LONGWORTH'S MISSION TOCIRCASSIA IN 1855

Doç. Dr. Musa ŞAŞMAZ*

The politieal history of the Circassian tribes was for a longtime intimately eonneeted with that of the Crimea prior to the an-nexation of the latter to the Russian Empire. The sovereignty of theSublime Porte was aeknowledged by both though never establishedin Cireassia, as in the Crimea, by eonquest. It partook rather of theeharaeter of religious than temporal supremaey; the Sultan as Ca-liph bearing the supreme head of Islamism.

In the treaty of Kaynarca', 21 July 1774, by whieh the Crimeawas eonstituted independent, it is deelared in artiele III "Toutes lesnations Tartares de la Crimee, du Budziach, du Kuban, d'Yedistan,de Geambouilak, de Sedikul, sans aucune exception quelconque,seront respectivement, par les deux Empires, reconnues libres etentierement independantes de toute Puissance etrangere et commeetant sous la puissance immediate de leur propre Khan de la racede Cengiz Khan, elu et etabli de l'accord et avec le consentementunanime des peuples Tartares, lequel les gouvernera suivant leurslois et leurs anciens usages, sans jamais rendre compte en aucuntemps a aucune Puissance etrangere quelconque, "&c.

* Academie Staff of Niğde University.I. Gabriel Noradoungian. Reeueil d'aetes internationaux de i'Empire Ottoman

(Paris. 1897). Vol. i. p. 310; C. de Martens and F. de Cussy. Recueil manuei et pratiquede traites, eonventions et autres aetes dipiomatiques. (Leipzig. 1846-1857).7 Vols ..Vol. i. p. ı i i; G- de Martens. Reeueil de traites d'alliance, de paix, ete., de 1761 a1808. (Gottingue. 1817-1835).8 vols. Vol. Il. p. 286; Meemua-i Muahedat. (istanbuL.1294-1298). 5 Vols .. Vol. LLL. p. 254; Treaties between Turkeyand Foreign Powers.(London. ı855). p. 463.

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This treaty, notwithstanding the connection that had subsistedbetween Circassia and the Crimea, makes no reference whatever tothe Circassian tribes. There may seem to be same ambiguiy in thephrase "nations Tartares du Kuban", but it will be found on ex-amination to apply only to the Tartars residing either on the rightbank, or in the delta between the two mouths of the Kuban, and notto the Circassians on the left bank. This was proved by the boun-dary convention coneluded about thet time between the RussianGovernar Tolstoy and Hasan Pasha, and the act of 20 Decemberl783c relative to the incorporation to the Russian Empire of the Cri-mea and the Isle of Taman, and which fixes for limİt of the twoEmpire the River Kuban.

This act, with the other foregoing treaties, is cİted in the 2ndartiele of the treaty of Yash" 24 December 1792, and all doubt withrespect to the Sultan's sovereign rights is removed by the 6th artieleof the same treaty, in which it is deelared: "Le deuxihne Article dupresent Traite ayant eonfirme entre autres Traites prectidents l'Aete du 20 Deeembre, 1783, relatif a I'incorporation a Li EmpireRusse de la Crimee et de l'lle de Taman, et qui fixe pour lünite desdeux Empires le fleuve du Kuban, la Sublime Porte promet et s'en-gage solennellement (i employer son autorite et tous ses moyenspour maintenir dans l'ordre les peuplades qui habitent la rivegauehe du Kuban, et les empeeher de faire des ineursions dansl'Empire Russe, ou de porter prejudiee soit secretement soit ou-vertement sous quelque pretexte que ce soit aux habitants Russesde la rive droite. Pour eet effet la Sublime Porte enverra (i qui il

2. Gabriel Noradoungian, Reeueil d'aetes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman.Vol. I, p. 377; C. de Martens and F. de Cussy, Reeueil Manuel ct pratique de traites,eonventions ct autres aetes diplomatiques. Vol. I, p. 3 i5; G- ele Martens, Reeueil detr ait es d'allianee, de paix, ete., de 1761 a 1808, Vol. III. p. 707; Meemua-i Muahedat.Vol. III, p. 319 anelTreaties between Turkeyand Foreign Powers. p. 50S.

3. Gabriel Noraeloungian, Reeueil d'aetes internationaux de I'Empire Ottoman.Vol. II. p. 16; C. ele Martens and F. de Cussy, Reeueil Manuel ct pratique de traites,eonventions ct autres actes diplomatiques, Vol. II. p.65; G- de Martens. Reeueil detraitcs d'allianee, de paix, ete., de 1761 a 1808. Vol. V, p. 291; Meemua-İ Muahedat.Vol. IV. p. 4; Treaties between Turkeyand Foreign Powers. p. 50S and State Papers.Vol. XIII. p. l)02.

LONGWORTH'S MtSStON TO CtRCASStA tN j 855 221

appartient les ordres les plus expres pour defendre, sous les peinesles plus severes, d'enlever des sujets Russes et de les conduire enesclavage: et elle fera, apres l'echange et la ratification du presentTraite, publier sur les lieux ces defenses. Si apres ces dispositionsil arrivait que quelque individu de ces peuplades fit des incursionssur le territoire Russe, derobat du betaif ou toute autre propriete.ou reduisit en ensclavage des sujets Russes, sur la plainte portee ace sujet il sera faite prompte justice,." &c

Thus, it can be elearly demonstrated that by the mutual consentof the Porte and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, the Circassian tribesinhabiting the left bank of the Kuban were held to be under the sov-ereignty of the Sultan. A different understanding was adopted withrespect to the two Cabardas. By the 2lst artiele of the treaty ofKaynarca it was settled that "les deux Cabardes c'est-Cı-dire, lagrande et la petite, etant par leur voisinage avec les Tartares enune plus grande connexion avec le Khan de Crimee, if est reserveau dit Khan de consentir avec son consentir avec son conseif et lesanciens de la nation Tartare que ces pays appatiennent cı la Courlmperiale de Russie."

