longino_gender politics theoretical virtues

Gender, Politics, and the Theoretical VirtuesAuthor(s): Helen E. LonginoSource: Synthese, Vol. 104, No. 3, Feminism and Science (Sep., 1995), pp. 383-397Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117439 .Accessed: 11/01/2011 13:57

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HELENE. LONGINO

GENDER, POLITICS, AND THE THEORETICAL VIRTUES*

ABSTRACT. Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated

as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are

cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative

virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the

only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This

undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.

I

In the 1970's Thomas Kuhn responded to critics of The Structure of Sci

entific Revolutions who claimed that Kuhn's analysis made theory choice

entirely subjective. In his essay 'Objectivity, Values, and Theory Choice', Kuhn discussed five values that scientists use to guide their judgments in choosing between competing theories. These are accuracy, simplicity, internal and external consistency, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness. Kuhn

had a lot to say about these values and how they functioned; his overall

claim was that they constituted objective grounds for theory choice. My

point in mentioning them here is that most of the elements on the list (with the possible exception of fruitfulness) are the sorts of considerations that

end up in philosophers' lists of what, besides agreement with observational

and experimental data, counts for the truth (or acceptability) of a theory or hypothesis.1 Indeed, when drawing a distinction between what I called

constitutive and contextual values, I used items like empirical adeguacy,

simplicity, explanatory power (a cognate of breadth of scope) as paradig matic examples of constitutive values. In this I was simply following in

the footsteps of other philosophers of science.

The items on Kuhn's list have qualified as constitutive values because

they have been considered characteristics enhancing the likelihood of the

truth of a theory or hypothesis. My point in Science as Social Knowledge

(Longino 1990) was to complicate the distinction, mainly by arguing that

what we identified as contextual values - social or practical interests -

could and did function as constitutive values. That is, social or practical interests function as do so-called cognitive values in determining what

Synthese 104: 383-397,1995. ? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

384 HELEN E. LONGINO

counts as good or acceptable scientific judgment. Which interests do so

and how depends on other features of the overall context. I have been

rethinking this distinction and am no longer convinced that what I was

treating as paradigmatic constitutive values have a solely epistemic or

cognitive basis. I hope in what follows to shake your confidence (if you have any), too.

My strategy will be crablike: moving sideways rather than forward. I

want first to examine an alternative set of values to the traditional ones.

I will then use that examination as a lens through which to reexamine

elements of the traditional set. To place this in a more general philosophical context, I want first briefly to summarize relevant bits of the account of

scientific inquiry that forms the background to my thinking. I've argued for a view I call contextual empiricism

- while experience

(experiment, observation) constitutes the least defeasible legitimator of

knowledge claims in the sciences, the evidential relevance of particular elements of experience to hypotheses is mediated by background assump tions operating at many levels. What controls the role of background

assumptions is interaction among scientists, interaction consisting in criti

cism of assumptions involved in observation, of assumptions involved in

reasoning, of assumptions involved in thinking a given hypothesis plau

sible, of assumptions involved in the application of particular methods to

the solution of particular problems. To be successful in uncovering such

assumptions, criticism must proceed from a variety of points of view,

ideally as many as are available.

This account, I maintain, has at least two consequences. 1) It allows

us to see that the same process accounts for both the suppression and the

expression of social values, interests and ideology in the sciences. Idiosyn cratic values are suppressed, while values held by all members are invisible

(as values, interests, or ideology). These are, therefore, not available for

control by discursive interactions and are free to be expressed in the con

tent of theories accepted by those members. 2) It identifies the producer of

scientific knowledge, the knower, as the community rather than the indi

vidual scientist. This means that certain features of community structure

are important to the knowledge productive capacity of a community. I've

discussed four such features. There must be:

(a) avenues for the expression and dissemination of criticism;

(b) uptake of, or response to, criticism;

(c) public standards by reference to which theories, etc. are

assessed;

(d) equality of intellectual authority.

