ltd cases for palabrica full text

8/12/2019 LTD Cases for Palabrica full text

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OFFICE OF CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS EBIO

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision[1]

and June 8, 2007

Resolution[2]

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary

to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order[3]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Paraaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.

Below are the facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406

square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque

City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D.

Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant

and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in

1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and

exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring

possession and occupancy,[4]Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in

his name.[5]

Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said

property.[6]

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. Upon

Pedros advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October

1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque municipal office for the

construction of their house within the said compound.[7]

On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a

notarized Transfer of Rights[8]

ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario

Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedros namewere cancelled and new ones were

issued in Mario Ebios name.[9]

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangayof Vitalez passed Resolution

No. 08, series of 1999[10]

seeking assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the

construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed
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road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma

Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound[11]

traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.

When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents

immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily

suspended.[12]

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the

barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said

lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the

Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.[13]

On June 29,

2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the

proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project

and their claim of ownership over the affected property.[14]

On November 14, 2003, respondents

attended another meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was

reached by and among the parties.[15]

On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering

them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said

property.[16]

Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum,

their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue.[17]

The request

remained unheeded.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April 21,

2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.[18]

In the course of the

proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for

the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR).[19]

On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[20]

denying the petition for lack of merit. The

trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an

established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title

and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead

the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.[21]
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Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007,

the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of

Appeals--

The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the landsadjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the

accreted portion beside RL 8.

The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing anarea of 291 square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT

No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the GuaranteedHomes to the City Government of Paraaque on 22 March 1966 and which was

accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is

no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.

On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ

possessed the accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The

property then became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the

year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been paid for the years 1966,1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971,

construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for thesubject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights inthe accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.

Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing

documentary evidence, it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner

of the accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which

the accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisionsof the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription which is likewise applicable in the

instant case.

x x x x

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accretedportion which [was] duly provenby the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930,Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have

been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had

introduced improvements thereon as evidenced by their construction permits.Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquiredownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was

subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. x x x.

x x x x


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Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8registered in its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO

VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.

x x x x

We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes ofAppellants which bolster their right over the subject property. x x x.

x x x x

In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have]amply proven their right over the property in question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal ishereby GRANTED. The challenged Order of the court a quo

is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[22]

On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence,

this petition raising the following assignment of errors:I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A

RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED

JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT ISAVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITHTHE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO

THE COMPLAINT FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THELOWERCOURT.

[23]

The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an

indispensable party to respondents action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether

the character of respondents possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them toavail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

The petition is without merit.
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An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of

an act.[24]

It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist

except only as part or as an incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an

action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction

may issue.[25]

In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local

government of Paraaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will

traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive

prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified

as part of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time shouldalso be considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the State

as it is an indispensable party to the action.

We do not agree.

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that

have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs

ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which

remains in effect,[26]in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over

alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,

streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof,

belong to the owners of such lands.[27]

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong theaccretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the

waters.
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It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks

of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to

the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by

law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;

otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third

persons.[28]

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter

how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State

regarding property of public domain.[29]

Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by

prescription as against the State.[30]

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,

[31]

the land which isformed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not

form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a

final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their

presence.[32]

In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary

to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final decree can

be made in their absence without affecting them.[33]

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of

Paraaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is

neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required

from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would

it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights

infringed.

We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over thecontested land entitles them to the avails of the action.

A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.[34]

A party seeking to avail of an

injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or

existing.[35]

It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never

arise.[36]
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In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had

occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured

a permit from the local government of Paraaque for the construction of their family dwelling on

the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to

declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when

Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land

occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Paraaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one

conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor

the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the

accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the

subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that theyhave yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land

registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant

already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring

ownership.[37]

A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.[38]

Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending

before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?

We answer in the negative.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through

judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted

that they opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing an application

for sales patent.

