, in congested camps and poorly resourced IDP settlements. Traditional structures have always played a role in regulating violence within families. However, fleeing populations and those settled in temporary internally displaced person (IDP) settlements, often do not have traditional court and community structures available, thereby allowing violence against women to go unchecked. Police and law enforcement mechanisms in the conflict-affected areas have been debilitated, providing little or no protection at all. Many women fear going to the police if police are of different ethnicities, and in many places women are afraid to leave the camps, for fear of ethnic targeting, and hence are unable to reach police stations.

South Sudan is a large country, with ten states that are each experiencing differing humanitarian situations. While in some parts of the country there is relative stability, in others there is full-blown conflict. Humanitarian organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), both local and international, have put various programmes in place to respond to GBV. Programmes have differed in form, varying between those targeting safer urban centres, those servicing conflict-affected areas and those aiming to reach displaced populations. Amongst other things, GBV actors provide health services, psychosocial support, as well as legal services to those who have been victims of harm.

While there are a range of GBV services offered, there are few structures available to ensure the safety of women who have been victims of GBV. When GBV survivors are still at risk of further harm by perpetrators – be it their husbands, or others – there are few functional systems in place to protect them. There are almost no safe-house facilities or places where women can be hidden and housed in order to remove them from further risk. As for many going to the police is not an option, there is likely to be no one available to arrest or detain their perpetrators. For the most part, women have little choice but to return to their homes and communities, unprotected from the continued threat.

Compounding the problem is the continuing emergency and the enduring state of population flux. In such a rapidly shifting context, it is difficult to put in place structures for the protection of women. The distinct conditions in differing parts of the country mean that any solutions need to be specifically tailored to the current conditions in each geographic area, to the facilities available there, to the capacities of actors on the ground and to the security situation at the time. Recognizing the differences across the country and the need for adaptations in various locations, this Guidance Note attempts to provide a general framework for safety and security planning in South Sudan.

This Guidance Note has been created to provide general guidance to those conducting programming in this area. It deals with the question of how to ensure the safety and security of GBV survivors. While GBV programming is inherently multi-sectoral and must always incorporate health, physical, psychological, legal and other responses, this Guidance Note focuses on the safety and security aspect of response, an integral facet of a holistic GBV response.

Safety and security concerns relate to ensuring a survivor’s safety from further harm by a perpetrator or others. It also relates to her sense of security and wellbeing in any new context she finds herself in. Until a survivor can be assured that she is not at an imminent threat of repeat attack, she cannot truly begin the process of healing. This Guidance Note seeks to explore different ways in which the continued safety and security of GBV survivors can be assured in South Sudan, exploring both temporary and longer-term options for protecting GBV survivors from further harm.

The use and purposes of this Guidance Note

This Guidance Note puts forward guidelines for providing temporary and longer-term safety to survivors of GBV. It is aimed that GBV actors operating in South Sudan will use this Guidance Note to improve the support they can provide to GBV survivors requiring protection.

This Guidance Note has been written under the auspices of South Sudan’s GBV sub-cluster. A workshop was held on the 16th and 17th of June 2015, to discuss the provision of safety and security to GBV survivors in humanitarian settings in South Sudan. The workshop aimed to allow those active in this field to document their experiences and to share the lessons they have learnt about what has worked in different locations. Participants also shared the challenges and barriers to programming and the areas where new solutions are required. The discussions from this workshop have informed the content of this Guidance Note. This Guidance Note has been presented to the GBV sub-cluster and has been reviewed by the Safety and Security Taskforce.

This Guidance Note focuses on those actions required to ensure continued safety and security of GBV survivors. GBV response is always multifaceted and multi-sectorial. The provision of safety and security is intrinsically linked to the provision of other GBV services – be they health, legal or psychosocial – and the various facets of GBV response can never be strictly separated. Throughout this Guidance Note other services will be mentioned, explaining where and how these should work together with safety and security responses. This Guidance Note deals primarily with female victims of GBV, reflecting the fact that in South Sudan the vast majority of GBV survivors are women and girls. Of course there will be times where men are GBV victims and many of the options explored below could also be used for them. However, as the bulk of GBV victims in South Sudan are women, this Guidance Note focuses largely on them.

This Guidance Note aims to create a list of available options that can be used by GBV actors to ensure the continued safety and security survivors. It puts forward suggestions for those working in the different regional contexts in South Sudan to assist them in determining what programming may work best in that context, what the risks and challenges may be and how to get around some of these. For the various programing types, this Guidance Note sets out some steps required to implement these effectively.

South Sudan is a large country, with greatly different contexts. There are distinct differences between geographic regions, ethnic groups, administrative authorities and operational contexts. While some areas of South Sudan are relatively quiet, others are still immersed in active conflict. These diverse humanitarian situations present distinct problems and challenges around ensuring the safety and security of GBV survivors. Given these differences, it is important to map out different possible options and to consider the viability of each safety options in different settings. What may work in one area of South Sudan, may not work in another – despite the fact that these are all classified as ‘humanitarian’ programming contexts.

This Guidance Note should not be read as prescriptive. It does not purport to be the authoritative guide on how safety and security programming should be run. Rather it provides options and general guidance on how safety and security options could work or could be improved or adapted, should the actors involved feel these suggestions are appropriate for their context of operation. When GBV actors are designing their own interventions, they can adapt the guidance provided in this note, making it contextually relevant and tailoring it to suit their needs. Partners on the ground need to ascertain what is feasible based on the resources and actors available in that location and on the local dynamics. While this Guidance Note provides options, these will not all work in all areas and even if they do work, these will need to be tailored to the contexts in which they are being implemented.

This Guidance Note will be set out along 2 dimensions:

1. The first dimension this Guidance Note will explore is time. The threats to GBV survivors and their protection will be considered along a timeline. This Guidance Note will consider the immediate/short-term safety and security needs of a survivor – those occurring within 72 hours of being subject to attack.[footnoteRef:1]It will also consider the longer-term options – those that are required if there is still a safety threat after this time. For both time frames the Guidance Note will explore the differing considerations and the various possible programming options. [1: For domestic violence, or situations of repeat attack, this timeframe refers to the time since a woman leaves her partner or take steps to seek help.]

2. The second dimension this Guidance Note will explore are differing humanitarian contexts. These are divided into 3 primary types of programming contexts. The first are United Nations (UN) Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites, the second are other sites for internally displaced persons (IDPs)and the third are host communities that have received large influxes of IDPs. Each of these provides different dynamics, opportunities and challenges in terms of providing safety and security to GBV survivors. This Guidance Note will seek to explore what is feasible in each, and for each safety and security ‘option’, will indicate whether this could work in each type of programming context, what the limitations and risks would be and whether there are any particularities required to apply them in each site.

GBV in South Sudan

GBV is rampant in South Sudan. Rates of domestic violence were said to have increased during the conflict – and have since flourished in a society where for years violence has been a regular feature of life. In South Sudan a certain level of violence in the domestic sphere is societally accepted and a man has the perceived right to discipline his wives and children. However this is frowned upon when it exceeds a certain level. In traditional South Sudanese society there were systems in place to address this. People lived in close-knit communities where neighbours could witness if unacceptable levels of violence were taking place and elders and chiefs kept behaviour in check. However due to on-going conflict and displacement, many have been removed from their communities and community checks and controls against domestic violence have broken down, allowing violence to flourish.