GENDER, POLITICS, AND THE THEORETICAL VIRTUES 385

This last condition is intended to correct for the fact that imbalances in

the social composition of the scientific community mean that certain sets

of values will escape criticism. The extension of equality of intellectual

authority to all qualified participants is intended to require representative

diversity in the community. I originally thought of this in terms of repre

senting the diversity of substantive assumptions that could play a role in

evidential reasoning, and would hence be among the public standards men

tioned in the third condition. But, as I said, I want now to raise questions about the more usual candidates for cognitive standards or values.

ii

In claiming that public standards are required for a knowledge productive

community, I am not claiming that there is a single set of standards that

characterizes all scientific communities. I'm claiming instead that there is

a pool of standards - formal, substantive, and practical

- that such com

munities draw upon in regulating themselves. Criticism and endorsement

of theories and explanatory models, as well as the profferring of alterna

tives, are made germane to a given community by appeal to some one or

more of the standards it recognizes. Satisfaction of a standard is a prima facie reason for accepting a model or theory. As prima facie, its probative

value, of course, can be overridden by failure to satisfy another standard

assigned greater weight in that context. Different, but overlapping, sets

from this pool characterize different communities. Sets of standards of

different communities are related by family resemblance, one might say, rather than by identity. Kuhn's values constitute one (or part of one) such

set. I want to think about a different set, drawing on work that has been

done by feminist scientists and feminist historians and philosophers of

science. Here one finds empirical adequacy (a.k.a. accuracy), but also nov

elty, ontological heterogeneity, complexity of interaction, applicability to

human needs, diffusion or decentralization of power. There are undoubt

edly others, but (as Kuhn said about his list) this list is enough to make the

points I want to make.

The traits listed are generally invoked singly or in groups of two or

three and for the most part become evident as values in the context of their

use.2 Like the elements in Kuhn's list, they function as virtues, qualities of a theory, hypothesis, or model that are regarded as desirable and hence

guide judgments between alternatives. I shall refer to them as virtues, val

ues, standards, criteria, ignoring the differences between those concepts for purposes of this discussion. One might say in defense of the Kuhnian

set that they conduce to truth. Kuhn didn't say so, but less cautious advo


cates have. But if an alternative set offers grounds for accepting theories

or models that do just as well as those validated by traditional standards at

organizing and generating explanations of the phenomena, then this argu ment is shown to be hollow. Let me begin by offering some interpretation of the elements of this alternative set based on the contexts in which they've been deployed. Then I shall offer some reflections on their status.

1) Empirical adequacy. Empirical adequacy generally means agree ment of the observational claims of a theory or model with observational

and experimental data, present, retrospective, or predictive. A good deal

of feminist effort has gone into discrediting research programs that pur

port to show a biological etiology for differences ascribed on the basis

of sex. The (feminist) scientists involved in this effort - scientists such

as Ruth Bleier, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Richard Lewontin, Ruth Doell -

have concentrated on showing that such research fails minimal standards

of empirical adequacy, either through faulty research design or improper statistical methodology. I take their appeal to empirical adequacy in the

context of their critiques to constitute an implicit endorsement of the stan

dard. Empirical adequacy is valued for, among other things, its power when

guiding inquiry to reveal both gender and gender bias. It is, of course, a

standard shared with race and class sensitive research communities as well

as with most mainstream communities. Failure to meet the standard in a

strong sense, i.e. the generation of statements about what will or has been

observed that are incompatible with what has actually been observed, is

grounds in most cases for rejection of the hypothesis or theory in ques tion. Application of the standard is not, as I shall argue below, always a

straightforward matter and empirical adequacy is not a sufficient criterion

of theory and hypothesis choice. So, other values come into play in theory,

hypothesis and model assessment.

