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The Qatari authorities are aware that hydrocarbon reserves will not last forever, and they intend to profit from the financial security that oil and

natural gas exports have brought them (80% of external revenue, 60% of total revenue) by diversifying the economy. At the end of 2008, they launched a long-term development plan called National Vision 2030. This strategic programme officially began in March 2011 with its first phase spread over five years. It is divided into four main areas: international centres for the knowledge economy; a transport hub (air, sea and land); a regional financial centre; and tourism focused on business travel, symposiums and conferences.

Qatar’s determination to diversify has also resulted in an ambitious industrialisation programme, especially in petrochemicals, the chemical industry, aluminium, steel, paper and fibre, agribusiness, and the liquefaction of natural gas (see Gas trump card). By 2016 Qatar will have spent an average of $15-18bn per year, around 40% of its annual expenditure, on financing investments in infrastructure and economic diversification. It has already spent almost $100bn under its 2005-10 five-year investment plan.

On a macroeconomic level, to support the development of non-hydrocarbon business, Qatar wants to attract foreign investors and also encourage the creation of local small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Company (QIMC), which consists of six subsidiaries, has the mission of promoting SMEs, if necessary by providing a part of their start-up capital and helping them to export the “Made in Qatar” label. It helps them to identify outlets in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Maghreb and Arab countries north of the Arabian Peninsula. The authorities have launched a credit-insurance programme, Al-Dhameen, to improve SMEs’ access to finance. A new agency responsible for SMEs will be created in 2011 under the leadership of the Supreme Council for Economic Affairs and Investments.

The government has also comprehensively revised its protectionist legislation on foreign investors. Since 1 January 2010, corporate income tax has been set at the flat rate of 10% (before there were several rates ranging up to 35%). Similarly, since 1 February 2011, foreign investors can hold 100% of the capital of a Qatar-registered company, except in certain sectors such as banking, insurance, real estate and consumer goods imports, where the majority of the capital must be held by local operators. Finally, Doha has increased its efforts to counter inflation, whose record levels in 2007 (+13.8%) and 2008 (+15%) – due to the simultaneous rise

in the prices of hydrocarbons, food and real estate – made the country less attractive. Prices rose by only 1% in 2010 and inflation should level off at 3% in 2011, indicating that it is under control.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup was awarded to Qatar in December 2010, and the decision is

already boosting economic activity. The emirate has committed to building nine new stadiums, and renovating and expanding the three existing ones, at a total cost of $4bn. The authorities have decided that this programme is to be headed by local companies in partnership with foreign operators, in the hope that it will revitalise local

subcontracting in the civil engineering and construction sectors.

One of Qatar’s main aims for the next 20 years is in the field of the knowledge economy. Under the leadership of the Qatar Foundation, the emirate has finished building Education City, intended to be a regional centre of excellence in higher education. Several North American and European universities and business schools – including Hautes Etudes Commerciales in Paris – have already established branch campuses there. Beyond this flagship project, the Qatar Foundation is also contributing to the development of the Qatar Science & Technology Park (QSTP), whose objective is to attract the R&D functions of large companies in the oil industry (Total, Exxon Mobil) or technology and IT (European Aeronautic Defence and Space [EADS], Apple, Microsoft, etc).

Qatari firms have also begun to invest in R&D. Pragmatech, a recently created subsidiary of United Development Company (UDC), is making a name for itself on the international stage for its text processing, document summarising and referencing software. In June 2011 the Pan Arab Web Awards Academy in association with Microsoft and Business Software Alliance (BSA) awarded Pragmatech a prize for its high-quality web design.

Alongside the knowledge economy, tourism in all its forms is a priority, despite competition from neighbours such as Dubai and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar plans to double its efforts in the hotel business to catch up with its neighbours and prepare for the World Cup. The country currently has 11,000 luxury rooms in 72 hotels, including 17 five-star and 13 four-star establishments. The authorities’ goal is to reach a total of 90,000 rooms by 2022.

