ltd batch 1 cases july 1, 2014

8/11/2019 Ltd Batch 1 Cases July 1, 2014

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1.EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,petitioners,vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGETAND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONALCOMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMIMANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMOCARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAIKIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATUEDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,

TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONGMALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAYDAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATUMAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIAGRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLINGDOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITAG. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAUROVALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDOABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEOA. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADORTIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIOMANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMYSALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORSMARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her fatherTONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'SASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,

intervenors.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATIONOF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM :


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Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus ascitizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1In compliance,

respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA andpray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and NaturalResources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filedthrough the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that theIPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources toindigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors

of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and theleaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion forLeave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for thedismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Interveneand/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle ofparens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of thosewho are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petitionbe dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the HaribonFoundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to

Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. thatIPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus bedismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed theirrespective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings andduring the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its ImplementingRules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands

of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of theregalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienablepublic lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains areprivate but community property of the indigenous peoples;
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"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domainsand ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over theancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over theancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areasclaimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenouspeoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protectand conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for criticalwatersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or

reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of theNCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestraldomains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause ofthe Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition ofancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestraldomains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area isan ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary ofEnvironment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the

jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenouspeoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditarysuccession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in theinterpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolvedisputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputesinvolving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
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Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative OrderNo. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office ofthe President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy andprogram coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of controlover executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other relatedprovisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of theNCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and itsImplementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Managementto cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailedprovisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment andNatural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandateto control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation ofPhilippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justiceand Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challengedprovisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challengedprovisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative OrderNo. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of theIPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of naturalresources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Onthe other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does notraise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionalityof R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed aseparate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions

of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rightsmay have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the viewthat Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the casewas redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
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Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,

and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,MendozaandPanganibanJJ., see separate opinion
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2.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICALDIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIALENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OFDEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISMSECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY,petitioners,vs.MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in theirbehalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated,respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAYSIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,

AKLAN,respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island tosecure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inKalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor

Jose Yap, et al.and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No.173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3]issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest andagricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707
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Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warmcrystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to12,003 inhabitants4who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved theNational Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018declaringBoracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones andmarine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). PresidentMarcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829dated September 3, 1982, to implementProclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing anapplication for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,respondents-claimants

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition fordeclaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that theythemselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, andnotorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since timeimmemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did notplace Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, itwas susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their namesthrough judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratoryrelief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified landof the public domain. Itformed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for dispositionpursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11asamended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PDNo. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whateverpossession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) theseparcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconuttrees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) yearsago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether ProclamationNo. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
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decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of theirrespective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in thename of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262

filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15

The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a falloreading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTACircular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire titleto their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed

therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Directorof Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. Itruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracaywere inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18The Circular itself recognized privateownership of lands.19The trial court cited Sections 8720and 5321of the Public Land Act as basis foracknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in publiclands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23

The Republic then appealed to theCA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in totothe RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING theappeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands theyoccupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25Hence, the present petition

under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoissued Proclamation No. 106426classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares ofreserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
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fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-wayand which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27Wilfredo Gelito,28and otherlandowners29in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, andnullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior

vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respectivelots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing theirlands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay intoagricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemedagricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land

Act.32Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicialconfirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right overtheir occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section

3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannotbe the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not thecourts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposablelands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principallyinvolve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 poseany legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupiedlands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OFOWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT

THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORYRELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURALLANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLESOR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.
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HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATEOWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACTTHAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLEUNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAINTITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIORVESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS INBORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR ISPROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TOAPPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THELANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35(Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupiedportions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation ofimperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title underother pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regal ian Doctr ine and power o f the executive

to reclassi fy lands of th e publ ic dom ain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation ofimperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/orsuperseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37(b) Proclamation No. 180138issued by thenPresident Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title underthese laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of thepublic domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial orcommercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such otherclasses as may be provided by law,41giving the government great leeway for classification.42Thenthe 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: nationalparks.43Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.44Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
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22, 2006, Boracay Island had neverbeen expressly and administratively classified under any ofthese grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the Stateis the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of suchpatrimony.45The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987

Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong tothe State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase orby grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48Necessarily, it is up to theState to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. Thegovernment, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law todetermine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they maybe granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of whatotherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the

Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to theSpanish Crown.50The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws ofthe Indies and the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquiredfrom the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. "51

The Laws of the Indieswas followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Lawof 1893.TheSpanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well aspossessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and theLaws of the Indies.It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession ofvacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54Under Section393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoriaor possessory information title,55when duly

inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse oftwenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56from thedate of its inscription.57However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after thepromulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to theState.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royalconcessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo realor royal grant; (2) concesion especialorspecial grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compraor title bypurchase; and (5) informacion posesoriaor possessory information title.59>

