The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 6 | Issue 7 | Jul 02, 2008

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MAD: Ten Years of the Bomb and the Obstacles to Peace inSouth Asia

MV Ramana, Zia Mian

MAD: Ten Years of the Bomb and theObstacles to Peace in South Asia

Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana

As the current Indian Prime MinisterManmohan Singh risks his administration on abid to override massive public opposition toentering into a nuclear power deal with theUnited States, hyped as an "historic" accordthat will emancipate India's economy and boostits international status, Japan Focus examines adecade of India-Pakistan maneuvering foradvantage in the South Asian nuclearsweepstakes. MS

We in America are living amongmadmen. Madmen govern ouraffairs in the name of order andsecurity. The chief madmen claimthe titles of general, admiral,senator, scientist, administrator,secretary of state, even president. .. . Soberly, day after day, themadmen continue to go throughthe undeviat ing motions ofmadness: motions so stereotyped,so commonplace, that they seemthe normal motions of normal men,not the mass compulsions ofpeople bent on total death. Withouta public mandate of any kind, themadmen have taken it uponthemselves to lead us by gradualstages to that final act of madnesswhich will corrupt the face of theearth.

Lewis Mumford (1946), inresponse to the American atomicbombing of Hiroshima andNagasaki and the announcement ofadditional nuclear weapons tests.

The tenth anniversaries of the May 1998 Indianand Pakistani nuclear weapons tests weremuted in both countries. Neither staged officialceremonies to commemorate the tests, whilepublic events were few and drew little support.India’s Press Information Bureau issued astatement on what it called “NationalTechnology Day,” recalling May 11, 1998, as“the defining moment in the growth oftechnology prowess,” but making no mention ofthe nuclear tests.[1] Pakistan’s foreign affairsministry released a short statement to mark theanniversary, calling them a “historic day in thenation’s quest for security.”[2] It was all a farcry from both countries' official exultation andpublic jubilation at the time of the tests.

This article reviews nuclear weapons relateddevelopments in south Asia since 1998. Westart by looking briefly at diplomatic efforts tomanage nuclear dangers, the role of nuclearweapons in India-Pakistan crises after the tests,and the subsequent planning and preparationsfor fighting a nuclear war. We describe thedevelopments in the nuclear weaponscommand structures, the testing anddeployment of missiles to carry these weapons,and the current status of the production offissile materials (plutonium and highly enricheduranium) for nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Denial

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One striking feature of years since the May1998 nuclear tests is the growing disconnectbetween nuclear realities and the twocountries' ongoing peace process. Leaders inboth nations behave as if the bomb theynurture is marginal to the peace process theyclaim to be taking forward, even though thenuclear weapons policies they promote at homeare geared toward destroying the othercountry.

The trend started at the February 1999 Lahoremeeting between Indian prime minister A. B.Vajpayee and Pakistani prime minister NawazSharif. While the Lahore Declaration promised“immediate steps for reducing the risk ofaccidental or un authorised use of nuclearweapons” and “measures for confidencebuilding in the nuclear and conventional fields,aimed at prevention of conflict,” the actualcommitments by the two countries amounted tovery limited transparency measures (Mian andRamana 1999). Subsequent talks went nofurther and of fered s teps that wereinsignificant in the face of the nuclear crisesthat the two countries had gone through andthe arms race underway between them (Mianet al. 2001; Mian, Nayyar and Ramana 2004).

Vajpayee (left) and Sharif (right) in a 1998 meeting.

The continued unwillingness to grapple with

the bomb was revealed most recently in theMay 2008 meeting of the India's and Pikistan'sforeign ministers in Islamabad. Their jointstatement said “the talks were held in afriendly and constructive atmosphere” and thatthey “resolved to carry forward the peaceprocess and to maintain its momentum.”[3] Theministers noted “a number of importantbilateral achievements,” including amemorandum of understanding to allow moreair travel between the two countries, anagreement for trucks to cross at the Wagah-Attari border, and an accord to allow the Delhi-Lahore bus to make one additional weekly trip.The 2007 agreement on “Reducing the Riskfrom Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons”only made number four on the l is t ofachievements.

