i

LLM Thesis

International and European Law Public International Law

University of Amsterdam

The Katuna border closure dispute between Rwanda and Uganda: A legal analysis of

international dispute/conflict settlement mechanisms within the East Africa Community

system. The way forward!

Dalton Odomoch

Thesis Supervisor: Dr Rosanne van Alebeek

23 July 2020

A Research paper submitted in partial fulfilment of The Degree of Master of Laws (LLM) in

Public International and European Law

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

Acknowledgement .......................................................................................................................... iv

Dedication ........................................................................................................................................ v

Abbreviation ................................................................................................................................... vi

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................. 2

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 2

CHAPTER TWO............................................................................................................................. 6

DISPUTE/CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AND THE ORGANS

RESPONSIBLE FOR DISPUTE/CONFLICT MANAGEMENT UNDER THE EAC

SYSTEM. ..................................................................................................................................... 6

2.1. Diplomatic and legally binding means of International Dispute Settlement(IDS) ..... 6

2.1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6

2.2. Institutional Framework of the EAC ........................................................................... 8

2.3. Peace and Security Framework (PSF) ....................................................................... 10

2.4. The Mechanism for the Prevention Management and Resolution of Conflict

(CPMR) .................................................................................................................................. 11

2.5. The East African Court Of Justice (EACJ) ............................................................... 14

2.6. Situations Relating to Customs and Trade within the EAC. ..................................... 17

CHAPTER THREE....................................................................................................................... 20

3.0. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

AND REGIONAL BLOCS. ....................................................................................................... 20

3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 20

3.2. The Organisation of American States (OAS) ............................................................ 20

3.3. The Organization of African Unity (now, the African Union) .................................. 23

3.4. The European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE)................................... 25

CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................................... 32

4.0. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................... 32

5.0. BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. viii

5.1. LEGISLATION .......................................................................................................... viii

5.2. CASES ..........................................................................................................................ix

5.3. TEXTBOOKS, JOURNALS, ARTICLES. ..................................................................ix

5.4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ......................................................................................... xii

5.5. INTERNET SOURCES............................................................................................... xii

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Declaration

I, Dalton Odomoch, declare that this research study is my original work and has not been

presented for a degree award at any other University.

Signed...............................................................................................Date...................................

Dalton Odomoch

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed...............................................................................................Date...................................

Dr Rosanne van Alebeek

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Acknowledgement

Special thanks go to my thesis supervisor, Dr Roseanne van Alebeek. Her patience, guidance,

and expert insights in this field of law have made this an inspiring experience.

Gratitude goes to the leadership of the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) represented

by the JCOS, Lt. Gen. J.B Musanyufu, the CPA, Maj. Gen. George Igumba, the UPDF-DA to

the Netherlands, Maj Gen. Moses Rwakitarate, the UPDF Chief of Legal Services, Brig.Gen.

Dr Goddard Busingye and the UvA-UPDF Alumni in Uganda represented by Lt. Col(s)

Susan Mwanga, James Kiiza, and Lt. Daniel Mayombo for all the support rendered towards

the completion of my research studies.

Uniquely, appreciation goes to the fantastic team of Legal experts at the Netherlands

Defence Forces led by Brig. Gen Aart Jan De Haan, Head of Legal Services, NL-DF, Col.

Arthur te Lintello, LegAd NL-DF, and Point of Contact during my stay and studies in the

Netherlands, assisted by academic mentors: Capt(s) Harry de Veld, Jantine van Delft and

Marijn Akveld, AP. Elesen (Provost MEA.) Their reviews and mentorship provided helpful

insights and perspectives for this paper.

Appreciation also goes to the distinguished academic and administrative staff of the UvA

Law School represented by Prof. Marjoline Zieck, Marlies Dale, Johanna Vogel, Paco Mens,

and Ellen Schurman for their unwavering support and assistance throughout the study at the

UvA.

Finally, thanks go to the UvA LLM-PIL 2019/2020 classmates, and friends for their support

during the compilation of this dissertation.

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Dedication

This research is dedicated to family, friends, and UPDF fraternity. A special feeling of gratitude

goes to my loving parents Eng. John.A.O. Odomoch (RIP), Esther Winifred Serubula, and

Serubula Fred whose words of encouragement and push for resilience ring in my ears, and my

siblings Dickens, Dorothy, Diana, Sharon, Wasswa, Kato, and Derrick who have never left my

side and are very special. To my friends; Alastair Roderick, Victor Nabwami, Sophia

Zademack, Sathiabama Sathiamoorthy, Veronica Boehlke, Isaac Tibasiima, Alex Kiwanuka,

Abdallah Hessi, Ivan Hortal, Sally Afram, Luke Meaton, Osman Kiyemba, Nisha Kit, Anna

Khote, Ellina Lauterbach, Gessa Simplicious, Pennie Nairuba, Raymond Okot, Paul Mugoya,

Maj. Innocent Ahimbisibwe, Maj. Charles Ssekayita, Capt. Tashobya Wazarwa, Lt. John

Mpunga, and Lt. Kiiza Anselm; this study is dedicated to your selfless and generous nature.

Special thanks go to my best friend Charlotte Cory Sasha, my wonderful daughters Hadline

Esther and Darlene Amari for being there for me throughout the entire Master's program. All

of you have been my best cheerleaders.

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Abbreviation

ADR - Alternative Dispute Resolution

AMISOM – African Mission In Somalia

ANAW - African Network For Animal Welfare

AU - African Union

CAR – Central African Republic

CERD – International Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial

Discrimination

CIAV - Comision International De Apoyo Y Verification. (The International Support And

Verification Commission)

COE - The Council Of Europe

CSG – Contradora Support Group

CPMR - Conflict Prevention Management And Resolution

Mechanism

D/SG - Deputy Secretary-General

DRC - The Democratic Republic Of Congo

EAC - East African Community

EACJ - East African Court Of Justice

EAC-SG - East African Community Secretary General

EACEWARN - East Africa Community Early Warning Mechanism

EADB - East African Development Bank

EALA - East African Legislative Assembly

ECPSD - European Convention For Pacific Settlement Of Disputes

ECHRT - European Court Of Human Rights

EU - European Union

EUGS - European Union Global Strategies

FDLR - Democratic Forces For The Liberation Of Rwanda

GCM - General Court-Martial

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GERD - Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

ICJ - International Court Of Justice

ICTS - International Courts And Tribunals

IDS- International Dispute Settlement

IOS - International Organisations

JSCCDISFD – Joint Sectoral Council On Cooperation In Defense, Interstate, Security, And

Foreign Policy Coordination

MOU - Memorandum Of Understanding

MOX - Mixed Oxide Fuel

NATO -The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEWC - National Early Warning Centres

OAS - Organisation Of American States

OAU - Organisation Of African Unity

OSCE - Organisation For Security And Cooperation

PCA - Permanent Court Of Arbitration

PCIJ - Permanent Court Of International Justice

PEP - Panel Of Eminent Persons

PF - Peace Facility

PSF - Peace Security Framework

PIL - Public Interest Litigation

POLISARIO- The Popular Front For The Liberation Of Saguia El-Hamra And Rio De Oro

REWC- Regional Early Warning Center

RNC - Rwanda National Congress

ROS - Regional Organisations

RPF - Rwanda Patriotic Front

TEEC - Treaty For The Establishment Of The European Economic Community

TEU - The Treaty Establishing The European Union

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TFEU - The Treaty Establishing The Functioning Of The European Union

UN - United Nations

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution

UPDF - Uganda Peoples Defence Forces

WTO – DBU – World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Body

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ABSTRACT

The East African Community (EAC) consists of the following countries: Kenya, Tanzania,

Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi. The EAC is one of the vibrant regional

organizations on the African Continent. Through a constitutive treaty framework, the EAC

seeks to realize effective social, economic, and political integration in the region by the year

2024. Unfortunately, member states are embroiled in inter-state conflict/ disputes. This

threatens the cohesion and the integration process within the EAC. One such situation is the

current Uganda-Rwanda Katuna border closure situation. This situation requires urgent

attention of the relevant EAC organs and structures mandated to deal with conflict and dispute

management under the EAC treaty. The Uganda-Rwanda conflict is not the only one plaguing

the community. Other disputes include the Migingo Island dispute between Uganda and Kenya;

the issue of the delayed completion of the interstate standard gauge railway by member states;

the protest by Kenya against Uganda's decision to reroute the crude oil pipeline construction to

the sea through Tanzania and not Kenya as had earlier been agreed; the dispute between

Burundi and Rwanda over allegations of political interference by Rwanda in Burundi’s internal

affairs; just to mention a few. It is noteworthy that the EAC once collapsed in 1977 because

similar disputes at the time were not properly addressed or managed.

This research investigates whether the EAC system has well-functioning dispute

settlement/conflict resolution mechanisms in place. It further seeks to establish how the

system's capacity to deal with conflict/disputes can be enhanced to avoid a repeat of the 1977

EAC collapse. The perceived weakness and absence of the EAC involvement in the various

conflict/ dispute management process, particularly those of an interstate political nature tests

the credibility of the EAC. This perception affects the integration process and slows down the

roadmap to the envisioned EA political federation. This generally undermines the confidence

of member states to resort to its organs and structures to solve any conflict or disputes likely to

arise. Whereas the EAC treaty enjoins member states to use peaceful dispute settlement

mechanisms, member states have violated this obligation; a phenomenon this study investigates

to ascertain why EAC member states are not making the full use of the IDS mechanisms

embedded in the EAC system and are not using the existing organs to manage and resolve

conflict/disputes, and finally to come up with relevant recommendations that can optimize the

EAC's capacity to resolve conflicts and disputes peacefully within its legal framework.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Former allies, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Paul Kagame are presidents of their respective

countries, Uganda and Rwanda for now 34 and 20 years respectively. The alliance soured

as tensions escalated sharply in early 2019 when both countries accused each other of

espionage and supporting rebel activities against their governments. Rwanda closed its

border with Uganda at Katuna, halting cross border trade and issuing travel advice; warning

Rwandans against traveling to Uganda, alleging that their safety and liberties cannot be

guaranteed in Uganda.1 Uganda claims Rwanda infiltrated her intelligence apparatus,

insists that some Rwanda state agents and collaborators are involved in espionage in

Uganda. Both countries made several arrests, deportations, and detentions of suspects. For

example, in 2017, a Rwandan ex-soldier, Rene Rutangugira was arrested in Kampala,

Uganda. Rutangugira was charged for espionage and for the abduction of Joel Mutabazi,

an ex-presidential bodyguard who had fled Rwanda and sought asylum protection in

Uganda. Uganda had granted Mutabazi refugee status protection before his unlawful

refoulement to Rwanda with the help of suspected collaborators and “moles” within the

Ugandan security apparatus. Rwanda protested Rutangugira's arrest and trial and further

protested the detention and trial of other Rwandan nationals then facing trial at the GCM.

Rwanda insists there is a witch-hunt against ethnic Banywaranda- sic, demanding they be

set free or produced in civil court to face trial without delay.2 Sam Kutesa, Uganda's foreign

affairs minister in response, stated that Uganda had deported Rwandan spy agents for

security reasons or for their being involved in espionage and subversive activities. After a

series of protracted diplomatic efforts, nine Rwandans including Rutangugira were recently

released by Uganda and handed over to Rwanda.3

Additionally, Rwanda accused Uganda of supporting hostile rebel groups/dissidents

namely, the RNC and FDLR, outlawed Rwandan Opposition groups. However, both

1Al Jazeera News, “Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda Sign a pact to ease tensions” (21 August 2019)

www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/presidents-rwanda-uganda-sign-pact-ease-tensions-190821134138867html

(Accessed on 25/02/2020). 2 See https://allafrica.com/stories/202002100574.html and https://www.softpower.ug/details-uganda-rwanda-

talks-turn-comic-as-rwanda-rejects-neutral-team-to-verify-allegations/ 3 See https://www.ktpress.rw/2020/01/relief-as-9-rwandans-released-by-uganda-arrive-home/

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countries vehemently deny the claims by each other thus the conflict/dispute.4 In direct

response to the situation, Rwanda closed the Katuna border, at first claiming major road

repairs were on-going at Katuna border. However, it later admitted it was a response to

Uganda's treatment of Rwandan nationals in Uganda and it would only reopen the border

crossing once Rwanda’s demands and concerns were addressed. This was the genesis of

the current Rwanda-Uganda dispute. The Rwanda-Uganda dispute is an indictment of the

EAC system’s deficiencies.