Rates of sexual violence are extremely high. South Sudan’s Penal Code prohibits sexual violence. However the vast majority of rape cases do not make it to the police or court system. Most women do not report rape – due to mistrust in the systems and a fear of the stigma that attaches to rape. The police are underfunded and poorly resourced and have inadequate capacity to investigate sexual violence and apprehend offenders. The legal system is weak and rape cases, which are notoriously hard to prosecute, often fail, with conviction rates low even when cases do make it to the system. Customary courts have no legal jurisdiction to hear rape cases and are expected to refer such serious cases to the formal court system. However in practice customary courts frequently do try rape cases, often because there are no formal courts in the area to try them. Even in those rare situations where perpetrators are convicted, punishments tend to be mild. A rapist might get a short prison term, sometimes up to 3 months, or might be told to compensate a victim’s family. Women are commonly encouraged to marry their rapists, an option that many prefer, as it keeps men from jail and keeps women from the stigma of being known to have been raped. Little is done by the system to protect women from repeat attacks.

There has been an increase in conflict-related sexual violence with the renewed fighting. While in the North/ South conflict rape was not a dominant feature, in the current civil conflict, strategic sexual violence has played a greater part. In its 2014 interim report on the human rights crisis in South Sudan, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) indicated that sexual violence has been a consistent feature of the crisis, and that there has been evidence of deliberate and ethnically based targeting of and reprisals against certain populations, often using sexual violence.[footnoteRef:2]There have also been high levels of ‘incidental’ rapes – carried out by the armed actors who roam the country and by the many others whose behaviour is left unchecked by the lack of law enforcement and societal controls. [2: http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/countries/south-sudan/]

Women are highly vulnerable to GBV in camps settings such as IDP camps and PoC sites. Large populations are congested in small spaces for long periods with little privacy. Practically this means that GBV victims remain in close quarters with their perpetrators, with repeated exposure to them and no place to escape. The lack of income generating opportunities for those in camps make women vulnerable to sexual exploitation. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms may not be operational in camp settings, meaning there may be no chief available to resolve situations between victims and perpetrators.

GBV Safety and Security Programming in South Sudan

Dealing with GBV is challenging in the South Sudanese context. There is a high societal tolerance for GBV. Stigma against victims is rife, as is victim blaming and in many situations women feel it is advantageous for them to keep silent or to settle matters quietly and even marry their perpetrates, rather than dealing with the condemnation of society. This stigma means that women do not come forward for assistance and protection, even when they critically need it. This also means that there is some antagonism towards those running GBV programmes.

South Sudan is a difficult setting in which to put safety and security options in place. The diverse geography, the differing dynamics in each setting and the persistent state of population movement and insecurity, make it a challenging environment for programming. The swiftly changing situation makes it difficult to put in place durable solutions. South Sudan remains a highly militarised environment, leading to heightened risk for survivors and programmers alike. The lack of infrastructure across the country compounds these challenges.

4. The different programming contexts in South Sudan

At the time of drafting this Guidance Note there are an estimated 1.5 million displaced persons in South Sudan. Violence has most strongly affected Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, and the majority of displaced persons can be found in these areas. An estimated 10 percent of IDPs have fled to camps in UN bases known as PoC sites. Other IDPs live in other IDP camps(those not under the auspices of UNMISS) or have gone to live in other communities (host communities).

Protection of Civilian Sites

Nearly 10% of IDPs live in UNMISS PoC sites. When fighting began and spread to different areas of the country, many thousands of civilians took refuge at UNMISS bases. A solution that was supposed to be a short-term fix soon became a longer-term situation. The PoC sites fall under UNMISS protection. UNMISS and UNPOL, the UN Police, provide security and policing services to the camps. From a safety and security programming perspective, these sites offer certain advantages in that UNMISS and other organisations can easily reach the enclosed group with services and protection. UNPOL and UNMISS are able to conduct regular patrols and even have the power to detain perpetrators for limited periods if they are residing within their camps.

The disadvantages that PoC sites offer from a protection point of view is that those inside these sites cannot access services available outside the camps, including protection services provided by the government and the police. For the most part, those within the camps are unable to leave because of perceived threats to their safety if they do. The South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) do not operate within the camps. This means that those in these sites are reliant on the UN and other humanitarian organisations for everything. PoC camps also do not allow for sustainable programming being temporary in nature.

Sites for Internally Displaced Persons

The vast majority of IDPs are not in PoC sites, but rather in other IDP camp settings. These are often camps that have sprung up rapidly in the areas that people have fled to. Unlike PoCs these do not have UNMISS’ protection and security.

IDP camps offer some challenges from a protection perspective. For one thing IDP camps are frequently situated in remote locations, which can make it difficult for NGOs and other organisations to reach them with services. Those in these sites are often unable to access existing protection services, either because of their location or because of safety concerns if they leave the camps. Protection mechanisms need to be created from scratch, as there are often no existing structures in these locations. While this provides the opportunity to custom-design effective systems, this also creates challenges, as one cannot rely on any existing service provision or infrastructure. As IDP camps spring up rapidly and are temporary in nature, this creates challenges in setting up protection mechanisms as rapidly as they are required.

Host Communities

Many IDPs flee to existing communities and towns. Often the host populations in these towns are from different ethnic groups to IDPs, sometimes leading to friction and hostilities. Problematically the communities that IDPs move to are often poor and the influx of thousands of IDPs puts strain on the limited resources and services that might already be provided to those communities, creating further hostilities towards IDPs.

IDPs living in host communities can be more difficult to target with protection interventions, as they are interspersed with local communities and not clearly demarcated and separated. However there are also programming advantages. There might be existing programming infrastructure and services, which can be extended to also deal with this additional population, meaning that services do not need to be developed from scratch. In host communities one is able to rely on government services, such as the police, justice and hospital services and those services provided by the state Ministries of Social Welfare.

Guiding principles for assisting GBV survivors in humanitarian settings

Ensuring safety and security to GBV survivors can be challenging. Survivors’ safety concerns are complex and particular to an individual. A survivor will have short-term concerns (such as not being physically harmed again), intermediate-term worries (such as where she will reside) and longer-term concerns, such as concern about what will happen to her children. There is no one method or option that will fully meet all of a survivor’s safety needs.

Agencies must be realistic about what they can actually provide to survivors in terms of safety and security. In most cases, they will not be able to guarantee her safety and they should be clear in explaining this, and not creating the impression that they can. GBV must acknowledge that they do not have all the answers to a survivor’s safety needs and they cannot provide her with everything that she requires. GBV actors must be transparent in explaining what capacity they have to assist a survivor and what they are not able to ensure or guarantee. There are certain guiding principles that must inform all programming and actions in this area.

Do no harm

Do no harm means thinking through the unanticipated results that might arise from safety and security programming, in order to anticipate harm that might occur as a result. Depending on the situation, do no harm may mean not taking any action – particularly in situations where actions might exacerbate a situation or put a survivor at further harm, or a different type of harm. As an example a safety and security ‘option’ that does not allow a survivor to take her children with her might result in her losing custody of them in the long term, a risk that should be considered up front.

Ensure safety

Steps must be taken to ensure that GBV survivors are not at continued risk from perpetrators or any other community members. It is important to ensure that a survivor understands the potential risks involved in different safety options and that where possible steps are taken to mitigate these. Where programming is considered to too risky, this should not be carried out. The safety of those assisting GBV survivors must also be ensured – including family, friends, medical staff, or those involved in GBV programming. In the past militarized violence has restrained agency’s efforts in South Sudan and there have been revenge attacks on women’s centres where survivors have been assisted. Safety protocols must be put in place for GBV workers and those involved in providing services, including developing exist strategies for staff and conducting scenario and safety planning with staff.