But this is to be expected. Almost 10 yearsafter nuclear talks commenced, all there is toshow are an agreement to inform each otherabout missile tests and a nuclear hotline in caseof accidents. This suggests a failure of bothimagination and political will to seriouslyengage with the nuclear danger. The peaceprocess does not seem to recognise that since1998, there has been a war and a majormilitary crisis, both prominently featuringnuclear threats (Ramana and Mian 2003).

Nuclear denial in South Asia is not a symptomof inattention, or passivity in the face of anoverwhelming problem. It is deliberateblindness to the contradiction between wordand deed. Pakistan and India talk of peacewhile pouring scarce resources into developingtheir nuclear arsenals, the infrastructure forproducing and using them, and doctrines aimedat fighting nuclear war. As the two states laythe technical and organisational basis for whatwas aptly labelled during the superpower coldwar as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD),the foreign ministers’ joint statement couldonly manage to agree that “The Expert Groupson Nuclear and Conventional CBMs [confidencebuilding measures] should consider existing

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and additional proposals by both sides with aview to developing further confidence buildingmeasures in the nuclear and conventionalfields.”

The nuclear arms race is part of a largermilitary buildup since the tests. Contrary tonuclear weapons advocates' claims thatbuilding nuclear weapons reduce conventionalmilitary expenditures,[4] actual figures for bothcountries show significant and consistentincreases (see table 1). In both countries,spending on nuclear weapons programs isspread across various departments and is notpublicly accounted for.

Table 1: Military Expenditure in India and Pakistan,1998–2005 (Local Currency, Current Prices for

Calendar Years).

Lacking the capacity to build many majorconventional weapons systems for themselves,the two countries have been investing heavilyin importing arms from various countries. Table2 indicates the amount of money India andPakistan have spent between 1998 and 2006.Much more is in the pipeline. A September2007 U.S. Congressional Research Servicereport noted that in 2006, Pakistan was rankedfirst among third-world countries in terms ofthe value of arms purchase agreements, havingsigned $5.1-billion worth of such agreements.India was ranked second with $3.5-billionworth of arms purchase agreements (Grimmett2007).

Table 2: Indian and Pakistani Arms Imports,1998–2006 (in Millions of U.S.$ at Constant 1990

Prices)

The high levels of military expenditure andarms purchases go hand-in-hand withwidespread poverty and misery in bothcountries, and a continued reliance, especiallyin Pakistan, on international development aidto help provide basic services such ashealthcare and education.

Crossing Nuclear thresholds

Nuclear weapons advocates have alwayspromised that nuclear weapons would preventwar, if not bring peace. The simple argumentwas that fearing destruction by the other side’snuclear weapons, no country would risk war.Within a year of the tests, however, India andPakistan went to war in the Kargil region ofKashmir. Although geographically limited, thewar claimed perhaps several thousand lives.

Indian forces in Kargil.

Air strikes were mounted for the first timesince the 1971 war. Nuclear weapons served toencourage senior Indian and Pakistani officialsto issue nuclear threats; by one reckoning, atleast 13 indirect and direct nuclear threatswere made (Bidwai and Vanaik 1999, vii). Thecrisis was not resolved by nuclear threats or

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mutual diplomacy. Pakistan sought Americanintervention to stop the fighting and to helpresolve the Kashmir dispute. Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif is described as becoming“desperate” in his appeals for help and flew toWashington to meet with U.S. president BillClinton (Riedel 2002). Clinton refused tobecome involved unless Pakistan withdrew itsforces from Kargil without preconditions, andconfronted Sharif with the information that thePakistani army had mobilized its nuclear-tippedmissiles. Sharif reportedly seemed “takenaback” when confronted with this fact, andargued that India was likely to be doing thesame, but denied having given the order to armPakistan’s missiles. Failing to get support fromthe U.S. for a face-saving end to the fighting,Pakistan agreed to an immediate withdrawal.

A December 2001 militant attack on theparliament building in Delhi triggered anothercrisis. Over half a million troops, about two-thirds of them Indian, were moved to thePakistani border. Senior officials and politiciansin both countries invoked nuclear weapons onseveral occasions. Prime Minister Vajpayeewarned: “no weapon would be spared in self-defence. Whatever weapon was available, itwould be used no matter how it wounded theenemy” (Shukla 2002). Many around the worldrightly feared the worst.

