F-117A

STEALTHFIGHTER

Jane'sHOW TO FLY AND FIGHT IN THE

F-117A

STEALTHFIGHTER

JON LAKE

HarperCollinsPublishers

F- I I 7A

HarperCollinsPublishers77-85 Fulham Palace RoadHammersmithLondon W6 8JB

First Published in Great Britain byHarperCollinsPublishers 1997

1 3 5 7 9 1 0 8 6 4 2

Copyright © Jon Lake 1997

ISBN 0 00 470109 8

Cover painting: lain WyllieColour illustrations: John Ridyard and Chris Davey (3-view)Editor: Ian DairyDesign: Rod TeasdaleProduction Manager: David Lennox

Colour reproduction by ColourscanPrinted in Italy by Rotolito

All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopyingor otherwise, without the prior writtenpermission of the publishers.

F- I I 7A

CONTENTS6

INTRODUCTION

8WHY STEALTH?

14

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

32FRONTLINE SERVICE

46FLYING TODAY'S MISSION

88A FUTURE FOR STEALTH?

F- I I 7A

INTRODUCTION:THE ELITE SURPRISEOf all the pilots in the US armed forces,those who fly the Lockheed F-l 17 areperhaps the most justified in thinking ofthemselves as an elite. Although it wasconceived, designed and delivered at theheight of the Cold War, when the USAFprocured its aircraft in hundreds, only 59production examples of the F-1 17 wereever built. The aircraft was conceived as a'Silver Bullet', a highly specialized precisionattack weapon capable of flying missionstoo difficult and too dangerous for anyother airplane in the inventory.

Below: The F-117A istoday openly flown bythe 49th Fighter Wingfrom Holloman AFB,New Mexico, close tothe White Sands NationalMonument, a far cryfrom its secretbeginnings.

The aircraft was primarily intended to act as asurprise attacker, a secret strategic asset readyfor use in some covert mission ordereddirectly by the President, perhaps one wheredeniability would be useful. Typical projectedmissions included attacks against individualterrorist leaders, or attacks on C3 (Command,Control & Communication) sites during a

hostage rescue mission. Alternatively, in areal war with the Warsaw Pact, the F-l 1 7 Acould have flown as a pathfinder, attackingkey air-defense sites to allow conventionalbombers and fighter bombers to follow upwith their own attacks. This would make theF-11 7A an effective force multiplier, makingconventional fighter bombers moreproductive and less vulnerable. Either way,only a handful of these versatile aircraft wereneeded.Pilots for this unique machine are themselvesalso something of a rare breed. Only a smallnumber of pilots have ever qualified to fly theF-11 7, and each has been assigned aconsecutive 'Bandit number' to mark hisachievement. To preserve security, Banditnumbers were secret, and began at 150 forservice pilots, with numbers from 100 for testpilots. In the earliest days of the program, F-11 7 pilots were assigned to an aircraft whosevery existence was a closely guarded secret,and they could not reveal which aircraft theyflew, even to their own families: they lived astrange nocturnal existence, isolated from therest of the world. Today the existence and

INTRODUCTION

mission of the F-117 is known, but theaircraft is still surrounded by great secrecy.You need special authorization even to goclose enough to the airplane to touch itsstrange black skin, and many of itstechnologies and capabilities remain veryhighly classified.The F-117A has been seen in the staticdisplays of a number of airshows in the USAand even in the UK and in Europe. Buteverywhere it has appeared, its groundcrewhave erected barriers at least 18 feet from itswingtips nose and tail, and armed guards arethere to ensure that no-one goes any closer

than that. The pilot might stand by thebarrier, basking in the limelight, signingposters and programs for small boys andanswering simple questions with easy charm.But start getting technical and he'll move on,or parrot a rehearsed answer which actuallymeans nothing at all. He certainly wouldn'tbe willing to confirm publicly most of whatis written in the pages that follow, though95% of this information has been providedby program insiders. The US Air Force willnot let the public anywhere near the F-117.This book puts you in its cockpit and lets youride along as it flies a typical mission.

Above: Hal Farley wasthe pilot of the first F-117 (then known simplyby its Senior Trendcodename) for its maidenflight on 18 June 1981.He has since been thedriving force behind theaircraft's flight testprogramme. His unique'Bandit Number' reflectshis unparallelledimportance to theprogramme. He is'Bandit 117'.

F- I I 7A

SECRET ORIGINS:WHY STEALTH?

American experience in the Vietnam war andIsraeli experience in the Yom Kippur warconclusively demonstrated the danger posedby increasingly sophisticated Soviet SAMsand air-defense radar. Intelligence sourcesindicated that the USSR would soon bedeploying advanced interceptors withimproved lookdown/shootdown capability.The SAM-5 was capable of reaching 125,000ft and could be nuclear-tipped, taking careof any minor aiming errors. In the 1973 YomKippur war, Israel lost some 109 aircraft in18 days, these falling to second-best exportSoviet SAMs manned by ill-trained Egyptianand Syrian crews. One answer to theincreasing vulnerability of tactical aircraftwas to dedicate forces to electronic warfare,jamming enemy radar, or locating anddirectly attacking air-defense systems. Butexperience in Vietnam and the Middle Eastseemed to indicate that the allocation ofresources to EW (Electronic Warfare) andSEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences)was unable to halt a growing loss rate andthat there had to be another, better answer.

The far-sighted suggested that one suchanswer could lie in the reduction of the radarcross section (RCS) of tactical aircraft. Thiswould decrease the effective range of enemyradars, potentially to a point at whichinterception would be impossible before thebomber reached its target. Lockheed madeplans to resurrect its D-21 reconnaissancedrone as the basis of a manned or unmannedattack aircraft, this vehicle having enjoyed thelowest RCS recorded to that date.

In 1975 the USAF held a Radar Camouflage.Symposium at Wright-Patterson AFB, andsoon afterwards, DARPA (Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency) invited Northrop,McDonnell Douglas and three otheraerospace companies to design proof-of-concept stealth aircraft in a competitionfunded in 1976. The winner would receive acontract to build two demonstrator aircraft.

Above left: A model ofthe original 'Have Blue'hangs in Lockheed'sanechoic chamber, duringearly tests of radar crosssection (RCS).

Below: Extensive use wasmade of sub-scalemodels for accuratemeasurement of RCS.Much of the work had tobe carried out by night.

SECRET ORIGINS

Remarkably, Lockheed were not invited tosubmit a design, not least because its existingStealth experience (the SR-71 reconnaissanceaircraft, the D-21 drone and the U-2, all withfeatures to reduce RCS) was so secret that no-one actually knew their capabilities.Lockheed were able to get CIA permission toreveal SR-71 and D-21 data to DARPA, andthis was impressive enough for the companyto be allowed to participate in thecompetition. It is said that the SR-71, the sizeof the B-58 Hustler bomber, had a radarcross-section similar to that of the Piper Cub,about 100 times smaller than that of thecontemporary F-14 fighter!

Lockheed won the competition in April1976 with a faceted design, which proved tentimes less visible to radar than that of itsnearest rival, Northrop. Scale models of bothwere extensively tested on the radar ranges atWhite Sands, where it was discovered thatboth had lower radar cross-sections than thepoles on which they were mounted! TheLockheed design's RCS was calculated asbeing equivalent to that of a small ballbearing, and senior Lockheed personnellobbied air-force officers and politicians byrolling equivalent ball bearings across theirdesks, saying 'That's how big our new fighterbomber looks on radar!'.

Above: The Have Blueprototypes were notdeclassified until longafter the production F-117A. Only a handful ofphotos of the tinyprototypes have everbeen released.

Technicians makeadjustments to a pole-mounted RCS model.Designing a pole with alower RCS than the -F-117 was hugely difficult!

RCS tests could bedisrupted by the tiniestblemish on a model'sskin, from insects to bird-excrement.

F- I I 7A

THE XST PROGRAM

Above: The XSTs and the early YF-117As were shipped from Burbank to the secrettest facility at Groom Lake at dead of night, aboard USAF C-5s.

When the Lockheed design's RCS was validated the wholeprogram was reclassified Top Secret - Special Access Required, andAir Force Systems Command took over the program from DARPA, toensure secrecy. Lockheed built two sub-scale prototypes (known asXSTs, or Experimental Survivable Test-beds) under the program name'Have Blue'. The aircraft had no USAF serials, and no DoDdesignations, and remained a completely secret project. These

prototypes were quite deliberately built lightlyand cheaply, using off-the-shelf componentswherever possible, including J85 engines. Thefirst prototype's role was to prove that afaceted aircraft could have acceptablehandling qualities, while the second woulddemonstrate RCS.

The XSTs were built and test-flown inconditions of enormous secrecy. No workerwas allowed to be left alone with a blueprint,and only a handful had any idea what theywere working on. When the aircraft werecompleted, they were shipped by C-5 Galaxyto the top-secret flight test facility at GroomLake. Here the first aircraft made its maidenflight on 1 December 1977. During this andall subsequent flights, all workers involvedwith other projects, and many of thoseworking on XST itself, were locked into themess hall. No-one who was not specificallycleared to do so was allowed to even see theaircraft. This rule was so strictly enforced thatthe flight test team's coffee mugs (whichshowed just the nose of a cartoon version ofthe XST, peeking from a cloud) fell foul of

GENESIS OF THE F-117These diagrams trace the evolution of the Stealth Fighter from its origins as the sub-scaleHave Blue, which represented the optimum 'Hopeless Diamond' shape to prove the LO concept.

SECRET ORIGINS

Right: The prototype YF-117A takes shape at theSkunk works. The facetednosecone has yet to beadded, and the engineintakes and exhausts arecompletely missing. Thetype's conventional alloyconstruction is apparent.

Far Right: The woodenmock-up of the YF-117takes shape at Lockheed'sfamous 'Skunk Works'.This allowed systems tobe accurately positioned.

security and had to be used only in the presence of cleared personnel,and then locked securely away in a safe (not just a locked cupboard,but a steel-doored, combination-locked safe).

The XST remains an extremely secret aircraft. Both prototypes werelost in accidents, and photos of them were not released until longafter the production F-11 7 A itself emerged from the secret world. Thismay be because the XST's external configuration represented a closerapproximation of the ideal 'Hopeless Diamond' stealth shape workedout by Lockheed, with no compromises for production or weaponssystem performance. It is likely that a full-scale XST would bestealthier than the F-11 7 as actually built.

Lockheed received an order to build a production version of theXST under the program name Senior Trend. The contract was signedon 1 November 1978, and stipulated that the aircraft would have the

same RCS as the original XST wooden polemodel, and that the first must fly by July1980. The production aircraft would be afighter-sized airplane carrying two laser-guided bombs. Five would be built initially,with twenty more to follow. Lockheed missedthe contractual first flight deadline and lost$6 m on the first five aircraft. Fortunatelyorders totalled 29 aircraft, then 59, and thecompany made $80 m on the program addingin $30 m of free improvements to avoidcharges of excess profit! The pre-productionSenior Trend first flew on 18 June 1981.

SENIOR TREND

F-1 1 7A FIRST PROTOTYPE

PRODUCTION F-117A

F- I I 7A

NAMING THE BLACK JETThe production Senior Trend aircraft is today officially named as theLockheed F-117A Stealth Fighter. This is a misleading epithet whichtakes little account of the fact that this is perhaps the aircraft in theUS inventory least capable of any useful air-to-air (fighter) role. Likethe F-111 before it, the F-117 is a bomber in all but name, and thefighter tag is a political convenience and an indication of theaircraft's size as much as anything else.

The aircraft went unnamed for much of itsearly history, and there have been aconfusion of designations and nicknamesapplied to the aircraft over the years. Thename Project Harvey (after the invisible rabbitin the Jimmy Stewart film of the same name)was probably unofficial, while Hollywoodalso provided a nickname used by the earlyflight test team - 'Elliott', or 'Pete's Dragon'. Itis still uncertain as to whether the COSIRSacronym (COvert Survivable In weatherReconniassance/Strike) was applied to the F-11 7 A, or whether this was another stealthaircraft program which has remained 'black'ever since. When Lockheed gained a contractto build five FSD (Full Scale Developmentphase) examples of a production derivative ofHave Blue (otherwise the XST, orexperimental survivable test-bed) the aircraftwere known by the Senior Trend programname. Senior Trend was itself a completelyrandom codename, since although the Senior

Below: Behindcamouflage netting,Lockheed techniciansand engineers preparethe first Senior Trend forits maiden flight. Withpanels removed, theengines can be seen,together with their jetpipes, which flattenedinto broad, flat slots,hidden by the upturnedtrailing edge.

prefix is a standard reconnaissance codeword, the second word in the name wasselected randomly by computer.

The first five FSD aircraft used Scorpion callsigns, and were often known as Scorpions,after a Baja Scorpion successfully penetratedall the security precautions to show up on theprogram manager's desk! Aviation engineersand pilots are not always the world's bestzoologists or entomologists and soon gotmixed up as to what species the aircraft was.The name 'Cockroach' was soon usedinstead, especially by the less reverentialservice pilots. The new name stuck, since theaircraft actually looked like one! In the earlydays, a number of names and designationswere used unofficially, including Nighthawk(which was nearly adopted as the type'sofficial name), Ghost and Spectre, as well asthe simple and straightforward Black Jet usedby pilots. Outside the Stealth community,there have also been nicknames. Someapplied the designation F-19, seeing a gapbetween the US Navy's F/A-18 and thestillborn F-20. In fact, Northrop requested theF-20 designation as a marketing ploy for theirF-5G, and the gap was left deliberately. Thisproved extremely handy for the USAF, whocould honestly deny the existence of any F-1 9Stealth aircraft. For a while, after the aircraft

SECRET ORIGINS

came out of the black world, some elementsof the press called it the Wobblin Goblin,based on a misunderstood fragment ofdescription applied to the aircraft's handlingcharacteristics before the stabilityaugmentation kicked in during one specificearly test maneuver.

The number 11 7 was used before theaircraft became the F-11 7, the number beingentered in lieu of an aircraft type on officialforms and maintenance records. There havebeen suggestions that the designation wasused to fit in with the codenames and call-sign type designations used by Groom Lakeand Tonopah-based Soviet aircraft. The MiG-1 7 (Have Drill) was reportedly the F-11 3, theMiG-21 (Have Doughnut) was the F-114,while other types, including the MiG-23 andSu-7, took other designations. One story hasit that the F-11 7A designation was reportedlyadopted officially after Lockheed printed the

aircraft's Dash One flight manual with F-117Aon its cover. There was supposedly anunwillingness to re-print the document, eventhough the officially favored designation wassaid to have been F-19!

One thing no-one called the aircraft wasthe 'Stealth Fighter', since the very wordStealth had been specifically and deliberatelyclassified as top secret, and even behindclosed doors at Tonopah or within the designoffices which produced the aircraft, use of theS-word was taboo. Things change, however,and once the aircraft's existence wasacknowledged, the word stealth becameacceptable. So officially, today, the one-timeSenior Trend is the Lockheed F-117A StealthFighter. Although the F-117 bears the'Lockheed' label, the aircraft was actually theproduct of a small and discrete division of theCalifornian aerospace giant, the so-called'Skunk Works'.

Above: With extendedleading edges, and withits port wingtip paintedred, this is the first YF-117A, identifiable by itscentreline testinstrumentation boomand symmetrical pilots.The leading edgedogtooth was added latein the aircraft's career inan effort to improve takeoff and landingperformance, andparticularly to reducelanding speeds.

F- I I 7A

SECRET STRIKE FORCE:

INTO SERVICEToday, any publication listing the order ofbattle of the US Air Force will openly andhappily tell you that the F-l I7A is flown bythe 49th TFW (Tactical Fighter Wing) atHolloman AFB, New Mexico, as part of AirCombat Command. With no two-seat F-1 17version, its pilots tend to come fromoperational tours on other frontlinetactical fighter types, not direct fromtraining. There is still a requirement for apotential F-117A pilot to have 700 flyinghours before conversion. This level ofopenness relating to the Stealth Fighter is avery new phenomenon, and is far from thesituation which pertained for the first sixyears of the aircraft's service career, whenits very existence was secret.

In the early days, the F-117A was seen as anairborne equivalent to the US Army's SpecialForces, or to the Navy's SEALs, with a covert'smokeless gun' role, which might includestrikes against terrorists or rogue nations onthe direct orders of the President. There wereplans for using the aircraft in larger, full-scalewars, but these were even more secret. Undera plan reportedly known as 'Downshift 02',for instance, it was envisaged that F-11 7As

Below: Wearing ED (forEdwards) tailcodes, theF-117A combined testforce are seen high overCalifornia. The second,third and fourthprototypes are seen withNo.831, a much lateraircraft used for test andtrials duties.

might 'take out' the Dacha of the SovietPresident. Complete secrecy was felt to beessential, not only to ensure surprise, but alsobecause some operations might be deniable.The very existence of the aircraft was notadmitted, and its operating unit and locationhad complex cover stories. While the USAFrequirement stood at a single squadron of'silver bullet' F-117As, the aircraft could haveremained based at the super-secret test facilityat Groom Lake, and might even havefollowed the U-2 and A-11 in being operatedby the CIA. But when it became clear that awhole wing of Stealth Fighters would beacquired (largely due to Congressionalpressure for a wing-strength unit), it wasincreasingly obvious that they would requirea separate base. Existing airforce facilitieswere too well known, and too open for thenew aircraft, and the decision was taken todevelop an entirely new facility. For a while,there were apparently plans to base asquadron permanently in the UK (foroperations in Western and Eastern Europe, theMiddle East and even the USSR), with asecond squadron to be based in Korea foroperations in the Pacific. The third squadronwould have remained in the USA for trainingand contingency operations in other areas.There were some plans to deploy the aircraftoverseas aboard C-5 Galaxies, with theirwings removed, but this was soon realized to

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

be impractical, because re-assembly and re-application of RAM was too time-consuming.There was always a degree of discomfortabout basing a secret aircraft at a USAF baseoverseas, particularly in the UK, where everyairfield is closely watched by dozens ofaircraft spotters, and where no airfield isreally 'off the beaten track' even to the extentthat major airfields in the USA often are.Macrahanish was reportedly examined as apossible base for the F-11 7, but in the end, itwas decided that overseas operating locationswould have to be just that, to preservesecrecy, and the search for a CON US(Continental United States) base for theStealth Fighter force continued.

Above: The first prototypewore the Christian namesof test pilots Farley,Anderson and Fergusonon its canopy rail.

Left and below: The firstprototype was re-paintedwith a disruptivecamouflage after its firstflight in an effort todisguise its facets. Thesmall vertical fins werereplaced after Flight No.7.

F- I I 7A

HIDDEN

Deep in the Nevada desert, in a remote partof the Nellis AFB ranges, lay the runway forthe Tonopah Test Range, one of manydisused runways and airfields within theranges. The 6,000-ft asphalt runway wasoriginally built by Sandia NationalLaboratories during the 1950s to supportnuclear weapons tests: the location hadpotential for improvement and expansion,while the only public land overlooking thebase was many miles away. The airfield wassubjected to a three-phase improvement andconstruction program.

Below: Armed guardssurround an F-117A as itmakes ready to taxyfrom its 'Canyon'somewhere onTonopah's darkenedramp. Until theprogramme was madepublic, F-ir7Asoperated only by night.

Under Phase I, from October 1979, the basewas reconstructed and expanded. Therunway was extended, and taxiways, aconcrete apron, a large maintenance hangarand a propane storage tank were addedstraight away. The USAF purchased 16 largefully air-conditioned mobile homes for abargain $1.5 m from Chevron Oil, and thesewere used as dormitories while permanentaccommodation was built.

Under Phase II the USAF added an extrataxiway, a new control tower, a 42,000-fthangar, a parts warehouse, a dining hall, awater storage tank, and extensive fuel storage

Below right: Tonopah'sgroundcrew used low-intensity 'wands' toguide the Stealth

!(>; fighters from theiranonymous corrugatedshelters, or 'canyons'.

Right: Access tosensitive areas of thesecret base atTonopah wascontrolled by palm-print scanners, withdifferent categories ofpersonnel allowed intodifferent areas of thebase, and wearingcolour-coded badges.

tanks. Phase III saw the runway furtherextended to 1 2,000 ft (a 2,000-ft increase),and further extensions were made to the ramfand taxiways. The runway gained arrestergear, and new navigation aids were installed.More fuel storage was provided, together witfLOX (Liquid Oxygen) storage, a fire stationand the first individual aircraft hangars toaccommodate the first 20 production aircraft.Permanent dormitories at last replaced themobile homes, which were relegated tostorage units until 1985, when all but onewere removed. The remaining Chevron traileiwas the TOCACL (Tonopah Officers' Club an<Chinese Laundry) which was equipped with ;bar, a big screen TV, pool and shuffleboardtables. By 1985 the pounding laundrymachines had been moved elsewhere, andthe trailer was given a much needed facelift

Above: Tonopah wasexpanded dramatically toaccomodate the F-117Aforce as it built up tobecome a Wing-strengthunit. The runway is alignedroughly South-East/North-West (300° and 120").

and improvement program of its own, butremained the after-duty hangout for the BlackJet pilots.

The airfield improvement program wascompleted in July 1982. The revitalization ofthe Tonopah Test Range was kept completelysecret, and the money spent was carefullyhidden in the defense budget.

Below: A Tonopah-based F-117A brieflyenters a pool of light as it passes throughdouble gates in the floodlit and heavilyguarded security fences, separating thecentral area of the base from therunway.

F- I I 7A

MYSTERY CORSAIR SQUADRON

It was inevitable that an entirely new unit would be formed tooperate the new aircraft, since to take the identity of an existingFighter Wing would have generated unwelcome questions. "Whathappened to the 4th TFW?" "What is this wing-sized unit atTonopah?". Additionally, the new unit did not need an obviousfrontline combat identity, a secondline test-unit designation fitting infar better with a number of possible cover stories.

Thus the USAF formed the 4450th Test Groupon 15 October 1979, under the pretence thatthe new unit was an A-7 equipped unitoperating in the avionics test role. It wasnominally based at Nellis AFB, Nevada,where its A-7 aircraft were occasionally seen,though in reality, the unit conducted most ofits operations from Tonopah. Although theexistence of the 4450th Test Group was not initself a secret, the USAF often used themeaningless designation A-Unit to furtherhide the operation. The Group's constituentunits were originally simply numbereddetachments of the 4450th TG, but they soonbecame numbered squadrons (flying andground-based) and had similar, randomlyallocated alphabetical alternative designationsbetween B-Unit and Z-Unit.