More tourism means more air travel. As well as the construction of a new $15bn airport in Doha, which will serve 24 million passengers in 2012 (and 50 million in 2015), the emirate’s business strategy is to make itself the obvious transit point for western tourists travelling to the Far East.

The idea is that travellers flying with Qatar Airways will stop over for several days in Doha or one of the new towns currently under construction, on either their outward or their return journey. Qatar is in the midst of an air travel boom: the national airline announced in December 2010 that it had had its first profitable year and planned to go public in 2012. This step should finance the expansion of its fleet from 92 planes to 120 by 2013.

Qatar also wants to position itself as a regional centre for medical tourism. In 2012 the $8bn Sidra Medical and Research Centre will open its doors. It is the region’s first hospital entirely equipped with digital machines, and aims to attract patients from Southeast Asia as well as the Gulf area.

The growth of tourism is directly connected to the growth of the property sector. One of

In just a few years Qatar has risen to the forefront of the global economic scene. Though the unexpected influence of the TV network Al-Jazeera can occasionally put Doha in a tight spot, the growth of this small Gulf emirate owes nothing to chance. Its rise is based on a long-term strategy that combines liberalism and free trade, development of its exceptional gas reserves and investment in new technologies

Akram Belkaïd is a journalist

0 50 100 km

Al-Ruwais

Al-Khor

Doha

Al-Wakrah

Oum Said

Oum Bab

Dukhan

Al- Zubarah

Hawar Islands

(Bahrain)

QATAR

Fasht al-Dibel

Islet

Salwah

KhafusKhor al-Udeid

SAUDIARABIA

BAHRAIN

UNITED ARABEMIRATES

Ras Laffan

Halal Island

DUKHAN

Iranian territorial

waters

Lusail CityThe Pearl Island

SOUTH PARS

NORTH DOME

Al-Udeid US military base

Main oil and gas pipelinesGas

Sea and land borders

Oil export port

Territory administered by Saudi Arabia but claimed by the United Arab Emirates

Oil

Energy resources and infrastructure

Sources: Policy Watch no 525; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Bloomberg; Khaleej Times Online; Petroleum Economist 2009 and 2010

From oil to business tourism

BY AKRAM BELKAÏD

Qatar, growth and diversification

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the largest projects under way in Qatar is the construction (managed by the UDC) of The Pearl, an artificial island, a few kilometres from Doha city centre. At a total cost of $10bn, the island will consist of marinas, shopping malls, restaurants, and residential zones. Once completed, it will house 35,000 people in 18,000 units. The Pearl is mostly intended for Qataris, but it will also be open to foreigners who, by purchasing real estate there, will have the right to a permanent residence permit.

The Pearl is an opportunity for Qatari engineering firms to develop their expertise and know-how. Qatar Cool, another UDC subsidiary, is perfecting a system of “district cooling” in Doha, meaning the centralised distribution of air conditioning to several parts of the new town. This air conditioning “factory” is about to become a global benchmark in the field. Several towns in the Gulf, all facing rising energy bills caused by the increased use of individual air conditioning units, have shown interest in Qatar Cool’s technological model.

Another new town project, Lusail City, is being developed by the Lusail Real Estate Development Company (LREDC). Situated north of Doha, this new town will be completed

in 2019 and will have a total area of 35 sq km, at an estimated cost of $5bn. It aims to accommodate 200,000 residents, 170,000 workers and 80,000 visitors. It will have 22 hotels, 34 mosques, a business park, and several golf courses. A tram line 22km long with 34 stops will connect the town’s various areas; it will have two interchanges with a projected railway crossing the emirate. A system of taxi boats will link the new city to Doha airport and the business area of West Bay. Lusail City will have five stadiums, one of which, the Lusail Iconic Stadium, will host the 2022 World Cup final. And Qatari Diar, a government-owned company, has acquired numerous tourist and real estate properties in Europe, Oman, Sudan, Morocco, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya.

