Lowering threats in

sustainable development using nuclear

energy

Anil Kakodkar

AHWR300-LEU

Per capita el. consumption kWh (HDI)

Goa 2263 (0.792)

Bihar 122 (0.542)

All India 779 (0.605)

HDI unaffected by change in electricity use

HDI strongly dependent on electricity use

World OECD World-OECDPopulation (billions) 6.7 1.18 5.52

AnnualElectricityGeneration 18.8 10.6 8.2(trillion kWh)

Carbon-di-oxideEmission 30 13 17(billion tons/yr)

Annual av. per capita ~2800 ~9000 ~1500Electricity (kWh)

Additional annual electricity generation needed just to reach 5000kWh average per-capita electricity (necessary for a reasonable standard of living) in non-OECD countries would amount to ~20 trillion kWh that is roughly equal to present total generation.

THE CRUCIAL ENERGY CHALLENGEWorld electricity supply would need to nearly

double (around 3000 GWe additional electric generation capacity) just to support a reasonable standard of living for allTimely ability to cater to this need in a sustainable manner(or at least reserve equitable resources for the purpose) is in my view a prerequisite for long term peace and stabilityOn the other hand the threat of climate change requires reduction in use of fossil energyClearly business as usual approach will not do and nuclear energy has to play much greater role

5

IS THERE ENOUGH URANIUM ?

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 21000

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Inst

alle

d C

ap

aci

ty (

GW

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IAEA INPRO GAINS High target Cumulative capacity (OT) Cumulative capacity (LWR-LWR (Pu-U MOX)) Cumulative capacity (LWR-LWR(Pu-Th MOX))

Demand profile as per IAEA INPRO GAINS (High)

By adding undiscovered uranium resources, this point merely shifts to 2050

Uranium in open cycle is unsustainable if nuclear energy is to meet a reasonable fraction of carbon free electricity requirements.

Recycle of nuclear fuel in breeder reactors has to be brought in soon enough

Cases with use of 5.469 million tonne natural uranium metal (Identified resources)* in LWR (OT) and LWR-MOX (both Pu-U and Pu-Th)*:Total resources (Identified + Undiscovered) are 15.969 million tonnes

Ref: Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand-The joint report by OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (RED Book 2008)

Cumulative uranium low proj-3.4 million tonsdemand by 2050 middle proj-5.4 million tons(Analysis of uranium supply high proj-7.6 million tonsto 2050-IAEA publication)Jan2009 estimate of uranium at 6.3 million tons(includes U up to $ 260/Kg). Should last a 100 years at 2008 consumption rate

Experience has shown that

investment in exploration is

driven by demand and

prices. No shortage is foreseen

A much talked

about view

Recycle of nuclear fuel is also necessary to resolve the issue of permanent disposal of spent fuel

There is already a large used uranium fuel inventory (~270,000 tons

as per WNA estimate). Its permanent disposal has remained an

unresolved issue which in my view is unlikely to be resolved.

While the spent fuel would be a sufficiently large energy resource if

recycled, its permanent disposal ( if resorted to ) is in my view an

unacceptable security and safety risk (plutonium mine?)

We need to adopt ways to liquidate the spent fuel inventory through

recycle

While direct disposal of spent fuel is a long term risk, universal

adoption of recycle is not likely to gain ground on account of nuclear

security concerns

Risk

Nuclear Security

#Diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes – Could cause threat any where

#Threat to nuclear facility can cause public trauma– Threat primarily in the neighborhood of the facility

Climate Change

# Difficult to predict global consequences – Could well be much larger that what can be caused by WMDs

# Development deficit and varying energy security challenges

Minimisation of risk to humanity would necessitate rapid growth of nuclear power.

Security measures alone, though necessary, are unlikely to be sufficient. Sovereignty of nations, varying degree of security deficit, responsible behaviour & trust deficit, managing non-state actors etc. are likely to remain difficult challenges.

Technology measures that provide inherent proliferation resistance and security strength must be quickly brought in to replace fossil energy.

Thorium, a one stop solution to safety, sustainability and proliferation resistance

Options for plutonium disposition

– Uranium-based fuel: Neutron absorption in 238U generates additional plutonium.

– Inert matrix fuel (non-fertile metal alloys containing Pu): Degraded reactor kinetics - only a part of the core can be loaded with such a fuel, reducing the plutonium disposition rate.

– Thorium: Enables more effective utilisation of Pu, added initially, while maintaining acceptable performance characteristics.