The 1999 and 2001–02 military confrontationsoffer important lessons. The first lesson is that,having nuclear weapons at hand, leaders inboth India and Pakistan are willing to use themto make threats during a crisis to try to force aresolution on their own terms and to inciteinternational attention and intervention. This isa way to use nuclear weapons withoutdetonating them. As Daniel Ellsberg pointedout, “a gun is used when you point it atsomeone’s head in a direct confrontation,whether or not the trigger is pulled” (Ellsberg1981).

Kargil also showed that nuclear weapons have

changed the calculus of risk for generals andpolicymakers. The late Benazir Bhutto revealedthat in 1996, Pakistani generals had presentedplans for a Kargil-style operation, which shevetoed (Anonymous 2000). It would seem thatthe 1998 tests convinced Pakistan's leadersthat the operation might be feasible withnuclear weapons to restrict any possiblydecisive Indian riposte. The Kargil war wasseen in very different ways by two countries'leaders. For Pakistan, Kargil represented proofthat its nuclear weapons would prevent Indiafrom launching a massive military attack. ForIndia, Kargil meant that it would have to findways of waging limited war that would not leadto the eventual use of nuclear weapons.Although it did not develop into war, a numberof factors make the 2001–02 crisis a moredangerous portent for the future than theKargil war. Unlike Kargil, where Pakistanclearly lost, especially politically, both sidesclaimed victory in 2002. Some in India seePresident Pervez Musharraf's promise that hewould rein in Pakistan-based militantorganisations as proof that Indian "coercivediplomacy" worked despite Pakistan havingnuclear weapons. In Pakistan, some see nuclearweapons having deterred India from crossingthe border, despite its huge buildup of forcesand threats to attack militant camps inPakistan. That a massive military confrontationwith strong nuclear overtones is seen by bothsides as a victory increases the likelihood thatsimilar incidents will occur in the future.

While Pakistan's leaders stress their nuclearweapons' utility in 1999 and 2001–02, Indianleaders have made a point of denying a role forsuch threats. Prime Minister Vajpayee claimedthat the 2001-02 crisis showed that India hadsuccessfully called Pakistan's nuclear bluff(Vanaik 2002). General V. P. Malik, formerchief of army staff, stated that nuclear weaponswere largely irrelevant and played no deterrentrole during the Kargil war or the 2002 crisis.This position was echoed by other senior Indianmilitary officials (Mehta 2003). Responding to

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Pakistan's strategy of using nuclear threats toincite international intervention, in 2004 theIndian army adopted a new and dangerous wardoctrine called "Cold Start" — which aims togive India the ability to "shift from defensive tooffensive operations at the very outset of aconflict, relying on the element of surprise andnot giving Pakistan any t ime to bringdiplomatic leverages into play vis-a-vis India"(Pant 2007). The offensive operations wouldinvolve a very quick, decisive attack across theborder with Pakistan and, some analysts argue,to "bring about a favourable war termination, afavourite scenario being to cut Pakistan intotwo at its midriff" (Ahmed 2004). The strike ismeant to be so swift and decisive that it would"preempt a nuclear retaliation" (IE 2006).

India carried out a trial version of this tactic inMay 2006 with a major military exercise closeto the Pakistani border (ToI 2006). The sangheshakti (joint power) exercise brought togetherstrike aircraft, tanks, and more than 40,000soldiers from the Second Strike Corps in a wargame whose purpose an Indian commanderdescribed as "test[ing] our 2004 war doctrineto dismember a not-so-friendly nationeffectively and at the shortest possible time"(DN 2006). General Daulat Shekhawat,commander of the corps explained that "Wefirmly believe that there is room for a swiftstrike even in case of a nuclear attack, and it isto validate this doctrine that we conducted thisoperation" (IANS 2006).