But the whole of the country inhabited by the Circassian tribesfrom the left bank of the Kuban to the sea-cost was acknowledgedby Russia to belong to Turkey. Anapa, which was taken by theRussians in 1791, was restored to the Porte in 1792. As to the Cir-cassians themselves, they were willing enough to be consideredsubjects of the Porte and that she should be held responsible for allthe disorders they committed on the frontier. But though many Cir-cassian chiefs were appointed and paid by the Porte to keep peaceon the border, all these arrangements proved abortive, the maraud-ers were unchecked and the Porte continually embroiled with theRussian govemment. The fact is the Porte never exercised any realauthority on those guarters and these stipulations were, as far as theCircassians were concemed, based on a diplomatic fiction, viz.,their subjection to Turkey, whereas they had aways been in-dependent de facto. Anapa was the only point on the coast wherethe Ottomans had a permanent footing, which the Circassians were

222 MUSAŞAŞMAZ

glad to concede to them as the chief mart of the slave trade- the trueand material bond of connection which had at all times united Cir-cassia to the Ottoman Empire. it should be at the same time re-marked that the fact of supplying slaves for the Turkish marketmust in the eyes of the Ottomans have disentitled Circassia to beconsidered Turkish territory since no bom subject of the Sultanwho was a Muslim could be saId as aslave.

By the treaty of Edime4, 14 Septembel' 1829, this nonıinal sov-ereignty was transferred from the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia.But, though deriving his title from this treaty, its very terms betrayan awareness that there is nothing serious or substantial in it. Noth-ing is said about a cession of territory, not a word about Circassia,no allusion made to the tribes and extensive provinces situated be-tween the Black Sea and the Kuban, but in tracing the limits of thetwo Empires as then adjusted, the 14th artiele contains a simpledeelaration to the effect that certain provinces of Caucasia therementianed, "ainsi que le littoral de la Mer Noire, depuis l'em-bouchure du Kuban jusqu'au Fort St. Nicholas inciusivement, ser-ait sous la domination de l'Empereur de la Russie." The reason forthis suppressian and the appropriation of a whole country, withouteven naming it, may to same extent have been that Russia wishedto draw as little attention as possible to the ten-itorial aggrand-

4, Gabriel Noradoungian. Recuei! d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman.Vol. ıı. p, 166; L. Neumann and A. de P1asson, Recuei! des traites etc ... (Vicnne). Vol.Vi. p. 489; Mecmua-i Muahedat, Vol. IV, p. 4 and G,-Fr de Martens, Nouveau recuei!de traites d'alliance de paix, etc. de 1808 a 1839,16 V01s, (Göttingue, 1817-1842), Vol.vııı, p, 143, For the situation in and the deseription of Circassia from 1829 to the be-ginning of the Crimean War, see Baron von Haxthausen, Transcaucasia, Sketches of theNations and Races between the Balck Sea and the Caspian, (London, ı854), pp, i-ı3;Edmund Spencer, Travels in Circassia, Kırım Tartary, including a Steam Voyagedown the Danube from Vienna to Constantinople, and round the Black Sea, (London.i839), ii Vols., espcciaııy Vol. ı. p, 238f.; Richard Wilbraham, Travels in the Trans-caucasian Provinces of Russia and Along the Southern Shore of the Lakes of Vanand Urumiah in the Autumn and Winter of 1837, (London. ı839), pp, 224-226; XavierHommaire de BelI, Travels in the Steppes of the Caspian Sea, the Crimea, the Ca-ucasus. (London. 1847), p, 297f,; For the mi1itary operations of Russüt between i830 and1852. see W, E, D, Aııen and P, Muratoff, Caucasian Battle-tields, a History of thcWars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, (Cambridge. 1953), pp, 46-53,

LONGWORTH'S MISSION TO CIRCASS1A iN ı855 223

izement she had in view and against which she was pledged at thecommencement of the war. But in reality, if not politically, theRussian government both before and after the treaty of Edirne,looked upon the Circassian tribes as independent. They were somarked in the official maps drawn in the early 19th century whichenumerated the population to discriminate between dependent andindependent tribes.

During the discussion of the question raised by the capture ofthe merchant ship Vixen\ which was taken by the Russians whileattempting to break the blockade of the coast of Circassia in 1837,the British government avoided any recognition of the de jure or defacto sovereignty of Russia over Circassia. The seizure of the ves-sel was admitted to be valid on the ground that it had entered theport of Sucukkale which belonged to the Ottoman Empire at the pe-riod of the conclusian of the treaty of Edirne and was then underRussian military occupation. In the apinion of the British govem-ment, at that time Russia had no legal claim to any part of the Cir-cassian territory which she did not hold, nar did the Ottoman em-pire have a right to cede what she never possessed6•

Amids the political complications which surrounded the ques-tion of Circassia, it was found very difficult, if not impossible dur-ing and after the Crimean War, to arriye at any satisfactory solu-tion. In that period, three distinct modes of settlement presentedthemselves, viz., the sovereignty of Russia, the sovereignty of theOttoman Empire, and the independence of the Circassian tribes.None of them was considered acceptable by the British govem-ment, because all consequently withdrew their forces from thecoasts. In this period, the British and French officers entertained toestablish a kind of permanent presence in the Caucasia, because

5. For the Vixen affair. see Norman Luxenburg, Russian Expansion into the Ca-ucasus and the English Relationship Thereto, Unpublished Ph.O Oissertation. (Uni-versity of Michigan, 1956), pp. 98- ı50.

