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Sachindex

Admissibility, 135 Adverse Selection, 48, 97 Agenten-Normal-Form, 126, 127 Akzeptanzmenge, 206 Arrow-Pratt-Maß, 39, 40, 205 AuswahlkriterienHarsanyi/Selten, 136 Auszahlungskonfiguration, 286, 287 Auszahlungsraum, 5, 44, 144 Automaten, endliche, 172 axiomatischer Ansatz, 27 Backward Induction, 23, 115 Banzhaf-Coleman-Index, 314 Banzhaf-Index, 299, 302, 310, 312--

316,318-320,322,324-326 Battle of the Sexes, 11, 12, 91, 92,

99, 137f Bayessche Regel, 53, 117, 119 Bayesscher Entscheider, 240, 242 Bayessches Gleichgewicht, 52, 81-89 Bayessches Spiel, 50, 81, 82 Behavioral Strategies, 46 behavioristischeVerhandlungsmodelle,

234 beschränkte Rationalität, 170 bindende Verpflichtung, 19 bindende Verträge, 9, 21, 30, 80, 91,

161 charakteristische Funktion, 264, 265 Chicken Game, 93-95, 100,228 Clarke-Mechanismus, 336 ff Coase-Theorem, 30, 339 Common Knowledge, 45, 102

s.a. gemeinsames Wissen Common Prior, 83-86, 97, 102 Cournot-Nash-Gleichgewicht,6O, 62-

-64,80, 153 Deegan-Packel-Index, 299, 319-324 Divinity, 135 dominante Strategie, 6, 8, 10, 46, 57,

329, 330, 335, 337, 338

Dominanz, 131, 135, 137, 138, 268, 269, 282, 285

Drohspiel, 230-232 dynamische Struktur, 139 Dyopol

Kartellabsprachen 7, 80-81, 139, 158ff

Cournot-Nash-Gleichgewicht, 61-63, 79-81

Bayessches Gleichgewicht bei un­vollständiger Information, 84-89

Stackelberg Gleichgewicht, 115-116 wiederholtes Spiel, 22ff, 156-160

Edgeworth-Box-Modell, 271, 275, 283, 326

effizient, 6,8,27,332,339,341,342 einfaches Verhandlungsspiel, 186, 235 Einheitssimplex, 35 Einwand, 66, 285-293, 325, 344 Eliminierung dominierter Strategien,

104, 130 Ereignis, 2-4, 44, 45, 204-207, 243,

245, 267-270, 328-330 Erwartungsnutzentheorie, 36ff, 55 essentielles Gleichgewicht, 109 extensive Form, 5, 13, 14, 21, 113,

137 extern-stabil, 274, 283, 284 externe Effekte, 79, 338-342 Fixpunkt, 67 ff Folk-Theorem, 24, 147ff, 167, 169 Fokus-Punkt, 12, 97 Free Rider Verhalten, 9 Gebührenspiel, 276-278,305,310,

333 Gefangenendilemma, Iff, 144f, 162f,

170-172, 184f, 227, 275, 276 gemeinsames Wissen, 45, 49, 55, 64,

75, 82, 83, 85, 92, 99, 101, 141, 176

Sachindex

gemischte Strategie, 34, 35, 71, 76 s.a. Randomisierung

Gibbard-Satterthwaite-Theorem, 330 Gleichgewicht, 6, 10-13,57

Bayesssches 81 ff essentielles, 109 in dominanten Strategien, 57f Nash-Gleichgewicht,60ff properes, 108 ff sequentielles, 116 strategisch stabiles, 135 teilspielperfektes 18, 114ff trembling-hand perfektes 100f, 125 ff

Groves-Mechanismus, 334 ff Handelskettenparadox, 175

s.a. Markteintrittsspiel Hidden Action, 46 Hidden Information, 48 Idealpunkt, 216, 217, 219, 223, 228,

247 IMF-Abstimmungsspiel,318 imperfekte Information, 14, 46, 48,

49 Implementierung, 327, 328, 330-332,

344 Imputation, 261, 268, 269, 274, 285--

287,299 individuelle Monotonie, 215, 216, 218 Information, 45-55

vollständige, 48 unvollständige, 48 ff imperfekte 46 ff

instabile Lösungen, 103 intern-stabil, 274, 283, 284 intuitives Kriterium, 131 ff Invarianz, 135 isomorphe Spiele, 137 Kalai-Smorodinsky-Lösung, 184, 215,

