looking back and looking forward in negotiation and

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/15718069-23031163

International Negotiation 25 (2020) 130–150

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Looking Back and Looking Forward in Negotiation and Conflict Research

Daniel Druckman1Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, [email protected]

Received 28 June 2019; accepted 4 September 2019

Abstract

In this article, I look back primarily at the research accomplishments made by my various collaborative teams to date and look forward toward the gaps that remain to be filled. Key insights and gaps are discussed on five research topics: group attach-ments and representation, turning points, social justice, values and interests, and con-ceptual learning. A concluding section highlights key discoveries that provide fertile ground for new research. Examples include the pulls and pushes of stakeholders, the role played by crises in producing turning points, connecting micro- to macro-level processes, the link between values and identities, and the thought processes that are encouraged by design activities. Further, advances in methodologies contribute to the next generation of studies on negotiation and conflict.

Keywords

concept learning – conflict research – group attachments – negotiation – social justice – turning points – values and interests

1 Daniel Druckman is Professor Emeritus of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. He is also an Honorary Professor at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia and at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. Many of his research interests are documented in this article. He has been a fre-quent contributor to this journal and has served on its Editorial Board since the beginning in 1996.

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131LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD IN NEGOTIATION RESEARCH


An anniversary issue provides an opportunity to look back at the accomplish-ments made by the journal to date. It also provides an opportunity to look forward toward the research that remains to be done in the areas covered by the journal’s authors. In this article, I look back and forward on several of the topics that I have contributed to during the twenty-five years of International Negotiation. I begin the retrospective/prospective discussion with two topics that were the basis for my tenth and twentieth anniversary articles. The former was on group attachments and collective action (Druckman 2006). The latter focused on group representation (Druckman 2015). Both topics have contin-ued to be fertile areas of research. The essay continues with sections on turn-ing points, justice, values and interests, and approaches to developing skills for negotiating in the international arena. Running through these research areas is a multi-method theme. Discussion of each of these topics is accompanied by the research method used. I conclude with a section on key discoveries that may guide the next generation of research on each of these topics.

Group Attachments and Representation

My interest in these topics stems from my thesis and dissertation work. The thesis was on ethnocentrism in the inter-nation simulation (Druckman 1968) leading to a stream of articles on nationalism (Druckman 1994) and emotions in negotiation (Olekalns & Druckman 2014). The dissertation was on impacts of representing a group (Druckman 1967) leading to further studies on this subject (Druckman 1968a; Druckman et al. 1972; Druckman 1994). These have also been topics for investigation by the larger community of negotiation re-searchers as discussed in my previous anniversary articles. A first question to be addressed is what are the key insights gained from the research. A second question is what are the knowledge gaps that remain?

Key InsightsSummarizing what we have learned about group attachments, we can marvel at the laboratory and field evidence on the breadth of an ingroup-outgroup bias and the stereotypes that accompany it. The concomitance of amity expressed toward ingroups and enmity toward outgroups may be one of a few experi-mental social science findings that qualify as an empirical generalization. But researchers have offered different explanations for the phenomenon. These include the following: enhanced self-esteem from group identity (Tajfel 1981); a need to accentuate differences through distinctions made between self and others (Turner 1987); the bias fosters ingroup cohesion or uniformity among


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members (Insko et al. 1988); the bias reduces uncertainty in social life (Hogg & Mullin 1999), and defends against threats to one’s group identity (Horsey & Hogg 2000). Rather than considering these as competing explanations, they can be combined to render the process sequential and mutually reinforcing, with one explanatory factor (self-esteem) leading to another (uncertainty re-duction) (Druckman 2006). A number of proposals have been made for reduc-ing the prevalence and intensity of an ingroup-favoring bias.

One reduction strategy is based on the observation that context matters. Emotional ties to groups may be context specific. Doggedness may occur when the context is invariable as in the laboratory. Less rigidity is observed in a world of frequent shifts in relations between nations as seems evident in current in-ternational politics. A second source for change is intergroup contact. A large research literature on the contact-attitude change relationship has identified the conditions under which contact may be effective in changing attitudes about the other: These conditions include equal status between the groups in the situation; common goals; intergroup (the group or nation from which the exchange cohort comes from) cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom. (See the meta-analysis by Pettigrew & Tropp 2006.) A third source concerns mobilization of groups for action. To the extent that groups are ready to be mobilized, members’ group identities strengthen. To the extent that the mobilization is successful, the group identity and corresponding commitment strengthens further. Another factor that influences identity is the extent of spread of identifications across different groups; each group is likely to receive less loyalty. And, the distinction between nationalism and patriotism is also relevant. The former depends on distinguishing between friends and enemies; the latter is rooted in positive feelings for one’s own nation without the need for casting aspersions on other groups.