6. See İnclosure i in J. A. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 37. 17 Jamıaryi856, FO 88J1545.

224 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

they were aware that, as soon as Russia was on her knees shewould try to take positions which she had lost in the war. So theBritish and French governments with a view to strengthening theirpositions, were cmmnitted to securing the active cooperation of theCircassian tribes in the war against Russia, and the British govern-ment, therefore, proposed to send 1. A. Longwarth, who had re-sided there for some time, and of whose ability and discretion theBritish govrenment was well assured. The British government con-templated persuading the French government to send a Frenchagent to accompany Longworth, so as to make this mission of en-quiry look more important in the eyes of the Circassians. If theFrench government thought otherwise, Longworth's departure wasto be postponed until Longworth's French colleague was ready toaccompany him. To this purpose, Clarendon, the British ForeignMinister, wrote aletter on 9 April1855 to Lord Cowley, the BritishAmbassador in Paris, to fİnd out whether the French governmentwas to assign a French agent to accompany Longworth for the mis-sion to be proceeded to Circassia. In accordance with this in-struction, Lord Cowley communicated with M. Thouvenel, theFrench Foreign Minister, on the subject of Longworth's missionand the result was that the French government had aıready sent anagent namely M. Champoiseau, to Batum for the purpose of pro-ceeding thence into Circassia. After this communication, M.Thouvenel ordered M. Champoiseau to wait at Batum to receivefurther instructions from his government. The French governmentdesired to furnish his agent instructions similar to those issued forLongworth. At M. Thouvenel's request, Lord Cowley left themwith him, in order to frame similar ones for M. Champoiseau7

• TheBritish Foreign Minister, the Ear1 of Clarendon, also instructed hisAmbassador at Istanbul, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to com-municate with M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Istanbul onthe subject. Clarendon found it necessary to communicate the in-formation to be given to Longworth with the Russian governmentin the event of his proceeding to Circassia aloneH

•

7. Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon. no 440. 13 April ı855. FO 881/1443.8. The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley. no 364. 9 April ı855.881/1443.

LONGWORTH'S MlsstON TO CIRCASSIA iN 1855 225

The Foreign Minister, Clarendon, sent to Stratford de Reddiffeand Longworth on 13 April 1855 the details and the instructionsabout Longworth's proceeding to Circassia. In his letter to Red-diffe, Clarendon asked him to supply Longworth with the nec-essary funds from his account of extraorinary disbursement, to fa-cilitate his proceeding to the coast and to obtain for him from theBritish naval and military authorities, or if necessary from the Otto-man arsenals any supplies to be entrusted to him for distribution.For these arrangements Clarendon stated that he had applied to theBritish War Department and to the Admiralty to give the necessaryauthority for the issue of such supplies available in the Britishstores and to convey Longworth and the supplies to the coast ofCircassia in a ship of war. Reddiffe was alsa requested to obtainfrom the Ottoman government a decree making Longworth thebearer of an autharitative disdaimer from the Porte of all intentionhere after to daim sovereignty over Cirassia. This decree was foundessential to wipe out the suspicions of the Circassian tribes as to theviews of the PorteY.

As for Longworth's instructian to go to Circassia, the Britishgovernment was desirous to obtain accurate information as to thestate of affairs in that country in 1855, and as to the extent to whichthe allies could count on the cooperatian of the various tribes in-habiting that country, if circumstances rendered it advisable to callthem into action. To this purpose Longworth was asked to proceedat once to such place on the Circassian coast to afford the readiestopportunity for communicating with the most influential chiefs ofthe different tribes.

The ostensible object of Longworth's visit was to inquire intothe amount of cavalry which the Circassian tribes were likely toplace at the disposal of the British government. All arrangementswere made for him to obtain, in Istanbul, a supply of gunpowder aswell as a supply of riffles and mountain guns. if they were found

9. The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redeliffe, no 29 i, ı3 April 1855, FO88111443.

226 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

insufficent in the British army stores in Istanbul, he would ask themfrom Britain. Soan after his arrival, he was to endeavour to placehimself in coımnunication with Shamil, and learn the state of hispasition with reference to the other tribes, of his intentions andplans with regard to carrying on hostilities against Russia. Anatherduty of Longworth was to inquire into the state and resources of theCircassian tribes, in general, for active warfare of the country,whether the feuds among the different tribes would prevent theirunited action even against a comman enemy, what prospect theywould be of their future consolidation, under what form of govern-ment, and what sort of assistance they would desire of accept fromthe allies, and what guarantees for their protection against Russiathey would look here after for in return for their more active as-sistance in the war and so on.

He was however warned to abstain from pledging the Britishgovernment to anything beyand the existing assistance in ca1Tyingon with the war, not to give a political character to his visit to thatcountry and not to raise expectations impossible to realize, but hewas encouraged to state in general terms that his government took agreat interest in the struggle which the Circassian tribes had so longprosecuted against Russia, and would see this struggle terminatedto the advantage of the several tribes with pleasure. He was alsa al-lowed to point out that at all events the cooperatian of the tribes inthe hostilities in progress could not place them in a worse pasitionthan that which they had at that time. While assisting the allies inthe ir endeavours to circumscribe the power of Russia, the Russia,the British government pledged that they would take the surestmeans of securing for themselves the independence which they hadso long striven to maintainıo.

In consequence of Clarendon's letter addressed to Lord Strat-ford de Redeliffe, on 13 April 1855, the latter appealed to the Porteto obtain a deelaration in favour of Circassian independence after

ıo. For the detailed instruetion, see the Earl of Clarendon to Longworth. no ı Con-fidential, 13 April 1855, FO 881/1443.