The EAC is a regional inter-governmental organization comprising six countries: Kenya,

Tanzania, South Sudan, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Rwanda and Uganda are key actors

in the integration agenda of the EAC.5 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African

Community, hereafter the EAC Treaty, entered into force on 7 July 2000 after its

ratification by Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya originally. Subsequently, Rwanda and

Burundi joined the EAC on 1 July 2007.6 South Sudan, the youngest nation of the regional

community, joined the EAC in April 2016.7 Under the EAC treaty, member states are

obliged to peacefully settle any dispute/conflict with each other using the EAC organs and

structures peacefully.8 The objectives of the EAC are enshrined in the EAC treaty and its

protocols.9 However, there is little indication that critical EAC organs have initiated any

tangible actions concerning the current Uganda-Rwanda conflict. In that regard, various

dispute settlement mechanisms initiated have been ad hoc and dependent on multilateral

relations, dialogues outside the EAC framework, to de-escalate the situation.10

International Organisations (IOs) and Regional Organisations (ROs) possess the cardinal

function of facilitating the pacific settlement of international conflict/disputes. For

example, the UN continuously promotes world peace by using peaceful means such as

4 See Hamza Kyeyune, “Tension between Uganda, Rwanda near breaking point,” All Africa News, 30/01/2020

available on url http://www.aa.com.tr/en/Africa/tension-between-uganda-rwanda-near-breaking-point/1719046

(Accessed on 06/04/2020). 5 A. Bainomugisha and S. Rwengabo, The Promise and Efficacy of the East African Community, ACODE

Policy Briefing Paper Series No. 41, 2016 at pp. 18,21,23 and 25, available at http://www.acode-

u.org/Files/Publications/PBP_41_EAC.pdf (accessed on 2nd April 20, 2020). 6 See “Overview of the EAC” available at https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac, (accessed on 10/05/2020) See also Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker (1995), International Institutional Law, Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, The Hague, pp. 505–885. See also Article 2 of the EAC treaty EAC ( 2002 xiv, 111p.: 230mm (EAC

Publication, No.1) ISBN: 9987 - 666-01-9) 7 https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/south-sudan (accessed on 06/04/2020). 8 See EAC Treaty, Articles 6 (c), 32, 38, 123 (4) (d), 124 (1) 9 EAC Treaty Article 5.1. 10 Emphasis added.

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Mediation, Good Offices, Conciliation, and Negotiation in its efforts to resolve

conflicts/disputes that threaten global peace.11 IOs and ROs, therefore, can engage in

preventive diplomacy to prevent the escalation of situations that undermine or threaten

world peace.12 In practice, IOs and ROs offer member states malleable mechanisms for

peaceful resolution of conflict/disputes; for example, matters entailing the interpretation

and application of treaties and their constitutive acts.13 In volatile situations, IOs have

deployed observers and military missions to preserve the peace, special representatives to

investigate, negotiate, and conduct fact-finding missions.14

In light of the above, this thesis' principal investigative question is: Does the EAC have well-

functioning dispute settlement/conflict resolution mechanisms in place, and if not, what lessons

can be learned from other international or regional organizations in this respect?

The thesis will mainly make inquiries as to the following sub-questions: -

• What legal provisions, exist within the EAC treaty system, relevant to the pacific

settlement of situations of dispute/conflict; that partner states can resort to and why do

member states seldom use them?

• How effective are the EAC treaty provisions on conflict/dispute management in light

of the current Katuna border closure dispute between Rwanda and Uganda?

• What conflict/dispute resolution mechanisms exist within other regional and

International blocs concerning political disputes of similar nature?

• What conclusions can be drawn, and what recommendations can be adopted in respect

of the EAC?

This research paper is a culmination of the qualitative design method and an on desk-based

inquiry into the progress and efficacy of the dispute/conflict settlement mechanisms within the

EAC system. Chapter two will show the mapping tools, modes of dispute/conflict settlement

mechanisms, the organs, and their roles within the EAC treaty system. Chapter three will

briefly discuss aspects of international dispute and conflict settlement mechanisms and what

they entail and later scan into a comparative study into the available mechanisms and practices

11 See, Chapter VI UN Charter (Arts 33–38). 12 Alain Pellet, Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, MPEPIL, vol VIII, Rudifer Wolfrum (ed), Oxford

University Press, August 2013, pp 212-215, paras 41-52. 13 Ibid, para 53. 14 For example, ECOWAS deployed in Sierra Leon and Liberia in the early 90s to avert a humanitarian crisis.

AMISOM is currently deployed in Somalia as a peace keeping mission since 2007.

5

within other regional or international organizations. Finally, chapter four will formulate

conclusions and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

DISPUTE/CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AND THE ORGANS

RESPONSIBLE FOR DISPUTE/CONFLICT MANAGEMENT UNDER THE EAC

SYSTEM.

This chapter identifies the various international dispute settlement mechanisms; specifically

zooming into the EAC Institutional Framework and the different conflict and dispute settlement

mechanisms existing under the EAC system.

2.1. Diplomatic and legally binding means of International Dispute Settlement(IDS)

2.1.1. Introduction

Although the terms Dispute and Conflict are used interchangeably in this thesis, it is pertinent

to distinguish between the two terms. A Dispute entails a "...disagreement on a point of law or

fact...,” a variance or clash of legal views or interests on a matter between parties;”15 the

determination of which, being a matter of substance and objective determination16 but not of

form.17 In contrast, Conflict is long term in nature, with fundamentally entrenched issues

perceived by the parties involved as being non- negotiable. A conflict/situation does not imply

that a difference of views exists between the parties concerned.18

The various modes of disputes settlement under general international law emanate from the

concept in customary international law that the out-turn of the prohibition of the use of force

vests in the notion that states must resolve their international disputes by peaceful means.19

Therefore, states should desist from the illegal use of force. States must respect the customary

international legal obligation to settle disputes peacefully.20 The ensuing means considered are

15 Alain Pellet ( n 12), pp 202, part A, para 1. Additionally see, PCIJ ruling in Mavrommatis Palestine

Concessions (Greece v. U.K), Jurisdiction case, File E.c. III Docket V.I Judgment No. 2, 30 August 1924, para

19. 16 See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria (Hungary vs Romania,) Phase I, A.O, I.C.J. Reports 1950, pg 13, para 74. 17 See ICJ ruling in Application of CERD (Georgia v Russian Federation) Preliminary Objections, 2011 para. 30 18 Interpretation of Peace Treaties (n 16), pp. 13, para 74. 19 See Articles 2 (3) and 33 of the UN Charter. 20 See ICJ judgement in Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v India) Jurisdiction of the Court, 2000,

para.53, In “Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.

United States of America);” Merits, ICJ, 27 June 1986, para. 290.

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Inquiry, Mediation, Negotiation, and Conciliation.21 Moreover, the use of Good Offices22 and

Consultations23 constitute other forms of diplomatic/political disputes/conflict management.24

These modes of dispute settlement entail particular elements.

Negotiation entails deliberations between parties concerned to establish opposite positions and

views to harmonize the differences. Negotiations help to clarify and elucidate the opposing

contentions. Negotiations offer sufficient opportunity to settle disputes because they are

discretional, and deemed a form of "self-initiative" in nature, parties engage each other directly

in the process, and interposition in the process by a third party is unnecessary.25 During

Negotiations, parties engage directly with each other. However, in Inquiry, Mediation, and

Conciliation, a third actor intervenes. In the latter three, a third actor suggests a solution.

Additionally, in Negotiation and Mediation, rules of procedure are absent, but in Inquiry and

Conciliation, pre-set rules of procedure are laid down. Other peaceful mechanisms of

disputes/conflict resolution are adjudicative. These include Arbitration and litigation before an

International Court or Tribunal(ICT).26 In the premises, a third actor mentions a feasible

solution to the dispute, hinged on legal grounds.27

Mediation and Good Offices involve an arbiter undertaking to bring conflicting parties together

to resolve the dispute/conflict. The acquiescence of parties is not an initial requirement, but

ultimately, Mediation proceedings may be started without their assent. A mediator ardently

participates in reaching agreement on the issue and does not concern himself with ensuring

negotiations happen and or remain on course."28

Conciliation entails resolving a dispute by inviting a uniquely established organ tasked to

appraise the facts and issues and make recommendations to the parties concerned to consider

21 See Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York, United Nations, 1992), pp.

9–55. 22 See Merrills JG, International Dispute Settlement (6th edn Cambridge University Press 2017), pp 26-42. 23 See Gleider Hernandez, International Law, Oxford University Press, 2019, pg 301, para 12.2.2. 24 Merills JG (2017) (n 22 above) pp. 10. 25 Gleider Hernandez (n 23), pp. 301, para 12.2.1. 26 For example, ICJ, PCA, PCIJ, WTO-DBU etc, have all made significant jurisprudential and juridical contributions in that regard. 27 Ramírez Robles, Edna, Training Module on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms for Trade Agreements (August

2012). UNCTAD & TradeMark South Africa, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2563178

page 5, para 2. 28 See Gleider Hernandez (n 23 above) pp. 301-302, See also Walid Abdulrahim, ‘Peaceful Settlement of

Disputes,’ Private site for Legal Research and Studies, (available at:

https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english) [accessed on 15/06/2020.]

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and reach a consensus. Note that the proposals of conciliators, like that of mediators, are

without binding effect on the parties who can assent to or decline them.29

Inquiry generally refers to the process in which information is gathered concerning a disputed

factual issue. The credibility of an Inquiry under international law is generally predicated on

there being an impartial record of the facts which helps the stakeholders determine the fault,

causation, and how to arrive at the value of loss and injury.30

The myriad of diplomatic techniques available to parties to resort to is complemented by the

existence of mechanisms that are binding, triadic in nature, and based on legal principles;

namely Arbitration and Adjudication.31 The 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement

of Disputes defines Arbitration as the resolution of differences between parties based on respect

for the law by a judge identified and selected by parties.32

On the other hand, Adjudication entails the resolution of international disputes through a

permanent judicial body with fixed rules of procedure and the power to issue binding

judgments. Adjudication has become popular judging- sic by the proliferation of international,

regional and supranational courts and tribunals.33

2.2. Institutional Framework of the EAC

The revived EAC was formed under Article 2 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East

African Community. The EAC currently comprises six countries from the African sub-Saharan

region; they are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, its

origins date as far back as 1967 when it was formed. It collapsed in 1977 due to mistrust,

political disputes, poor leadership and bad governance, disagreements over the sharing of the

resource allocations, and variant economic models pursued at the time.34 On 7 July 2000, the

29 Gleider Hernandez (n 23), pp. 304, para 12.2.4. 30 Ibid, see also Arts 9-36 1899 Hague Convention. 31 Greenhouse, Carol J. “Mediation: A Comparative Approach.” Man, vol. 20, no. 1, 1985, pp. 90–114 at pp 1. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2802223. Accessed 6/06/2020. 32 The 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes art. 15. See also, Art. 37 of the 1907

Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 33 Gleider Hernandez (n 23) pp. 308, para 12.3.2.1-3. 34 See generally, Mshomba R.E. “The Rise and Fall of the Former East African Community,” Economic

Integration in Africa: The East African Community in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press

2017) pp. 49-73.

9

EAC was revived after the coming into force of the Treaty establishing the EAC in 2000. The

principal organs of the EAC include the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Coordination

and Sectoral Committees, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the East African

Legislative Assembly (EALA), and the Secretariat. Other semi-autonomous institutions that

morphed into being part of the EAC structures include the East African Development Bank

(EADB) (1980), the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (1994) just to mention a few.35 The

analysis in this thesis, however, will focus mainly on the relevant key EAC Organs and

institutions.