The unit's A-7Ds were used as a cover for

Left: As far as everyoneoutside the Senior Trendprogramme wasconcerned, the 4450thTactical Group was a testand trials unit, nominallybased at Nellis AFB, andequipped solely with thevenerable A-7 Corsair.Known as the SWF(Short Little Ugly F*****;the A-7 was the epitomeof aeronautical beauty bycomparison with theangular F-117A. Used fortraining, liaison anddisinformation, the A-7swere able to visitpotential operatinglocations by day.Significantly theseincluded airfields in theUK, South Korea andJapan.

the F-11 7As, to maintain flight currencybefore the F-11 7As were delivered, andbefore the unit had built up to full strength.The A-7D was also a useful trainer for the F-117 itself, with similar performancecharacteristics. In particular, prospective F-117A pilots practiced flapless landings in theA-7, to prepare themselves for the high-speedflat approach of the F-117. The aircraft wereeven used for miscellaneous test duties,including chase for SLCM firings. A-7 flightoperations began in June 1981, by whichtime Britain's Prime Minister and some seniorRAF officers were being kept fully appraisedof the program's progress, in preparation forRAF participation and for the use of Britishairfields as forward operating bases. Some A-7s operated from Tonopah from thebeginning, and care was taken to leave themoutside the hangars, so that prowling satellite;could see that Tonopah operated nothingmore exciting than some clapped-outCorsairs. These aircraft were nominally basedat Nellis AFB, but wore unique LV (for LasVegas) tailcodes. There is no suggestion thatthis code was ever applied to the F-11 7As,which remained very anonymous-looking

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

until after they emerged from the black world.The 4450th Tactical Group's A-7D Corsair Ms

were used to conduct limited operations frompotential operating locations, to familiarizepilots with bases they might eventually have touse 'for real'. In some cases, the A-7's 'role'was 'leaked'; this 'secret' cover story being thatthe aircraft were testing atomic anti-radardevices. The aircraft often carried black-

painted modified napalm canisters, these beingfitted with a red warning light, a radiationwarning notice and an ominous-looking portlabelled 'reactor cooling filler port'. When A-7Ds equipped with these pods visited Korea,USAF policemen closed the base, surroundingit with machine-gun-armed jeeps, and forcinggroundcrew to lie face down on the ramp asthe mystery A-7s taxied by.

Above: A 4450th TGpilot walks out to his F-117A at Tonopah as duskfalls. Missions wereroutinely carried outfrom inside the aircraftshelters, and not from aflightline, except for thecamera!

F- I I 7A

PILOT CONVERSIONWith an aircraft, a base and an operating unit designation, all thatwas missing was personnel. Since no-one knew about the program,there was no way of attracting volunteers, yet clearly the aircraftwould demand the most highly motivated maintenance personneland pilots. When it came to pilots, the new unit required tacticalfighter pilots with sufficient experience and maturity to be able toadapt to the new aircraft, its unusual role, and the unique need forcomplete confidentiality. Most came from the F-4, F-111 and A-10communities initially. Potential pilots for the program, withoutstanding records and at least 1,000 hours of fighter time, werecarefully screened and those who looked promising were askedwhether they were interested in a job which would involve 'a greatdeal of A-7 flying' but without specifying what or where that jobwas. They were expected to make their decision within five minutes!

Below: Pilots for the F-117A trained with the417th TFTS, previouslyknown as Z-Unit andthen as the 4453rd TES.With no dual-controlledtrainer, F-117A pilotsrelied on groundschooland simulator training toprepare them for theirfirst flight.

Potential squadron commanders andcandidates for other senior flyingappointments were even more carefullyscreened. Every effort was made to appoint'fast-track' high-fliers (known as 'Fast Burners'within the USAF) who were on their way tothe very top, to General rank at least. This, itwas felt, would deliver two key advantages.First, the USAF would soon have a spectrumof senior officers who knew about and

understood the F-117A, and who could thusmake proper use of the force. Second, the F-117A would have some powerful andinfluential friends.

As more pilots joined the program, theselection procedure changed slightly, withStealth pilots themselves being asked torecommend their own acquaintances for theprogram. After selection, pilots were sent tothe Arizona Air National Guard's 162nd TFGfor conversion to the A-7D. Even after the4450th started receiving its F-117As(beginning with 80-0787 on 23 August 1982),pilots could expect to fly the A-7 nearly asoften as they flew the F-117A, and thisremained true for several years. When theyarrived at Nellis AFB, new personnel for the4450th were shown into a secure lecturetheatre, where they were shown a brief silentfilm, in which the extraordinary F-11 7A wasseen emerging from a hangar, taxying to therunway and taking off. This is what you guyswill be working on", the briefing officerwould say; and - to the pilots - "This is whatyou guys will be flying". At this point, the

SECRET STRIKE FORCE

suppliers, security policemen and otherindirectly involved personnel would beushered from the room, while pilots andmaintainers were shown a second, moredetailed, film with an informative soundtrack.

Before the F-117A actually entered servicewith the 4450th, pilots underwent groundschool with Lockheed at Burbank, and werethen rotated through the flight test facility atGroom Lake between 1981 and 1982 wherethey were briefed by Lockheed's test pilots,and where they could sit in the cockpit, andhave the sensors and systems demonstrated.The first Senior Trend arrived at Tonopah on23 August 1982, and the first flight by a TAGpilot was made on 1 5 October 1982. (Thepilot was Major Alton C.Whitley, commanderof the Tonopah-based Detachment 1 whilethe rest of the 4450th TG remained at Nell is,and subsequently commander of the 4452ndTS (Q-Unit), the 'Goat Suckers'). Whitleyreceived a commemorative plaque 'InRecognition of a Significant Event, October15 1982'. He could not tell his wife what thatevent was for eight years!

The first F-11 7As were delivered to Q-Unit,which became the 4452nd TS ('GoatSuckers') in September 1982. Later in theyear, l-Unit (already designated as the 4450thTS, 'Nightstalkers') started to receive F-117s.A-7s were assigned primarily to the 4451 st TS(P-Unit, 'Ghostriders'). The 4453rd TES (Z-Unit, 'Grim Reapers') activated in October1985 and took over the training role. A finalunit was R-Unit, which never received anumerical squadron designation, but whichperformed acceptance testing and local areafamiliarization flying and which parented theflight test detachment of USAF test pilots atGroom Lake and at Tonopah.

The 4450th Test Group gained IOC (InitialOperating Capability) on 28 October 1983,with the delivery of its 14th F-117A. It passedits ORI (Operational Readiness Inspection) inOctober 1984. The second squadron gainedits IOC in the same year. There has neverbeen a twin-stick, two-seat Stealth Fighter,although Lockheed proposed building an F-117 trainer (which would probably havebecome the F-117B) using the hulk of the firstproduction F-117A, which had been writtenoff in a pre-delivery crash. This made pilotconversion a difficult enough process, evenwithout the further complication that allflights (even first flights) had to be made atnight. Fortunately, all F-117 pilots werealready experienced fast jet jockeys, and allhad converted to the A-7 from their previous

type. During their A-7 training, their ability tolearn and absorb information and techniquesquickly was quietly analyzed. Before flyingthe F-11 7A, the pilots would fly the F-15,whose landing characteristics were said to beextremely similar to those of the F-117 itself.

The first group of potential Black Jet pilotsbegan conversion with ten days of intensiveground school, this phase increasing steadilyuntil the textbook and chalkboard phaselasted for several weeks. This was followedby seven sorties in the fixed-base simulator,before the so-called 'Sortie 1' which consistedof two hours going through the checklists in apowered-up cockpit. 'Sortie 2' was closer to areal flight, consisting of a high-speed taxyrun, with a real brake chute deployment. Thiswas a vital skill to learn, since in a crosswindthe chute could become wrapped around atailfin, causing damage to the skin. Until theaircraft left the black world, the pilot's firstreal flight in the F-117A was made (like allother flights at Tonopah) at night. An A-7Dflew chase, and the pilot would get used tothe aircraft's handling, usually flying somegentle aerobatics before returning to Tonopahto shoot a couple of instrument approaches.The conversion course took some fivemonths, and included between 30 and 40flying hours. Certain operational techniquescould not be taught in the simulator, since thesimulator staff were not cleared to knowthem, and these had to be taught on thesquadrons themselves, in actual flights. Afterthe aircraft came out of the black worldconversion, training could be undertaken byday, and T-38 Talons replaced the Corsairs.On a first F-11 7A solo, the T-38 would takeoff first, flying a visual circuit and picking upthe Black Jet as it climbed out, slipping intothe eight o'clock position.

Above: When the F-117Aemerged from the blackworld, Northrop T-38Talons replaced Corsairsfor training and chaseduties. This aircraft ofthe 37th TFW wearsTonopah's TR (forTonopah test Range)tailcode, whereas today,the 49th FW's T-38s wearan HO code signifyingtheir base at HollomanAFB, New Mexico.

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UNDER COVER OF DARKNESSEarly operations at Tonopah were extremely restricted. AlthoughTonopah is extremely remote, and sparsely populated, there arepeople in the scattered mining town nearby, and to maintainabsolute security extraordinary measures had to be taken. For years,the F-117A never flew by daylight, and there was even a strictembargo on opening individual hangar doors before nightfall. If an F-117A did have to venture outside its hangar during daylight, thewhole area was secured, and reference was made to acomprehensive listing of satellite overflights. If there was theslightest risk of detection, the aircraft remained under cover. Anyaircraft flying near the airfield and its airspace was carefullyinvestigated, and even trucks on nearby public roads were monitoredand, if necessary, apprehended while the drivers were questioned.The base security personnel operated a fleet of UH-1N helicoptersand a wide range of vehicles. Crews undergoing Red Flag exercises atNellis were prohibited from going anywhere near Tonopah, and anywho broke the rules were given a very hard time indeed on landing.

Below: Suction reliefdoors in the roof of eachintake are open as thisF-117A prepares to taxyout from its Canyon atTonopah.

While there was no absolute prohibition ongoing into the town of Tonopah, such tripswere discouraged, and the process was madedeliberately difficult. The policy wassuccessful: few locals had any idea what wasgoing on at the airfield. Tonopah airfield itself

was an interesting location to operate from,and the F-11 7As of the 4450th TG reportedlyshared the base with a number of highlyclassified programs. For a brief period afterthe F-11 7A emerged from the black world andbegan flying daylight missions at Tonopah, itis said that F-117A pilots could findthemselves taxying out behind the MiG-21sand MiG-23s of the 4477th Test andEvaluation Squadron - a far cry from theLuftwaffe Phantoms and Tornados with whichthey share their current base at HollomanAFB, New Mexico.

The 4450th Tactical Group had an unusualand unenviable working week. The pilots(apart from a handful standing alert) spent theweekends with their families at Nellis AFB, orin the nearby towns in which they had theirhomes. They would fly out to Tonopahaboard the chartered Boeing 727 and 737airliners provided for the purpose, arriving atbetween 0800 and 0900. The 4450th TG alsooperated a Mitsubishi MU-2 for outsideairline-hours transport of small groups of

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personnel. Anybody on board one of theseflights was specially cleared, some visitors toTonopah in the early days arrived aboard UH-1 helicopters with blacked-out windows onone side, and were whisked from aircraft toops building in a blacked-out car. Mondaywould be a relatively easy day, however, withan early finish to the night flying. Every effortwas made to ensure that the last landing wasbefore midnight, even during the summermonths. Pilots would then fly moreintensively on Tuesday, Wednesday andThursday, returning to Nellis on the Friday.The separation from families during the week(which they were not allowed to explain) washard enough, but the change from a primarilynocturnal existence during the week to a'normal' existence at weekends wasreportedly shattering and made it difficult tosustain a normal family life. Some felt that theposting was a guaranteed divorce, but theUSAF soon stepped in to provide extra flightsurgeons (a high proportion of whom werereportedly psychiatrists and counsellors) andenforce regulations relating to time off, resthours and duty time.

F-117A pilots lived off-base, in a housingcompound seven miles from the center of theairfield facilities, far enough away for aircraftnoise not to be a problem to sleepingaircrew. Their accommodation had heavyblack-out curtains to allow them to getproper sleep even in daylight hours. The

Right: 'Use of Deadly Force is authorised' againstanyone who attempts to compromise the strictsecurity surrounding every F-117A in service.

compounds were linked only by a shuttle buswhich plied the single-track desert road byday and night. This ran almost arrow-straightto Tonopah airfield, with a gentle left handerthrown in mid-way to prevent the bus driverfrom falling asleep at the wheel. The buspulled up outside the central compound, andthere was no exception to the requirementthat every man should clear security, eachand every working day.

Above: Tonopah'scorrugated Canyons weremuch larger thanrequired for a singleF-117A, leading many towonder if they had beendesigned with a still-secret follow-on in mind,perhaps the much-rumoured 'Aurora'?

F- I I 7A

INSIDE THE COMPOUNDAt Tonopah, the central rectangular compound, which contained thehangars, operations building, maintenance area and ATC tower, wasbordered on all sides by double barbed-wire-topped fences. The gapbetween the fences was permanently floodlit, and was seeded withproximity and other sensors. The handful of entry points wereheavily guarded, and each was equipped with special turnstilesincorporating palm-print scanners. A palm is as unique to anindividual as a fingerprint, and comparing a print electronically witha recorded image is quicker than it would be to check papers, passesand documents manually. The scanner also allowed comparison ofthe relative sizes and orientation of an individual's fingers, furtheraiding differentiation between individuals. The palm-print scannersincorporated channels for the four outspread fingers of the righthand, with a projecting pin to be positioned between the second andthird fingers. This ensured that a given hand would always be placedon a scanner in the same way, aiding the recognition process. Thescanner unit incorporated a row of lights, the last two of which werea simple green (ACCESS) and a red (NO ACCESS). The only exitswithout turnstiles were the four to the east of the compound, leadingto the runway, which were manned by armed guards, and which hadmassive sliding double steel gates across access taxiways.

Within the compound, personnel woreprominent 'line badges' indicating how farthey were cleared into the program. A whitesquare, for example, indicated that its wearercould see the F-117A, but could not touch it;while the green square, worn by crew chiefsand maintainers, indicated that the wearercould work on the aircraft, had a broadunderstanding of the aircraft's role andcapabilities and understood some of itssystems. Most pilots wore a black square,indicating that they had been briefed on the'no-kidding' radar cross section (still a highlyclassified figure), though some had a highercategory (details of the badge relating to thisare, you've guessed it, still classified). Theseofficers, who tended to be weaponsinstructors and senior guys involved in thedevelopment of tactics had a broader-basedknowledge of the aircraft's exact capabilities,and may have been the only pilots cleared tostand alert.

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Above: The 37th FighterWing lost its Tacticalprefix on 1 October1991, when TACdisbanded and itsfunctions were takenover by the new AirCombat Command. ThisF-117A is pictured in itsnew markings atTonopah during early1992, before the move toHolloman.

Left: 'Chocks away!' Infront of the aircraft, themarshaller stands readyto uncross his hands tosignal 'Brakes off', oncethe groundcrew areclear, and the pilot isready to taxy. For manyyears, hangar doorsremained firmly closedduring daylight hours,with complex rules andregulations as to howlong after sunset doorscould be opened, whenaircraft could taxy, andwhen they could fly.

Right: When working onthe F-117A groundcrewwore protectiveoverboots to preventdamage to the RAM skin.

F- I I 7A

46SOME DAY THEY'LL KNOW 99A typical working day might begin at 1500 for a pilot assigned asmission planner on a given day. Having risen at noon, and perhapsspent an hour running or in the gym, the planner might have eaten anormal lunch before having an hour or two free. Arriving in thewindowless operations building, he would pick targets and routesand nominate a realistic scenario. Normally all of the pilots flying ona particular 'wave' would fly the same route and the same mission,or one of two missions, usually simulating the same scenario. Asimple navigation exercise culminating in a simulated attack on aparticular dock in a Marine on Lake Tahoe, for instance, might haveto be flown as though it were a strike against a target in Teheran,with all the implications that had on likely defenses, target weatherconditions and the like. Often, every turn-point included a target tobe located, identified, and locked onto with the IRADS. Workingbackwards, the planner would deconflict routes and launch times,and would then plan them in detail, preparing the tapes which thepilots would program into their computers.

Below: The aim of the F-117A's designers was toproduce a shape whichwould present no surfaceat right angles to enemyradars. They achievedthis through faceting.

The chow truck (like an ice cream van, butserving hot food) would come round between1700 and 1800, allowing the planner tosnatch a quick bite to eat, while pilotsscheduled to fly would start to arrive. Somewould sit in the ready room, with its massive

wall-slogan 'Someday they'll know', whileothers would go to the vault in which flightmanuals were kept, perhaps to learn or reviseemergency procedures, perhaps just to beable to get the required 'tick in the box' forhaving read the Flight Manual that month.Such work was much more difficult in the F-11 7 A community since pilots could not keeptheir own flight manual. The books were notallowed out of the vault, and even in thevault the manual had to be physically in thepossession of the officer who'd signed it out.If he had to take a phone call, or go to thetoilet, he'd first have to sign the manual backin, see it locked away, then return and gothrough the whole rigmarole again. At 1830the planner would supervize a mass brief,outlining the mission, routes, required timeson target, and giving actual en-route weatherand a time back. The briefing would alsoinclude the simulated weather for thesimulated target area, giving actual weatherconditions for Teheran and its environs in ourexample. A simple brief might last only 20minutes, but between 30 and 40 minutes wasmore normal.

Following the brief, pilots would not needto flight-plan their route formally, since theywould already have a tape with the turnpoints

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and timings provided by the planner. Theywould inevitably want to check this, however,and would want time to study their route andany target intelligence (for the actual target ortargets they would be finding that night, andfor the simulated Teheran target, in case ofawkward questions during the debrief). Theywould also need to make careful notes as totheir call sign, and any radio frequencies theywould be using. One last-minute checkbefore leaving operations was to ensure thatthe pilot was carrying a letter from theTACDO (a two- or three-star General)addressed to whom it may concern for use inthe event of an unscheduled diversion andenjoining any base commander to do as hewas told by the pilot carrying the letter! It isnot known whether such letters were everused 'in anger'.

With preparations complete, the first wavepilots would be driven to the individualhangars accommodating their assignedaircraft. At Tonopah the hangars werearranged in blocks of six, six, nine and six perrow, in two close parallel rows. Those closestto the runway bore odd numbers, from 1 to53, while those in the rear row were even-numbered, from 2 to 54. The first 24 hangarsdiffered slightly from the next 18, havingvents on their roofs and with concertina-typedoors. These differed from the first batch of

shelters in having sliding panel doors in eightsections, and themselves differed from the last12 hangars. The overall effect was one ofuniformity, however. All were constructedfrom corrugated steel sheet, and all werepainted in a pale sandy color, with anidentical black number board on the left handedge of each door. All had identical cleanwhite floors with neatly painted taxiguidelines, and a parking point (with fulllatitude and longitude) indicated to allowabsolute precision when aligning the INS.

Above: The DLIR sensorcan be seen below thenearest of these two F-117'As, to the right of thenosewheel, ahead of thered anti-collision light.

Below: The SandiaNational Laboratoriesairstrip at Tonopah wastransformed into amodern air base for theF-117, in utter secrecy.

F- I I 7A

TAKE OFF

Arriving at the correct shelter, the F-117 A pilot entered through asmall personnel door, going into the hangar through a small unlitannexe. This meant that no light showed when the small door wasopened. The main hangar doors remained firmly shut until officialtwilight (half an hour after official sunset), with official twilight,sunset, and moonrise charts being consulted to determine the time atwhich doors could be opened. Some reports suggest that thisprohibition was backed up by the use of a sensor which could detectwhen no direct sunlight was hitting the unit. This was used toconfirm the official sunset time. In addition to these precautions, itwas ruled that from two hours after sunset until two hours beforesunrise, the hangar lights had to be turned off whenever the doorswere opened, however briefly.

Above: The pilot of theF-117A has his view ofthe outside worldseverely constrained bythe heavily-framedcanopy. The pilot of thisStealth Fighter wears theinsignia of the 57thFighter Wing on hisshoulder. This Nellis-based unit conductsweapons, and tacticstraining anddevelopment andincorporates a 2-3aircraft F-117A element.

The first wave might typically begin to takeoff at 2100, and all 12 aircraft would havedeparted by 2300. With a typical 90-minutesortie time, the aircraft would land between2230 and 0030 and a second wave wouldtake off from 0000 to 0100, landing between0130 and 0230. Within about 35 minutes oflanding, the F-11 7 A pilot would be back inthe Operations Building, ready to debrief.

Although Tonopah had a small controltower, it was not too hard-worked. Evenwhen F-117As going off range communicatedwith other agencies pretending to be A-7Ds,they usually operated 'radio silent' at Tonopahitself. The most important role for Tonopah's

air-traffic controllers was to monitor theairspace surrounding the base for intruders!

The planner would be among the last toleave after the last aircraft had landed, sincehe would also act as a flying supervisor andmight be required to debrief the returningpilots, going over their tapes with thesquadron's weapons officer. On Thursdays,everyone would tend to retire to the TOCACLafter the end of flying, to have a beer andwatch the sun-up, before returning to theaccommodation annex to get ready for theKey Airlines flight back to Nellis. OnMondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, (withflying the next night) pilots might also have abeer at the TOCACL, but were far morecareful to get back to their beds before thesun rose. During the week, Tonopah wasoften likened to a Vampire Convention, withpersonnel rushing to hide themselves beforethey could be touched by the sun's rays. Thiswas an essential precaution, since the humanmind will not allow the body to rest properlyonce it has seen daylight, 'knowing' that itshould be active. The Tonopah working weekwas hard enough, without risking disruptedsleep patterns.

Black Jet pilots typically logged betweenten and twelve F-117A flights per month, with

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five or six further missions in the A-7.Virtually all flight time was spent practicingrealistic operational profiles, though therewas little opportunity for the dropping of liveordnance, since few ranges were active atnight and use of the laser 'off-range' wasprohibited. On the rare occasions that liveordnance was dropped, the 4450th made useof the same 'broadband, wide-spectrum,inexpensive, expendable point-source target'invented by the flight test team at GroomLake - a barrel filled with glowing charcoal!In-flight refuelling was a vital element inBlack Jet operations, and was thereforepracticed more often, with each pilot able topractice refuelling once a week. Weather hada disproportionate effect on F-11 7 Aoperations, with snow or a full moonpreventing the aircraft from flying 'off-range'at all, and with even 50% moonlight closingmany of the approved 'off-range' trainingroutes. The risk of hail (which would havedamaged the aircraft's RAM) was enough tokeep aircraft firmly under cover. In the veryearliest days, weather had an even greatereffect, since early aircraft had unheatedpilots, so were prohibited from flying incloud, or when icing was predicted.

Left: A pair of F-117Astaxy out at Tonopah. Theaircraft's flattened, shell-like fuselage andprimarily nocturnalhabits led some to applythe unflatteringnickname 'Cockroach'.The F-117A provedsimilarly elusive, but verymuch more deadly. TheF-117A normallyoperates alone, andformation sorties (evenby as few as two aircraft)are exceptionally rare.

Below: One F-117A takesoff from Tonopah asanother sits on Tonopah'staxyway. The StealthFighter's take offperformance is adequate,though withoutafterburner, it is neverspectacular. The basic F-117A carries only arelatively small pay load,a pair of 2,000 Ib LGBs,or less.