Respondents application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or

derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales patentapplication should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since ownership over

the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of

acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property

through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.[39]
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Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is

equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31,

2007 Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43346 March 20, 1991

MARIO C. RONQUILLO,petitioner

vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF

THE PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO and

FLORENCIA DEL ROSARIO, respondents.*

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:p

This petition seeks the review of the decision1

rendered by respondent Court of Appeals onSeptember 25, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 32479-R, entitled "Rosendo del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs-

Appellees, versus Mario Ronquillo, Defendant-Appellant," affirming in totothe judgment of thetrial court, and its amendatory resolution

2dated January 28, 1976 the dispositive portion of

which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of this Court dated September 25,

1975 is hereby amended in the sense that the first part of the appealed decision is

set aside, except the last portion "declaring the plaintiffs to be the rightful ownersof the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub which is abutting plaintiffs' property,"

which we affirm, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The following facts are culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals:

It appears that plaintiff Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of

land known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc,Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 of the Registry of


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Deeds of Manila (Exhibit "A"). The other plaintiffs Florencia and Amparo del

Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario. Adjoining said lot is a dried-

up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied by the defendant since 1945which is the subject matter of the present action.

Plaintiffs claim that long before the year 1930, when T.C.T. No. 34797 over LotNo. 34 was issued in the name of Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in

possession of said lot including the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero

Calubcub having bought the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, saidtitled lot was occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of the

plaintiff on condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining

dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant

occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion of theold Estero Calubcub which abuts plaintiffs' titled lot. After a relocation survey of

the land in question sometime in 1960, plaintiffs learned that defendant was

occupying a portion of their land and thus demanded defendant to vacate said land

when the latter refused to pay the reasonable rent for its occupancy. However,despite said demand defendant refused to vacate.

Defendant on the other hand claims that sometime before 1945 he was living with

his sister who was then residing or renting plaintiffs' titled lot. In 1945 he built his

house on the disputed dried-up portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small

portion thereof on the titled lot of plaintiffs. Later in 1961, said house wasdestroyed by a fire which prompted him to rebuild the same. However, this time it

was built only on the called up portion of the old Estero Calubcub without

touching any part of plaintiffs titled land. He further claims that said dried-upportion is a land of public domain.

3

Private respondents Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia, all surnamed del Rosario (Del Rosarios),lodged a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila praying, among others, that they be

declared the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Petitioner Mario

Ronquillo (Ronquillo) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial courthad no jurisdiction over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land

and, thus, subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del Rosarios opposed the

motion arguing that since they are claiming title to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as

riparian owners, the trial court has jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss wasdeferred until after trial on the merits.

Before trial, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan

Subdivision covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797;

2. That said property of the plaintiffs abuts and is adjacent to the dried-up riverbed of Estero Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila;


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3. That defendant Mario Ronquillo has no property around the premises in

question and is only claiming the dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub,

whereon before October 23, 1961, the larger portion of his house was constructed;

4. That before October 23, 1961, a portion of defendant's house stands (sic) on the

above-mentioned lot belonging to the plaintiffs;

5. That the plaintiffs and defendant have both filed with the Bureau of Lands

miscellaneous sales application for the purchase of the abandoned river bedknown as Estero Calubcub and their sales applications, dated August 5, 1958 and

October 13, 1959, respectively, are still pending action before the Bureau of

Lands;

6. That the parties hereby reserve their right to prove such facts as are necessary

to support their case but not covered by this stipulation of facts.4

On December 26, 1962, the trial court rendered judgment the decretal portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to deliver to

the plaintiffs the portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of title No.

34797 which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and occupation of saidportion of land at the rate of P 5.00 a month from the date of the filing of the

complaint until such time as he surrenders the same to the plaintiffs and declaring

plaintiffs to be the owners of the dried-up portion of estero Calubcub which isabutting plaintiffs' property.

With costs to the defendant.

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, respondent court, in affirming the aforequoted decision of the trial court, declared

that since Estero Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in

the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it considers applicable tothe present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to the Del Rosarios as riparian owners.

Consequently, respondent court opines, the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form

part of the land of the public domain. It stated further that "(e)ven assuming for the sake ofargument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or disappeared, said

dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner," citingits ruling in the case ofPinzon

vs. Rama.

6

Upon motion of Ronquillo, respondent court modified its decision by setting aside the first

portion of the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender to the Del Rosarios thatportion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797 occupied by the former, based

on the former's representation that he had already vacated the same prior to the commencement

of this case. However, respondent court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the

rightful owners of the dried-up river bed. Hence, this petition.


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On May 17, 1976, this Court issued a resolution7requiring the Solicitor General to comment on

the petition in behalf of the Director of Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the

Republic of the Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently consideredimpleaded as such in our resolution of September 10, 1976.