Under the preamble of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC,36 the critical mission of

the EAC is to "...widen and deepen cooperation among the partner states in the political,

economic, social and cultural integration for their mutual benefit..."37 In that regard, the EAC

Customs Union, the Common Market, and other key EAC organs, discussed below, were

formed. However, the much foretold Monetary Union is yet to become a reality.

Therefore, this chapter provides an overview of the role and importance of the EAC

Institutional framework concerning dispute/conflict resolution mechanisms. Specifically, it

analyses the critical mapping tools within the EAC system.

The EAC system recognizes the relevance of some of the mechanisms highlighted above. It

duly assigns particular organs/institutions with specific or broad mandates to activate or apply

some of the dispute/ conflict settlement mechanisms as will be discussed below. The overview

will begin with the Peace and Security Framework because it outlines the overall broad political

mandate assigned to the EAC organs in the pursuit of realizing the EAC vision towards peace-

building within the East Africa region. Secondly, this chapter underscores the EAC's Conflict

Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPMRM) and the institutions

thereunder. It will draw attention to the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) which plays a

pivotal role in adjudication, and finally, because the Rwanda-Uganda conflict involves some

trade disputes, the mechanisms available in the different relevant EAC Protocols and the

applicable organs will be surveyed.

35 See “About EAC: EAC Institutions” available at https://www.eac.int/eac-institutions (accessed on

06/07/2020). 36 As amended on 14th December 2006 and 20th August 2007. 37 See “Overview of the EAC” available at https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac (accessed on 06/07/2020).

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2.3. Peace and Security Framework (PSF)

EAC member states tasked the EAC with broad political authority focused on preventing

conflict, building peace, addressing volatile situations, and seeking to resolve disputes arising

between partner states peacefully. Under Article 5(3) of the EAC Treaty, the EAC can

intervene in any situation affecting peace in the region. This mandate includes addressing

security issues likely to affect peace in the hemisphere. In tandem with the objectives of the

EAC, the above provision requires the EAC to promote stability, peace, security, and good

relations among member states (cooperation). Therefore, the cardinal objective of the PSF is

to advocate for the equable, non-belligerent resolution of conflicts and disputes mainly through

cooperation in political affairs.38 Article 123 of the EAC Treaty further provides for the

establishment of conventional "foreign and security policies" geared at the peaceful settlement

of disputes in the community. Therefore, Article 123 reinforces Article 5 of the Treaty which

lays out the objectives of the EAC.

Additionally, the Summit of Heads of State39 and the Council of Ministers40 is tasked with the

responsibility of addressing matters of political and security cooperation viz-a-viz the

integration agenda through negotiation and policy adoption. The guiding legal framework of

the activities and decisions of the above organs are the EAC treaty, the Protocol for Peace and

Security, and the Strategy for Regional Peace and Security.41 Under Article 123(5), the EAC

has created an institutional framework that requires the Sectoral Councils and Committees to

steer policy and give guidance; identifying areas for cooperation in matters of Defence, Inter-

State Security, and Foreign Policy. The Sectoral Councils include the Sectoral Council on

Cooperation in Defence, Joint Sectoral Councils on Defence, Sectoral Council on Inter-State

Security, Sectoral Council on Foreign Policy Coordination; Inter-State Security, and Foreign

Policy Coordination.42 The EAC's Department for Peace and Security oversees the Sectoral

Councils mentioned above.43

38 See Chapter 23 of EAC Treaty. 39 Article 11(3) of the EAC Treaty. 40 Article 14 of the EAC Treaty. 41 Article 123 ibid. 42 See paper by Beatrice Kiraso, then D/SG EAC at the EAC Peace and Security Conference- Kampala, 5

October 2009 entitled “EAC Integration Process And The Enabling Peace And Security Architecture” available

at http://repository.eac.int/bitstream/handle/11671/248/EAC [accessed on 07/06/2020]. 43 See, Isabelle Wafubwa (Editor & contributor,) “Towards Political Federation in the East African Community:

Achievements and Challenges” EAC Publication (2014), (available at http://eacgermany.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/03/Achievements-and-Challenges-Towards-EAC-Politcal-Federation.pdf) [accessed on

07/06/2020] pp 26, section 3.2.

11

Article 124 of the EAC treaty entrenches its aspirations for peace and security in the region.

To the extent, the Strategy on Peace and Security was adopted by the Council of Ministers in

November 2006.44 In 2010, the Council of Ministers endorsed a strategic plan for the

implementation of the EAC Peace and Security Strategy that was updated in 2016 and is still

in use today. The strategy seeks to address the current security challenges within East Africa,

such as genocide, genocidal ideology, crime management, food security, piracy, just to mention

a few.45 In March 2008, the Sectoral Council on Interstate Security was formed to nurture

regional cooperation among partner states and to make policy guidelines for the oversight over

the sector.46

In 2012, the EAC Peace and Security Protocol was adopted by the Summit after protracted

negotiations that lasted five years. On 15th February 2013, the Protocol took effect after it was

ratified at the Meeting of the Joint Sectoral Council of Cooperation in Defense, Inter-State

Security, and Foreign Policy Coordination. The Protocol lays down an obligatory framework

for the realization of peace, security, and stability in the East African region. It entails over 10

objectives to promote regional stability, peace, and security.47 Besides, the Protocol provides

for the creation of other institutions48 such as the Directorate for Peace and Security, tasked

with overseeing the implementation of the Protocol.

2.4. The Mechanism for the Prevention Management and Resolution of Conflict

(CPMR)

In January 2012, the Joint Sectoral Council on Cooperation in Defence, Interstate Security,

and Foreign Policy adopted the CPMR. It was approved by the Council of Ministers in August

2012. The CPMR provides the legal framework for prevention, management, peaceful

resolution and mitigation of conflicts in the EAC region through the use of preventive

44 EAC, “Peace and Security,” available at https://www.eac.int/security (accessed on 06/07/2020). 45 EAC, “EAC Development Strategy (2011/12 – 2015/16), Deepening And Accelerating Integration, One People, One Destiny” available online at

https://www.preventionweb.net/files/EAC%20development%20strategy.pdf (accessed on 07/07/2020) 46 Isabel Wafubwa (2014) op cit, pp. 26, para 3.2. 47 Article 3 of EAC Protocol on Peace and Security. See also UN Economic Commission for Africa website

publication “EAC - Peace, Security, Stability and Governance” available at

https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac-peace-security-stability-and-governance [accessed on 07/10/2020] 48 See article 15 of the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security.

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diplomacy by way of negotiations, dialogue, and cooperation, to facilitate peace support

interventions, conflict management, and peace-building efforts.49

Additionally, the EAC has adopted an Early Warning Mechanism (EACEWARN) to enable

timely anticipation, preparedness, and responses to situations developing and likely to affect

peace and stability in the region.50 The EACEWARN structure comprises the Regional Early

Warning Center (REWC-Situation Room) under the Department for Peace and Security that is

overseen by the EAC Secretariat.51 It is significant because the Secretariate ought to beware of

all volatile situations like the “Rwanda-Uganda conflict” and address it appropriately.

Moreover, the National Early Warning Centres (NEWC) present in all Partner States

complements the role of the REWC.52 The NEWC was created to compliment the CPRM and

align its early warning alerts with congruous timely responses.53 According to Isabelle

Wafubwa, EAC Secretariat, the EACEWARN relies on open-source information such as media

reports, field reports, and structural attributes and data to verify, analyze, disseminate, and

share information.54 The EACEWARN gathers data, analyses it, and designs an appropriate

response such as developing policies for consideration by the EAC to remedy a situation. Also

embedded in the current EACEWARN is a roadmap that lays out areas for prioritization and

commitment of resources for operationalization of the EACEWARN.

Another vital institution under the EAC's CPMR is the Panel of the Eminent Persons (PEP)

established under Articles 6, 123, and 124 of the EAC Treaty. Its main task is to advise and

guide the Summit, the Council, and the Secretary-General on sensitive issues affecting the

community, especially matters relating to peace, security in the region.55 The PEP is mainly

engaged in offering competent counsel to the critical organs of the EAC and uses their

eminence to advocate for peaceful resolution of conflicts.56 Accordingly, the PEP comprises

49 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa “EAC- Peace, Security, Stability and Governance,”

available at url: https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac-peace-security-stability-and-governance (accessed on

07/07/2020). 50 Ibid. 51 See generally, Charles Njoroge,Ebs Eac Deputy Secretary General (Political Federation) “Silencing the Guns

in Africa: Nexus between Peace, Security, Governance and Development” Presentation by the East African

Community, available at https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/events/20151//012/statements/njoroge20151012pm.pdf (accessed on

07/07/2020). 52 Isabelle Wafubwa (n 43) pp. 28, para 3.2.1.3. 53 Isabelle Wafubwa (n 43) pp. 28 54 Ibid 55 Isabelle Wafubwa (n 43), pp 28, para 3.2.1.4. 56 See “Communiqué: 3rd Emergency Summit Of Heads Of State Of The East African Community On

13

one eminent, highly distinguished, knowledgeable, respected, and reputable person from each

EAC member state. A member of the PEP is usually someone who has contributed immensely

to the realization of peace and security at various levels including national, to say the least. In

February 2012, the EAC adopted the modality for the functionality and facilitation of the PEP.

The Mediation Unit of the EAC Secretariat is tasked to support the activities and efforts of the

PEP and ensure that disputes are resolved peacefully. The PEP is guided by the customary

tenets of preventive diplomacy to achieve the aims and objectives for its existence; that is to

say; to de-escalate tension, facilitate the amicable resolution of disputes, and encourage

harmony among the Partner States. The PEP encourages member states to use peaceful

mechanisms such as Good Offices, Dialogue, Mediation, Conciliation Negotiation, and

Arbitration in a bid to facilitate peacemaking and peace-building strategies.57

Articles 2(2) and 4(1) of the EAC Peace and Security Protocol provide the basis for the creation

of the Peace Facility (PF) as a mechanism under the CPMR. In February 2013, the PF was

established by the Joint Sectoral Council on Cooperation in Defense, inter-state Security, and

Foreign policy.58 The crucial role of the PF is to operationalize the CPMR by allocating

resources for its action plans and budget framework. However, the PF's contribution towards

peaceful resolutions of conflict/disputes in the region is negligible as there is hardly any record

of its performance. Isabelle Wafubwa (2014) notes that the PF is currently underfunded and

relies heavily on external donor funding.59

In respect to the Rwanda-Uganda conflict, it should be noted that this is the fourth time the two

former country allies have come to the brink of armed conflict since the British government

helped mediate to prevent an all-out war in 2001. In each case, the personal commitment of the

two presidents was the last ray of hope of de-escalation of the tensions. Therefore, the absence

of involvement of crucial EAC institutions and reliance on personal envoys means that

interventions remain personalized, unpublished or secretive, frothy, and militarized. There is

hardly any record to support the argument that EAC's Conflict Prevention Management and

Resolution (CPMR) mechanisms and institutions like the paper glossy REWC-Situation Room,

The Situation In Burundi” 2015 for emphasis of the role the PEP has within the EAC system particularly on

guiding the Council, the Summit and the Secretariat available at

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COMMUNIQU%C3%89_%203RD (accessed on

07/07/2020). 57 See Isabelle Wofubwa, op. Cit. pp. 28. 58 Isabelle Wofubwa, op. Cit. pp. 30. 59 Isabelle Wofubwa, op cit, pp 30.

14

NEWC, PEP, and the PF believed to be robustly involved in managing and resolving conflict

in the region. A detailed search for information in the public and private domain, relating to

the activities of the EAC-CPMR in IDS yielded inconclusive results, an outcome that further

supports the need for drastic recommendations for changes in the EA system.