The related topic of group representation has also benefitted from experi-mental research (Druckman 2015). We have learned about some constraints that limit actions taken by representatives and opportunities for them to in-fluence negotiations and intergroup relations. The constraints come from constituencies (those being represented) and features of the other side in a negotiation. Of particular interest are the findings on constituencies divided into more hawkish or dovish factions (Aaldering & De Dreu 2012) and the type of regime, as autocratic or democratic, of the nation represented by the op-ponent (Cuhadar & Druckman 2014). The opportunities occur when represen-tatives adopt a pro-social orientation, when they negotiate in privacy, when they have high status within the group being represented (increased latitude), and when salient solutions to problems are identified (Druckman 2015). The




challenge for representatives is balancing the forces that constrain them with those that provide freedom to maneuver.

Gaps to Be FilledThe knowledge accumulated to date and summarized above opens a frontier for further investigation. Following are brief descriptions of six windows of op-portunity for research on group attachment and representation.

On emotional attachments and incentives: One unresolved question on this issue is the extent to which people (including group representatives) are motivated by emotional attachments usually learned early in life or by the situational contingencies that define rewards, including praise and sanctions. When is one source of motivation stronger than the other?

On the distinction between patriotism and nationalism: We have learned about the roots for these expressions of group loyalty. We know less about the situations and contexts that elicit one or the other orientation toward other groups. Nor do we have sufficient knowledge about the international conse-quences that occur when leaders adhere strongly to one or another of these two orientations, for example, in the case of Donald Trump, an unswerving nationalist orientation.

On the functions of group identification: A compelling research question is the relative strength of the uncertainty reduction and categorization (cog-nitive economy) explanations for attraction to groups. The former is linked to anxiety about an uncertain world. The latter emphasizes a need to extract meaning in a complex world. These functions may be related. Categorizing the landscape of groups and nations in the world provides a means for reducing uncertainty about their future behavior. Yet we know little about the interplay between these functions.

On mobilization and sustaining identities: Two factors identified as contrib-uting to mobilization are the spread and durability of identities in a popula-tion (Druckman 2001). Widespread and durable identities are hypothesized to facilitate mobilization by a country’s leaders. However, when these identities are coerced or sanctioned, as in authoritarian regimes, they are more likely to wither through time. The research issue focuses on the conditions for sustain-ing identities in wars and humanitarian campaigns.

On the dilemma of group representation: Referred to as a boundary role conflict, representatives are caught between the rock of emboldened con-stituencies (principals and domestic audiences) and the hard place of seek-ing workable agreements with the opposition. This dilemma was identified a long time ago by Walton and McKersie (1965), who also suggested tactics for


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managing it. Yet we have limited empirical knowledge about how this dilemma is perceived and dealt with by representatives from different negotiating areas.

On micro and macro connections: The question asked is how the results produced by negotiating representatives influence social or policy changes. Recent comparative case research on civil war termination shows that by their conduct in negotiation, representatives can influence both the durability of agreements and social change (Druckman & Wagner 2019). Going forward, an important question is: What are the activities that must be practiced to sustain the changes wrought by the agreement? This question links representational negotiations with peace-building.

Turning Points

The concept of turning points (TP) came from two sources. One was from my reading of transcripts of a 1975 negotiation that occurred between Spain and the United States about base rights. I noticed the talks alternated between pe-riods of calm and eruptions that threw a wrench in the process. At times the eruptions brought the discussions to a halt, sending the delegates home (either to Washington or Madrid) for further planning. Interestingly, each impasse was resolved and the talks moved forward toward an eventual settlement. The sec-ond source was a 1972 chapter by Charles McClelland. His time series analysis of the Taiwan Straits conflict showed that crises were an impetus for progress in resolving the conflict. His finding comported with my observations of the base-rights process. His time series approach struck me as suitable for analyz-ing the negotiation. The result was evidence for a relationship between crises and turning points. It was also the impetus for a line of research that included additional case studies and simulation experiments. In the next section I sum-marize key findings obtained from these studies.