218, 247, 261, 329, 338 Kampf der Geschlechter, 12, 74, 91,

136-138, 184 Kartell, 22, 23, 27, 80, 160, 333 Kern, 27, 28, 273-283, 289-291, 297,

361

306, 310, 326, 329 Kernei, 293-295, 297, 325, 326 Koalition, 27,261,263-282,285-292,

294-296, 299, 300, 305, 310, 311, 313, 315, 319-322, 324, 325, 342-344

Koalitionsstruktur, 278, 286, 287, 291-295,297-299

kompakt, 33-35, 67-70, 72, 189, 195, 297,299

Komplement, 261, 264, 267, 271 Komplexität von Strategien, 172 Konfliktpunkt, 26, 44 konsistenter Lösungen, 60 konvex, 33-35, 39, 67-70, 72, 189,

195, 199, 210, 266, 273, 297, 299

konvexe Menge, 34, 145, 189, 223, 248

kooperatives Spiel, 6, 25, 185, 186, 226

korrelierte Strategien, 76, 90-93, 95-98, 100-102

Kreps-Wilson-Reputationsmodell, 173 ff

Kuchenteilungsregel, 243, 250, 261 lexikographisch, 296, 298, 299 Lösung des Spiels, 2, 7, 11, 103,

138, 250, 278, 330 Lösung in Maximin-Strategien, 57-59 Lösungskonzept, 4-7, 10-11, 57, 60,

64, 66, 75, 76, 90, 100-102, 212, 215, 216, 242, 243, 273, 339

Machina-Dreieck, 41, 42 Markteintrittsspiel

GrundmodeIl17-18, 115, 173 ff mit unvollständiger Information 54-

55,176ff Matching Pennies, 76 Matrixform, 5, 16, 18

s.a. Normalform, strategische Form Maximin-Kriterium, 38, 59

362

Maximin-Punkt, 148, Maximin-Strategie, 58, 74 Mechanismusdesign, 30, 327, 332 Mengenansätze , 270 Monotonie, 214-216, 218-220, 222,

223, 320, 328 Moral Hazard, 46, 48, 97 Nash-Gleichgewicht, 10-13, 57,

59-80 Effizienz, 78ff Eindeutigkeit, 76f Existenz, 66-70 Verfeinerungen

für die strategische Form, 102-110 für die extensive Form, 114-135

Nash-Lösung, 27, 163, 184, 190, 192-203,205-209,211-216,219, 224, 226-232, 234, 238-240, 242, 243, 245-250, 261, 311, 314,327,338

Nash-Programm, 28 neuverhandlungssstabile Gleichge­

wichte, 161 nicht-kooperative Spiele 3, 6, 185f,

226f,242f nicht manipulierbare Mechanismen,

329f Normalform, 5, 124, 135, 136, 173

s.a. Matrixform, strategische Form Nucleolus, 295-299, 302, 306, 325,

326 Nullsummenspiele, 59 Nutzenindex, 4, 5 Nutzenfunktion, 36ff Nutzengrenze, 44 Nutzenraum s. Auszahlungsraum öffentliche Güter, 8-9, 333 ff Oligopol, 60, 62, 156ff 333 Paradox of New Members, 305, 315 Paradox of Quarreling Members, 305,

315 Paradox of Redistribution, 304, 318

Sachindex

Paradox of Size, 304, 315 Pareto-Grenze, 27, 44 pareto-optimal, 6, 25, 27, 44, 78, 79,

209, 218, 220, 224, 237, 268, 274

Payoff-Dominanz, 137, 138 Perfect Recall, 45 perfekte Information, 46, 47, 156 perfektes Erinnerungsvermögen, 45,

46 Perfektheit gegenüber uniformen Per­

turbationen, 137 Pooling-Gleichgewicht, 129-131 proportionale Lösung, 184,200,220--

222, 224, 228 Public-Good-Index, 299, 321-326 quasi-konkave Funktion, 39 Randomisierung, 35, 70-73, 121, 127,

133,308,311,317 rationalisierbare Strategien, 98 ff reduzierte Form, 17, 135 reine Strategie, 34, 35, 71, 90, 119 relative Risikoaversion, 40 Reputation, 24, 173 ff Risiko-Dominanz, 137, 138 Risikoaversion , 40 Risikoneutralität, 40, 211 risikosensitiv , 209 Rubinstein-Verhandlungsspiel, 243,