Such a policy's danger is that Pakistanigenerals are likely to adopt policies that involveusing their nuclear weapons early in theconflict, rather than lose both the weapons andthe war. And sure enough, for their part,Pakistani military planners have been publiclylaying out various "red lines" that might resultin their use of nuclear weapons. General KhalidKidwai, Pakistani Army Strategic Plans Divisiondirector, has explained that Pakistan might beforced to use nuclear weapons if: (1) Indiaattacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its

territory; (2) India destroys a large part ofPakistan's armed forces; (3) India imposes aneconomic blockade or limits access to riverwaters; or (4) India creates political instabilityor large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan(Martellini and Cotta-Ramusino 2002).

The two military plans carry are potentiallycatastrophic if they encounter each other onthe battlefield. Indian generals may hope for,and promise their leaders, a decisive butlimited attack that will not trigger Pakistan'suse of nuclear weapons.[5] But in any crisis,inadvertent or deliberate escalation is always arisk. Nuclear thresholds might well be crossedwithout anyone actually intending to, bymistake, by one side misunderstanding whatthe other is planning and doing, or in the heatof the moment. The Kargil war offers examples.In Pakistan, Sharif did not know what hisgenerals were doing. In India, concerns aboutescalation gave way to a perceived need toprevail as the Cabinet Committee on Security(CCS) recommended against using airpower,fearing that it would enlarge the scope of theconflict, only to reconsider its decision and givethe go-ahead after a week of ground fightingbrought no gains (Ganguly and Hagerty 2005,154).

Planning Mass Destruction

All nuclear-armed states learn quickly thathaving the bomb and the will to threaten to useit are not enough. It only functions as a threatwhen the adversary believes it can be used asintended. It must take on all the attributes of aweapon. Since 1998, India and Pakistan haveset up formal organisational structures to planand manage their use of nuclear weapons.

India

Some months after ordering the nuclear tests,India's Bharatiya Janata Party government setup a National Security Council, which includeda National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).[6]

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In August 1999, the NSAB released its draftreport on a nuclear doctrine (DND) for India(NSAB 1999). In January 2003, the Indiangovernment's cabinet committee on nationalsecurity published a brief official statement onthe nuclear doctrine (PMO 2003). Therelationship between the two has beenelucidated by the first convenor of the NSAB,who argued that the latter document showsthat "the cabinet committee on nationalsecurity has . . . accepted the draft nucleardoctrine" (Subrahmanyam 2003). The DNDechoes nuclear weapon states' postures. Itdeclared: "India shall pursue a doctrine ofcredible minimum nuclear deterrence."According to the DND, this pursuit requires:

(1) sufficient, survivable andoperationally prepared nuclearforces;(2)a robust command and controlsystem;(3) effective intelligence and early-warning capabilities;(4) planning and training fornuclear operations; and(5) the will to employ nuclearweapons.

These nuclear forces are to be deployed on atriad of delivery vehicles of “aircraft, mobileland-based missiles and sea-based assets” thatare structured for “punitive retaliation” so as to“inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.”The DND called for an “assured capability toshift from peactime deployment to fullyemployable forces in the shortest possibletime.” The three armed-service headquarterswere subsequently reported to be “drawing updetailed schemes for inducting a variety ofnuclear armaments and ancillary and supportequipment in their orders-of-battle . . . [and]appropriate command and control frameworks”(Karnad 2002, 108).

The Indian government’s formal embrace of anuclear deterrence doctrine is in markedcontrast with previous governments' publicpositions. As recently as 1995, at theInternational Court of Justice (the “WorldCourt”), India’s representative describednuclear deterrence as “abhorrent to humansentiment since it implies that a state ifrequired to defend its own existence will actwith pitiless disregard for the consequences toits own and adversary’s people.”

Apart from basic strategic and ethical problemswith deterrence, the notion that there is or canbe a stable “minimum deterrent” is unfounded.It is not enough to put up a “beware of thenuclear weapons” sign for all to read and takeheed. Nuclear history suggests that what seemsacceptable to one leadership may seemintolerable to another and may depend oncircumstances. In a telling observation, GeneralThomas Power, U.S. Strategic Air Commandhead, observed in 1960 that “The closest to oneman who would know what the minimumdeterrent is would be [Soviet leader] Mr.Khrushchev, and frankly I don’t think he knowsfrom one week to another. He might be able toabsorb more punishment next week than hewants to absorb today. Therefore a deterrent isnot a concrete or finite amount” (Schwartz1998).