Survivor centred approach

The survivor is best placed to understand the danger she faces and what may exacerbate or worsen these. Those involved in GBV programming must be led by a survivor. GBV actors may seek assistance from police, protection officers, IDP camp security or others, but they may only do this with the consent of the victim. Respect for survivors includes respecting her choices, wishes, rights and dignity. Safety options chosen should be those that allow the survivor to live in dignity.

Empowerment

Where possible, a survivor should be provided with a number of safety options from which she will chose her preferred one, in order to give her back a sense of control. It is important to conduct longer-term safety planning with survivors. Empowerment should include economic, social and psychological empowerment.

Confidentiality

Information must only be shared between those who need this information in order to provide assistance. Information must only be shared with consent of the survivor. In particular, the locations where survivors are being sheltered or hidden must be kept confidential, as should the names of those taking up particular safety and security options.

Non-discrimination

Services should be provided for all requesting assistance regardless of their sex, ethnicity, religion or political actions.

Community based approach

AsGBV happens in the community, the community often have the best and most sustainable solutions to address this. It is important to work with the community to develop strategies that protect survivors within the locality. Those developing safety options for a particular location should consult local women and girls about how they keep safe. They should also consult with local community leaders about the structures already in place to protect women at threat of harm. One should not assume that a strategy that has worked in another context would work everywhere.

Human Rights Approach

All programming conducted should be in line with human rights standards – international and domestic – as well as accordance with refugee law and international humanitarian law. The human rights of survivors should be respected at all times.

GBV prevention

One of the means of preventing repeat attacks against GBV survivors is to carry out prevention activities in camps. GBV actors should work to prevent the circumstances that allow for incidents of violence against women, addressing the structural conditions in camps that provide opportunity for violence. Doing so might eliminate some of the opportunities that perpetrators have to commit repeat attacks against survivors, thereby increasing their chances of safety. Prevention activities can include the following:[footnoteRef:3] [3: See Guidelinesfor Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian SettingsFocusing on Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies, Inter Agency Standing Committee.]

· Camp layout: Consider and address factors pertaining to camp layout and design that allow for episodes of violence to take place. This should include ensuring lights and locks in latrines and sanitation facilities and creating lights or patrols nearby to water sources. The Inter Agency Standing Group GBV Guidelines contain guidelines that could be considered in this regard.

· Make resources available for women: Ensure that resources such as food, water, sanitation and fuel/firewood are readily accessible for women, to prevent them needing to put themselves into situations where they are vulnerable, and to prevent women being vulnerable to sexual exploitation in exchange for these.

· Risk assessments: Regular camp participatory safety assessments should be conducted to identify and address known risk factors. These assessments should be conducted both for facilities in general and for individual survivors.

Coordination

A central aspect of effective safety and security programming is ensuring that there is coordination between GBV actors. GBV response should be multi-sectoral; involving medical, legal, psychosocial, security and other responses. Safety and security planning must work together with the other layers of response in order to be properly effective. In all coordination efforts, the principles of safe and ethical sharing of information need to be adhered to.

In South Sudan the GBV sub-cluster is responsible for coordinating GBV response nationally. Safety and security programming should make use of existing coordination mechanisms and work within the framework of these. Where possible, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the relevant Ministries must be included in safety and security efforts and involved in all stages of planning and programming.

In preparing for GBV safety and security response in humanitarian settings, it is important to strengthen pre-existing relationships between organizations and security personnel on the ground, in each locality. All actors involved in GBV response need to understand the safety and security services available in each place and to understand each other’s roles in implementing these.

Referral pathways

It is important that there be clear communication and understanding on safety and security case referrals and case transfers. Safety referral pathways need to be clarified in each area, camp or location, which utilise the appropriate safety and security options described below.

Once safety options are developed in each area, a clear referral system should be established around these options so that survivors and actors know who they should report and refer to should they be safety issues. This referral system should be developed together with all GBV actors working in a community, and safety and security referrals should become a part of broader GBV referral pathways. The referral pathways need to be continuously reviewed in each locality. All members of the community, GBV actors and service-providers should be familiarized with the safety and security referral system. The referral system should be written and translated into local languages. Where possible, pictorial versions should also be produced.

Referral pathways should be tailored to a site or geographic area, taking into consideration who is providing what services in that area. They should specify:

· Which agencies or institutions provide GBV safety and security services?

· The specific contact information (name and telephone number) of one key focal person within that institution.

· The specific services that institution provides

· Any associated costs for the service.

· Where survivors should go to receive these services.

Planning and preparedness

Situational Analysis and Context Analysis

GBV safety and security responses must be context specific and will differ in each area. In order to implement these effectively, context analyses need to be conducted in each area by GBV actors implementing safety and security programming. These can be done by individual organisations involved in response, or by collectives of organisations working together. A community-based approach to understanding the context must be used. This should include talking to women and girls in the communities about how they keep safe, talking with community leaders about the structures in place to protect people at threat of harm and trying to understand the community and the leader’s perception of GBV.

The results of context analyses should be used in decision-making about which safety options are developed and promoted in each area. For example, where there are more state services available in the area (i.e. police, justice or state medical facilities) these should be chosen above those implemented by NGOs. Where there are suitable options for keeping survivors within their own communities, these should be prioritised above options that require her relocating.

When conducting a context analysis in a particular area, the following information should be ascertained:

1. What are the specific types of GBV safety and security threats likely in the area /site?

For example:

· Following an act of sexual or physical violence, a known perpetrator has made additional threats.

· There is a threat of sexual or physical violence by an individual known to the survivor.

· Sexual violence has occurred but the perpetrator is unknown and/or his where-about are unknown.

· A survivor’s family member has threatened her with physical violence.

· A perpetrator’s family or friends have threatened a survivor with physical violence.

2. What safety and security services are available in that area? Alternatively, what facilities are available in which safety options could be created?

3. What protection / shelter options are available in that area?

4. What is the political /conflict situation in that geographic area and how does this impact on GBV safety risk and response?

5. Are the police operational in that area? Is there a functioning SPU in the area?

Planning

When there is an imminent safety threat against a survivor, it is important that actors are able to act without thinking. This means that preparedness and contingency plans need to already be in place for the protection of survivors. As part of this planning, it is important to understand the capacity available within an area to support a survivor’s immediate, intermediate and long-term safety needs. It is also important to understand what safety options are available in a given area and how these can be quickly put in place.

As part of safety and security preparedness, the following should be done in each area:

1. Map out Safety Options: List locally available options for protecting a survivor with security/safety needs. These options can draw from the list of options provided in section 8 below. This Safety Options List should be regularly reviewed and amended. For each safety option identify the following:

· Who can provide some element of safety to a survivor? What organization is responsible for what parts?

· What is the scenario when this option is a possibility?

· What are the steps that make that option work properly?

· What are the procedural issues organisations will face when putting options into action and who is responsible for each step?

· What are the potential barriers/challenges with each option?

· What is the timeframe for this option?

· What are the requirements and starting point for this to be an option?

· How long is this option viable?”

2. Assign / delineate tasks involved in each Safety Option:

· Assign tasks to different partners.

· Create a check list of materials needed on site and for pre-preposition.

· What are the procedures/steps required for each safety option?

· Who are the focal persons involved in each step?

· What are the timeframe in which each step can be available?

3. Make sure each focal person is aware of their function when there is an emergency.

4. Share the procedures with other organizations.

5. Ensure that there is an up to date contact list at any given time.

Within individual organisations, preparedness includes thinking about what different organizations can do to support a survivor’s safety needs, as well as thinking about what the limits are to what they can and cannot do.