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ON THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS

Once sufficient aircraft were available, some 12 F-117As weremaintained on standby, ready for any mission ordered by thePresident. Two aircraft were ready to go at a mere two hours' notice.But while the aircraft were ready to undertake any mission, the orderto go was never given. Twice aircraft were armed for strikes andpilots were briefed, but on each occasion the missions werescrubbed before takeoff.

Above: An F-117A overone of the aircraft's mostfrequent training targets,Lake Tahoe. Marinas andeven individual boatspresented difficulttargets, with littledifference in IR signatureto the surrounding water.No.802 was the 18thproduction F-117A, andwas named 'Black Magic'during the Gulf War.

During October 1983 F-11 7's wereconsidered for use in support of the USinvasion of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury)but were judged not ready according tosome reports. During the same monthseveral F-11 7As (variously reported as five,seven or ten) had their INS equipment fullyaligned ready for a strike against PLO targetsin the Lebanon. It was planned that theaircraft would fly to Myrtle Beach, wherethey would land and refuel, and where thepilots would have a face-to-face brief withtheir tanker crews and the pilots of 'othersupport aircraft'. Four aircraft (plus air

spares) would then have flown direct to thetarget. The mission was cancelled only 45minutes before the planned takeoff. It hasalso been reported that another operationalmission was planned in 1983 by Lt ColOliver North. This would have reportedlyinvolved a strike against Colonel Gaddafi byF-117As operating from Rota in Spain. On1 5 April 1986 an unknown number of F-117As were readied for participation inOperation El Dorado Canyon, the retaliatorystrike against Colonel Gaddafi followingLibyan military actions against US Navyships in the Gulf of Sidra and Libyan-sponsored terrorist outrages against UStargets. In the event, the mission was notregarded as being important enough to riskcompromising the F-11 7A, and their takeoffwas cancelled one hour before it was due totake place. The raid was flown by carrier-borne strike aircraft and UK-based F-111Fs.

Although F-117As did not undertakeoperational bombing missions before'coming out of the black' there is plenty ofcircumstantial evidence to suggest that theymay have deployed to overseas OLs(Operating Locations). There werewidespread reports that British enthusiastsheard an aircraft declare an emergency anddivert to RAF Lakenheath, where the roadsround the base were rapidly closed by USAFpolicemen just before a 'strange sounding'machine landed. This was apparently putstraight into a shelter, departing some nightslater, when roads were again closed. Otherreports suggested that the aircraft operatedfrom Alconbury, Sculthorpe and Wethersfield(all RAF stations accommodating USAFunits) and Binbrook, an RAF fighter station.The Binbrook 'rumor' was more detailedthan most, with suggestions that the F-117Awould take off in close formation with abased Lightning (which would explain night-time aircraft noise and provide a radar blip)before flying off on a representative sortieprofile along (or even just over) the IronCurtain, testing the aircraft against the latestSoviet air-defense systems. The inclusion ofan RAF exchange officer in the programgave credence to these rumors, since RAFofficers in the U-2 (and possibly in the SR-71 and RB-69 programs) won their places asreciprocation for the use of British bases. Inthe case of the U-2, RAF and CIA pilotsmade the crucial overflights of the USSR,which USAF U-2 pilots were not permittedto fly.

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Above inset: The red-outline on the rearunderfuselage of the F-117A surrounds the bayfor the arrester hook,which has to bedeployed explosively, andis an 'emergency only'piece of kit.

Right: An unusual side-onview showing typicaltoned down markings,with a simple three-digitserial, the TAC badge(until 1981) and a wingbadge on the intakes.

An F-117A cruises overhigh clouds. Even in theinvisible-to-radar F-117,the wise pilot wouldavoid flying immediatelyabove or belowunbroken cloud, againstwhich he might besilhouetted.

F- I I 7A

FRONTLINE SERVICESTEALTHPUBLIC

GOESBelow: A Tonopah-basedStealth Fighter flies overthe Half Dome inYosemite National Park.Daylight flights werevirtually unheard ofduring the early days ofthe programme.

By 1988, the F-1 17A's Black status wasseriously restricting operations. Moreserious than the inability to fly by day wasthe impracticality of operating alongsideother units (since to do so would havecompromised security). Even in-flightrefuelling was difficult, since only a handfulof tanker crews from two refuelling wings(at March and Beale) were let into thesecret and cleared to refuel the StealthFighter. Moreover, rumors of strangeaircraft flying in Nevada were growingstronger.

The F-11 7 A finally 'came out of the closet'on 10 November 1988, when the Pentagonreleased a single, heavily distorted,retouched, and electronically alteredphotograph. Lockheed joined in the fun byreleasing a piece of artwork based on thephoto, in which the facets were moreapparent (though completely altered inalignment) and with a tiny pilot in thecockpit which made the aircraft look B-52sized! This allowed a change in operatingprocedures, including limited daylight flyingand participation in exercises. The possibilityof daylight operations had an immediateeffect on the training and conversion process,meaning that F-11 7 A pilots no longer had to

FRONTLINE SERVICE

Above: Release of asingle distortedphotograph allowed the4450th to begin daylightoperations, but it was 17months before the typewas publicly unveiled atNellis, on 21 April 1990.

Below: The 4450thTactical Group becamethe 37th TFW in 1989.

make their first flight in the aircraft indarkness. The ageing A-7s were replaced inthe chase role by cheaper-to-operate T-38sfrom January 1989, the latter being assignedto the 4453rd TS, while the A-7-equipped4451st TS ran down. The 4452nd TSinactivated on 30 May 1989, while the R-Unit inactivated the same day, continuing tooperate at Tonopah as an undesignatedsubordinate of the 6510th Test Wing. Morephotos of the aircraft (taken by intrepid

photographers who trekked out into thedesert) soon emerged. These revealed manynew features, among which was the adoptionof unit markings by the Black Jets. Beforetheir existence was revealed, the aircraft flewwith a three-digit serial on the tailfin, and alow conspicuity rendition of the Tactical AirCommand badge on the fin tips. Someaircraft also had a 4450th TG crest on theengine intakes. Now the aircraft hadprominent white 'TR' tailcodes, and Groupand Squadron markings became morecommon.

On 5 October 1989, the unit took a furtherstep into the 'normal' world, when it adoptedthe designation and traditions of the 37thTFW, an F-4G Phantom Wild Weasel wing,which had just disbanded at George AFB. There-designated Stealth unit remained atTonopah, however. The 4450th's survivingthree squadrons were redesignated, with the4450th TS becoming the 41 5th TFS, retainingits 'Nightstalkers' name and badge. The4451st TS (hitherto an A-7 unit) gained F-117As and a new designation as the 416thTFS, 'Ghostriders'. The 4453rd TES becamethe 41 7th TFTS (Tactical Fighter TrainingSquadron) 'Bandits'.

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TARGET PANAMA

On 19 December 1989, the 37th TFW finally took the F-117A intoaction for the first time. Six F-117As took off to attack two sets oftargets in Panama during the US operation to topple Noriega. Two ofthe aircraft turned back when the attack on their targets wascancelled (they had been assigned to support special operationsforces who hoped to capture Noriega himself, and the mission wascancelled when it became clear that he could not be located). Twomore aircraft flew only as air spares. The final two aircraft attackedbarrack buildings near Rio Hato, with the stated aim of droppingbombs near enough to stun and disable the defenders, but withouteither destroying the buildings or causing major casualties.

Above: Six F-117As tookoff from Tonopah toparticipate in 'JustCause', the operation totopple Panama's dictatorNoriega.

Below: Three F-117Aslined up outside Canyons1, 3, and 5 at Tonopah.

This unusual mission was intended tominimize casualties among parachute-landingUS troops from the 2nd and 3rd RangerBattalions. Unfortunately, a last minute changeof plan led to the lead pilot dropping hissingle GBU-27 bomb where the secondaircraft should have aimed (while also failingto compensate for the wind), while the secondpilot's aim point was an unspecified point aset distance and bearing from the first aircraft's

bomb. Once the first bomb went awry, thesecond was bound to be even further off-target.

Instead of generously missing two barrackbuildings the two CBU-27s narrowly missed athird barracks, generating a fireball whichgutted it and destroyed an empty cantina. Theaccuracy of the bombs was further hamperedby the poor performance of the F-11 7A'sIRADS sensor, which was hampered by thehumidity and vegetation in the target area,which lowered contrast to a barely acceptablelevel. There were those who questionedwhether an F-117A was strictly necessary inorder to guarantee a hit on an empty field (letalone to miss its target within that field!), andthere were criticisms that the raid had been'unnecessary show-biz' designed primarily towin funding for the program. Others felt thatthe use of the F-117A had been justified bythe need for bombing accuracy, and by thedesire to minimize collateral damage. The

FRONTLINE SERVICE / PANAMA

truth is probably that the aircraft had to beused in Panama, mainly so that Congresscould actually see some return from the BlackProgram which they had unwittingly beenfunding for so long, but which they now knewabout.

At the end of the day, however, the F-11 7 A

mission was judged a success by the'customer', and the Rangers' commanderjudged that the aircraft's bombs did causeconfusion among the defenders, and did savelives on both sides. Fortunately, the F-117A'snext combat experience was altogether moresuccessful.

Above: The pilot of theF-117Ahasa vital ifunglamorous role, for heis the unseen assassin,using the cover of nightto attack his targetundetected.

F- I I 7A

BLACK JETIN THE GULF

Above: On 19 August1990, en route to theGulf, the 22 F-117'As ofthe 415th TFS (includingfour spares) made arefuelling stop at LangleyAFB, Virginia, where thepilots grabbed a night'srest before crossing theAtlantic and flying on to'Tonopah East', a newlyrebuilt and modernisedairbase near KhamisMushayt in Saudi Arabia.

When Saddam Hussein invaded neighboringKuwait, the international community wasremarkably unanimous in its condemnationof his actions. Even more remarkably, theUSA was able to organize a relatively largecoalition of countries prepared to usemilitary force, initially to try to intimidatethe Iraqis to withdraw, and later to actuallyforce them out of Kuwait. It was clear that astraightforward direct attack on Iraqi forcesin Kuwait was not the best way of achievingthe coalition's aims, since such an attackcould have resulted in massive casualtiesamong the Iraqis in their prepared defensivepositions, and might have wreaked terribledestruction on Kuwait itself. It was felt that aheavy but limited blow against Iraq's militarymachine and command infrastructure couldprevent the reinforcement of the forces inKuwait. This strategy would also allow atargeted offensive, preventing Iraq fromcontinuing its occupation and resisting alliedoperations, while simultaneously destroyingthe will to fight.

But the coalition was a fragile one, and itwas apparent from the start that every effortwould have to be made to keep casualties onboth sides very low, and to minimizecollateral damage. Seeing US servicemenbeing brought home in body bags wouldhave rapidly wiped out public support for theoperation. It was clear that any militarycampaign would have to be limited induration and extent, to avoid claims that thewar was being fought for control of oil in theregion, and not simply to right a wrong. Tohave killed large numbers of enemy civilians,or to have destroyed a religious buildingwould have handed Saddam Hussein victoryin the propaganda war, and might have madeit difficult to keep some Arab members of thecoalition 'on board'.

These unusual requirements dictated thatthe military campaign to oust Iraqi forcesfrom Kuwait would have to be undertakenwith speed and with surgical precision.General Chuck Horner's plan envisaged thedestruction of 84 key targets in the first week

FRONTLINE SERVICE /THE GULF

Above: The 415th TFS lined up atLangley AFB, the largest gatheringofF-117As ever seen outsideTonopah, and perhaps the largestnumber ever seen in the open, onthe ground, at once.

Right: ColonelAl Whiteley, COof the 37th TFWduringOperationDesert Storm.

of air operations - a highly ambitious aim. Itwas obvious that the F-117 A would be anextremely useful tool in any such campaign,since it offered the potential ability to tear outthe eyes, ears and heart of Iraq's militarymachine. Accordingly, the USAF deployedthe 415th TFS to Khamis Mushayt in SaudiArabia, 900 miles from Baghdad (as the crow,but not the military airplane, flies). Thedeployment began at 0645 on 19 August,when three cells of twelve KC-135s took offfrom Beale AFB, California. At 0800 the 22 F-11 7As joined the tankers and flew on toLangley AFB, Virginia, refuelling three timeson the way. The Black Jets night-stopped atLangley, while the KC-135As flew on to SaudiArabia, waiting only for three aircraft whichhad landed at Pittsburgh after heavycrosswinds forced a refuelling stop. The nextday, the F-117As flew to Saudi Arabiathemselves, accompanied by KC-10AExtenders from March AFB. This non-stopflight took 15 hours, and was a severe test ofthe endurance of aircraft and aircrew alike.

F- I I 7A

TONOPAH EASTThe Saudi airfield had many parallels with the F-117's home base,located in a similar desert and at a similar elevation (6,776 ft forKhamis, 5,500 ft for Tonopah). When they arrived, the Black Jetsoccupied brand-new shelters very similar to those they had leftbehind in Nevada, but each accommodating eight aircraft in fourbays, parked nose to tail. The front aircraft would be towed outsideto start, but the second could start up within the canyon itself. Theshelters were fully hardened and were serviced by revetted taxiways.The quality of the facilities was hardly surprising, since the base hadbeen rebuilt by the USA during the early 1980s, with extra shelterareas provided to support deployments by USAF units. The sheltersused by the 415th ITS actually still had seals on their doors.Inevitably, the Saudi base came to be nicknamed 'Tonopah East'.

Far right: The sheltersand taxyways at Kingkh.ilid air base, KhamisMushayt, were wellprotected against airattack, with reinforcedconcrete covered andcamouflaged with rocks,and with plentifulrevetments. The shelterareas were far more likereal canyons than the so-called Canyons atTonopah.

Below: Two of the 42 F-777,4s deployed toKhamis Mushayt beingprepared for a missionoutside their shelters.Late in the war it wasapparent that the risk ofair attack by Iraq wasnegligible, and aircraftoccasionally operatedfrom flightlines.

If anything, the F-117 pilots actually enjoyedbetter facilities at Khamis than they had atTonopah. They slept, four to a room, inbedrooms attached to the shelters, each ofwhich had a massive generator, with facilitiesfor over-pressurization in the event of NBC(Nuclear, Chemical or Biological)contamination outside.

The F-11 7As were operational by 26August, and the unit began intensive training,until the process of briefing, starting andflying to the tanker drop-off point was secondnature to every pilot. The unit also got itslogistics and maintenance organization upand running very quickly. Having deployedwith extra spares in the shape of warreadiness spares kits, a repair program foravionics units was instituted while thesquadron's avionics maintenance vans werestill en route to the Gulf. Aircraft were alsocannibalized for spares when necessary,resulting in a readiness and serviceability ratewhich was actually higher than was normalback home at Tonopah.

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

F- I I 7A

TARGET BAGHDAD

Following a September 1990 visit to the F-117A force at KhamisMushayt, the air-force Chief of Staff General Dugan opined that theair campaign's "cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad", andhinted that Saddam himself would be a key target. This was anextremely accurate prophecy, but to admit that the enemy leaderwould be personally targeted was unacceptable, and earned Dugan asummary dismissal. The capabilities and effectiveness of Iraq's air-defense system were consistently overestimated during OperationDesert Shield, and no-one seemed able to predict the level ofdislocation that would be caused by first night strikes against it.

Left and below left: DLIR imagery of targets attackedby F-117As in the Gulf. Once the cross-hairs werecentred on a target, the mission objective wasachieved, or so it seemed. In fact, the F-117A wasvulnerable to the effects of low cloud and smoke, andrequired clear weather over the target to operate.

The US Studies and Analysis Agencyproduced detailed computer models based onGeneral Chuck Horner's plan for thecampaign, and these showed that non-stealthy warplanes would suffer unacceptablyhigh losses if they attempted to hit targets inthe Iraqi capital, and even predicted thatnumerous F-117As would be shot downbefore they reached their targets. This was aserious finding, and prompted thedevelopment of complex plans for thebombing of F-11 7A wreckage if any aircrafthad been downed. This was felt to be the bestway of ensuring that the aircraft's secretswould not be compromised. Some urged thedevelopment and incorporation of 'self-destruct' systems similar to those developedfor the U-2, for activation by the pilot onejection, but this was not felt to be practicalor desirable. But if the F-117A was felt to bevulnerable to hostile defenses, it wasconsiderably less vulnerable than any othertype, and it was allocated the most importanttargets. Within a month of Dugan's outburst itwas confirmed that the F-11 7A andunmanned cruise missiles would be the onlyweapons used against Baghdad itself.

Half of the problem was that the verysecrecy which had kept the F-11 7'scapabilities hidden from potential enemieshad meant that its own commanders knewtoo little about the aircraft and how it couldbe best used. The Desert Storm aircommander, General Chuck Horner, wasinitially apprehensive as to how the aircraftmight shape up in combat. "We had a lot oftechnical data, but I had no way of knowingthat we would not lose the whole (F-11 7) fleetthat first night of the war. We were bettingeverything on the data proving thetechnology - but we had no real experiencewith the airplane to know for certain howwell it performed under fire. We sent thoseboys in naked and all alone. As it turned out,the data was right on the mark. But weshould've known that before the first attack."In Horner the USAF had a gutsy commanderprepared to take the risk.

In early November, the USAF decided todeploy a second F-11 7A unit (the 416th TFS)

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

to Saudi Arabia, as it became increasinglyclear that Saddam would not be backingdown. The Ghostriders finally arrived intheatre on 4 December 1990, leaving only askeleton training force at Tonopah under the41 7th TFS. As the role to be played by theBlack Jet increased, support assets increasedproportionately. Initially, the KC-135s fromBeale AFB were assigned as the F-117A's in-theatre tankers, but these were joined by theKC-1 35Rs from the AFRes tanker unit atGrissom AFB, Indiana.

On 1 6/1 7 January 1991, the first night ofDesert Storm, the 41 5th and 41 6th TFSlaunched two waves of F-11 7As againstBaghdad. The first was led by the 41 Sth's CO,Lt. Col. Ralph Getchell, while Al Whitley, COof the 37th and de facto detachmentcommander, led the second. The enemy AAAbarrage over Baghdad was incrediblyspectacular, while SAMs were being fired inhuge numbers. Many of the F-11 7A pilotsflying over Baghdad that night were quiteconvinced that their number was up, andmore than one dreaded returning to KhamisMushayt as the sole survivor of the evening'seffort, so convinced were they that no-onecould survive in the maelstrom of fire. Of 65F-117A pilots deployed, only four had anycombat experience, and one of them hadonly one combat mission to his credit. Eventhe old hands, including Wing CommanderColonel Alton Whitley, who had flowncombat missions over Vietnam, found theintensity of the Iraqi flak quite incredible. Butwhile the barrage of AAA looked impressive,it was entirely blind, and was ineffectual. Notone F-11 7A was hit on that or any othernight. Nor did the barrage force the F-11 7Asto drop their bombs wildly or inaccurately,which was its primary purpose. But the pilotswere not to know any of that. After the warGetchell affected a studied nonchalance:"Most of the guys figured that since we'dalready been in Saudi Arabia for six months,and in the air for a little over two hours, itwould be kind of foolish to turn around andgo back, so we went ahead." This wasactually heroism of the highest order (sincemost pilots admitted to fear, which theyovercame), and it must have felt like flyinginto the dragon's jaws. The list of targets hitby the Black Jets during their first night ofoperations is quite frightening.

The first wave of Black Jet targets hit inBaghdad included the 370-ft Al Quarkcommunications relay tower (attacked byCapt.Marcel Kerdavid, who won the SilverStar for this attack and his subsequent attack

on the National Command Alternate Bunkerat North Tajii), the Al Karak main telephoneexchange, colloquially known as the AT&Tbuilding (Captain Paul Dolson), the Iraqi air-defense headquarters (Captain MarkLindstrom), and the National Air DefenseOperations Center (Lt.Col. Ralph Getchell).Moments later, more F-117As attacked. MajorJerry Leatherman, for example, aimed twoGBU-1 Os through the hole in the roof of theAT&T building punched by Dolson's GBU-27A/B penetrator. Lee Gustin wrecked thepresidential palace east of Baghdad's airport.Pilots who still carried a bomb went on toattack other targets, with Kerdavid attackingthe National Command alternate bunker atNorth Tajii, with little apparent effect. Thesame target was attacked twice more by F-117As, then was finally taken out by F-111 Fslater in the war, using specially developedbunker-busting bombs.

Above: Stress is clearlyetched in the face of thisF-117A pilot. In the earlydays, the intensity of thebarrage of AAA andSAMs led many Stealthpilots to wonder if theycould possibly survive. Itsoon became clear thatBaghdad's defences werefiring blind, however.

Below: Jokey messageswere de rigeur on bombsdropped on Iraqi targets.These reflected the highmorale among USAFarmourers, and perhapsa subconscious desirenot to think too muchabout the deadly purposeof such lethal ordnance.

F- I I 7A

BUNKER BUSTING

But before the main force of F-117s reached Baghdad, other BlackJets added to the mayhem and confusion, initially striking theintercept operations center near Nukhayb (which controlled thefighters at H1 and H2 airfields), and the sector operations center atH-2, near Ar Rutba, in Western Iraq. Both of these targets were hitby the same pilot. Major Greg Feest, the man who dropped the firstbomb in Panama dropped the first bomb of the Gulf War, too,watching as the doors blew off the Nukhayb bunker before turningtowards his second target. This effectively put the southern fighterbases out of action, and further deprived Iraqi air force and air-defense chiefs of information. Moments later, Captain BlakeBourland sent the Sector Operations Center at Tallil off-line. The warhad begun with attacks by US Army AH-64 Apaches and US MarineAH-1 Cobras on surveillance radar sites close to the border,effectively punching two huge holes in the border defenses, throughwhich strike aircraft (including the F-117As) began to pour. Cruisemissiles had then attacked communications relay and power stationsin Baghdad, waking the defenses.

Left: The F-117A used two types of weapon during theGulf War, both 2,000-lb LGBs. This is a GBU-27,before installation of the Paveway III guidance kit.

Even after the Black Jets left Baghdad, andeven after a second wave of cruise missilestargeted against ministry buildings andtelephone exchanges, the Iraqi air-defensesystem remained in reasonable shape. USNavy A-6s and F/A-18s launched some 137TALDs (simulating full-sized attack aircraft) atBaghdad, and these were mostly engaged anddestroyed by the defenses, though in doingso, they marked themselves for destruction bya massive force of 'Wild Weasel' F-4GPhantoms and F/A-18 Hornets.

The second wave of F-11 7As whichattacked on the first night re-visited the AirForce Headquarters and the National AirDefense Operations Center, while other SOCselsewhere in the country were taken out bythe Black Jets. Many senior Iraqi air-force andair-defense officers were killed during theattacks. Of the survivors, more were executedbecause of the dismal performance of thesystem they controlled.