8In his Motion to Admit

Comment,9the Solicitor General manifested that pursuant to a request made by this office with

the Bureau of Lands to conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureausent a communication informing him that the records of his office "do not show that MarioRonquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario or Florencia del Rosario has filed any

public land application covering parcels of land situated at Estero Calubcub Manila as verified

by our Records Division.

The position taken by the Director of Lands in his Comment10

filed on September 3, 1978,

which was reiterated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 and again in the Comment dated August17, 1989, explicates:

5. We do not see our way clear to subscribe to the ruling of the Honorable Court

of Appeals on this point for Article 370 of the Old Civil Code, insofar asownership of abandoned river beds by the owners of riparian lands are concerned,

speaks only of a situation where such river beds were abandonedbecause of a

natural change in the course of the waters. Conversely, we submit that if the

abandonment was for some cause other than the natural change in the course of

the waters, Article 370 is not applicable and the abandoned bed does not lose its

character as a property of public dominion not susceptible to private ownership inaccordance with Article 502 (No. 1) of the New Civil Code. In the present case,

the drying up of the bed, as contended by the petitioner, is clearly caused by

human activity and undeniably not because of the natural change of the course ofthe waters (Emphasis in the original text).

In his Comment11

dated August 17, 1989, the Director of Lands further adds:

8. Petitioner herein and the private respondents, the del Rosarios, claim to have

pending sales application(s) over the portion of the dried up Estero Calubcub, asstated in pages 4-5, of the Amended Petition.

9. However, as stated in the Reply dated May 4, 1989 of the Director of Lands, all

sales application(s) have been rejected by that office because of the objection

interposed by the Manila City Engineer's Office that they need the dried portion

of the estero for drainage purposes.

10. Furthermore, petitioner and private respondents, the del Rosarios having filed

said sales application(s) are now estopped from claiming title to the EsteroCalubcub (by possession for petitioner and by accretion for respondents del

Rosarios) because for (sic) they have acknowledged that they do not own the land

and that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands(Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, 194).


12/22

In a letter dated June 29, 197912

Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo,

Amparo and Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive among the

private respondents in this case.

In a resolution dated January 20, 1988,13

the Court required petitioner Ronquillo to implead one

Benjamin Diaz pursuant to the former'smanifestation14

that the land adjacent to the dried up river bed has already been sold to the latter,

and the Solicitor General was also required to inquire into the status of the investigation being

conducted by the Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General presented aletter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the parties involved in the present

case has filed any public land application.15

On April 3, 1989, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari,16

this time impleading the

Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which subsequently bought the property adjacent to

the dried-up river bed from Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated January 10, 1990,17

the Court

ordered that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent.

In a Comment18

filed on May 9, 1990, DBP averred that "[c]onsidering the fact that the

petitioner in this case claims/asserts no right over the property sold to Diaz/DBP by the delRosarios; and considering, on the contrary, that Diaz and DBP claims/asserts (sic) no right

(direct or indirect) over the property being claimed by Ronquillo (the dried-up portion of Estero

Calubcub), it follows, therefore, that the petitioner Ronquillo has no cause of action against Diazor DBP. Afortiorifrom the viewpoint of the classical definition of a cause of action, there is no

legal justification to implead DBP as one of the respondents in this petition." DBP thereafter

prayed that it be dropped in the case as party respondent.

On September 13, 1990, respondent DBP filed a Manifestation/Compliance19

stating that DBP's

interest over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139215 issued in its name (formerly TransferCertificate of Title No. 34797 of the Del Rosarios and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135170 ofBenjamin Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a

Deed of Sale dated September 11, 1990.

Petitioner Ronquillo avers that respondent Court of Appeals committed an error of law and gross

abuse of discretion, acted arbitrarily and denied petitioner due process of law (a) when itdeclared private respondents Del Rosarios the rightful owners of the dried-up portion of Estero

Calubcub by unduly relying upon decisional law in the case ofPinzon vs. Rama, ante, which

case was decided entirely on a set of facts different from that obtaining in this case; and (b) when

it ignored the undisputed facts in the present case and declared the dried-up portion of EsteroCalubcub as a private property.

The main issue posed for resolution in this petition is whether the dried-up portion of EsteroCalubcub being claimed by herein petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the

waters; and, corollary thereto, is the issue of the applicability of Article 370 of the old Civil

Code.