Qatar, which emits the most greenhouse gases per inhabitant of any country, wants to promote public transport. For an overall cost of $35bn over 10 years, it plans to build four underground lines, two tram lines, an automatic underground line and a high-speed rail link between Doha and Manama, Bahrain’s capital. In addition, there will be several goods rail lines, especially to Saudi Arabia. One of the most important road infrastructure projects is the 40km-long causeway between Qatar and Bahrain, an emblematic project for the region with an estimated cost of $5bn. The country also plans to allocate $20bn to modernising its current road network by building several

motorways. It also plans to expand maritime activities: the port of Doha will be expanded and modernised so as to become a platform for logistics and regional re-export (budget $7bn).

The development of a financial hub in Doha is another of Qatar’s strategic objectives. The Qatar Financial Centre, created in 2005, plans to revitalise the banking sector, which already has around 20 banks, 16 of them local. The world’s big financial institutions, attracted by the country’s economic boom and jockeying for position to finance projects, all have a presence here. But above all, the Qatari authorities hope Doha will become the world capital of Islamic finance, to rival centres such as Kuala Lumpur, Geneva, London and Manama. University disciplines have been created to train specialised executives in this field, and the government has decided to encourage the foundation of Islamic banks, particularly through taxat concessions.

National Vision 2030 also positions other sectors as strategic from the standpoint of economic diversification. Qatar, which imports 95% of the food it consumes, is aiming at 70% self-sufficiency by 2023. In 2008 the country’s authorities formed the Qatar National Food Security Programme, whose mission is to secure food supplies by buying farmland abroad, but also by launching agricultural businesses on Qatari soil, notably the production of cereals near the town of Al-Khor.

The country also plans to develop its expertise in hydraulics. Currently dependent on its desalination plants for 99% of its water, it aims to acquire strategic reserves of drinking water. It will therefore invest $2.8bn in building pre-stressed concrete reservoirs (12 metres high, with a diameter of 200 metres), interconnected by pipelines with a total length of 183km. This infrastructure will hold 32m cubic metres of drinking water, the equivalent of seven days’ consumption for Qatar’s projected population in 2040.

Diversifying the economy also means investing abroad, via the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA). This sovereign fund manages assets with an estimated worth of $60bn in almost 20 Middle Eastern, African, European and North American countries. QIA already has numerous partnerships with French companies: it holds 7.6% of Lagardère, 3% of EADS (since 2008); 0.98% of Suez Environnement; 5.78% of Vinci (in exchange for Cegelec and with the approval of the European Commission); and 22.7% of the capital of the Société Fermière du Casino Municipal de Cannes. QIA has also just taken control of 70% of the capital of French soccer club Paris Saint-Germain, and holds 9.1% of the capital of Hochtief, the German construction industry leader, which is a stakeholder in the Lusail City project.

AKRAM BELKAÏD TRANSLATED BY TOM GENRicH

In Qatar natural gas has its own town: Ras Laffan. In this port on the Strait of Hormuz 80km north of the capital, natural gas is processed, refined, frozen or burned, and

exported around the clock (1). People make their livings from it. Over the last 15 years, Qatar Petroleum (QP) and the big international energy companies (Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, Suez, etc) have invested $70bn in building the world’s largest gas-processing facility on this deserted Gulf coast made up of sand and rocks. It has seven liquefaction factories, a refinery, a giant steamcracker (producing 1.3m tons of ethylene a year), three power plants, several petrochemical units, and tanks 40 metres high and as wide as football pitches. Fifty-four tankers, 20% of the world’s fleet, service the port terminal. The first cargo of petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene) derived from gas at the Pearl Plant set off on 14 June 2011. The plant they came from was built by Shell, and employs up to 52,000 workers, housed in long rows of air-conditioned dormitories just 10 minutes from their workplace.