Key InsightsThe time series analyses of the base rights negotiation case (Druckman 1986) showed that process departures, referred to as turning points, often followed negotiating crisis either within the negotiation or from outside. The crises were signaled by mutual tough behavior: the negotiating pattern consisted of mismatching hard and soft negotiating behaviors, with the more generous del-egation closing the “hardness” gap by matching the other’s tough moves. This pattern led to a break in the discussions: actions taken by policymakers during the break usually got the talks back on track, at least until the next crisis oc-curred. The agreement emerged shortly after the break in early 1976 following




Franco’s death. Indeed, this event was the final blow to Spain’s negotiating aspirations.

Further insights were obtained from the next case study on the 1987 In-termediate Nuclear-Force (INF) talks (Druckman et al. 1991). Two decisions were regarded as turning points: the separation of French and British forces from U.S. systems and a double-zero option that facilitated verification of the weapons systems.2 These decisions had several features that helped to move the talks toward agreement. They departed from previous events, often stick-ing points in the discussion. They occurred with varying degrees of abruptness, and they had consequences for both parties. These features were a basis for a framework that organized a comparative analysis on turning points in 34 cases (Druckman 2001).

The three parts of the framework consist of precipitants, departures (turning points), and consequences. This is a linear trace of events, decisions, or moves taken during the process. Each of the 34 cases, divided into security, trade, and political or environmental negotiations, was analyzed in terms of these pro-cess traces. A key finding was a difference among the three issue areas: secu-rity talks were characterized by external precipitants, notably mediation, and abrupt departures; the primary precipitants for the other types of cases were internal, either procedural or substantive. The comparative case analyses also confirmed a relationship between crises and turning points (Druckman 2001a). This study was followed by a theoretical analysis of the departures concept. In-sights were sought at each of three levels of analysis, individual, interactional, and systemic (Druckman 2004).

The turning points framework was used in analyses of more complex negoti-ations. In their International Negotiation articles, Crump and Druckman (2012, 2016) compared two multilateral trade negotiations, the successful GATT talks and the unsuccessful WTO conferences to follow. Their focused comparison showed different patterns of precipitants and consequences for these cases. Hall’s comparative case analyses (2014) examined the patterns in 29 domes-tic cases with a smaller set of international cases showing different kinds of process traces for these domains. Focusing on experimental prediction rather than retrospective case studies, Druckman and Olekalns’ laboratory simula-tions (2013) led to the discovery that agreements can result from either of two

2 The “double zero” was a “double-edged sword.” Initially it was a ploy by the US to get Euro-pean backing for deployment of INF missiles by making a proposal that Richard Perle and Reagan knew would be rejected outright by Soviet negotiators. This all changed after Gor-bachev arrived in power and met with Reagan at Reykjavik. In essence the turning point may have been Gorbachev’s arrival in power and his efforts to end the Cold War.


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motives, desperation stemming from low trust or opportunity that develops into a more trusting social climate.

Gaps to Be FilledThe case and experimental research to date on turning points suggest that this is a useful concept. It also directs attention to several areas where further re-search would be helpful. These topics are summarized in this section.

Crises and TPs: Transitions in negotiations result often from crises. By con-ceiving of crises as precipitating events, rather than only as impasses, we can appreciate the positive impacts of disruptions on the process. However, nego-tiators have options for responding to crises and these include re-framing the issues. Some of the research questions are the following: What kinds of crises lead to progress or continuing impasses including dissolving the talks? Can TPs following crises be distinguished in terms of their short and long-term conse-quences? When does issue re-framing occur and with what consequences?

Synchronization: A precursor to negotiation crises is a lack of synchroniza-tion: The parties’ negotiating behavior diverges. A number of research ques-tions are suggested by this finding: What kinds of divergences are more or less likely to create crises (linguistic, framing, concessions, nonverbal expressions)? How do negotiators switch from being out of sync to coordinating their behav-ior? How do they recognize synchronization problems during the process?

Relationship-building: To the extent that TPs influence perceptions of trust, they have implications for relationships between negotiators. Shifts from com-petitive to cooperative processes are keys to negotiation success, particularly when agreements are durable. Further research attention to relationships can be guided by the following questions: What are the conditions for changes in perceptions of trust? How can the dynamics of trust be assessed during the course of a negotiation? What are distinguishing features of agreements that are more or less lasting through the post-conflict period?

