ltd full text cases

7/27/2019 LTD Full Text Cases

1/34

G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J .:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decisio n1of the

Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of boththe Regional Trial Court (RTC),

2Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Cour

(MCTC)3of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon

Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-NabasAklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as LoNo. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks

judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and JoseAngeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed aformal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world excepas to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of RamonUrbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.

4On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor o

the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by hisfather to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.

5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of

respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact andadministrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addi tion toexisting coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, thereare parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and herpredecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or

even the government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present anyevidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despitenotice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of theProperty Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name oNaguit.

6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSGstressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from RegionaExecutive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI .

7However, the cour

denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999

the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of theRTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred i n holding that there is no needfor the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposa ble withinthe meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the requiredperiod.

11
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt1


2/34

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that thesubject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under abona fide claim of ownership couldeven start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12

in arguing that the property which is in opencontinuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the PropertyRegistration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly

provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration oftitle to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership sinceJune 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

. . . .

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property inquestion is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established sinceJune 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision,qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only thewords or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.

13Ad proximum antecedents

fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position . Absent a legislative amendment, the rulewould be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 121945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such

interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even asit decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even beaggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as alreadyalienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, hasnot yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving theright to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession evenif in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there isalready an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding inRepublic v. Court of Appeals.14

Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the landsubject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government suchas a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators

and a legislative act or a statute."15

In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents hadoccupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even thepetitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.

16

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17

wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been inpossession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid atregistration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the propertywas declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.ntThus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property hadbeen certified as alienable and disposable, theBracewellruling does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18

such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19

the possessionof which cannot ripen into ownership.

20It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_127060_2002.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_127060_2002.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_127060_2002.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_127060_2002.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt12


3/34

private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21

forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthycannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

22In the case at bar

the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, ascorrectly held by the Court of Appeals.

23

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registrationderives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land oran interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province wherethe land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, towit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at leastthirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register theirtitle to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new startingpoint is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property RegistrationDecree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution dec lares tha"alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."

24Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration ofalienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of privatelands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25

There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that propertiesclassified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of aleast thirty (30) years.

26With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section

14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of thealienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusivethen the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27

The inherennature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application oSection 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the requiredperiod. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion shown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could havebeen no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registrationowing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion isprimarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 wasestablished through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as taxdeclarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be payingtaxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claimof title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt21


4/34

honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested part ies, but alsothe intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens onesbona fide claim of acquisition oownership.

28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired titlethereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in theconcept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makesher right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is herebyAFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J .:

One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands arenot titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

x x x

The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title thesepeople and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather

proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same meansdeveloped by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems oregistration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is goingto bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue isthat there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.

- Hernando De Soto1

This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine governmentThe petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to theapplicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doingso, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground.

The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately beentreated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, theduty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed ourpublic land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.

I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad452-D, Silang Cadastre,

2situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he

had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and

continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/jan2005/gr_144057_2005.html#fnt28


5/34

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General(OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State .

4Apart from

presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified thathe property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had foursons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inheritedthe property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all theproperties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeededthem in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this propertythat was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

5

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knewthe property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any

evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the CommunityEnvironment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that thesubject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established underProject No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982."

7

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A andcontaining an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technica

description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who isof legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged tothe alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of theproperty in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The

appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification o

the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possessionThus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable anddisposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period opossession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courtsruling in Republic v. Herbieto.

9

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;10

hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of theappellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,

11which was handed down just four months prior

to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since theMetropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisitenotice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to thedeclaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under thePublic Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Courtformulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of PresidentiaDecree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable anddisposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant forregistration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionof the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable anddisposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt4


6/34

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that offorest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the CiviCode on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree or both?

13

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision

The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registrationproceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that inRepublic v. Bibonia,

14promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred

interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply,the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites thesubsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,

15Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic

16and Republic v. Imperial Credi

Corporation,17

as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of thepublic domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land ofthe public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been "converted" into private property throughprescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.