2) Novelty. By novelty, I mean models or theories that differ in signifi cant ways from presently accepted theories, either by postulating different

entities and processes, adopting different principles of explanation, incor

porating alternative metaphors, or by attempting to describe and explain

phenomena that have not previously been the subject of scientific inves

tigation. Several thinkers have endorsed the novelty of a model or theory as a value. Sandra Harding seems to do so explicitly when she calls both

for "successor science" and for "deconstructing the assumptions upon which are grounded anything that resembles the science we know" (Hard

ing 1986b). And she has interpreted Donna Haraway as supporting "an

epistemology that justifies knowledge claims only insofar as they arise

from enthusiastic violation of the founding taboos of Western humanism"

(Harding 1986b, p. 193). Without going that far, certainly one can read


Haraway's invocation of the visions of certain science fiction writers as

an appeal for or endorsement of a departure from entrenched assumptions, for the sake of a new framework (or new frameworks). Nothing less, she

suggests, will be appropriate for the new circumstances of twenty-first

century life (Haraway 1992).

Treating novelty as a virtue reflects a doubt that mainstream theoretical

frameworks are adequate to the problems confronting us, as well as a sus

picion of any frameworks developed in the exclusionary context of modern

European and American science. Since mainstream traditional frameworks

have been used in accounts that either neglect female contributions to pro cesses biological and social or that treat as natural alleged male superiority in various dimensions, something new will be required to address phenom ena in a non-androcentric way. Novelty could, of course, have stronger and

weaker interpretations. The strong interpretation demands new frameworks

and theories to replace current ones in the domains in which they are cur

rently employed. On the weaker interpretation, new frameworks are to

be sought in satisfying a demand for scientific understanding of hitherto

neglected phenomena.

3) Ontological heterogeneity. Any theory posits, implicitly or explicitly, an ontology, that is, it characterizes what is to count as a real entity in

its domain. A theory characterized by ontological heterogeneity is one

that grants parity to different kinds of entities. Ontological homogeneity,

by contrast, characterizes theories that posit only one sort of causally efficacious entity, or that treat apparently different entities as versions of a

standard or paradigmatic member of the domain, or that treat differences as

eliminable through decomposition of entities into a single basic kind. This

criterion is found in two quite different sorts of discussion in the feminist

literature on the sciences. Feminists writing about biology have urged that we take account of individual difference among the individuals and

samples that constitute the objects of study.3 Although she was not herself a

feminist, Barbara McClintock's attention to the individual kernels of a cob

of corn (which helped her to recognize an underlying pattern of mutability) has been taken as a paradigm of what a feminist attitude to nature ought to

be. Primatologist Jeanne Altmann has insisted on methods of observation

that descriptively preserve the differences among the primates and groups of primates that she studies. (Altmann 1974)

Treating individual differences as important and not to be elided in

abstractions or idealizations which smooth out heterogeneity is valuing

heterogeneity, taking it as a basic aspect, if not of the natural world, of

one's theories of it.4 One may have a variety of reasons for so valuing models that preserve heterogeneity. The reason feminists have embraced


this aspect of the work of McClintock, Altmann, and others is connected, I

think, to the second discussion I draw on here: the rejection of theories of

inferiority. Theories of inferiority are supported in part by an intolerance of

heterogeneity. Difference must be ordered, one type chosen as the standard, and all others seen as failed or incomplete versions. Theories of inferiority

which take the white middle-class male (or the free male citizen) as the

standard grant ontological priority to that type. Difference is then treated

as a departure from, a failure to fully meet, the standard, rather than

simply difference. Ontological heterogeneity permits equal standing for

different types, and mandates investigation of the details of such difference.

Difference is resource, not failure.

4) Complexity of Relationship. While the prior criterion values theories

that are pluralist with respect to entities, this criterion values theories that

treat relationships between entities and processes as mutual, rather than

unidirectional, and as involving multiple rather than single factors. Many feminist scientists have taken complex interaction as a fundamental princi

ple of explanation. Evelyn Keller's (1983) account of the work of Barbara

McClintock and her defense of an interactionist perspective in her (1985)

may provide the best known examples, but scientists from icons like Ruth

Bleier and Anne Fausto-Sterling to much less well known practitioners have eschewed single factor causal models for models that incorporate

dynamic interaction, models in which no factor can be described as domi

nant or controlling and that describe processes in which all active factors

influence the others. This perspective has been employed in areas rang

ing from neuroscience to cell biochemistry by scientists self-consciously

practicing science as feminists as well as, of course, by non-feminists. It

has also been endorsed in texts devoted mainly to reflections about the

sciences.