Micro and macro levels of analysis: Although TPs are analyzed at a micro-level, they are influenced by the context in which the negotiation occurs. In-deed, external factors are considered as precipitants in the TP framework. Some progress has been made in understanding the conflict environment and social context in which the talks are embedded. But there is much yet to be learned along the lines of the following questions: How does the larger conflict impact on progress (including TPs) in the negotiation? Under what conditions do external events influence the emergence of TPs? What is the relationship between tipping points at the societal level (Gladwell 2000) and TPs at the interactional level? What is the relationship between turning points, studied at a micro level of analysis, and critical junctures, studied during the course of macro or global-level political events (Munck 2019)?




Social Justice

Research conducted over the course of a decade has produced insights about the way that procedural and distributive justice influence the effectiveness and durability of negotiated agreements. The comparative case studies cov-ered a variety of negotiations including civil war termination, arms control, trade, and environmental talks. Two special issues were prepared on the topic, one, edited for this journal by Mueller and Druckman (2014) with a focus on security talks, another edited by Druckman and Wagner (2017) for Group Decision and Negotiation. The contributions included experiments, single case studies, and comparative analyses with a large number of cases as well as both qualitative and quantitative analyses. Using this mixed methods strategy, we have learned a lot about the importance of justice considerations during and following negotiations.

Key InsightsMany of the insights gained from the research on this topic focus on the role played by justice considerations during the negotiation process and in the out-comes obtained from the talks. Process considerations include such elements of procedural justice (PJ) as fair treatment and representation, transparency, and voluntary decisions. Outcome considerations include such aspects of dis-tributive justice (DJ) as equality, proportionality, compensation, and need. Interestingly, convergent findings from experiments (Hollander-Blumoff 2017) and case studies (Druckman & Wagner 2019) showed that better outcomes and more durable agreements occurred when the negotiators adhered, during the process, to the PJ principles of fair treatment and transparency, referred to also as social conduct. These principles were also instrumental in bringing long-term peace and institutional change to post-conflict societies. Further, adherence to the DJ principle of equality led to more durable agreements in peace negotiations as shown in the comparative case study by Druckman and Albin (2011).

When negotiation is conceived in terms of stages, we have learned that jus-tice considerations impact each of these stages. During the pre-negotiation pe-riod, justice-related factors that influence negotiation include task framing – for example in terms of values or self-interests (Lind & Tyler 1988), equity (re-wards based on performance) or equality (rewards unrelated to performance) norms (Harmon & Kim 2013; Deutsch 1985) – organizational structure and power differentials (Kabanoff 1991), and anticipation of adhering to justice principles (Goldman et al. 2013). With regard to the process, trust that devel-ops from distributive or problem-solving orientations (Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler 2008), shared identities (Kramer et al. 1993), false justice (manipulation


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of PJ principles) (Lind & Tyler 1988), and power asymmetries with regard to issues of compensatory justice (Kapstein 2008) have been shown to influence the course of the talks.

With regard to outcomes, the focus is on DJ considerations. Factors that in-fluence these considerations include how PJ influences the choice of outcome (see the meta-analysis by Hauenstein et al. 2001), the emphasis on productivity versus solidarity (Deutsch 1985; Klebanoff 1991), and perceptions of outcome fairness based on social comparisons (Brickman 1975). The implementation phase is also influenced by justice considerations. These factors include con-tinuing to adhere to PJ principles (Pruitt et al. 1993; Albin & Druckman 2012), the extent to which trust has been repaired (Harmon & Kim 2013), the conflict environment (Mittone & Plone 2012), the use of compensation to restore eq-uity (Kapstein 2008), and the role played by spoilers in disrupting agreements perceived by the parties as being fair (Stedman 2000).

Gaps to Be FilledThe research to date informs us about the importance of justice principles for seeking and sustaining agreements in the laboratory and field. These studies also make evident several gaps in understanding to be filled.

On framing: We have learned that negotiator perspectives are important. Whether conceived in terms of group values or self-interests, as being instru-mental or in terms of solidarity, or as relationship building (affiliation) vs. competitive (power driven) has consequences. We know less about how these perspectives develop or change during the negotiation process. We also know little about how negotiators converge or diverge on their perspectives both during the process and in the post-negotiation implementation period.

