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Major Walter P. Lang Jr., United States Army

Major John N. Taylor, United States Army Reserw

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THE BEST tlEFENSE IS . . .

T HERE is a momentous prob.lem confronting the Allied Com-

mand Europe (ACE ) and the NorthAtlantic Alliance. If the Soviet Unionshou Id launch a massed conventionalarms limited objective campaign inCentral Europe with initial air superi-ority, then what is the most effectiveand prudent response for ACE ?

Many will say that this situation isso unlikely to occur as to be absurd.The objection will be made that theSoviets are unlikely to attack NATOin this era of declining tensions. Afurther uhjection will be that a Sovietoffensive would probably be unlimitedin scope and would duubtless be sup-ported with all available tactical nu.clear tires.

Can we safely accept the assump-tions inherent in these objections tothe problem stated above ? What arethese assumptions ? First, there is thenotion that detente is solid enough topreclude such an attack in the future.Second is the belief that tbe Russianswould necessarily find it to be in theirnw’n best interest to initiate a generalunskmght, with all its risk of creating>1un]ty born of desperation among theNATO allies. Third is the Idea thattbe Soviets would find it necessary ore~rendesicable to let the nuclear “imp”out of the bottle in such a situation.These assumptions must be examinedclosely before they are accepted asfacts.

The policy of d6tente in the Soviet~T~i~n is, at least to SOme ~xtent, &

pendent on the personal support ofSecretary Bcezhnev and his support-ers, Their maintenance in power needsthe continued momentum of success insuch areas as SALT, Soviet-Americantrade and the Middle East. These are

all sensitive areas, and setbacke arepossible in all of them. A really dam-aging reverse could be the end of thoseassociated with d&ente in MOSCOWandwith them the policy itself. The fall ofKhrushchev is an example of thisphenomenon.

A post.d~tente Soviet government,disillusioned by the failure of its pre-vious efforts and perceiving a lack of\vill in the West, might well decidethat the time had come to use thestrength it has created in CentcalEurope. Recent Soviet activities inAngola do not support the belief thatthe USSR has renounced the use offorce as a means of exporting revolu-tion.

A Communi>t aggression in Cen-tral Europe is not likely to be un-limited in nature. As long as theUnited States adheres to the NATOTreaty and maintnins at least a parityuf >trategic forces with the USSR,the Soviets are unlikely to adopt acourse of action that appeacs to themtO lead to a strategic nuclear responseby the L~nited States. To take such arisk umuhl he “military adventurism”of the worst sort and, according totheir political and military doctrine,quite unacceptable.

It seems more probable that theywould, in these circumstances, chuosethe option of a carefully limited offen-sive “]n response” to a well-preparedand staged West German “provoca-tion” or “aggress ion.” An artificial“CCISUSbell~” such as this can be cre-ated easily in controlled or sympa-thetic mass media.

At the outset of such an offensive,the limited nature of the attack wouldbe clearly stated along with a dis-:lvo~val uf hostile intent tnward such

C.mri.ht O 19:6 by ham’ Walter P Lmw JrUnitmJ State, A! my Re.mve

lln,td Stntm A ,n, y. an,l ill.,,,, J,,hn N ‘ray],,, ,

August 1976 13

THE BEST DEFENSE IS . . .

countries as Denmark, the Benelux,Great 13ritsin and, of course, France.The idea woald be to smash the ACEconventional forces in the forwardarea, seize a slice of Germany andthen announce a willingness to nego-tiate. It might well work.

Would the L’SSR employ nuclear\veapons in support of this kind ofeffort ? A better question might be,why should they ? At present, there isa current of popular disbelief flowingin the West as to the reality or mag-nitude of the Soviet threat. With this,there is a concomitant disinclinati, mto make the financial and other sacri-fices needed to match Soviet power inthe arena of Central Europe. This re-sults in a large imbalance of conven.tional combat power in favor of the%viet Union in the t~~o German ies.