The rationales offered for embracing this criterion have ranged from a

metaphysical certainty that this is the way the world is to the notion that

the criterion expresses a female quality of apprehension. Some rationales

are less antecedently problematic than others. In particular, one might note

that simple models of single factor control often makes one party to an

interaction a passive object rather than an agent. This has been the fate

of female gametes in accounts of fertilization and of female organisms in

accounts of social structure. Asymmetry of agency in the physiological context is used to naturalize asymmetry in the social. Replacing simple

models of single factor control in social contexts with more complex mod

els of social interaction makes visible the role of gender in the structure of

social institutions and the role of private, domestic (traditionally, women's) work in maintaining the activity and institutions of the "public" sphere.


5) Applicability to Current Human Needs. This and the next are more

pragmatic criteria, and relevant to decisions about what theories or theoret

ical frameworks to work on. This criterion favors research programs that

can ultimately generate applicable knowledge. Many, but not all, feminists

in the sciences have stressed the potential role of scientific understanding in improving the material conditions of human life, or alleviating some

of its misery. Scientific inquiry directed at reducing hunger (by improving

techniques of sustainable agriculture, soil preservation, etc.), promoting

health, assisting the infirm, protecting or reversing the destruction of the

environment, is valued over knowledge pursued either for political domi

nation, i.e., science for "defense", or for knowledge's sake. As expressed in feminist contexts, this is not just a call for more applied science, but for

research that can be directed towards meeting the human and social needs

traditionally ministered to by women. The applicability criterion could be

understood, then, as requiring research into hitherto neglected areas and

hence triggering the novelty criterion in its weaker interpretation.

6) Diffusion of Power. This criterion is the practical version of the

fourth criterion, the one favoring models that incorporate interactive rather

than dominant-subordinate relationships in explanatory models. This one

gives preference to research programs that do not require arcane exper

tise, expensive equipment, or that otherwise limit access to utilization

and participation. This feature has emerged as a value in a number of

different contexts. Feminists in engineering and in economics have con

demned requirements of mathematical achievement far beyond what is

required for successfully engaging in these fields. Other feminists, such as

Hilary Rose (1983) and Ruth Ginzburg (1987), have urged a revamping of traditional distinctions to include widely distributed practices such as

midwifery as scientific practices. They urge that such practices be used as

models for feminist science practice. Feminist health professionals urge a

preference for medical practices and procedures that empower the individ

ual woman either to make decisions about her health or to retain control

over her own body. And ecofeminists and feminists in developing regions

urge the development of technologies that are accessible and that can be

locally implemented (Sen and Grown 1987). Diffusion or decentralization

of power interprets the above cited elements of the applicability criteri

on as knowledge of soil conservation, intensive small-scale sustainable

agriculture, promoting health by preventive measures such as improved

hygiene rather than high-tech interventive measures available only to the

few, protection of the environment by conservation and widely dispersed renewable energy technologies.


The various proponents of these standards have had different ideas about

how they work or ought to work in inquiry. If we treat them as components of a community set of public standards as I am suggesting, we take them as

criteria proposed for the assessment of theories, models, and hypotheses,

guiding their formulation, acceptance, and rejection (or perhaps in the

case of the last two, what Allen Franklin calls theory pursuit). As Kuhn

noticed for the values he discussed, these require further interpretation to be

applied in a given research context, they are not simultaneously maximally

satisfiable, and they are not subject to hierarchical ordering or algorithmic

application.

in

Since empirical adequacy is almost universally recognized as a value, and

since others of these characteristics have been endorsed as virtues by non

feminists, one might well wonder what about these standards is specifically feminist.5 Several answers to this question can be discerned in the texts in

which these virtues have been endorsed.