This gigantic effort is servicing the South Pars/North Dome Field, the world’s largest gas field, a geological rarity. Middle Eastern fields contain predominantly oil with a little natural gas, which for many years was burnt off in flares. This is the exact opposite. The field contains some oil (a high-quality oil called condensate, highly sought after by the chemical industry) and huge quantities of gas: 50,900bn cubic metres, according to the International Energy Agency, the third-largest natural gas reserve in the world (14%), after those in Russia and Iran. It lies under 65 metres of water and 3,000 metres of sand, right in the middle of the Gulf.

South Pars/North Dome has two owners who are strange bedfellows: Qatar, a Sunni monarchy, and Iran, a Shia republic. Hence the two names – the first for the Iranian section, the second for the Qatari.

In 1971 the United Kingdom withdrew its soldiers “west of Suez”, leaving its protégés in the Gulf to their fate. At the same time, a team of drillers from the Anglo-Dutch company Shell found gas in North West Dome 1. The discovery did not have a huge impact on the small emirate, which already owned 15bn barrels in oil reserves. (The rights to all of Qatar’s onshore deposits were held by a subsidiary of the powerful Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) from 1935 on.) Oil exports, long postponed, only began at the end of the 1940s: several hundred thousand barrels of crude oil a day, which is how Qatar has a seat on Opec.

Qatar later followed the example set by Saddam Hussein, who in 1972 had nationalised the IPC. In 1974 it assumed control of the IPC subsidiary, the Qatar Petroleum Company; and in 1976 of the Shell Qatar Company, the discoverer of North Dome, which had had exclusive rights to the emirate’s maritime fields since 1952.

Almost 10 years passed before exploration of the field was back on the agenda. Development began in 1984 as a modest enterprise aimed at supplying gas to the small emirate, whose population was growing rapidly. But Qatar’s domestic market, and even the regional market, could not absorb North Dome’s output, in contrast to those of populous Iran, which consumed all it produced and more. For Qatar, it became imperative to export. But how? The large consumer markets (Europe, North America and Asia) were far away. It was impossible to use gas pipelines, as Russia and Algeria did with Europe.

The alternative was to liquefy natural gas by cooling it to about –160°C. This decreases its volume drastically: 600 cubic metres of natural gas become a single cubic metre of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped around the world on specialised ships called LNG carriers. On arrival, it is regasified and pumped into the distribution networks.

Liquefaction is a complex technology. Only a few big western and Japanese companies control the whole process, from the well to the gasification terminals. It is also expensive: 15% of the gas is lost during the operation, and building a factory costs billions of dollars. First the gas, which is carried by pipelines from production areas, needs to be treated: liquid condensate is separated; carbon dioxide and sulphur components are extracted; the gas is dehydrated; and all traces of mercury are removed, because it is corrosive. The gas is then cooled, and fractionated in a series of distillations that isolate heavy hydrocarbons and marketable propane and butane.

Qatar has chosen not to emulate liquefaction pioneer Algeria, which finances the whole process itself from well to factory, and bears the commercial and financial risks too. The Algerian National Society for Research, Production, Transport, Transformation and Marketing of Hydrocarbons (Sonatrach) has built three liquefaction factories and exports around 20bn cubic metres, drawn from its main field, Hassi R’Mel: its 2,000bn cubic metres of reserves are dwarfed by North Dome.

Qatar Petroleum (QP), the national company fully owned by Qatar, decided to form partnerships with foreign companies, like its neighbours Abu Dhabi and Indonesia. In 1994 two years after the arrival of the first American soldiers in the emirate (which now hosts a large US base), Qatargas 1 was launched. QP’s partners were two former members of the IPC before it was nationalised, the US company Exxon and France’s Total (each with 10% of the capital), and the Japanese firms Mitsui and Marubeni (with a total of 15%). Qatar kept a majority holding. Three liquefaction “trains” were built which, over the course of several cooling cycles, pass the gas through heat exchangers on a huge production chain. LNG exports began in 1997. Qatargas 1 was followed by the identical Qatargas 2 (with Exxon Mobil and Total), 3 (with ConocoPhillips) and 4 (with Shell).