The 37th TFW soon ran out of strategictargets, and was soon allocated tacticaltargets, from Iraqi aircraft sitting on the ground(reportedly including one of the scarce AdnanAEW aircraft and a group of Tu-1 6 bombersbeing readied for an attack using chemicalweapons), to captured Kuwaiti HAWK SAMsites and Iraqi hardened aircraft shelters.

FRONTLINE SERVICE / THE GULF

Despite the fact that it provided only 2.5%of the 'shooters' in theatre on day one ofDesert Storm, the 37th TFW hit 31% of thefirst night targets. During the war as a whole,the force flew 1,271 combat sorties and over6,900 combat flying hours, carrying 2,567bombs to their targets. These scored 1,669direct hits, and 418 misses, though there werealso 480 no drops due to weather. In doingso, it was claimed that the Black Jet had"demonstrated a level of accuracy unmatchedin the history of air warfare". Not a single F-117A was even touched by enemy airdefenses. Some other coalition aircraftenjoyed very low loss rates, but none weresent into the teeth of such danger. Perhapsmost importantly, collateral damage wasinsignificant. Military facilities wereobliterated without touching nearby mosques,and throughout the war, the civilianpopulation felt safe enough to walk thestreets.

TAC's commander, General John Loh, toldthe US Senate that the F-117A had been eighttimes more efficient than non-Stealthwarplanes in putting its bombs on target.Congress urged the USAF to cancel itsrequirement to buy an additional 72 F-16s,and to buy 24 new F-117As instead, but theplan came to naught, probably because thevery success of the aircraft was starting tothreaten planned future programs. The bigworry was that Congress might say, "If the F-11 7 can do all this, why do you need JSF, or

JAST, or whatever?" It was not an easyquestion to answer. Senior figures began torun down the F-117A, with Homer's Gulf Wardeputy, General Buster Glossom, chargingthat the F-11 7A represented "archaic, 1 5 year-old technology" that was "a nightmare tomaintain". Lockheed themselves werecarefully warned that lobbying for a re-opening of the F-117A production line wouldbe a threat to their own F-22.

Above: The F-117Ademonstrated incrediblelevels of accuracy, anddelivered its deadlyweaponloads withoutrequiring massive fighteror SEAD support. Thismade it a particularlyeconomic means ofattacking enemy targets.

Left: An F-117A taxiesout for a mission as duskfalls. The aircraft carriedall of its fuel andordnance internally, topreserve its low radarcross section. Late in thewar, the ability to carry ahigher payload externallywould have beenvaluable.

Right: One by one, Iraq'sairfields were attackedand turned into ruins.Here hardened aircraftshelters have beenattacked using LGBs,blowing off their doors.The F-117A attacked airdefence installations,bunkers and bridges,among a long list oftargets.

F- I I 7A

RETURN TO IRAQThe wing, and its squadrons, finally lost the Tactical prefix on 1October 1991. Between 9 May and 7 July 1992 the F-117A tookanother step out of the secret world when it moved from its speciallybuilt Tonopah base to Holloman AFB, New Mexico, next to the WhiteSands National Monument and close to the town of Almagordo.

Above: An F-117Areturning to Langley AFBafter the Gulf War. Thepilots of the 37th TFWreturned to a heroes'welcome, and withLockheed's extravagantclaims for their aircraftthoroughly vindicated.Despite its success, theaircraft remains a rarityin USAF service, and nofurther procurement islikely.

The move to Holloman was accompanied bya further change of unit designation, with the37th FW becoming the 49th FW, previouslyequipped with F-15s at Holloman. It wasostensibly made as a "further step to integratethe F-11 7A into everyday operations", thoughthe truth may be less prosaic. There seemslittle doubt that Holloman is less well suitedto Stealth Fighter operations, with inferiorfacilities, and this has had an impact onreadiness and sortie rates. After the F-117Asleft Tonopah, security around the baseactually increased. In any case, it seemsinconceivable that Tonopah, the USAF'snewest air base, has been left empty so thequestion has to be asked - what has replacedthe F-117A at Tonopah?

Although the F-11 7A squadrons from

Tonopah initially retained their numericalidentities after the move to Holloman, allwere eventually re-designated, using theidentities of the units which had traditionallyconstituted the 49th. Thus the 415th FSbecame the 7th FS , the 416th FS became the8th FS, and the 41 7th FS became the 9th FS.There was reportedly fierce resistance to theloss of the squadron designations underwhich the Black Jet had gone to war.

The 8th FS has the 'Pacific Contingency'responsibility, and would deploy to SouthKorea in time of tension. The 7th FS has whatis known as the 'Atlantic Contingency' andwould deploy to Europe or Saudi Arabia ifrequired. There have been frequent rumorsthat single F-117 squadrons might bepermanently based in the UK and Korea, butthis seems unlikely. The aircraft has deployedto Europe, however, flying from British andDutch air bases for exercises.

Having gone to war in the colors of the37th TFW, the F-117A has also droppedbombs in anger while wearing the markingsof its present unit, the 49th FW. Following theend of the Gulf War, Iraq became

bold in its violations of the ceasefireagreement, making incursions into Kuwaitand across the boundaries of the no-flyzones imposed by the coalition allies.Allied aircraft patrolling these areas werethreatened by Iraqi air defenses, and itbecame increasingly clear that SaddamHussein would have to be taught anotherlesson. On 13 January 1993 six F-117As,

each carrying only a single bomb, attackedSAM sites, the SOC at Tallil and the IOC atAl Amara. None of the four aircraftattacking SAM sites hit their targets, thanksto broken laser locks, which were in turncaused by low cloud. The aircraft targetingthe SOC at Tallil was unable even to findthe target, but the remaining aircraftvirtually destroyed the facility at Al Amara.

Above: The F-117Aroutinely uses a brakeparachute to shorten itslanding run. These areoften black, like the restof the aircraft. The chutebay is between thetailfins, which make itsuse impossible in astrong crosswind.

Left: The F-117A played avital role in the GulfWar, as the only alliedwarplane routinelyassigned to attack targetsin heavily-defendeddowntown Baghdad.Here a pilot waits to taxyat Khamis Mushayt,watched by hisgroundcrew. The F-117Ais a unique shape in thesky, and improvedcomputer power hasallowed subsequentstealth aircraft to bedesigned with morecurvaceous shapes.

THE MISSION

FLYING TODAY'S MISSION:PREPARING TO FLYProper operational briefings are notalways so simple and straightforward asthey were during training at Tonopah,since the F-1 17 may advantageouslyoperate in conjunction with other aircrafttypes, and since unusual locations mightrequire specialized intelligence briefingsand updates. The aircraft can even makeuse of EF-1 I I Ravens for radar jamming,using jamming to mislead enemy forces asto the position and direction of the(invisible) attack force, or simply toreplace delayed detection with nodetection at all. In the USAF, the pilot willnot necessarily plan his own mission,arriving at the squadron some hours afterthe officers designated as planners thatday (a duty rotated among experienced F-I 17A pilots on a daily basis). In training atTonopah and in the Gulf War alike, F-1 17Apilots tended to act as planners on onenight and fly the next.

Tasking for the F-11 7 A might come throughnormal channels in a conventional war, ormight still come direct from the President, orfrom a specific special-operation joint-forcecommander. The tasking message willusually be very specific about the target andthe required time on target, particularly sincean F-117 strike might be carefully co-ordinated with action by special forces onthe ground, or designed to open a corridorthrough enemy air defenses for conventionalattack aircraft or bombers. The planners planthe required mission in detail, taking care todeconflict routeings and timings with otheraircraft (the F-117A will be operating 'radiosilent'). They will make use of a planningcomputer which remains one of the F-11 7A'smost closely guarded secrets to this day. Thisincorporates a digital map of known air-defense radars, with their effective rangesagainst the Black Jet. This computer allowsmission tapes to be prepared, which thenallow the F-117A to evade enemy radarsautomatically.

Since the F-11 7A pilot does not plan hisown mission, the briefing is particularlyimportant, and covers the exact routeing aswell as the attack itself. The briefing is anopportunity for the pilot to receive the verylatest target information and intelligence,together with anticipated meteologicalconditions and all the usual details, fromemergency procedures, alternate targets,

Left: Stealth Fighterpilots wear the sameflying equipment andflight safety gear as allother USAF fast jetpilots.

Above: The pilot'ssignature indicates hisformal assumption ofresponsibility for theaircraft he is about to fly.

THE MISSION

diversion airfields, radio frequencies and air-defense corridors. Exact aim points arediscussed and decided before flight, suchpoints being far more specific than areroutinely given to the pilots of other bombers.The ability of the Black Jet to hit not just abuilding, but a specific window, vent or roomwithin that building, makes it necessary totarget the most important part of a building.There is no point in taking out the store roomsif you can destroy the Minister's own office!

The accuracy of the F-11 7A's weaponssystem actually allows a more subtle approachto the 'blunt instrument' method of tacticalbombing. If F-16s were assigned to knock outan electrical plant, several aircraft would besent, attacking the major buildings as best theycould, using sheer weight of numbers todestroy the sturdy generator room and thevulnerable but easy to repair water plant. Bycontrast a single F-117 might be assigned toknock out the plant's generator, which iscritical, difficult to repair and easy to find.

After briefing, the pilot picks up his flyingequipment, donning external anti-g trousersand a slimline back-type parachute. For anoperational mission he will 'sanitize',emptying his pockets of anything personal,and of objects which might conceivably be ofuse to an enemy, from Movie theatre ticketsto drugstore receipts. Finally he will strip theVelcro-backed patches from his flying suit andflight jacket. He will then put on his helmetand mask, connecting the intercom lead andoxygen hose to portable test equipment in theflight safety equipment room. On anoperational mission, the pilot will also wear asurvival vest, containing an escape kit,emergency rations and water, a survival knife,a 'Coolie chit' (or 'blood chit') in theappropriate language, offering a reward forhis safe return and money in appropriatedenominations for bribes during escape andevasion. The pilot will also carry a side arm,usually a 9-mm Beretta Model 92F automaticpistol. Perhaps most importantly, the pilot willcarry a lightweight Motorola survival radioand transponder. The last task is to sign outthe aircraft he has been assigned, carefullychecking its modification state. Early in theSenior Trend program, it made a differencewhich aircraft you flew because each wasbuilt to a slightly different standard, withLockheed incorporating improvements on theproduction line as they arose. Later in the lifeof the F-117A, various modification programswere incorporated by retrofit, and it took agreat deal of time for these to becomestandard across the entire operational fleet.

Left: Checking thelatest Met (weather)and any navigationwarnings is a crucialstep prior to going outto fly the mission. TheF-117A's weapons andtargeting sensors areextremely weatherdependant.

Below: Before walking(or being driven) tothe aircraft, the pilotchecks the oxygenconnectors andintercom leads of hisflying helmet.

THE MISSION

FLYING THE F-l 17AImprovements to the F-117's weapons system began in 1984, withthe replacement of the aircraft's three F-16 type Delco M362Fcomputers by three examples of the IBM Federal Systems/LoralAP-102 as used in the Space Shuttle, with an expanded datatransfer module. Three computers are required because one isdedicated to the weapons delivery system, one to the navigationsystem, with the third serving as a back up. New composite bombdoors were fitted from much the same date. These improvementstogether conferred on the F-117A the ability to use two bombs (i.e.both bays) during a single pass, the aircraft having previously beenrestricted to single-bomb attacks. The ability to drop two bombsgave new capabilities: by dropping both on a single designatedspot, the second bomb could punch through the hole blown by thefirst weapon, a useful trick when busting multi-layered bunkers.

At the time of the Gulf War, some F-11 7Asstill had their original metal bomb doors,but most had the new computer. By thattime, the next phase of the improvementprogram was also well underway. This wasknown as OCIP (Offensive CapabilityImprovement Program) and the firstmodified aircraft made its first flight on 1December 1988. The first 'productionconversion' (805) was redelivered toTonopah on 27 November 1990. The firstseven OCIP-configured aircraft were readyand re-delivered, but were not deployed toSaudi Arabia for use in Desert Storm,remaining behind for training and othercontingencies.

OCIP introduced a range of new features,including an improved FMS and autopilot(including autothrottle for the first time) anda number of cockpit improvements. The

Below: The F-117A is asimple and pleasantaircraft to fly, and pilotssneer at the continued useby the ill-informed of the'Wobblin'Goblin'nickname applied early inthe programme and nowregarded as a historicalcurio. The aircraft's FBWcontrol system gives itbenign handlingcharacteristics throughoutthe envelope.

aircraft was given a new display processor,and the original monochrome displayscreens were replaced by Honeywell colorMFDs, while a Harris Corporation TacticalSituation Display/digital moving map wasalso added, together with an LCD avionicsfunction data-entry panel. Finally the aircraftincorporated a Pilot Activated AutomaticRecovery System, which could return theaircraft to straight and level flight,established in a gentle climb, slightly nose-up, at the touch of a single button. Overall,the OCIP improvements improved pilotsituational awareness and gave him moretime to concentrate on his attack, requiringless effort, concentration and time to fly andnavigate. The FMS improvements andautothrottle allowed the aircraft to fly morecomplex profiles automatically.

Redeliveries of OCIP-modified aircraftbuilt up to a rate of one per month, and allhad been modified by the end of 1995. In1992, long before the basic OCIP programwas complete, a third phase of improvementswas flight tested. This involves replacementof the IRADS with new Texas InstrumentsFLIR and DLIR turrets, a Honeywell RingLaser Gyro INS and a Collins GPS (GlobalPositioning System) using the stealthyantenna designed for the ATF (AdvancedTactical Fighter). The incorporation of GPSwas prompted by combat experience in theGulf, where extended five- or six-hourflights over the featureless desert gave littleopportunity to update the existing INS. Thenew IRADS was fitted in an effort to doublesensor and laser range, and reportedlyallowed target acquisition and identificationat 50% better ranges than were achievedduring Operation Desert Storm, thoughexact figures are classified.

Further modifications are planned for theF-11 7A. Lockheed began work on a MidLife Improvement Study (MIPS) during 1995.This was funded by the US Air Force andinvolves improvements to weapons, radarsignature and other operational features.When further upgrades are commissioned, itis generally believed that they will almostcertainly feature the incorporation of a MILSTD 1760 data bus. This would allow theaircraft's GPS to talk to the guidance systemsof weapons like the JDAM or JSOW beforelaunch, although the relevance of suchstand-off weapons to the F-117A is notobvious at first sight. Certainly GPS-guided

THE MISSION

FLYING CONTROLSThe F-l 17A's flying control surfacesconsist of two elevens on the trailingedge of each wing, for pitch and rollcontrol, while the all-moving tailfins(ruddervators) can move in unison toprovide yaw control, or differentially togive pitch control. The control surfacesare actuated via the quadruplex GECAstronics fly by wire control system.

weapons like JDAM actually have a loweraccuracy than the F-117A's existing laser-guided bombs, while the aircraft remainsrelatively invulnerable to air defenses. Moreuseful would be a new communications suite,with Low-Probability-of-lntercept (LPI) radio toallow pilots to talk to one another and tobase, to allow changes in attack plans aftertakeoff.

In the longer term, it is still possible that theaircraft will undergo more drasticmodifications. New electrochromic andthermalchromic coatings might be added tofurther reduce radar reflections and to

POWERPLANT

The F-117A is powered by a pair of 48-kN(10,800 Ib st) General Electric F404-GE-F1D2 turbofans, unaugrnented derivatives ofthe F404-GE-400 engines which power theF/A-18 Hornet. The F-117A is somewhatlacking in thrust, and many believe that theaircraft should be re-engined with a non-afterburning version of the F414, or even anafterburning engine, if the technicaldifficulties could be resolved.

suppress 75% of the aircraft's IR signature inthe 3-5 and 8-12 micron ranges. Devices maybe fitted to the engine exhausts to reducevisible exhaust glow, or alternatively, therehave been proposals to fit afterburningengines, which would increase payloadcapability to up to 18,000 Ib. Many pilotshope that a clear-view bubble canopy mightbe fitted (like that designed for the F-22, andfor the naval F-117N/X. The USAF has alwayswanted the F-11 7 to carry a heavierweaponload, and this may eventually be

achieved, perhaps with a doubling of theinternal load, and with some externalweapons carriage for operations in low-threat areas. External weapons carriage nolonger imposes quite the penalties that itonce did, since low RCS pylons can beused in conjunction with radar-absorbent coatings on the weaponsthemselves. Proposals have alsobeen made to incorporate aTARPS reconnaissance pod,which would presumably be lowered

THE MISSION

NEW SENSORS& AVIONICSUnder the third stage of the OffensiveCombat Improvement Program, theF-117A received a new Honeywellring laser gyro INS in place of thehand-picked B-52 type SPN-GEANS.The new INS receives inputs from aRockwell Collins GPS. OCIP III alsoincludes incorporation of a new TexasInstruments thermal imaging sensor,to replace the old IR sensors. These areexpected to double the system's targetacquisition range. Development ofnew low-observable IFF equipmentand UHF antennas has reportedlybeen cancelled, along with programmesto reduce leading ed<?e RCS and recoatt> &the aircraft with new RAM skins.

FUEL SYSTEM

Fuel is stored in tanks in the upper fuselage, fore and aft of and above the weapons bay, and in integraltanks in the wings. For ferry flights the aircraft can carry additional tanks in the weapons bay. A rotatinginflight refuelling receptacle is fitted on the centreline, behind the cockpit. An aft-shining light on thecanopy apex illuminates the receptacle at night. Refuelling the aircraft calls for great skill on the part ofthe boom operator, since to 'ding the sensitive RAM skin might compromise the F-117A's RCS.

OCIP I AND II

The first stage of the F-117A'i OCIP (Offensive Capability ImprovementProgram) replaced the original Delco M362F mission computers with amore powerful IBM/Loral AP-102, a repackaged derivative of thecomputer used in the Space Shuttle. The second stage added newHoneywell MFDs and a Harris Corporation moving map display, while anew flight management system and a recovery system were also added.

THE MISSION

on the trapeze for use. To further increase theaircraft's versatility, an LPI radar like thatdeveloped for the stillborn GeneralDynamics A-12 could be added, and thiscould confer a limited air-to-air capability,using the AIM-120 AMRAAM and the AIM-9X Sidewinder.

Having ascertained the exact standard of theaircraft assigned for the flight, the pilot will bedriven to the aircraft's hangar or flightline.Here he talks to the crew chief. The airplanehe is about to fly is very much the crew chief'sbaby, and this NCO will be intimately awareof exactly what the aircraft's individualservicing history has been, and what individualcharacteristics this particular airframe has.Having been built virtually by hand, at a verylow rate, the F-117As were far from beinguniform and they did have a degree of

individuality. Some were prone to particularfaults and problems, while different aircrafthad slightly different features and equipment.A crew chief works on only one aircraft, andhis name (and the names of his team) arepainted prominently on the aircraft'snosewheel door. Aircraft might also have apilot's name on the canopy rail, but this wasmore symbolic, and a pilot would expect to flywhatever aircraft was available, perhaps neveractually flying the aircraft with his name on it!A quick check of the aircraft's documentationcompletes the formal and official preparations,and the pilot signs to indicate his acceptanceof the aircraft, in its current condition. This isvital, and cannot be skipped. Knowledge ofrecent defects and how they have beenrectified may give the pilot a useful clue ifsomething goes wrong on this flight. Moreover,some defects may be so minor that their repair

or rectification might be deemed to haveno impact on the aircraft's ability to fulfilits mission, and a repair can be deferred.The pilot needs to be aware of all such

defects. With his signature he indicates thathe is aware of all these factors, and

that he is accepting the aircraft asbeing fit for flight. From now on,

several million dollars' worth ofF-117Ais in

INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT HISTORYThis aircraft was later flown by Squadron Leader Chris Tophdm, theRAF's F-117A exchange pilot during the period 1990-1992. Topham'spredecessor left the 37th just before the Gulf War, and Topham wasstill training when Desert Storm ended. Here the aircraft wears post-war markings, with high-visibility white 37th Fighter Wing andHolloman tailcodes, and with the AirCombat Command shield insigniahigh on the fins.

This aircraft carries a GBU-W in the port weapons bay (seen here on the extended trapeze), with a GBU-27 in the other bay. This is aroutine F-117A warlaad. Other weapons believed to be compatible with the F-117A include the AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missile,and the laser-guidedAGM-114 Hellfire andAGM-65 Maverick. The bomb bay is relatively confined, and cannot accomodate thestandard Paveway III (GBU-24) the GBU-27 being purpose built for the F-117A with the smaller tail unit of the Paveway II.

ARMAMENT

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PRE-FUIGHTINSPECTIONAccompanying a pilot as hewalked to his aircraft, andthen as he conducted hiswalk-around inspectionwould be an excellentintroduction to the uniquefeatures of the aircraft.

Right: The pre-flightwalkaround is a vital partof every mission. There isno point at all in gettingairborne in an aircraftwhich will not be able tofly the mission. Here apilot checks his practicebombs.

THE BLACK JETOn seeing the F-117 sitting in its hangar or onthe ramp, the first thing one might noticewould be the aircraft's sinister, slightly sootymatt-black finish, which is reminiscent of thefinish applied to U-2 and SR-71 spyplanes.Whether the aircraft needed to be black isopen to some question. Certainly the specialradar-absorbent paint used could beproduced in other shades, while gray can bea better camouflage at night than black, (asdemonstrated by German night fighters,during World War II) and gray is inevitablysuperior during daylight hours. Black isprobably a very poor camouflage color,

especially if the finish is matt. The BritishRoyal Air Force is currently painting its traineraircraft glossy black overall to improve theirconspicuity, and rejected matt-black paintonly because it was more time-consuming tokeep clean and smart! With its black paint theF-117A is hardly optically stealthy, exceptduring the darkest nights. But succeedinggenerations of aircraft produced byLockheed's Skunk Works have been paintedblack, and tradition (if nothing else)demanded that the Stealth fighter should havea similarly sinister paint job! The first YF-117A prototype was actually finished in a

INSIDE THE F-117AThe structure of the F-1 17 A is entirelyconventional, with a skeleton of ribs andstringers, spars and longerons.Thefaceted panels which form the skinare then attached to this structure.These panels are mostlyaluminium, but are coatedwith RAM, applied in asophisticated andautomated 'spraybooth'.

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gray, with large patches of pale blue and red-brown added for the first few flights to hideits faceted shape. But General WilliamCreech, the commanding general of the thenTactical Air Command, had definite ideas onwhat color 'his' new night bombers shouldbe, and the order went out that all F-11 7Asshould be black, reportedly because he feltthat this would best camouflage their facetedshape. It is possible to reduce an aircraft'sconspicuity by using particular shades ofpaint, or by lighting certain areas to 'fill out'shadows, but this has not been attempted onthe F-117A.

