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DET NORSKE VERITAS

Navigational and Safety Risk Assessment

Washington State Ferries MANAGING RISK

Appendix 3

Safety Risk HAZID Workshop

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible.

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Appendix 3 Safety Risk HAZID Workshop

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Abbreviations

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

BOG Boil Off Gas

DOI Declaration of Intent

DNV Det Norske Veritas

ESD Emergency Shut Down

HAZID Hazard Identification (workshop)

HC Hydrocarbon

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

MES Marine Evacuation System

PKP Fire extinguishing agent

PMS Preventive Maintenance System

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

SMS Safety Management System

USCG United States Coast Guard

WSF Washington State Ferries


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Table of Contents Page

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 4

2 HAZID WORKSHOP ............................................................................................................ 4

2.1 Scope.................................................................................................................................. 4

2.2 Participants ........................................................................................................................ 5

2.3 Guidewords ........................................................................................................................ 6

2.4 Photographs of a Bunkering Operation ............................................................................. 7

3 HAZID FINDINGS .............................................................................................................. 10

3.1 General Findings .............................................................................................................. 10

3.2 HAZID Worksheets ......................................................................................................... 11

4 HAZID CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 22


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1 INTRODUCTION

DNV conducted a safety risk assessment, with stakeholder input, of the LNG-fueled passenger

ferry vessels and terminals. As part of the safety risk assessment, a vessel and terminal safety

HAZID workshop was held in Seattle on February 14, 2013 with local maritime experts. The purpose of the workshop was to identify local hazards related to the LNG-fuelled passenger ferry

vessels and bunkering at the terminals and to assess how the hazards could influence risk.

The vessel and terminal safety HAZID workshop used a systematic approach to identify hazards

and assess the associated risk. Existing safeguards and barriers were identified as well as needsfor risk reducing measures.

Output of the vessel and terminal safety HAZID was used to establish relevant probability valuesfor accidental incidents along the sailing route and at the terminal (an input to navigational risk

modeling). The HAZID output is also useful for development of the first draft of an OperationsManual.

2

HAZID WORKSHOP

A Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) uses a systematic process to identify hazards in order to plan for, avoid, or mitigate their impacts. Hazard identification is an important step in risk

assessment and risk management.

The vessel and terminal safety HAZID workshop was a key early step and provided risk

assessors important local knowledge about hazards related to the LNG system in the ferries -

hazards related to terminal operations and hazards related to bunkering.

2.1

Scope

The following incident types where considered during the workshop:

• LNG truck trailer approach

• Bunkering operations- Pre-cooling

- Purging- Filling

-

Inerting• LNG-fueled passenger ferry operations

- Fires- LNG leaks

- LNG venting

• Out of service / dry dock


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The main safety issues examined were:

• LNG leakage and spills

•

Rapid phase transition• Incorrect operation

• Pressure build-up

• Communication

• Control and automation systems

• Natural gas emissions to air

2.2 Participants

A HAZID participant group was assembled of 32 local experts who were knowledgeable aboutthe study area. Members of the team had experience in piloting, escorting, and conning vessels

within WSF’s ferry network and working on marine projects in the Seattle and coastal areas.The participants’ experience covered a wide range of maritime background and detailed

knowledge about the area. The participant group was appropriate to assess the hazards involved

in navigation in the area.

Table 2-1 List of Vessel and Terminal Safety HAZID Participants

Name Company Position e-mail

Peter Hoffmann DNV Facilitator [email protected] Lie Strom DNV Scribe [email protected]

Per Sollie DNV Project Manager [email protected]

Christopher Lanza DNV Security Analyst [email protected]

Philip Read DNV Surveyor [email protected]

Robin Zahler WSF Staff Chief [email protected]

Gretchen Bailey USCG CID [email protected]

John Dwyer USCG OCMI [email protected]

Lindsay Cook USCG Inspector [email protected]

McCrea Harrison USCG Inspector [email protected]

Randy Sorge USCG Facilities Branch [email protected]

Kelly Mitchell WSF Sr. Port Captain [email protected]

Paul Wilson WSF Staff Chief [email protected]

Doug McPheed WSF Staff Chief [email protected]

Darrell Kimmerly WSF Master [email protected]


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Name Company Position e-mail

Dave Goddard WSF Staff Chief [email protected]

Vern Day WSF Sr.Port Engineer [email protected]