One approach holds that these characteristics express a feminine or

female orientation to the world, i.e. that women either because of biology or social experience are more likely to understand the world via theories

characterized by these traits. This is said primarily of the substantive and

pragmatic virtues. Women are said, for example, to be more inclined to

perceive mutual influence and interaction than unidirectional single factor

control, and to be more interested in research that will help others. What

would be feminist, then, would be treating as theoretical virtues charac

teristics of women's ways of thinking about the natural and social worlds.

The problems with this approach are, first, that there's no evidence that

women are inclined biologically or culturally to understand the world in

these ways, and, second, that even if they were, we'd still need an argument that these were traits that ought to be valued in theory construction and

assessment. Of course, if one is antecedently convinced, as some advocates

of these virtues are, that the world really is constituted of heterogeneous entities that interact in complex ways, the need for such an argument will

be much less apparent than it is to one less certain. But if the world is such

as to be more adequately understood via theories exhibiting these virtues, then they ought to be promoted as general theoretical virtues and not just as feminist theoretical virtues.

A second approach suggests that women are more likely to value the

characteristics of theories because they are outsiders to mainstream science

and so less likely to be acculturated to the values of the mainstream. But this


is an even less plausible candidate for grounding the claim that the virtues

would be feminist.6 Neither female biology nor feminine conditioning, but

marginality explains the appeal of these virtues. Marginality, however, is

common to any group excluded from the practice of science and so not

specifically feminist. Furthermore, while marginal status may alienate or

free those marginalized from mainstream values, in some cases preference for alternative values may be the basis of marginalization. And, as is the

case for the previous approach, the empirical data supporting the view that

marginalized groups are likely to endorse these virtues in particular has

yet to be brought forward.

Rather than look to sociological facts about who uses them, I have

suggested that we look to the work these virtues can do for specifically feminist inquiry.7 In the account given above of each of the virtues, I

suggested how inquiry guided by them would be thought to reveal gender, either in the form of bias about the phenomena or as a phenomenon in

the domain itself, or to reveal the activities of women or females in the

domain. The aim of revealing gender and/or the activities of women is, I

propose, what makes inquiry feminist. Feminist theoretical virtues will be

those that serve this aim. Thus, satisfying it is a bottom line requirement of theoretical standards. I should emphasize that I am not arguing here

that the virtues I have discussed so far are the theoretical virtues feminists

should adopt. I think such a claim needs further discussion and argument. What I do propose is that the basis on which such a claim should be argued

and disputed is the contribution any proposed virtue can make to furthering feminist goals in inquiry. If the virtues that have been discussed here are

feminist, it is because they satisfy this bottom line requirement, and not

because of any intrinsic, statistical, or symbolic association with women

or cultural femininity.

IV

My reasons for thinking about the elements and structure of this list are

several. One of course, is to contribute to the feminist discussion of scien

tific knowledge. In that spirit, I've argued that the bottom line requirement

gives us a basis for critique of the standards as I articulated them a moment

ago. Secondly, and relatedly, I've argued that we should understand the

values not as absolutes, but as contextually mandated at particular moments

in the framework of a kind of bootstrapping provisionalism.8 But my pur

pose here is to use this example of an alternative to the traditional set of

theoretical virtues as a lens through which to focus on some of the latter's

less-remarked aspects.


One way to begin is to pair elements from the two sets.

Feminist list Traditional list

Empirical adequacy Accuracy

Novelty Internal /External Consistency

Ontological heterogeneity Simplicity

Complexity of interaction Breadth of scope

Applicability to human needs

Diffusion of power Fruitfulness

There isn't a single neat pairing, but some rough links can be made. Of

these only the pair made by the first in each list tend in the same direction, while the other pairs include elements pulling in opposite directions. As you will I see, I don't think this is a reason for thinking that empirical adequacy or accuracy is the real - constitutive or scientific - value in scientific

judgment, while the rest are all contextual. I want to start, however, by

exploring the more clearly contrastive pairs.