253 sequentiell perfekt, 117 sequentielle Struktur, 14, 257 sequentielles Gleichgewicht 116 Shapley-Shubik-Index, 301-304, 311,

312, 319-321, 325 Shapley-Wert, 27, 299-301, 303-306,

308, 310-316, 319, 324, 326 Sicherheitsäquivalent, 39, 204, 205 Signalspiele, 128 ff Spiele

Chicken Game 93-95 Dyopolspiel, 61ff, 79ff, 84ff, 115f

156ff

Sachindex

Gebührenspiel, 276-278, 305, 310, 333

Gefangenendilemma, 1ff, 144f, 162f, 184f

Kampf der Geschlechter (Battle of the Sexes), 11f, 91f, 137f

Koordinationsspiel, 138, 183 Markteintrittsspiel, 17f, 54f, 173ff Rubinstein-Verhandlungsspiel, 251 ff Zeuthen-Harsanyi-Spiel, 235ff,

246ff Size Principle, 320, 325 soziale Entscheidungsfunktion, 328 soziale Entscheidungskorrespondenz,

328, 3~2 Spielbaum, 14-16,36,46,47,50,51,

53, 113, 116 Spielform, 2, 3, 33, 267, 269, 286,

327,329,330,336,343,344 Stackelberg-Führer, 21, 116, 154 Strategieraum, 3, 4, 7, 33, 35, 61,

67, 69-72, 78, 116 strategisch robuste Mechanismen,

329f strategische Form, 5, 15

s.a. Matrixform, Normalform strategische Stabilität, 135, 136 strikt kompetitive Spiele, 59 strikt quasi-konkav, 39, 67, 69 Sunk Costs, 20 Sunspots 93 Superspiel, 23, 139, 142, 150 Symmetrie, 107, 191, 194, 216, 21'8,

224, 261, 290, 292, 300, 311 symmetrisches Verhandlungsspiel,

191, 219 Teilspiel-Konsistenz, 164 Teilspiel-Perfektheit, 18, 114 teilspielperfekte Gleichgewichte', 18,

23, 114, 115, 118, 149, 152, 153, 161, 167,256,259

Theoreme der Wohlfahrtstheorie 332 Trembling Hand Perfekte Gleichge-

363

wichte, 106 ff, 125ff Trennungsgleichgewicht 129f Trigger-Strategie, 23, 142-147, 151,

153, 160, 162, 165, 166 unplausible Strategien, 103 unvollständige Information, 48, 50,

84, 87, 89, 116, 155, 168, 169, 340, 341

Verfeinerungen des Nash-Gleichge­wichts

für die strategische Form, 102-110 für die extensive Form, 114-135

Verhandlungsmenge, 286, 288-293, 295,297,310,311,314

Verhandlungsspiel, 29, 186, 188, 190-192, 194, 201, 212, 217, 219-221, 223, 230, 231, 234, 235, 239, 243, 247, 250, 253, 254, 257, 261, 339

Verhaltensstrategien, 46 VNM-Lösung, 282, 283, 285 vollständige Information, 24, 48, 176,

331, 339 Wahrscheinlichkeit 37, 41 ff, 43 Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzung, 43,

49, 81 ff, 120 ff unplausible 123f, 130 wechselseitig beste Antworten, 11, 12,

29, 61, 71, 72 Wertansätze, 270 wesentliche Spiele, 266 wiederholte Dominanz, 135 wiederholte Spiele, 21, 22, 139, 165 Zeuthen-Harsanyi-Spiel, 235ff, 246ff,

261,327 Zeuthen-Nash-Analogie, 238, 240,

248, 249 Zeuthen-Prinzip, 237-242, 249 Zulässigkeit, 135 Zurechnung, 261,269 Zusatz-Kosten-Test, 278,279 Zustandspräferenz-Diagramm 37

Personenindex

Abreu, D., 151-153, 158, 159, 164, 171, 172

Affuso, P., 302, 305, 314, 315 Akerlof, G., 48, 340 Albers, W., 293 Allais, M., 43 Anbar, D., 243 Arrow, K., 39,40,69,205,344,345 Asheim, G., 164 Aumann, R., 31, 45, 74, 76, 91, 97,

100, 111, 149, 150, 172, 182, 264

Axelrod, R., 22, 167, 242, 327 Azariadis, C., 93 Bailey, E., 278 Banks, J., 135 Banzhaf, J., 299, 302, 310, 312-320,