Tim Browning WSF Port Engineer [email protected]

Greg Peterson BC Ferries Director, Fleet Performance [email protected]

Brad Judson BC Ferries Manager, SMS [email protected]

David Samuelson WSF Staff Chief [email protected]

Jim Ghiglione SJCFD#4 Fire Chief [email protected]

Rand Lymangrover Tote Terminal Manger [email protected]

J.M. Havner SFD Captain [email protected]

Rusty Palmer SWEF Chief [email protected]

Shane Kelly WSF Port Engineer [email protected]

Tom Castor WSF Marine Project Engineer [email protected]

Steven Hopkins WSF Staff Master [email protected]

Cotty Fay WSF Chief Naval Architect [email protected]

Sheila Helgath WSF Environmental Program Manager [email protected]

Darnell Baldinelli WSF Safety Systems Engineer [email protected]

2.3

Guidewords

The following guidewords were used to aid in the identification of hazards:

• Fire or explosion

o

in machinery spaces

o

in other areas

• Mechanical hazards

• Electrical hazards

• Thermal hazards

•

Hazards generated by malfunctions• Other hazards generated by materials and

substances

• Hazards generated by erroneous human

intervention

• Collisions

• Dropped objects

• Grounding

• Foundering

• Environmental hazards

• Pollution

•

Occupational accidents

• Hazards generated by neglecting ergonomic

principles


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2.4 Photographs of a Bunkering Operation

For purposes of setting a common understanding, the following photographs were shared during

the workshop. The bunkering operations shown in the pictures were conducted in Norway.

Figure 2-1 Supervision of bunkering

Figure 2-2 View of truck manifold and transfer hose during bunkering


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Figure 2-3 Connection of bunkering hose to vessel inlet manifold

Figure 2-4 Supervision of LNG fuel transfer


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Figure 2-5 View of exhaust stack and vent mast


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3 HAZID FINDINGS

The HAZID was organized by LNG bunkering approaches and stages. LNG ferry operations,

dry docking, and type information was provided. The following was captured during theworkshop:

• Hazard or Threat

• Cause

• Consequence

• Existing Safeguards and Barriers

• Risk Reducing Measures

Each item was discussed and potential hazards identified, noting any segment-specific causes.

3.1

General Findings

The following issues were raised as part of general discussions across the various stages of theoperation (bunkering, ferry operations and out of service / dry docking):

1. The largest risk from an LNG or gas release would most likely be from a spill during bunkering, due to not following procedures or from a hole in a transfer hose or piping.

2. Crew entrapment (during a fire or crew incident) on the vessel during bunkering would

be a worst case scenario (blocked egress by an LNG truck trailer).

3.

Ignition sources that are present during bunkering and LNG-fueled passenger ferry vesseloperation need to be identified and treated during the planning phase of the ferry

conversions.

4. Hazardous area zones on the ferry and in the terminals need to be defined for LNG

operations.

5. Mitigating measures for fires on the vessel during operation due to electrical shorts,

diesel leaks or from vehicles are currently in place.

6. During sailing, a leak in a LNG tank or gas piping will pose a potential fire and explosion

hazard.

7.

A LNG liquid leak around the cold box is foreseen as a credible event.8. For the Eagle Harbor site (out of service / dry docking period) various dry dock events

were discussed regarding pressure build-up in an LNG tank (venting/excess BOG), gas

freeing of piping and components, hot work near proximity to gas/LNG spaces andworking environment issues related to confined spaces.


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3.2 HAZID Worksheets

The HAZID Worksheets below document the results and reflect the information gathered in the workshop. Information in [brackets] was added to the worksheets by comment after the workshop.

ID HAZARD OR CRITICALISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLECONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDSAND BARRIERS

RISK REDUCING MEASURES OR PROCEDURES COMMENTS

Transfer Operations

1 LNG Truck Tanker Terminal Approach

1.1 Crew entrapment on the vesselin a worst case scenario

(blocked egress)

FireCrew incident (truck

blocking escape way)

[Crew injury or death] Life rescue boats Evaluate to have a second mean of egress or access to the shipExtra access from the other end the ship

Evaluate a Marine Evacuation System (MES) to a smaller vessel

1.2 Electrical components on the

station shore and vessel side

[Equipment malfunction

or improper installation]

Ignition, fire Specify Explosion proof or intrinsically safe components

De-energize the system in case of a gas leak to ensure thehazardous zoneEnsure proper grounding via an isolating flange on the bunker

hose.