Novelty and external consistency are quite starkly opposed. The nov

elty criterion recommends theories and models that depart from accepted

theories, while the criterion of external consistency recommends those

that do not contradict them. Different interpretations of the two criteria

can produce different articulations of the contrast, but what interests me

here is their socio-political valence. Obviously, the socio-political basis for

the criterion of novelty is the need for theoretical frameworks other than

those that have functioned - directly or indirectly

- in gender oppression. External consistency, in a context in which theories have had that func

tion, perpetuates it. Those satisfied with the status quo will endorse this

criterion, and the effect of its endorsement is to keep from view the ways in which currently accepted theories are implicated in the legitimation of

gender oppression. Donna Haraway (1986) has pointed out, for example, how the reten

tion of a socio-biological framework in Sarah Blaffer Hrdy's feminist

primatology replicates problematic moves in liberal feminism, which per

petuates the framing assumptions about individualist and self-regarding human nature of liberal political theory. In both cases the feminist turn is

limited to claiming for females what has been reserved for males with

out challenging the deeper assumptions about human nature involved in

both the scientific and the political program. And Susan Sperling (1991) develops a similar argument with respect to the functionalist and socio

biological frameworks she identifies in most of the feminist primatology of the last twenty-five years. Her point is that it preserves essentialist and


determinist concepts of gender, its feminism being restricted to revaluing the roles of females in primate evolution. The models advanced by these

primatologists thus satisfy the mainstream virtue of external consistency.

Paying attention to females, making them more central to the analysis, corrects omissions of androcentric field work, but by leaving the theoret

ical scaffolding in place, the work under discussion fails to challenge the

ways in which socio-biological analysis naturalizes the social relations of

capitalism. While a few women may benefit in such a system, the vast

majority are impoverished. Even though it has been resisted in certain

quarters, one reason the feminist primatology has been taken seriously is

its conservativism with respect to basic theory. According to Haraway and

Sperling, its exemplification of this traditional virtue is also a cause of its

political regressiveness.

Pursuing yet another contrast, we can see how certain interpretations of

the simplicity criterion are laden with socio-political values. The interpre tation that contrasts with ontological heterogeneity is an ontological one:

the simpler theory is the one positing the fewest different kinds of funda

mental entities (or of causally effective entities). This encourages us to find

ways of treating putative entities which are not members of the privileged class either as epiphenomena, as constructions that can be disassembled

into collections of entities of the privileged class (cells into molecules, molecules into atoms, etc.), as parts of members of the privileged class, or as variants whose deviations from the standard can be disregarded. To

suppose the social world is composed of just one or a few kinds of basic

entity (e.g. rational self-interested individuals in neoclassical economic

theory) erases the differences among persons that are fundamental to how

they act. Economics, for example, treats the head of household as the main

economic actor - assuming its (his) dominance in the household - and

assuming that the interests of other members of the household - spouse,

partner, children, elderly parent - are identical with those of the head. By

erasing the independent interests of other household members from the

oretical view, these models prop up an oppressive family structure (one

person - "the benevolent patriarch"

- is supposed to make the decisions) and indirectly legitimate the assumption by welfare policy makers, family

policy makers, etc., that this structure is the primary and appropriate family structure in our society.

One of the other interpretations of simplicity is in the form of a contrast

with the virtue of complexity of interaction. A model involving causal

relations going only in one direction is simpler than one in which elements

in the model interact to produce an effect or in which elements mutually influence each other. As I suggested above, the former, which mimic social


relations of domination, naturalize these relations. That is, the more the

natural order appears to be one in which factors can be said to control

processes or events the more such an organizational form seems to be

natural - the way of nature. To treat this form of simplicity as a theoretical

virtue is to incorporate its socio-political valence into the justificatory

processes of science.