322, 324-326, 345 Barry, B., 322 Basu, K., 127 Battalio, 138 Baumol, W., 278 Beil, R., 138 Bennett, E., 293 Benoit, J.-P., 165-167 Berg, S., 307, 308, 316 Bergin, J., 164, 182 Bernheim, D., 98, 100, 102 Binmore, K., 31, 64, 102, 111, 127,

226 Bishop, R., 212 Bjurulf, B., 325 Bolle, F., 333 Boreh, K., 243 Bös, D., 302 Brams, S., 288, 302, 304, 305, 314,

315,321,326 Brandenberger, A., 111, 127 Caplow, T., 320

Chatterjee, K., 341 Cho, 1., 122, 134-136, 182 Cohen, A., 315 Coleman, J., 314, 345 Cooper, R., 138 Cournot, A., 60, 62-64, 80, 153,

155, 157-159, 163, 168, 345 Crawford, V., 138 Crott, H., 214 Damme, E. van, 64, 108, 110, 111,

130, 136, 139, 146, 162, 163, 167, 182

Dasgupta, P., 31, 64, 67, 70, 330, 344

Davis, M., 321 Debreu, G., 69, 332 Deegan, J., 299, 319-324, 345 Deemen, A. van, 325 Dekel, E., 100 Dreyer, J., 318 Dubey, P., 78, 300, 314, 316 Duffie, D., 69 Edgeworth,F., 26,27,186-188,263,

271, 274, 275, 283, 326, 332, 345

Elicker, H., 302 Eucken, W., 332 Farrell, J., 161-163,342 Faulhaber, G., 276 Finsinger, J., 333 Fischer, D., 304, 318 Frey, B., 301 Friedman, J., 31, 67, 139, 144, 165,

166, 256, 261, 262, 288, 289, 326

Fudenberg, D., 31, 109, 154, 169, 171, 341

Gibbard, A., 58, 330, 346 Gillies, D., 274

Personenindex

Green, E., 58, 156-160, 330, 333, 334, 336, 344

Guesnerie, R., 93 Güth, W., 138, 139, 164, 261, 326 Haller, H., 138 Hammond, P., 330, 344 Harsanyi, J., 49, 50, 52, 75, 81, 87,

104, 136-139, 164, 182, 184, 185, 201, 234, 236-243, 247, 249, 250, 261, 311, 327, 329, 349

Hellwig, M., 135 Hildenbrand, W., 273, 275 Hillas, J., 136 Holler, M., 74, 185, 190, 201, 219,

227, 236, 243, 261, 266, 293, 302, 307-309, 312, 316, 318, 321, 322, 326

Holzman, R., 295 Hoven, J., 333 Hunt, A., 302, 314 Huyck, J. van, 138 Jia-He, J., 109 Johnston, R., 302, 314 Kahneman, D., 43 Kalai, E., 172, 182, 184, 215, 217--

219, 221, 243, 247, 261, 329, 338, 346

Kalkofen, B., 138 Kilgour, D., 305 Kirman, A., 273, 275 Kliemt, H., 31, 242, 327 Kohlberg, E., 122, 135, 136, 139 Kreps, D., 31, 109, 118-120, 122,

123, 130, 131, 134-136, 173, 181, 182

Kuhn, H., 46, 198 Laffont, J.J., 58, 330, 331, 333, 334,

336, 344 Lehrer, E., 315 Leininger , W., 164 Leiserson, M., 325

Levine, J., 109, 171 Littlechild, S., 298, 302 Lucas, W., 283

365

Luce, R., 1, 3, 31, 190, 206, 224, 261

Machina, M., 41-43, 55, 347 MacLeod, B., 164, 182 Malouf, M., 214 Maschler, M., 74 Maskin, E., 67, 70, 154, 162-164,

169, 328, 330, 331, 344 McDonald, 1., 219 Mertens, J.-F., 122, 135, 136, 139 Milgrom, P., 182 MiIler, M., 268, 310 Morgenstern, 0., 4, 15, 41, 282,

285,311 Moulin, H. , 74, 268, 269, 276, 282,

309, 326, 328-330, 338, 343, 344

Murnigham, J., 214 Myerson, R., 30, 31, 64, 83, 107,

108, 111,221-223, 341, 344 Nash, J., 10-13, 15, 18, 23-25, 27-

-29, 46, 47, 52, 57, 59-67, 69-81, 83, 87, 89-94, 97-99, 101, 102, 103-111, 114, 115, 117-120, 122, 126, 136, 138, 141-155, 157-159, 161-163, 165-167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 182, 184, 190, 192-203, 205--209, 211-216, 218, 219, 223, 224, 226-234, 238-240, 242, 243, 245-251, 254, 255