The Russian preponderance in mech-anized equipment and sheer numbersimmediately available is compoundedby their alltomatic possession of theinitiative and ability to mass againstspecific sectors. A loss of air superi-ority resulting from the initial nnm-bers and early air strikes againstNATO airfields is likely to complicatestill f~lrtber the ACE defense problem.

Further inhibiting Soviet willing-ness to use nuclear !veapons in thissort of operation is the fi~ct thatAmerican response to such employ-ment is incalculable. In fact, no onereally knows what will happen afterthe first tactical nuclear weapon isused on a European battlefield.

If the contingency of a Soviet lim-ited objective attack in Europe is aplaaslble case, then what is NATO’s

Majuv John N. Taylor, US Arm~Reserve, is an Instructor fn the 6239US Army Reserve School of the USA-CGSC Department. He is a graduateof the USfifA and has bpen on the fac-ulties of the US Army ManagemwtSchoot, the US AYmJ Logistics Centerand the Defense Systems ManagementSchool. He is a doctoral research as-sociate to University DistinguishedProfessor F!’edevick Herzberg at theUniuersitu of Utah.

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Major Walter P, Lang Jr. is studg-ing for a ,Vaster’s d~.qree tn MiddleEast Studies at the University ofUtah. He is a graduate of the Vzr-ginia MilitaryInstitute. the ArmedForces Stafl Col[ege and the USA-CGSC. He has commanded intelligenceunits and has served u,ith SpecialForces, a corps staff in Germany, ajoint headqua? ters in the Republic ofV!etnam and a NATO arnt~ grouph eadquavt em in Turkey.

Military Review

THEBESTDEFENSEIS . . s

present chance of defeating sach astrategy ? Not very good it appeal-s.Oar numerical disadvantage aloneseems. to leave us only one good alter-native to defwat—the tactical nuclearweapon. This is the stone \vith ~l,hi~hDavid may hope to slay Goliath. Isthis satisfactory ? No. The inhibition\vith regard to the open-ended natl, reof nuclear conflict in Europe appliesto IIS m well as to the Russians. More!mp(jrtantly, MII’ adversaries are notso simple as to think serlausly thatan~ incursion across the West Ger-man border \vill cause the release ofUS nuclear weapons to the NATOfield forces. How’ solid then is the de-terrent effect of oar tactical nuclearcapability when arrayed against apossible Soviet attack which }vould bebotb relati~rely shallow and nmbiguousin intent ? The necessary conclusionis that ,NATO should develop a de-fen>ive .trategy \vhich is nnt depend-ent on the American tactical nucleardeterrent tvhen defending against So-viet nttacks that may not appeau tothe LTSSR likely to exceed the thresh.old necess:iry for release of nurlear!veapons.

The Concept

In the remninder of this article, theauthors will attempt to o[ltline a pos-sible defensive strategy and techniquedesigned to meet the needs nf the di-Iemmn described above.

Several assumptions critical to adiscussion of the defense of Germanyshnuld be stated. First, West C.ermanywill continue to be adtlrnant about de-fending as fur east a+ possible. WestGermany, the obvious econornlc andemotional target of the USSR, is notexpendable. Second, the pohtical cli-mate in the United States \vill con-tinue to make it impractical to in-crease significantly L’S forces in flu-

rope. Third, no additional allied forcesare likely to become available.

The proposed concept is based upona corollary derived from several prin-ciples of war such as Napoleon’sXVIIth or Jomini and Clausewitz’principles of the defensive-offensivemanellver, The corollary:

A defense that is to be a deter~enfmust appear to make the cost of )rkatwill lW last in at) attack greater tltax,,./tat a.,ncld 1X gained if the defense1(.f,ll’ b) ?17clled.

How is this to be done in the con-text of no nuclear weapons and a mas->ive Russian preponderance of forces?Cletirly, some element or system ofelements which will have a “force-mllltiplier” effect must be found. Theneeded element mast enable a smallerforce committed to the defensive toinflict sltch loss on the attacking forcesas to make the whole scheme pat-ently unprotibable and probably unat-tempted.