On trust and shared identity: Trust-building and repair are often regarded as mechanisms that connect justice to negotiated agreements. Yet we know little about the direction of the causal chain: Is trust a pre-condition for adher-ence to PJ principles? Is trust a consequence of adhering to those principles? It would seem plausible to assert that the relationship between trust and justice is circular rather than directional. The cycle may be set in motion by a social climate that encourages cooperation and shared identities. The research chal-lenge is to understand the interplay among these factors, noting in particular that the way this system of variables operate may be context-specific.

On compensatory justice: The DJ principle of compensation surfaces in a number of negotiated agreements. Results from an earlier developmental ex-periment suggest that this is a more complex form of justice that takes time to develop (Solomon & Druckman 1972). Gaps in our understanding of this idea concern various motivations for compensating an opponent or adversary.




These include preserving a long-term relationship with disappointed negotiat-ing parties in asymmetrical negotiations, recognizing a lack of fairness during the process of negotiating, preserving a global system of trade or environmen-tal regulations, and a belief in the progressive value of creating or preserving a more just world. Research that contributes insights into the conditions, in the situation or social context, that give rise to one or another of these motives would be welcomed.

On transitional justice: Justice also plays an important role in sustaining agreements as former combatants transition from conflict to peace. Activities engaged in by the previous combatants can solidify their relationship. One of these is joint community projects during the implementation phase and be-yond. However, we know little about how these activities are managed and sus-tained. Another activity is in the realm of truth and reconciliation processes. The key is to acknowledge (and apologize for) past atrocities while prevent-ing escalation. Understanding how backward (restorative justice) and forward (more just institutions) looking dialogues are balanced remains a research challenge. A third gap to be filled is to better understand the role played by spoilers – parties with a stake in disrupting or nullifying agreements – in the post-negotiation period. Further work on spoiler typologies would be useful. But it would also be helpful to probe situations where spoilers have served to unite the former combatants in a joint effort to undermine spoilers’ activities in the interest of sustaining the new agreement.

Values and Interests

My early experimental research on bargaining focused on conflicting interests (Druckman 1968a, Druckman et al. 1972). At that time, I was also reading lit-erature on the sociology of conflict (Coser 1956). A particular article in this tradition caught my attention. Aubert (1963) analyzed conflict as an interplay between values and interests. In addition to contrasting these sources of con-flict, he showed how different values, referred as a dissensus, interfered with attempts to resolve conflicting interests. His treatment sparked research pro-grams with Kathleen Zechmeister in the early 1970s and with Fieke Harinck during the past few years. The results of these research streams are summa-rized in the section to follow.

Key InsightsThe earlier research focused on the way the two sources of conflict interact during attempts to find agreements. A first experiment showed that interests


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are more difficult to resolve when differences in underlying values are salient (Druckman & Zechmeister 1970). This finding was replicated in other experi-ments (Zechmeister & Druckman 1973) and expanded in a theoretical treat-ment of the dynamics of intergroup conflict (Druckman & Zechmeister 1973). During the 1980s, we evaluated interventions designed to deal with value dif-ferences. This experimental research showed that prenegotiation discussions focused on values produced more agreements than a negotiation where val-ues were excluded and no prenegotiation workshop occurred (Druckman et al. 1988). The effect was due to the increase in both liking and respect that develops during the workshop sessions (Druckman & Broome 1991). A more dynamic case-study application of the values-interests theory showed how conflict intensity is intertwined with values polarization in an escalatory cycle. Attempts to reverse the cycle turn on efforts made by moderates in the con-tending groups (Druckman & Green 1995).

My recent experimental studies with Fieke Harinck have focused on in-terventions that reduce the intensity of value-based conflicts. Affirming the other party, whose values differed, proved to be more effective than attempts to increase the perception of shared values or reducing the costs of negotiating transactions (Harinck & Druckman 2017). The effect of this intervention is ac-counted for by an increase in logrolling (trading on different preferences) dur-ing the bargaining and a decrease in defending one’s own positions. Explicit affirming of the other (sharing the affirmations) may have an even stronger positive effect on outcomes in a values-based interest conflict, especially when combined with a facilitative mediator. More interesting perhaps is the find-ing that the combination of type of other affirmation (as implicit or explicit) and mediator style (as directive or facilitative) matters. We showed that both explicit-facilitative and implicit-directive combinations helped to improve joint outcomes for a conflict where interests derived from values (Harinck & Druckman 2019). These findings were explained in terms of the reduction of uncertainty that occurs in both of these conditions. This explanation is devel-oped further in the section to follow.

