ln~~~-~sb.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/2018/k_crim_sb-18-crm... · 2018-12-03 · resolution...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBA YAN

QUEZON CITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Criminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-0458For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of

Republic Act No. 3019

- versus- Present:

SOLEDAD C. MONTILLA, etal.,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.l

Accused. Promulgated:

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RESOLUTION

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.:

For resolution is accused Renato Pido Manilla , FernandoRivera Balbin, Porferio Eyoy Calderon, Jr., Elizer Rivera Balbinand Alfredo Gulmatico Lim's "Motion to Quash Information, DeferArraignment and Hold Further Proceedings" dated October 1,201~

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1Sitting as a special member of the Third Division as per Administrative Order No. 262-2018 dated April 30,2018.2 pp. 266-271, Record 4

ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-0458People vs. Montilla, et al.

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Accused-movants Manilla, et al. pray that the Informationagainst them be quashed on the ground of a violation of theirconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.P They submitthat the Office of the Ombudsman took nine (9) years to resolvethe preliminary investigation of this case without providing ajustifiable reason for the said delay.4 They narrate the followingfactual antecedents, which purportedly transpired during thepreliminary investigation of this case before the Office of theOmbudsman:

On February 6, 2009, Virginia Palanca-Santiago,Assistant Ombudsman for the Visayas, forwarded toAtty. Viola P. Villanueva, State Auditor V, Commissionon Audit, Regional Office No. VI, Ungka, Ilo-ilo therecords of this case which was docketed as CPL-V-09-0028, requesting the latter to submit a report andrecommendation as soon as possible. From then on,this case had been under investigation of the Office ofthe Ombudsman. Despite the availability of all thedocuments in this case, it was only on March 10,2014, or after five (5) years,S that Ma. Sonnette SevilleDaquita, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I,Office of the Ombudsman, executed her ComplaintAffidavit. Herein Accused, promptly submitted theirCounter-Affidavit thereto. No further exchange ofpleadings took place thereafter.

It can be readily noted that the attachedCertificate of Non-Forum Shopping thereto was not evennotarized.

On 13 February 2019, nine (9) long years afterthis case was investigated,6 the Office of theOmbudsman issued its Decision in OMB-V-A-14-01S0and Resolution in OMB-V-C-14-01S9. No explanation-:>

3 p. 270, Id4 p. 266, Id5 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movants6 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movants

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ResolutionCriminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-04S8People vs. Montilla, et al.

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on the delay was ever made by the Office of theOmbudsman.

Herein Accused, promptly questioned the saidResolutions via Petition for Review in the Court ofAppeals, Cebu City.?

Accused-movants Manilla, et al. further point out that the'facts of this case are "simple and well documented" such that theOffice of the Ombudsman need not go beyond the publicdocuments consisting mainly of the pre-bid and biddingdocuments.f

In support of their claim of a violation of their constitutionalright to speedy disposition of cases, the accused-movants invokethe cases of Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman.» Tatad v.Sandiganbayan,lO Angchangco, Jr., v. Ombudsmanl! andPeople v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division).12

In its "Opposition" dated October 24,2018,13 the prosecutioncontends that in the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,14 theSupreme Court abandoned the ruling in People which includedthe period of fact-finding investigations in the determination ofexistence of inordinate delay. It argues that a case is deemed tohave commenced from the filing of the complaint and thesubsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation. IS

In its attempt to explain the circumstances surrounding thepurported delay, the prosecution presents the following narrationof the proceedings during the preliminary investigation of thesecases, VIZ: /77 pp. 266-267, Id

8 p. 267, Id !O9307 seRA 104 (1999)10159 seRA 70 (1988)11 270 seRA 337 (1997)12798 seRA 36 (2016)13 pp. 283-287, Id14 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 201815 p. 284, Id

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6. Based on the records, on July 2, 2014, the DeputyOmbudsman for Visayas had directed therespondents to file their respective counter-affidavits.The accused-movants received the July 2, 2014Order on August 4, 2014 but instead of filing theirrespective counter-affidavits, they moved forextension of time. It was only on September 5, 2014that the Joint Counter-Affidavit of the accused-movants was received by the Office of theOmbudsman- Visayas. The last counter-affidavit ofrespondent Danilo K. Jocson, however, was receivedon November 12, 2014. Thus, it was only then thatthe Complaint could be finally resolved.