When one searches for an analogoussituation in history, se~,eral come tomind. In claisical times, there is thecase of Leonidas and his Spartans atThermopylae. In tbe ?diddle Ages,there M the English “miracle” ofAgincourt. In recent times, there isthe exemplar provided by the Finno-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40. In thisconflict, the Soviets in the end tri.umphed at a cost of at least 200,000killed. Most of these losses were takenin attempting to breach the Manner-heim Line across the Karelian Isth-mus betm’een Leningrad and Helsinki.Significantly, the Soviet Army vmsprevented by the severity of its lossesfrom taking full advantage of its“victory.” Perhaps n e a r e r to theAmerican consciousness is the exampleprovided by the later stages of ourown Civil War. In the period afterGettysburg, Lee bridled his instinct

August1976 15

THEBESTDEFENSEIS . . .

firrnish soldiersattacka SoviettankwithhandErenadeSduringtheWinterWar

for the offense ma tended to rely onthe defensive tactics that had wonhim such a victory at Frederickshur%In December 1862. In battles such asMine Run, Spotsylvania and Cold Har-hcw, his army’s lines were unbreak-h]e against (xfds uf 2 and sometime+3 to 1.

The art of defen~e is all too oftentaught and imagined to be an undesir-able alternative. It carries \vith It theIlndeserved stigma of being incap:lbleof bringing about victory. This is aninaccurate view of the lessons of his-tory. For the smaller force, the well-fought defense has uften proven to bea decisive form of combat. At Agin-court, the French Army was. for allpractical purposes, destroyed attack-irr.rr the English. Imawne what thecourse of American history mighthave been if Longstreet’s advice hadbeen heeded at Gettysburg. He urgeda tactical defense. There, the cost ofan offensive fixation was a cata-strophic reverse.

At this point, one should look for auseful generalization from these ex-amples, a principle that bas relevanceto our times. What are the co~monthreads that run through these strug-gles of the past? First, there was ahigh skill level in the defending forces.This could be the hoplite phalanx, theIongbow, the rifled musket or the tecb-

niques of northern warfare, Second,there m’as a high standard of lw~der-ship, and, third, there was the careftllselection anti improvement of de fen-silw g-round.

The first two are of great signifi-cance. Imagination, creativity and re-sourcefulness characterize the style ofleadership found most often in skilleddefenders. Additionally, inferior sol-rllers are inferior in any form of com-bat. Highly skilled and experiencedtroops exponentmlly harden a defense.History sparkles with the legends ofresolute and Successful riefenders,seasoned and skilled soldiers imaginn-tlvely led. In contrast, defensive fail-ures usually can be trnced to a majordeficiency in one of the three areasmentioned.

Nevertheless, It is in the selectionand improvement of defensive posi-tions that the essence of success ap-

16 Military Review

THE BEST DEFENSE IS . . .

pears to lie. In all our examples, high-quality troops were committed to de-fensive battle employing the best fieldfortification techmques known at the.time, on groond chosen \vith a“ eye tnma~imizing defensive strength andprotection \vh]le minimizing the at-tocker’h mass. In some cases, the at-tacker’s characteristic. of mnss actu-ally w’orked against him bec}tuse ofthe defender’s dispositlnns and Iise oftemain.

Thl!s, at Thermupyl:ie, the sm:,llGreek force was artfully posit] onecl onn gravel beach 30 yurds wqde between.1 sheer unscalable cliff :Lnrl the >eu.To further strengthen the position, anearthen wall !!US thrmvn Up for thebnp]ites to fight behind. Grit and thedi~mfiy nf the Persi:{ns at their lossesdid the rest.

At Aglnconrt. Henry V knew thath!s little force could not stnnd in openground :Lgalnst the massed \veight nfthe henvy French cavalry. Therefore,he posltione[i his men xt the end of nlong, opeu pace bet~veen wwods, with:lrchem in the Nood.s to dellver .s crossfire fvhen the French advanced. Theol)en space had been plom’ed and waswet. The ]nf:mtry erecteti sbarpenerlstakes to their front. The Frenchr]l.<bed, u’ere halted :tnd \\ere thenshot to pieces by the ar~,hers.

