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Hellenic Macedonia Since Liberation:General Observations and Principal PhasesIoannis K. Hassiotis

Questions of Methodology and InterpretationThe contemporary period of Macedon ian history hasalready completed eighty years of Hellenic administra-tion. Nonetheless, this important chapter in modemGreek history has not yet received the historiographicalattention which it deserves.' To begin with, the bibliog-raphy is clearly and dishearteningly deficient in termsboth of quantity and quality, and this is especially true

of the literature referring solely to the more recentperiods. As a result, the basic points of reference con-tinue to be the special volumes devoted to Macedoniaand published on the occasion of the various anniver-saries of its liberation. However, these works inevitablysuffer from the shortcomings of all circumstantial pub-lications, and, furthermore, they focus their interestprimarily on one of the most important (and easiest) ofthe thematic targets: the city of Thessaloniki.2 It isindicative of the situation that contemporary Macedoniahas only recently begun to appear on the agenda ofspecialist conferences.land even then this has occurredin such a way as to ensure that the primacy ofthe ancientand, to a lesser extent, of the Byzantine period -goesunchallenged.This historiographical narrowness of approach canbe attributed to material and technical factors, many ofwhich have had an equally counterproductive effect onresearch into almost all the post-war history of Greece.4Yet in the case of Macedonia, over and above themethodological rigidity which has been a general char-acteristic of the study of recent periods in Greek history,a number of additional negative factors, most of themideological in nature.ihave been at work. For example,the national phobias justifiably provoked by the misad-ventures which befell Macedonia during the SecondWorld War and the Civil War which followed it, con-tinued to flare up again and again throughout the post-Civil War period. Until the early 1970s, these phobiashad the effect of discouraging the historians who wouldhave liked to study unhindered the historical phenomenaand situations of contemporary Macedonia. On the otherhand, access to the appropriate sources was not alwayspossible, or their use was precluded by the generalfifty-year rule on the release of documents, which, ofcourse, had a prohibitive effect on the study of thepost-war period.' Researchers often found themselvesconfronted in provincial areas by a lack of properly-or-ganized archive collections which they needed to attain

a satisfactory degree of documentation for issues oflocalhistory. One welcome exception in this respect is thematerial in the Historical Archive of Macedonia (andparticularly in the Archive of the Government-Generalof Macedonia). Some ofthe local Macedonian archives,now re-organised, were also helpful. Yet the materialwhich has survived even in these archives is fragmen-tary, and thus insufficient for a full investigation ofpost-war Macedonian history. Now, however, theprospects for such archives - and especially for theHistorical Archive of Macedonia - are rather more en-couraging, particularly in view of the introduction ofsome system into the collections and gradual classifica-tion of the various documents issued by the civil servicedepartments ofMacedonia. 6 The previous state of affairscompelled researchers to seek out their materials in theachives of other countries: primarily of the UnitedKingdom for the period up to the 1960s and of the UnitedStates for more recent events.'Apart from these technical issues, the study of certaincrucial phases in contemporary Macedonian history alsopresents problems of academic validity. Challenges aremost frequently directed against the texts of those well-known or less familiar figures who were involved inwhatever way in the crucial events of the period andwho, in a wish to explain themselves, published theirreminiscences, diaries or memoirs. Naturally enough,works which refer to the controversial 'Macedonian'policies of specific political parties during the inter-warperiod have attracted the greatest suspicion - particularlywhen the policies involved are those of the CommunistParty of Greece. Criticism is also aimed at those workswhich attempt to study and interpret the period of tripleoccupation (by Italy, Germany and Bulgaria), the resis-tance movement and the Civil War.8 Nonetheless, quitea number of these works are welcome contributions,especially when they contain source material or eye-wit-ness reports."It can thus be said that, despite the adverse condi-tions, the contemporary period of Macedonian historyhas at last begun to attract the attention of serious-minded and professional research workers, who havealready enhanced the bibliography with original re-search work. Itwould be unfair to suppress the fact thatsome of these interesting contributions are included inthis volume ofModern and Contemporary Macedonia.

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HELLENIC MACEDONIA SINCE LIBERATION

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9

The surrender of the city of Thessaloniki as depicted by popular art.The period which has elapsed since the Balkan Wars

will, reasonably enough, strike the reader as exception-ally brief by comparison with the five long centuries ofOttoman rule over 'Greater Macedonia'. As a result, onewould not expect contemporary Macedonian history tofall into phases as deeply or as sharply marked off fromone another as those of the Ottoman period. Sureenough, Greek Macedonia has shared the fate of the restof Greece in its evolution since liberation, without per-ceptible deviations and with common historical 'areasof inertia'. Yet during those eight decades GreekMacedonia has experienced a number of changes - per-ceptible ones - some of which, thanks to their long-termimpact on the more general historical advance of Hel-lenism in Macedonia, could be seen as equally impor-tant, to say the least, as the vicissitudes of the Ottomanera. These changes, which might also be termed histori-cal dividing-lines, certainly had an effect on Greece asa whole, yet their influence on the history of Macedoniain particular was both more immediate and moreprofound.

Bearing this in mind, we could thus discern thefollowing phases - in the conventional sense, as always- in contemporary Greek Macedonian history: a firstphase, beginning with the Balkan Wars and ending with

the aftermath of the First World War (1919-23); a secondcovering the period up to the Second World War; a third,lasting from Greece's involvement in the Second WorldWar to the end of the Civil War (1940-49), and a fourthwhich began in the 1950s. This last period still continues.However, the realignments which are taking place rapid-ly today in the southern Balkans in general and, aboveall, the new political and inter-state relations which arebeing formed as a result of these changes and (inevitab-ly) within the framework of the European Communitymay well be the introduction to a new phase in the historynot only of Macedonia but of the Greek world as a whole.The First Phase

The liberation of Macedonia was carried out at aspeed which even the most optimistic ofthe victors couldscarcely have been prepared for: between 5/18 October1912, when the first Greek troops crossed the demarca-tion line in northern Thessaly, and 26 October/8 Novem-ber, when the Turkish commander of Thessalonikisigned the surrender of the city to the Greeks, almost allof Western and Central Macedonia had been overrun. InDecember of the same year, negotiations on a peacetreaty began in London between the four victorious

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10 IOANNIS K. HASSIOTIS

KonstantinosRaktivan, firstGovernor-Generalof Macedonia.