LONGWORTH'S MISSION TO CİRCASsIA iN 1855 227

the expulsion of the Russians from their country. This appeal wasmet with favour and the Porte issued a decree in the form of a fir-man. The decree was addressed to the commander of the arıny ofBatum, the commandant of Sukumkale and its neihgbourhood andto Mustafa Pasha. The Sultan declared in the decree that his gov-emment and his intimate allies, the govemments of Britain andFrance, in the continuation of the war with Russia, desired to liber-ate the countries of Circassia from Russian dominion. To this aim,the British govemment had sent Longworth to Circassia to inquireinto the measures, local and military, necessary for producing a col-!ectiye movement of the Circassian tribes against the common en-emy and for ensuring the end in view. The decree added that Long-worth was instructed to act in concert with the French agent M.Champoseau at Batum. As they were both distinguished and con-fidential agents, the Circassian tribes were asked to show them eve-ry courtesy and pay attention to what these agents stated con-ceming the comman object. The Sultan further pointed out that thesincere aim and intention of the three imperial govemments was tohasten the liberation of Circassia from the grasp of Russia, to savethe Circassian people from the troubles and difficulties they had forsome time been plunged into, to ensure the ir welfare and prosper-ity, and to respect and preserve the national rights and privilegesenjoyed of old by the Circassian race and the chiefs of the tribesll.

Before coming to Istanbul, Longworth had been performingthe consulate of Monastıf. Longworth, together with Alfred Sandi-son, proceeded to Istanbul and arrived there on 13 May 1855 fromwhich time to 5 June he engaged in making the necessary prepara-tions for the mission. He received his deteailed instructions and thedecree from the Sublime Porte with pledges and assurances as toCircassian independence. The mountain guns, minie riffles and am-munition were placed at Longworth's disposal to be given as apresent to the Circassians. He alsa received from the British Am-

ı \. For the decree, see Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, no 422,IL June \855, FO 88111443 and N. Luxenburg, Russian Expansion into the Caucasusand the English Relationship Thereto, pp. 196-\97.

228 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

bassador funds to the amount of 1000 Sterlingo On receipt of the in-telligence indicating the projected attack on Anapa, it was deemedadvisable that he should proceed thither with as little delay as pos-sible. He was then boarded on the British ship "Caradoc" by whichhe was taken to Kertch. The artides and materials to be transportedto Circassia could not be shipped on this vessel conveniently and soLongworth had to leave them behind so that they were to be loadedon and conveyed to him by another. The British Ambassador at Is-tanbul therefore applied to Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons for asteam vesseL. Accordingly, the latter dispatched the order to thecaptain of the "Cydops" at Sivastapol to proceed immediately to Is-tanbul to the purpose of transporting the persons and effects left be-hind. It seems that the vessel "Cydops" could not come to Istanbuland another vessel namely "Niger" was provided on 10 June 1855to take him from Kertch to Sucukkale or Anapal". The followingday Longworth was conveyed to the shore of Anapa by a shipnamely "Highflyer". He observed there that the Russians had evac-uated their garrison from Anapa on 7 June, and 28 May they hadalso abondened Sucukkale. The withdrawn forces of the Russianswere reported to amount to 8000. While they were withdrawingtheir forces, they destroyed the bridges standing at the mouth of theKuban. The fortresses of Anapa had also been most effectualy dis-mantled. Al the guns, 102 in number, had been spiked and 77 ofthem irremediably damaged by the destruction of the trunnions.The powder magazines had been blown up, and several wide bridg-es opened in the walls by which the Russians had intended to ruinthe defences of this fortress. Sefer Pashal" a Circassian acting un-

ı2. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 4, 24 June 1855. FO 88 II 1443. it is ob-served that sametimes later the vessel "Cyclops" alsa appeared off Anapa.

i3. Sefer Pasha was by origİıı a Cireassian from the neighbourhood of Anapa. wherehe was known by the name of Zanaoglu Sefer Beg. Through family influenee anel con-nection as weıı as personal merit he formerly enjoyeel great creelit. anel soan after the warbetween Russia and the Ottoman Empire. whieh terminated in the treaty of Edirne. he waseleputeel by his countrymen as their representative to IstanbuL. with a view to maving thesympathy anel procuring the assistance of the Porte and the Western Powers in the unequaIstnlggIe whieh they continueel to maintain against Russia. rt was in this capacity of Cir-eassian envay that he attracteel the notice of M. Boutinieff, the Russian Minister, who in1836 elemaneleel his expulsion from !stanbuL. Sinee that time he lived as a pensioner of the

LONGWORTH'S MIsstON TO C1RCASSIA iN 1855 229

der to command of the Ottoman General Mustafa Pasha at Su-kumkale, arrived at Anapa with a small personal escart on LO June,after having taken possesion of that place. Having liberated theseplaces from the Russian occupation the Ottoman officers in-tendedto appropriate the fortresses in Circassia. This was met withcool reception by the British authorities who wished to protestagainst such an assumption. To them these fortresses had been formany years in the possession of Russia. In a conference held byAdımral Steward and the French AdmiraL, the representatives of theallies, Sefer Pasha talked of repairing the breaches, remounting theguns, and putting the fortresses in a good state of defence again.The Ottomans had a view to making these places strongly de-fensible against any eventual Russian attacks, but it appears thatthis intention was not supported by the British or French, in fearthat it might harm their general interests in the Caucasus. Long-warth, in his conversation with the Ottoman military commanders,such as Halid Pasha, expressed his dislike ar objections to such Ot-toman acts and stated that the possession of Anapa could only bedaimed on the grounds of temporary occupation for military rea-sons, and that it was only in this light that placing an Onoman gar-rison in Anapa was admissible. However the question of future pos-session of the place, he pointed out, was of a political nature andthis matter could only be settled by the common accord of the al-

Porte at Edirne till the breaking out of the hostilities induced her to avail herself of his ser-vices as a political emissary in Circassia. For more than fourteen months he remained in astate of inactivity at Sukumkale on the southern coast of Abhasia. a port of the country inwhich his inlluence had at no time prcvailed and where he had to contend agaiııst that of aforıııidable rivaı. the popular and energetic Naib of Sheyh Shaıııil, Mehmed Emin Efendi.who hael also been invested with the title of Pasha by the Porte. It was only after the Rus-sians had evacuated Anapa and Sucukkale that he ventured to appear in the northern pro-vinces of Shapsu and Natakoych. However, during the twentyfive years that he had beenabscnt, a decided change had taken place in the political character of these districts, nearlyall his influential contemperaries of a former period had disappeared from scne, and thenew generation had been very much Russanised. For these, see Longworth to the Earl ofClarenelon, no 3, 21 hıne 1855, FO 88/1443. AIso about Sefer Pasha and Mehmeel Emin'sarrival anel his eloings up to the Crimean War from pro-British ancl anti-Ottoman points ofview. see Shauket Mufti, Heroes and Emperors in Circassian History, (Beirtlt, 1944),pp. 207-224.