Contingency planning

Contingency planning is an important part of safety and security response. As well as thinking about the best possible options of what can be done where a survivor’s life is in danger, it is also important to brainstorm what to do when initial options are not functioning or possible. Contingency planning includes brainstorming plausible actions to address threats that may come up.

Contingency planning needs to take into account the length and depth of a security situation. Actors must be prepared to change plans if humanitarian situations change. Planning for programming in humanitarian settings includes planning for the ability to shift human and material resources if necessary. Contingency planning might also require stockpiling material. Planning also includes understanding the internal procedures within organisations that allows action to happen.

As part of contingency planning protocols need to be created for the implementation of any relevant safety and security options, so that if these options are required they can be implemented immediately. Another part of safety and security planning is awareness raising; local actors, women’s groups, local leaders and service provides all need to be made aware of contingency plans, in order that they will be available to implement these should these be needed.

Providing safety and security to GBV survivors in South Sudan: The various options

This section provides a number of options that might be used to ensure the safety and security of GBV survivors in different contexts in South Sudan. Different responses will be possible in more peaceful contexts and protracted phases of emergency to those that are possible in active emergency settings. In times of active crisis there is much that cannot be done for security reasons. Those conducting programming will need to make an assessment about what options are possible in their current circumstances. The list below merely aims to provide choices to those involved in programming, providing options that can be modified and adapted to make them appropriate to a particular context. For each option, slightly differing types of information are provided – reflecting the points that were felt to most critical for those weighing up and implementing programming options.

Different options will be more suited to different types of violence – and some options will be wholly unsuited to certain types of violence. For example, an option like mediation will not be suitable for sexual violence committed by a stranger or armed actor. Ultimately it is up to a survivor to decide which safety and security option she wishes to utilize. Safety plans should be reviewed survivors, and no actions should be taken without her prior consent.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

In each case, before safety and security options are selected, a comprehensive safety assessment should be conducted with a survivor to determine the best course of action to assist her. A safety assessment must consider the source of threat, the support systems available to a survivor and her relationship with the perpetrator. A safety assessment must also assess the risks that different safety and security options might present for her. Safety assessments must be conducted by qualified actors, who have been trained in how to do this. Not all organizations and all persons have the in house capacity to do this and actors that have not been trained should where possible, refer this on to actors who have experience in conducting such assessments.

In case of child survivors of GBV there are certain additional issues to consider when conducting a safety assessment. For more information and tools on conducting safety assessment and planning for child survivors, see the IRC/UNICEF Caring for Child Survivors of Sexual Violence tool. When planning for child survivors, the best interests of the child principle must be applied to all decision-making.

SHORT-TERM OPTIONS

This section sets out programing options that are useful for the protection of a GBV survivor within 72 hours of her being attacked. For domestic violence or on-going violence this time period refers to the first 72 hours after her coming forward for assistance, or leaving the situations of violence.

a. Targeted patrols

Conducting targeted patrols is a short-term option, that can be helpful in preventing further harm to GBV survivors who are in imminent danger of repeat attack by perpetrators. This can work for domestic violence and sexual violence. Patrols can also be helping in preventing incidents of GBV more generally.

UNPOL conducts regular patrols along the main roads and paths throughout the residential areas in all PoCs. Patrolling generally happens 7 days a week,24 hours a day, at intervals, with patrols done in shifts. There are two types of patrols that can be useful in preventing GBV. Both of these can be incorporated into the regular patrolling that UNPOL conducts.

1. Targeted patrols: Targeted patrols can be conducted at the houses of survivors and perpetrators, during the immediate danger period. A targeted patrol would take place within the regular patrol plan. The patrol shift leader would ensure that UNPOL officers patrol near and around the shelter/location of the survivor who is threatened and the shelter/location of the perpetrator. The patrols would walk past and make themselves seen, but they would not go inside and disrupt residents. The aim of these patrols is to reduce the likelihood of further attack by demonstrating the presence of uniformed officers near the locations. Having patrols pass nearby can also allow for quick reaction if repeat violence occurs.

2. Regular patrols at high-risk locations: UNMISS /UNPOL can conduct regular patrols at key times, focussing on the places where women are known to be in danger. Such places could include firewood collection spots and distant latrine sites.

Contexts this option will work in: Patrol options are viable in camp contexts, such as PoCs, where UNMISS guards or UNPOL are available and have the jurisdiction to patrol. This option is more effective where populations are contained in relatively small areas.

Challenges and risks:

· Resources: Resources will likely be the biggest barrier to this approach, as regular patrols will be costly, particularly in terms of human resources. When assessing whether this option is worthwhile in an area, the demand for GBV patrols must be considered in light of competing demand for various resources.

· Stigma and confidentiality: This option might draw attention to a survivor and can compromise her confidentiality.

· Risk: Having a visible patrol might lead to the risk of retaliation as a perpetrator would be made aware that she has reported the violence against her.

Elements required in order for this to work:

· Decisions about patrols: The survivor should always be given the final say on whether a patrol option is used. Given the risks and publicity involved in this option, visible targeted patrols should not be conducted without a survivor’s consent. Where GBV actors wish to refer this to UNPOL for patrols, this must be done in consultation with the survivor.

· Patrolling guide/protocol for a location: A patrolling guide/protocol would need to be put in place in each area where patrolling is implemented. This would need to be tailored to the specificities of that location – and the procedures it could entail are described below.

· Community acceptance: Community acceptance and support for patrols is required, as this may feel invasive for a community. Those implementing this option should proactively engage with community members explaining the importance of these patrols and what they hope to achieve.

· Information sharing: A critical factor to making patrols effective is facilitating information sharing between UNMISS/UNPOL and GBV/protection actors in an area. It is necessary for GBV to alert UNMISS/UNPOL to those areas where there is a threat and to individuals in danger of violence. In turn, UNMISS/UNPOL must alert GBV actors about the status of cases and what occurred on patrols.

· Frequency and consistency of patrols: In order for patrols to be successful, they need to be frequent and consistent. Regular patrols will only function as a deterrent, if perpetrators know patrols will happen continuously. Likewise they will only function to alleviate the fear of victims if they have regularity.

· Patrol staff capacity: Staff conducting these patrols will need to be capacitated with the appropriate skills and abilities, in particular with skills around community policing and an understanding of GBV and associated risks.

Sample procedures could be put in place in a given location:

· GBV actors with information about a survivor at risk, after consulting and attaining consent from the survivor, could contact a central UNPOL representative to arrange patrols. They would provide information about the location of the survivor and the perpetrator and descriptions of how best to find them (i.e. section/PoCs, block and any nearby landmarks, such as WASH facilities, offices, drainage, stores, signage, containers, etc., as well as directions).

· This information is incorporated into patrol plans.

· Information about persons at risk is systematically passed between various patrols shifts, together with updates on the situations.

· Information about continued risk is fed back to other GBV actors.

(See Annex 3, for the Patrolling Guide developed in Malakal, which sets out an example of a procedure, which might be replicated in other areas)

Actors involved in this option: The actors who could be involved in this option include UNPOL, UNMISS, Non-violent Peaceforce, Community Watch Group, Warrior Security Group and Women Peace Keeping Teams, Community Based Protection Networks (CBPNs). In addition GBV service providers in each area would be involved in this option, as well as those acting on behalf of survivors.

b. Holding of the perpetrator by UNMISS

UNPOL and UNMISS are the main actors involved in this option. When there are known perpetrators in the camps who are threatening survivors, UNPOL/UNMISS can temporarily detain perpetrators. This can be useful as a deterrent.