countries (Greece, Bul~aria, Serbia and Montenegro)and the Sublime Porte. I The second, and equally short,Second Balkan War followed, judging the fate of theremaining territories of Macedonia. The signing of theTreaty of Bucharest on 28 July/ 10 August 1913, whichrang down the curtain on what had been a bloodymilitary confronation, was an event of great significancefor the historical development of all the peoples ofSouth-eastern Europe. I I For the Greeks, the treaty con-firmed Greek sovereignty in Eastern Macedonia, push-ing the Greek-Bulgarian frontier to its naturaleasternmost limit, the Nestos estuary.V On the con-clusion of the Balkan Wars, then, the total geographicalarea of Macedonia was divided up amongst its threemain contenders: Greece, which received 51.57% ofMacedonian territory (more or less corresponding to thearea historically occupied by ancient Macedon), Serbia,which was given 38.32%, and Bulgaria, which eventual-ly took 10.11 %. It was left for the near future to showhow lasting and effective that settlement would be.However, the touchstone for the viability and stabilityof the new territorial regime lay in the ability of threeindividual states to incorporate their new acquisitions inMacedonia.

The administrative incorporation of Macedonia intothe Greek state took place in a manner which, as thesubsequent course of history in the area has proved, hasstood the test of time - successive and grave mishapsnotwithstanding. Yet the process of incorporation wasfar from an easy business, at least in the beginning.Despite the preliminary work which had been doneduring the closing decades of Ottoman rule, the ad-ministrative integration of Macedonia with the mainbody of Greece did not follow the model previouslyapplied in Thessaly (1881-82), still less of that of the

Ionian Islands (1864). In Macedonia, the process wasnot one of annexation or union, but of conquest - and ofa conquest which at least until the Treaty of Bucharestwas challenged and undermined by a variety of ex-ogenous factors: Bulgaria, to begin with, and alsoAustria- Hungary. Bulgaria, after its humiliating militarydefeat of 1913, embarked on a fresh revanchist en-deavour just before and after the outbreak ?f the ~_Jre~tWar Austria-Hungary continued to create difficulties mthe full implementation of Greek sovereign rights untilits ultimate collapse and dissolution in 1918.

Despite these difficulties, the extent and nature of theadministrative changes brought about in Greek Ma-cedonia meant that integration of the 'New Lands' intothe rest of Greece took place in a relatively short spaceof time. Without doubt, this was a remarkable ac-complishment, the foundations for which were laidduring the terms of service as Governors-General ofMacedonia of a number of outstanding statesmen:Konstantinos Raktivan, Stephanos Dragoumis, Em-manouil Repoulis and Themistoklis Sophoulis.l'' Theadministrative reforms implemented by the Greek ad-ministration in Macedonia during the first and crucialyears of 1912-15 not only opened up the way toeconomic and social development, but also ensured thatthe area was suitably prepared for the tribulations whichwere to follow.

Greek sovereignty over Macedonia was not to betaken for granted - despite the widespread belief to thecontrary - even after the signing of the Bucharest Pe~~eTreaty. This became plain in the course of the first cnS1Sto break out in South-eastern Europe after the BalkanWars: that is, during the First World War. During thesecret negotiations which both the Central Powers andthe Entente conducted with the governments of the area(and especially with the Bulgarians and the Turks),Macedonia in general, whet~er S~rbian or ~reek, wasused as an inducement to gam their support.

When the 'National Schism' broke out in Greece andthe Western allies began to interfere constantly in Greekaffairs, Greek sovereignty in Macedonia was still moreseriously endangered. After the Greek surrender to theBulgarians of the fort of Rupel, on 28 May 1916, thesituation seemed to be entirely out of Greek control;systematic persecution of the Greek popul~ti?n o\Eas.t-ern Macedonia began, and the Greek administration mThessaloniki had in effect been replaced by the com-manders of the British and French forces who formedwhat was known as the Macedonian Front (1916-18). Inparallel, the French civil and military authoritie~ gavetheir blessing to an extensive propaganda campaign onthe part of a variety offoreign personalities and organisa-tions (of a religious and educational nature) whose pur-pose was either to coerce Greece into entering the Waror to weaken the Greek presence in sensitive areas ofCentral and Western Macedonia.ls Indeed, it would

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HELLENIC MACEDONIA SINCE LIBERATION 11

Eleutherios Venizelos talking tothe Commander-in-Chief of theGreek forces 011 the Macedonian

front during WWI, GeneralPanagiotis Daglis.

appear that the date of the National Defence putsch of30 August 1916, which saved Greek Macedonia, wasbrought forward because Eleutherios Venizelos was

afraid that the Serbs were preparing to appoint their ownPrefect for the Thessaloniki area, with French support,or even that they were moving to make the city

Eleutherios Venizelos with members of It is Provisional Government in Thessaloniki (1916-1917).

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provisional capital of Serbia. 16Greek entry into the War on the Allied side had other

consequences for Greek Macedonia, in the longer term,The defeat ofthe Central Powers and their Bulgarian allyput an abrupt end to the latter's aggressiveness towardsits neighbours, given that the Treaty of Neuilly (1919)obliged Bulgaria to withdraw from all the territories ithad occupied during the course of the war. The treatyalso compelled Bulgaria to relinquish to the Greeks allits rights and titles in Thrace, and by a special conventionprovided for an exchange of populations betweenGreece and Bulgaria. This, however, was to be done ona voluntary basis, with the populations moving in ac-cordance with their national consciousnessY This ex-change supplemented the first Greek-Bulgarian andGreek-Turkish movements of population, which hadtaken place defacto during the Balkan Wars and also byagreement once hostilities had ceased.i"The Inter-War Period

Macedonia, however, was fated to experience otherdemographic fluctuations, 19 the most extensive of which- not just for this period but for the entire modem historyof Greece - was, of course, that which came about as aresult of the compulsory exchange of populations be-tween Greece and Turkey. 20 This measure almost entire-ly removed the Muslim part of the Macedonian popula-tion which had stayed on after the Balkan Wars andwhich, at the time of liberation, amounted to 39.4% ofthe population as opposed to the Greek share of 42.6%. 21On the other hand, it led to the establishment en masseof some 600,000 Greek refugees from Eastern Thrace,Asia Minor, Pontus, the Caucusus and southern Russia.It is estimated that the population of Macedonia in-creased by 30% between 1920 and 1928, and this mustbe attributed primarily to the settlement of refugees. Inaddition to altering the quantitative magnitudes, thearrival of the Greek refugees in Greek Macedonia alsohad a number of other significant effects: inter alia, it atlast gave the area a degree of ethnological homogeneityunprecedented by Balkan standards, with the Greeksamounting to 88.8% of the population by 1926.22 Thisdevelopment did much to eliminate the challenges to thepolitical map of Macedonia, depriving Greece's north-ern neighbours of one of the basic arguments in the'irredentist' claims they had put forward from time totime. As subsequent years proved, the outstanding issuesleft over - for special reasons - from that painful severingof the Gordian knot of nationalities in the other Balkancountries and in Turkey were the sources of the crisescurrently troubling this part of the world.