1.3 Operational failure Insufficient [or improper]

lighting

Cargo light on the tower Install Intrinsically safe lighting in bunkering area

Sufficient lighting on the total bunkering system, lines, ventmast on the vessel

DNV working on PHAST calculations for

LNG/Gas leakage

Truck area in the shadow of the cargo light

1.4 Spillage of LNG Substantial differences in

the tilt of the apron due totide

Impact on truck and truck

personnel - a high tide maycause a leak to flow downtowards the truck (Bridge

ramp is higher than the shiptransfer apron)

Planned drip trays Have piping or hoses cross over the bridge, making it possible

for the truck to bunker away from the bridge

Evaluate a drain over the side of the bridge

Evaluate a water hose in the vicinity of the bunkering area

Evaluate a double walled bunker hose

Evaluate the effect of LNG spillage on the bridge structure

The deck covering material on the bridge is

concrete.

All the electronics controlling the bridge

will be in close proximity to the truck and bunker station.

Have not yet decided if there will be amobile LNG transfer pump or if a pump

will be integrated on the tr uck

1.5 Spillage of LNG Not sufficient drip trays

Wear and tear of hose.

[Ignition, fire] Drip trays Aluminum or stainless steel drip trays

Maintenance inspection

Move the bridge halfway up the span

Tray is a trough/gutter protecting the deck from the bunkerstation to truck

Deck is concrete

All the electronics controlling movement

on the bridge is in close proximity to thetruck and bunker station


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ID HAZARD OR CRITICAL

ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


1.6 Backing the truck up on theapron

Maneuvering Hitting the bridge side/othernearby obstacles/personnel

injury

Have piping or hoses across the bridge

Back-up siting personnel (spotter)

Back-up cameras and proximity alarms

Guiding line/light for the truck

WSF to evaluate the practices for Dieselsupply trucks and utilize these as an initial

guideline

1.7 Proximity of unauthorized

personnel

Insufficient marking of

bunkering and transferarea

Safety or Security violation [Signs posted at terminals] Physical, temporary barriers (fences), marking and signs (area

restriction)

Evaluate to have crew member standing to

keep people away

1.8 External ignition source Bad weather (lightning

strike)Plane passing (mainlysmall aircrafts)

Ignition, fire [Regular weather updates

provided by U.S. Coast Guardand WSF Operation Center]

Notice to the FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) during refueling DNV working on PHAST calculations for

LNG/Gas leakage. Need to calculate thedispersion height in case of a gas releaseduring bunkering.

1.9 Large LNG release Catastrophic breach of thetruck

Overflow of drip trays.Damage to the vessel deck

and vehicle bridge

Ignition, fire

Calculate the plume size (height) in modeling software(PHAST)

Very low probability of this event to occur

1.10 Large LNG release, fire propagation

Truck fire Damage to material,equipment and surroundings

Personnel injury and/orfatalities

[Fueling only at night and mostfueling locations are away from

population densities]

Install baffles or other measures on the vehicle bridge with the purpose of directing the LNG away from the ship on case of a

large spill and a potential fire. The purpose being to ensure thatthe LNG or fire of the truck does not damage the bridge or thevessel.

Ensure notification of local fire departments and U.S. Coast

Guard advanced notification center prior to truck transfers

Ensure possible means of notification are incorporated intofuture procedures

The closest fire department (manned) isanything between 1 miles to 4 miles away

from the planned bunkering stations

1.12 Wrong/insufficientmaintenance of external pump

Pump not integrated onthe truck or ship -

responsibility not clearly

defined

Dysfunctional pump [Regular preventive maintenance performed]

Clearly specified maintenance procedures and responsibility

Validate the concepts of operations in prior to initiating them


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


2 Preparations

2.1 Human error during bunkering

operations

Lack of clear procedural

interface between gasvendor, ship personneland fire department.