Moreover, it is reported that the spark off for the rapidly deteriorating relations between

Rwanda and Uganda was a damning report of the UN Working Group of Experts on the DRC

which led Rwanda to believe that dissident opposition groups had formed a militia group

calling itself the 'Platform Five' ( P5) and that P5 was allegedly being armed and trained by

Uganda, Burundi, and the DRC60 to destabilize Rwanda. The P5 is said to be dominated by

former high ranking RPF government officials, ex-intelligentsia, and ex-RDF military officials;

the vast majority of who are believed to have served in Uganda military and government

before.61 Whereas the main task of the EACEWARN is to gather actionable data and

intelligence information to monitor and analyze any security concerns in the region, it is the

UN system that appears to be doing the real groundwork of gathering intelligence and

investigating activities likely to disturb peace in the great lakes region including East Africa.

According to the UN report, even after receiving repeated appeals by the UN for investigations

or information on the subject, there was no response or significant policy action taken by the

countries implicated in the report nor has the EAC sought to address the conflict/situation.62

2.5. The East African Court Of Justice (EACJ)

The EACJ is the principal juridical organ of the East Africa Community.63 It was founded

under the provisions of the EAC Treaty.64 It is tasked with ensuring "...the adherence to law in

the interpretation and application of and compliance with..." the EAC treaty.65 The EACJ has

two chambers namely: The Division of First instance and the Appellate Division/Chamber.66

60 See “Letter dated 18 December 2018 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

addressed to the President of the Security Council,” Ref: S/2018/1133, accessed from

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Midterm%20report% (Accessed on 07/07/2020) para 17,

41, 103 and 1041. 61 Paul Nantulya, “Escalating Tensions Between Uganda And Rwanda Raise Fear Of War,” July 3, 2019, Africa Center For Strategic Studies available at https://africacenter.org/spotlight/escalating-tensions-between-

uganda-and-rwanda-raise-fear-of-war/ (accessed on 07/07/2020). 62 See Letter to UNSC, Ref: S/2018/1133 ( n 60 above) at para 104. 63 Article 23 of the EAC Treaty. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Article 23(2) of the EAC Treaty.

15

Generally, the EACJ comprises a maximum of 15 judges; that is to say: ten Judges for the First

Instance Division and five judges for the Appellate Division.67 Under Article 24 (1) (a) and (b)

pf the EAC Treaty, each partner state can appoint no more than two judges to the court of the

First Instance and one judge to the Appellate Division.68 In Article 28 of the Treaty, the EACJ

after a referral by a partner state is competent to hear and determine the legality of any act or

conduct of a partner state in respect of the EAC treaty. To date, no member state has exercised

this right even in the case of triable issues such as the legal implications of the on-going

Rwanda-Uganda Katuna border closure dispute. Member states prefer to engage in "preventive

diplomacy" than face off with each other before the EACJ. Besides, the Secretary-General,

with the approval of the Council, can refer a dispute or situation to the EACJ if the Council is

unable to resolve a matter concerning infringement of an EAC treaty provision but not before

referring the matter to a state party concerned as a way to allow it to respond or address the

issues in question.69

Where parties to an Arbitration proceeding are dissatisfied with the outcome of the award or

the conduct of the proceedings, they can refer the matter to the EACJ for adjudication. The

court can also give advisory opinions on legal issues emanating from the application of the

EAC treaty.70 However, the EACJ has no jurisdiction over matters touching on the question of

"...jurisdiction conferred by the EAC treaty on the organs of Partner states...,"71 The EACJ

does not also have jurisdiction over petitions by legal or natural persons pertaining “...an Act,

regulation, directive, decision or action...” that is a preserve under the EAC Treaty; for an

institution of a Partner State."72 The EACJ has the power under the EAC treaty and where

special jurisdiction has been conferred upon the EACJ by the Council, to hear original,

appellate, human rights petitions, and disputes touching on implementation of EAC protocols.73

As per the information posted on the EACJ’s website, the First Instance Division of the EACJ

has determined about 14 cases only relating to principles of the community and a few cases

67 Article 24 (1)(a)-(b) of the EAC Treaty. 68 Article 24 of the EAC Treaty. 69 Article 28 of the EAC Treaty. 70 Article 36 of the EAC Treaty. 71 Article 27 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 72 Article 30 (3) of the EAC Treaty. 73 See Article 27 (2) of the EAC Treaty which permits the Council to extend the court’s jurisdiction at

“...suitable subsequent date.” See also The East African Center For Trade Policy and Law vs The Secretary

General of the East African Community, Reference No.9 of 2012, paras 85, 86, 87, 90.

16

have been handled as additional applications and appeals.74 The EACJ First Division has

delivered close to 127 judgments since 2006-2019.75 This is an unimpressive scorecard in

comparison to the performance of similar juridical institutions of other international systems

such as the European Court of Human Rights which delivered 823 judgments in 2015 alone

and 891 in 2014 respectively76 and 704 by the CJEU in 2016;77 which have delivered more

binding judgments in a year than the EACJ since its creation. However, the EACJ’s

performance scorecard is excusable considering it is still in its tender years as opposed to other

more established and experienced ICTs like the ICJ, PCA, ECHR, and CJEU. The EACJ’s

current composition of 15 judges (5 Judges in the Appellate Division and 10 Judges in the First

Instance Division,)78 does not help matters on the EACJ’s standing and performance.

Possi A. (2018) summarizes the EACJ’s gains and weaknesses quite well. He concludes: “...the

EACJ is falling short of its authority in matters directly linked to EAC integration, such as

trade. The shortcomings are caused by the existence of gaps in the EAC Treaty and the narrow

interpretation of the role of the EACJ. Consequently, the EACJ has failed to establish its role

in shaping the EAC integration agenda. On trade, integration laws, including EAC law, are not

designed to regulate daily activities in the business sector. As a result, business actors resort to

national law or any other relevant law in resolving trade disputes. The EACJ has not played a

meaningful role in trade issues. Much of the blame can be placed on the Court's limited

jurisdictional scope and remedial authority as well as its lack of compliance mechanisms. The

newly adopted Protocol could have addressed these issues, but the opportunity was wasted by

the Member States. This might give rise to the perception that the Member States are not ready

to see the EACJ as effectively authoritative. As long as these constraints persist, the EACJ will

not be used by commercial actors. The cross-border activities in the region constantly trigger

disputes, mostly on business matters, which the EACJ cannot adequately deal with at the

moment. Major integration projects such as roads, ports, railways, oil, gas, and minerals are

74 EACJ website: https://www.eacj.org/?page_id=4878 (accessed on 07/07/2020). 75 Ibid. 76 ECHR – Analysis of Statistics 2015, pg 10/60 available at

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf (accessed ib 21/07/2020). 77 See Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 17/17 Luxembourg, 17 February 2017 at

pg 1, available at https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-02/cp170017en.pdf (accessed

on 21/07/2020). 78 See Article 24(1) of the EAC Treaty

17

underway and are likely to give rise to disputes.”79 He paints a grim picture, and rightly so, for

the EACJ.

2.6. Situations Relating to Customs and Trade within the EAC.

Trade disputes relating to the tax and customs regimes of EAC partner states are to be resolved

per the principles enshrined in the EAC Protocol on the Establishment of the East African

Customers Union80 and in tandem with the regulations laid down in Annex XI of the Protocol.81

The Protocol recognizes the option for an equable and harmonious resolution of a trade and

customs related dispute through Good Offices, Mediation, and Conciliation; initiated by the

parties or at their behest upon initial consultation with each other.82 This mechanism can be

invoked where disputes arise in respect of measures aimed at curbing dumping of goods, the

grant of unfair subsidies and in respect of infringements of duties levied or in violation of the

respective tax regimes of member states; and in respect of any other matter envisaged under

the said Protocol. The Protocol stipulates that if concerned parties do not hold consultations

within the prescribed period of 10 days for perishable goods and 30 days for non-perishable

items, the matter may set for determination by a panel formed upon request by the parties to

the Committee on Trade Remedies.83 The regulations require that such a panel is established

within 07 days of the meeting of the Trade Remedies Committee, comprising members drawn

and selected from an indicative list held by the Secretariat, and approved annually by the

Partner States.84

Parties enmeshed in a trade dispute may pronounce themselves or critique the report of the

Panel, as well as comment on the preliminary report prepared by the Committee.85 Notice of

the final report is furnished to the Committee on Trade Remedies which has the last say on

whether or not to adopt the Report.86 Its decision is imperatively binding once reached. A

reasonable period can be agreed upon to enable the full implementation of the Panel's Report.

79 Possi A. "An Appraisal of the Functioning and Effectiveness of the East African Court of Justice" PER / PELJ

2018(21) – DOI: https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2018/v21i0a2311 at pp 32-33. 80 Article 41 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Customs Union. 81 East African Community Customs Union (Dispute Settlement Mechanism) Regulations. 82 See Regulation 5(1) and Regulation 6, Annex IX to the Customs Union Protocol. 83 Article 6.3 and 8.1 EAC Customs Union Dispute Settlement Mechanism Regulations (Annex XI). 84 Article 8.4 and 8.7, ibid. 85 Article 15, ibid. 86 Article 16, ibid.

18

Such timelines are reached either voluntarily, mutually, or by an arbitral award.87 The Council

of Ministers maintains under its watch, the resolutions of the Committee.88 Besides, parties to

a trade and customs dispute are free to elect to use other peaceful means mean to resolve the

dispute. These options include the use of binding arbitration procedures89 as well as recourse

to litigation before the East Africa Court of Justice. The latter option is seeing an increase in

its usage even though, no interstate adjudication has been held at the time of conducting this

study even as we see increasing proliferation of mainly interstate trade and customs related

disputes and conflicts between member states mainly.90

Furthermore, EAC member states adopted the Protocol on the Establishment of the East

African Community Common Market in July 2010. It contains Annexes regulating social,

political, cultural, and economic aspects of free and unrestricted movement of workers and

persons across borders, respect for the right of establishment, guarantees to right of residence,

enabling free movement of capital, and facilitation of trade in services in the region.91 Under

Article 54 of the Protocol, "Any dispute between the partner states arising from the

interpretation or application of this protocol shall be settled under the provisions of the treaty."

It states further that "...the competent judicial, administrative or legislative or any other

competent authority, shall rule on the rights of the person seeking redress."92 Thus, persons

who have been denied access to the border crossing and traders affected by the standoff

between Uganda and Rwanda can petition the EACJ and other relevant EAC organs to

expeditiously address the impasse and remedy the legal injuries arising for the conduct of both

states.

Consequently, no specific IDS mechanisms under the Protocols have been invoked by the EAC

organs or member states to resolve the Uganda-Rwanda dispute per se. Nevertheless, it is

pertinent to mention that some civil societies groups namely: The Eastern African Sub-regional

Support Initiative for Advancement of Women ( EASSI), Southern and Eastern Africa Trade

Information and Negotiation Institute (SEATIN)- Uganda and Center for Food and Adequate

87 Article 21.2.a, b and c, ibid. 88 Article 21.4 a, b and c, ibid. 89 Article 7 and 20, ibid. 90 For example, the Kenya and Uganda long standing dispute over trade restrictions and protectionism that

resulted in the seizing of several tones of Lato Milk from Uganda by Kenya, Details available at url:

https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Uganda-resists-trade-war-push/3815534-5441524-

im8fyiz/index.html (accessed on 20/06/2020). 91See EAC website on “Common Market” available at https://www.eac.int/common-market (Accessed on

20/06/2020). 92 Article 54 (2) (b) of the Protocol On The Establishment Of The East African Community Common Market

19

Living Rights (CEFROHT) filed a case against the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda in

2019 at the EACJ over the continued arbitrary border closure.93 SEATIN avers that the border

closure is in contravention of the EAC Treaty and the Common Market Protocol. SEATINI's

prayer is that the EACJ pronounces itself on the continued impunity and arbitrary border

closure, that the court should declare that this blatant impunity must not be allowed to happen

anywhere else within the EAC. Their plaint further demands that EACJ issues a permanent

injunction against the two governments of Rwanda and Uganda to never close border posts

between themselves and ensure the unfettered movement of persons and trade facilitation. The

suit filed against the two governments aims to ensure that losses incurred by the business

community and society at large are audited, and concerned parties are adequately

compensated.94

93 See Press Statement on a PIL case on the closure of Uganda- Rwanda Border available at https://eassi.org/wp-

content/uploads/2019/07/Press-statement-on-a-public-interest-litigation-case-on-the-closure-of-uganda-rwanda-

border.pdf (accessed on 21/06/2020). 94 Ibid.