19

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of theCivil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "privatelands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, andthat the 30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept ofprescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against publiclands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property andthe ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be madeto the Public Land Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition olands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable anddisposable, timber, or mineral lands.

20Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses

into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similapurposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

21

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Se ction 11 othe Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfecor incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization."

22Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the

details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land oran interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the provincewhere the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration

Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona f ide claim of acquisition of ownershipsince June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by waor force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shalbe entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt13


7/34

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significantamendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands othe public domain." The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered .

23This is no

actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienableor open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing ofthe application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their

title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:


(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 121945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act hasremained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuousexclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim ofownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, othat Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming toown any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of FirstInstance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, undethe Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance anapplication for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

x x x

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself forthe first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that hasprimarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance o

the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public landssuitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that bothprovisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who hasbeen in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes thesubstantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedurefor the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which onemay exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. AcNo. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt23


8/34

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does noexceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with SectionForty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed asprohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

24

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, theOSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the publicdomain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownershipsince 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either undeSection 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such animplication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established sinceJune 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provisionqualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only thewords or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.

25Ad proximum antecedents

fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rulewould be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 121945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Suchinterpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even asit decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even beaggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienableand disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yedeemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the rightto utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in

good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is alreadyan intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement inHerbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only covelands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of theiimperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcomingdiscussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registrationproceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is noneed to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used thereinconcerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26

the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possessionprior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excludedfrom the computation of the period of possession" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneousNonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimatelygranted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on thei r part prioto 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein hadclaimed entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession undea bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt24


9/34

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On theother hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been inexclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) thereinwas decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court onSection 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27

since in the latter, the application for registrationhad been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rulebetween the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling inRepublic v. Ceniza,

28which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared

alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, theattempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act othe government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau ofLands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating thatthe lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 29624-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondentsapplication. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in thiscase. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the propertystill forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law would entitle itsoccupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement inSection 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the landsubject of their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.

Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(bof public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is

that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable,while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial differencewas also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:


x x x

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be anobiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration ofalienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of privatelands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[30

] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule thaproperties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusivepossession of at least thirty (30) years.[

31] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt27


10/34

under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even ipossession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been opencontinuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily onthat provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case thawe can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original registration underSection 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or anyof its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitiveprescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands andmineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of reaproperty may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years ,

32or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30

years.

33

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,

34

as well as just title.

35

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over privatelands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registrationof lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, includingpatrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompassoriginal registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land may beconverted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years .

36Yet if we

ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates wouldemerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to

seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or aninterest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province wherethe land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, towit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at leastthirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)

37

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for thefirst time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No.1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the CiviCode, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinaryacquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterruptedadverse possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the onlylegal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt32


11/34

there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the CivilCode.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisionson prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation oftitle, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandatedsuch a requirement,

38similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945

as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) ofthe Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under theprovisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinaryprescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescriptionunder the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled toapply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similardemand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial incharacter shall not be the object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and

421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banksshores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for thedevelopment of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription

or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, areproperty of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized government officer oalienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, undethe Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable anddisposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man aresusceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired byprescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for publicservice, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may beconverted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property"which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the nationa

wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable odisposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of thenational wealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public serviceor the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declarationthe property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thusincapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to beno longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin torun. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where thePresident is duly authorized by law.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt38


12/34

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree l imits its scope and reach and thusaffects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors oroccupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption thatall lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance withtheir language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well beentreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize therequirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An ActAccelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA lawSection 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including FortBonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfersuch military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)

40which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administe

them.41

The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42

Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declaresthat the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulationsgoverning sales of government properties."

43

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said landsdid not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raisefunds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic .

44Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the

development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion undeArticle 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to aprivate person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgatedproclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period ofpossession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor ofthe possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public domain land becomespatrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before ibecomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the landwas still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registrationunder Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of theProperty Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration undeSection 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by RepAct No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 othe Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concernsa thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the

vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other stat utes such as theProperty Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enactssubsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the CivilCode, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our lawon prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This isbrought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," andthat [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_179987_2009.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009

ltd full text cases

Documents