Crew change

Lack of training orrepetitive training

Mis-operation [Thorough and detailed

bunkering procedures]

Have joint written and agreed upon bunkering procedures with

chosen vendor and fire department

Joint training and common drills

Share written procedures and emergency manual with fire

department

Separate bunkering and crew change operations (Don't allow

crew change, vendors, non-essential personal within theidentified safety zone)

Ensure check lists, communication in place

2.2 Mal-functioning or mal-operation of fire fightingequipment

Fire fighting equipmentand sprinkler system notchecked

Incorporate maintenance of firefighting equipment into PMS

2.4 Lack of proper PPE Insufficient availability Training and development of processes and procedures for

implementation

Incorporate into pre-bunkering check-list

2.6 Human fatigue Night time operations Mis-operation Have designated fueling crew for all bunkering operations

Perform bunkering operations during daylight hours if possible

2.7 Improper or lack of repetitivetraining

Lack of funds,insufficient personnel,lack of training facilities

May incur cost for additionalduties and training

Incorporate crew training practices and frequency of traininginto company practices

2.8 Insufficient power to the firesystem pump

Black out, engines notoperable/available

Redundant power by generator

2.9 Misunderstanding,

miscommunication, mis-operation

Common terminology and technical language

2.10 Lack of clear authority forwhen a bunkering operation

should be terminated

Establish a pre-bunkering brief, check list and chart of authority

2.11 No/limited access tointernational connection for

firefighting equipment

Evaluate additional shore connection point on shore t erminal


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


2.12 Lack of safe and functioningcommunication channels

Engine room has intrinsically safecommunication equipment

Back-up communication system that are intrinsically safe

Having spare on board

2.13 Lack of sufficient Nitrogenonboard for inerting operations

Detailed demand study and calculations

Regular supply of Nitrogen

Store back-up supply of Nitrogen bottles onshore

Include check of nitrogen pressure level in the pre-bunker

check-list

2.14 Lack/ non-functional PKPsystem/equipment Portable fire extinguisher Frequent maintenance of the system incorporated into the PMS

2.15 Vessel drift-off Harsh weather, lack ofinspection of mooring

LNG spillage Having a crew standby during bunkering

Double-up mooring lines

Clearly define weather limits for bunkering

Weather monitoring during the total bunkering operations and pre operations (forecast)

Add tide and current limitations to t he bunkering procedures(terminal dependent)

2.16 Insufficient crew with properqualification available to keepvessel moored or maneuver the

ship away if necessary

Ensure a dedicated bunkering crew for bunkering operations

See 2.15

2.17 Unable to deploy the chemical

powder firefighting system

See 2.14

3 Signed Agreement Between Bunker Parties

3.1 Parties signing declaration ofinspection that are not familiarwith the systems

Signed Declaration of inspection (DOI). See 2.6

3.2 Impurities in the LNG

received

Set up sampling procedures

Vendor to provide gas sample upon delivery

Establish proper communication procedures with LNG supplieron documentation of received quality and quantity prior to the

bunkering operations. Include these procedures in the pre- bunkering check-list.


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


4 Hazardous Area Zone

4.1 No clear distance establishedaround the vessel, the pier and

the bunkering truck

Need to determine gas hazardous zones for all critical areasaccording to industry practice

4.2 Lack of standardisation of piers

Perform an assessment of the requirements for the piers relatedto LNG bunkering and incorporate changes into the route

manual

4.3 Maintain integrity ofintrinsically safe equipment

Regular Maintenance in PMS

4.4 Fire affecting the whole pier

(including hydraulic system ofthe pier)

Lock pins holding the pier bridge

stationary

Fire proofing of the pier

4.5 Lack of access to theemergency generator rooms

due to proximity of the LNGtanks due to an emergency

Evaluate location and potential of alternative location of theemergency generator

4.6 Emergency generator can potentially represent anignition source due to its

location

Reconfigure current design wrt access and safe location ofemergency generator (gas tight r oom, etc.)

4.7 Consequences spreading to thecommunity around the

bunkering area

Large release of bunkering

Establish zones of concern (size of gas plume)

4.8 LNG leakage on the transfer

lines from the bunker stationon the ship to the LNG tanks

LNG release Maintain continuous inspections of the lines

Gas detectors in cold box

4.9 Valves failing within the

coldbox

LNG release Valves are auto sequenced (fail

safe to close/open)

Response procedures

Inspection and maintenance procedures (in PMS)

4.10 Loss of ventilation from theengine room and the coldbox

Evaluate the need for alternate ventilation


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


6.6 People using unauthorizedtools in the hazardous zones

Introduction of new ignitionsources

Intrinsically safe tools and equipment to be applied under alloperations inside the hazardous zone