Over and above its national and political sig-nificance, the establishment of the refugees in Ma-cedonia also had serious economic and social conse-quences.r' To begin with, the overwhelming majority of

the new-comers (the figure is put at 90% of the total ruralrefugee population of Greece) settled in the Macedoniancountryside. This speeded up the process of compulsorypurchase oflarge estates and monastery lands. Compul-sory purchase and land reform in general had begun inMacedonia in a revolutionary manner in 1917 (at thetime of the Venizelos provisional government in Thes-saloniki) and in 1919, but it was not until the followingdecade that it was completed by legislative action. Overthat period, almost all large estates in Greece werebroken up, and share-cropping as a manner of cultivationwas abolished. In this way, the amount of farmlandavailable multiplied, and the number and strength ofsmall and medium-sized fanners grew, thus increasingagricultural production. The experience which therefugees brought with them introduced new andprofitable crops into Macedonia, such as tobacco (es-tablished by the Greeks of Pontus) silk (by the Greeksof Eastern Thrace), and contibuted to the developementof handicrafts and craft industry (by the Greeks ofIonia),etc.

These changes took place to a greater extent inMacedonia - where 3/4 of the 800,000 hectares alottedto refugee settlement by 1927 were located - thananywhere else. It proved possible to distribute farmlandto hundreds of thousands offamilies. However, it shouldbe borne in mind that the compulsory purchase systemfunctioned neither easily nor quickly. The landlessfanners (whether refugees or not) had to claim the landawarded to them by the state by means of tough, lengthyand costly litigation against the social groups affectedby the measure or even against the administrative bar-riers set up by the bureaucratic rigidity of the civilservice. Nonetheless, the agrarian policy implemented inthe Greek countryside -and particularly in Macedonia-during the 1920s and the early 1930s was a true peacefulrevolution, one which was more radical than the landreforms of many Eastern European countries (with theexception of Soviet Russia). At all events, the agrarianquestion which had begun to emerge in Epirus andThessaly in the late 19th and early 20th century soon ranits historical course without spreading to Macedonia. Asa result, Greece never had to deal with the grave socialproblems which caused such upheaval in other countriesof Eastern and South-eastern Europe (such as Romaniaand Bulgaria) during the same period.r"

The breaking up of the large estates also altered thestructure of Greek agricultural production, which notonly increased dramatically but also gradually integrateditself into the more general mechanisms of economiclife. This development was greatly assisted by drainage,flood protection and irrigation projects (the most impor-tant of which were carried out in the plains of Thes-saloniki, Serres and Drama, and involved Lakes Yannit-sa and Kerkini), and also by the more extensive use offertilizers and new varieties of wheat, the regular sub-

\

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Thessaloniki received ill proportion the largest number of refugees following the Asia Minor disaster.

sidies paid on certain crops, and other factors. The wayto the self-sufficiency in cereals of Greece as a whole, adream for so many centuries, was now open, and condi-tions were ripe for new forms of relationship betweenfanning, conunerce and industry.The foundations of the industrialization ofMacedonia and of Greece in general were laid during theinter-war period. A number of factors contributed to this:the protectionist tariff policy of the Greek governments(and especially of the four productive years of rule byVenizelos between 1928 and 1932), reductions in thecost of agricultural produce, and an increase in thenumber of working hands (caused by the influx ofrefugees). This latter factor inevitably led to an increasedsupply of labour and caused labour costs to fall to verylow levels.The task of refugee settlement - especially in thecities - lay beyond the economic and organisationalcapacity of the Greek state. Foreign loans helped over-come these difficulties, but this tactic had an adverseeffect on the public finances, and by 1932 the Greekforeign debt exceeded the country's per capita income.Despite the frenzy of building, it proved impossible tohouse all the refugees during the inter-war period, oreven in the years which followed. The situation in Thes-saloniki was particularly acute in this respect; apart fromthe vast influx of refugees (more than 160,000 of them

in the first few months after the Asia Minor disaster), thecity had already been facing a chronic housing problemcaused by the great fire of 1917. In the major industrialcentres of Central and above all Eastern Macedonia(Thessaloniki, Kavala, Drama and Serres) the housingcrisis had a multiplicity of adverse consequences: itcaused a continuous rise in property prices, it channelledthe Greek economy into unproductive entrepreneurialactivities to which it would adhere for many decades,and although it expanded building activity it also con-tributed to the irreversible distortion of the urban fabricof the Macedonian cities."The housing crisis also resulted in extensive biton-villes in the refugee slums, which developed into reser-ves of cheap labour and also sources of social discontent.The excessive rise in the supply of labour which, as wehave already seen, caused a drop in wages and led to thedevelopment of industry (which, in effect, was taking itsfirst steps in Greece at this time),26 also exacerbatedsocial inequality. The situation was still worse in theearly 1930sas a result of the Great Depressiorr" and thesocial problems which had now become general; thesefactors, in conjunction with the October Revolution,seemed to be threatening to dislocate the social fabric ofall Europe.The crisis also had grave political consequences.Unemployment and inequality, especially among the

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impoverished refugees, favoured the rise of the Left.While social peace was tending to be restored in thecountryside, the situation took quite a different course inthe urban centres: there, the growing urban proletariat,aware of its rights in society as a whole, began to putforward dynamic claims for better living and workingconditions, for a reduction in indirect taxation and,above all, for the proper implementation and expansionoflabour legislation. The Greek governments respondedto the repeated strike action in a contradictory and oftenspasmodic manner. Indeed, the bloody clashes of May1936, during a tobacco workers' demonstration inThes-saloniki, gave Metaxas the pretext he needed for install-ing the 4th of August dictatorship, with the approval ofKing George II. Thus it was with open wounds thatMacedonia embarked upon a fresh and equally criticalperiod thatbegan with the outbreak of the Second WorldWar.The Dramatic Decade of the Forties