Contexts this option will work in: This is a short-term option that will only be effective in a camp setting, such as IDP camps and PoCs.

Challenges:

· Short-term: The main problem with this option is that is a very short-term option, and UNMISS may not hold a perpetrator for long. Generally speaking UNMISS have no access to the criminal justice system. As such, there is no referral system for UNMISS to refer perpetrators to the formal system, ensuring a longer-term more sustainable solution. After a short period UNMISS might have little option but to release the perpetrator, putting the survivor back at risk.

· No MOU with Ministry of Justice: UNPOL have no working arrangement with the Ministry of Justice, making them unable to refer perpetrators to the formal justice system.

· Restrictive UNPOL mandate: UNPOL are operating in a restrictive environment due to limitations made to their mandate. UNPOL have no mandate for long detentions. At this point, they are restricted to reactive policing, limiting their power to take strong action over perpetrators.

· Option only suitable for certain types of cases: This option will only be appropriate in certain types of GBV cases. Assessing whether UNMISS detention is appropriate will require an effective risk assessment.

· Lack of coordination: Problems can be caused by a lack of coordination between actors.There can be significant risk if perpetrators are released without GBV actors and survivors being made aware of this.

Steps to put in place in order to implement this option:

· Detention facilities: Appropriate facilities to for detention need to be created by UNMISS.

· Exit strategy: A clear exit strategy needs to be developed for perpetrators. Before perpetrators are detained, careful thought should be given to what will be done following the temporary detention. This is likely to differ between areas and perpetrators.

· Information flow: A systematised flow of information between communities, NGOs and UN Agencies is required to make this function properly. Effective communication is required to ensure adequate coordination and so that all are aware of detention and released times and conditions.

· Mapping of role and processes: A process mapping and a mapping out of clear roles and responsibilities of actors is required before this is implemented in an area.

· Standard Operation Procedures: SOPs for holding and releasing GBV perpetrators need to be developed.

· Community buy-in: Community leaders will need to be consulted when setting up this option, as restraint and buy-in from the community will be required for effective implementation.

Actors involved in this option: The actors that might be involved in this include: UNMISS, UNPOL and corrections and protection actors.

c. Reporting GBV cases and threats to the police

Police can provide protection to survivors, in a few ways.

· The most obvious is for the police to apprehend and detain GBV perpetrators, holding them him in police holding cells, until they are referred to the criminal justice and prison system. Despite the fact that this is a primary police function, in South Sudan this is hampered by the limited capacity of the police, their lack of resources, as well as their lack of vehicles to investigate, follow up on, arrest and transport perpetrators. The result is that frequently perpetrators are not arrested by the police even where they post further threat to survivors.

· The alternative options that police frequently utilise, is to detain GBV survivors for their own protection as a short-term measure. Across South Sudan police detention cells hold women who are detained because it is unsafe to send them home. This is problematic from a human rights perspective. The conditions in police cells are harsh and punitive – there is generally no furniture and no food provided to detainees, making these cells inappropriate holding facilities for survivors.

Special Protection Units (SPUs) are units within South Sudanese police stations, established to provide police services to women, children and vulnerable groups. At major police stations, special units were created in custom-built buildings where specially selected and trained police provide policing services to vulnerable groups. Today there are 14 SPUs throughout South Sudan; two in Juba, one in each of the other state capitals and one each in Yei, Terekeka and Nasir. The SPUs today are in varying states of functionality.

Contexts this option will work in: Going to the police is an option that is available to those in host communities. IDPs may not feel safe visiting police in an area, if the police come from a different ethnic group to them, given the inter-ethnic nature of the current conflict.

Challenges:

· Mistrust of police: One effect of the effects of the renewal of fighting has been a loss in confidence in the police. This has been made worse by allegations of police being perpetrators of GBV during the current crisis. Feelings of distrust are particularly strong amongst displaced population. Mistrust of the police has become a barrier to people seeking police assistance. Many displaced women are unwilling to go to the police if they are in danger.

· Language barriers: For IDP women far from their areas of origin, there might be language barriers to accessing police assistance.

· Police perceived to be insensitive: Many women perceive the police to be insensitive. Police are said to be unsympathetic to GBV survivors and to blame women.

· Few police trained on GBV: There are relatively few officers trained on how to work with GBV survivors. The high staff turnover and transfer rates amongst the police mean that the few who have undergone training in working with GBV survivors are quickly transferred to other units.

· Police fees: It is alleged that police take fees/bribes for filing/making arrests, which further prevents women from going to them.

· Form 8:There have been problems around Form 8, the medico-legal form police provide GBV survivors once they have opened a police file. Survivors are required to take these forms to medical facilities in order to receive medical treatment following attack. There has been some confusion about the way in which this form should be used. While many in the police and health system state that a woman cannot seek health care until she has gone to the police for a form, others particularly in the humanitarian sector, contend that a GBV survivor may go and seek health care first – particularly in urgent cases – and then open a police file and collect the form afterwards. There has been no agreement on this to date. Others problems around Form 8 are that sometimes Form 8 is not available at police stations and at times police ask women to pay for these or make their own copies of these forms.

Steps to be taken:

· Assistance to survivors: Assistance could be provided to survivors visiting to the police. This could be provided by paralegals or social workers who would accompany survivors visiting the police, ensuring they are treated as they should be.

· Monitoring of police: Case managers could monitor police actions in investigating and arresting perpetrators. If police are not arresting a known perpetrator, organisations could follow up on the reasons and help to address blockages.

· Engaging with police: Those in the humanitarian sector should engage the police to help improve their skills and capacity in protecting GBV survivors. There is need to support the training of more victim-friendly police, so that survivors will feel more confident in turning to them. Efforts should be taken to identify specific entry points for police in the GBV referral pathways.

· Emergency call centre: A possible area of potential is the newly formed emergency call centre – the toll free number that people can phone for emergency response. At this point it is not focussed on GBV and operators and respondents have not been trained on how to handle SGBV cases. In the future, by providing them with training and support, there could be an opportunity to expand their services towards GBV response. At this point, this service only functions in Central Equatoria.

· Social workers and female personnel: Advocacy and monitoring should be conducted to ensure that there are social workers available at all police stations, as well as more female police working at police stations.

· Training police on national laws: Training should be conducted with police on national law and policies.

· Transparency around fees: There is a need for steps to be put in place to ensure transparency regarding police fees for filing and forms. Police could be supported in putting in place an internal monitoring and accountability system.

Actors involved in this option: Organisations that might be involved in this option include Steward Women, CCC, UNDP, DFID, CEPO.

d. Community hosting system for GBV survivor

GBV victims who have recently been subject to violence and who’s safety is compromised in their homes, could be hosted by other community members including; family relatives, friends, community leaders, women leaders, church members and community groups. Where possible small children can follow a survivor to a host family. The strength of this approach is that it engages the community in resolving problems, rather than removing a woman from her community or imposing a solution from the outside.

Contexts this option will work in: This is an option that is available in PoCs, IDP camps and host communities. This is a short term, temporary solution, available for one or two nights, or at most, a few days, after which time a more lasting solution needs to be found.

There are a few different ways in which a community hosting system can work:

1. Ad hoc hosting by family and friends: This can operate on an ad hoc basis, with no formal mandate or organization, with family and community members merely opening up their homes to GBV survivors who they know need temporary safe shelter.

2. Formalised system of pre-arranged homes: A more formalised system could be created, whereby actors put together a list of pre-arranged safe homes – homes which have indicated they would be willing to take in survivors in case of an emergency.