0 20 40 60 80 1000

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Discharge fuel

Initial fuel

Fiss

ile p

luto

nium

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e fu

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kg/te

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Discharge burnup (GWd/te)

Plutonium destruction in thorium-plutonium fuel in PHWR

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Burnup GWd/te23

2U

con

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3U

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(g/k

g o

f H

M)

233U

232U

0 20 40 60 80 100 1200

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Burnup GWd/te23

2U

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Exp

osu

re t

ime (

hr)

to a

cquir

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LD5

0 at

1 m

for

8.4

kg 23

3U

232U

Exposure time for lethal dose

Detectability of 233U (contaminated with 232U) for all the cases, is unquestionable

Case of Pu-RG+Thoria in AHWR

The Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR), a quicker proliferation resistant solution for the energy

hungry world AHWR is a 300 MWe vertical pressure tube type, boiling light water cooled and heavy water moderated reactor (An innovative configuration that can provide low risk nuclear energy using available technologies)

AHWR can be configured to accept a range of fuel types including LEU, U-Pu , Th-Pu , LEU-Th and 233U-Th in full core

AHWR Fuel assemblyAHWR Fuel assembly

Bottom Tie Plate

Top Tie Plate

Water Tube

Displacer Rod

Fuel Pin

Major design objectives

Significant fraction of Energy from Thorium

Several passive features 3 days grace period No radiological impact

Passive shutdown system to address insider threat scenarios.

Design life of 100 years.

Easily replaceable coolant channels.

AHWR300-LEU provides a robust design against external as well as internal threats, including insider malevolent acts. This feature contributes to strong security of the reactor through implementation of technological solutions.

Reactor Block Components

AHWR 300-LEU is a simple 300 MWe system fuelled with LEU-Thorium fuel, has advanced passive safety features,

high degree of operator forgiving characteristics, no adverse impact in public domain, high proliferation

resistance and inherent security strength.

Peak clad temperature hardly

rises even in the extreme condition of

complete station blackout and failure

of primary and secondary systems.

The composition

of the fresh (LEU in Thorium)

as well as the

spent fuel of

AHWR300-LEU

makes the

fuel cycle

inherently

proliferation

resistant.

MODERN LWR

AHWR300-LEU

232U 0.00 %233U 0.00 %234U 0.00 %235U 0.82 %236U 0.59 %238U 98.59 %

232U 0.02 %233U 6.51 %234U 1.24 %235U 1.62 %236U 3.27 %238U 87.35 %

232U233U234U

236U

235U

238U

Presence of 232U in uranium from spent fuel

Uranium in the spent fuel contains about 8% fissile isotopes, and hence is suitable to be reused in other reactors. Further, it is also possible to reuse the Plutonium from spent fuel in fast reactors.

STRONGER PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE WITH AHWR 300-LEU

MUCH LOWER PLUTONIUM PRODUCTIONMuch Higher 238Pu & Lower Fissile Plutonium

Reduced Plutonium generation

MODERN LWR

AHWR300-LEU

238Pu239Pu240Pu

242Pu

241Pu

238Pu 3.50 %239Pu 51.87 %240Pu 23.81 %241Pu 12.91 %242Pu 7.91 %

238Pu 9.54 %239Pu 41.65 %240Pu 21.14 %241Pu 13.96 %242Pu 13.70 %

High 238Pu fraction and low fissile content of Plutonium

The French N4 PWR is considered as representative of a modern LWR.. The reactor has been referred from “Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactor (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles”, OECD (2002)

AHWR300-LEUprovides a betterutilisation ofnatural uranium,as a result ofa significantfraction of theenergy is extractedby fission of 233U,converted in-situfrom the thoriumfertile host.

With high burn up possible today, LEU-Thorium fuel can lead to

better/comparable utilisation of mined Uranium

Thorium thus offers the potential for a wider deployment of nuclear power with reduced threats ( both nuclear as well as those related to climate change )

16

“IAEA is not concerned with the tenth or the thousandth nuclear device of a country. IAEA is only concened with the first.

- And that will certainly not be based on a thorium fuel cycle”

- ---------Bruno-Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General,IAEA

While greater geographical spread of nuclear energy with minimised risk can be realised by Thorium-LEU fuel, there would still be a question of meeting energy needs beyond what can be supported by thermal reactors

Fast breeder reactors would thus be necessary for growth in nuclear power capacity beyond thermal reactor potential

Fast reactors as well as uranium fuel enrichment and recycle would however need to be kept within a more “responsible” domain

Nuclear power with greater proliferation

resistance

Enrichment Plant LEU

Thermal reactors

Safe &Secure

ReactorsFor ex. AHWR

LEU Thorium fuel

Reprocess Spent Fuel Fast

Reactor

Recycle

ThoriumReactorsFor ex. Acc. Driven MSR

Recycle

Thorium

Thorium

Uranium

MOX

LEU-Thorium

233UThorium

Thorium

For growth in nuclear

generation beyond thermal reactor

potential

Present deploymentOf nuclear power

Thank you