The position of Macedonia in the events of thetroubled decade of the 1940s differed considerably fromthat of the rest of Greece. Right from the start,Macedonia found itself at the centre of important events,as a result primarily of its geopolitical and strategicinterest. Eastern Macedonia was the basic axis of thecountry's preparations to defend itself, in view of theever-present concern in the minds ofGreek political andmilitary leaders over Bulgarian ambitions." Thes-saloniki was also seen - particularly by the FrenchGeneral Staff - as the spring-board for a new Ma-cedonian Front similar to that which had been openedduring the First World War. 29 And when the Italianforces collapsed in Epirus and Albania, Macedoniafound itself once more in the forefront of the strategicoptions first of the Greeks and British, who were or-ganizing their defence against the descending Germancolumns, and then of the German General Staff itself.Sure enough, as soon as the German attack had beenlaunched and Greece was safely in the hands of theGermans, Thessaloniki became the centre of the Germanmilitary presence in the Balkans and the most importantjunction on the lines ofcommunication between the Axisforces in South-eastern Europe and those of NorthAfrica.The very first days of the German occupationdemonstrated that Macedonia and northern Greece ingeneral were destined to experience one of the darkestperiods in their modem history, with persecution, move-ments of population, executions and the draining of thearea's economic resources. The people of Macedoniaand Western Thrace - and in particular of Thessalonikiand the other urban centres - also watched in horror asthe Nazi occupation authorities revealed the full extentof their inhumanity by annihilating the Jews of Greece.

It is estimated that between the beginning of the Germanoccupation and the summer of 1943 some 49,000 Jewswere taken from Thessaloniki to the death camps, fromwhich only a couple of thousand survivors returned. Tothevictims among the Greek Jewish population ofnorth-ern Greece one must also add the five thousand or sowho were deported from Eastern Macedonia andWestern Thrace by the Bulgarian occupation authorities,and a few thousand more who were taken from otherparts of the Macedonian hinterland. 30Wartime had other unpleasant aspects which wereunique to Macedonia and Eastern Thrace: above all, thefact that the area was under triple occupation, with aGerman zone in 'the centre, the Italians in WesternMacedonia and the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedoniaand Thrace. Among all three occupation authorities, theBulgarian was the most asphyxiating and perilous. TheBulgarians not only abolished the Greek police andadministrative services (by way of contrast to the Ger-man and Italian zones, where the Greek occupationgovernment continued to be represented) but also wentahead with compulsory movements of population, ex-plusions, imprisonment, executions and a variety ofother measures designed to terrorize the population.Their ultimate aim was to weaken the Greek presenceand gradually 'bulgarize Thrace and EasternMacedonia.3l After the summer of 1943, when Bulgariaextracted the consent of the Germans to an expansion ofits zone of control to Central and Western Macedonia,h . . d h 32t e same tactics were tne t ere, too.:

The dramatic events of May 1936 ill Thessaloniki:the mother of automobile driver Tousis over the dead

body of her SOli. .

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Thessaloniki Jews in Liberty Square, shortly before their departure for the death camps. They were subjected to physical andmoral abuse immediately after being rounded up by the Germans.

This state of affairs - as it initially manifested itselfin Eastern Macedonia and Thrace - provoked a reactionon the part of the occupation government in Athens and,more importantly, among the political, intellectual andreligious leaders of the Macedonians, but to noparticularavail. The lawful representations of the traditionalleaders were of less significance than the undergroundresistance movement which gradually developed in theBulgarian-occupied areas. The guerrilla action did not,of course, produce positive military results; indeed itprovoked bloody reprisals on the part of the Bulgarians(especiall y after the Drama rising) and intensified theirpolicy of violently altering the ethnological compositionof the population in occupied Macedonia.33 Nonethe-less, the immediacy of the threat to Greece representedby the policy of the occupying powers, together with themore general problem offreeing the country ofNazi andFascist occupation, led to the growth ingeographical andpolitical terms both of the military action of the resis-tance organisations and of their political appeal, and, atleast during 1943, increased their effectiveness.34 InSeptember 1943, the strongly-worded protests of theRallis occupation government over the terror acts of theBulgarians in Central and Western Macedonia, and,above all, the massive popular reaction caused the Ger-mans to consign the Bulgarians to a secondary role andtake over the control of the suffering areas themselves.fHowever, growing popular reaction should not be

seen in isolation from the significant role played by thesocial factor, and, consequently, by the leading positiongradually acquired within the resistance movement as awhole by the left-wing organisations, and especially bythe National Liberation Front (EAM). But while in therest of Greece the resistance struggle focused on twomain objectives - liberation and the post-war reform ofsociety, politics and the system of government - innorthern Greece it was necessary for a third objective tobe stated right from the start: the national and territorialprotection of Macedonia and Thrace from the threat ofa loss of Greek identity and dismemberment. 36 Thisfactor had a decisive effect on the attitude of publicopinion to all the resistance organisations (YBE, PAOand EAMIELAS). As a result, the almost completemonopoly which the forces of ELAS (and their mainpolitical party behind them, the Communist Party ofGreece) had managed to secure, for a variety of reasons,in the resistance movement of Greece as a whole wasnaturally challenged in Macedonia because of the ques-tionable 'Macedonian' policy which the CommunistParty had adopted before the War. From 1924 to 1934,the KKE had aligned itself with the position of theComintern on the creation of a unified Macedonia andThrace, while after 1935 it had reverted to slogans infavour of the equal status of the ethnic minorities ofMacedonia. This attitude, which had also underminedthe unity of the party and the credibility of its leaders,