3. Women’s groups: Survivors could be hosted with women’s leaders in the community or with members of women’s groups. This option is reliant on the consent of the families of women leaders.

Challenges and risks:

· Safety concerns: The biggest problem with this approach is that there is no way to guarantee a survivor’s safety when she stays at a host home. This is particularly the case where perpetrators are from the same family as a survivor. The host family may also be put at risk by the presence of the survivor.

· Managing expectations of survivor: The success of this option is reliant on a survivor having the confidence to stay with families and community members, feeling comfortable that she will be safe. It is important to manage her expectations and to not guarantee her safety or benefits that cannot be ensured. It is also important to emphasise to her that if she remains in the community there is no way to guarantee confidentiality about her whereabouts and experiences. She should be warned about these concerns in order that she can make an informed choice.

· Attaining necessary consents: This option is dependent on attaining the consent of host family members. It may also depend on attaining the victim’s family’s consent depending on the circumstances.

· Burden on host family: Hosting a survivor puts a burden on host family members, particularly in impoverished communities and displaced communities, where people will already be living in cramped, poor conditions. Those hosting a survivor may require material support. This is something that those putting a programme in place can facilitate.

· Inconsistent availability of host homes: Host homes may not be available in all areas.

· Set up time: This system might also take a little time to set up, meaning it may not be immediately available in new IDP settlements.

Steps to be taken: In each case, when a survivor is placed with a host family, the following should be done:

· Agree on timelines with host family and survivor: Develop and agree on timelines of stay with host families/homes in order to ensure potential hosts are provided with accurate information.

· Risk assessment: Before referring survivors to host families, assessments of potential risks must be conducted. GBV actors should visit a host home, seeking to determine what risks might threaten a survivor’s security. Relevant considerations could include: proximity to the premises of a perpetrator, proximity of neighbours or others who can intervene if there is any trouble, distance to latrine facilities where a survivor might be vulnerable. If a house presents easy opportunity for a perpetrator to reach a survivor, then this house should not be used. Referrals should only be made if this is concluded to be safe, and where steps have been taken to mitigate risks. Such steps could include ensuring there are security precautions in place and putting patrols in place.

· Safety planning: Conduct safety planning for the host family and survivor.

· Follow-up for survivors: Those implementing this programme must conduct follow-ups once the survivor has left the host home. Suitable longer-term arrangements must be put in place for survivors for once they have left the host homes.

Steps to put such a system in place:

· Identify appropriate potential host houses: A system should be put in place for selecting appropriate homes. Those putting this system in place should work with members of the local community to identify good homes, preferably those with respected people who have standing in the community.

· Material support: Those putting in place this system could provide host families with material support to reduce the burden of hosting a survivor. This could include money or additional food items. Bundles could also be created for survivors, providing survivors with sleeping materials, soap and other necessities. The survivor could also be provided with food to reduce the burden on the hosts.

· Referral guidelines: Develop clear guidelines and procedures for referrals in each community or camp.

· Safety options: Put in place safety options to facilitate safety in this system. These will vary from site to site. For example, a host system could work well alongside targeted UNPOL patrols in a PoC setting.

· Community leaders: Work with community leaders so that they are ready and able to provide immediate support should any problems occur. It can also be beneficial to involve community leaders to ensure transparency.

e. Referral to medical facility for temporary shelter

Contexts this option will work in: This could work in PoCs, IDP sites or in host communities. Where there is no-where else for a survivor to go immediately following an attack, a survivor can be temporarily housed at a medical facility. This is a very short-term option available for a few days at the most and a more sustainable solution will need to be quickly developed.

Challenges and risks:

· Space issues: There might not be space at a medical facility at a given time.

· Strain on resources: This option can put strain on the resources of a medical facility, which may already be over-burdened in these contexts.

· Safety concerns: It might not be possible to guarantee the safety of a survivor when she is at a medical facility. If a perpetrator tries to attack her there, that can put both the survivor and others at the medical facility at risk. To mitigate this confidentiality is key. In small close-knit communities, secrecy may be difficult to ensure.

· Staff turnover: There may be problems caused by the high turnover of medical facility staff if there is no proper handover and training on agreed upon procedures.

· Availability of suitable facilities: This option is reliant on the availability of medical facilities in the area, which have the capacity to host survivors. This is also reliant on the willingness and good will of the staff in the medical facility to take this on.

· Understanding of GBV: Medical facility staff may not understand a survivor’s situation, or the consequences of GBV. They may blame the survivor for what has happened to her and be unsympathetic. Not all medical facility staff may understand the importance of confidentiality in this context.

Steps to put such a system in place:

· Guidelines: Create guidelines on using a medical space for this purpose. These should include guidance on informed consent and on how potential risks should be communicated to survivors.

· Referral and handover guidelines: Develop guidelines on the procedures for referrals into this system. Such guidelines should also include a section on handover and transition plans.

· Safety protocols: A safety protocol is required for hosting survivors in medical facilities. Thought should be given to what protection options are available for survivors and staff at medical facilities and whether these would be effective given a threat.

· Training for staff: New staff and focal points at medical centres will need to be given training and induction on housing GBV survivors.

· Follow-up for survivors: On-going follow up and support for survivors who have been housed at medical facilities needs to be arranged.

Actors involved in this option: The actors involved in this option can include: Health partners with protection programmes such as IMC, MSF, DRC and IRC.

f. Taking matter to the customary courts

Traditional leaders are the main providers of justice in South Sudan. Given the weaknesses in the formal justice system most of the population relies on customary courts and on chiefs to adjudicate their problems.

Contexts this option will work in: GBV survivors can turn to traditional leaders in all of the programming contexts, including IDP camps, PoCs and host communities. In displacement settings communities may have been separated from each other and people may have been removed from their own tribal chiefs. Sometimes traditional leaders may not be present in the camps.

Problems/ challenges:

· Chiefs unsympathetic to women’s concerns: Traditional courts and chiefs can be unsympathetic to GBV survivors. They often reach solutions that are problematic from a protection perspective. Chiefs are generally older men, with deeply ingrained patriarchal views. They often seek restorative solutions, which promote community harmony, rather than solutions to hold perpetrators to account. For example, chiefs aim to preserve marriages and so rather than granting a divorce in a domestic violence case, a court may order that a man promise to desist from further violence and compensate his wife for harm inflicted, preferring the woman to stay on in a marriage, even where this might expose her to further danger. The same is the case with sexual violence, where options including mediation and reconciliation are favoured, rather than options in which perpetrators are punished and kept away from survivors. As such, consulting chiefs might bring about solutions that are not favourable to survivors.

· Customary law and domestic violence: Customary law, the traditional legal system, allows a certain level of violence in the home and permits a man to ‘discipline’ his wife and children. While women may appeal to chiefs if this violence exceeds a level perceived as reasonable, this level varies depending on the location and the views of the individual chief. Customary courts condone domestic violence if a wife is found to be behaving badly or not fulfilling her duties. Many women who take their husbands to court end up themselves sentenced by the courts; with wives sometimes punished more harshly than offending husbands.

· Lack of privacy: Chief’s courts are normally held in public. As such approaching a chief may mean a survivor gives up her confidentiality or privacy – problematic given the stigma that exists against victims of violence.

· Formal law: Traditional leaders often have little knowledge about national laws – and particularly around sexual offences. In terms of the law chiefs are not supposed to adjudicate on serious crimes such as rape, yet in practice they frequently do.

Steps that can be taken to improve this option:

· Engage local leaders and chiefs: Traditional leaders could be provided with capacity building and training on laws, human rights, GBV referral pathways, a survivor centred approach, women’s rights and on how to provide safety to survivors.