Evaluate color coded tools and marking of equipment

6.7 Mix-up of filling lines Check-list to ensure no mix-up of vapor return and filling lines

Evaluate color coded tools and marking of equipment

7 Inerting of Filling Lines

7.1 Insufficient Nitrogen onboard

for inerting

Nitrogen pressure gauge check

Nitrogen bottles are replaced by a specialized provider

7.2 Insufficient time for inerting Moisture Moist residuals in the lines Establish appropriate time spans for inerting

Performance testing

7.3 Insufficient supply of Nitrogento chemical powder system

Have separate Nitrogen system Have spare Nitrogen batteries available onboard

Nitrogen pressure gauge check

Nitrogen bottles are replaced by a specialized provider

8 Purging the Filling Lines

8.1 Sequence of purging the fillinglines is unclear

Establish appropriate procedures

8.2 Unclear use of vapor return

line

Establish appropriate procedures For information: Teekay requires a vapor

return line for their supply system due tothe placement of the LNG tanks on top of

vessel (don’t have enough pressure on thetruck to work against the static head)

9 Filling Sequence

9.1 Heat in the liquid transfer line Introduce a small amount of LNG

in addition to the purging


9.2 Overfilling of the tank Testing protocol and pre transfer check of equipment and alarms

9.3 Filling the wrong tank See above for coding of equipment


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


9.4 Running the LNG tank empty Establish procedures Cross-connection of the tanks is possible

9.5 Valve leakage in the cold box Monitoring, maintenance and inspection procedures

9.6 Leakage during filling Monitoring, maintenance and inspection procedures

Sufficient drip trays and drain

9.8 Unintentional closing of thevalves

Maintenance and inspection procedures

9.9 Hose rupture Pinching of the hoseWear and tear

Maintenance and inspection procedures

Manufacture appropriate guards for protection of the hose

9.10 Communication failure See above bunkering procedures

9.11 Failure of the automaticcontrol system

Redundancy, ESD

9.12 Hold-up/interruption of thefilling

Evaluate effect on the system and establish proper proceduresfor ramping the bunkering

9.13 Freezing/inoperable valves Do a valve check in prior to the bunkering

9.15 Over pressurization of theLNG tank

Failure of the safetyvalves

Maintenance of the safety valves

Provide an alarm for failure of the safety valves

9.16 Mal-functioning of the liquid

level gauge

Maintenance

Failure notification

Redundant gauges

Provide ultrasound gauging


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


9.17 Ship board power failure Uninterrupted Power Supply(UPS)

Independant ESD system

Emergency generator support

Regular periodic testing of the UPS and ESD Normally the vessel is on shore power

9.18 Improper calibration ofmeasuring and detection

equipment

Wrong reading/signals Equipment or operationfailure

Proper calibration procedures according to vendorrecommendation

9.19 Truck fire and BLEVE Immediate notification to local firefighting

Emergency evacuation of the vessel

9.20 Fire in terminal building Immediate notification to local firefighting


9.21 Fire in dolphins Immediate notification to local firefighting


9.22 Fire in the galley Engage firefighting systems inthe galley

Engagement of the fire screendoors and ventilation shut downfor passenger spaces

Immediate notification to local firefighting

Notify the USCG


No passengers or crew in the galley during bunkering

9.23 Damage to steel wires(mooring)

Bunker hose contact withthe mooring lines, apronis laying on the wires

Crew injury from handling Use stainless wires, rubber mat protection of mooring lines

10 Stripping the Liquid Line

10.1 Traces of LNG left in thefilling lines Lack of sufficient timefor pressure build-up andLNG stripping back intothe tanks

Establish procedures for stripping


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


10.2 Rain out of LNG upon ventingof the lines

Trapped LNG in the lines Rain out on deck, potential forstructural damage and

personnel injury

Ensure that design of vent mast has an outlet directing the flowaway from the vessel