230 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

lied and beligerent governments. He said that it was difficult to seewhat advantage the Porte could deri ve from the possession of ana-pa, since it did appear to him that evidently the Russians had notthe slightest intention of reoccupying the town and that it was infact in its actual state untenable by any Power, friendly or hostile.He further stated that the French and British Admirals having visit-ed it decided on leaving it unoccupied and that the pasition was iso-lated and unconnected for strategic purposes with any other, norcould its possession have the slightest bearing on the success of op-erations in the Crimea or elsewhere. Longworth came to a conclu-sion that whatever disavowal of ambitious views of the Porte or itsagents, the circumstances afforded very conclusiye evidence of anintention on its part, not only of recovering the fortified placeswhich it had formerly possessed on the coast, but ettending its au-thority, temporal as well as religious, over the whole of Circassia.Longworth's fear became stronger when he confined himself to thestatement made by Sefer Pasha to the etfect that he was in possis-sion of a firman investing him with authority as civil and militarygovernar of all the Circassian provinces situated between the BlackSea and the River Kubanl4• At that time, the Ottomans maintained aforce of 1500 men at Sukumkale and of 500 at Tupse. The problemwas that they had difficulty in transporting them to Anapa. MustafaPasha had applied for the steamers to the British and French navalcommanders but his request was not complied withl

'.

On 21 June, Halid Pasha, the generalaf adivisian, came toAnapa in a screw steam-frigate with a brig of war in tow and three-four small transports conveying on board a battalion of Ottoman in-fantry which was then disembarked and quartered within the wallsof the fortress. Halid Pasha's explanation for this act was that hehad been ordered by Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman commander in-chief at Batum, to occupy the place. The latter was to follow himwith an additional force in a few days. On 23 June, Mustafa Pashabrought a company of Tunisian infantry. He stayed there overnight

14. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 3, 2 ı June 1855, FO 88 i/1443.ı5. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 2, ı ı Juııe 1855, FO 88 ı/1443.

LONGWORTH'S MlsslüN TO CİRCASSİA İN 1855 231

and early the next morning proceeded to the Crimea with the in-tention of confening with Omer Pasha and the allied admirals as tothe combined plan of operations. Longworth had an opportunity toconverse with Mustafa Pasha. The former explained to the latter theobject of his mission and probably expressed his fear about the mil-itary anangements being taken by the Ottoman army in Circassia.Mustafa Pasha used very cautious and evasive languages to reply tohis statements. It appears most likely that Mustafa Pasha was in-formed by Halid Pasha of the British remonstrances on the Otto-man military movement at Anapa. Mustafa Pasha therefore wishedto avoid raising the subject and toId Longworth that he would re-turn to Anapa in the course of a week and would be glad to attendto any communication Longworth was to makel6• Mustafa Pasha re-turned to Anapa from Kertch on 26 June 1855 and two days laterhe gaye an audience to the Circassians. In this assembly he readtwo Imperial firmans. By the first of them he was appointed gov-ernor-general of Circassia. Moreover, he was authorized to namekaymakams over any district thought proper. The second firmanwhich was referred to the French and British missions in Circassiacontained a pledge on the part of the Sultan to respect the old İn-dependence and original national privileges of the Circassians. InCircassia Longworth observed that the Circassians were the adher-ents to the Sunni sect, and consequent1y acknowledged the com-plete supremacy of the Sultan. Although he wanted to raise his ob-jections to this, he found it unseasonable, since the Circassiansthemselves would have been the first to resent iL In fact, Long-worth tried to intrigue amongst the Circassians, but, as he admitted,on political matters they always prefened refening to the Ottomancommander in-chief or Sefer Pasha. In other words the loyalty ofthe local people to the Ottoman Sultan was unquestionable and thiswas made firmer by possession by the Ottoman troops of Anapaand the other places on the coasL

One of the aims of the British government for sending a mis-sion to Circassia was to levy irregular cavalry for Britain. This de-

16. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 4, 24 Itme 1855, FO 881/1443.

232 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

mand was discussed at an assembly held at Anapa amongst thechiefs and notables of the neighbouring districts, the OUoman andthe British officials. Though the overture was warınly seconded byMustafa Pasha, the commander-in-chief at Batum, it did not meetwith much favour of the Circassians. Longworth believed that theirbackwardness played an important role in their reaching this de-cision. The Circassians however declared that while they werethreatened by the forces which Russia had collected along thewhole line of the Kuban, they would have no cavalry to spare forforeign service, but that when relieved from this danger, theywould, with the sanction of the Porte, fumish any contingent thatmight be required from them. In Longworth's opinion this answerwas by no means a final decision and did not necessiate the post-ponement of the levy altogether, because the reason assigned wasan unfounded pretext. He further stated that the Circassian rejectionwas based on fear of Russia'7•

Longworth went on an excursion of twelve day s into the inter-ior of Circasia from 2 to 14 July 1855. Having visited the interiorof the country, Longworth retumed to Anapa and observed that theBritish ship "Leopard" also arrived at this town, having on boardeighty French artillerymen under the command of two superior of-fieers of artillery and engineers directed under a convention signedby the French, British and OUoman commanders-in-chief in theCrimea to blow up the seaward defences of Anapa and, if found de-sirable, to repair the fortifications on the landside. These in-structions were considered peremtory and had been issued underthe apprehension that the Russians might re-occupy the place. Thispresumption seemed to both Longworth and Sefer Pasha improb-able, that the Russians could return to Anapa under the existing cir-cumstances. Sefer Pasha therefore decidedly set his face against it,declaring that he could not give his consent till he received ordersto this effect from his superior in command, Mustafa Pasha at Su-kumkale or Batum. Sefer Pasha persisted in his opposition and