Heterogeneity and complexity of interaction can also be contrasted

with the virtue of breadth of scope. The former validate models contain

ing different sorts of fundamental entities in complex relations of mutual

dependence. This is compatible with only loosely related multiple models

rather than a quantity of models or phenomena derived from (explained

by) one or a very few basic principles, which is the situation envisioned

by breadth of scope. I shall leave the political interpretations here to the

reader.

Finally, the feminist practical virtues can also be used to demonstrate

the political valence of their counterpart. Fruitfulness, for Kuhn, referred

to the capacity of a theory to generate problems or puzzles demanding solutions and to provide the resources with which to solve them. This, of

course, means more opportunities to articulate connections between the

theory and putatively established phenomena as well as other theories.

The feminist practical virtues favor theories and models that can be used

to improve living conditions in a way that reduces inequalities of power.

Taking them seriously requires looking beyond the immediate (internal) context of research to the ways in which it might or might not be developed. This in turn requires taking stock of the social, political, and economic

context in which development might take place. Fruitfulness is by contrast

conservative in that it is inward looking. It directs attention away from

the social and technological applications of research, whether they be

beneficial or harmful.

Well, what of empirical adequacy and accuracy? Why can't we treat

them as the same virtue and the fact that it appears in both lists as evi

dence that here at last is a possible candidate for a purely cognitive virtue?

As someone who is by instinct some kind of empiricist this is an appeal

ing move. Let me explain why I hesitate to make it. Regina Kollek has

challenged (in discussion) the appropriateness of citing empirical adequa

cy as a feminist criterion. Don't the data change in different discursive

and research contexts, she asks? If so, doesn't empirical adequacy beg the question with which data and with whose data the observational ele

ment of a model or theory ought to be in agreement? Shouldn't a feminist

criterion consist in specific methods rather than the demonstrably vague notion of empirical adequacy? I would not go so far as to specify particular


methods as inherently feminist or not, as I think how a method is used

is more important than the method itself. But the question draws atten

tion to ways in which empirical adequacy needs further interpretation or

specification. One of the critiques of modern experimental methods is that they

involve what Ruth Hubbard calls "context stripping". When we detach

a factor from the contexts in which it naturally occurs, we are hoping to

achieve understanding of that factor's precise contribution to some process. But by taking it out of its natural context we deprive ourselves of under

standing how its operation is affected by factors in the context from which

it has been removed. This is, of course, a crucial aspect of experimen tal method. I suspect that it's not (or not always) the decontextualization

that is to be deplored, but the concomitant devaluation as unimportant or ephemeral of what remains. The decontextualization of experimental variables is analogous to the way in which activity in the public domain

of modern industrial societies is analytically detached from the material

conditions of its possibility in the private domain. Resistance to the con

stant marginalization of domestic (and female) activity has made feminists

sensitive to the processes of exclusion and devaluation. These are prob lematic not only in our understandings of the social world but also in our

understanding of the natural world. The failure to attend fully to the inter

actions of the entire social group, including its females, in studying the

males of a species has led to distorted accounts of the structure of animal

societies, including male-male interactions. In toxicity studies, the focus

on a single chemical's toxic properties fails to inform us how its activity is modified, canceled or magnified by interaction with other elements in

its natural environments. Focus on gene action has blinded us to the ways in which the genes must be activated by other elements in the cell. These

models may well be empirically adequate in relation to data generated in

laboratory experiments, but not in relation to potential data excluded by a

particular experimental set up.

Comparable remarks must be made about accuracy. A model may be

accurate with respect to a narrow range of possible data. But why should

the data in that band be the relevant ones? Empirical adequacy and accu

racy (treated as one or separate virtues) need further interpretation to be

meaningfully applied in a context of theory choice. Those interpretations are likely to import the socio-political or practical dimensions that the

search for a purely cognitive criterion seeks to escape. At the very least the

burden of argument falls on those who think such an escape possible.