Gaps to Be Filled The findings reviewed above suggest areas for further research. These include how to deal with interest conflicts in the context of values, further probes into other affirmation, and the regulatory fit idea.

On interests and values: A broad research theme is finding acceptable so-lutions to conflicting interests among parties with different values. The chal-lenge is to cooperate without altering the wedge caused by the dissensus. For




researchers this consists of exploring conflicts that differ in the centrality of the values (central or peripheral) and in the magnitude of the stakes involved in the competition (career advancement or small monetary settlements). For conflict resolution practitioners the key issue concerns managing possible threats to the identities that are reflected in the values narratives. In addi-tion, further study of the interplay between these sources of conflict would be welcomed.

On values and identities: A variety of interventions have been implement-ed to reduce the intensity of conflicts that involve values. These include su-perordinate goals, discussing value differences in prenegotiation workshops, mediation, de-linking the values from the issues (referred to also as fraction-ation), and an implicit or explicit other affirmation. A common thread running through the interventions is identity threat. Cooperation among conflicting groups is more likely to bear fruit when these activities preserve the identities attached to their value or belief systems. We have only fragmentary evidence about the impacts of working together in diverse groups. One approach is to encourage a focus on the tasks rather than the values. Another is to devise exercises that serve to increase understanding of the different value systems (referred to also as constructive conversations). A third is to search for ways to integrate or transcend the different values. The success of any of these ap-proaches may depend on the type of conflict, its context, and the centrality of the values in play.

On settlements and resolutions: This distinction was raised in an earlier re-view article appearing in this journal (Druckman 2002). Settlements are out-comes that emerge from distributive bargaining processes. They often take the form of compromises. Resolutions are outcomes that follow from problem-solving processes. They often take the form of integrative agreements. The role played by values differ for these approaches. Settlements are often a way around differences in values: they manage the conflicting interests while leav-ing the values unaltered. Resolutions take the different values into account as sources of the conflict: they result from a process where the values are debated and understood.

The settlement-resolution distinction raises an interesting research ques-tion. How can values be confronted or reframed without escalating the conflict or risking failed negotiations? This key dilemma looms large, particularly in international relations. The research challenge is to design and evaluate in-terventions that address the sources of conflict without threatening the par-ties’ identities or jeopardizing opportunities for attaining durable negotiated agreements.


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Enhancing Concept Learning

Turning to negotiation training, we have incorporated many of the research concepts discussed above in our training procedures, including integrative bargaining, power, and procedural fairness. Trainers use a variety of formats for learning, including lectures, case studies, role plays, and the design of train-ing simulations. Which of these formats is most effective for learning? This question was addressed in several evaluation experiments. The results to date are reviewed prior to discussing the gaps that remain to be filled.

Key InsightsThe idea of using research findings in negotiation training programs was dis-cussed in an article in this journal by Druckman and Robinson (1998). We orga-nized twenty-five years of research into such thematic categories as achieving integrative agreements, third-party effects, emotions, culture and so on. Twelve summary narratives of the findings were used as guides for performing four exercises – an analyst searching for explanations, a strategist developing tac-tics, a role player in a simulated multilateral negotiation, and a simulation exercise design. We embedded control-group comparisons in the training workshop. The evaluation results showed better products produced by train-ees in the longer, more conceptual workshops. Analyst and strategist roles were easier to execute than the role of exercise designer. All participants indi-cated on questionnaires administered a week later that their experience had longer-term impacts on their subsequent professional work.