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JOANNIS K. HASSI OTIS

was certainly exploited to the utmost by rival politicaland guerrilla groups, and the KKE never managed to riditself of its inter-war Iegacy"The dilemmas for the leadership of EAM/ELASgrew still greater during the critical year 1943, firstlywhen the resistance movement was forced to deal withthe terrorist activities of the pro-Bulgarian paramilitarybands in Central and, above all, Western Macedonia(and especially of the nightmarish Ohrana organisation),and, latterly, when EAM/ELAS was invited by Tito(through his special emissary Svetovar Vukmanovic-Tempo) to become part of a joint Balkan resistanceheadquarters. To begin with, EAM reacted negatively tothe Yugoslav 'invitation'. On the one hand, the co-operation proposed was tantamount to placing theEAMIELAS organisations in the general area ofMacedonia under Yugoslav command. On the other, itwould lead to the overt intervention of Yugoslav par-tisans in purely domestic Greek affairs. In both cases,the ultimate aim of the Yugoslavs seemed to be theusurpation of the Slav-speaking Greek population.Nonetheless, EAM was eventually compelled to acceptco-operation, at least, with Yugoslav and Albanian guer-rilla groups in the border areas. But this agreementproved to be fatal, for as early as late 1943 it paved theway for the formation of a particular Slav-Macedonianorganisation, SNOF. EAM hastened to break up SNOFearly in 1944, but the events which ensued - especiallyafter the declaration founding the Federative People'sRepublic of 'Macedonia' (2 August 1944) led it in-evitably into a vicious circle of co-operation and simul-taneous covert rivalry with the Yugoslavs and theirautonomist collaborators.38This development had an impact on the fate ofMacedonia during the following five years. During theCivil War, of course, the whole of Greece suffered, asmuch in the south as in the north. But once again it wasMacedonia which enjoyed the unenviable privilege ofbeing the principal battlefield in the bloody conflictbetween the 'Democratic Army' and the governmentforces, especially during the dramatic final act of theGreek national tragedy (1946-1949).39 For that reason,the price which Macedonia paid in human lives andmaterial destruction was also heavier than that of otherparts ofGreece.4o The fact that the Civil War focused onMacedonia affected the attitude of the Greek populationas a whole towards the 'Democratic Army' and the KKE.The conflict between the two sides did not simply takethe form of an ideological confrontation between 'bour-geois democracy' and 'Bolshevism': it was also'patriotic defence against the enemies of the nation'. Forthat reason, although the KKE was aware of the gravityof the accusations levelled at it by the government campduring the propaganda war between the two sides itwas41 'effectively unable to react. Even the measures of sup-pression which were adopted during that relentless war

(such as the notorious Resolution C) were designed onthe criterion of the threat to the northern provinces. Inbrief, the 'Democratic Army' and the KKE wereregarded as jointly responsible not only for the seces-sionist activity developing along the country's northernborders but also for the aggressive designs of Greece'snorthern neighbours on Macedonia.Y Given this in-heritance, it is easy to see why the traumatic post-CivilWar situation lasted longer in Macedonia than else-where. Some of the consequences of the War lingeredinto the early 1970s, ifnot even down to the present day.The Contemporary Era in Perspechive

The destructive vicissitudes of Macedonian historyduring the previous decade made reconstruction essen-tial, first and foremost, in every sphere, whethereconomic, social and ideological.f But reconstructionhad to take place on the basis of the new situation whichwar, occupation and civil war had brought about.44 As itturned out, for some decades after the end of the CivilWar much of the rural population which had gatheredvoluntarily or under pressure in the large urban centres(andparticularly inThessaloniki) as 'rebel-stricken' wasunwilling to return to the villages. As a result of thisdistorted urbanization, the late 1940s and early 1950ssaw a sharp rise in the building ofmakeshift and general-ly tasteless apartment blocks (in most cases on a quidpro quo system), a drop in agricultural production and ashift towards emigration." The pre-war industrial in-frastructure which as we have seen had begun to becreated after the First World War was amost completelydestroyed. However, the Greek governments centredtheir efforts on the already hypertrophic Athens andPiraeus area, which for quite some time had a constrain-ing effect on the prospects for industrial production inMacedonia. However, the early 1960s saw a trueeconomic lift-off in northern Greece, bringing per capitaincome in Macedonia up to the national average. Theindustrial production ofMacedonia over the same periodwas equally impressive, and it caused at least some areas- around Thessaloniki, Kozani and Kavala - to grow intoexemplary industrial zones.

Throughout the period after liberation, the urbancentres of Macedonia, and Thessaloniki in particular,had contributed much to the renewal of political life inGreece. This could probably be attributed to the general-ly innovative nature of the cultural performance ofMacedonia, as reflected in its intellectual and literaryproduction, and also, on some occasions, to its achieve-ments in science and the arts. These activities, and thevariety of factors which influenced them, were con-nected with the more general position occupied byMacedonia in the history of the wider area, both underthe Turks and in the period after liberatiori" However,they were also influenced by the unique role which, for

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TI,e port of Thessaloniki , acrucial/actor ill the developmentof Greek trade with Central and

Western Europe.historical and geographical reasons, Macedonia andThessaloniki played in linking the Greek world with theBalkans and Western Europe. This was a reciprocalprocess: the growth of Macedonia in all areas (culturaland, above all, economic) was dependent on peacefuland productive relations between Greece and her north-ern neighbours.However, the restoration of such relations presup-posed that the traumas of the 1940scould be overcome,and once again most of these were connected withMacedonia. At all events, a beginning was made withthe rift between Tito and Stalin in 1948, a developmentwhich caused Yugoslavia - taking its geopolitical posi-tion into consideration - to revive its pre-war co-opera-tion with Greece." In 1951 land communications with

Yugoslavia were re-opened, which helped restore thecommercial links with Central and Western Europe soessential for the economic development of Macedonia.Another step in this direction was taken with the reor-ganization in 1953 of the Free Zone regime in the portofThessaloniki. At about the same time, the thaw whichfollowed the death of Stalin in 1953 saw the beginningofthe gradual normalization of relations between Greeceand Bulgaria. After the 1970s, the rapprochement be-tween Athens and Sofia was strengthened by a furtherfactor: the pressure which Turkey exerted (as it con-tinues to do today) on Greece and on Bulgaria (whichhas a large Muslim minority). An improvement in rela-tions between Greece and Albania began to becomeperceptible after the restoration first of commercial links