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ORGANISATIONS AND REGIONAL BLOCS.

3.1. Introduction

The UN Charter (UNC) reiterates the significant role of IOs and ROs perform in ensuring world

peace prevails. It stipulates the modalities applicable in fulfilling their roles such as enabling

and facilitation of the peaceful settlement of disputes in their respective regions and sub-

regions.95 Chapter VI, Articles 33-38 of the UNC reinforces the customary international

obligation to ensure peaceful and equable settlement of disputes. Article 33 outlines explicitly

the modes of pacific dispute settlement which includes the involvement of regional agencies.

This chapter encompasses a brief comparative description of three regional blocs and their IDS

legal framework, citing some examples of the IDS mechanisms invoked and a brief description

of procedures involved in the settlement of disputes/ conflicts with specific regard to the

adroitness and efficacy of the select systems thereunder.

3.2. The Organisation of American States (OAS)

The OAS has been uninterruptedly extant since 1948. It comprises 35 sovereign states of the

Americas.96 The OAS system enjoins members states to use peaceful means to settle disputes

likely to arise between members by laying down the obligations in the OAS Charter.97

Following the amendment of Article 23 of the Charter by the "Protocol of Cartagena de Indias,"

the system requires state parties to an international dispute likely to arise between them to

proffer to the equable procedures enshrined in the OAS Charter. The provisions of the charter

are binding on member states and it enjoins them to use direct Negotiations, Mediation,

Investigation, Good Offices, Conciliation Arbitration, and Juridical processes to resolve

international disputes.98 In the same breath, the Charter allows members states to use any other

means which they may agree to in the premises. In this context, the unique attribute is that the

charter grants choice to the parties concerned to agree on alternative peaceful mechanisms they

95 Article 52, United Nations Charter. 96 Karns, M. et. al. (2004,) International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance,

Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 195-199. 97 See Generally Chapter 5 of OAS and particularly Articles 24 and 27 of OAS Charter. 98 Article 25 of OAS Charter.

21

may elect to resolve their dispute,99 especially wherein the view of the parties concerned, the

diplomatic means spelt out in Article 25 of the Charter are unlikely to enable them to reach a

solution. On that basis, parties may use other peaceful means to address the matter.100 Key in

the OAS system is The Permanent Council of the OAS, created under Chapter VII of the

Charter, comprises of a representative from each partner state.101 Among other functions, the

Council serves as a consultative organ for the OAS102; it may investigate situations threatening

peace within the community,103 ensure friendly relations endure among members104 , and

exercise diplomacy through the application of peaceful means to resolve disputes.105 The OAS

system also features a Consultative Organ106 comprising of foreign ministers of member states,

tasked with monitoring and reporting on volatile situations in the region. The system also boasts

the nuance of a Peace Fund that is used to fund requests by member states to fund peaceful

dispute resolutions proceedings.107

The OAS system, like the EAC system, has a General Secretariat, a permanent and crucial

organ of the organization.108 Under chapter XVI of the OAS Charter, the tasks of the OAS

Secretary-General relevant to IDS include directing the affairs of the Secretariat,109 calling the

attention of the General Assembly and the Permanent Council to any matter threatening peace

in the region.110 This encompasses disputes of such magnitude likely to cause war or affect the

human rights index in the hemisphere. Besides, the Secretariat is tasked with promoting

cooperation in all aspects of concern to the Organisation.111

The OAS system is unique and relatively successful compared to the EAC system. A vivid

example of the effectiveness of the OAS system is its handling of the border conflict involving

Costa Rica and Nicaragua, where the Permanent Council played a crucial role in trying to

99 Ibid. 100 Article 26 of the OAS Charter. See also “Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States,

United Nations,” New York, 1992, United Nations publication Sales No. E.92.V.7, ISBN 92-1-133428-4

Copyright, page 84. 101 Article 80 of the OAS Charter. 102 Article 61 and 83 ibid. 103 Article 87 ibid. 104 Article 84 ibid. 105Articles 85 to 88 ibid. 106 Article 61 ibid. 107 OAS, Resolution 1756 (XXX-O / 00) para 1-5, available at

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres_1756_xxxo00.htm(accessed on 06/07/2020). 108 Article 107 ibid. 109 Article 107 and 109 ibid. 110 Article 110 ibid. 111 Article 116, Protocol of Cartagena de Indias.

22

resolve it peacefully. Briefly, the dispute involved a series of clashes from 1948 to 1949

because militia groups would cross from one border to another to fight the governments in their

respective home countries and flee to refuge across the porous borders. Following complaints

by Costa Rica to the OAS, the Permanent Council took an interest in the matter and appointed

temporary diplomatic outposts/ peace observers at the border. These outposts became the

"eyes" and ears" of the organization dubbed the "first peace observers" of the OAS.112

The OAS Secretariat has played an instrumental role in mediating talks to resolve various

conflicts that had rocked the hemisphere for many years. For example, The Secretariat

rendered support to peace initiatives reached by member states of the Contadora peace accord

and the Contadora Support Group(CSG) in the 1970s. H.Dana Simms and Vilma Petrash

(1987) describe the Contadora process as part of a peace initiative which emerged from the

efforts of the foreign ministers of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama over the nations

facing instability from the fighting activities and sabotage of the paramilitary groups operating

within the region.113 The question of the activities of the contras in the region, the USA's

support to the contras would eventually boomerang and haunt the USA in the famous case of

the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua

(Nicaragua v. the United States of America).114 The ICJ reiterated the principle of customary

international law that requires all states to peacefully resolve any international dispute, which

is a cardinal principle mirrored in Article 33 of the UN Charter.115

Additionally, one cannot undertake an analytical discourse of the OAS system without referring

to "The Pact of Bogota" (1948)116 which spells out the general legal obligation of state parties

"to settle disputes by pacific means."117 It was adopted under Article XXIII of the OAS

Charter. As the name suggests, the pact was signed in Bogota, Columbia in 1948 by the

112 See, Jack Child, “Peacekeeping and the Inter-American Military System” in L. Mokhtari (ed), “Peacemaking,

Peacekeeping and Coalition warfare: The Future Role of the United Nations,” Proceedings of a Conference

Cosponsored by the National Defense University and Norwich University, National Defense University Press

Publications ( 1994), pp 243. 113 Sims, H. D., & Petrash, V. (1987). The Contadora Peace Process. Journal of Conflict Studies, 7(4). Retrieved from https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/14775, pp 5. 114 Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 1986, available at:

https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a44d2.html [accessed 8 July 2020]. 115 Ibid, para 290-291. 116 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (1948) “The Pact of Bogota,” UN Registration: 05/13/49 No. 449

Vol. 30. 117 See Chapter 1-8 of the Bogota Pact.

23

American states present at the Ninth international conference of American states.118 The accord

is an excellent example of a special treaty enacted under the OAS system that expressly

commits member states to respect the obligation to use equable means to resolve disputes or

conflict. For instance, the Bogota pact was invoked by Costa Rica in 1988 after the filing of

the ICJ Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras.)119

Nicaragua, a member state had filed a case against Costa Rica and Honduras respectively.

However, Nicaragua was forced to drop judicial proceedings against Costa Rica in the spirit of

breathing life into the "Esquipulas II" pact120 while it maintained its claim against Honduras

for undermining its territorial and sovereign integrity. Whereas Honduras averred that the ICJ

did not have jurisdiction over the matter, the ICJ concluded, agreeing with Nicaragua, that it

had jurisdiction over the case under article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota121 a "creature" of the

effectiveness of the OAS system. Furthermore, the Bogota Pact is comprehensive and elaborate

on the various peaceful mechanisms available to members states to use, another unique

attribute of the OAS system that is traceable in the EAC system. Therefore, it is arguable that

the OAS system is effective in reducing regional tensions and preventing disputes from

escalating into inter-state armed conflict.122

3.3. The Organization of African Unity (now, the African Union)

In 1963, the OAU was formed under Article 1 of the Charter of the Organisation of African

Unity (1963), following a consensus reached among African leaders that there was a need to

unite, progress, and form a continental bloc working towards the liberation, cooperation,

development and independence of all states on the African continent.123 In 2002, the African

Union succeeded the OAU, thus becoming the continental body bringing together now 55

member countries that have ratified its constitutive act.124 Article III (4) of the Charter lists

among its principles, compliance with the principle of "...peaceful settlement of disputes by

118 See Preamble of American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact Of Bogotá) (1948), UNTS NO. 449. 119 See Case Concerning Border And Trans-border Armed Actions (Nicaragua V. Honduras) (Jurisdiction on

Admissibility) ICJ Judgment Of 20 December 1988). 120 Ibid, See generally overview of summary of Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Costa

Rica) available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/73 (accessed on 21/06/2020). 121 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, L C.J Reports 1988, p. 69 and p.195. 122 Sonia Boulos (2017), The Role of the Organization of American States in Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

Iuris Dictio 20, 211-240. ISSN 1390-6402 / e-ISSN 2528-7834. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18272/iu.v20i20. 909

pp. 193-199. 123 See the Preamble of the OAU Charter and Article 1 the OAU Charter. 124 Article 2 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000). See also the preamble of the Act for the

detailed reasoning for the transition from the OAU to the AU.

24

negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration." Furthermore, Article XIX enjoins member

states to resolve all disputes among themselves through peaceful means and to commit to

establishing a commission of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conciliation. In that regard, the

Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration came into effect on 21

July 1964, after its signoff in Cairo by the state parties present.125 The Protocol established the

said Commission, laying down generally the procedures applicable to the functions of the

Commission.126 The Commission can receive petitions or referrals from States only.127 If one

or more parties declines the Commission’s jurisdiction, the Bureau shall refer the dispute to

the Council of Ministers.128 The Commission enjoys a comprehensive mandate that includes

the power to investigate or inquire about any fact or circumstance particular to the referred

matter. The concerned state parties should cooperate with the Commission in the performance

of its tasks.129 Furthermore, the state parties entangled in a dispute are free to select any of the

ensuing apparatus to resolve the dispute: Mediation, Conciliation, or Arbitration.130 Never the

less, state parties have the liberty to select any of the above means prescribed; reinforcing the

principle state consent and sovereignty.131

The AU system recognizes the use of "good offices" and peace Envoys consisting of

distinguished and accomplished African statesmen to facilitate the resolution disputes/conflicts

within the continent or to de-escalate situations threatening peace and stability on the African

continent. For example, in October 1963, violence broke out between Algeria and Morocco

over a disputed area in the Sahara region. The matter was tabled before the OAU in its

extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers convened to address fundamental issues

affecting the organization at the time. An ad hoc commission was set up to investigate the facts

brewing the dispute, and it was tasked to come up with recommendations for consideration by

the OAU Assembly.132 Besides, the OAU has conducted various Mediation proceedings geared

at seeking an equable resolution of conflict and disputes among member nations; including in

125 "Organization of African Unity: Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and

Arbitration." International Legal Materials 3, no. 6 (1964): 1116-124. Accessed July 8, 2020.

www.jstor.org/stable/20689845. 126Ibid. 127 Article XII of the Cairo Protocol. 128 Article XIII(2) ibid. 129 Articles XVIII ibid. 130 Article XIX Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Meyers, B. David. "Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization of African Unity." International

Organization 28, no. 3 (1974): 345-73. Accessed July 8, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/2706298 at pp.354.