As an observant pilot approaches the F-117A, he might notice that other StealthFighters being prepared for flight do not havea host of open access panels, nor would henormally see groundcrew standing atop theaircraft, except when wearing specially

designed cloth overboots. This is because theaircraft has been designed to have all sub-systems servicing access within theundercarriage and weapons bays, minimizingthe number of frequently opened 'holes' inthe aircraft's sensitive RAM-covered skin.There are other access panels for second-lineservicing, but if these are opened, they haveto be resealed, and the aircraft has to be re-painted in the area of the panel. No normalaccess panels are located on top of theaircraft, and there is a strict prohibition onanyone walking atop the wing or fuselagewithout the protective cloth overboots. Thespecial paint which helps to give the aircraftits very low radar cross section is extremelyvulnerable to damage, and is very highlyclassified. The unauthorized and uninitiatedare still not even allowed to touch theaircraft's surface!

Above: This F-117A isseen in one of the PhaseIII shelters at Tonopah.The design of the hangars(known as Canyons)changed appreciablyduring the course ofTonopah's construction,and there are at leastthree distinct designs. Allopen at both ends,allowing the aircraft totaxy in, shut down, andbe ready to taxy outwithout being turned.'Old Glory' hangs inmany of the shelters.

F- I I 7A

THE RADAR RIDDLEWork on reducing radar cross section through the use of unusual skinmaterials is almost as old as radar itself, dating back to the waryears. As early as 1943, the Horten brothers proposed using asandwich skin, with granulated charcoal and sawdust as the centerlayer, whose sole purpose was to absorb radar energy. Serious effortsto reduce frontal RCS began in earnest during the 1950s, with thedevelopment of aluminium or iron-rich rubber coatings designed toabsorb radar energy. Such material (known as RAM, or RadarAbsorbent Material) was applied to a number of test-bed aircraft,and even in Britain RAM was applied to the leading edges of aCanberra bomber for trials. But while this gave useful results, it wasclear that more could be achieved, especially if an aircraft were tobe designed with a low radar cross section (low-observability) as aprimary requirement.

Above: The observercannot tell whatordnance load is beingcarried by an F-117A,since everything iscarried in the fore-and-aft split weapons bay.Beyond confirming theuse of the GBU-27Pavewaylll and GBU-10Paveway II in the Gulf,the USAF is coy aboutwhat weapons can becarried, stating merelythat it is compatible withall air-to-groundweapons in theinventory. This isinaccurate, since manyweapons will not fit inthe narrow and shortconfines of the F-117A'sbomb bay.

The use of surface coatings to reduce radarcross section was explored more thoroughlyon the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird and the U-2,which were painted with a paint containingcarbonyl iron ferrites, and known as 'iron ball'paint. When a radar wave hit the paint, itinduced a magnetic field within the metallicelements of the paint, the field switchingpolarity and dissipating the electrical energy ofthe radar pulse, rather than reflecting theenergy back. Much of the radar's energy isactually transformed into heat. As well asradar-absorbent paint, radar-absorbent material(RAM) can be manufactured in neoprene-liketiles, which incorporate similar active ferriccompounds in the synthetic polymer matrix.

The effectiveness of the F-11 7A's RAM skinwas demonstrated in an unusual mannerduring the Gulf War, when groundcrewsstarted finding dead bats around the tails ofthe hangared aircraft. The unfortunatecreatures had clearly flown "full tilt" into theBlack Jet's tailfins, which their high frequency

'sonar' had been unable to detect.The F-11 7A made extensive use of RAM in

sheet form (similar to lino in thickness andcomposition, but significantly heavier), withthicknesses differing on different parts of theairframe. These sheets were metal-backed,and were cut to shape, then bonded directlyto the aircraft's metal skin or substructure.Gaps between the sheets were sealed withRAM applied in paint or putty form, whilesome panels would be sealed only duringoperations, using tape or paint. RAM paint isdifficult to apply consistently to an accuratethickness, and requires the use of highly toxicsolvents. Despite this, the F-117A now usespaint-type RAM instead of sheets, and this isapplied using robotics. The paint facility atHolloman AFB uses a giant cradle to holdand move the aircraft, and computer-controlled paint nozzles.

The use of RAM alone would have given theF-117A a significantly reduced radar crosssection, but would not have given the aircraftits present level of invisibility. Below the skin,some use is made of radar-absorbent structure,including what are known as re-entranttriangles, which tend to trap radar energy,bouncing it around from face to face internally,dissipating it instead of reflecting it back. Asimilar structure was pioneered in the SR-71.

But the key to the success of the StealthFighter's stealthiness lies in the solution of amathematician's riddle. Radar works bymeasuring the energy reflected back by atarget. If a target can absorb some of theenergy it will reduce the effective range of theradar and help to confuse those trying toanalyze radar returns. A second way to 'spoil'radar is to reflect energy away from thetransmitter, giving it no returns to measure.The crucial breakthrough in producing aStealth aircraft came with the rediscovery offormulae which allowed an accurateprediction of the reflection of Electro-Magnetic Radiation (e.g. radar energy) from atwo-dimensional object. The basic formulaefor predicting the radar reflectivity of ageometric object were worked out early thiscentury by James Clark Maxwell (a Scot) andwere refined by the German Arnold Johannes.These formulae were rediscovered by theSoviet scientist Pyotr Ufimtsev, who appliedthe formulae to predict the RCS of aparticular two dimensional object. His paperwas published in 1966, winning its author aprestigious State Prize. Fortunately, no-onetried to apply his theories in the USSR. A

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Lockheed Skunk works mathematician, DenysOverholser discovered Ufimtsev's paper andcreated a software program ('Echo 1') whichcould work out the RCS of an aircraftcomposed of flat panels, but not of aconventional rounded aircraft. From thesoftware program it was a short step to designthe optimum shape for minimizing RCS, theso-called 'Hopeless Diamond', on which theF-11 7 A is closely based.

Thus the solution of a mathematicalproblem accounts for the Black Jet's angularshape, with the external surface made upentirely of sharp-edged flat panels set atangles to one another. No attempt has beenmade to round off corners or to add curves,the shape is quite clearly made up ofhundreds of faceted plates.

Beneath the surface outline, the aircraft isless radical than its shape might suggest.Perhaps mindful of its early unflatteringcockroach nickname, Lockheed described the'central carapace' as having a skeleton of ribsand stringers, with larger structural membersrunning through the key load routes, and towhich was attached a shell of faceted panels.The wings are built around a two-spar box,and are attached to the fuselage by five mainbolts along the inter-spar interface with threemore bolts forward of the front spar, and withan angled strut attaching the rear spar to thefuselage immediately forward of the exhaust.

With a production run of less than 60aircraft, unit cost of the F-11 7 A was inevitablygoing to be high, but sensible economieswere made to keep the price down to anastonishingly low figure. Wherever possible,existing equipment and systems were used,saving the cost of developing, testing andproving new items. Use of parts from otheraircraft types also had a security advantage.No-one would notice an order for extra F404engines (used by the F/A-18) or for additionalF-16 flight-control-system computers andactuators. Thus while the F-11 7's uniqueshape makes it look 'all new' it in fact makesextensive use of existing technology,equipment and parts. Approaching the aircraftfrom the rear, no-one could guess that thelong, flat exhaust slots served the familiarF404 engine, though there are other, moreobvious clues to the type's reliance onexisting aircraft 'parts bins'. Theundercarriage, for example, is made byMenasco, but uses a nose oleo which comesfrom an A-10A, while the wheels are from theF-16. The ECS was a standard Hercules item,and the Sundstrand APU turbine starter camefrom the F/A-18.

By the time the pilot arrives at his aircraft, ifit is a pre-OCIP machine, it will have beenconnected to external power for some time,to allow the INS to be fully aligned. Thisprocess takes about 43 minutes under normalcircumstances. The INS is an old-fashionedpiece of equipment, and is actually theHoneywell SPN-JEANS navigation system asused by the Boeing B-52. This helps toexplain the extended alignment timerequired, but not the extraordinary accuracyand minimal drift rate of the equipment (thedrift rate is claimed as better than 0.12 nmper hour, which is less than 128 yards, or 384feet, after flying more than 400 miles). The

INS had an electrostatic gimbal, with gyroshoused in a metal sphere, this beingsuspended in a magnetic field. INS units inthe F-117As were hand-picked and speciallycalibrated, and are thus even more reliableand precise than those fitted to Boeing B-52s.Today, the increasing cost of supporting theout-of-production INS is high, and the unit isbeing replaced by a ring laser gyro INS and aGPS. The pilot can take off with a partiallyaligned INS if necessary, but accuracy anddrift-rate figures are considerably worse thanfor a fully aligned INS.

Before conducting his walk-aroundinspection of the aircraft, the pilot checkscertain switch positions in the cockpit. Thewalk-around inspection should beunnecessary, since the groundcrew willalready have given the aircraft a thoroughdaily inspection. Nevertheless, the pilot hassigned for the aircraft and he will follow theusual ritual, circling slowly round the aircraftand visually inspecting the control surfaces,

Above: Reports suggestthat the F-117A hasrecently assumed adefence suppression role,hunting mobile SAMsusing the AGM-88HARM missile. It isunclear how the F-117detects and locatesenemy SAM radars, butmay rely on third-partytargeting by F-16s, withwhich it has recentlye\ercised in the WildWeasel role.

F- I I 7A

tyres, and a host of other details. He willcheck the sit of the aircraft, and that there areno untoward leaks. Above all, he willcarefully check the condition of the RAM skin.

The F-117A's unusual and unconventionalconfiguration meant that the aircraft could notbe made aerodynamically stable, in theconventional sense, and that the aircraftcould not be 'flown' without the aid ofsophisticated stability augmentation in theform of a modern digital fly-by-wire controlsystem. Without such a system, the aircraftsuffered from severe pitch instability andmoderate directional instability. Only acomputer could react quickly enough to keep

Above: The USAF's smallbut vital fleet ofF-117Ashave received asuccession ofmodificationprogrammes. These havetransformed the aircraft'scapabilities, withoutaltering its externalappearance at all.

the aircraft from diverging from straight andlevel flight, and the computerized flight-control system thus acts as an interfacebetween the human pilot and the aircraft'scontrol surfaces. The pilot makes a controlinput, and the computer then ensures that theaircraft maneuvers in accordance with thatinput, while preventing the aircraft fromtumbling out of control. Trying to fly aninherently unstable aircraft has been likenedto attempting to steer a bicycle backwards, byits handlebars, while sitting on the front of aspeeding car, pushing the bike along at 70miles an hour. A sophisticated computercould make tiny corrections quickly enoughto keep the bicycle straight, but a humanwould find the bike's handlebars torn from hishands within seconds. The aircraft wastherefore fitted with a re-programmed andmodified version of the PCS used in theGeneral Dynamics F-16.

At the point of the aircraft's nose, there arefour short faceted probes. As a quadruplexsystem, the Lear Siegler Astronics fly-by-wireFlight Control System required four separatesources of air data. Ideally air data would

have been provided via static ports flush withthe aircraft's skin, but it proved impossible tofind four suitable locations for separatesensors for yaw, pitch, AoA, q (dynamicpressure) and airspeed where the airflow didnol make the variables affect each other.Therefore, the decision was made to employfour separate pitot probes, though these wereto prove one of the most severe headachesencountered by the designers. It was difficultto design a faceted probe which could gatherthe necessary information, but conventionalpitch and yaw vanes were clearly out of thequestion. As built, each pitot probe had apyramid-shaped tip, with a flattened pointcontaining one aperture, and with four moreapertures on each 'facet'. The tips of theprobes are the only part of the F-11 7A whichare not coated with RAM, and are said to beresponsible for a very high proportion of theaircraft's RCS. Providing heat to prevent theprobes from icing up proved to be an almostintractable problem, and initially the F-117Awas prohibited from flying in icing conditionsor in cloud. Eventually, a very fine non-conductive heating filament was designed,this being the thickness of a human hair, andthus having a negligible affect on radar crosssection. This took two and a half years!

Looking up the nose from the probes, thepilot can see the FLIR turret behind a finewire-mesh screen. The FLIR is one of twoidentical and interchangeable turret-mountedsensors (the other being the DLIR, mountedbelow the nose, offset to starboard), differingonly in calibration and alignment. The DLIRimage is inverted electronically for 'naturalsense' display in the cockpit. The turrets aremodified versions of the FLIR used by theRockwell OV-10D Bronco, linked to anenlarged servo controller and video tracker.On the ground, the FLIR turret will be rotatedto face aft, so its distinctive three windowsare not visible. They serve the narrow andwide field of view FLIR modes, and the laserdesignator.

The IRADS turrets are housed behindsimple wire-mesh screens, which allow thepassage of a broad spectrum of IR and laserenergy, but which reflect radar energy. Thescreen uses copper wires which provideelectrical continuity across the bay, and eachone costs $7,000. This may seem expensivefor a piece of wire mesh, but the alternativewould have been a screen made of GalliumArsenide or Germanium, which would havebeen $500,000! The leading edge of the'frame' containing the mesh had a saw tooth,designed to reflect radar energy in different

THE MISSION

directions. Most edges aligned with the likelydirection of enemy radar waves weresimilarly 'jagged', including the front and rearedges of the bomb bay doors, the canopy sidewindows, and the nosewheel door.

Cavities and apertures in the RAM-coveredskin are avoided at all costs, so, like theIRADS turrets, the engine intakes have to becovered by grids which appear as solid facetsto radar, while still allowing air to enterwithout distortion. The grids covering theengine intakes are constructed from elementswhich are themselves faceted in cross-sectionand coated with RAM. Most radar energy isabsorbed in the skin of the grid, or reflectedaround within the grid. Very little radar energyreaches the compressor face of the engine,and even less returns through the grid. Theintake grids have the advantage of acting asflow straighteners, but are prone to icing,acting like freezer ice trays, and requiring aunique fluid de-icing system. To ensure thatthe intakes are clear of ice, the pilot canswitch on small lamps set into the cockpitsides, which shine back and illuminate theintake grids. Above the intakes are auxiliarysuck-in doors, which open when greater massflow is required, mainly on takeoff.

The F-11 7A has an arrow-like wingplanform, with sharply swept wing leadingedges. The notched Delta shape gavemaximum sweep, yet also allowed maximumaspect ratio (the ratio of span to chord) whichimproved lift and drag characteristics. Thehigh wing sweep angle was selected not toimprove supersonic performance (the aircraftis very much a subsonic bomb truck) but toreflect radar waves away from their sourceinstead of back to it. Remarkably, theproduction F-117A actually has reducedsweep by comparison with the original XSTconcept demonstrator. This gave higher lift,without materially reducing the effectivenessof the wing planform in reflecting away radarwaves. The leading edges themselves areextremely sharp, to maximize lowobservability, though this was not ideal for asubsonic airfoil. The wings were madedetachable to make rapid deployment ofpartially disassembled aircraft (aboard C-5Galaxies) more easy.

It was decided that a conventionalhorizontal tail would impose an unacceptableRCS penalty, and this necessitated theprovision of full-span, four-section elevens forpitch and roll control. They could not bedrooped as flaps, and leading-edge high-liftdevices were judged to be impractical. Thecontrol surfaces were sealed with flexible

RAM, with no appreciable gap between thewing itself and the flaps.

The engine exhausts were made byASTECH/MI and tapered from the standardcircular section to a broad, flat slot, five feetwide, but only four inches deep. The broad,flat louvres were manufactured from nickelalloy 718 honeycomb sandwich to cope withheat and pressure. They incorporate baffles tokeep the flow straight, with other baffles andplates to break up radar waves, and to blockany view of the hot exhaust of the engine.Bypass air cools the surrounding structure andthe exhaust plume itself, while heat-reflectivetiles protect the most vulnerable parts of thestructure. The wide, flat exhaust plume coolsvery quickly, making the aircraft lessvulnerable to detection by IR-based sensors.

Tailfins were selected for yaw control,instead of split eleven tips, which would havehad less control authority and which wouldhave generated greater drag. The tailfins werealways going to be canted, since a vertical finwould inevitably reflect radar waves straightback at their source. The XST's inward cantedfins had been designed to shield the engineexhausts from above, which they did, thoughthey also hindered dissipation of the hotexhaust gases, making the aircraft more visibleto IR sensors. The production aircraft wouldhave had its fins far too far apart if they hadbeen mounted outboard of the platypusexhausts, whether canted inboard or outboard.Instead, an outward canted V tail was mountedon an extension to the fuselage spine.

Above: All apertures inthe F-117A's skin arecovered, sealed withRAM putty, or coveredby radar-reflecting andabsorbing screens. TheIRADS turrets lie behinda fine wire mesh, whilecruder screens cover theengine intakes.

F- I I 7A

INTERNAL WEAPONS BAYDucking under the broad, not quite flat belly, the pilot checks insidethe undercarriage bays, and inside the bomb bay. It was clear fromthe start that the F-117A would carry its weapons internally, sinceexternal carriage would have made a low RCS impossible to obtain.This necessitated the provision of a large internal weapons bay, andthis drove the size of the aircraft. The F-117A's weapons bay islocated between the engines, with a unique hoist or trapeze providedfor weapon loading and launching. The bay is actually divided intotwo, with separate doors hinged at the inboard edge, closest to thecenterline. Each bay actually has a separate trapeze.

In use, the trapeze can swing down below thelevel of the aircraft's belly, giving the aircraftthe theoretical capability of carrying rail-launched missiles like the AIM-9 Sidewinderor AGM-65 Maverick. Originally, all weaponshad to be released from the lowered trapeze,with bombs dropping off under gravity, andnot being ejected pyrotechnically. Smallperforated baffles swung down in front of thetrapezes to improve airflow for bomb release.Use of the trapeze in the lowered position isnot favored, since it increases the time duringwhich the doors are open, and radicallyincreases the aircraft's radar cross sectionduring this time. It has been calculated thatuse of the trapeze actually increases exposuretime by about a factor of five. The trapezenow remains within the bay when freefallweapons are being dropped, making an LCBdrop relatively quick, and exposing theaircraft to the risk of detection for a shortertime.

The weapons bay was sized toaccommodate the GBU-10 Paveway II LGB,based on the 2,000 Ib Mk 84 iron bomb. Theweapon has a gimballed seeker, with full-deflection guidance, meaning that the controlfins can move only to the neutral position orto full deflection. This means that the bombbounces from one side of the 'basket' to theother, losing energy and momentum. Whenusing a Paveway ll-based weapon it is vital tolob it accurately into the center of the 'basket'(the cone of reflected laser energy reflectedby the target) and to 'lase' (designate) thetarget late. This gives the minimum number ofcorrections to the bomb to prevent itporpoising down the basket, losing energy allthe way. In the normal mode, the F-117A'scomputer shuts off the laser (which has up tonow been providing range information) as thebomb is released, firing it again only secondsfrom impact. This ensures that the bomb hitsat a better angle, with much greatermomentum.

Ironically, sizing the bay for the GBU-1 0

made it too short to accommodate the basicPaveway III 2,000 Ib bomb, which was beingdeveloped by Texas Instruments amid greatsecrecy at much the same time as the F-11 7A.The new bomb used a novel proportionalguidance system, moving the control surfacesonly as much as was necessary to makeminor corrections to the course. This meantthat the bomb 'flapped about' far less in thebasket, retaining more energy. When it wasfinally unveiled, it became apparent that theGBU-24 Paveway Ill's long wings projectedwell beyond the tail when retracted, and aspecial derivative of the weapon wasdeveloped for carriage by the F-11 7, using theshorter 500 Ib Mk 82-based Paveway II GBU-12 tail. The smaller tail restricted low-leveltoss-bombing performance, but this was neverintended to be a feature of F-11 7A operations.With the new tail, the Mk 84-based PavewayIII became the GBU-27B, while a similarweapon using the hard (4340 steel alloy)-cased, tail-fused BLU-109B penetratorbecame the GBU-27A/B. Even with theshorter tail, the GBU-27s are almost as longas the weapons bay itself and there wereonce fears that the bombs would have to belowered on their trapezes before release.Fortunately, trials showed that the weaponcould be dropped directly out of the bay,without lowering the trapeze. The GBU-27can be dropped in two modes with pre-programmed impact angles, either following aballistic trajectory against targets with somevertical extent, or pitching nose down topenetrate vertically.

It seems likely that the GBU-10 and GBU-27 are actually the only weapons routinelycarried by the F-11 7A, although some otherweapons have seen limited use, and yetothers (probably including the nuclear B.61)have been cleared for use, but have not beendeployed operationally. Some 27 500-lbGBU-12 Paveway Us were used on a coupleof occasions during the Gulf War, mostnotably against oil-filled trenches andpipelines in Kuwait. At one stage, the F-117Asquadrons also wanted to use unguided CBUsagainst SAM sites, but the weapons werebeing used by A-1 Os and F-16s, and couldnot be transported to Khamis Mushayt.Unguided 2,000 Ib bombs were also used bythe F-11 7A for attacks on a large factorybuilding for which intelligence could provideno specific aim point, and against which itwould have been wasteful to use anexpensive guidance kit! In the early days of

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the program, the USAF's position was that theaircraft carried "the full range of tacticalmunitions in the inventory", but in recentyears the statement has tended to be that theF-117A is compatible with "a full range" ofsuch munitions. The USAF would certainlylike to expand the range and weight ofweapons carried by the F-11 7A, but theaircraft is severely limited by the size of its

internal weapons bays.During the pilot's walk-around inspection

he will look up into the bay with great care,probably using a torch, and perhaps with hisgroundcrew holding more light sources.Inside the bay he checks the condition andcorrect attachment of various locking wiresand fuse settings, and makes sure that thearming lanyards have been fitted properly.

Above: A GBU-10Paveway II hangs downon the starboard trapeze(on the left of thispicture) with the moremodem GBU-27Paveway III on the porttrapeze.

F- I I 7A

INTO THE COCKPITFollowing the walk-around, the pilot again mounts the flimsyaluminium ladder to the cockpit, steps over the sill, and settles intothe seat. Inevitably, he will be followed by one of the groundcrew,who will pass him the mountain of paperwork and equipment that hewill require during the flight ahead. Despite the sophisticatednavigation system, the pilot will take several maps on the mission, alarge-scale one showing the IP-to-target run and the egress, andothers showing the overall routeing and diversions, with timings, fuelstates, and headings to fly, as well as headings to fly to the bestdiversion at each point of the mission. In a pre-OCIP aircraft thepilot would have had to refer to his maps, since his monochromeMFDs would have displayed only a graphic representation of theroute, but in a post-OCIP aircraft the digital moving map shouldmake his conventional paper maps more of a back-up. He will havetarget photos (taken by satellite, U-2 or intelligence assets in-country) and a checklist of operations for every stage of the flight,with comprehensive emergency procedures to deal with any crisis.

Below: Colonel AltonWhitley was the first TACpilottoflytheF-1l7A,and as a Lt Col led thefirst frontline unit. Helater led the 37th TFW towar in the Gulf, and isseen here on his returnto Nellis AFB.