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(1970) and subsequently of diplomatic contacts(1971 ).48 Itwas in this atmosphere of rapprochement thatthe first Balkan conference on co-operation in fanning,transport, trade, energy and the environment was held inAthens in 1976. The conference emphasized the impor-tant mediating role which Greece and, in particular,Macedonia - with its privileged position - could once. 49more play in South-eastern Europe.Despite this encouraging convergence, Greece'srelations with her Balkan neighbours have not ceased tobe overshadowed by the contradictions which historyhas left unresolved or by the new political expedienciescontained in the Pandora's box which the dissolution ofYugoslavia" has opened - in other words, by mattersalways affecting northern Greece and to Macedonia inparticular. Some of the problems which have emergedalong Greece's northern borders are connected with arange of factors which are no longer susceptible tocontrol. In my view, there are three dangerous, uncon-trolled and 'internal' destabilising factors in the area:Albanian irridentism (starting in Kosovo and movingsouth), the future status of the Skopje republic, and thecentrifugal tendency in the Muslim population of theBalkans, living in a zone which stretches from GreekThrace and southern Bulgaria to Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At first sight, Albanian irridentism seems to affectonly relations between Tirana and Belgrade. Nonethe-less, its repercussions can be expected to pose seriousdilemmas for Greece, since the Greek minority inNorthEpirus and the problems caused for Macedonia by theindependence of the Skopje republic will become in-volved in the Albanian-Serbian dispute. The state ofSkopje, with its motley and fluid ethnological andideological composition, is already riven with seces-sionist trends which originate in the large and growingAlbanian Muslim minority (amounting, at the most con-servative official estimates, to atleast 28% ofthe popula-tion). However, this autonomist movement is organical-ly and inextricably linked with the Albanian irridentistsof neighbouring Kosovo - that is, the part ofYugoslaviawhich was the starting-point for the internal ethnic con-flict that is today tearing the country apart." Thisdevelopment produced reactions similar to those of theSerbs among the Slav majority of the Skopje region,whether they call themselves 'Macedonians' or not. Thereaction of the powerful nationalist 'Democratic Partyfor the Unity of the Macedonians' (VMRO-DPNM) wasparticularly fierce. This party is the direct political des-cendant of the autonomist Bulgarian movement by thesame name -VMRO- which existed early in the 20thcentury, which iswhy, as far back as its founding charter(17 June 1990), it set as its goal the same target whichits ideological ancestors had attempted to achieve. Itsaim is the unification, by whatever means, of the 'un-redeemed Macedonian people' allegedly living, in

'slavery', in the neighbouring states of Greece, Serbia,Albania and Bulgaria. The case of Bulgaria is of par-ticular interest: it was the first country (along withTurkey) to recognize the independence of the Republicof Skopje with the clear purpose of 'protecting' its'brethren' in the lilliputian republic. On the one hand,then, the absolute Albanian majority in Kosovo is co-or-dinating itself with the Albanian minority just next doorin Skopje, while on the other Bulgaria's ill-concealedimpatience to make fresh overtures to the Bulgarian-speaking pseudo-Macedonian population in the artificialstate of Skopje, as it had done during both the First andSecond World Wars, is apparent once more.The other important and incalculable factor in thearea is that of Turkey's interference in the domesticaffairs of the Balkan countries - a factor which ismakingits presence felt to an ever increasing extent. Ankara hasalready displayed the dynamic nature of its policy in thevariety of initiatives it has developed over matters con-cerning Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Skopje and - morerecently - Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such developments arefar from good omens: Albanian irredentism and the'Macedonian-Bulgarian' rapprochement, if they bearfruit, could lead to the interpolation between Serbia andGreece, and directly about the sensitive arc of the bor-ders of Greek Macedonia, of a greater Albania and anenlarged Bulgaria. This would cleariy have serious con-sequences for Greece, and would affect the country'snorthern provinces in particular. 52Whatever course events may take, the combinedeffect of these external and internal factors in the area inquestion deprives Greece of the luxury of enjoying thepeace of mind of her partners inWestern Europe. Mem-bership of the European Community, of NATO and,more recently, of the Western European Union is litlecomfort when Greece feels powerful and multiplyingvibrations along the sensitive arc of her borders from theAdriatic to the Evros river and the islands of the EasternAegean. This is particularly true in view of the fact thatthe advantages which Greece was supposed to enjoy byvirtue of her membership of these collective Europeanbodies have so far proved incapable of guaranteeing herthe peace she needs in the East for rapid economicgrowth and the consequent acceleration of the processof long her overdue incorporation into Europe.After these unexpectedly profound and far-reachchanges in the area around Greece, what could be theprospects for Greece's relations with her neighbours -or, rather, what are the prospects for relations amongstall the peoples of South-eastern Europe? What will bethe position of Macedonia in the network of those rela-tions? In view of the extent to which the predictions ofinternational relations experts, sociologists and variouspolitical analysts have been disproved by the avalancheof change in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, it isdifficult for anyone to risk an answer to questions of such

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importance. At all events, the prospects for Greece andfor Macedonia more specifically, whatever they may be,are bound up with the relations between the northernneighbours of Greece and her partners in Europe. In themedium term, the orientation of the heirs to Yugoslaviain the direction of accession to the Community tends toencourage centrifugal tendencies among them, perhapsalso generating more regional ethnic friction. But in thelong term this orientation will tend to alleviate the acutenature which such conflict has assumed in the past.Similarly, membership of a world in which people,goods and ideologies move freely from one place toanother will inevitably cause artificial 'national' andstate formations (such as that of Skopje), which were notthe outcome of centuries of historical growth but werefabricated out of the specific post-war political cir-cumstances, to sink back into obscurity. Thus, any formof ethnic 'survival', in multi-cultural Europe will bepossible on condition that: a) it relies on a lengthy and,more importantly, constantly renewed historical tradi-tion, and b) it is organically and dynamically interwovenwith the economic, social and cultural development ofthe European family as a whole. This challenge is notaddressed only to Greece's northern neighbours: it alsoconcerns the Greek nation, and in particular that part ofit which lives in Macedonia.

Thessaloniki, past and present.