25

the Arab Middle East hemisphere on the question of the status of Palestine where it passed

several resolutions showing solidarity with the Palestinian peoples and support for Egypt's push

for a Palestinian state solution.133 The OAU was also able to negotiate a cease-fire agreement

between Morocco and Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro

(POLISARIO Front.) It set up an ad hoc committee on the question of the status of Western

Sahara. It was duly constituted by the Implementation Committee of the Assembly of African

heads of state to ensure that a fragile cease-fire agreement reached would hold while the OAU

was exploring possible solutions to the dispute. An OAU-UN negotiated referendum134 was

held to enable the people of that territory to exercise their right to self-determination. However,

the issue of Western Sahara remains a thorny one to date for the AU and member states in the

Maghreb region as it is largely unresolved even though the violence remains contained mainly

because of the commendable Mediation, Good Offices and Negotiation efforts of the AU and

UN in large part.135 Moreover, the AU is currently mediating the GERD dispute involving

Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over the on-going construction of the GERD dam by Ethiopia on

the Nile river against Egypt's scrutiny that the construction works of the dam could severely

and adversely affect her share of the River Nile's water release downstream states.136

3.4. The European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE)

The CoE and the EU have similar cardinal values of respect for human rights, democratic and

ethical governance, and the rule of law, but are distinct entities performing different yet in some

respects, complementary roles.137

In 1957, the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes(ECPSD) was

adopted at Strasbourg138 to promote harmony and unity within the CoE. The Convention seeks

to facilitate the cordial and friendly resolution of any disputes likely to arise between state

133 See Gitelson, Susan Aurelia. "The OAU Mission and the Middle East Conflict." International

Organization 27, no. 3 (1973): 413-19. Accessed July 8, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/2705994, pp. 413-416 134 See para 6 of the 1983 OAU resolution ARG/res. 104 (XIX) available at

http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ahg-res-104-xix-e.pdf, (accessed on 07/07/2020). 135 See Security Council Report on West Africa for month of April 2020 available at url: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-04/western-sahara-4.php (accessed on

22/06/2020), See also Andreu Solà-Martín, Conflict resolution in Western Sahara, AJCR 2009/3 published

online at url: https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/conflict-resolution-in-western-sahara/. 136 https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2020/06/27/au-mediation-hopefully-pushes-towards-gerd-dispute-

settlement/ (accessed on 22/06/2020). 137 https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/european-union (accessed on 22/06/2020). 138 European Treaty Series - No. 23, Strasbourg, 29.IV.1957.

26

parties and to preserve human society and civilization.139 Briefly, the Treaty entails the

following: that the Parties recognize and accept the juridical competence of the ICJ to

determine any dispute likely to arise between them especially those touching on the

interpretation of the Treaty; issues of international law, matters relating to breaches of

international obligations; and matters relating to reparations where breaches of international

obligations have occurred.140 Besides, if state Parties consent to the mechanism of conciliation

before resorting to juridical proceedings, they may invite the Permanent Conciliation

Commission (PCC) or in the alternative, to a special Conciliation Commission to facilitate the

process.141 Parties may also employ Arbitration except in cases, where the matter is before the

ICJ or has been submitted for conciliation or where conciliation has been unsuccessful.142 The

provisions of the Convention are inapplicable where the parties have consented to the use of

peaceful alternative dispute settlement mechanisms outside those laid down in the Convention

and parties are barred from reaching agreements that ouster mechanisms that involve binding

decisions.143

The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is tasked with the duty to ensure

enforcement and compliance with the decisions reached or the awards made viz-a-viz the

mechanisms contained in the Convention.144 An essential aspect of the CoE legal framework

on peaceful settlement of international disputes is the fact that the Convention does not apply

retrospectively145 and nor does its overlook the requirement for the exhaustion of local

remedies where the dispute is premised on questions of international law that is within the

domestic jurisdiction of member states. 146 Lastly, the Convention is without effect vide the

applicability of the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental

freedoms.147

139 Preamble of European Convention For The Peaceful Settlement Of Disputes (1957). 140 Article 1 ibid. 141 See Chapter II (Article 4-18) ibid. 142 Chapter III ibid. 143 Article 28 ibid. 144 Article 39 (2), European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957) 145 Article 27 (a) ibid. 146 Article 27 (b) ibid. 147 Article 28 (2) ibid.

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On the other hand, the EU system is founded on the applicability of the provisions of the Treaty

Establishing the European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009.)148 Article

21(1)149 stipulates: "The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the

principles which have inspired its creation, and which it seeks to advance in the wider

world...the respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law."

The EU system empowers the Union to "...define and pursue common policies and actions...

"and to promote cooperation in international relations, to keep the peace and avert conflicts

while reinforcing international security following the set purposes and principles of the UN

Charter.150 According to Frank Hoffmeister (2012,) "The EU system enjoys a quasi-

constitutional mandate" that aims at the equable resolution of conflict/disputes in consonance

with Article 33 of the UN Charter.151

Embedded in the EU IDS system is a complex mechanism that allows the EU to be able to

conform to the roles of being "a claimant, respondent and third-party"152 whereas the EU is not

a state under International law.153 It can enact laws as an independent legal entity even though

its existence is wholly premised on the continued membership of states that form the EU. It is

akin to a symbiotic relationship where member states and the EU reinforce their complex

mutually exclusive relationship through consent to be bound, law/treaty-making mandate,

enforcement, cooperation, and compliance with EU law to achieve institutionalized

efficiency.154 For example, under the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European

Economic Community155 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

proscribes the option to resolve disputes between the member states concerning its

interpretation and implementation outside the mechanisms provided under the regime.156

148 See para 11 of the Preamble of the TEU. Text available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/lis/sign

(accessed on 08/07/2020). 149 Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union ((2007/C 306/01)) available at https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

(accessed on 07/07/2020). 150 See Article 21 (2) ibid. 151 See generally, Frank Hoffmeister, The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of International

Disputes, Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2012, Pages 77–105,

https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jms001, para 1. 152 Marise Cremona, A. Thies and R.A. Wessel (Eds.),The European Union and International Dispute

Settlement, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017, pp 1, para 2. 153 Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para 156, available at

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=160882&doclang=EN (accessed on 09/07/2020). 154 Article 335 TFEU. See also Christophe Hillion and Ramses A Wessel (2017) “The European Union and

International Dispute Settlement: Mapping Principles and Conditions” available at

https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/13757102/wessel118.pdf (accessed on 09/07/2020) at pp 25. 155 Article 219 of TEEC, Rome, 25 March 1957. 156 See Article 344 TFEU.

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Therefore, Article 344 of TFEU foists on state parties the obligation "...not to submit a dispute

concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other

than those provided for therein." Note that article 3 of the TFEU entrenches Article 344 of the

TFEU. In the Mox Plant Case C-459/03 (Commission of the European Communities v Ireland)

(Order),157 the EEC alleged the breach of 292 EC and 193 EC, it invoked Articles 3 and 344

of the TFEU in respect of the dispute between Ireland and the UK. The dispute concerned the

operations of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) facility and the potential risk it poses to the environment

of the Irish Sea. The EEC sought to enforce the application of the EEC law insisting that Ireland

had circumvented the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ as by community law prescribed when

Ireland elected to use the OSPAR arbitration mechanism. The court ruled that Ireland had

breached its obligation as a member of the EEC to observe and comply with the duty to

cooperate when it instituted proceedings under the disputes settlement mechanism outside the

confines of the EU disputes settlement regime before informing and consulting the competent

EC institution. Therefore, Ireland had breached its obligation to comply with its community

duty of cooperation laid down in Articles 10 of EC and 192 of EA.158

Where an international dispute that is likely to affect the EU membership bid of an applicant

country exists, the EU tends to exercise political leverage by encouraging the applicant party

to resolve the dispute or conflict peacefully before its candidature to join the EU can be

considered. Examples, where such diplomatic manoeuvres have been used, include the Greece-

Turkish Aegean dispute where the EU has continually encouraged the parties to yield to a

juridical solution before an ICT like the ICJ. Currently, the matter is one of the issues being

considered in respect to Turkey's bid to join the EU.159 More intricate, though, is the EU's

requirement for applicant states to submit to the strict "Copenhagen criteria" where judicial or

Arbitration proceedings appear untenable to pacify a dispute equally. Generally, the EU

identifies key aspects for negotiations to be fulfilled by states seeking to join the EU like was

the case in for Cyprus and for Croatia viz-a-viz the Slovenia-Croatia dispute.160

157 European Court Reports 2006 I-04635. 158 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-04635 (Judgement of the court) paras 59 and 61. See

also judgement of the CJEU in the Open Skies cases (Commission vs Sweden) ECLI:EU:C:2002:626, para 107. 159 See F. Hoffmeister, The Aegean Conflict—an Unsettled Dispute in Turkey’s Accession Course, in: T.

Giegerich (ed.), AWiser Century? —Judicial Dispute Settlement, Disarmament and the Laws of War 100 Years

after the Second Hague Peace Conference (Duncker & Humblot 2009), 493. 160 See, BBC News, “EU enlargement: The next seven” dated 2/09/2014 available at

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11283616 (accessed on 22/05/2020)

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Additionally, the EU has adopted a unique practice of being a facilitator and enabler for equable

resolution of disputes/conflict between third states.161 For instance, under the Common

Foreign and Security Policy initiative, the EU has responded to various international crises to

contain peace or to protect the lives of persons not participating in the conflict. The EU has

responded to urgent calls of the UN, non-EU governments, and even EU member states- like

France which appealed for the EU's buy-in of a military expedition to contain violence in the

war-torn Mali and CAR. The EU has also funded various missions abroad, e.g. in Somalia,

Chad, Niger, Ukraine, Palestine, to mention a few.162

Just like the EAC and the AU, the EU has adopted an early warning mechanism to monitor

and examine the primary causes of conflict in a region. According to A. E. Juncos And S.

Blockmans (2018,) "...these capabilities are located in the European External Action Service,

namely in the INTCEN (EU Intelligence and Situation Centre) and PRISM ("Prevention of

conflicts, the rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation, and Mediation")

divisions."163 Moreover, the EU strategy for security underpins the relevance of "effective

multilateralism" that is to say a multi-pronged strategy that seeks to involve all actors engaged

in the conflict to arrive at a practical solution through consensus and involvement.164

Accordingly, the EU system strives to reinforce its collaboration and cooperation with crucial

IOs engaged in peace-building efforts across the globe. The EU has thus partnered with the

UN, AU, OAS, NATO, and even third states to address situations of conflict and instability.165

The EU may be imperfect, but it is one of Europe's most creative experiments in peaceful

community building.166

161 See S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel, The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the Lisbon Treaty

Make the EU More Effective? CLEER Working Papers 2009/1, The Hague, 1. 162 See official website of the EU, European Union External Action, “Military and Civilian missions and

Operations,” dated 05/03/2019 “Overview of the current EU mission and operations” available at

https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-

and-operations_en (accessed on 09/07/2020). 163 Ana E. Juncos & Steven Blockmans (2018) The EU’s role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key

challenges, Global Affairs, page 133, DOI:10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619 (accessed on 22/06/2020) at pp. 133 para 1. 164 Ibid, pp 134 para 2. 165Ibid. 166 BBC History Extra, “The Big Question: Has the European Union Been a Success? January 31, 2020 at 9:16

am quoting Denise Dunne, a lecturer of History at Maynooth University, Ireland available at url:

https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/big-question-has-european-union-eu-been-success-brexit/,

(accessed on 22/06/2020.)

30

Generally, the EU system stands out as one of the most effective regional and international

mechanisms, mainly on account of its use of pacific means of disputes settlement. Its organs

and institutions such as the ECtHrs, CJEU, EC, and CoM have played a pivotal role to ensure

respect for the rule of law and to encourage compliance. To that extent, Eva Gross and Anna

E. Juncos argue that the EU has institutionalized crisis management and that it has an extensive

spectrum of instruments at its disposal;167 a situation that has contributed significantly to its

effective use of pacific disputes settlement mechanisms.