Neumann, J. von, 4, 15,41,43, 137, 191,211,282, 285, 311

Neymann, A., 171, 172 Nikaido, H., 55, 67 Nurmi, H., 310, 312, 314, 324 Nydegger, R., 190, 214, 223 Ochs, J., 261 Ockenfels, P., 89

366

Owen, G., 31, 190, 214, 223, 227, 246, 283, 288, 289, 294, 295, 297, 298, 314, 325, 326

Packei, E., 299, 319-324, 326, 345 Panzar, J., 278 Pearce, D., 98, 100, 158, 159, 164 Peleg, B., 268, 269, 276, 282, 326,

328,344 Pen, J., 237 Postlewaite, A., 332 Radner, R., 171 Raiffa, H., 1, 3, 31, 190, 206, 224,

230,261 Ramey, G., 120 Rapoport, A., 315 Rasch, B., 7, 325 Rasmusen, E., 31 Rattinger, H., 302 Rawls, J., 31, 329 Riker, W., 320, 325 Roberts, J., 182,332 Roth, A., 190, 196, 204-206, 209,

211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 224, 226, 230, 236, 243,261,311

Rubinstein, A., 29, 76, 149, 171, 172, 184, 226, 243, 253-256, 261, 327, 348

Sabouriao, H., 152, 182 Salonen, H., 338 Satterthwaite, M., 330, 341, 346 Scarf, H., 332 Scarrow, H., 313 Schmeidler, D., 295 Schofield, M., 289,293, 311 Schotter, A., 304,318,327 Schoumaker, F., 214 Schweizer, U., 341 Selten, R., 49, 55, 101, 104, 106,

114, 126, 136-139, 164, 175, 182, 185, 310

Sertel, M., 344

Personenindex

Shapley, L., 27, 149, 299-316, 319--322, 324-326, 332, 348

Shubik, M., 250,297, 301-304, 311, 312, 319-322, 325, 332, 344, 348

Simon, H., 170 Smith, A., 332 Smorodinsky, M., 184,215,217-219,

247, 261, 329, 338, 346 Sobel, J., 135 Solow, R., 219 Sonnenschein, H., 69 Sorin, S., 172 Stacchetti, E., 158, 159 Steinhaus, H., 250 Steinherr , A., 344 Stenlund, H., 325 Stephao, G., 164 Straffin, P., 316, 321, 324 Sutton, J., 226 Tao, T., 64, 111 Taylor, M., 242, 327 Tirole, J., 31, 182, 341 Tversky, A., 43 Vaidya, K., 298 Vannucci, S., 268 Variao, H., 55, 77, 195, 198, 206,

273,275, 332 Vives, X., 89 Vogelsaog, 1., 333 Voss, T., 242, 327 Weizsäcker, C.C. von, 333 Wen-Tsün, W., 109 Werlaog, S., 64, 111 Willig, R., 278 Wilson, R., 118-120, 123, 173, 181,

182 Wittmao, D., 288 Yu, P., 226 Zagare, F., 288 Zeuthen, F., 234, 236-243, 247-250,

261, 327, 349

B. Felderer, S. Homburg

Makroökonomik . und neue '"-.,~ Makroökonomik~ 5., verb. Autl. 1991. IX, 455 S. 97 Abb. (Springer-Lehrbuch) Brosch. DM 36,-ISBN 3-540-53415-6

Aus einer Besprechung: " ... die Autoren bieten eine längst über­fällige, übersichtliche Einftihrung in die verschiedenen makroökonomischen Schulen, die sich in den vergangenen 200 Jahren entwickelt haben und früher oder später jedem Studenten im VWL-Studium begegnen ... eine will­kommene Orientierungshilfe im "Dickicht" der widerstreitenden Makro­schulen ... ein komplexes Standardwerk, das über das gesamte Studium hinweg einen guten Wegbegleiter abgibt."