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I.K. HASSTOTISGREEK MACEDONIA SINCE LIBERATION

NOTES

1. By way of contrast, of course, with the period of Turkish rule, forwhich (down to the 1830s,at least) we have the reliable handbook byA.E. Vakalopoulos (History of Macedonia 1354-1830, Thessaloniki1973, in Greek). Only a small part of the valuable collective workMacedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization (ed. M.Sakellariou, Athens 1990) is devoted to Macedonian history sinceliberation.2. For a description, see the sample bibliography at the end of thisvolume.3. What was in effect the first interdisciplinary seminar of this kindwas held in early November 1985 by the Municipality of Thes-saloniki. The proceedings were published a year later uder the titleThessaloniki Since 1912, Thessaloniki 1986 (in Greek).4.For the first decade after the War, see H. Fleischer and S.Bowman,Greece in the 1940s. A Bibliographical Companion, Hanover &London 1981, which contains a considerable number of entries onMacedonia.5.This principle applies at least totheHistorical Archives of the GreekMinistry for Foreign Affairs, the most systematic and - for that reason-the most important centre for the documentation of modem Greekpolitical history today.6. Brief descriptions were published in the periodical Mnimon, no. 13(1991): Amalia Pappa-Karapidaki, 'The Historical Archive ofMacedonia. Contents', 310-327; E. Machairidou, 'The Archives ofthe Prefecture ofXanthi', 309; Triantaphyllia Kourtoumi, 'The Ar-chives of the Government-General of Northern Greece', 342-345;Dimitris Kastanidis, 'The Archives of the Bank of the East. I.Thes-saloniki Branch. II. Monastir Agency', 327-330; Kaiti Papado-poulou-Giorgos Kalantzis, 'The Archives of the AutonomousProvisioning Service of Macedonia' ,330- 334; Kaiti Papadopoulou-Giorgos Kalantzis, 'The Archives of the Provisioning Service ofMacedonia (1945-1948)" 334-342 (all in Greek). See also KostasKampouridis, 'The Permanent Local History Archive of Kozani andthe Ottoman Archive Material', Yearbook of the General Archives ofState, Library of the General Archives of State, no. 19, Athens 1991,73-76 (in Greek).7. See, for example, B. Kondis, British and American Policy and theProblem of Greece, 1945-1949, Thessaloniki 1986 (in Greek), which

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contains separate chapters on Macedonia. Cf. the archival documen-tation provided by the various chapters in this volume referring to thepost-war period of Macedonian polit ical history.8. The doubts cast on historical works by irresponsible and non-academic critics who, in the name of objectivity, in fact aim to servetheir own purposes (usually of a blatantly party politicalnature) are,of course, in a different category. The most typical example of thiscategory is to be found in the mishaps which befell the collectivehistorical work Thessaloniki, 2300 Years (Municipality of Thes-saloniki, Thessaloniki 1985): after first being pilloried in public as'not objective' by the opponents of the municipal authorities then inpower (who had been responsible for the book) during a period oflocal elections, it was hidden away in a warehouse by its critics whenthey came to power. Presumably it will have to wait until there isanother change in local authorities before it can be 'rehabilitated' andput back in circulation.9. In this respect, the following works are of interest: the early andcontroversial work by Anathasios I.Chrysochoos, The Occupation inMacedonia, 6 vols., Thessaloniki 1949-1952 (in Greek), and, from theopposing side, Thanasis Hatzis, The Victorious Revolution that wasLost, 1941-1945,3 vols. , Athens 1977-1979, Thanasis Mitsopoulos ,In the Mountains 0 / Macedonia: the 30th Regiment 0 / ELAS, Athens.'1980, and the Memoirs of Markos Vapheiadis, 4 vols., Athens 1984-1992 (all in Greek). Cf. the equally polemical text by Achilleus A.Kyrou, The Conspiracy Against Macedonia, 1940-1949, Athens 1950(in Greek). For the significance and credibility of the volumes ofmemoirs concerning Macedonia during the crucial period of theOccupation and the Resistance movement, see the level-headed ob-servations of Evangelos Kofos in 'The Balkan Dimension of theMacedonian Question during the Occupation and the Resistance',Proceedings 0 / the International Historical Conference on Greece,1936-1944, Athens 1989, pp. 418-471; bibliography in pp. 451-463(in Greek).10. When the defeated Ottoman representatives signed the Treaty ofLondon in May of the following year, they accepted the finality oftheir loss of almost all their Balkan territories, with the exception ofEastern Thrace, which they re-occupied during the Second Balkan

War that followed. On the other hand, the Porte exploited the oppor-tunity represented by the breakdown in the London negotiationscaused by the hostilities between the countries which had until recent-ly been allies to deny Greece her sovereign rights over the islands ofthe Eastern Aegean, which had already been occupied by the Greekfleet. This outstanding dispute plunged the two countries into a navalarms race which would inevitably have led to renewed militaryconflict if the outbreak of the First World War had not supervened.Cf in this respect B. Kondis, 'The Problem of the Aegean Islands onthe Eve of World War I and Great Britain', Greece and Great Britainduring World War I, Thessaloniki 1985, pp. 49-63.1I. For the importance of this treaty, see the proceedings of the specialsymposium held on 16-18 November 1988 by the Institute for BalkanStudies, published as The Treaty of Bucharest and Greece; 75 Yearsfrom the Liberation of Macedonia, Thessaloniki 1990 (in Greek).12. For the corresponding settlement of the borders between Greeceand Serbia, agreed between the two countries before the outbreak ofthe Second World War, see Georgia Ioannidou-Bitsiadou, 'TheGreek-Serbian Rapprochement and the Settlement of the Greek-Ser-bian Borders', in The Treaty of Bucharest, pp. 71-98.13. See A. Tachos, The Contribution 0/ the Greek Administration tothe Regeneration of the New Lands. Personalities above Institutions,Thessaloniki 1979 (in Greek).14. S.T. Lascaris, Diplomatic History ofContemporary Europe (1914-1939), Thessaloniki 1954, pp. 22-29, 39-45 (in Greek).15. Useful information about this propaganda and about the equallydangerous Serbian activities, especialy in Western Macedonia, is tobe found in the (as yet unpublished) post-graduate dissertation byKonstantina Zachopoulou-Apostolidi, French Policy and ForeignPropaganda in Macedonia (1914-1918), Thessaloniki 1990, pp. 22-42,45-61,63-81 (in Greek).16. For the fears among the leaders of the putsch, see P.V. Petridis,Foreign Dependency and National Policy (1910-1918), Thessaloniki1981, pp. 340ff(in Greek).17. Numerical data about the exchanges will be found in S. Ladas,The Exchange ofMinorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York1932, pp. 122-123. For the consequences, see Dimitri Pentzopoulos,

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22 IOANNIS K. HASSIOTISI'

ei!!dlf~OyJH'I

Souvenir de Salonlque (Greee)