7. Counted from November 12, 2014, it took the Officeof the Ombudsman only three (3)years and three (3)months to terminate the preliminary investigation(upon approval by the Office of the Ombudsman on .February 14,2018). Such span of time can hardly beconsidered as capricious or oppressive consideringthat there were several respondents involved,Moreover, the Complaint alleged variousirregularities committed by the respondents in theexecution of three (3) separate lease contracts,absence of bidder's bond, performance bond andauthority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Theseaccusations had to be meticulously scrutinized andverified not to mention that the complaint originatedfrom an anonymous complaint sent through textmessage. Also, the preliminary investigation wasconducted by the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayasbut the Resolution had to be approved by theOmbudsman. 16

The prosecution further argues that the accused-movants'reliance on the cases of Roque, Angchangco, Jr., Tatad, andPeople are misplaced due to the differences in factual milieu ofthe saidcasestothepresentcan

16 pp. 284-285, Id

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ResolutionCriminal Case No. S8-18-CRM-0458People vs. Mantilla, et al.

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It ratiocinates that the accused-movants cannot properlyrely on the cases of Roque and Angchangco, Jr., becausethese cases involved an unexplained delay of more than six (6)years and despite several motions for early resolution filed byAngchangco.!? Likewise, the prosecution argues that the case ofTatad is inapplicable to the present case because the SupremeCourt in the said case found that (1) political motivation playeda vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorialprocess; (2) there was a departure from established proceduresprescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigationas the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the PresidentialSecurity Command for fact-finding investigation and report;and, (3) the long delay in the preliminary investigation could notbe justified on the basis of the records.t" Also, the prosecutionexplains that the case of People is inapplicable herein becausethe preliminary investigation in said case took more than fifteen(15) years to be completed, counted from the time the complaintwas filed on December 28, 1994, up to the filing of theInformations therein. 19

Lastly, the prosecution points out that pursuant to theruling of the Supreme Court in Cagang, the right to speedydisposition of cases must be timely raised. Otherwise, therespondent is deemed to have effectively waived such right. Itargues that the accused-movants belatedly invoked the issue ofinordinate delay thereby negating their claim of a violation oftheir right to speedy disposition of cases.s?

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The Court finds the subject motion bereft of merit.

r=17 p. 285, Id18 p. 285, Id19 p. 285, Id20 p. 286, Id A


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Jurisprudence teaches that although the Constitutionguarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases, such speedydisposition is a relative and flexible concept. The determinationof the existence of inordinate delay is never made through amere mathematical reckoning of the time involved but throughthe examination of the peculiar facts and circumstancessurrounding each case.21

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court has consistentlyemphasized the need for courts dealing with "speedy dispositioncases," to approach the said cases on an ad hoc basis andweigh the conduct of both the prosecution and theaccused/ respondent vis-a-vis the [1] length of delay; [2] reasonfor the delay; [3] accused/respondent's assertion or non-assertion of his/her right to speedy trial; and, [4] prejudicecaused to the accused/respondent resulting from the delay.22Notably, none of the above-mentioned elements is either anecessary or sufficient condition to hold the existence ofinordinate delay.23

In other words, the said factors must be considered andrelated together with other relevant circumstances and courtsmust still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancingprocess.>' Thus, the Court cannot mechanically apply the casesinvoked by the accused-rnovants to the present case without aclose scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstancessurrounding the preliminary investigation of the present case.