As the groundcrew remove the ladder andmake ready for the pilot to taxi, he stowsaway all his kit (which might include an NBCsuit and mask) and begins to go through thepre-flight checklist. For a typical operationalflight, the initial checks take up to an hour, asthe pilot exhaustively satisfies himself as tothe correct operation of the aircraft's various

systems. Probably the pilot's first action oncethe ladder has been removed from thecockpit rail is to insert the electronic memorycartridge (the EDTM, or Electronic DataTransmission Module) into the Data TransferUnit. This loads the mission plan into theaircraft computer. If the EDTM fails tofunction, or if last-minute changes have tomade, the pilot can input the data directly,using a key pad.

Although the F-117A is not renowned asbeing unreliable, the aircraft can betemperamental and is sometimes prone toground aborts. If there is a spare aircraft, andif there is time, the pilot will unload hisEDTM, grab his maps and photos and sprintto the spare aircraft and, exceptionally, mightfind himself getting as far as beginning thechecklist in three different aircraft. It certainlyis not unheard of. During the process, thepilot can communicate with the groundcrew,whose headsets are plugged into a socket inthe nosewheel bay via a long umbilical. Asthe pilot runs through his checklist, thegroundcrew have their own checks andprocedures to follow. For a no-kidding

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operational sortie, the bomb bay doors aresealed with metallic tape and are then'buttered' with RAM putty or sprayed withRAM paint. The canopy may undergo similartreatment. The standing joke is that the finalitem on the pre-taxi checklist is to ensure thatthe RAM putty is properly dry! All RAMrepairs are checked using a JOST gun,ensuring that the radar reflectiveness andabsorption characteristics are uniform acrossold and new skin.

Like the aircraft itself, the cockpit of the F-11 7 was shaped by its genesis within theblack world. Existing equipment was usedwherever possible, since any new item mightattract the unwelcome question, "What's itfor?" Thus the cockpit does not represent thevery cutting edge of man-machine interfacetechnology and does not represent the state ofthe art. The main instrument panel issomewhat cluttered, with three large displayscreens; the central one is a TV dedicated todisplaying imagery from the FUR and DLIR,with slightly smaller multi-function displays toits left and right. These are surrounded byinput buttons, allowing the pilot to call up avariety of displays and menus.

The rest of the panel includes a cluster ofstandby analogue flight instruments in the farleft hand corner, armament and bomb doorcontrols below the left hand MFD, a radalt,standby artificial horizon and slip ball belowthe right hand screen, and with a g-meter,engine and fuel instruments on the right handside of the panel. Clusters of four warningannunciator lights are mounted at the apex ofthe instrument panel, on each side of theHUD. These are not the normal systemswarnings found in other aircraft types though,they are warning lights which illuminate if theaircraft's low observability is compromised,and indicate the nature of the problem.

Pilots from some aircraft types might evenfind certain items in the cockpit familiar, andcertainly few find adapting to the F-11 7difficult. An F/A-18 Hornet pilot would feelimmediately at home, since the stick-top,throttles, modified Kaiser AVQ-18 HUD andTexas Instruments multi-function displayscreens are standard F/A-18 items, togetherwith the fuel controls. Although the HUDitself was from the F/A-1 8, the optics werefrom the Alpha )et. The primary sensordisplay was developed for use in the OV-10Dand P-3C, while the navigation system wastaken from the B-52. The simplicity andfamiliarity of the cockpit helps to explain whythere is no two-seat trainer version of theaircraft. There doesn't need to be. The

cockpit has few unique features, and any fastjet pilot worth his salt could probably masterthe Stealth Fighler by reading the flightmanual and listening carefully to a good brieffrom an instructor. In fact, conversion to theaircraft is eased through use of a simulator,though the first pilots in the programconverted to the airplane without this luxury.

Although the F-11 7A has undergone a fairlymajor upgrade, including modernization ofthe cockpit, this is not readily apparent untilthe displays are switched on. From a cursoryglance, or even from the brief check of keyitems before the walk-around, the F-11 7Acockpit today looks much the same as it hasalways been.

If the F-11 7 were being built today, it wouldalmost certainly have a more conventional-looking cockpit canopy, giving the pilot abetter view of the outside world. But at thetime it was built, the F-11 7 needed a canopythat was as faceted as the aircraft itself, andthis required a strong backbone structure.Furthermore, it proved impossible to givetransparent materials the same radarabsorption and reflectivity characteristics assolid materials, even though they were thinlycoated with gold, so they were limited in sizeand area. The five transparencies in thecanopy and windscreen were manufactured

Above: The F-117A'scockpit has beenmodernised andupgraded, and this photoshows the pre-OCIPconfiguration. Two CRTMFDs flank the centralIRADS display screen, onwhich an IR picture isdisplayed in eerie greenmonochrome. The pilotcarries checklists andtarget photos on hiskneeboards.

F- I I 7A

by the Sierracin/Sylmar Corporation. Thus theF-11 7 has a more heavily framed canopy thanany other tactical aircraft in the inventory,and when it is closed, the cockpit seemsdarker, more claustrophobic, and offerspoorer visibility than anything the averagefighter pilot has experienced. The pilot has noview of his rear hemisphere, and the viewdown over the nose and to the sides is poor.Keeping track of an opponent in an air-to-airclose-in dogfight would be virtuallyimpossible in this 'fighter'.

But in keeping with US practice andtradition, the F-117's cockpit is at least largeand spacious, a far cry from the cramped(loyal pilots call them snug!) quarters in someEuropean fighters. And the cockpit iscomfortable. The F-11 7 cockpit has clearlybenefited from the input of pilots themselvesand from some high-powered human-factorsand ergonomics specialists. The aircraft iscomfortable to fly for extended periods,allowing long-range and high-enduranceoperations without unacceptable degradationof pilot performance. Short of installing twoseats, a crew rest bunk, a toilet and a galley(all features of the latest Russian 'tactical'aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-27IB) the aircraft couldnot be better for long flights.

The ejection seat is a standard McDonnellDouglas ACES II seat, re-painted in certainareas to reduce 'glint', but otherwiseunchanged. The seat is rocket-powered forsmooth acceleration (reducing the likelihoodof back injuries) and is capable of operationat zero height and zero forward speed. But,more than in other tactical aircraft, the F-11 7pilot is aware that the seat is only one link inhis 'escape system'. When sitting under acresof clear perspex, pilots realize that, inextremis, they could probably eject throughthe canopy if it failed to jettison, or if theembedded detonator cord failed to explodethe canopy into powder and fragments. Manyseats even have sharp steel spikes in theirhead fairings for just this eventuality. But theheavy steel structure of the F-11 7 canopymakes it immediately apparent that ejectionwould be impossible unless the canopy wasjettisoned first. Checking that the safety pinsfor canopy jettison have been removed maythus have just a touch more significance tothe F-11 7 pilot.

Once strapped in, the pilot reaches forwardand pulls back the elephant ears (large hingedanti-glare shields), which are stowed atop theinstrument panel coaming. These shield theinstruments and screens from light outside thecockpit (preventing distracting reflections),

F-1 17A COCKPIT LAYOUT

Noteworthy features of the F-1 17Acockpit included 'eyebrow' RCS warninglights along the edges of the cockpitcoaming, in a positioncalculated to makethem ideal 'attention-getters'.All engineparameters aredisplayed digitally,below and to the rightof the starboard CRTscreen.The cockpitshown is typical of anOCIP I aircraft.

HOTASThe designers clustered allvital controls on the throttleand control column, allowingthe pilot to make all necessaryroutine switch selectionswithout taking his hands off theflying controls.This is known asHOTAS (Hands-On-Throttle-And-Stick).The controls on thethrottles included a full freedom ofmovement thumb rocker which thepilot used to move the IRADSturret over the target. Depressingthe switch generated the solid boxused to obtain a contrast lock. Rotaryrockers on the front of the throttlewere used to adjust image level andgain, while a'Pinkie' switch on theouter face of the throttles dimmed allcockpit lighting. The throttle alsoaccomodated the black hot/white hotselector and the radio transmit switch.

and hide the F-11 7's own instrument glowoutside the cockpit. Starting the engines issimple, and is achieved by using the built-inAPU. The engines are non-afterburningGeneral Electric F404-GE-F1D2 turbofans,each rated at approximately 48 kN (10,800 Ibst). These were derived from the engines usedby the F/A-18 Hornet, and had a three-stagefan, with a bypass ratio of 0.34. The relativelylow bypass ratio minimizes mass flow, thusminimizing the size, volume and weight ofthe engine intakes and intake ducts. From thefan, the airflow passes through a seven-stagehigh pressure compressor, an annularcombustion chamber, and single-stage highand low pressure turbines.

FLYING CONTROLSThe flying controls of the F-l I7A areentirely conventional, with rudderpedals and a centrally-mounted 'long-throw' stick, rather than the pressure-sensing sidestick used in the F-l6.

DISPLAY SCREENSBelow the HUD is a small screenshowing attack profile andautopilot modes, with inputbuttons above and below.Themain IRADSTV display is flankedby two high resolution CRTdisplays, the right one beingcapable of displaying IRADSimagery.

STICK1 Attack 'commit' button2 Reversionary trimmer3 Attack modes selector4 Nosewheel steering disengage

F- I I 7A

RADIO SILENT TAKE OFFAt Tonopah, the aircraft inevitably taxied out in darkness, usuallywithout any external lights. A FLIR picture could be displayed in theHUD, but NVGs (Night Vision Goggles), which would have beenuseful for looking out of the aircraft outside the FLIR's gimbal limits,were not used. The aircraft were guided by groundcrew with torchesor glowing 'wands'. The aircraft would usually taxi out with its noseoleo mounted taxi-light on, and with wingtip navigation lightsglowing. The flashing red anti-collision beacon is a peacetime onlyoption, however, since it is scabbed on externally, increasing RCS.

Right: An F-117A enmute to Baghdad, asseen by the boomer of aKC-135 tanker. Theglowing green dots oneach side of the cockpitare the lights whichallow the pilot to checkthat his intakes are noticing up.

Below: The F-117Acockpit, pre-OCIP. Thecockpit is stronglyreminiscent of that of theF/A-18, and uses some ofthe same instruments. Itis dominated by theunique IRADS display,flanked by a pair of CRTmulti-function displays.The stick top is basicallythat of the F/A-18, albeitwith different switchesand buttons to suit theStealth Fighters' uniquerole.

The entire mission may be radio silent, fromstart-up to shut-down, though usually thereare brief routine reports to be made atspecific points during the mission. Trainingflights are made under the same proceduresas are used by other tactical aircraft, andduring the Black years at Tonopah the aircraftwere operated under the guise of being A-7s.

The F-11 7 A is an easy aircraft to taxi, with a

good turning radius on the ground, and withreasonable visibility on the ground. The pilotcan use the boresighted FLIR to taxi accuratelyeven in total darkness. Reaching the holdingpoint, the F-11 7 A pilot conducts his final pre-takeoff checks and then taxies onto therunway as briefed. He might do this at a pre-briefed time, or on receiving a visual signalfrom the tower, or from a runway caravan.With no flaps and no afterburner, the aircraftaccelerates slowly and uses a lot of runwaybefore it reaches unstick speed (180 kt, 207mph). The F-117A's engines are relativelywidely spaced, although the broad flatexhausts minimize thrust asymmetry in theevent of an engine failure. If an engine doesfail after takeoff, the pilot will already havereached single-engined safety speed, and theaircraft can easily be held straight usingrudder. The rudder pedals are actuallydisabled when the gear is retracted, and an

THE MISSION

automatic yaw trimmer takes over. In mostcases, the correct drill following an enginefailure is to retract the landing gear andmaintain AoA and bank angle, letting theaircraft keep itself straight using the yawtrimmer.

Airborne, the pilot retracts the landing gear,moving his left hand briefly from the throttlesto the chunky up/down selector at the base of

the right hand side of the main panel,watching for the three green lights toextinguish, confirming that the gear is up andlocked. The hiss of bleed air increases, justslightly, as the gear doors close fully, whilethere is a dull thump as the blow-in auxiliaryintake doors shut. With the gear up, theaircraft's RCS is suddenly minuscule, and ifnavigation lights were used on the ground,they are now turned off and will remain off(except perhaps during in-flight refuelling)until the aircraft is back in the circuit,preparing to land. Once in cruising flight, thepilot will check fuel flow and contents. Fuel isthe preoccupation of every military pilot,since missions are inevitably tightly plannedwith regard to payload/fuel/rangeconsiderations. The F-117A has an internalfuel capacity of some 12,000 Ib, and innormal flight, fuel flow is about 3,000 Ib perhour. The F-11 7A cockpit is a relatively

pleasant working environment, slightly noisierthan that of the A-10, but considerably quieterthan the cockpits of aircraft like the F-4, F-1 5and Jaguar.

Shortly after takeoff, the Stealth pilotnormally makes a radio check. First hereaches down with his right hand and flips thetoggle switch for the RLS from 'RETRACT'through 'AUTO' to 'EXTEND'. This extends a

tiny retractable blade antenna above thefuselage spine, offset slightly to starboard. Thistiny antenna dramatically affects the aircraft'sradar cross section, so has to be retractable,and is extended only briefly and only infriendly airspace. The 'AUTO' position wouldextend the antenna automatically when thepilot thumbed his radio transmit switch, but ifhe did this inadvertently over hostile territorythe consequences could be serious, so hewould most likely check and retract theantenna, leaving the switch in retract, with thepower switch next to it in the 'OFF' position.He will extend the antenna only whenexpecting a pre-briefed message, perhaps aGo-No Go codeword. During the black yearsat Tonopah, antennas would be left extendedfor the duration of the mission, and the pilotwould make routine radio calls as though hewere flying a LANA-equipped A-7 - theF-11 7A's 'cover'.

Above: F-117As en routeto the target. Picturedfrom a tanker is anF-117A waiting (or hiswingman to finishrefuelling. In thebackground, anotherF-117A approachesanother KC-10 tanker.

F- I I 7A

INSTRUMENT FLYING

Above: TheF-117A'sautopilot is linked to theINS and missioncomputer and isprogrammed to maketurns which minimiseexposure to hostile radar.

The F-117A's sophisticated quadruplex fly-by-wire control system makes it a simple,easy aircraft to fly, although on a typicaloperational mission, the F-117A pilotactually does little real 'piloting', leavingmost of the flight in the capable hands of theaircraft's highly sophisticated autopilot. Thiscan fly the entire planned mission withoutfurther input from the pilot, turning,changing altitude and adjusting throttlesettings and airspeed in order to keep toplanned times. Turns made by the autopilotare carefully planned to minimize exposureto known hostile radars, carefully controllingthe angle of bank.

The control column does not move whenautopilot is engaged, and if the pilot moves it,he automatically engages the control sticksteering mode, disabling the autopilot whilehe maneuvers. The autopilot will then holdthe new attitude, heading or altitude, untildirected to return to the planned mission.

This is perhaps fortunate, since flying atnight is in itself a demanding and difficultbusiness (as is any instrument flying). There ismuch scope for disorientation and confusionwhen visual cues become unreliable orconfusing - for instance when stars in the skyand lights on the ground are similar enoughto be confused. The important thing is tobelieve your flight instruments and to avoidhead movements (especially rapid headmovements) as far as is possible. In the F-11 7 A this is impossible, since the flightinstruments (including the basic instrumentflying T') are not located centrally on thepanel. To fly on instruments, the StealthFighter pilot must look to the left, while tochange radio frequencies he must leanforward far enough for his head to tell himthat his aircraft has rolled and climbed. Addin tiredness and fatigue, and it can be seenthat flying the F-11 7A at low level, at night,by hand, could be a very dangerous business.

But at the same time, simply sitting back,hands off, and monitoring the various systemsraises its own challenges. Without the task ofphysically flying the aircraft, it can be difficultto maintain concentration, and on longtransits the seat can become veryuncomfortable. For ferry flights through safeairspace, the pilot will sit on an air-filledplastic doughnut, much like a child's rubber

ESCAPING DETECTIONDuring the long transit to the target, the F-117A is not entirelyinvisible, and the pilot must remain alert to the presence of lowcloud, moonlight, and cloud above his aircraft, in order to avoidbeing sighted visually by other aircraft or from the ground.

During high-altitude flight, with the precisealtitudes differing according to the conditions,conventional aircraft can produce aconspicuous vapor trail (contrail), which actsas a giant arrow pointing to the exact positionof the aircraft. One way to avoid this is to flyabove or below the air in which contrails areforming, or alternatively, fuel additives can beused to reduce the size of the individualdroplets of moisture within the trail. F-11 7As

routinely avoid flying at altitudes wherecontrail formation is likely, and may also usefuel additives, though this cannot beconfirmed.

Even if the F-11 7A is effectively invisible tomost types of radar, there is a problem withvery low frequency radar, which can evendetect the massive volume of turbulent airgenerated by the aircraft's passage throughthe sky. Some sources suggest that cruisingspeeds are optimized to minimize waketurbulence, and that flight plans also takeaccount of high-level winds to reduce thesize of the aircraft's 'wake'.

THE MISSION

ring, but to eject while sitting on one of thesewould be dangerous, since it would compressunder acceleration. Other aids used on longferry flights can also be used during long-range bombing missions however. Flightsurgeons on the F-11 7 A force are more thanhappy to prescribe the amphetamine

IR SIGNATUREAlthough effectively invisible tomany types of radar, the F-1 I 7A isvisible to the naked eye, and toheat-detecting sensors.Theaircraft's IR (Infra Red, orheat) signature iscarefully managed andevery effort is made toavoid 'hot spots'

Right: The broad, flat exhausts ofthe F-117A spread the jet effluxout, giving it a larger surface area,which cools more rapidly than theconventional 'tight' cylinder of airproduced by a conventionalengine nozzle.

Dexedrine though the pilots themselves preferrock and roll played (very loud) on a SonyWalkman hooked up to the helmet.'Piddlepacks' are also routinely carried, torelieve the pressure on bladders andkidneys.

Above: An F-117A pilot isilluminated by the greenglow of his instrumentsand displays as he taxiesout of his Canyon atTonopah.

F- I I 7A

REFUELLINGThe faceting which gives the F-117A its unique appearance and lowobservability also imposes limitations. The aircraft is not asaerodynamically efficient as it would have been had the fuselage beengracefully curved and faired, and it has been estimated that the sharpangles and multiple planes of the surface impose a fuel consumptionpenalty of about 20%. This is exacerbated by the unusual engineoutlet design, which is less efficient than a conventional straight-through round jet pipe. The thrust and efficiency penalties imposedby the broad flat nozzles have not been publicly quantified, butcertainly further degrade performance and range.

Above: Once the F-117Aemerged from the 'BlackWorld', it could refuelfrom any air forcetanker, and was notlimited to operating withspecially selected crewsfrom one Beale-basedunit. The F-117A is alarge aircraft for a single-seater, and is notdwarfed by the bulk ofthis 22nd ARWKC-WAExtender from MarchAFB, California.

This makes in-flight refuelling a vital part ofF-11 7A operations, and a revolving in-flightrefuelling receptacle was provided on theupper fuselage centerline, just behind thecanopy. Like all USAF aircraft, the F-117A isequipped to receive fuel from a tanker with arigid boom, rather than using a probe toengage a drogue on the end of a flexible hosetrailed by a tanker, as favored by the USNavy, RAF, and most European air arms.

The probe and drogue method of in-flightrefuelling demands little from the tanker crew,who simply stream one or more hoses, andmaintain a pre-briefed flightpath while theaircraft requiring fuel plug in to the drogues.More than one aircraft can be refuelled at anyone time, though the rate of flow from asingle hose is considerably less than ispossible through a solid boom. Moreover,refuelling is a very difficult business for thepilot of the receiver aircraft, who has to guidehis probe (which may be offset to one side,and on some aircraft may not even be easilyvisible to him!) into a tiny drogue basket,which his own slipstream will tend to disturband push this way and that. "Like trying toshove spaghetti up a wildcat's backside" isone common description of the procedure,while many pilots use the cruder aphorism,"it's like trying to take a running fuck at a

rolling doughnut." Missing the basket canhave serious consequences, too. Probes canbe easily damaged, as can the drogue basketsthemselves. Add bad weather, turbulence anddarkness, and in-flight refuelling can becomeboth difficult and stressful.

The 'flying boom' method is less stressfulfor the receiver pilot, who simply maintainsposition below the tanker, while a dedicatedoperator (the boomer) uses aerodynamiccontrol surfaces on the end of the boom to'fly' its nozzle into the receiver aircraft'sreceptacle. Each method has its adherents,but the flying boom method is firmlyentrenched within the US Air Force.

Simply finding the tanker is not easy for theF-11 7A pilot. Other tactical aircraft can usetheir own onboard radar to search for tankers,or can be guided towards the tanker byAWACS or friendly ground radar.Alternatively, tanker and receiver can use air-to-air TACAN (Tactical Aid to Navigation) andDME (Distance Measuring Equipment) toeffect a rendezvous, but for the F-11 7, theprocedure is usually less simple, and less co-operative. The pilot normally relies on findingthe tankers autonomously, without radaremissions, using pinpoint navigation to findthe tankers in their orbit. The F-11 7 formatesoff the tanker's starboard wingtip, droppingback to a pre-contact position 50 ft behindthe tanker's extended refuelling boom, edgingforward in response to signals conveyed byflashing lights. The procedure is completelyradio silent.

To aid the boomer, the F-11 7A is fitted witha tiny light on the canopy apex, this shiningaft to illuminate the in-flight refuellingreceptacle. Normally, the 'boomer' would callthe receiver aircraft forward, constantlyupdating the distance between the twoaircraft in feet. But in the radio-silent world ofthe F-11 7A, the pilot of the Black Jet isresponsible for getting himself into thecontact position, referring to a yellowposition stripe on the tanker's belly, and tothe tanker's own lights. This is not easy, giventhe restricted upward visibility from the BlackJet's heavily-framed pyramidal canopy. Twosets of PDI (Pilot Direction Indicator) lightscontrolled by the boomer tell the pilot if he istoo low or too high. Once in position, andsteady, the F-11 7 pilot will see the tanker'sboom extend hydraulically towards hisaircraft's spine, but will have to crane hishead down and forward if he wants to lookup and see the boomer. He will hope for a

THE MISSION

successful contact first time. Without one hewill have to drop back, approach again, andre-establish his position. A failed contact isstressful for the boomer, too. All boomerscleared to refuel the F-11 7 are carefullybriefed on the delicacy of the aircraft's skinand it is a matter of some professional prideamong boomers to avoid 'dinging it' with theboom tip.

But while the F-11 7As remain 'radio silent'during refuelling, they do extend their smallradio antennas, ready to talk to the tankerpilot if something goes wrong, but above allwaiting for the tanker to transmit the code

nominally operate in pairs.The final refuelling will have been

conducted as close as is safe to the enemyborder, and, crossing this, the F-11 7A pilotconducts a brief 'Fence check', ensuring thatposition lights are off, aerials are retracted,that fuel is flowing correctly, and thatsufficient fuel remains to get back to thetanker, outbound. Crossing into enemyairspace in the knowledge that one has notmade the normal efforts to avoid enemyradar, the widely quoted reaction of oneBlack Jet pilot - "I hope this Stealth shit reallyworks!" - seems entirely understandable.