17. Longworth to the Ear1 ofClarendon. no 5. 2 July 1855. FO 881/1443.

LONGWORTH'S MlsstON TO CtRCASStA tN ı855 233

threatened the British and French representatives there with aprotest that the measure was directed against the Circassians. Hetherefore talked of raising twenty thousand Circassians for the de-fence of Anapa against the detachment which had been sent to de-stroy the seaward fortifications. This opposition displayed by thePasha on this and other occasions was considered unacceptable anduseless. Longworth felt annoyed and humiliated by the repeated op-pasition of Sefer Pasha and the other Ottoman authorities. On see-ing his French colleague, M. Champoiseau who arrived at Anapaon 14 July 1855 by the "Leopard", he complained about the un-acceptibility of the administrative authority at Anapa exercised bythe Ottoman officials, because this authority in his opinion had notbeen constituted or sanctioned in concert with the allied Powers1x

•

Longworth prepared a long and detailed dispach about histwelve day excursion. His principal object was to persuade the peo-ple in those areas to euro 1in the British anny, because he had failedto levy from the Circassians on the coast. He alluded in his dispatchto the difficulties raised by the Ottoman authorities who wereaverse to his proceeding into the interioL Sefer Pasha apparentlyendeavoured to dissuade him under various pretexts, by stating thattravelling was unsafe. Mustafa Pasha had alsa strongly rec-ommended him not to leave the coast. He suspected they had triedto put forward several obstac1es to his going to visit the interior ofthe country. This meant to him that they were concealing their dou-ble-dealings and intrigues. Despite this accusation directed againstthe Ottoman authorities, on his request he was given by MustafaPasha and Sefer Pasha three mihmandars to accompany him. Hisexcursion was confined to the section of Circassia forming thenorth-western angle, between the River Kuban and the Black Seaand inhabited by the tribes of Shapsugh and Natkoych. He first pro-eeeded to Bzadugh and the other provinces extending from sameleagues bela w Ekaterinadar to the sources of the Laba and the Ku-ban. The feudal chiefs of Pshees and Uzdens preserved the author-

18. Longworth to the Earl ofClarendon, no 6,15 July 1855, FO 881/1443.

234 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

ity in these areas. Longworth had been to this country for the firsttime around 1838 and had acquainted many chiefs, but almost all ofthem were unfortunately dead. Their survivors or successors couldprovide him no good, because they possessed no weight or in-tluence in the country.

He observed that the encrouchments of the commoners on theprivileges of the nobles had been the cause of division. The latterwere alienated from their countrymen and the fonner had readilyaccepted bribes from the Russian government which was deceivedhowever as to the amount of advantage it could obtain throughthese means. The Russian government found to its cost that it hadto purchase not individuals but a whole population. StilI in 1855,by its conciliatory policyand the concession of commercial facil-ities induding a connivence at the slave trade, it made greatprogress in the pacification of the Kuban provinces. The principalcheck it sustained was in the reactionary movement headed by thefamous Naib or lieutenant of Shamil who had been occasionallyvisiting the inhabitants of Shapsugh and Natkoych. They weresometimes fined, confiscated and put to death because of the dis-loyalty to the cause which Shamil was fighting to achieve. Some ofthese people, for instance those of Uzdens prefelTed taking refugeand even service with the Russians. The great majority of themhowever returned to Circassia after the evacuation of anapa in 1855and together with some of their countrymen, formed a very numer-ous body who gaye their support to Sefer Pasha, mentioned pre-viously. Longworth daimed that it was Sefer Pasha who preventedthe recruitment of the Circassians in the service of the British army.

He then proceeded to another part of Bzadugh and the otherprovinces of Kuban where the nobles he knew were possessed ofsubstantial authoıity, which would enable them to dispose of theirwarlike resources for the benefit of the common cause. All thesedistricts bordering on the Laba and the Kuban, namely Bzadugh,Hatukoy, Demigoy, Beslenoy and Karachay along with those of theGreat and Little Kabarda, had, from their contiguity to the Russianti"ontier, as well as to that they were situated on the plains, main-

LONGWORTH'S MISSION TO CİRCASslA iN ı855 235

tained peaceful re1ations with Russia, and had become either neu-tral or subject to her. The nobles, from the power and influencethey possessed, offered satisfactory guarantees for the security ofthe frontier to some degree. Many of them had even emoUed in theservice of the border police. Over twenty thousand families, Tartaı-sand Circassians, who were most exposed to the imoads of the hos-tile tribes inhabiting the mountains of Abhasia, had emigratedacross the Kuban, where lands had been aUoted to them. Livingthere among the Cossack population, they appeared to be dan ger-ous to the Russian govemment, when war broke out in 1853. In1855 an ukase arrived from St. Petersburg, ordering the emigrantsto be removed to the distance of 100 versts into the interior of Rus-sia, or to be allowed to return to Circassia. Many chiefs avai1edthemselves o this permission, weU aware that they would in futurehave to side with their countrymen against Russia.

Longwort approached the stream of Afips- a cont1uent of theKuban which seperates Shapsugh from Bzadugh where the com-moners had risen against the nobles (Pshees and Uzdens) with a de-termination to overthrow their authority and privileges. Theavowed instigator of this movement was the Naib Mehmed EminPasha who at the head of 500 horsemen from Abassah, had pro-claimed that feudal distinctions were opposed to the precepts of theQuran, which held aUMuslims equal in the eyes of the God.