We leave it to the reader to consider how, ifgiven the responsibility, to determine thenumber of cities he or she would be willing todestroy to produce a deterrent effect in anothercountry's leadership. Would they consider itsufficient to threaten to destroy Islamabad,Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabadfor Pakistan’s generals to be deterred? And,conversely, how many Indian cities would theybe willing to see destroyed before they wouldbe deterred — would risking the destruction ofDelhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, andBangalore be sufficient? Despite governmentplans, there is no prospect of an effective civildefence against such a nuclear attack

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(Rajaraman, Mian and Nayyar 2004). Table 3gives estimates for the casualties that wouldresult from a nuclear attack with just oneHiroshima-sized weapon on each of these cities(McKinzie et al. 2001).

Table 3: Estimated Nuclear Casualties in MajorIndian and Pakistani Cities.

Recognising that the word “minimum” has littleor no meaning in the context of nucleardeterrence, it is not surprising that India’snuclear doctrine documents do not assign anumber to the term, minimum. Nor do mostnuclear strategists or policymakers.[7] If onewere to go by public articles by some of thedoctrine's authors, the planned arsenal couldnumber hundreds of nuclear weapons, andinclude several d i f ferent types. Thenegotiations on the Indo-U.S. nuclear dealsuggest that Indian policymakers seem to beinterested in having the option to build upstocks of nuclear weapons material to allow forsuch a large arsenal (Mian et al. 2006).

India’s nuclear doctrine affirms a commitmentto no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons in aconflict. Many aver that this is proof India doesnot intend to attack anyone with its nuclearweapons, and that its weapons are meant as adefence. However, this may be harder toimplement in a crisis than its supporters claimand may not be convincing to others in any

case. In a conflict between two nuclear-armedstates, a strict NFU policy would entail waitingfor the other’s bomb to explode beforeresponding. Experience suggests policymakersmay not be planning to do so. In February2000, responding to threats of a Pakistaninuclear attack, Prime Minister Vajpayee said,“If they think we will wait for them to drop abomb and face destruction, they are mistaken”(Gardner 2000). Pakistan claims that India’sNFU position is not credible. Pakistan’sambassador to the United Nations Conferenceon Disarmament has argued that “India itselfplaces no credibility in ‘no-first-use’. If it did, itshould have accepted China’s assurance of ‘no-first-use’ and of non-use of nuclear weaponsagainst non-nuclear weapon states. This wouldhave obviated the need for India’s nuclearweapons acquisition” (Akram 1999). India hasput conditions on its NFU policy in its nucleardoc t r ine . I t expanded the range o fcircumstances that could draw a nuclearresponse to include attacks with chemical andbiological weapons (CBW). This caveat aboutCBW attacks may well be the first step tocompletely repudiating the NFU policy. The2003 nuclear doctrine statement also includeda description of the organisations set up tomanage the nuclear and missile arsenals. Thesewere to be under a two-layered structure calledthe Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), whichcomprises the political council, chaired by theprime minister, and the executive council,chaired by the national security adviser to theprime minister. The political council is the solebody able to authorise the use of nuclearweapons. However, “arrangements foralternate chains of command for retaliatorynuclear strikes in all eventualities” are alsomentioned; that is, it anticipates contingenciesin which someone other than the primeminister may have to, and will be able to, orderthe use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan

The organisation responsible for formulating

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policy and exercising control over thedevelopment and Pakistan’s nuclear weaponsuse is the National Command Authority (NCA).Created in February 2000, the NCA has threecomponents: the Employment ControlCommittee (ECC), the Development ControlCommittee (DCC) and the Strategic PlansDivision (SPD). The military’s representativesare in a majority in all of them. The authority ismeant to be chaired by the prime minister ashead of government. But, in December 2007,Musharraf issued the NCA ordinance, whichgave official cover to the body, removed it fromany legal challenge, and made him (aspresident) the chairman. The authority has“complete command and control over research,development, production and use of nuclearand space technologies and , , , the safety andsecurity of all personnel, facilities, information,installations or organisations.”[8] The ECCincludes the head of the government andincludes the cabinet ministers of foreign affairs,defence and interior; the chairman of the jointchiefs of staff committee (CJCSC); the militaryservice chiefs; the director-general of SPD (asenior army officer), who acts as secretary; andtechnical advisers. This committee is thought tohave been charged with making nuclearweapons policy, including the formulation ofpolicy on the decision to use nuclear weapons.Pakistan’s conditions for use of its nuclearweapons have been outlined above.