Below: An F-1"17'A seenplugged into a 9th SRWKC-135Q. The 9th SRW'sKC-135Qs for manyyears performed thesensitive task ofrefuelling the USAF's SR-71 Blackbird spyplanes.The 'Beale Bandits' werea natural choice toprovide tanker support tothe F-117A when it wasstill a highly classifiedblack world programme.

word that would mean that the mission wascancelled and that they were to return tobase. Once hooked up to the boom, though,the pilot can talk to the boomer on intercom,without using radio.

When the first F-11 7A finishes refuelling, itmoves to the tanker's port wing, stabilizingthere while the second aircraft refuels. Oncethe second aircraft finishes refuelling it joinsthe first off the port wing and then, after morecoded light flashing, both aircraft continuewith their mission. Using the flying boomrefuelling system meant that only one F-11 7Acould refuel from a tanker at once. Usuallyoperating in pairs, two F-117As would refuelfrom a single tanker, though more aircraftmight stack up off the tanker's wing if tankerassets were scarce. Once he leaves the tanker,the F-11 7A pilot will be unlikely to see hiswingman again, even though the aircraft

Left: On operations, anF-117A could approachthe tanker without lights,though even those visiblehere would be virtuallyinvisible to the nakedeye, being visibleprimarily in the IRspectrum. Wingtipnavigation lights are seenhere, along with intakelights and the inflightrefuelling receptacle lightshining aft from thecanopy apex. A faintglow can also be seenfrom the engine exhaustoutlets.

F- I I 7A

ATTACK HEADINGThe mission will almost certainly have been planned with frequentturns, these being flown by the autopilot in order to minimizeexposure to hostile radar. If unexpected (mobile) radars areencountered the pilot will assess whether to fly around them ordirectly at them (frontal aspect stealthiness is the lowest of all on theF-117). Generally though, the pilot of the F-117A remains a systemsmonitor for most of the flight, which is flown hands-off by theautopilot.

At the final pre-IP turn point, the pilot (ormore accurately the autopilot) will turn ontoa new heading, probably the attack heading,and will continue to overfly the IP,descending to attack altitude if necessary. Hewill quickly check altitude, air speed andheading, and make sure that the computer isin the ATTACK mode. The altitude willdepend on a number of factors, includingatmospheric factors (which will affect theperformance of the FLIR and DLIR), and thenature of the target. In a conventional aircraft,the pilot will be 'maxed out' during the IP-to-target run, alert to enemy air defenses andready to take any evasive action necessary.The F-11 7A pilot should know that he isinvulnerable, and, in theory at least, heconcentrates on weapons delivery to theexclusion of all else. There is, reportedly, littleof the 'pucker factor' encountered bygenerations of bomber pilots in previouswars. The pilot will switch from thenavigation to the weapons delivery mode,arming the weapons, then switching thesystem to 'WEAPONS ARMED, OFF SAFE' toprevent accidental release.

TARGETING SENSORSThe F-l I7A relies on self-designating forits laser-guided bombs, using a pair ofcombined FLIR/laser designator turretsabove (FLIR) and below (DLIR) the nose.These form the Infra-Red Acquisition andDetection System (IRADS).The FLIR'hands over' to the DLIR as the targetpasses below the nose.

DLIR turret

FLIR turret

As he passes the IP, the target itself will bethe next waypoint, and the IRADS cross hairswill automatically position themselves overthe target area selected by the computer. Thisfar out, the cross hairs cover an area 'the sizeof two zip-codes', but the picture is rapidlyrefined as the target gets closer, and as thepilot fine-tunes the grain. For most of theflight the FLIR is usually locked forward, butas the aircraft approaches the target, thesensor is steered by the INS. Even in the wide'Field of View' mode, the sensor's viewpointis actually very narrow, and the INS thereforehas to be extremely accurate in order toensure that the target is within the sensor's

field of regard. Once the target has beenlocated in the wide field of view, the

FLIR switches to its narrow field ofview, with the cross hairs

remaining centered overthe target.

THE MISSION

Left: The presence ofblade antennas aboveand below the fuselageindicate that this is atraining mission. Duringoperations, antennas arekept retracted, and theunder/use/age red anti-collision light is notfitted. Even tinyprotruberances like thisdramatically increase theaircraft's radar crosssection, and multiply thechance of detection.

Below: The F-117Aspends most of its life atmedium level, where italone is almost immunefrom detection orinterception. Altitude isdetermined by therequirements of thesensors, with loweraltitudes being necessaryin hazy or dustyconditions. Here an F-117A nears its practicetarget (a trash can filledwith glowing coal) highover the Nevada desert,on a flight from Tonopah.

F- I I 7A

TARGET ACQUIREDThe sensors will actually acquire the target at between 10 and 15miles, depending on atmospheric and weather conditions, and thepilot adjusts the IRADS gain to optimize target contrast. Meanwhile,the pilot simultaneously checks his altitude, heading and airspeed,and selects 'ARM' on the master armament switch. He compares thetarget in the cross hairs with the target photo on his kneeboard, andchecks whether the cross hairs are correctly centered over thetarget. If they are not, he can slew them in any direction, using asmall TD button on the throttles. Oncehe is happy that the cross hairs are overthe exact aim point on the target, hepresses and releases the TD button.

The aim point may be a window or an airvent, or a precise point on a wall or roof, andis known as the DMPI (Designated MeanPoint of Impact) The aim point is now locked-up, and will be automatically tracked. Thelaser fires to determine slant range. The F-11 7A's laser designator is part of the IRADSsystem, and is duplicated in the FLIR andDLIR turrets. It is the only non-passive pieceof equipment on the aircraft and its use isthus carefully controlled. Unclassified reportswould seem to suggest that the laser remains'on' once it has fired to determine range, butthis seems most unlikely. Rather, it seems

more probable that the laser firesoccasionally to determine range, then firesbriefly for a continuous period to illuminatethe target after bomb release.

At some point, before the target 'disappears'under the nose, the FLIR automatically handsover to the DLIR. Many sources have castdoubts as to how this can be possible, sincethe DLIR does not appear to be able to lookforward as far as the FLIR looks down, sothere would appear to be a gap in coverage.In fact, at a point some way ahead of theaircraft, the FLIR and DLIR can see a targetsimultaneously. In order to achieve successful

SENSORTURRETSThe IRADS turretseach incorporatedthree apertures,one for the FLIR,one for the laserand one for asimple TV camera.The turrets werederived fromthose fitted to theRockwell OV-IODBronco.

THE MISSION

hand-offs from the FLIR to the DLIR (and viceversa), the two turrets must be boresighted onthe ground, by aligning both with the sametarget, simultaneously. To do this, the nose ofthe F-11 7 A has to be raised by rolling thenosewheel up a 30-in ramp.

It may be that the DLIR turret can moveback in its housing to squint forward alongthe belly of the aircraft, though this wouldseem difficult, even without the screencovering the turret. It may be that the FLIRcan look down more steeply to the side thanit can along the centerline, while the DLIR isoffset to starboard, set into a sloping part of

the underside, allowing it to look furtherforward than is generally realized, especiallyout to starboard. If the F-11 7 A approaches itstarget obliquely, there is certainly no gap inthe coverage between the two turrets, but it isunclear as to whether the two sensors can beboresighted on a target directly in front of theaircraft. However it is achieved, there is atransition from FLIR to DLIR, and this isusually marked by a small 'jump' in thepicture on the central display.

Above: The sensor turretis usually rotated with itswindows facing aft, intothe housing. The finemesh screen is hardlyvisible.

F- I I 7A

MAKE READYAs he approaches the target, the F-117A pilot will start to makeready for dropping his weapons, which will inevitably beconventional 2,000 Ib bombs, fitted with precision guidance kitswhich will allow them to 'home' onto laser energy reflected by thedesignated target.

The F-117A can designate its own targets,illuminating a precise point with a laserslaved to the IR sensor. On the ground, thelaser spot is approximately 12 to 18 inches indiameter. The seeker head of the bomb then'looks' for reflected laser energy of the rightfrequency, and the bomb guides itself ontothe illuminated point. All the F-11 7A pilot hasto do is to monitor that the cross hairs of thedesignator are centered on the target,intervening only to make minor adjustments,if necessary. This system is simple to use,even in a single-seat attack aircraft, and givesremarkable accuracy.

The watching world gasped at the DLIRimage of a 2,000 Ib LGB going straight downa one yard wide vent in the so-called AT&Tbuilding in the heart of Baghdad on the firstnight of Operation Desert Storm. It was greattelevision, but to the pilots of the Black Jetthis was little more than routine. Years before,

Below: The F-117's RAMcovering does not needto be black, and indeedthe first prototype andearly FSD aircraft werepainted in a mediumgrey. This actuallyproved more effective asa night camouflagecolour, black being toostark and too likely toproduce a 'hard'silhouette. But after theSR-71 and U-2R, theUSAF was determinedthat black was the rightcolour.

during the long black years at Tonopah,Stealth pilots had been used to nominatingspecific windows in certain motels as their'targets' during long range training missions.They expected a level of accuracy whichwould allow them to put a bomb through aparticular window, or down a particularairshaft. And during Desert Storm, almost nineout of ten bombs dropped by the F-11 7 hitwith similar accuracy, while the best otheraircraft types could manage was a 'hit rate'(against less 'pinpoint' targets) of about 30%.

Such a degree of accuracy is not just goodfor spectacular imagery on the TV news, ofcourse. The ability to put a bomb reliably ontarget within feet allows the F-11 7A to knockout bunkers and hardened facilities, with asecond bomb exploiting the weaknessescaused by a first weapon. In attacks againstunderground bunkers, for example, an initialbomb might penetrate the first couple of levels,with a second punching down to the heart ofthe complex. In the post Cold War world,accuracy also allows devastating attacksagainst legitimate targets with a minimum ofcollateral damage, and with minimal impacton the 'innocent' civil populace.

THE MISSION

Above and right: Twoviews of Tonopah-basedF-117As on trainingflights over Nevada andCalifornia during theearly days of theprogramme. The F-117A'sfaceted exterior wasdictated by the inabilityof Lockheedmathematicians to workout the RCS of a shapecomposed of compoundcurves. With increasedcomputer power, thisbecame possible, andaircraft like the B-2 andF-22 do not need to befaceted.

F- I I 7A

RISKING THE "GOLDEN BB"The ability to penetrate hostile defenses 'unseen', together with the proven ability to strike withthe utmost precision, inevitably means that the F-117A will be assigned the most difficulttargets. Tonight, our target must be hit within two seconds of the TOT (Time over target)detailed on the ATO (Air Task Order). Several aircraft will be hitting several targetssimultaneously. If one bomb impacts early, it will alert the defenses that something ishappening, and the enemy defenses will put up a wall of AAA, perhaps even blind-launchingSAMs. And while the intense fire will be unaimed, there is always the chance that some enemygunner will 'get lucky'. But until the bombs hit, the enemy are not even aware that there areStealth Fighters in the area.

In larger-scale attacks, the F-117A force mighthave to hit targets in the same area in waves,or one aircraft might wake up the defenseswith its first bomb, then drop its secondweapon on another target a few momentslater. During the Gulf War, pilots of the BlackJet frequently found themselves flying througha barrage of unaimed flak. Fortunately, nonewere hit, though it was nevertheless anextremely scary business. There are, ofcourse, ways and means of stacking the oddsin our favor. If a first bomb wakes up thedefenses, then the next aircraft might fly inbetween six and twenty minutes later,depending on the fire discipline of the enemygunners. They will have been firingconstantly for some five minutes, and willinevitably stop for a couple of minutes toallow their gun barrels to cool down. If thenext aircraft flies in before those barrels havecooled properly, their accuracy will besignificantly affected.

At the end of the day, if you are the guysitting in the cockpit, then it doesn't matter ifthe guy on the ground can see you or not. A57-mm shell hitting your airplane will doexactly the same damage if it hits you,whether it was deliberately aimed or just alucky break. The chance is always there thatyour wingman's bomb might wake thedefenses, or that a particularly lucky or skilledradar operator might connect that tiny returnamong the clutter with an F-117A and mightbe able to trigger the blind defensive barrage.The fact that Stealth Fighters came through 43days of the Gulf War unscathed isn'tnecessarily much comfort. If it's a chanceshot that's going to get you, and if they werelucky enough to avoid that one freak shot,that one 'golden BB' with F-11 7A engravedupon it, then it is natural to wonder whethersurely the odds might not be shortening. Soeven if the skies around you are quiet as youfly your final IP to target attack run, thatmight change before you actually releaseyour bomb, and the brief moments closest tothe target are naturally stressful.

Most F-11 7A pilots who have seen actionwould admit to being nervous in the targetarea, but equally, most would confirm thatthey were less nervous than perhaps theyexpected. Certainly, a SAM launch didn'tengender the bowel-loosening terror it mightif you were flying an F-1 6 (say) nor did itrequire violent evasive action orcountermeasures. But the first time a SAM iscoming up at you, not to react, and to go onflying along serenely is difficult enough. Youknow that the missile won't lock on to you,but there will always be doubts and 'Whatifs'. If it couldn't happen, you wouldn't havetrained so hard, and would not havepracticed specific maneuvers to defeatdifferent types of missile. Pilots are aware ofthe times in the history of the program whenradar was suddenly able to see the F-11 7A orthe 'Have Blue' or a model on a pole; whenthe sudden increase in signature was causedby fasteners that had suddenly projected afew thousandths of an inch from theotherwise smooth skin, or even when theperformance of a particular facet had beendestroyed through contamination by birddroppings. In the F-11 7A, even a minorbirdstrike (which you might not even feel, if itwas in a non-critical area) could easilyquadruple your radar cross section.

Luckily, the Gulf War gave plenty ofreassuring experiences, and these haveentered the folklore of the Stealth community.En route from one Baghdad target to another,Capt. Matt Byrd suddenly saw two brightwhite flashes off the right wing. Looking out,Byrd was close enough to see that the lightswere SAM rocket motors illuminating theground and the control vans around them asthey launched. The SA-3s initially looked as ifthey were guiding, but passed harmlesslybehind the aircraft, exploding far enoughaway to cause the young pilot no problems.Generally, experience has taught pilots of theBlack Jet that SAMs are not to be feared, butan unaimed wall of flak remains potentiallydangerous.

But the IP to target run is no time fornerves, nor indeed for any extraneousthoughts. There are weapon selections to bemade and procedures to be followed. So ashe flies in towards the target at a steady 480kts, the pilot will have to concentrate, and hewill have to ignore the distraction of AAA

(which may be heard as a series of pops, if itis close enough), or the potential for AAA.Many pilots actually make a deliberatedecision to keep their heads inside thecockpit, ignoring the outside world entirely,and focusing only on the job in hand. Someeven lower the ejection seat by a few inches.

Above: A pair ofGBU-27s topple fromthe weapons bays of anF-117A. AAA burstsharmlessly behind theaircraft, the gunnershaving receivedinadequate warning.

F- I I 7A

BOMB DOORS OPENWith the DMPI locked-up, the F-117 pilot flies on towards the target,perhaps making minor corrections to adjust for crosswind as steeringcues come up in the HUD and MFD. With no wind, the attackremains 'hands off'. With the laser measuring range, the computerwill eventually generate 'within range' symbology in the HUD and onthe MFD, and if the pilot agrees he presses the pickle button on thestick. This does not necessarily release the weapon, however, since inthe normal attack mode, the pilot's selection has merely given hisconsent to the attack, and the computer then selects the optimumtime for bomb release, taking into account the wind, airspeed, andthe bomb's ballistic characteristics and predicted trajectory.

Below: A GBU-27 ismanoeuvred below an F-117A, for loading intothe port weapons bay.The Paveway IIIguidance kit is not fitted.

The bomb doors open with a 'clunk' that canbe heard and felt in the cockpit, and thensnap shut when the bomb is clear. As theyopen, the aircraft begins to vibrate, as airbuffets into the weapons bays, and DOORSOPEN warning lights blaze into life on the

instrument panel, telling the pilot that he'ssuddenly lost much of his invisibility. Becausethey open to a vertical position, open bombdoors present a marvellous radar target. Forevery second that the bomb doors are open,the F-117A has effectively lost its invisibilityto enemy radar. With them open, the F-11 7A'sradar cross section is huge, much like that ofa conventional fighter, and the aircraft is thusbriefly potentially vulnerable to hostile fire.The doors therefore stay open for theminimum possible period, usually closingbefore an enemy radar will have made asingle sweep. There have been reports thatbomb door opening is actually linked to theRHAWS (Radar Homing And WarningSystem), which prevent opening if the aircraftis being 'painted' by a hostile radar.

THE MISSION

Above: An inert GBU-27A/B falls from theopen bay of Scorpion 5'(784), the last of the FSDF-117As. Test camerasare fitted in facetedfairings below theaircraft's wings. In theearly days, weaponswere dropped from theextended trapeze, butthese are now cleared tobe dropped straight fromthe weapons bays. Theaircraft has a well-patched appearance.

Right: Groundcrewsecure a GBU-27 to thestarboard trapeze. Theaircraft appears to befitted with the newer,composite bomb baydoors. The GBU-27 (thisone is still without itscontrol fins fitted) isbasically a BLU-109penetrator fitted with aPaveway III seeker andthe smaller Paveway IItail.

F- I I 7A

LASER LOCK ON

The laser will keep locked onto the target, but will fire briefly beforeimpact to illuminate and designate the target. The DLIR turret movesslightly in its gimballed mount to keep the laser pointing directly atthe target, 'steered' by the auto-tracker. Inside the cockpit, the pilotwatches the central IRADS display, monitoring that the cross hairsremain centered on the DMPI, ready to make corrections if they donot. The pilot may suddenly see the bomb appear in the bottom ofthe display, and may see it streak into the DMPI. He will certainlysee the target explode, with doors blowing out of bunkers to markthe success of the attack.

Top: When the F-117emerged from the BlackWorld, its operating unitwas able to adopt aformal frontline fighterwing identity.Accordingly, the 4450thTactical Group becamethe 37th Tactical FighterWing. A handful ofaircraft wear largetailcodes reflecting thewing and individualsquadron identities.

In most circumstances, the defenses will beunaware of his presence until now, and itwould be typical that AAA would begin toexplode behind him, as he egresses.Happiness is AAA in your rear-view mirror!

The F-117A normally delivers its bombsfrom straight and level flight, there being littleneed for the accuracy of a dive attack usingLGBs (which are inherently accurate anyway)and with no need to loft the bombs in orderto avoid overflying the target. Loft attacks arepossible however, and software has beendeveloped to allow the technique to be used,though a dive for speed and pull-up to loftwill typically require three handovers backand forth between the FLIR and DLIR.

The Stealth Fighter's complete reliance oninfrared sensors for target acquisition andtracking is the key to its invulnerability in thetarget area. If the F-11 7A pilot had to use

radar, its emissions would be detected (andcould be pinpointed). It would be like using atorch in a dark room. Even if you don't shinethe torch at your enemy, he can see exactlywhere you are. But at the same time, electro-optical and IR sensors impose their ownlimitations. The most serious of theselimitations is the aircraft's almost totalinability to drop bombs in anything but clearweather. During the Gulf war, huge numbersof F-11 7A missions were scrubbed due topoor weather over the target, and yet moreended with the aircraft being forced to dropon secondary targets, or even bringing theirbombs home.

If you can't see the target, you can't hit it.And if you can't see your secondary targeteither, you'll have to take your bombs home,or jettison them in some pre-designated safearea. Even if you can see the target, thethinnest layer of wispy cloud can be enoughto make your bomb miss the DMPI, as itdisrupts laser designation. The vulnerability ofthe F-11 7A's IRADS was demonstratedconclusively during the Gulf War. Successfulmissions frequently hid some alarmingshortfalls. Amid the celebrations surroundingthe first night attacks it went barely unnoticedthat of 60 bombs carried to their targets, only49 were dropped, and of the 49 bombsdropped, only 28 actually hit their aim

THE MISSION

Right: The small fairings aft of the star and bar eachcontain a radar reflector. These are fitted on trainingmissions to allow the aircraft to be tracked by ATC.

points! Even ignoring the bombs that werenot dropped, this represented only a 55% hitrate, while F-111s scored a 70% hit rate onthe same night. (F-111s, of course, would nothave performed so well over Baghdad, andmany might have been lost to AAA andSAMs.) The third wave of eight aircraftperformed particularly badly, scoring onlyfive hits because of a bank of cloud whichrolled in, obscuring many targets. On thesecond night, things went slightly better. Of48 bombs put into the air, 23 direct hits wererecorded. But poor weather on the third nightallowed only six hits, with 1 7 hits on thefourth and fifth nights.

Weather conditions were 'perfect' on 21/22January, but even then, two misses (of 28bombs dropped) were recorded by the secondwave. When F-11 7As attacked Tu-16 bombersin their revetments at Al Taqaddum, onlythree of the eight bombers were destroyed,leaving five survivors, which fortunately failedto carry out their planned chemical warfaremission. On 24/25 January, a strike againstHASs at Kirkuk and Qayyara West provedcompletely fruitless. A wave of ten F-11 7Asscored no less than 19 no-drops, with thesingle bomb actually dropped scoring a miss.Another mission, against Tigris and Euphratesbridges, conducted by twelve F-11 7As theprevious night, scored the all-time record lowof 23 no-drops.

It would be too easy to overstate the F-117A's unreliability in poor weatherconditions. The fact remains that the aircraftwas and is capable of operating in airspace inwhich other bombers would sufferunacceptably heavy losses. Moreover, the F-11 7A's invisibility to radar allowed it to attacktargets with the advantage of total surprise.Again and again, targets attacked by theBlack Jet have received no warning untilbombs actually explode, when it is often toolate to respond. On 19 January 1991, theUSAF sent a force of 32 F-1 6 'bombers'against the Baghdad Nuclear Research Center(also known as Osirak), supported by 16 F-1 5escort fighters, four EF-111 jammers, eight F-4G SEAD aircraft and eleven KC-135 tankers.The Iraqis ignited smoke pots, whichcompletely obscured the target, and the raidcaused no significant damage, while two ofthe F-16s were shot down. On the night of

21/22 January, eight F-11 7s attacked the sametarget, giving the defenders no warning andsuccessfully destroying three reactors andbadly damaging the fourth. They requiredonly two KC-1 35 tankers for support.

Below: The F-117A'sexhausts are only visiblefrom above and behind.Flow straighteners arejust visible from thisangle.