WISU 7/87

J.Schumann

Grundzüge der mikroökonomischen Theorie 5., rev. u. erw. Autl. 1987. XVI, 444 S. 192 Abb. (Heidelberger Taschenbücher, Bd. 92) Brosch. DM 29,80 ISBN 3-540-17985-2

Dieses im deutschen Sprachgebiet weit verbreitete und auch ins Spanische über­setzte Buch ist ftir das wirtschaftswissen­schaftliche Grund- und Hauptstudium gedacht. Es vermittelt solide Kenntnisse der mikroökonomischen Theorie und schafft Verständnis ftir das Funktionieren einer Marktwirtschaft.

A. Pfingsten

Mikroökonomik Eine Einführung

1989. XIV, 240 s. 56 Abb. Brosch. DM 29,80 ISBN 3-540-50971-2

Dieses Lehrbuch der Mikroökonomik vermittelt einen Einblick in grundlegende Fragestellungen, Methoden und Modelle mikroökonomischer Theorie. Nach kurzen Abschnitten über die Stellung der Mikroökonomik in den Wirtschaftswis-. senschaften, Grundprobleme des Wirt­schaftens und wirtschaftswissenschaftli­che Modellbildung folgen mehrere ausftihrliche Kapitel zur Haushaltstheo­rie, zur G1eichgewichts- und Wohlfahrts­theorie sowie zur Produktionstheorie. Elastizitäten und ein kurzer Abstecher in die Preistheorie bilden den Abschluß.

U. Meyer, J. Diekmann

Arbeitsbuch zu den Grundzügen der mikro­ökonomischen Theorie 3., verb. Autl. 1988. X, 250 S. 132 Abb. Brosch. DM 27,50 ISBN 3-540-50046-4

A.Stobbe

Volkswirtschaftliches Rechnungswesen 7., rev. Aufl. 1989. XV, 409 S. 27 Abb. (Heidelberger Taschenbücher, Bd. 14) Brosch. DM 32,- ISBN 3·540-51151-2

Aus den Besprechungen: "Der Versuch, den Leser vom einfachsten wirtschaftlichen Grundbegriff aus über die einzel- und gesamtwirtschaftliche Vermögensrechnung die makroökonomischen Probleme des Geldwesens zur Kreislaufanalyse und zur eigentlichen volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamt­rechnung bis zu den verwickelten Zahlungs­bilanzfragen zu fUhren, ist ausgezeichnet gelungen. Zum begrifflichen Verständnis der großen wirtschaftspolitischen Zeitfragen gibt es jedenfalls kaum einen besseren Helfer." Der Volkswirt

U. WestphaI

Makroökonomik Theorie, Empirie und Politikanalyse

1988. XIV, 530 S. 129 Abb. 50 Tab. Brosch. DM 69,- ISBN 3-540-18837-1

In diesem Lehrbuch wird eine Makro­Theorie entwickelt, die an der Empirie und den wirtschaftspolitischen Problemen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland orientiert ist. Entsprechend dem "state ofthe art" inte­griert diese Theorie Nachfrage- und Angebotsseite; sie umfaßt verschiedene Ungleichgewichtsregime, die Preis-Lohn­Dynamik, Stock-flow-Zusammenhänge, Prozesse der Erwartungsbildung sowie eine konsistente portfoliotheoretische ModelIie­rung des finanziellen Sektors offener Volks­wirtschaften.

A.Stobbe

Volkswirtschaftslehre 11 Mikroökonomik

1983. XV, 600 S. 100 Abo. 12 Tab. (Heidelberger Taschenbücher, Bd. 227) Brosch. DM 39,80 ISBN 3-540-12446-2

Inhaltsübersicht: Einleitung: Methodische Grundlagen. - Theorie des privaten Haus­halts. - Theorie der Produktionsuntemeh­mungo - Grundlagen der Markttheorie. -Marktstrukturen, Marktverhalten und Marktergebnisse. - Markt und Staat. -Anhang I: Allgemeine Literatur zur Mikro­ökonomik. - Anhang 11: Fachausdrücke aus der Mikroökonomik. - Personen- und Insti­tutionenverzeichnis. - Sachverzeichnis.

A.Stobbe

Volkswirtschsftslehre 111 Makroökonomik

2., völlig überarb. Aufl. 1987. XIV, 394 S. (Heidelberger Taschenbücher, Bd. 158) Brosch. DM 34,80 ISBN 3-540-18172-5

Dieses Lehrbuch der Makroökonomik, eine vollständig revidierte und in weiten Teilen neu geschriebene Fassung der "Gesamtwirt­schaftlichen Theorie" von 1975, wendet sich an Studienanfänger und mittlere Seme-ster der Wirtschafts­und Sozial­wissen­schaften.