The workshops were a basis for a series of experiments on design. The ear-lier experiments focused on comparing impacts on concept learning from sce-nario design, role-playing, and lecture experiences. Results from these com-parisons were clear: Student-designers (compared to role players and lecture recipients) showed better concept learning and retained the learning gains over time. These results spread widely across the various questions asked im-mediately after the experience and one week later (Druckman & Ebner 2008). Follow-up studies showed that the key to design is learning about relationships among concepts, referred to as synthetic learning. When these conceptual re-lationships are primed in instructions the advantages of design are further enhanced.3

3 More recently, we have explored design in the context of management education. These ex-periments focused on learning four cognitive bias concepts by students who designed the-atrical scripts, analyzed cases, or listened to a lecture on the concepts. Similar to the earlier




Gaps to Be FilledThe findings reviewed above leave open a number of issues for further inves-tigation. These include complementarities between design and role-play ex-ercises in negotiation training, contributions to relational thinking, and the distinction between invention and discovery.

On design and role playing: The evident advantages of design may be limit-ed to concept learning. Negotiators also implement tactics on the way to agree-ment. Experiential role plays may be the best way to learn tactics, but more generally for the interactive give and take during the bargaining phase. A train-ing challenge is how to sequence design and role play experiences. Research questions include the optimum mix of these training approaches: Should role plays precede or follow design exercises? The argument for role-play first is that this experience may provide a structure for design. The argument for de-sign first is that the designs may be implemented in role-plays by other train-ees. Ebner and Druckman have been exploring these options in classes. A next step is to construe them as competing hypotheses to be evaluated in experi-ments. The assessments should include questions about gains in both tactical and conceptual learning.

On synthetic learning: Relational thinking appears to be encouraged by design. Sound designs incorporate the way that alternatives are influenced by time pressure and the other bargainer’s offers. Yet relational thinking may take different forms. One form is sequential conceptualizing where negotia-tion is considered as a stage-like progression punctuated by critical moments that alter its course. Another form may be construed as compartmentaliza-tion where certain processes are highlighted, for example, the relationship be-tween social conduct (transparency, fair treatment) during the process and fair outcomes. A third form may be depicted as holistic thinking. Here the designer regards a negotiation as a system of interrelated processes or as a dynamic (cyclical) interplay of tactics, emotions, and social relationships. Research questions ask about the implications of these alternative modes for concept learning, the quality of designs, and negotiating effectiveness.

On invention and discovery: This distinction refers to a difference between design, where trainees invent scenarios, and case analysis, where learners

results, designers showed better learning and retention of the concepts than those in the case study and lecture conditions. Implications of these findings for discovery learning were developed, particularly with regard to the difference between invention (design) and discov-ery (case analysis) (Druckman & Ebner 2018).


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discover insights in case material, as alternative modes for learning concepts. The former may be regarded as deductive learning where the concepts provide a structure for the invented scenario or script. The latter is more like inductive learning where the case provides a structure for application of the concepts. Research to date has examined relative effects of deductive and inductive ap-proaches to concept learning. Next steps would be to explore how these modes can be used in combination. One question is whether the combined effects are additive (stronger than either mode alone) or interactive (combined effects are conditional on other aspects of the training situation). Another question asks about sequencing during training sessions: Should design precede or fol-low case analysis? A third question concerns the place of role plays (as experi-ential learning) in this sequence: Should they precede or follow the design and case analysis exercises?

Looking Back and Looking Forward: Concepts, Methods, and Practice

The areas covered in this essay are a sampling of insights discovered by the research that my collaborators and I have accomplished to date. The discus-sion provides readers with a synopsis of knowledge gained about parties, pro-cesses, issues, and learning. Although noted in conjunction with the studies, less attention was paid to the research methods used to generate that knowl-edge. In this final section I highlight the key discoveries that form a basis for a next generation of studies and the methodologies likely to be most useful in that quest.

With regard to parties, we have learned a great deal about the pulls and pushes from a variety of domestic and international stakeholders in any nego-tiation. Walton and McKersie’s (1965) insight about boundary role dilemmas in labor negotiations was applied to international negotiations by Druck-man (1977) and Hopmann (1977) and expanded considerably to the realm of international politics by Putnam’s (1988) work on two/multi-level games. For negotiating representatives, as noted above, the challenge is to balance the forces that constrain them with those that provide freedom to maneuver. This balancing act was captured by this author in the form of algebraic models of the bargaining and representing functions: When negotiators bargain, they monitor movement or concessions from the other. When they are in the role of representative, they monitor the different preferences shown by constitu-ents (Druckman 1977). Considerable experimental research has accumulated on concession dynamics. Much less has been done on changing preferences




or on the interplay between these two functions. More complex experiments would be useful. Better yet, a research strategy that includes fieldwork in live negotiation settings would add information on the way these dynamics play out.