F- I I 7A

EGRESS AND RETURN

There is a natural tendency to relax, just a little, after you leave thetarget area, though in many ways the egress and return home may bethe most dangerous part of the flight. While radar is no more likelyto see you outbound as it was while you were inbound, the enemynow knows that you are in his airspace, and probably has areasonable idea of the general direction in which you are heading. Ifthe Stealth Fighter's invisibility to radar is combat-proven, many areless sanguine about the aircraft's ability to evade some other sensors.When a larger Northrop B-2 bomber visited the Farnborough airshow in late 1996, Rapier SAM crews had no difficulty acquiring andtracking the aircraft using electro-optical and infrared equipment,and while the F-117 does incorporate many features to reduce its IRsignature, there may be a danger if an IRSTS (Infra Red Search andTrack) equipped fighter gets close enough for its equipment to dealwith a low-signature target.

Above: The return fromthe target is no time torelax. The F-117 A is asinvisible to friendlyradars as it is to those ofthe enemy, and the riskof collision is notinsignificant. Tracks andtimings have to becarefully planned andadhered to.

But the enemy may sometimes be the least ofa pilot's worries. The Standard OperatingProcedure for the F-11 7 A demands that thepilot remains radio silent, and the returning F-11 7A is as invisible to friendly forces as it isto the enemy. In crowded airspace (as wasoften the case when aircraft were returningfrom targets during Desert Storm) the risk ofcollision is considerable, and inbound andoutbound timings and tracks had to be verycarefully co-ordinated, with pinpointnavigational accuracy continuing to be

completely vital. The journey home is thus notime to relax.

In Desert Storm, particularly after theenemy air defenses had been degraded byconstant bombing, F-117A pilots did make abrief call to the AWACS as they egressed,letting the sector controller that they wereoutbound, that they were friendlies, and notto send anyone after them!

During a long bombing campaign (as wasconducted during Desert Storm), there is anatural tendency to become more blaseduring later missions. But the wise F-11 7Apilot never relaxes his vigilance, since there isnothing to guarantee that the enemy will noteventually strike lucky and field a new sensorthat might detect the aircraft, or there mightbe a minor technical glitch that robs theaircraft of some of its cloak of invisibility. Buthaving found and attacked the target, andwith the autopilot guiding the aircraftinexorably towards the tanker rendezvous,the cockpit workload is reduced, and there istime for thought, or even food! Returningfrom his first mission of the Gulf War, AlWhitley ate half a Snickers bar, forbiddinghimself the second half in punishment formissing his second aim point. It would be

THE MISSION

rare for many pilots to return with half achocolate bar, had they set themselves thesame rules. It is simply unusual not to get adirect hit when flying the Black Jet.

Once back over friendly territory, the firstpriority is to find the post-strike tanker, and totake on sufficient fuel to return to base.During the Gulf War, the F-11 7As were oftenvery low on fuel as they egressed, havingmade deep penetrations of enemy airspace,only to struggle home against severeheadwinds. Without radar, air-to-air TACANand with radio silence being maintained,finding the tanker at all is by no meansstraightforward, and relies (as does so muchin the F-117A world) on navigationalaccuracy and split-second timing. All of thefactors which made refuelling difficult on theoutbound journey make it just as difficult onthe way home, but with the added problemsof fatigue: the pilot may feel less 'psyched-up', perhaps even with some feelings ofanticlimax. And if you missed the tanker onthe way to the target, you could abort themission and still have sufficient fuel to returnto base. On the way home, you are refuellingin order to be able to get home. If for anyreason you can't refuel, you may not reach afriendly airfield at all. As if all this were notenough, the tanker may fly a racetrackpattern, banking at angles of up to 1 5°, whichcan cause spatial disorientation, especially inpoor weather.

Above: One F-117A flieson as its wingman breaksaway. The F-117A'sdistinctive arrow-headplanform is a uniqueshape in the sky. Suchformation flying is rare inthe F-117A, and theStealth Fighter's cockpitis a lonely place. Onoperations, the pilot doesnot use his radio, Hieswith no wingman andseldom sees anotheraircraft.

Left: The F-117A relieson split-second timingand pinpoint navigationto find its targets, and tofind the inflight refuellingtanker. The aircraftusually remains radio-silent, and this imposes ahigh workload on thepilot.

F- I I 7A

LANDINGDuring the early days at Tonopah, F-117A pilots would shootpractice instrument approaches until they got down to 2,000 Ib offuel, and then land. The F-117 has ILS, using retractable horizontalantennae immediately behind the cockpit. After an operationalmission, the F-117A would land straight away.

With no flaps, the F-11 7A comes in flat andfast, and consequently needs a long runwayto operate from. The actual approachattitude is 9.5 a (9.5 units, Angle of Attack),giving a reasonably normal sink rate, butwith a fast landing speed of around 150knots. The aircraft doesn't actually have toslow down that much from its normalcruising speed, so a flashy, high g fighter-pilot run-in and break is not required. This isprobably just as well, since at night, with therestricted visibility from the Black Jet's tinycockpit windows, such a maneuver wouldbe somewhat disorientating. A normalapproach can be disorientating enough to atired pilot, since under some conditions areversed image of the runway can appear asa reflection at the top of the screen. Despitethis, and despite the high landing speed,most pilots rate the aircraft as being easier toland than the F-1 6.

The brakes are powerful (and muchimproved by comparison with the brakesfitted to the first F-117s delivered), but use ofthe Pioneer Aerospace braking parachute isstill routine. The 18-ft diameter brake chute isdeployed as soon as the nosewheel touches

Below: An F-117A landsat Lockheed's Palmdaleplant, black brake chutefull streamed even beforethe nosewheel is on therunway, and before themain gear oleos are fullycompressed.

the runway: it is actuated by pulling on a T-handle mounted beside the right-hand displayscreen and streams from a compartmentbetween the tailfin roots. Brake-chuteoperation is not entirely straightforward,especially in a crosswind when it can foul onthe roots of the tailfins. Actuation is thereforepracticed during a high-speed taxi run evenbefore the trainee Stealth pilot makes hisofficial first flight. The chute is usually black,like the aircraft, and is a vital piece ofequipment. It is used except in the strongestcrosswinds. Without it, the early aircraft (withLoral steel brakes) needed a rollout of morethan 10,000 ft to avoid seriously over-heatingthe brakes. The stopping distance with thenew carbon-carbon brakes is slightly shorter,but if they are used without the brake chute,the aircraft must sit stationary in a 'hot brakearea' for one minute after rolling off therunway, for the brakes to cool down. The firerisk is significant. In some circumstances10,000 ft of runway may not always beavailable, and the aircraft is fitted with anairfield arrester hook, a lightweight deviceintended to prevent the aircraft from runningoff the end of a runway in the event of abrake failure. The aircraft must already betravelling fairly slowly to engage typicalairfield arrester-wire equipment. The hook ismounted in a separate bay, behind a fullyRAM sealed door: this has to be jettisonedexplosively if the hook is used.

THE MISSION

Above: The position ofthe F-117A's brakeparachute bay makes iteasy to wrap the chutearound the aircraft's fins,and the device cannot beused in anything morethan a moderatecrosswind. The trainee F-777/4 pilot taxies theaircraft and deploys thechute before his first soloflight.

Right: An F-117A on finalapproach to Tonopah,passing the off-baseaccomodation complex,oleos fully extended. Theaircraft is fitted with ILS,with retractablehorizontal antennasimmediately aft of thecockpit.

F- I I 7A

DEBRIEFINGThe F-117A taxies in much like any other tactical aircraft, though itspilots are more used to doing so on blacked-out airfields, using FLIRand guided by groundcrew with torches. At Tonopah the purpose-built shelters had doors at each end, and the aircraft could thus taxiinto its assigned hangar (or canyon) from the back, so that it wasfacing forward when it started its next mission. The pilot would shutdown in the canyon, but might leave electrical power on while thegroundcrew connected up external power. If the aircraft wasdestined to fly again that day the INS would not be turned off, sincerealignment is so time-consuming. Alighting from the cockpit thepilot would briefly tell the crew chief of any defects or incidents thathad occurred during the flight, before being driven to the operationsbuilding for debriefing.

During the Gulf War, the pilot would typicallyretrieve the arming lanyards (which pulled thepins and armed the fuses) from the weapons bay,these being prized souvenirs. One, or perhapsboth, would then be handed to the groundcrewwith a handshake and a grin which said morethan words ever could. The groundcrew wouldplug their own equipment into the single-pointdiagnostic interface panel, which hinges downfrom the underside of the port wing.

F-117A debriefings tend to be fairly routine.The aircraft seldom diverge from their plannedflight, and usually the only useful information

THE MISSION

to emerge is the pilot's assessment of how hisbombs behaved (though intelligence willexamine his DLIR picture on video) and hisreports as to the position and intensity ofenemy AAA and SAMs. Nevertheless, thepilot will sit down with the squadronintelligence officer postflight (or with anInstructor following a routine trainingmission) and go through the mission in somedetail. Video tape of the IRADS display isavailable immediately, greatly assistingdamage assessment and attack effectiveness.Watching the tapes takes on an entirely

different dimension after a no-kiddingoperational sortie. During the Gulf War, theaircraft's crew chief and other maintainerstypically came into the debrief to watch thetapes, too, often bringing popcorn! TheStealth Fighter force remains a small, tight-knit and elite group, and there is a high levelof camaraderie among all ranks. DuringDesert Storm, one pilot became known forbringing his groundcrew Apple Pie a la modeif he'd had a good night, stepping it up untilhe was taking apple pie and ice cream forsome 200 maintenance troops!

Four F-117As lined up at Holloman AFB,shortly after the 37th FW moved to the NewMexico base and took over the identity ofthe 49th FW. The aircraft wear the tailmarkings of the 9th, 8th, and 7th FighterSquadrons, with the furthest aircraft wearing49th FW tail markings.

F- I I 7A

A FUTURE FORSTEALTH?Many suspected that faceted Stealth aircraft like the F-I 17 A would only ever be an interim step, necessitatedbecause calculating radar returns from three-dimensionalshapes was simply too difficult. There was plenty ofevidence to suggest that smooth and blended curvaceousaircraft could have low radar cross sections. The originalNorthrop XB-49 flying wing proved extremely difficult totrack on radar, while the F-16 and SR-71 both enjoyedlower radar cross sections than had once been predicted.The NASA Lifting Bodies (precursors to the Space Shuttle)proved similarly difficult to track on radar. Improvedcomputer power allowed work on truly three-dimensionalshapes, and this led to the second generation of 'curvy*Stealth aircraft, including the Northrop B-2 and Tacit Blue.

When Lockheed first invented their faceted'Hopeless Diamond' configuration, thecompany believed that the configuration wasequally applicable to large and small aircraft,and that radar cross section was a function ofgetting the facets right, and not of size.Following the success of the 'Have Blue' XSTs,Lockheed submitted two stealth aircraft basedon the same configuration. One was a fighter-sized attack aircraft, the other much larger,

broadly equivalent to the F-111, with a crewof two, a 10,000 Ib payload and a 3,600 nmrange. The company was awarded a contractto build five FSD and 15 production examplesof the fighter-sized aircraft, although its figuressuggested that the larger 'bomber' would havehad no greater a radar signature.

There would have been advantages incommissioning Lockheed to produce both thefighter-sized Stealth aircraft and the bomber,

THE FUTURE

Above: The rollout of 88-0843, the last of 59production F-117Asaccepted by the US AirForce, delivered on 12July 1990, andoperational in the GulfWar as 'AffectionatelyChristine', flying 33combat missions.

Left: Stealth Fighter is amisnomer for the F-117A, since the aircraft'ssole purpose is to dropbombs. But the StealthBomber is this Leviathan,the Northrop B-2, whichrepresents the nextgeneration of stealthconfiguration, with asmoothly blended shapeof complex curves whichhave the same affect asthe F-117's facets.

F- I I 7A

Above: Optimised as aBVR interceptor, theLockheed F-22 Raptor(seen here in YF-22prototype form)incorporatesconsiderable stealthtechnology. The USAF isdesperately keen tosafeguard funding forthis, its next generationfighter, and may even usea derivative as an F-117Areplacement.

since there was a need for both types ofaircraft. The bomber would fulfil a USAFrequirement for an Advanced TechnologyBomber designed to penetrate hostile airspacewithout detection, and to hunt and attackmobile targets, primarily mobile ICBMs. Itwas clear that Low Observable technologywould be crucial in allowing the aircraft tooperate undetected and unmolested as itperformed its role. A competition waslaunched in 1978, attracting proposals from aNorthrop/Boeing team, and from aLockheed/Rockwell team: though the size ofthe required ATB grew (largely at the urgingof the commander of Air Force SystemsCommand), until it was a four-enginedmonster in broadly the same class as the B-58Hustler, with expanded payload and a 6,000mile unrefuelled range.

Lockheed dropped its faceted, highly sweptF-11 7A type configuration at this point andunwittingly began work on a flying wingconfiguration very similar to that whichNorthrop were simultaneously working on.The difference was primarily one of size,since Lockheed listened to SAC insiders whoadvised small and short range to keep theprice down, while Northrop listened topeople inside the Pentagon, who urged themto maximize range at the expense of size andcost. The larger Northrop aircraft could havelarger wing control surfaces, and was able todispense with a tailfin, which the smallerLockheed design needed. This made theNorthrop design markedly more fuel efficient.Although the Lockheed aircraft demonstratedbetter radar cross section figures, the

Northrop bomber design was selected forproduction, supposedly 'on technical merit'.The more relaxed and slightly later timescalefollowed for the ATB allowed the winningteam to make use of the new generation ofCray super computers, which were powerfulenough to allow Ufimtsev's equations to beapplied to predicting the RCS of three-dimensional shapes. This in turn allowed theresulting aircraft to have a more conventionalaerodynamically smooth shape.

THE FUTURE

Above all, the USAF were concerned not tohave all their eggs in one 'Stealthy' basket,and accepted a later deployment date for thebomber in order to take advantage of newtechnologies, and to ensure that Lockheeddid not gain an effective monopoly in thenew technology. The ATB program was neveras secret as the Stealth Fighter program,primarily because the aircraft had anadmissible Cold War role and was notintended for 'Special Forces' type operations.

The end of the Cold War marked a dramaticchange in the B-2's fortunes, with plannedprocurement slashed from an original total of1 32 aircraft (at $480 m each!) in four full-strength Bomb Wings, to a single two-squadron Bomb Wing of only 20 B-2s (at$2.2 bn each!), 16 of them operational at anyone time. A program was quickly initiated toallow the aircraft to carry and dropconventionally armed PGMS, its initial rolehaving been seen as being primarily nuclear.

Above: The B-2 is soexpensive ($2.2 bn peraircraft) that only 20 willever be procured. It israpidly assuming aconventional, precisionstrike role.

F- I I 7A

F-117 VARIANTSThe emergence of the more aerodynamically efficient streamlinedStealth aircraft sounded the death knell for the faceted shapepioneered by the F-117A, although a number of advanced F-117Aderivatives have been proposed by Lockheed in recent years, theirattraction being one of swift, low-risk development and battle-proven effectiveness.

The designation F-117A+ was appliedin-house to an ambitious upgrade of existingF-11 7A airframes. A prototype conversion waspriced at $79 m, though exact details of theupgrade were not released. The F-117A+ mayhave been similar to the F-11 7 variantreportedly offered to the British Royal Air

Force, which had revised B-2 type intakesand a clear-view F-22 type canopy, but whichotherwise retained the basic configuration ofthe original F-117A. The USAF was reportedlymore interested in this upgrade than inacquiring any new-build F-117 derivative.

When re-opening the F-11 7A productionline was mooted, following the Gulf War,General McPeak, USAF Chief of Staff, wasreportedly lukewarm, stating that he"wouldn't spend any money on whatamounts to obsolete technology". Lockheedsuggestions that the aircraft would make anideal replacement for the F-4G in the WildWeasel role were not taken up, and the USAF

F-1 17 - ADVANCED DERIVATIVES

The F-1 I 7 has spawned a number of advanced derivatives, offeringimproved performance, payload, range and versatility, though inthe present funding climate these remain unbuilt. Shown here arethe F-1 I7B and the proposed 'F-1 17' also confusingly referred toas the F-1 I7B for the British Royal Air Force.

F-1 17B (A/F-1 17X AND F-1 17N SIMILAR)

THE FUTURE

instead received dedicated F-16s.A new-build advanced F-11 7 was offered to

the USAF under the designation F-11 7B, thisreportedly having considerable commonalitywith the navalized A/F-117X variant describedbelow. The F-117B was credited with anMTOW of 73,200 Ib (compared with 52,500Ib for the F-11 7A), with unrefuelled combatradius extended from 570 nm (1055 km) to980 nm (1813 km), and with internal payloaddoubled to 10,000 Ib. The F-11 7B might alsofeature new all-weather sensors, improvedlow observability, afterburning GeneralElectric F414 engines and aerodynamicimprovements.

Lockheed first proposed a navalized versionof the F-11 7 to the US Navy following thecancellation of the AF/X strike aircraft,suggesting a 'Silver Bullet' force of between40 and 75 aircraft. As originally conceivedthe F-117N had an off-the-shelf ACLS(Automatic Carrier Landing System) and somestructural improvements to withstand therigors of carrier landings and the corrosion-prone maritime environment. This proved

insufficiently attractive to deflect the Navyfrom its intended purchase of second-generation F/A-18 Hornets. Lockheed furtherrefined the F-11 7N into the A/F-11 7X, whichproved more interesting to the Navy, butwhich has still not been procured. The A/F-11 7X retains the basic body of the F-11 7, buthas new wings, of slightly reduced sweep,and a separate conventional horizontaltailplane. The wings are foldable to allow theaircraft to use carrier elevators and hangardecks, and are fitted with extensive double-slotted trailing edge flaps to improveapproach handling characteristics and reducelanding speed.

The new variant has a new, strengthenedlanding gear (perhaps taken directly from theF-14), with a redesigned nose unit, with twinnosewheels and a catapult tie bar. The aircraftis fitted with a new clear-view canopy, similarto that fitted to the F-22. Lockheed havereportedly suggested that the A/F-11 7X wouldbe compatible with the AIM-1 20 AMRAAM,inferring that an air-to-air radar capabilitywould be incorporated.

F- I I 7A

SOMETHING BLACK IN THE SKYIn today's budgetary climate, however, funding for any new aircraftis difficult, and the F-117's success in the 'White World' makes itdifficult to develop a low rate production, 'Black' derivative. Asfunding constraints become increasingly difficult, the USAF isconcentrating more and more on its key core programs (particularlythe F-22). The Northrop B-2, which represented the logicalextrapolation of the Stealth idea, has been cut back dramatically, andit will represent little more than a limited 'Silver Bullet' force.

Right: An F-117A in flightover the fringes of theWhite Sands NationalMonument, close to itsbase at Holloman AFB,New Mexico, a suitablyspectacular and awe-inspiring home for thisremarkable strikeaircraft.

Below: The all-aspectlow-observabilitypioneered by the F-117Aremains unusual, thoughlow frontal RCS isbecoming a design driverfor many fighters.

It is difficult to predict the longer-term futurefor Stealth aircraft. Advances in radartechnology and the use of alternative sensorswill erode the advantage they currently enjoy,although broad signature management willremain an issue in combat aircraft design.Frontal radar cross section is now a key factorin the design of fighters and interceptors, butthe kind of all-aspect low-observabilitytypified by the F-11 7A has a more limitedapplication. It would be foolish to dismiss thepossibility of another strike aircraft optimizedfor radar stealth, but at the same time, it isprobably realistic to assume that such aspecialized platform would probably beanother 'Skunk Works' type product, procuredin tiny numbers and used for 'Special Forces'type roles. A 'cottage industry' has grown up

around the investigation of Stealth aircraft, USBlack programs, and the work carried out atTonopah and Groom Lake. Unfortunately, thewhole subject has become closely associatedwith that of UFOs, and specifically of thesecret use of alien technology by the USGovernment, and this kind of hokum castsdoubt on the veracity of other rumoredStealthy Black projects, from the Northrop (?)TR-3A tactical reconnaissance aircraft to thestrategic high Mach SR-71 replacement, theLockheed Aurora, and a host of other weirdand wonderful strike and reconnaissanceaircraft, from the 'Artichoke' to the NorthropA-1 7, a swing-wing strike derivative of theYF-23.

But as one former F-11 7A pilot opined,"When you strip away all this X-Files bullshit,it does seem kind of likely that there'ssomething going on at Tonopah, and thatsomeone is using our old facilities. I'm surethere's something black in the skies overNevada." Whether or not he's right, at themoment, the F-11 7A remains the mostcapable and least vulnerable precision strikeasset available to USAF commanders.

THE FUTURE

Acknowledgements

Trying to write a book about the F-117A is not easy. The US Department of Defense remainsunhappy for those outside the program to even touch the aircraft, and the USAF is still tight-lipped about its capabilities. The level of secrecy goes way beyond that required to safe-guard the legitimate security concerns of the Air Force, as is acknowledged by many servingand former members of the F-117A community. Fortunately, some have been willing to talkand answer questions, but it is best to give them the protection of anonymity, whetherrequested or not.

The men who fly the F-11 7A are among the country's finest, and they deserve to berecognized for the dedicated, highly skilled and superbly motivated men they are. They areunlikely to be celebrated by Hollywood or the TV companies, so I can only hope that thisbook does them some small amount of justice

Thanks go to my wife, Jilly, for tolerating such massive disruption and untidiness during thewriting of this book, and for preventing our two cats, Muttley and Bert from eating the man-uscript! Robert F Dorr, whose own book on the F-11 7A for Aerospace Publishing (and hisarticle in World Air Power Journal) provided a useful briefing and some 'magnificentinspiration'. Bob's readiness to help track down folks to talk to went far beyond the call ofduty. Randy Jolly, the doyen of air-to-air photographers, also provided much inspiration. Hisphotos bring the Black Jet to life, and I hope they inspire the reader as they inspired me. RJhas also gone out of his way to help out in ways great and small, and I owe him a debt ofgratitude.

Many other colleagues have been happy to help out here and there with F-117A informationand leads. Thanks therefore to Joe Cupido, John Gourley, Rick Llinares and Chuck Lloyd,and to Bill Sweetman, and to former colleagues Dave, Rob and Tim at World Air PowerJournal. Above all, I must thank Mr Denny Lombard of Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works,who supplied the photos credited to Lockheed Martin, and who took many of them, alongwith Eric Schulzinger. Penultimately, I must thank artists John Ridyard and Chris Davey andshould acknowledge the massive contribution made by the series editor, Ian Drury, whoseenthusiasm and patience have been remarkable! Finally, I would like to thank the late BenRich whose own book Skunk Works was inspirational.

Jon Lake, 1997

The publishers would like to thank the following organisations and individualsfor their help in supplying photographs

Lockheed Martin Skunk Works6-35, 37, 38, 40-43, 45-48, 52-53, 56, 60, 64, 66-74, 75, 78-79, 81, 83-89, 90, 94

Aviation Photos International75

Randy Jolly54, 55, 57, 80, 81, 82, 95

United States Air Force36, 37, 39, 44, 45, 61, 65, 83, 91