· ‘Champion’ traditional leaders: ‘Champions’ amongst chiefs should be identified and worked with, in order that they can help to influence others.

· Privacy: Working should be done with community leaders around understanding stigma, confidentiality and helping them to establish private places for hearings these matters.

Actors involved in this option: The following actors could be involved in implementing this option: UNDP, Steward Women, UNFPA, CES MoGSD, Internews, radio stations, Nile Hope, ISRAAID, IMC, HDC, SAADO, ADRA, NRC, IOM, DRC, IRC, NP, SALF.

LONGER-TERM OPTIONS

This section sets out programing options that are useful for the protection of a GBV survivor after 72 hours following attack.

g. Temporary shelter / safe houses / safe shelter

The option of developing safe houses was extensively debated at the Safety and Security Workshop in Juba. Those at the workshop came to the conclusion that this would not be a safe option in South Sudan, as there would be no way to guarantee the safety of survivors housed in these. Experiences in other countries have also shown this to be a risky option.

Given the risks, those considering this option should give careful thought as to whether this option is suitable, and to whether this closes protection gaps or rather, whether it adds protection concerns. This option should only be considered as a last resort.

This section is included in this Guidance Note as it is evident that certain actors are considering opening safe houses, so it was felt that guidance should be included for where this is being done.

Safe shelters are any physical spaces that can offer temporary safety to GBV survivors. GBV survivors can be housed in these until the threat against them subsides or a longer-term solution can be found. Safe shelters can take different forms, such as being a centre, rooms, tents or huts that provide shelter.

Contexts this option will work in: Safe shelters are possible in IDP camps and host communities. This option should optimally be used from between one week to three months, but not for a longer period.

Risks:

· Safety concerns: There is no way to ensure the safety of a survivor and staff in safe shelters. If a perpetrator attacks a safe shelter all inside may be vulnerable.

· Confidentiality: It can be difficult to guarantee the privacy and confidentiality of GBV survivors in a safe shelter. This can lead to stigma for those seen entering them.

· Exit strategy: Safe shelters are not supposed to be a long-term solution or a new permanent home for a survivor. The problem is that there might be few real exit strategies for survivors. As such there can be real challenges in referring them onwards. Thought should be given to the duration of survivor’s stays in these, in order to not promote dependency.

Procedures:

· Referrals: Referrals to safe houses can be made by GBV actors, by social workers, or by state Ministries of Social Welfare.

· Admission decisions: Decisions about which survivors should be admitted to the safe houses could be made by a pre-selected inter-agency panel including those running camps, or by staff employed by a safe shelter. Where possible, State Ministries of Social Welfare should also sit on such panels. Confidentiality must be respected in this process.

· Transition/exit plans: Exist plans should be rapidly developed for women moving into safe shelters. Shelter providers should work with residents to identify transition strategies. This will help to foster recovery and independence. Residents should have meaningful engagement in all levels of decision-making about their transition readiness and options.

· Follow up: Those setting up these houses should ensure on-going support and follow up while survivors are in the houses and after they have left. Referring agencies could work to identify social support structures within survivors’ communities to assist with follow-up.

To put this option in place, the following steps should be taken:

· Protocol for safe shelters: Actors could develop a protocol for safe shelters. This should include instructions for setting up and running temporary shelters. Eligibility and exit strategies should also be set out. The protocol should make provisions for ensuring safe shelters are child and disabled person friendly.

· Referral Pathways: Those setting up safe shelters should establish clear referral pathways with other GBV service providers, with clear procedures for each agency the survivor is likely to interact with.

· Safety measures: Measures should be put in place for the protection of safe houses, to make them as safe as the context allows. Steps must be put in place to ensure the safety of both residents and staff. The security needs of residents and staff should be assessed in advance. Site-appropriate security measures must be developed. These can include things like fences, guards, alarm systems and setting up partnerships with law enforcement agencies.

· Community buy-in: Steps should be taken to ensure community buy-in and support, particularly from community leaders, including traditional leaders and those active in campaigning for women’s issues. Those setting up shelters should engage in regular dialogue with community leaders. Steps should be taken to build community awareness about this service, so that community women utilise the shelters.

· Support staff needs: Actors must ensure there is adequate support for shelter staff. An assessment should be conducted in each site to identity the context specific needs of staff, and funds should be made available to meet these needs. Staff might require emotional support services, training in counselling and other skills, resources, as well as additional staffing.

· Support survivor’s needs: The relevant agencies operating in an area can coordinate the provision of psychosocial support for survivors. Residents might request additional assistance, like increased access to counselling, health care, legal services, education for their children or vocational training services. Where possible funds should be made available to meet these needs. Shelter residents should be given the same food rations as others.

· Code of Conduct: A ‘Code of Conduct and ‘Rules for the House’ should be put in place in safe houses. Residents must agree to these before being admitted. These should include rules about movement, visitors and sleeping outside the shelter. Those who violate the rules should be given warnings – verbal and written, and finally they should be evicted if there is no improvement.

· Anonymity: Steps should be taken to ensure that specific safe shelters are kept secret, in order that community members do not realise that these are safe shelters. To achieve this, steps to be taken include building houses in locations not visible to the road, putting alternative signage on the shelter building, and ensuring that only relevant GBV actors are aware of their locations.

Actors involved in this option: Relevant government Ministries and state Ministries, women’s organisations.

h. File a case against the perpetrator in the court system

In most parts of the country, there is little formal court infrastructure and capacity. Where it does exist, this tends to be in state capitals. The rural areas have little in the way of formal justice infrastructure.

Contexts this option will work in: Those in IDP camps in remote areas will not be able to access the formal court system. So too, those in PoCs who cannot leave the camps due to safety concerns will not be able to access these. This option is only available to IDPs in host communities – and mainly in host communities in the bigger urban centres.

Problems with the court system that reduce its ability to protect women:

Even if women are able access the formal court system, there are many reasons this may not provide helpful results for GBV survivors at risk.

· Delays: The formal court system is extremely slow and subject to long delays. Prosecutions are frequently delayed and it can take long periods for a matter to be put onto the court dock.

· Over-burdened prosecution: The prosecution are often over-burdened.

· Focus on perpetrator: The prosecution’s focus is on prosecuting perpetrators, rather than on taking steps to ensure a survivor’s safety. There is no one in the formal court system tasked with the victim’s safety or well being.

· Sexual violence difficult to prosecute: Sexual violence is always difficult to prosecute, especially in the absence of capacity for forensic evidence analysis. Acts of GBV often happen in private, frequently coming down to his word versus her word, which judges are reluctant to convict on. Hence the results for women in criminal GBV cases are often not favourable.

· Public system: The formal court system is a public system. Matters going through this system cannot be kept confidential. This might result in increased stigma for GBV survivors.

· Increasing risks: Sometimes filing cases can anger perpetrators, resulting in them or their relatives threatening survivors – particularly if she refuses to withdraw a matter.

· Mistrust of court system: Many women do not trust the formal court system, which is foreign to their ways and practices.

· Access: In many parts of the country, there are no functioning courts so this option would not be accessible. Women may be deterred if they have to travel and pay for transport to attend the courts.

To put this option in place, the following steps should be taken:

· Provide survivors with funds to cover the cost of court-filing fees and transport to and from the courthouse when her case is being heard.

· Increased integrated trainings between social workers, police, lawyers, prosecutors and NGOS.