With regard to process, the turning points concept has shed light on the stops (impasses) and starts (recovery) of ongoing talks. It has also raised ques-tions for further research. Most compelling perhaps is the role played by ex-ternal or internal crises in precipitating TPs. Pragmatically, negotiators are faced with the question of whether to create a crisis or wait for it to occur. Digging more deeply, we would like to learn more about the ways that negotia-tors react to crises, including reframing the issues, re-establishing a pattern of synchronized moves and language, and reestablishing trust. We would also like to probe the nexus between process, at a micro level, and context, at a macro level. Our earlier finding about the impact of external factors on TPs in secu-rity talks is an area for further investigation. The qualitative process-tracing methods used in the earlier studies would be suitable for filling these gaps in understanding. More precise measurement of TP variables would provide a data set for time series analysis as was done a long time ago by McClelland (1972). More precise comparisons of cases for inferring causal links between crises and reactions to TPs would benefit from a focused comparison approach as was done by Irmer and Druckman (2009). Taken together, this combination of methods covers both issues of internal (confidence in results) and external (generalizability of results) validity.

Another process focus is the research on justice in peace agreements. The causal path from procedural justice (PJ) to societal peace illuminates a con-nection between micro and macro-level variables. Adherence to PJ principles during the negotiating process sets in motion a path that travels from fair outcomes and stable agreements to societal peace. The path was discovered with recent advances in regression-based statistical analysis. The double or se-rial mediation model developed by Hayes (2013) enabled us to perform these analyses. Since then Hayes (2019) has developed complex mediation (causal mechanisms) and moderation (conditional effects) models that would provide more detailed paths (multiple mediators) and factors in the environment that serve to qualify the paths. Additional statistical mediators would include trust development, shared identities, and community activities during implementa-tion of the agreement. Moderators would include power asymmetries, truth and reconciliation commissions, and the conflict environment. A result would be a more complex model of the justice-peace relationship. A broader under-standing of peace systems is provided by non-linear models in the dynamical analysis tradition (Liebovitch et al. 2019).


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A focus on issues is provided by the research on values and interests. The key insight from the research is a dual function of values. On the one hand, value differences exacerbate conflict. On the other hand, these differences are a basis for resolving conflicts. The values-interest nexus has received a lot of attention in the experimental literature. The interventions that work, such as other affirmation, go around the values to settle the conflicting interests. The values-identity connection has received attention primarily in applied and case study literature. Many of the interventions confront questions of identity and achieve a modest goal of understanding rather than the larger objective of transformation. A key question is whether the process from settlement to resolution is stepwise where dealing first with interests leads to improved re-lationships that recognize different identities. The laboratory evaluations of interventions that produce settlements can be augmented with tracing the process of trust development in dialogues conducted over longer periods of time. A question asked is whether the settlements, such as cease fires that stop violence, pave the way for confronting the deeper sources of conflict such as living together peacefully.

Turning to practice, I addressed the concept learning that occurs in train-ing programs. The findings on the impacts of design activities are impressive. We know less, however, about the thought processes that are set in motion by the design experience. Preliminary research points to synthetic thinking where negotiators conceive of relationships among parties, processes, and is-sues. Designs often incorporate a broad landscape of domestic and interna-tional actors, fairness norms, and issues that reflect both interests and values. A question is whether these experiences also improve negotiating: Are design-ers more effective negotiators than those who prepare with role plays or case studies? Do the advantages of design accrue in similar ways to students and professionals? These questions can be addressed with a mixed methods re-search strategy. Think aloud protocols pioneered by Ericsson and Simon (1980) or ecological momentary assessments used in clinical psychology (Shiffman et al. 2008) can be augmented by content analyses of the conversations during negotiation. These methods would document the way synthetic thinking oc-curs and its consequences for the unfolding process and outcome.

An anniversary issue provides opportunities to reflect on accomplishments and to chart paths for filling gaps in knowledge. I have done my share of both with regard to five topics. It is also a time to celebrate. So, then, let’s pop the cork and toast our authors, editors, reviewers, readers, and publisher for creat-ing a field inaugurated with this journal’s first issue in 1996. Our cast is to be congratulated as well for sustaining the excitement of being part of a thriving community of researchers and practitioners.




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