The firstlaw governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was

embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60

By this law, lands of the public domain in the PhilippineIslands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forestlands.61The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolutegrant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62It also provided the definition byexclusion of "agricultural public lands."63Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under thePhilippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
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x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land"as used in Act No. 926 means thosepublic lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65(EmphasisOurs)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,otherwise known as the LandRegistration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes

absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903,the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,which was thefirst Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial andadministrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permittedcorporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease orpurchase lands of the public domain.67Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68

On November 29, 1919,Act No. 926 was supersededby Act No. 2874,otherwise known as thesecond Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural

lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the sameprivileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueosince timeimmemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,1936.To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remainsas the existing general law governing theclassification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands ,70andprivately owned lands which reverted to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession andoccupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by

PD No. 1073,73which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for sinceJune 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles asevidence in land registration proceedings.76Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grantsshould apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivityof the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77shall begoverned by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the PropertyRegistration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property .78Itgoverns registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including

chattel mortgages.79

A posi t ive act declar ing land as al ienable and disposable is required.In keeping with thepresumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be apositive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80declassifying inalienable publicland into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limitsalienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited andclassified."82
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The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the publicdomain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that theland subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83To overcome this presumption,incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) isalienable or disposable.84There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain asalienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,

the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidentialproclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau ofLands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85The applicant may also secure a certificationfrom the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of yearsis alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, orcertification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a governmentproclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertibleevidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants werealready open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot beassumed. They call for proof.87

Ankro n and De Aldecoa did not m ake the whole of Boracay Island, or po rt ions of i t ,

agricul tural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant tothe old casesAnkron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88and De Aldecoa v. The InsularGovernment (1909).89These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to thecontrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. "90

Private claimants reliance onAnkronand De Aldecoa ismisplaced. These cases did not have theeffect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should bestressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through whichland registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be

classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankronand DeAldecoawere decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no powerto classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courtswere free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicitpower to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91This was the Courts ruling inHeirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act ofthe Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

x x x x

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Governmentis misplaced.These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provisionvesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the publicdomain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
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classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon thepreponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary todevise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts havea right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are

agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption inAnkronand De Aldecoa to an argument that alllands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienableagricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the publicdomain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would haveautomatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineralland, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption inAnkronand De Aldecoaattaches only to land registration cases brought underthe provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial andadministrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial oradministrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply tolandowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to availthemselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtueof the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption inAnkronand De Aldecoawas not absolute. Land classification was, inthe end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agriculturaluses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. InAnkron,thisCourt stated:

In the case ofJocson vs. Director of Forestry(supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect thatwhether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. Themere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient todeclare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extentand present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, manydefinitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case itis a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proofmust show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is foragricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some treesupon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.

And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands

classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decidedupon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one orthe other purposes.We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of publicknowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courtshave a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands areagricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular landregistration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superiorvalue for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in eachparticular case.The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
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to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or theother of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestryland, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interestshave intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself

what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.(Ramos vs. Director of Lands,39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry,supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919,courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of eachcase, except those that have already became private lands.96Act No. 2874,promulgated in 1919and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineralor forest.96-aSince then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determinethe classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98did notpresent a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys landclassification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land theBoracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by

Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by privateclaimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine thepropertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds ofManila,100which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power toclassify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenkocited the old cases Mapa v.Insular Government,101De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102andAnkron v. Government of thePhilippine Islands.103

Krivenko,however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent

issue in Krivenkowas whether residential lots were included in the general classification ofagricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that asan alien, Krivenkowas prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104from acquiring agricultural land, whichincluded residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain areautomatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenkorelied on the old casesdecided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, includingAnkronand De Aldecoa.105As We havealready stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did nothave the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption

that the land is al ienable.Private claimants also contend that their continued possession ofportions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106ipso factoconverted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107Collado,citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary ofEnvironment and Natural Resources,107-aruled:
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"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the PhilippineBill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules andregulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of thePhilippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles topublic lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers uponpublic lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of

imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in theIslands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in thePhilippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung

from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. Theterm "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in thegovernment and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded thepatrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and PublicLand Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legalpresumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108(Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already cov ered by exist ing ti t les, Boracay was an u nclassi f ied land o f the

publ ic d omain pr ior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such un classi f ied lands are cons idered pu bl ic

forest und er PD No. 705.The DENR109and the National Mapping and Resource InformationAuthority110certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain aspublic forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the publicdomain whichhas not been the subject of the present system of classificationfor the determinationof which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, allunclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PDNo. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to

be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped ofits forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination forlocal and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forestland.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on theisland;111that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation ofProclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do notnegate its character aspublic forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112classifying lands of thepublic domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not

necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees andunderbrushes.113The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114is particularlyinstructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simplybecause loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified asforest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or otherfarmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areascovered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
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be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status anddoes not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the landclassified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part ofthe disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title donot apply.115(Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as aclassification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of whatappears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116At anyrate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into itsphysical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants andother commercial establishments, it has not been automatically con

ltd batch 1 cases july 1, 2014

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