Katja S. Zieglar (2015)168 observed that the EU is an IO that is "...highly constitutionalized;

with supranational legislation and a dense web of detailed norms due to the sheer amount of

regulation, it is characterized by advanced and widespread law-making procedures and output;

the EU courts have jurisdiction in procedures that create an elaborate system of compulsory

dispute settlement mechanisms which has been described." Therefore, the EU system offers a

"complete system of remedies" backed by the high degree of compliance and enforcement of

EU law by its organs and member states. Ziegler Katja thus concludes that the EU legal regime

on IDS entails aspects of an IO as a legal entity and the similitude of state entity, a framework

that makes the EU system more effective in dealing with disputes and conflicts that arise among

members and within.169

However, the EU system is not without its shortcomings. Eva Gross and Anna E. Juncos

observed that the increasing EU activity in both prevention and crisis management does not

mean that the EU resembles a monolithic actor; instead, semantic/glossy differences and

bureaucratic politics exist among the Commission's departments and between Council and

Commission; including outright turf wars highlighting the fact that coherence between policy

and instruments presents a significant challenge.170

167 Juncos, Ana E., and Eva Gross, “EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions, and Policies,” Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011

at p.4-6. 168 Ziegler, Katja S., The Relationship between EU Law and International Law (December 30, 2013). University

of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-17, pp. 1. Available at SSRN:

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2373296 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2373296 (accessed on 09/07/2020) 169169 Ibid, pp. 2. 170 Ibid, pp 22.

31

Additionally, International Law sometimes predisposes the EU system and member states to

complications such as "competing for dispute settlement fora"171 like it was observed in the

MOX plant dispute between the European Commission and Ireland172 and between Ireland and

the UK173 over the Mox plant operations and the mechanism Ireland had used to address the

dispute, and the CJEU opinion on European Convention on Human Rights.174

171 Tobias Lock, "The Not So Free Choice of EU Member States in International Dispute Settlement" in Marise Cremona, Anne Thies, Ramses A Wessel, "The European Union and International Dispute Settlment" (eds),

Hart Publishing, 2017 at pg 123. 172 European Court Reports 2006 I-04635. 173 Cf ITLOS, Mox I (Ireland vs UK) no. 1, Request for provisional measures, Dec. 2001, Order and Mox II,

European Court Reports 2006 I-04635 cases respectively. 174 In Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, para 36, the ECJ opined that the EU did not have competence to accede

to the European Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This research set out to investigate whether the EAC system has well-functioning IDS

mechanisms embedded in it and how the EAC system can be further enhanced to manage and

address conflict/disputes among member states; which not only threatens stability in the region

but negatively impacts the EAC integration/federation agenda. This study reveals that the EAC

is far from being a perfect system, its organs and institutions are not fully equipped to enforce

state compliance with the legal obligations under CIL and Treaty law to ensure that states

parties amicably and peacefully resolve international disputes among themselves. It suffers an

identity crisis, funding gaps, enforcement challenges, under-developed organs and institutions,

political interference, legal ambiguity in its legal regime, fragmentation of international law,

and duplicated response mechanism aped from other systems. These fundamental challenges

undermine the credibility and performance of the EAC as an IO. Therefore, this chapter will

summarize the main findings and formulates recommendations for improvement of the EAC’s

role as an RO and IO.

Whereas individual, nationalistic, politically and ethnically motivated disputes have affected

the EAC's integration agenda in the past, the Rwanda-Uganda conflict presents an opportunity

for the EAC IDS system to cure mistakes of the 1970s that caused the collapse of the EAC.

Complacency, impunity, disdain for the rule of law, ideological differences, economic

imbalances, and mistrust continue to undermine the EAC system, mainly because leaders

ignore structures and procedures put in place, engage in insincere "preventive diplomacy" or

none at all.175 This mirrors the same trappings of the mirage of a 'perfect' system that the EAC

boasts while real tension festers beneath. As observed regarding the Rwanda-Uganda dispute,

member states are resorting to countermeasures, retaliatory conduct, and unlawful retorsions

shy of the use of force to circumvent the system. This is not what the framers of the Treaty

envisaged. EAC member states are increasingly exhibiting a preference for mechanisms

outside the EAC system, and sometimes they coalesce into cliques of the willing, leaving

behind member states they disagree with on Community matters.176 EAC member states

175 Institute for Security Studies, Central Africa Report, “The East Africa Community Takes on the Burundi

Crisis,” Issue 8, August 2016 at p. 4/12 available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/car8-

v2.pdf (accessed on 09/07/2020). 176 Ibid, p.2.

33

should support and lend credence to EAC organs/ institutions while at the same time “walking

the talk,” otherwise past mistakes are likely to be repeated.177 There is a compliance problem,

an enforcement challenge, and a funding gap due to member state failure to remit their annual

subscriptions, the absence of commitment on the part of EAC leaders because as we have seen

in previous chapters, the issue is not the absence of a legal framework within which to enforce

the EAC IDS legal regime.

Besides, there are indications Rwanda and Uganda want to settle their conflict/ dispute through

Mediation and Negotiation (Diplomacy). In July 2019, Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Paul

Kagame held talks in Luanda, Angola in a closed-door meeting mediated by the presidents of

Angola and the DRC. After a series of botched attempts, two subsequent meetings were again

held in Luanda, Angola and the latest quadripartite meeting was held at the closed Katuna

border on 21 February 2020. An MOU was signed committing the parties to release prisoners

detained in respect of the dispute, refrain from supporting and supporting militia, and dissident

political groups destabilizing the region. It was also resolved to establish a commission to

oversee the implementation of the agreement. There is growing optimism in the on-going

diplomatic efforts following the release and return of citizens on either side of the border. In

the period October 2019 to February 2020, Uganda has so far released 14 suspects and convicts

to Rwanda. Rwanda has reciprocated Uganda's gesture by releasing 20 Ugandans who had long

been held in detention in secret detention facilities in Rwanda.

A broad and effective legal framework on IDS exists under the AU, OAS, and EU systems.

The same cannot be said of the elaborate and sometimes ambiguous EAC system. The AU

system is multidimensional as its mechanisms are designed to timeously, intervene, de-

escalate, and resolve conflict on the continent. The AU framework has to no small extent

helped to avert or stop conflict even though there have been many unforgivable failings of the

AU system like the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, conflict in Somalia, Darfur, Madagascar.178

Various parts of the continent are peaceful, but some places Somalia, Darfur, South Sudan

have experienced conflict for far too long. S. Zondi (2017) credits the AU system as being

unique because, despite the problems faced it has managed to shake off its colonial legacy,

177 P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Dispute Recognition and Dispute Settlement in Integration Processes: The COMESA

Experience, 15 Nw. J. Int'l, pp. 490. 178 See Siphamandla Zondi, “African Union approaches to peacebuilding: Efforts at shifting the continent

towards decolonial peace,” AJCR 2017/1, 105-131 at pp. 108-121.

34

transformed from the sterile OAU to a more visible IO that is committed to achieving

"decolonized peace" through peace-building efforts, taking an interest in the domestic affairs

of member states.179 This approach should be emulated by the EAC as well since it will help

it to respond expediently to incidents of conflicts and disputes.

The EU in its constitutive Act -TCFEU expressly prohibits member states from resorting to

any dispute/conflict settlement means besides those laid down in the Treaty namely Mediation,

Negotiations, and Conciliation at first instance as discussed earlier. This mechanism is likely

to result in compliance because the dialogue ensued and the parties lend themselves to

resolution by agreement.180 This mechanism also prevents the plurality of claims based on the

same fact and injuries. It is also cheaper than Adjudication or Litigation. Therefore the EAC

treaty and its Protocols should be amended to entrench a similar provision requiring member

states to exhaust all local remedies or resort to means enshrined in the Treaty before resorting

to adjudicative and forceful means like countermeasures and retorsions which is being used by

member states in the Rwanda Uganda Conflict.

A recap of the EACJ's role in Chapter two revealed that the EACJ was created as the juridical

organ of the EAC. It is progressively establishing its jurisprudence. Whereas Partner states had

hoped that the EACJ would mostly deal with trade-related disputes among member states, over

time, it “...has evolved in that cases that it deals with seeking to hold governments accountable

and promote the good governance and the rule of law.”181 No state actor has filed an "inter-

state party" case before the EACJ even though it has jurisdiction to hear such matters.182

Therefore, member states should utilize the EACJ rather than undermine its role. Presently,

the jurisprudence of the EACJ is limited or “doubtful”183 as Possi A.(2018) notes. State actors

should promote and support the EACJ. Its decisions should be respected and enforced

domestically and internationally. More funds should be allocated to its operations. It should be

separated from the EAC's political machinery that rear is its head through the appointment of

179 Ibid, pp 105, 107, 109 and 126. 180 Geraint Howells, Lain Ramsay, Thomas Wilhelmsson (Eds), Handbook of Research on International

Consumer law, 2nd Ed, Edward Elgar publishing, 2018 at p.438- 439. See generally Luca Prete, Infringement Proceedings in EU Law 98, European Monogrpahs, Wolters Kluwer, 2017. 181 Philomena Apiko, “Understanding The East African Court of Justice The hard road to independent

institutions and human rights jurisdiction,” ECDM 2017, pp 8, para 2.4, available at https://ecdpm.org/wp-

content/uploads/EACJ-Background-Paper-PEDRO-Political-Economy-Dynamics-Regional-Organisations-

Africa-ECDPM-2017.pdf (accessed on 10/07/2020). 182Philomena Apiko (ibid), pp. 8, para 2.3. 183 Possi A.(2018) op cit, (n 79 above), pp. 1, Abstract note.

35

judges and funding conditionalities. The court must also take a strict "activist stance" against

breaches of international obligations by member states.184

Furthermore, the EAC needs to build meaningful partnerships with other IOs, ROs, and CSOs

like the EU, UN, and AU, and to regularly conduct a needs assessment analysis, benchmarking

exercise to evaluate its performance. EAC technocrats should organize regular consultative

meetings and training programs for staff with the help of experts from other jurisdictions to

enhance their skills and capacity in the area of IDS and ADR.185

Ultimately, the EAC should underpin the importance of regionalism, cooperation,

constitutionalism, good governance, the rule of law, human safety, peace, and security over

selfish and national political interests. Peace and security in the region can be guaranteed when

the rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights are assured. To that extent, there

is a need to harmonize national and regional initiatives to build peace through dialogue,

negotiations, consultations, cross-cultural exchanges, free movement of people, good and

services, and political/economic integration. Besides, borders are merely a political and

colonial creation that should be done away with like the EU has done particularly under the

Schengen arrangements although the EAC should be careful not to simply replicate Eurocentric

solutions just because it is working well in the EU. The approach should be based on the

concept of “EAC solutions for EAC problems."

International law compels states as "subjects of international" law to seek recourse to peaceful

means of settling disputes that may threaten international peace; the consequence of which is

a customary obligation to refrain from the use of force and the duty to preserve international

peace.186 This obligation is mirrored in various international treaties and the constitutive acts

of various IOs. It is manifest that the effectiveness of any IDS system lies in the capacity of

its institutions and procedures to resolve disputes peacefully and the enforcement mechanisms

therein which ensure compliance and flexible choice of lawful mechanism that states may elect

to use within the constitutional/institutional setup.187 The EAC system needs to develop and

184 Ibid, pp. 3 para 2. 185 Dorina A. Bekoe and Paul Omach (Rappoteurs) “Building Peace in Eastern Africa,” International Peace

Academy, Makerere University, Uganda, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya (2002,) page 16 available at

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D2D91197ABA5112B8525742D005E03CA-

IPA_Peacebuilding_EasternAfrica_Dec02.pdf (accessed on 09/07/2020). 186 See Articles 2(3), 33(1) and 52(2) of the UN Charter. 187 See Case C-459/03, European Court Reports 2006 I-04635.

36

adopt an effective enforcement system particularly for its judicial decisions and treaty

provisions. Leaders of the six-member states should work towards promoting a

constitutionalized monist EAC system whose legal framework shall bind all members. Under

monism, the international legal order automatically applies in the national or domestic legal

system, treating national legal order and international as coherent and unified forming the

Grundnorm.188 This should help check on the tendency of EAC states to circumvent their

obligations under international law and make enforcement at the national level easier.