In 2001 a new subsidiary of QP, the RasGas Company Ltd, formed a partnership with Exxon Mobil to create the world’s first fully integrated LNG company, controlling extraction, storage, liquefaction and export. Rasgas 1, then 2, and then 3, were launched to supply Asia (Korea, India, Taiwan), Europe (Italy, Spain, Belgium) and the US. Qatar had built up an enormous production

capacity of 77m tons when, in 2005, the decision was taken to defer all new projects until 2014. Officially, new drilling had led to concerns that the North Dome was not a single field but was divided into four, which would require major work to evaluate the reserves. This is a subject on which the world’s producers like to be discreet.

Inside the industry, another explanation circulated. South Pars gas was said to be seeping into the Qatari part of the field, which was exploited more intensively because Iran, subject to a US embargo, had trouble finding partners: Total had given up all involvement in Iran after strong political pressure.

The moratorium proved to have been a good decision when, in 2008, the US massively increased its own exploitation of unconventional gas deposits, such as shale gas, effectively closing its market to Middle Eastern LNG. US imports dropped 40% over five years. The result was a collapse of prices on LNG short-term markets: at Henry Hub, the US entry point for LNG, its spot price fell 50.4% between 2008 and 2010.

The self-sufficiency of the US market was exploited by European and Asian clients, who demanded lower prices. They had convincing arguments. Deliveries intended for the US were transferred to Asia and Europe: long-term contracts (up to 25 years) fixed the volumes that must be bought and set the prices, which were indexed on petroleum products that could be

substituted for natural gas, or even on crude oil. The price of LNG was rising with the price of oil, while the world market in natural gas was saturated. LNG had two prices: a short-term spot price and a contract price. The differential between them could reach $2-3 per million British Thermal Units (2). Clients lobbied for the lower spot price; producers defended the higher contract price.

In 2008 producing countries tried to make a united stand by forming the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (3). Their goal was to maintain prices and, in the long term, to achieve price parity of oil and gas (4). Russia was the first country to give in, with Gazprom accepting spot prices. Over three years, 15% of its clients’ contractual purchases benefited. The Algerian company Sonatrach soon followed suit. Qatar’s enormous liquefaction capacity is under-utilised, and the plants built with Exxon Mobil specifically to supply the US market were inaugurated just as that market was closing to imports. QP’s search for substitute outlets in Asia (Thailand, China) and in Israel has led to conflicts with rivals, often Russian or Indonesian. Its European clients (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, E.ON, Suez, etc) are keener than ever on comprehensive contract renegotiations.

The fight for gas prices to be unpegged from oil prices is far from over. Qatar, with its small population and 50,000bn cubic metres of gas reserves, can afford to wait. It may even become the Saudi Arabia of natural gas, the producing country that sets the prices because it is the last resort.

TRANSLATED BY TOM GENRicH

(1) In 2011 Qatar is expected to earn almost $90bn from hydrocarbon exports (two-thirds from gas, one-third from crude oil).(2) The British Thermal Unit is a unit of energy. It represents the amount of heat needed to raise the temperature of one British pound of water by one degree Fahrenheit at constant atmospheric pressure.(3) The Gas Exporting Countries Forum was informally established in Tehran in 2001. At its seventh ministerial meeting in Moscow in December 2008, the GECF established a board and headquarters, in Doha (Qatar). The forum has 11 members (Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela) and several observers or guests (Angola, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Yemen).(4) Houari Barti, “Les pays exportateurs de gaz veulent une parité avec le pétrole: en attendant le juste prix”, 20 April 2010, Le Quotidien d’Oran; www.lequotidien-oran.com/index.php?news=5137077&archive_date=2010-04-20

Gas trump cardQatar stands out in a region rich in oil, with the third largest natural gas reserves in the world, after Russia and Iran. This unique

position puts it among the big international energy players, but also means costly investments

BY JEAN-PiERRE SÉRÉNi

Jean-Pierre Séréni is a journalist and former director of Nouvel Economiste, Paris