In the case of the Finns, the Mm-nerbeim Line blocked the dire& ronteto Helsinki. It consisted of light forti-fications sited to make the most ofFinnish manpmver ~nd to cost theRussians deariy. The Soviets won inthe end bot at the high cost alreadymentioned.

The Technique

The lesson to be derived from his-tory, with regard to operations againstnumerically soperior forces, is thatgood troops, well-led and \vell.posi -

tioned, have n far greater effect thantheir mere numbers wxmhi Caltse oneto expect. What is proposed in thisarticle is the creation of a defensivezone in !Vest Germany, running fromthe base of the Jutlanrl Peninsula tothe S\viss frontier, rougb]y contig[tonsto the borders of the Soviet bloc states.Such a defensive belt should average:tbol]t 40 kilometers in depth in gooddefensive terra]n. Tbe tactical conceptivlthln tbls zone would be to establishu matrix of pre~,ionsly prepared fort]-tied pnsiti{,n.. The n[lrnber of posi-tions would vtir~, from sector to sector!vithin the defensive belt but JYouklgenernlly exceed the ntlrnber of cross.;tttached comb:lt ;irms teums ns. ]gnedto defen(l in an area. Each positionwould be hilt for defense by a “taskteam” consisting of a cross-a ttncbedt:ink-lnfantrj’ company augmented!r!th certain supporting elemeuts. Allp~,siti{)ns !~oilkl be bu]lt for 3G0-degree[Iefense :ind !vollld be essentially fieldfortltications Collstrocted of earth andtimber with a minimum Ilse of c.on.crete except where absolutely neces-ssry. Supplies necessary to the con-[Il!ct of a 10-day defense of positionbv n “task team” Nould be prestockedin All positions under the peacetimec-ire of n c]vlli:ln mretaker group,

The positions constnlcted wwuldronstltute a grid, adapted to the ter-rain, upon which Alli:lnce forces wooldmanel]ver in the conduct of tbe de-fense, occllpying positions successivelyin a retrograde movement back fromthe present frontiers.

Each position must meet two equallyimportant criteria. First, the locationof the position must provide maximumadvantage in fields of fice to confrontthe enemy while complementing thedefense of other positions. Second, thelocation of the position must affordthe small cross-attnched teams of

August 1976 17

THE BEST DEFENSE IS . . .

mechanized infantry, armor and sup-porting \\.capons (artillery, mortars,antiaircraft, and so forth ) realisticalternate routes of maneuver in andout of the positions.

The idea is to inflict high casualtieson the enemy \vhile using the best ter-rain to optimize \veapons effectivenessand prepared positions with overheadcover to minimize friendly losses. Theideal uf minimum losses will be :ii{iedby the fact thnt the uttacker w’ill haveu diffictllt time deciding which of thepositions in the grid are actually oc-cupied !Intil he reaches them. A de-ceptive camouflage plan, us well as thecnmmllnication system described be-low, will greatly embnrrow enemytarget ucquisltion efforts.

The momentum :md bnlk of tbe SLI-viet forces, predominately t>lnks, mustbe used to the Sowet riis>ldvantage. AsW) attacker penetrates the matrix de-fense, the defensive pre+sure incremesgrwiually as the can:! iizution of thespearheads Incre:!ses. Accnrciingly, thefolloj! iug ~vaves uf mechanized tnmpsv ill tend to slow dov’n, bottleneck and,lnm Up, into more lucrntlve turgetsfor the defenders !! ho are fightingfrom one well-sited defensive positionafter another. It i. particularly cr]t]-cal to this fnrm of defense that de-fending unit+ not UIIOWthemselves tobecome engaged to such a degree thntafl~ withdrawal is impossible. A umtciefencling a given fortified Iocahtyshould be !~lthdrnw’n by higher head.quarters when the continuation of ac-tion on that powtion would resu]t inriestruction of the unit. The Itnlt then\!’ould be w’lthdritw’n over >1 cgveredroute to a vacnnt fortified positionfmther to the rear. Such withdrawalswwuid be assisted by covering firesprovided by adjacent units, artilleryfire, smoke and such limited objecti~eattacks as may be required to assist