Even though the ICJ has held that states have a customary international legal obligation to use

peaceful means to resolve international disputes,189 it does not mean that states are restricted to

the use of specific pacific IDS mechanisms. Alain Pellet argues that the obligation is neither

traditional nor absolute but is uncontroversial qualified, and binding.190 Under Article 33 of the

UN Charter, the free choice to use a particular mechanism is entirely up to concerned member

states save for where a binding treaty provision or legal regime requires the use of a particular

regime to deal with a particular dispute.191 Therefore, EAC member states have the flexibility

to use the most effective and appropriate means. However, possibly, it is for this reason some

EAC states sometimes circumvent the institutionalized mechanisms or use extra-legal means,

thus undermining the effectiveness of the EAC system; similar to CJEU's findings of Ireland’s

conduct in MOX Oxide Plant Case II.192 Therefore, the EAC system should be enhanced to

require member states to resort to compulsory peaceful dispute/conflict settlement mechanisms

in the EAC's legal regime akin to the EU system requirements.

Lastly, to make the Secretariate more independent and accountable, this study recommends the

amendment of Article 29 (3) of the EAC treaty to grant standing to the EAC as a creature of

supranational law (IO) to be able to institute legal proceedings against member states who

violate their obligations under the Treaty such as the obligation to cooperate and to settle

disputes and matters affecting the community peacefully like the EU system provide for such

mechanism. The EAC Secretary-General should not require approval or consent from the

188 Gleider Hernandez (2019) op. Cit,(n 23) pp. 79. 189 Military and Parliamentary Activities in and against Nicaragua ( Nicaragua V. United States Of America)

[Merits], Judgment Of 27 June 1986, para.290. 190 Alain Pellet (n 12 above ), pp. 202-part B, para 3. 191 See Fisheries Jurisdiction case [Spain v Canada] [Jurisdiction of the Court] para. 56; see also Aerial Incident

of 10 August 1999 [Pakistan v India] [Jurisdiction of the Court] para. 53, Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory

Opinion no. 5, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) no. 5, p.27 (July 23). 192 Case C-459/03, European Court Reports 2006 I-04635.

37

Council to institute proceedings against defiant members before the EACJ. This may help

check impunity and inspire compliance with EAC law by member states. Such an amendment

shall give the EAC Secretariat more authority over the affairs of the EAC and enforce

compliance with EAC treaty laws while reinforcing the autonomy of EAC organs from

political interference and manipulation by member states.

viii

5.0. BIBLIOGRAPHY

5.1. LEGISLATION

1. THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY.

2. THE UN CHARTER.

3. THE MANILA CHARTER.

4. THE 1899 HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF

DISPUTES.

5. THE MODALITY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE

PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONS.

6. THE PROTOCOL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EAST AFRICAN

COMMUNITY CUSTOMS UNION.

7. THE PROTOCOL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EAST AFRICAN

COMMUNITY COMMON MARKET.

8. THE PROTOCOL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EAST AFRICAN

COMMUNITY MONETARY UNION.

9. THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CUSTOMS UNION (DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT MECHANISM REGULATIONS).

10. EAC CUSTOMS UNION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM

REGULATIONS (ANNEX XI).

11. THE OAS CHARTER.

12. THE PROTOCOL OF CARTAGENA DE INDIAS.

13. THE 1957 EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF

DISPUTES.

14. UNITED NATIONS, TREATY SERIES, VOL. 320.

15. THE 1948 AMERICAN TREATY ON PACIFIC SETTLEMENT.

16. THE 1964 CAIRO PROTOCOL.

17. THE LISBON TREATY.

ix

5.2. CASES

1. Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 [Pakistan v India] available at URL: https://www.icj-

cij.org/files/case-related/119/8090.pdf (accessed on 23 June 2020)

2. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and

Admissibility, Judgment, L CJ Reports 1988, p. 69 and p.195

3. Calist Mwatela and others vs the East African Community App. No. 1, Judgement

(EACJ Oct.1, 2006)

4. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case [Spain vs Canada], [1998] ICJ Rep 432.

5. Case Concerning Application Of The International Convention On The Elimination Of

All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia V. Russian Federation) Preliminary

Objections Judgment Of 1 April 2011

6. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria (Hungary vs Romania,) Phase I, A.O,

I.C.J. Reports 1950

7. ITLOS, The Mox Plant Case (Ireland V. United Kingdom) (2001) 3 December 2001,

No. 10, Request for provisional measures, ORDER

8. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion no. 5, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) no. 5, p.27 (23

July)

9. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) case. PCIJ, Series A, No.2,

10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs the United

States) 1986 I.C.J.14.

11. Mox Plant case II (Commission of the European Communities vs Ireland) European

Court Reports 2006 I-04635

12. Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR (2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454

13. The East African Center For Trade Policy and Law vs The Secretary-General of the

East African Community, Reference No.9 of 2012.

14. The East African Law Society vs the Secretary-General of the EAC. Ref. No. 1 of 2011.

15. Open Skies cases (Commission vs Sweden) ECLI:EU:C:2002:626

5.3. TEXTBOOKS, JOURNALS, ARTICLES.

1. A. Bainomugisha and S. Rwengabo, The Promise and Efficacy of the East African

Community, ACODE Policy Briefing Paper Series No. 41, 2016

x

2. A Wiser Century? —Judicial Dispute Settlement, Disarmament, and the Laws of War

100 Years after the Second Hague Peace Conference (Duncker & Humblot 2009), 493.

3. Siphamandla Zondi, African Union approaches to peace-building, AJCR 2017/1

4. Alain Pellet, Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, MPEPIL vol. VIII, Rudiger

Wolfrum(ed), Oxford University Press, August 2013

5. Ana E. Juncos & Steven Blockmans (2018) The EU's role in conflict prevention and

peace-building: four key challenges, Global Affairs.

6. Building Peace in Eastern Africa International Peace Academy Makerere University,

Uganda Africa Peace Forum, Kenya Rapporteurs: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe and Dr. Paul

Omach December 2002, Entebbe, Uganda

7. Christophe Hillion and Ramses A Wessel (2017) “The European Union and

International Dispute Settlement: Mapping Principles and Conditions”

8. David Meyers, "Intraregional conflict management by the Organization of African

Unity," International organization, vol. 28 (1974), p. 354

9. Dispute Recognition and Dispute Settlement in Integration Processes: The COMESA

Experience.

10. Frank Hoffmeister, The European Union and the Peaceful Settlement of International

Disputes.

11. Geraint Howells, Lain Ramsay, Thomas Wilhelmsson (Eds), Handbook of Research

on International Consumer Law, 2nd Ed, Edward Elgar publishing, 2018 at p.438- 439.

12. Gleider Hernandez, International Law, Oxford University Press, 2019.

13. Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York, United

Nations, 1992), pp. 9–55;

14. Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker (1995), International Institutional Law,

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, pp. 505–885.

15. Institute for Security Studies, Central Africa Report, "The East Africa Community

Takes on the Burundi Crisis," Issue 8, August 2016 at p. 4/12.

16. Marise. Cremona, A. Thies and R.A. Wessel (Eds.), The European Union and

International Dispute Settlement, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017

17. Merrills JG, International Dispute Settlement, (6th Edn, Cambridge University Press

2017)

18. Juma Volter Mwapachu, Challenging The Frontiers of African Integration: The

Dynamics of Policies, Politics, and Transformation in the East African Community,

Dar es Salaam, E&D Vision Publishing Limited, 2012 p. 56.

xi

19. Juncos, Ana E., and Eva Gross. EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles,

Institutions, and Policies.

20. Karns, M. et. al. (2004). International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of

Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

21. Katja S Ziegler, Sir Robert Jennings, The Relationship between EU law and

International Law, University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-17

22. Luca Prete, Infringement Proceedings in EU Law 98, European Monographs, Wolters

Kluwer, 2017.

23. M. Martinelli, Strengthening Security, Building Peace: The EU in the Democratic

Republic of Congo, in S. Blockmans, J. Wouters and T. Ruys (eds.), The EU and

Peacebuilding (T.M.C Asser Press 2010), 221, 230–233.

24. P. Kenneth Kiplagat North-western Journal of International Law & Business Volume

15, Issue 3 Spring, page 490.

25. Possi A "An Appraisal of the Functioning and Effectiveness of the East African Court

of Justice" PER / PELJ 2018(21) – DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-

3781/2018/v21i0a2311

26. Ramírez Robles, Edna, Training Module on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms for Trade

Agreements (August 2012). UNCTAD & TradeMark South Africa, 2012

27. Remiro Brotons, A., Riquelme Cortado, R.M., Diez-Hochleitner, J., Orihuela

Calatayud, E. and Pérez-Prat Durbán, L. Derecho Internacional.

28. Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon:

Routledge, 2011 at p.4-6.

29. S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel, The European Union and Crisis Management: Will the

Lisbon Treaty Make the EU More Effective? CLEERWorking Papers 2009/1.

30. Sims, H. D., & Petrash, V. (1987). The Contadora Peace Process. Journal of Conflict

Studies 7(4)

31. The report of the Fact-Finding Committee established by the Permanent Council to

investigate the complaint filed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, OAS

document CP/doc. 1592/85.

32. The report of the OAS Secretary-General to the Permanent Council on 29 January

1987,3 4s3ect. G., CP/ACTA: 685/87 (1987).

33. The Role of the Organization of American States in Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

By Sonia Boulos Antonio de Nebrija University, Page 199.

xii

34. Towards Political Federation in the East African Community: Achievements and

Challenges Published by East African Community (EAC), (Isabelle Wafubwa as a

contributor) August 2014.

35. Training Module on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms for Trade Agreements, published

under the auspices of TradeMark Southern Africa.

5.4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

1. Escalating Tensions between Uganda and Rwanda Raise fear of war, By Paul Nantulya,

3 July, 2019., Africa Center For Strategic Studies.

2. www. africanbusinessmagazine.com, Rwanda- Uganda Conflict: Is the end in Sight?

By Tom Collins, 23 March 2020.

5.5. INTERNET SOURCES

1. www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/presidents-rwanda-uganda-sign-pact-ease-

tensions-190821134138867html.

2. https://observer.ug/news/headlines/63145-uganda-hands-over-nine-freed-

rwandan-nationals.

3. http://www.aa.com.tr/en/Africa/tension-between-uganda-rwanda-near-breaking-

point/1719046.

4. http://www.acode-u.org/Files/Publications/PBP_41_EAC.pdf.

5. https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac.

6. https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english

7. http://eac.int/sectors/peace-and-security

8. https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eac-peace-security-stability-and-governance

9. http://eacgermany.org/

10. https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/15668.html

11. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Uganda-resists-trade-

war-push/3815534-5441524-im8fyiz/index.html

12. http://www.eac.int/commonmarket/documentationcat-view/24-documents-a-

downloads/30-common-market-protocol-a-annexes.html.

13. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/74/6593.pdf

xiii

14. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-04/western-sahara-

4.php

15. https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/conflict-resolution-in-western-sahara/

16. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/european-union

17. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619.

18. https://www.historyextra.com/period/20th-century/big-question-has-european-

union-eu-been-success-brexit/.

19. https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/73

20. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/74/6593.pdf

21. https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/south-sudan

22. https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2020/06/27/au-mediation-hopefully-pushes-

towards-gerd-dispute-settlement/

23. https://alainpellet.sharepoint.com/Documents/PELLET%20-%202012%20-

%20Peaceful%20Settlement.pdf

24. https://www.pmldaily.com/news/2020/06/their-blood-is-on-your-hands-ugandan-

officials-tell-off-their-rwanda-colleagues-as-body-of-slain-businessman-is-brought-

back.html

25. https://www.eac.int/eac-institution

26. https://www.eacj.org/?page_id=4878

27. https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/cara_reichard_cddrl_thesis.pdf

28. https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf

29. https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-02/cp170017en.pdf