At a glanceCapital: DohaArea: 11,586 sq kmType of regime: monarchyPopulation: 1.5 millionPercentage of under-25s: 34%Percentage of foreigners in total population: 86.5% (incl. 500,000 Indians; 350,000 Nepalese; 160,000 Filipinos)Gross domestic product (GDP): $98.3bn (2009)GDP per capita: $69,754 (2009)Unemployment: 0.5% (2007)Adult literacy rate (over-15s): 95% (2009)Literacy rate among 15-24-year-olds: 99% (2007)Life expectancy: 75.3 years (men); 77.3 years (women)

Sources: World Bank; United Nations

Qatar’s diplomacy since 1995 seems to have run counter to Thucydides’ maxim: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they

must.” Qatar has demonstrated that even small states can have a foreign policy.

The transformation of the Arab regional system to the detriment of its larger states has enabled smaller countries to take the initiative, with the tacit approval of the great powers, especially the United States. Egypt’s signature of the Camp David accords in 1978, Saudi Arabia’s appeal for US troops in 1990 and Iraq’s defeat in 1991 significantly reduced these states’ claim to the status of regional leader. Forced to retreat within their own borders and emphasise national identity and sovereignty over transnational Arab identification and solidarity, they have opened the field to other players.

In this context, the editorial position of the satellite TV network Al-Jazeera, based in the capital Doha, has allowed Qatari foreign policy to shape transnational Arab sentiment. Its approach, which mixes pan-Arabism, Islamic sensitivity and liberalism, has ensured Al-Jazeera’s success and popularity. The Doha authorities have turned this into diplomatic leverage.

But this media influence conflicts with ambiguities in the emirate’s foreign policy, which Al-Jazeera has highlighted. When the prime minister and foreign minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jaber Al-Thani appeared on the show Bila Hodoud (Without Limits), its presenter, Ahmad Mansour, summarised his activities in plain language: “For many observers, Qatar’s foreign policy lacks clarity. The country hosts the biggest US military base outside the United States, yet it also has privileged relations with America’s enemies in the region, such as Iran and Syria. When it had diplomatic relations with Israel, it was also receptive to leaders of the Islamic resistance movement Hamas ... It has been reconciled for two years with its big sister, Saudi Arabia, and has now begun squabbling with the Egyptian regime, the largest Arab state ... In today’s broadcast, we will try to understand the foundations of Qatar’s foreign policy, to see for whose profit you play your part ... and which powers allow you to hold this position” (1).

These policy fluctuations were illustrated by the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 2002. Relations later improved and, on 6 July 2008, hit a new high with the signing of an accord determining the exact position of the border between the two countries, an accord that was somewhat favourable to Qatar. In return, the Saudi opposition disappeared from Al-Jazeera’s screens (2). The Qatari minister openly acknowledged that the media battle between the countries had had a political dimension (3), and declared there was no longer any dispute between them.

Secret US embassy cables released by WikiLeaks revealed that Al-Jazeera modified its coverage of events several times to conform to Qatar’s diplomatic line (4). But the alignment is far from systematic, and the mechanism ensuring the station’s success is a triangular interaction between Qatari foreign policy, Al-Jazeera journalists and Arab public opinion. Public opinion is not only taken into account, but prioritised over governing Arab elites, who feel the network’s popularity intrudes into their internal affairs and usurps their ability to communicate with their citizens. Al-Jazeera derives its legitimacy from its professionalism and its role as a media relay for Arab opposition

movements. The Arab voice it represents puts a permanent pressure on governments, which they can no longer ignore.

Morocco is an interesting example. Al-Jazeera opened a regional office in Rabat in November 2006 to broadcast a daily news programme specifically aimed at the Maghreb. Officially, its presence was supposed to prove Morocco’s liberal approach to freedom of expression. But in October 2010 the office was closed down, chiefly because of the amount of screen time given to opposition movements, especially Islamist ones. To everyone’s surprise, two days before the constitutional referendum of 1 July 2011, the minister of communication, Khaled al-Naceri, who had led a vitriolic campaign against Al-Jazeera (5), gave it permission to continue working in Morocco. In Egypt Al-Jazeera became the media relay of the revolution in February 2011, in spite of the closure of its office on Tahrir Square. When the Mubarak regime shut down the internet, it was Al-Jazeera that disrupted that communication strategy.