13/22

Respondent court, in affirming the findings of the trial court that there was a natural change in

the course of Estero Calubcub declared that:

The defendant claims that Article 370 of the old Civil Code is not applicable to

the instant case because said Estero Calubcub did not actually change its course

but simply dried up, hence, the land in dispute is a land of public domain andsubject to the disposition of the Director of Land(s). The contention of defendant

is without merit. As mentioned earlier, said estero as shown by the relocation plan

(Exhibit "D") did not disappear but merely changed its course by a moresoutheasternly (sic) direction. As such, "the abandoned river bed belongs to the

plaintiffs-appellees and said land is private and not public in nature. Hence,

further, it is not subject to a Homestead Application by the appellant." (Fabian vs.

Paculan CA-G.R. Nos. 21062-63-64-R, Jan. 25 1962). Even assuming for the sakeof argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or

disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner as held

by this Court in the case ofPinzon vs. Rama(CA-G.R. No. 8389, Jan. 8, 1943; 2

O.G. 307).

20

Elementary is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from theCourt of Appeals in a petition for certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the

review of errors of law, and that said appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this

Court. However, there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding

grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made ismanifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the

appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when

the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its findingswent beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant

and

appellee.21

A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the

change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to thedumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. Under the

circumstances, a review of the findings of fact of respondent court thus becomes imperative.

Private respondent Florencia del Rosario, in her testimony, made a categorical statement which

in effect admitted that Estero Calubcub changed its course because of the garbage dumped

therein, by the inhabitants of the locality, thus:

Q When more or less what (sic) the estero fully dried up?

A By 1960 it is (sic) already dried up except for a little rain that accumulates on

the lot when it rains.

Q How or why did the Estero Calubcub dried (sic) up?


14/22

A It has been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood. There is no street,

they dumped all the garbage there. It is the dumping place of the whole

community, sir.22

In addition, the relocation plan (Exhibit "D") which also formed the basis of respondent court's

ruling, merely reflects the change in the course of Estero Calubcub but it is not clear therefrom asto what actually brought about such change. There is nothing in the testimony of lone witness

Florencia del Rosario nor in said relocation plan which would indicate that the change in the

course of the estero was due to the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the aforequotedtestimony of the witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the

matter. The inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was

occasioned, not by a natural change in the course of the waters, but through the active

intervention of man.

The foregoing facts and circumstances remove the instant case from the applicability of Article

370 of the old Civil Code which provides:

Art. 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change in

the course of the waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout therespective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to

different owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other.

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only

if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-

made or artificial accretions23

nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificialdrainage systems.

24Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub

was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply

to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparianowners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land ofthe public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. That such is the

case is made more evident in the letter, dated April 28, 1989, of the Chief, Legal Division of the

Bureau of Lands25

as reported in the Reply of respondent Director of Lands stating that "thealleged application filed by Ronquillo no longer exists in its records as it must have already been

disposed of as a rejected application for the reason that other applications "covering Estero

Calubcub Sampaloc, Manila for areas other than that contested in the instant case, were all

rejected by our office because of the objection interposed by the City Engineer's office that theyneed the same land for drainage purposes". Consequently, since the land is to be used for

drainage purposes the same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application.

Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales applications with

the Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub cannot but be

deemed as outright admissions by them that the same is public land. They are now estopped fromclaiming otherwise.


15/22

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, the remaining effective portion of which declares

private respondents Del Rosarios as riparian owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub

is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997]

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DEROXAS (in

substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS andMAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

Trinidad de Leon Vda. deRoxas, substituted by her heirs,[1]

instituted this petition for review

of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. deRoxas v.

Maguesun Management and Development: Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), allegingreversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private

respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registrationover two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to

reopen or review a decree of registration.

The facts of the case are narrated below:

On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development

Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels ofunregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-

355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The

original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court ofCavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application forregistration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990,

executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00.

Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad deLeon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of

Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
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Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land

Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna

on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda.de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a

notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record

Newsweekly.

[2]

After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear theland registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, amongother things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land

Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by

Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon.[3]

Eventually,on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for

registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following

dispositive portion:[4]

"WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands

described in plan As-04-000108? Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the

other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the correspondingtechnical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management

and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liensand encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature.

Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso factobecomes executory, upon which eventuality

the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.

SO ORDERED."

Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on

March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final

[5]

but notbefore it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No.55072) applied for by Manuel A Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that

petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots inMaguesun Corporation's name.

Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial

Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground

that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among theproperties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April

15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession

of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for

its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold thelots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both

the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed

a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps moresignificantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an

adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the
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Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As

result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for

registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship ofthe fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay

after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of

Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help withthe latter's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance ofthe latter's cars.