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the withdrawing unit. Withdrawalspreferably would be made duringperiods of reduced visibility. If it be-comes impossible to extricate a par-ticular unit, then n determined andprolonged resistance on the part ofthe encircled “task team” will be ex-pected. Such a resistance will begreatly facilitated by the facts thateach position is organized for all-round defense; every position is pre-stocked with supplies; and all “taskteams” are organized to contain mini-mum support elements such as airdefense artillery, medical personnel,:Lnd so forth. A prutrwted defense ofperhaps three or four days by cut-offunits }vould prove to be a severe em-barrassment to a Soviet commandertrying to CIJIMiLICt offensive operationsfarther to the ]vest.

The individ~lal fortified localities\vill be orgnnized for all-round defense:ii](i mutual support on successivelines. \\’lthin the position, fightinglw.ltlons for all troops lvlil be pre.umstrncted \\ith uverhead c o c e r,There v’ill be dug-in hull.duwn posi-tion. fur all armored vehicles, undfire, ~~iil be preplanned \vith mngec:~rds an(i concentrations esttibll shedIn advsnce and mnintu ined on the pv-sititm in z central Iocketi hunker. Thedefended lornlity !vIII be surrotlnded\vith {iefensive bari)e[i wire and mines.

CommumcalionstV1thin the defended belt, all com-

munications 1!ill be by protected mul-Ilple wire circuits, These circ~lits MIllrun in buried conduit und will ~nrfaceat hookup pwnts insi[ie e:wh defendedIocallty. An ucc~}pying unit \vili hoveto connect telephones, teietype equip-ment, anti w forth to huve depemiablehecure commtinicntiims. Area signsicenters wili be the focus for commnnd:ind control through this protected

MilitsryReview

THEBESTDEFENsEIS. . .

land-line system. An all-wire, multiple-circn it, protected communications sys-tem may, at first glance, seem extrav-agant. Farther examination will showthis system to be a very good invest-ment.

Modern armored and mechanizedforces are hopelessly addicted to wire-less communications in connectionwith their high mobility. To take ad-vantage of this vulnerable character-istic, the defenders u ill, upon initia-tim of the attack, blanket all atttain.able \vireless transmission frequencieswith high-powered jamming. The nb-jective will be to prevent any use of~vireless commlln ications \vithin thematrix defensive zone. The fixed na-ture of the defense installations makespossible the use of very high-poweredequipment and large antenna arrays.The true beauty of this approach isthat it will greatly disrupt the opera-

tions of the attacker while the de-fender is enjoying unusually depend-able signal support.

An additional advantage offered bythe \vire approach is the small targetwhich will be presented to Soviet radiodirection-finding equipment. The se-curity of the system will greatly com-plicate the enemy target acquisitionprocess.

Air Defense and Air Space Control

It is accepted as an assumption ofthis article that air superiority willbe with the USSR for the first andmost critical phase of the attack. Thisbeing the case, some provision mastbe made for air defense over the de-fensive belt. If unchallenged, the So-\,iet air arm will make hash of boththe defended localities +nd any move-ments between them.

The answer to this threat is to move

August 1976 19

THE BEST DEFENsE IS . .

~ Vulcan

Chaparral

20Military Review .

THE BEST DEFENSE IS . . .

the :Iir defense capability as far fur-ward ,is possible into the belt and tu(Ieclare the block of air sp>ice over thebelt to be an “’<ur defenw free tirezone.’” IIelulv a prescribed altltude, allman-mark flying t,bjects !vould be slIb-Ject to eng:igement by the defender’sair de fen>e assets, J/t d, W. <’l)apa) (al

L:rld t’ulcfltl would be I)resent a.s or-ganic m’ :ittacheci in tbe many comimtarms “tt;sk teams” defending ]n thebelt. The “task teams,” whether occu-pying a position or on the march, thuswill never prehent a “soft” target forRussian aviation. Ammuultlt>n resup-ply NIll be effected through the pre-stocking procedure previously men-tioned. The bonus presented by theground slipport fire capability of theVu/ra)Z w’ill ~lso aid in position de-fense.