These leveUing doctrines were eagerly embraced by the com-moners (Tokavs) of Bzadugh, who, of themselves, were, in point ofnumerical strenght, much more than a match for the Uzdens. Long-worth invited the Naib Mehmed Emin Efendi to a conference. Heaccepted the invitation, but later fai1ed to go to the rendezvous.Longworth somehow talked to the Naib who stated that his reasonfor not receiving Longworth with the customary honours was thatwhen he had previously sought to cultivate friendly relations withthe agents of the British govemment, he had faUen into disgrace inIstanbul, that in consequence of his having paid avisit of ceremonyto the British Ambassador, he had incurred into serious displeasurewith the Porte, and that subsequently, on his return to Circassia, his

236 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

friendly reception of the two British agents, Captain Brook andCaptain Hughes, had alsa given offence to Mustafa Pasha, whohad, in consequence, witheld a sword of honour and a declarationwhich had been sent to him by the Sultan.

In fact, the reason for the Naib declining to meet Longworthwas that the Naib did not tend hto discuss matters over which hehad absolute authority in Circassia. The Naib did not wish to give ashare to Longworth and therefare did not meet with him. As theNaib was mainly supported by the majority of the Circassians, thecommoners (Tokavs), Longworth found it desirable that the Britishgovernment should support and maintain the authority and pri v-ileges of the nobles, Uzdens, by which action the British govern-ment was likely to be furnished with a contingent of inegular cav-alry from the Circassians. Their assistance was considered asvaluable in the event of an expedition being directed against thecommunications of Russia with her Trans-Caucasian provinces. Tothis purpose, an expedition was to be undertaken either on the lineof the Kuban with the cooperatian of the Muslim tribes or from thesouth-eastern coast of the Black Sea through the countries of ab-hases and Mingrelians. The first choice seemed to present many ad-vantages to the British compared to the second one. The plains ofthe Kuban, from Anapa to the sources of that river, abounded inevery resource which an army could require. They were well wu-tered, and would yield plentiful supply of cattle and provisions. Theinhabitants, as far as the Kabarda, were eager to make war againstthe Russians, and would rally enthusiastically around an expedi-tionaı'y force in that quarter, but the inhabitants in the neighbour-hood of Ekaterinadar were at war amongst themselves. It wasdeemed vital to keep peace among the tribes and to stop the Naibfomenting the civil dissensions if thi idea of expedition was to beput into action.

Longworth bitterly criticized both civil and military officialsadminisitering Circassia in tenns of both civil and military. For thecivil one it was the Naib kept responsible almost for all the civil ad-ministratian. He first made his appearence in Circassia at the time

LONGWORTH'S MlsstON TO CtRCASStA IN 1855 237

of active resistance against Russia. He, as disciple and lieutenant ofShamil, began to propagate the doctrines of Shafithere, by whichall intercourse with Christians was held to be a contamination and acurse. Such a principle, though applicable only to the Russians, wasof course favourable to the prosecution of war to the last extreme.The Naib thus grew more popular and powerfuL. Longworth ac-cused him of having behaved with cruelty and rapacity, an accusa-tion which was most probably originated from Longworth's pre-wudice against the Naib, who stood against the British aims, forinstance, the levy of cavalry from the Circassians. Before the com-mencement of the war his extent of power was unknown in detaiL.However it was preUy clear that during the war he revived the oldfeeling of loyalty to the Sultan as Caliph and the supreme head ofthe Muslim faith and afforded the OUomans access to the coast.Longworth asserted that, prior to the war, he had been accustomedto denounce the Osmanlı and their sovereign as a degenerate raceof Muslims and he had even substituted the name of Shamil for thatof the Sultan in the weekly prayers for the Caliph's health and pros-perity. Longworth claimed that there unquestionably existed a de-sire to found a new Empire in the Caucasia, based on the principlesof Muslim belief and domination and believed that this scheme hadnot been abondaned by the Naib, but only adjourned to more pro-pitious moments. Meanwhile, he found it convenient to temporizeas the only means of retaining any share of power and int1uence,because he had to present himself as a humble suitor in IstanbuL.He was however disappointed in his expectations there and he nextaddressed the representatives of the Great Powers. it appears thatthe impression he made of the British Ambassador in Istanbul wasnot very favourable. Longworth pointed out that at first he had notunderstood the coolness of the British Ambassador to the Naib's ad-vances cleady, until he was fully acquainted with the artful anddangereous character of the Naib.

If the British government were to prioritise between the Porteand the Naib for the accomplishment of its own views in Circassia,Longworth was sure and had no hesitation in giying his preference

238 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

to the former, because the British government could deal more con-fidentially with the Porte than what he described as the compoundof cunning and ignorance one could see in the Naib. Longworthwas throughly convinced that the civil and military functionariesappointed by the Porte to conduct her affairs in this quarter weremost unfortunately selected. Every person, such as Mustafa Pasha,Sefer Pasha, Mehmed Beyand partly Behcet Pasha, all of whichhad been selected and appointed, evidently landed in Circassia withan idea that they could only repossess all the old Ottoman posses-sions ceded by treaties to Russia on the coast, but also make them-selves masters of the whole country as far as the Kuban. All this,they imagined, was to be done without the acquiescence of the al-lied Powers. Hence their jealousy and anxiety to prevent Britishand French agents from penetrating into the country. In otherwords, while the presence of such persons would have been to ad-vantageous to the comrnon interests of the allied Powers, they werethought to harm the unity of the allies and it was therefore thoughtproper to advice the Porte to withdraw them and appoint the ac-credited persons in their place. Longworth remarked that the agentof the Porte in Circassia should be fully informed as to the natureof this inHuence, so as not to confound it with civil and military au-thority and that the authority exercised by the Porte should beequivalent to the material advantages it offered. This proportionshould also be applied to the British and French governments. THeexplanation given above necessiated a complete revision of the pol-icy adopted by the Porte with respect to Circassia. The best meas-ure for Britain and France was to suspend all their negatiations withthe Circassiansı~.