[6]

The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or

not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.

[7]Petitioner, who was then already 92

years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida

Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and

Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged.[8]

A document examiner from the PhilippineNational Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.

[9]Upon petitioner's motion, the

signatures were re-examined by another expert from the National Bureau of Investigation The

latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written bythe same person.

[10]Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court

dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration on April 15, 1992.[11]

Placing greater

weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the

questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and notMaguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not

commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been

paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of

not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her application for registration was"previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she

had already lost . x x interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question."[12]

In a decision dated December 8, 1994,[13]

respondent court denied the petition for reviewand affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to

demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a

prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale

and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve

matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not

necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith especially whenconsidered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, according

to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the

existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally,

the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette issufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

[14]

Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in

ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of theregistration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good

faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun

Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that
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respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not

less thanP36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.

We find the petition for review impressed with merit.

1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative toregistration of property.[15]

Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not

become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the finaldecree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the

court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and

adjudicate the land to another party.[16]

Absence, minority or other disability of any personaffected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to

reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or

interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraudis recognized

by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening andrevising a decree of registration.

[17]It is further required that a petition for reopening and review

of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, thatthe petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an

innocent purchaser.[18]

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an

intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material

fact.[19]

Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon publicinterests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an

actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.[20]

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the

fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting

the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it preventsa party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates

upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, sothat there is not a fair submission of the controversy.

[21]Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but

collateral to the transaction sued upon.[22]

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been

accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registrationreopened and reviewed.

[23]In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing

Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been

granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against

the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the

court."[24]The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No. 1529) is actualand extrinsic, which includes, an intentional omission of fact required by law.

[25]For fraud to

justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is basedhave not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was

rendered.[26]

Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the

original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
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InRamirez v. CA,[27]

this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of

the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors

and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other personshad any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud

supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the

fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actualfraud.[28]

Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit isobtained to the prejudice of a third person.

[29]

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in

obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.

Petitioner Vda. deRoxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their

name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.

In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the

following declaration appears:

"6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners ofall adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors,encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil. Leon Luna. Provincial Roadall at Tagaytay City (no house No.)"[30]

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of theword "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Magesun Corporation, however, annexed a

differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183,

"Trinidad de Leon Vda. deRoxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et

al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.[31]

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed

erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original

application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted tothe trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead

the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner,

encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the LandRegistration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree

No 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all

occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of thesearch made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with thisrequirement of law.

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly

through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.[32]

Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared innumber 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact,

the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise

charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the
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Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda.

de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the

property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants couldhave been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of

petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual

fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through suchmisfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving theirproperty, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from

the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. deRoxas or any interest she may have inthe registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation

itself to petitioner.[33]

Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made

principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots

7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficientcompliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure

of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate

time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will notbe sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their

opposition or claims.

3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the

Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appealsheld that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official

Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the

Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in

the Official Gazette andonce in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided,however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction

upon the court. x x x"While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction

upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable

procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due

process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse-

interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof.[34]

Althoughjurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of

general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.

4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the

testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Courtto undertake a careful review of the facts of the case.

[35]A close scrutiny of the evidence on

record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case

at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation inthe execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves

that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of

the law.

In response to the questions fielded by the trial counsel and by counsel for petitioner, PNP

Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the
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questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural

variation."[36]

He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of

the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramostestified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were

not written by one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes the

personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between letters thestructural pattern of letters and other minute details x x x."[37]

Moreover, petitioner Trinidad deLeon vda. deRoxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not

sell the subject property.[38]

Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a

falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which areleased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant.

[39]This is an

indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that

she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a

stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as theenlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken

from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample

signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smoothand rounded, and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures,

characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.

There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of

Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner.[40]

In it she declares that she is a residentof 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North

Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who

died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas

and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. deRoxas. President Roxas was survived bypetitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased

petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well

as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner

did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the

unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.

Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given

address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase

the subject property? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the

legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not haveoffered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person

sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was

earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the

alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's Presidentwho is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject

property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. deRoxas, as one

who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties aswell as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge.

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to

that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed no title over the subject
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parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof.[41]

Maguesun

Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its

decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open,uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject

lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and

sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[42]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun

Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is herebyREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of

land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and

10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical

descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to hereinpeti