Al-Jazeera’s regional influence can be seen in the way that it can impose on Arab leaders the idea that its presence on their territory is less costly than its absence. Where it is banned, it is usually also boycotted by official

representatives and transformed into a media relay for the opposition. This can unbalance relations within the media framework as the Egyptian and Libyan examples demonstrate.

There are three main obstacles to fully understanding the links between Al-Jazeera and Qatari foreign policy. The first is methodological. To analyse the foreign policy initiatives of Qatar using the sociologist Max Weber’s model of a rational and bureaucratic nation-state is to dislocate them from the network that Qatari leaders have patiently created, and also from ideological and clientelist loyalties, among which national allegiance is the least important. To consider Al-Jazeera a normal media outlet is to disregard its political dimension, as a substitute transnational political sphere (6) that energises all national political spheres in the Arab world.

The second obstacle is ideological: the refusal to see Al-Jazeera as an Arab phenomenon established in Qatar that transcends the logic of the state. The third is psychological, as can be seen from the embarrassment often caused by the atypical conduct of Qatari leaders. How does supporting Arab revolutions serve the interests of the local dynastic regime? Or defending Hamas against Israel but also against Fatah? These are concessions made by leaders to the Arab journalists they employ, and to public opinion. They are the price Qatar has to pay for sending warplanes to Libya or hosting Israeli leaders in Doha.

Sheikh Hamad bin Jaber Al-Thani told his Egyptian interviewer that Al-Jazeera was a problem for the government and that Qatar would be prepared to sell it: “We were offered $5bn two years ago” (7). Possibly true. Or possibly not.

TRANSLATED BY TOM GENRicH

(1) “Qatar’s foreign policy”, Bila Hodoud, 24 June 2009; www.aljazeera.net (2) Robert F Worth, “Al-Jazeera No Longer Nips at Saudis”, The New York Times, 4 January 2008.(3) Mohammed El Oifi, “Le face-à-face Al-Arabiya/Al-Jazeera: un duel diplomatico-médiatique”, Moyen-Orient, Paris, June 2010.(4) “WikiLeaks cables claim Al-Jazeera changed coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy”, The Guardian, London, 6 December 2010.(5) “Mustapha Alaoui [sic] est la chaîne Al-Jazira”, Wabayn.com, 23 November 2010. (6) See Mohammed El Oifi, “The Al-Jazeera effect”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, May 2011. (7) Bila Hodoud, op cit.

What to do about Al-Jazeera?Al-Jazeera has great influence in the Arab world, now in ferment. And it is able to embarrass Qatar’s government

by contradicting its diplomatic moves

BY MOHAMMED EL OiFi

Mohammed El Oifi is a political scientist

Continued from page 1

From oil to business tourism

Ally of the United States1868: The Al-Thani family takes possession of Qatar, nominally part of the Ottoman Empire since 1538. 1916: The emirate becomes a British protectorate. 1940: Discovery of oil; exploration starts in 1949. 3 September 1971: Qatar proclaims independence.August 1990: Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the emirate allows international coalition troops led by the US to be deployed on its soil.1991: Territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar Islands. June 1992: Defence agreement signed with US.June 1995: Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani, in power since 1972, is toppled by his oldest son, Hamad Bin Khalifa.1996: Satellite channel Al-Jazeera created. May 1997: Doha stock market opens.November 2001: Fourth ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) takes place in Qatar.March-April 2003: Qatar hosts the central command of the US forces in the Gulf during the military campaign against Saddam Hussein. 29 April 2003: A new constitution, the first since independence, is approved by referendum; it comes into force in 2005.19 March 2005: A car bomb outside a British school in Doha kills one and injures 12.2 December 2010: The emirate is chosen to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

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