V

I've argued that by identifying values of a scientific community other

than the traditional ones we can get insight into important features of

the latter. In particular, I've tried to give some reasons for thinking that

those traditional values are not purely epistemic (if at all), but that their

use in certain contexts of scientific judgment imports significant socio

political values into those contexts. Even the apparently neutral criteria of

accuracy or empirical adequacy can involve socio-political dimensions in

the judgment of which data a theory or model must agree with.

I do not want to claim that the virtues or criteria I've discussed have

fixed and absolute socio-political meanings. At the very least, whatever

valence they have will be modified by their interaction with whatever other

criteria are brought to bear in a given situation and the relative priorities

assigned to the different members of a given set. And the social context

in which they are used will also make a difference. Thus, it is not clear

that treating simplicity as a theoretical virtue would have the same socio

political resonance in a social-political context which values diversity and

equality. But in our context, in which diversity and equality are granted

lip service but made to defer to more important social values like order

and economic competitiveness, and in which the physical and life sciences

possess a greater cognitive authority than other intellectual sources of

value, it does serve anti-progressive ends. Similarly, heterogeneity could, in a context other than our own, fail to be a theoretical virtue with a

liberatory potential.

Finally, a note of caution must be sounded. Simply articulating those

theoretical virtues that could count as feminist does not mean it is possible to develop, pursue, and establish theories and models that exemplify them.

The virtues to which they are opposed are mainstream precisely because

they stand in reinforcing relations with values and relations in the social

context of science. There may be pockets, "niches", in which it is possible to practice alternative science that satisfies at least some feminist criteria

(the ones discussed or others). But these must be deliberately created and

will stand in complicated relations to other sites of research. The practice of science is too materially dependent on its socio-political context for

significant change to be possible without changes in that context.

One cannot claim by looking at the theoretical virtues themselves that

they are liberatory, oppressive, feminist, masculinist, or neutral. One must

look instead at the grounds that are offered for treating them as virtues

and the ways in which their deployment in particular scientific arguments and research programs resonates with conditions in the social and political context of the research. One must look as well at the consequences of


employing their contraries in a given context, and the grounds for doing so or not. Placing the virtues in this fuller setting of use and defense

undermines the idea that we could separate out the purely cognitive from

the political in any absolute or final sense. It depends on the context.

NOTES

* I am grateful to participants in the Indiana University Workshop on Social Values in the

Context of Justification for their comments on an earlier, spoken, version of this paper. 1

See Quine and Ullian (1978) for simplicity and external consistency, i.e., consistency with

presently accepted theory. Philip Kitcher (1993) has argued for unification as a scientific

desideratum. This, for present purposes, can be considered as a variation of breadth of

scope. Kitcher, it might be argued, has a more precise measure in mind than the notion of

breadth of scope allows. I will treat differences in a later paper. 2

I first discussed what I have called the feminist theoretical virtues in (Longino 1993a).

I used them again in a discussion of the possibility of feminist epistemology in (Longino

1994). The exposition of the next several pages borrows from those earlier publications. 3 See Bleier (1984), Keller (1985), Fausto-Sterling (1985). 4

Stephen F. Kellert has suggested that the value at work here is particularism. I shall defer

consideration of the relation between particularity and heterogeneity to another occasion. 5

For example, Levins and Lewontin (1985) embrace both heterogeneity and a strong form

of interaction they label "dialectical" as features of dialectical biology. Literary scientists

Stephen J. Gould and Lewis Thomas endorse interaction as a principle of explanation. Whatever sympathies with feminism they may have, it is not feminism that leads them to

heterogeneity or interaction. Indeed Gould explicitly says that gender or feminism have

nothing to do with it. It's just a matter of good science. 6

Ian Barbour suggested this point to me in conversation. 7

Cf. Longino (forthcoming). 8

Cf. Longino (forthcoming).

University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, MN 55455 U.S.A.

longino_gender politics theoretical virtues

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