Logical behaviourism: objections

Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.co

.uk

Logical behaviourism

• Mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways (in certain circumstances)– Talk about the mind and mental

states is talk about behaviour

• Ryle: mental states aren’t causes – to think that they are is a category mistake– To cite a disposition is not to cite a cause

• Obj: there is mental causation– Even if dispositions aren’t causes in the

same sense as events, they are part of the ‘causal story’• E.g. the flying stone won’t break the glass if it

is not brittle

Mental causation

Davidson’s argument

• ‘I went to the party because I thought it would be fun’– My thought is causally relevant to my action

• Suppose I also believe that you’ll be at the party, and I want to see you. But suppose that my reason for going is not to see you, but because I want to have fun– How is this possible? I have both

dispositions– My reason for going is the one that causes

my action

Is mind without body conceivable?

• If mental states are behavioural dispositions, only creatures that can behave have mental states

• So mind without body is inconceivable – a category mistake

• But mind without body is conceivable• So behaviourism is false• Reply: we are wrong to think that mind

without body is conceivable

• Which behaviour is a mental state a disposition to?

• Multiple realizability: different people can express the same mental state by different behaviours in the same situation– How can these different dispositions be the

same mental state?• Reply: On the whole, people with the same

mental state have similar dispositions– Fear: facial expression; saying ‘yes’ to ‘are you

scared?’ …

Multiple realizability

Multiple realizability

• The same behaviour can express different mental states– E.g. running towards a lion– Depends on what else one believes and desires

• Reply: ‘Behaviour’ doesn’t name a single ‘piece’ of behaviour– Can’t tell from this what disposition is being

expressed – need to consider broader spectrum of behaviour

– This doesn’t remain the same while expressing different mental states

Circularity

• There is no set behaviour correlated with a mental state – Can’t analyze what dispositions to

behaviour a mental state without referring to other mental states

– A particular belief is compatible with any behaviour at all, depending on what else you believe or want

Circularity

• So different mental states may be dispositions to the same behaviour, depending on other mental states.– And the same mental state may be dispositions

to different behaviour, depending on other mental states

• So mental states can’t be analyzed as behavioural dispositions

Reply

• Ryle: we can’t reduce mental concepts to a set of behavioural dispositions– They are ‘indefinite’– Dispositional statements can’t be

completely analyzed either• But mental concepts are still concepts

of behavioural dispositions, just at a higher level of generality– So the circularity objection is correct, but

not an objection

• Dualism thinks of mental states as ‘inner’ and defends an asymmetry of knowledge– Our mental states are inaccessible to

other people– But known to us through conscious

introspection

Knowledge of the mind

Knowledge of the mind

• Behaviourism rejects this– We don’t have to infer that someone has a

mind from their behaviour– To say that someone has certain behaviour

dispositions just is to say they have a mind– So we can know other people’s mental

states• But now, can I only know my own

mental states by observing my behaviour??– If they are behavioural dispositions, how

could ‘introspection’ reveal them?

Knowledge of the mind

• Ryle: conscious introspection is a myth– We pay attention to ourselves just as

we pay attention to others’ behaviour– To know what you think is just to be

ready to say what you think– We just have more evidence –

thinking is inner speech

Mental states without behaviour

• Many conscious mental states, e.g. pain, have a particular feeling, ‘what it is like’ – this cannot be understood just as a behavioural disposition– Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of

the mind• Putnam’s ‘super-spartans’

– Through culture, they have no disposition to express pain at all

– Yet they feel pain