HA WI? would be moved forwardinto the defended zmle as necessaryto engage higher targets. N~/;e Her-cules would supplement this defense

August1976

from location+ to the rear of the beltunder centrtilized fire control.

This type air defense will have sev-eral beneficial effect>, Soviet alr unitsw Ill experience a high rate [If attritimlIvhlle “boring in” in attempts to sup-port their armored units trying to getfonwtrd in the maze uf our defensematrix; the intense volt}me of gwwndfire tvlll tend to force the enemy :Iirupu’a~d u’here bomb]ng 8CUUMCYwill

~tiffer somewhat und aircraft will bemnre wllnerable tu wcapons sy>temssuch as HA W’K and .\’tI;+ Hcrrulrs;nnd h’ATO nir force. will be emibledto concelltmte scarce assets for a reso-lution of the caunterair battle !vithouthawng to piecemeal aircraft into alow-level defense over the defendecibelt.

Rangerand SpecialForcesOperationsSpecinl operations forces can make

n significant contribution to n defen-sive scheme of this kind, They ~vouid

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THE BEST DEFENSE IS . . .

operate fomvard of the defensive zonein two bands.

Immediately for}vard of the a]lieddefensive belt in what will become theSoviet forward support area will benumerous small Ranger teams. Duringthe defense, the Ranger team missionwill be to destroy communications,concentrating on couriers, groundwire circuits and command posts. Thiseffort w’111dovetail in its effect \\,iththe major j:lmming campaign in prog.ress to the w,est.

Because of the short duration of op-erations, Special Forces ,vill not beable to rely heavily upon well-devel-oped indigenous assets. The SpecialForces’ primary mission should be toconcentrate immediately on the pe-troleum, O]IS and lubricants ( POL )flow. This may include pipe lines,tsnker trucks, airfields and storagesites. An impediment to the POLstream needed by the armored forcemaking the attack ~vou]d cause gravediflic[ilties to the So\,iet command. TheSpecial Forces’ operational area nwnldbe located at some distance to the eastof the Ranger combat zone.

The Desired Effect

Soviet Armed Forces engaged in alimited offensive against the kind nfdefensive system outlined above !vouldfind themselves committed to an at-tritional battle of horrendous scopeand intensity and on terms adverseto themselves in spite of their greatnumerical advantage. The offensiveprobably would grind to a halt some-where in the depths of the defensivematrix in a w’elter of casualties andsnarled command systems.

The prospect of such a struggle atprohibitive cost and for little gainwould deter the aggressor from mak-ing the attempt. If the Soviet Armydid succeed in fighting its way out of

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the other side of the defense belt, theprize won would be the near certaintyof the commitment of American nn-clear weapons to the contest.

What NATO would give itself byadoption of a ciefensive scheme simi.Iar to the one outlined here is a con-vincing deterrent at rzny level of ag-gression. For this reason, a system ofthis sort, if adopted, should receivewide publicity in its general terms. Adeterrent system is ineffective if It iscompletely hidden from the adver+ary.

Conclusion

It should be pointeri out th%t the

technique of defense described in thisarticle is applicable to situations otherthan the arena of Central E!lrope. Inthe 1973 October War in the MiddleEast, Israeli forces fighting fromcarefully prepared positions on theGolan Heights badly mauled attackingSyrutn forces before lsr,neli mobilereinforcements arrived on the scene.

In some portions of the Golan front,the massed Syrian armor and infantrynever dld manage to break throughthe Israeli positional defense. Dug-intanks and prepared infantry positionsplayed ;l large rnle in turning backvery determined Syrian assaults.

There would seem to be an xpplicu-tion for this kind of defense ~vherevera force of quality troops faces an en-emy superior in numbers, equally mo-bile and—even worse-possesses com-mand of the sic. The problem facedb“y Jordan in a possible defense of itswestern front along the Jordan River~vould appear to be another likely lo-cation for a matrix defense.

An old military saw states that“The best defense is a good offense.”What we have tried to show in thisarticle is that, in some cases, THEBEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD DE-FENSE. imt

MifitaryReview