The DCC manages the nuclear weapon complexand the development of nuclear weaponsystems. It has the same military and technicalmembers as the employment committee, butlacks the cabinet ministers that represent theother parts of government. The DCC is chairedby the head of the government and includes theCJCSC (as its deputy chairman), the militaryservice chiefs, the director-general of the SPDand representatives of the weapon research,development and production organisations.These organisations include the A Q Khanresearch laboratory in Kahuta, the PakistanAtomic Energy Commission, and the National

Engineering and Scientific Commission (whichis responsible for weapons development).

The SPD was established in the joint servicesheadquarters under the CJCSC and is led by asenior army officer (who continues to lead itafter his retirement). It has responsibility forplanning and coordination and, in particular,for establishing the lower tiers of the commandand contro l system and i ts phys ica linfrastructure.

The 2003 revelations that while he wasuranium enrichment program head, A. Q. Khanhad been selling and sharing enrichmenttechnology and weapons information with Iran,Libya, North Korea, and perhaps others haveraised important questions about Pakistan’scontrol over its nuclear complex. The U.S. hasbeen helping Pakistan secure its nuclearweapons complex. This has involved supply ofabout $100 million worth of support andequipment since September 11, 2001, includingintrusion detectors and ID systems, and nucleardetection equipment.

The Machinery of Mass Destruction

The most visible sign of the growing capabilityof the respective nuclear complexes is thefrequent testing of a diverse array of nuclear-capable missiles. Some of these tests are nowcarried out by military units rather thanscientists and engineers, and implies somemissiles are deployed as military systems withattendant command and control structures.India has also developed or otherwise acquiredcomponents of an early warning system and ananti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system(Ramana, Rajaraman and Mian 2004).

The development of missiles carries grave risksin South Asia. Geography makes ballisticmissile flight times from India or Pakistan tothe other country’s cities as short as fiveminutes and possible warning times would beshorter (Mian, Rajaraman, and Ramana 2003).

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There would be no time at all for decision-makers to check the facts, to assess thesituation, to consult, or weigh options. Therewill be pressure to move to a planned,predetermined, response. If such a responseinvolved launch on warning, a posture thatmight have military backing (Ramana 2003),there would be a significant possibility ofaccidental nuclear war.

India

India has been developing land-based missilesand missiles that can be fired from sea,including from submarines. It also has aircraftable to drop nuclear bombs.

The main land-based nuclear delivery system isthe Agni series of missiles. Work on the Agnistarted as part of the Integrated Guided MissileDevelopment Program in 1983, but the missilehas been substantially redesigned since the1998 nuclear tests. The early Agni had bothsolid and liquid propellants and was neverdeployed.

An Agni missile.

Chronologically, the first of the missilescurrently in the arsenal is Agni-2 with a rangeof 2,500 km. This missile's first test was in April1999 and the second test was in January 2001(Mehta 2004). The third test was conducted inAugust 2004 with participation from the armedforces (Subramanian 2005). In October 1999,

Agni-1 was “undertaken as a crash project . . .to cover the gap in range between the Prithvi-2(250 km) and the Agni-2 (2,500 km)” missiles.The missile was first tested in January 2002with a range of 700 km (Aneja and Dikshit2002). The army and the air force are known tohave fought over who would get control overthese missiles (Sawant 2002).

The most recent missile in this series is 3,500km-range Agni-3, which was first tested in June2006. The test was a fai lure (SpecialCorrespondent 2007). The next tests in April2007 and May 2008 were declared successful(Subramanian and Mallikarjun 2008). Defenceofficials claim Agni-3 “can destroy targets inany country in south, east and south-east Asia”(ENS 2008). Agni-3 is still under developmentand is to be handed over to the army after oneor more user trials (Subramanian 2008).