· Victim’s advocates/ paralegals / case managers:

One way that GBV actors could help to make this system more supportive of women, would be to invest in case-managers or paralegals who could assist a survivor in going through this system. Case managers could take on victim’s cases, in order to ensure victim’s needs are accounted for. They could do the following:

· Accompany, advocate for and support a survivor during any meetings with the police or court officials.

· Accompany, advocate for and support a survivor during any court proceedings, including pre-trial sessions, trial and sentencing.

· Provide victims with information about all aspects of the legal process. Information that a case manager could provide to survivors includes the following:

· How the legal system works.

· What happens during a court case and what they should expect.

· The expected date a survivor’s case is likely to be heard in court.

· Any actions that may be required of the survivor during the process.

· Any interactions the survivor may have with the perpetrator during the court process.

· The roles and responsibilities of any actors involved in adjudication of the survivor’s case, including the police, health workers who completed the medico-legal forms, the state and defence attorneys and the magistrate.

i. Relocation

If the threats have not subsided a few months following an attack relocation could be considered. This is a last resort option. In this option, GBV survivors are moved from one geographic area to another, in order to move them away from those who are threatening them. In each case a suitable tailor-made arrangement would need to be found for each survivor. Where there is a family member in a different location that a survivor can be relocated to this will be the preferable option. A survivor who is moved to an area where she does not have family or a support system might find herself at risk of harm or vulnerable to exploitation.

Contexts this option will work in: This option that can be set in place in PoCs, IDPs sites and host communities.

Challenges and risks:

· Safety issues: A survivor’s safety in the new environment is not guaranteed, as a perpetrator may have social connections in that area too. If a survivor is not safe in the new location, more durable safety solutions will need to be found.

· Confidentiality: It can be difficult to ensure the confidentiality of GBV survivors when implementing this option. This option involves a range of actors (GBV actors, NGO and UN staff, transport, friends/family members that accompany the survivor), so it will be important to ensure they all understand the importance of confidentiality.

· Family objections: Sometimes family members may find this option unacceptable. Their wishes should be taken into consideration, while always applying a survivor centred approach

· Time consuming and expensive: This option is time consuming and expensive. There might be no NGOs willing to financially support relocations outside PoCs.

· Lack of coordination: There may be problems around coordination and communication associated with having too many actors involved and multiple communication channels operating. Actors in both locations will need to be involved, as well as those transporting the survivor. Complicated bureaucracy can get in the way of this option functioning well.

· Services in relocation community: There may be additional challenges caused by the unavailability of services in the new relocation community.

· Challenges relocating child survivors: It can be traumatic and difficult to relocate child GBV survivors. Child survivors will require accompaniment, yet their adult relatives may not be safe to move outside the PoCs.

Things that will be required to make this work:

· Coordination: Good coordination among actors is critical to making this option work. It is important to engage all relevant actors, including government and community leaders. On-going support is required from various actors in order to make this work. Clear communications channels and protocols must be put in place.

· Case handover: It will be important to ensure a proper handover of cases to those working in the new community, for continued service provision.

· Logistic support: Logistic support will be required from actors such as UNOCHA, UNHCR and UNMISS. Some survivors may require accompaniment and humanitarian actors can help to provide this.

· Guidelines and Protocols: Before this option is implemented comprehensive guidelines for relocation must be created. Standard Operating Procedures on relocation are also required. A Protocol on high risks relocation should be drafted.

· Define roles and responsibilities of actors: The roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in relocations need to be clearly defined. In each context it is important to question what role the government and local authorities should play. Where possible an MOU between relevant actors and government should be created.

· On-going follow-up: Arrangements for on-going follow up and continued support for relocated survivors need to be put in place. NGOs in the relocation location should be identified who are able to provide such support.

Actors involved in this option: The following actors could be involved in this process: IMC, IRC, NP, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, Un coordinating agencies such as UNMISS, UNPOL, UNOCHA and UNFPA.

j. Mediation

Contexts this option will work in: This is an option that can be used in all settings; PoCs, IDP camps and host communities.

Problems with mediation for GBV cases:

Mediation is inherently unfair in GBV cases– often disempowering women and favouring the interests of perpetrators. Many feel that mediation is not suitable for GBV cases. There are a number of reasons for this:

· Mediation wrongly assumes equal power dynamics and equal responsibility between parties. It can therefore reinforce the misperception that both victim and perpetrator share responsibility for the GBV actions that occurred.

· Mediation operates from the assumption that perpetrators do not want continued violence – an assumption that may be altogether false.

· Mediation can reinforce norms of gender inequality.

· Mediation can lead to the re-victimization of a survivor.

· Mediation can lead to survivors being put back into potentially dangerous home situations, based largely on the perpetrator’s word that harmful behaviour will not persist.

· Mediation does not work well where victims fear the information they share in mediation will be used against them later when violence begins again.

· Mediation outcomes are hard to enforce and violence often worsens as a result.

Because of all of these problems mentioned above, many recommend that this is not an approach that should be used for GBV cases.

If actors are using this approach, despite the above disclaimer, the following steps could be taken to make mediation less problematic in GBV cases:

· Recognise the problem: It is important to recognize upfront that mediation for sexual violence and domestic violence is inherently unfair.

· Gender-sensitive mediators: Identify mediators who are open to listening to both sides, who are gender sensitive and who are fair arbitrators.

· Training: Mediators (including chiefs) could be provided with training in conflict-resolution and mediation as well as in gender sensitivity and GBV.

· Select persons who will be involved: Carefully select the persons to be involved in the mediation. These persons should be neutral and representative of both the parties and their interests.

· Follow-up: Ensure that there is regular follow-up after the mediation, in order to ensure that all is okay and that violence has not begun again. If violence begins again, actors can try another mediation, or can proceed to another safety and security option.

k. Psychosocial support

Psychosocial support is an important aspect of ensuing the longer-term well-being of GBV survivors. Psychosocial support will be required alongside many of the other safety and security options listed above. Psychosocial interventions should address a survivor’s emotional, psychological and social needs.

Contexts this option will work in: This is an option that can be provided in all settings; PoCs, IDP camps and host communities.

GBV survivor’s psychosocial needs:

Effective psychosocial assistance requires understanding a survivor’s unique needs – not using a predetermined formula. Her psychosocial functioning needs to be assessed, as well as her unmet needs, her strengths and her capacities. While some survivors require a great deal of help, others will mainly require information and reassurance. The psychosocial needs of GBV survivors are affected by the nature and extent of the emotional, psychological and social trauma. The level of dysfunction that she has as a result of the violence will be an important factor.

Case managers:

A crucial aspect of providing effective psychosocial support is to have an effective case manager assigned to a survivor’s case. The case manager will do the following:

· Act as overall case manager.

· Assess the needs of a survivor.

· Refer and/or accompanying a survivor as she receives the services and assistance she requires.

· Coordinate all service delivery through case planning.

· Ensure survivors have relevant information on the consequences of violence and available services.

· Provide follow-up care and assistance.

· Provide basic emotional support for the survivor, one-on-one, or in group settings.

· Provide basic emotional support for the survivor’s family or friends.

Varied psychosocial support options:

A variety of different psychosocial support options should be made available in each area. The following are different types of options that could be provided:

· Individual and group counselling

· Counsellors must properly trained.

· Councillors must be continuously monitored or supervised to ensure counselling quality.

· Traditional ceremonies and other local coping customs

· These ceremonies must be respectful of human and women’s rights.

· Group activities for survivors

· Including income generation and micro-credit projects.

· Group activities build a survivor’s support networks, facilitate her reintegration into the community, build her confidence and skills, and promote her economic empowerment.

· Income-generating activities

· Skills-trai