11 Inerting the Transfer Lines

11.1 Unable to inert the gas transfer

lines

See above for N2 supply

12 Disconnecting and Ready for Operations

12.1 Gas release Trapped gas in the lines /insufficient inerting

Ignition, explosion, fire Establish sufficient time for purging

12.2 LNG traces in the bunker hose Personnel injury due toexposure

Establish sufficient time for purging

13 LNG Fueled Ferry Operation (Sailing)

13.1 Fire on the ship duringoperation

See fire above Include reference to what HAZARD

13.2 Fire in cars or gasoline tanks

during sailing

Fire sprinklers and system on all

the car decks

See fire above Include reference to what HAZARD Gasoline and electric cars

13.3 Unclear procedures in theevent of a leakage in the

system


13.4 Smoking Establish appropriate smoking policies

Mark non-smoking areas

13.5 LNG liquid leak in the cold

box

Drip trays and ventilation

Evaluate considerations for shut down of operations

Maintenance of gas detectors

Evaluate effect of down time and costs

13.6 Gas release in passengerspaces or ventilation system

Isolation, casing and double barriers Very low probability


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ISSUE

CAUSE POSSIBLE

CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARDS

AND BARRIERS


13.7 LNG tank loosening Fatigue in tank supportsor structure failure

Proper design according to international/class code

13.8 Unauthorized entering of thetank and coldbox area

Restricted access areas around the tank and coldbox

13.9 Black out and potential loss of propulsion

Loss of gas supply to theengine

See above emergency generators

14 Out of Service / Dry Dock

14.1 Gas freeing of the total system Dry dock requirements Need to be towed from thesite of gas freeing to the drydock site

Establish procedures and practices for gas freeing

Determine requirements for ship yards

Recertification of the LNG tanks before drydock leave

14.2 Long term lay-up Casualty repair Pressure build-up in the LNG

tank, excess BOG

Establish procedures and practices for gas freeing upon a lay-up.

Define upper limits of operating parameters for gas freeing.

14.3 Gas freeing of a portion of thesystem

Maintenance and hotwork on parts of the

system

Establish procedures and practices for gas freeing for parts ofthe system

Evaluate if there are differences in requirements for the different parts of the system

14.4 Hot work in near proximity togas/LNG spaces

Maintenance, sand blasting, welding

Establish procedures and practices for gas freeing

Determine requirements for ship yards

14.5 Unidentified confined spaces Space limitation Unable to evacuate peoplefrom confined spaces

Define and evaluate confined spaces


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4 HAZID CONCLUSIONS

The key observations from the Vessel and Terminal Safety HAZID are as follows:

1. The largest risk for an LNG or gas release would be a spillage during a bunkeringoperation due to failure to follow procedures or because of a leaking transfer hose or

piping. Development of bunkering procedures and extensive personnel training is

necessary to mitigate these types of events. Involvement and training of local emergencyresponse teams would be of high importance.

2. LNG liquid leaks during bunkering are foreseen as a credible event and can pose damage

to structures and create a fire hazard. Well known design measures from other industry

applications exist to safeguard and mitigate potential escalation. Education and trainingof local emergency response teams would be of outmost importance in order to deal with

various LNG scenarios.

3. During bunkering, crew entrapment poses a serious threat, and a review of alternate orsecondary means of egress and access should be evaluated. WSF needs to determine the

minimum number of personnel required, and limit the number of employees performing a

fueling operation.

4. Hazardous areas and zones will need to be identified to clearly understand areas ofconcern with respect to ignition sources and impact to off-site personnel.

5. LNG/gas fires pose a new threat to WSF and updated fire suppression systems will need

to be designed to cater for this threat. International rules and regulations for these types of

systems exist and are in continuous development.

6. WSF will need to establish appropriate procedures to deal with leaks from a LNG tank or

gas piping. Proper operational inspection, maintenance and suppression procedures will

have to be developed. Even though smoking is not allowed on the WSF network, it was

suggested to revisit current smoking policies and mark clearly all non-smoking areas.

7. For any dry docking activity, WSF will need to investigate and establish requirements

and procedures on how to deal with various dry dock events such as pressure build-up in

the LNG tank (venting/excess BOG), gas freeing of piping and components, hot worknear proximity to gas/LNG spaces and working environment issues related to confined

spaces.

8.

The Masters and Mates usually sail on one given route on all rotations and special crewwith knowledge of all routes are at hand if needed. This reduces the risk of errors due tolack of local knowledge. In addition, Masters and Mates are required to be familiar with

the routes and equipment through experience and training before being assigned Master

or Mate duties.


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Det Norske Veritas:

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maritime and energy sectors. Since 1864, DNV has balanced the needs of business and society based on our

independence and integrity. Today, we have a global presence with a network of 300 offices in 100 countries,

with headquarters in Oslo, Norway.

Global impact for a safe and sustainable future:

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