In the relatively recent case of Cagang v.Sandiganbayan,25 the Supreme Court ruled that for purposesof determining the existence of inordinate delay, a case is.r>21 Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018; See alsoPeople v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 232197-98, April 16, 2018; Remulla v. Sandlganbayan,G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017; Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SeRA 135 (2008), Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan442 seRA 294 (2004), Dela Pei'ia v. Sandiganbayan, 360 seRA 478 (2001)22 Cagang v. Sandlganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018; See also People v.Sandlganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 232197-98, April 16, 2018; Remulla v. Sandlganbayan, G.R. No.218040, April 17, 201723/d24/d

25 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,2018


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deemed to have commenced from the filing of a formal complaintand the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.Thus, the reckoning period used by the accused-movants.wwhich was the date Virginia Palanca-Santiago, AssistantOmbudsman for the Visayas, required Atty. Viola P. Villanueva,State Auditor V of the Commission on Audit, to submit a reportand recommendation regarding the subject transaction, shouldbe excluded in determining whether or not there has been aviolation of the accused-movants' constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases.

The records of this case shows that the formal complaintwas filed by the Field Investigation Office (FIO).Regional OfficeNo. VI of the Officeof the Ombudsman on May 6, 2014.27 Thus,the preliminary investigation of these cases lasted for four (4)years and one (1) month, counted from the filing of the formalcomplaint by the FIO up to the date of filing=' of the presentInformation with the Court.

Plainly, the amount of time spent by the Office of theOmbudsman in the resolution of the preliminary investigationof this case cannot be considered unreasonable, oppressive,vexatious and inordinate taking into consideration the numberof respondents involved in this case, each of whom was giventhe opportunity to answer the allegations against him/her; theperiod during which the complaint, which involved three [3]separate contracts for lease of heavy equipment entered into bythe Sipalay City government and DK Jocson Construction, andthe counter-affidavits of the respondents, together with theirattachments were examined and reviewed; the complexities ofthe issues presented; the time poured into the review of thefindings of the Commission on Audit in its Memorandum datedApril 14, 2009; the time dedicated to the research of pertinentlaws and applicable jurisprudence; and, the levels of review thatthe case had to go through. The followingpronouncement of theSupreme Court in Cagang is also worth quoting:

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26 February 6, 200927 p. 7, Id28 June 29, 2018; p. 4, Record

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The reality is that institutional delay-? [is] a realitythat the court must address. The prosecution is staffedby overworked and underpaid government lawyers withmounting caseloads. The courts' dockets are congested.This Court has already launched programs to remedythis situation, such as the Judicial Affidavit Rule,3oGuidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcingthe Right of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial.s!and the Revised Guidelines to Continuous Trial.32Theseprograms, however, are mere stepping stones. Thecomplete eradication of institutional delay requiresthese sustained actions.

Institutional delay, in the proper context, shouldnot be taken against the State. Most cases handled bythe Office of the Ombudsman involved individuals whohave the resources and who engage private counsel withthe means and resources to fully dedicate themselves totheir client's case. More often than not, the accusedonly invoke the right to speedy disposition of caseswhen the Ombudsman has already rendered anunfavorable decision. The prosecution should not beprejudiced by private counsels' failure to protect theinterests of their clients or the accused's lack of interestin the prosecution of their case.33

Moreover, the Court observes that it is only now, or after theaccused-movants have been scheduled for arraignment, that theyare minded to invoke their constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases. A review of the records of this case revealsthat none of the herein accused-movants sought areconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman's adverseResolution dated February 13, 2018, finding probable causeagainst them for violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A.No. 3019.34

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t29 Footnote omitted30 Footnote omitted31 Footnote omitted32 Footnote omitted33 p. 33-34, Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201834 p. 82, Id

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In Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan,35 the Supreme Court enbanc held:

Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on21 December 1999, after the case was set forarraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of thedelay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. Asstated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss,"[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing."Also, in their petition, they averred: "Aside from themotion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did notfile nor send any letter-queries addressed to theOffice of the Ombudsman for Mindanao whichconducted the preliminary investigation. " Theyslept on their right - a situation amounting tolaches. The matter could have taken a differentdimension if during all those four years, theyshowed signs of asserting their right to a speedydisposition of their cases or at least made someovert acts, like filing a motion for early resolution,to show that they were not waiving that right.36

Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiverof such right.»?As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitionertherein was "insensitive to the implications andcontingencies" of the projected criminal prosecutionposed against him "by not taking any step whatsoever toaccelerate the disposition of the matter, which inactionconduces to the perception that the supervening delayseems to have been without his objection, [and] henceimpliedly with his acquiescence."38

Again, in Cagang, the Supreme Court ruled that theabove-mentioned ruling squarely applies to cases wherein theaccused was fully aware that a preliminary investigation against-=

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35360 SCRA478 (2001)36 Emphasis supplied37 Footnote omitted38 pp. 487-488, Dela Peiia v. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA478 (2001)

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him/her has not yet been fully terminated despite aconsiderable length of time.s? Moreover, the High Tribunalpronounced in the said case that a respondent/ accused musttimely raise his/her constitutional right to speedy disposition ofcases. Otherwise, he/she is deemed to have waived the same:

The right to speedy disposition of cases, however,is invoked by a respondent to any type of proceedingonce delay has already become prejudicial to therespondent. The invocation of the constitutional rightdoes not require a threat to the right to liberty. Loss ofemployment or compensation may already beconsidered as sufficient to invoke the right. Thus,waiver of the right does not necessarily require that therespondent has already been subjected to the rigors ofcriminal prosecution. The failure of the respondent toinvoke the right even when [he] or she has alreadysuffered or will suffer the consequences of delayconstitutes a valid waiver of that right.w

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases orright to speedy trial must be timely raised. Therespondent or the accused must file the appropriatemotion upon the lapse of the statutory or proceduralperiods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waivedtheir right to speedy disposition of cases.:'!

Applying the above-mentioned rulings to the present cases,the Court is of the view that the accused-movants' failure to seeka reconsideration of the adverse resolution of the Office of the-:>39 See Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 201840 p. 33, Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018•• p. 40, cagong v, 5andlganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018 r-

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Ombudsman and raise the issue of inordinate delay at theearliest opportunity amounted to an implicit acquiescence ontheir part to the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman inthe resolution of the complaint against them.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the accused-movantsfailed to allege and/ or demonstrate the amount of prejudicecaused to them by the alleged delay. A plain reading of theirpresent motion reveals that the accused-movants simply allege aviolation of their constitutional right to speedy disposition ofcases on the ground that the preliminary investigation thereoflasted for "nine (9)years, without justifiable reason. "42

It bears to stress that while a respondent in a criminal caseis not obligated to follow-up on his/her case, jurisprudenceinstructs that the accused's assertion of his/her right to speedydisposition of cases is entitled to a strong evidentiary weight indetermining whether or not he / she is being deprived thereof. 43This is due to the fact that the right to speedy dispositionof cases is usuaZZyinvoked by an accused [or respondent} toany type of proceeding once the delay had becomeprejudicial to him/her.44 Thus, assuming arguendo thataccused-movants were indeed prejudiced by the purporteddelay in the preliminary investigation of these cases, theyshould have raised the issue of inordinate delay at the firstinstance. 45

WHEREFORE, accused-movants Renato Pido Manilla,Fernando Rivera Balbin, Porferio Eyoy Calderon, Jr., ElizerRivera Balbin and Alfredo Gulmatico Lim's "Motion to QuashInformation, Defer Arraignment and Hold Further Proceedings"dated October 1, 2018,46 is DENIED for lack of merit.

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"D42 p. 266, Id43 Perez v. People, 544 SCRA532 (2008), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US514 (1972)44 See Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201845 See Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,2018; Perez v. People,544 SCRA532 (2008), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972); Emphasis supplied46 pp. 266-271, Record

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SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

AMPARO~A~PresiCiIilgJusticeChairperson

BERNE~ITO R. FERNANDEZssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

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