The Balkan Exchange ofMinorities and its Impact upon Greece, Paris1962, pp. 60-61, 125ff. Cf. also A. Tounta-Fergadi, Greek-BulgarianMinorities: the Politis-Kalfov Protocol, 1924-1925, Thessaloniki1986 (in Greek), pp. 35, 38-39.18. S. Ladas, op. cit., pp. 14-17. Cf. Yannis G. Mourelos, 'The 1914Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minoritiesbetween Greece and Turkey', Balkan Studies 2612 (1985), 389-413,and, by the same author, 'Population Realignments after the BalkanWars: the First Attempt at an Exchange of Populations betweenGreece and Turkey', The Treaty of Bucharest, pp. 175-190, andTounta-Fergadi, op. cit., pp. 26-28.19. A total of seventeen waves of migration to and from Asia Minorhave been counted between 1912 and 1923: Tounta-Fergadi, op. cit.,p. 27, note 22.20. For this event, which was of decisive importance for Macedoniaand for Greece as a whole, see Pentzopoulos, op. cit., pp. 51-60, 61ff.21. Ibid., pp. 132-136; see also the ethnological tables between pp.136 and 137.22. According to the official statistics of the League of Nations:Pentzopoulos, op. cit., p. 134. Cf E. Kofos, Nationalism and Com-munism in Macedonia, Thessaloniki 1964, p. 83.23. Estimates for the whole country are provided by Pentzopoulos,op. cit., pp. 143-167,199-212.24. Cf. G.D. Jackson, 'Peasant Political Movements in EasternEurope', in Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change,RE. Landsberger (ed.), 1974, pp. 259-315.25. For the urban planning development of Thessaloniki, see. V.Hastaoglou - A. Karadimou-Gerolympou, 'Thessaloniki 1890-1940:From the Contradictions of Cosmopolitanism to the Uniformity of theModem Greek City', in Thessaloniki Since j912, pp. 449-474. Cf. thedoctoral thesis of A. Karadimou-Gerolympou, The Redesigning andReconstruction of Thessaloniki after the Fire of 1917, Thessaloniki1985 (in Greek).26. For the role of the refugees in this development, see MargaritaDitsa, 'Refugees and Industrialisat ion' in Eleutherios Venizelos.Society, Economy and Politics in hisAge, T. Veremis and G.Goulimis(eds.), Athens 1989, pp. 27-70 (in Greek).

27. K. Kostis, 'The Greek Economy in the Years of Crisis, 19

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of the National Resistance, 1941-1945, Athens 1983, pp. 252-254 (inGreek). Cf. also Kofos, 'The Balkan Dimension', op. cit., p. 422.35. Ibid., pp. 422-424.36. Ibid., p. 419.37. Ibid.., pp. 420 and 452-453, note 12.38. On these questions, see Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, pp.121ff, and 'The Balkan Dimension', op. cit., pp. 434-444.39. Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, op. cit ., pp. 164fT.40. In general, the three years of civil war in Greece cost more humanlives than the Greek-Italian and Greek-German wars put together;Kofos,op. cit., pp. 185-186.41. Kofos, op. cit., pp. 22-23, which contains the relevant quotations .42. N. Alivizatos, 'The State of Emergency' in Greece in the 1940s,Athens 1984, pp. 397ff(in Greek).43. For the factors which influenced the ideological shift in Greeksociety after the Civil War, see Constantine Tsoukalas, 'The Ideologi-cal Impact of the Civil War' in Greece in the 1940s, pp. 561-594.44. Quite a number of proposals for the reorientation of the Greekeconomy were made before the end of the Civil War, but none of themwas ever implemented; see, for example, X. Zolotas, EconomicReconstruction and National Survival, Athens 1948 (in Greek) .45. Between 1960 and 1976, Federal Germany alone received 623,320'guest-workers' from Greece, most of them from northern Greece.During the 1960s there was a rapid increase in the annual volume ofemigration (once more with the rural areas of Macedonia as its maingeographical source). This demographic haemorrhage oustripped thenatural increase in the Greek population, over the years 1963-1965 atleast. For the numbers and the host countries of the Greek emigrants,see I.K. Hassiotis, 'Continuity and Change in the Modem GreekDiaspora', Journal of Modem Hellenism, 6 (1989) , 9-24.46. For these factors, which were perceptible above all in the historyof Thessaloniki, see Tolis Kazantzis, The Prose-Writing of Thes-saloniki, 1912-1983, Thessaloniki 1991, pp. 14-18, 33-36 (in Greek).Cf. also I.K. Hassiotis, 'Landmarks and Principal Features of theHistory of Thessaloniki', Nea Estia 118 no. 1403 (Christmas 1985),142-145 (in Greek).47. The restoration of Greek -Yugoslav relations was speeded up underthe pressure of the British and American governments and led in 1954,

with the participation of Turkey, to the Tripartite Balkan Pact. For thefirst attempts at a rapprochement, see I. Stefanidis, 'United States,Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav Rapprochement, 1949-1950',Balkan Studies, 27/2 (1986), 315-343. Although this tripartite mil itaryand political alliance lapsed within only a year (as a result of thesuccessive Greek-Turkish crises after 1955), bilateral co-operationbetween Greece and Yugoslavia continued down to the present. Untilrecently, the friction on the level of diplomatic relations was slight,and was caused by what appeared at the time to be the harmlessprovocations of Skopje.48. Nonetheless, Greek-Albanian relations did not effectively beginto improve until August 1987, when Greece unilaterally declared theend of the peculiar state of war which had existed between the twocountr ies since 1940.49. For the economic relations between Greece and the Eastern-bloccountries in the post-war and contemporary periods, see specializedstudies such as those of Sotiris Vaiden (e.g. Greece and the EasternCountries, 1950- 1967. Economic Relations and Politics, Athens1991, in Greek) and T. Tsiovaridou, 'Council for Mutual EconomicAssistance and Socialist Integration. The Case of Balkan Countries' ,Balkan Studies 27/2 (1986), 353-367.50. It is still too early to evaluate this major crisis. For some initialeye-witness conclusions, see L. Hatziprodromidis, Yugoslavia: TheNationalist Outburst, Athens 1991. A more searching analysis isundertaken in the collective work The Balkans at the Crossroads ofDevelopments (ed. C. Giallouridis and S. Aleiphantis), Athens 1988(in Greek), and, from a different perspective, by Tasos Fi laniotis- Had-zianastasiou,.The Balkan Volcano. The Balkans after the Cold War,Athens 1992 (all in Greek).51. For a detailed analysis of the economic and social problem ofKosovo as it is articulated with the other republics of former Yugos-lavia, see M. Roux, 'Le trois crises de la Yougoslavia', Herodote, no.48/1 (1988), 107-126. On the current minority problems in the areamore generally, see K. Manolopoulou-Varvitsioti , ContemporaryMinority Problems in the Balkans, Athens 1985 (in Greek).52. In this respect, see I.K. Hassiotis, 'La Grecia e i suoi antagonisti',Euros, year 2, no. 112, Palermo, Jan-Feb 1992,73-74 (in Spanish inp.p. 150-153).

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