The navy has also laid claim to missiles. Thefirst missile developed for the navy is theDhanush, a variant of the Prithvi missile thatwas to be fired from a ship. Since the first testin April 2000, the launches have failed (PTI2002). The missile has a range of 350 km with apayload of 500 kg (Special Correspondent2007). The second naval missile is theSagarika, also called the K-15, with a range of700 km. Perhaps because of the difficultieswith the initial Dhanush test, the first fourSagarika launches were kept a secret; only thesuccessful fifth test in February 2008 waspublicly announced (Subramanian 2008). Thescale and complexity of the missile programhas helped to drive a burgeoning military-industrial complex that brings together theDefence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation, government laboratories, publicsector and private companies, and universities.The Agni-3 project, for example, has involvedover 250 firms, several research laboratories,and academic institutions (Gilani 2007; Rediff2008).

Pakistan

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Pakistan has developed three types of ballisticmissiles that are considered capable ofdelivering a nuclear warhead (Norris andKristensen 2007). These are the Ghaznavi,Shaheen, and Ghauri.

A Shaheen missile.

Though the short-range Ghaznavi was said tohave entered service in 2004, it was only in2006 that it was declared ready for operations.The solid-fueled Shaheen comes in twovarieties, a short-range Shaheen-1 and amedium-range Shaheen-2. The latter was flighttested on February 23, 2007, to a range of2,000 km. The liquid-fueled Ghauri, derivedfrom a North Korean missile, was first tested in

April 1998, a month before the nuclear weapontests. Recent Pakistani missile tests have beencarried out by the various strategic missilegroups (each equipped with a particular type ofmissile) of the army’s strategic force commandand are described as “field exercises.” The1,300 km-range Ghauri missile and the 700 km-range Shaheen-1 were tested by the armystrategic force command in 2006. The first testlaunch of the Shaheen-2 missile by an armystrategic missile group was carried out in April2008 (AP 2008).

Pakistan has also developed a 500 km rangecruise missile, the Babur, which has beendescribed as “low-flying, terrain-huggingmissile with high manoeuvrability, pinpointaccuracy, and radar-avoidance features”(Garwood 2006). The most recent test of thiscruise missile, in May 2008, was described as“validating the design parameters of theweapon system” and implies the missile is stillin the development phase (AFP 2008). Pakistanmay eventually seek to arm its submarines withnuclear-capable cruise missiles.

Fuel for Bombs

The two basic materials used to make nuclearweapons are plutonium and highly enricheduranium. A simple first-generation nuclearweapon can be made with either about 5 kg ofplutonium or about 25 kg of highly enricheduranium. More advanced weapon designs useless material. At the time of the nuclear tests,India was estimated as having a weapon-gradeplutonium stockpile of about 300 kg, sufficientfor about 60 weapons. Experts estimate thatPakistan now has about 550 kg (enough for justover 100 simple weapons). These estimatesassume India used only the CIRUS and Dhruvareactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centrecomplex to produce weapons plutonium. Thesereactors do not produce electricity. During thenegotiations and public debates surroundingthe Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, the atomic energydepartment insisted on keeping nine nuclear

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reactors to be used for electricity productionoutside international safeguards. This includeseight heavy-water reactors, and the prototypefast-breeder reactor (PFBR) being constructedin Kalpakkam near Chennai. All are muchlarger than CIRUS and Dhruva. By keepingthem outside international inspection, Indiaensures they can be used also to makeweapons-grade plutonium.

A study for the International Panel of FissileMaterials (http://www.fissilematerials.org),which we cowrote, shows that if there issufficient uranium available to fuel them eachheavy water reactor can produce about 200 kgof weapon-grade plutonium every year (Mian etal. 2006). Similarly, the PFBR can produceabout 140 kg of weapon grade plutonium everyyear if it operates at 75 percent efficiency(Glaser and Ramana 2007). Pakistan has reliedon highly enriched uranium from its Kahutacentrifuge enrichment plant for most of itsnuclear arsenal so far. It is estimated to haveabout 1,400 kg of this material, enough forperhaps 60 weapons, and to be producing onthe order of 100 kg per year (an additional fourweapons a years) (ibid.). Pakistan also has aplutonium production reactor at Khushab thatmay yield about 10 kg a year (about twoweapons worth). It may have accumulated aplutonium stockpile of about 80 kg — enoughfor roughly 15 weapons.