On 20 July 1855 Longworth and his French colleague, M.Champoiseau, visited Prince Michael known to the Turks by thename of Hamid Bey. He was the chief of the Christian tribe of Ab-hases, and acknowledged till lately the sovereignty of Russia, hold-ing at the same time the rank of lieutenant-general in the Russian

19. Loııgworth to the Earl ofC1arelıdolı, 1107,20 July 1855. FO 88111443.

LONGWORTH'S MtSStON TO CtRCASSİA İN 1855 239

service. The withdrawal of the Russian forces from Sukumkale atthe coımnencement of the war forced him and his people to go un-der to control of an occupying force which might be landed thereby the allies. Upon the occupation of this place by a detachment ofOUoman troops, he fled and took up his abode at the Russian head-quarter tilI the end of May 1855, when he retumed to the neigh-bourhood of Sukumkale. He made his peace with Mustafa Pashaand agreed to place at his disposal a body of 600 or 700 irregulartroops composed chiefly of Muslims. When the British and Frenchagents visited him in his residence, he complained about the OUo-mans propagating their faith and establishing their rule in Circassia.He therefore asked for the protection of the British and French gov-emments. In eonsideration of the support he was to receive, he de-clared his readiness to subscribe to the same conditions as those onwhich he had previously held his Principality under the Emperor ofRussia. Aceordingly, he was to levy an irregular force of 10.000men who were to be placed at their disposal whenever they wishedto use it. He alsa promised to obtain the cooperatian of the govem-ment of Mingrelia, the reigning prinee of whieh was related to himby marriage. The eonversation made with Prinee Michael remindedLongworth that the oceupation by OUoman forees of plaees in Cau-casia populated by Christians had not given good results. The Mus-lims İn Caueasia were inclined towards the OUoman control,whereas the Christians looked favourably to Russia. If any militaryoperations directed against the places populated by the Christiansin Caucasia, for instance Georgia, were on the agenda, they shouldbe made not by the OUoman army but by the British and Frenchforees, so as not to push them to the mercy of the Russians"o.

All endeavours of Longworth from early June to the end ofJuly 1855 were fruit1ess and the mission aiming at the furtheranceof British objects in the Caucasia failed, as far as British interestsand aims mentioned in Longworth's instructian of 13 April 1855were concerned. However Longworth's visit to Circassia brought

20. Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon, no 8, 25 July ı855. FO 88 ı/1443.

240 MUSA ŞAŞMAZ

into light the fact that the allies were not cordial1y acting togetherin the Caucasia and that the British government, having somethingat the back of its mind, planned to settle the affairs administrativelyand militarily in Circassia, despite the jealousy of the Ottoman Em- .pıre.

It is inferred from Longworth's dispatches that he coud not ac-complish his mission. He felt disheartened and left Circassia forTrabzon without achieving the goals for which he had been sent tothe Caucasia. Prior to his leave, he underlined the points whichwere necessary for the furtherance of British objects. They werethree altogether. The first of them was the question of the pasitionor the state of the Naib Mehmed Emin Efendi in the country wherehe was alleged to subvert the authority and privileges of the noblesof Bzadugh in direct contravention of the firman; to share in theplunder arising from confiscation and fines in the first instance andultimately to establish his own authority as the vicar of Shamil andto usuı-p the highest functions of the Hilafet for political purposes.The second point was concerned with the interference of the Otto-man military and administrative officials in the internal affairs ofCircassia. Longworth complained about the contemplation of theestablishment of Ottoman rule not only in a military sense, but po-litical and administratively as welL. For the achievement of thisgoal, the Porte had appointed to the posts certain persons with pow-ers conferred on them. These persons such as Mustafa Pasha, SeferPasha, Behcet Pasha and their subordinates were administering theaffairs of Circassia both domestic and foreign of Circassia. This ad-ministratian was alsa supported by the Circassians. Not only theNaib but alsa every native chief had to refer particularly to MustafaPasha. Unless they were authorized by him, they could not evenccommunicate with any foreign agents. Under these circumstances,Longworth as the British representative in Circassia, felt humiliatedand declared that he had no alternatiye but to suspend all nego-tiations with the Circassians, until same further understanding orarrangement be set up in IstanbuL. The third point related to the be-havior of the Porte's agents on the coast, inhabited by a tribe of Ab-

LONGWORTH'S MIssloN TO C1RCASsİA iN 1855 241

hasia who chiefly professed Christianity. The chief of this tribecomplained of the Turks who were desirous of establishing Muslimascendancy there. As the neighboring Christian countries of Min-grelia, Immeritia and Guric were connected by kinship of relationswith that of Abhasia, the British representatieve considered it mostessential that the Ottoman agents in question should be duly re-strained by either withdrawing them altogether from the Chiristiandistrichts, or insisting that they should in no case be permitted totake any steps there, unless in concert with the agents of the Britishand French govemments21•

As soan as the information provided by Longworth with re-spect to the situation in Circassia, from the point of view of theBritish interests, reached the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford deReddiffe, it seems most likely, that he made representation both onthe Sultan and on the Porte, so that these complaints be removedand the demands mentioned be met. The lack of correspondencebetween the British Ambassador and the Porte as to the solution tothese problems may indicate that the Porte did not act on Britishdesire. So the affairs of Circassia were not on the agenda, as far asBritish-Ottoman relations were concemed, from August 1855 toFebruary 185722

•

21. Longworth to the Earl ofClarendon, no 9, 26 July 1855, FO 881/1443.22. From August i855 to February i857 i have been able to find onlyone documenl

conceming the affairs of Circassia. It was sent by the British Consul Stevens from Trab-zon, stating that "News has been received by Hafız Pasha from Circassia, iLappears, Rus-sians, having lately crossed the Kuban attacked a Circassian viIIage and massacred a num-ber of its inhabitants". Stevens to Stratford de Redeliffe, no 38, 17 November 1855, FO195/448.