As a response to the nuclear deal, Pakistan’sNCA, which Musharraf chaired, declared that“In view of the fact the [US-India] agreement[that] would enable India to produce asignificant quantity of fissile material andnuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclearreactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve thatour credible minimum deterrence requirementswill be met” (Sheikh 2006). A former Pakistaniforeign minister has proposed building asecond Kahuta uranium enrichment facility as away to keep up with India (Sattar 2006).Pakistan may also have moved from the first-and second-generation centrifuges that Khan

exported to Libya, North Korea, and Iran tomore powerful machines (Hibbs 2007, 2007).As these machines come online, Pakistan’sproduction capacity and inventory of highlyenriched uranium could increase significantly.Pakistan also appears to be building two newplutonium production reactors at Khushab(Warrick 2006; Broad and Sanger 2006). Workon the last of these appears to have started in2006 (Albright and Brannan 2007). Each ofthese new reactors may be the same size as theexisting reactor at the site. Once operational,these reactors would allow a rapid increase inPakistan’s stock of weapons plutonium.

Conclusion

Ten years after the nuclear tests, leaders inIndia and Pakistan are supporting and fundingtheir militaries' preparations to fight nuclearwars. A war and a subsequent military crisis, adecade of political turmoil in both countries,changes in government in India, a coup andtransition to democracy in Pakistan, andcountless rounds of peace talks, have failed tobring meaningful changes or restraint innuclear policy. National leaders and armedforces remain committed to nuclear weapons.The guiding principle of the respective nuclearpostures remains the achievement of a capacityfor MAD. At the same time, leaders tell eachother and the public that they are committed toestablishing peace between the two countries.This is an impossible contradiction. As AlbertEinstein noted “You cannot simultaneouslyprevent and prepare for war.” The most thatcan be gained is a hostile, crisis-ridden, andcostly search for advantage that is known as a“cold war.”

The remorseless momentum driving the nuclearweapons and missile programmes of the twocountries needs to urgently be slowed. Theinstability already unleashed by the prospect ofan Indo-U.S. nuclear deal needs to beaddressed. There is much that can be done. Theobvious first steps are to freeze nuclear weapon

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production, halt further missile tests, andrenounce military doctrines that involve orcould trigger the use of nuclear weapons.Failure to deal with the nuclear realities atwork in the subcontinent runs the risk thatIndia and Pakistan will succumb to the bomb'sMAD logic. Otherwise, the bomb will take on alife of its own as it has in the U.S. and Russiaafter the Cold War. It will transcend politicsand purpose. Even if it is not used, it willpoison the prospects for a peaceful future.

Zia Mian is a research scientist with theprogramme on science and global security,Woodrow Wilson School of Public andInternational Affairs, Princeton University. Heis the coeditor of Out of the Nuclear Shadow:Pakistan’s Atomic Bomb & the Search forSecurity (Zed Books, 2001).

M. V. Ramana is a physicist at the Centre forInterdisciplinary Studies in Environment andDevelopment in Bangalore, India.

This article was published in the Economic andPolitical Weekly on June 28, 2008. Published atJapan Focus on July 12, 2008.

Notes

[1] “National Technology Day Celebrated,”Press Information Bureau, Government ofIndia, May 11, 2008.[2] “A Decade of Responsibility and Restraint,”Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government ofPakistan, May 28, 2008.[3] Text of Joint Statement on Pakistan-Indiaministerial-level talks, May 21, 2008.[4] See Subrahmanyam (1990), Chellaney(1999), and Zehra (1997).[5] For example, in June 2002 an Indian armyofficer revealed plans for a quick attack onPakistan, adding that there was only “theslimmest chance” of nuclear weapons beingused in retaliation (Bedi 2002).[6] The NSAB is supposed to be independent ofthe government, but it is dominated by

exbureaucrats (Babu 2003).[7] For example, foreign minister JaswantSingh explicitly admitted in the Rajya Sabha onDecember 16, 1998 that “The minimum is not afixed physical quantification” (Rajagopalan2005, 73).[8] National Command Authority Ordinance,Government of Pakistan, December 13, 2007.

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