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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
PROJECT: INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT (PAGI)
COUNTRY: MADAGASCAR
PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT
Date : June 2013
OSGE/GECL DEPARTMENT
August 2013
Translated document
Appraisal Team
Regional Director : Mrs. M. KANGA, ORCE
Sector Director : Mr. I LOBE NDOUMBE, OSGE
Sector Manager : Mr. J. MUKETE, OSGE.2
Team Leader : Mr. L. BASSOLE, OSGE.2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I- STRATEGIC THRUST AND RATIONALE ........................................................................1
1.1 Project Linkages with Country Strategy and Objectives ............................................................1
1.2 Rationale for Bank's Involvement ...............................................................................................2
1.3 Aid Coordination ......................................................................................................... ………..4
II- PROJECT DESCRIPTION ………………………………………………………………….5
2.1 Project Components ....................................................................................................................5
2.2 Technical Solutions Adopted and Alternatives Considered .......................................................7
2.3 Project Type ................................................................................................................................7
2.4 Project Cost and Financing Arrangements .................................................................................7
2.5 Project Target Area and Beneficiaries ........................................................................................9
2.6 Participatory Approach ..............................................................................................................9
2.7 Bank Group Experience and Lessons Reflected in Project Design ...........................................9
2.8 Key Performance Indicators .....................................................................................................11
III- PROJECT FEASIBILITY ....................................................................................................11
3.1 Financial and Economic Performance.......................................................................................11
3.2 Environmental and Social Impact .............................................................................................11
IV- PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.........................................................................................12
4.1 Implementation Arrangements .................................................................................................12
4.2 Project Monitoring and Evaluation ...........................................................................................13
4.3 Governance................................................................................................................................14
4.4 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................14
4.5 Risk Management .....................................................................................................................15
4.6 Knowledge Building .................................................................................................................15
V- LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................16
5.1 Legal Instrument .......................................................................................................................16
5.2 Conditions for Bank Intervention .............................................................................................16
5.3 Compliance with Bank Policies ...............................................................................................16
VI- RECOMMENDATION ........................................................................................................16
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Donor Interventions in Areas Covered by the Project
Table 2 : Project Components and Sub-components
Table 3 : Project Cost Estimate by Component
Table 4 : Sources of Financing
Table 5 : Project Cost by Expenditure Category (UA thousand)
Table 6 : Expenditure Schedule by Component
Table 7 : Expenditure Schedule by Category (UA thousand)
Table 8 : Lessons Learnt from Previous Institutional Support
Table 9 : Milestones in PAGI Execution
Table 10: Risks and Mitigation Measures
LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex I: Country’s Comparative Socio-economic Indicators
Annex II: Table of AfDB Portfolio in Madagascar
Annex III: Map of Project Area
LIST OF TECHNICAL ANNEXES
Technical Annex A – Country Development Agenda, Sector Brief and Project
Background
A1. – Country Development Agenda
A2. – Sector Brief
A3. – Donors’ Technical Assistance in Public Finance
A4. – Lessons from Institutional Support Projects
Technical Annex B – Support of Key Arguments of the Report
B1. – Detailed Project Costs
B2. – Implementation Arrangements
B3. – Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements
B4. – Procurement Arrangements
B5 – Environmental and Social Analysis
Annex C – Additional Technical Annexes
C1. – Detailed Outline of Project Activities
i
Currency Equivalents
(May 2013)
Madagascar Currency Unit = Ariary (MGA)
UA 1 MGA 3 346.97
UA 1 USD 1.51
UA 1 EUR 1.15
USD 1 MGA 2 218.00
EUR I MGA 2899.33
Fiscal Year
January - December
List of Abbreviations
ADF African Development Fund
AfDB African Development Bank
ARMP Public Procurement Regulatory Authority
BdG Bureau Unique de Gestion (Centralized Project Management Office)
BIANCO Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau
CdC Audit Bench
COS Orientation and Monitoring Committee
CSI Council for the Safeguard of Integrity
CSP Country Strategy Paper
DBIV Inspection and Audit Directorate
DGB General Budget Directorate
DGCF General Financial Control Directorate
DGI General Taxation Directorate
DGT Directorate General of the Treasury
DRG Governance Enhancement Department
EARC East Africa Resource Centre
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
MAP Madagascar Action Plan
MFB Ministry of Finance and Budget
MGFO Bank’s Madagascar Field Office
MoV Means of Verification
N/A Not Applicable
ORDSEC Secondary Authorizing Officer
PAGI Institutional Governance Support Project
PCR Project Completion Report
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Assessment
PFM Public Finance Management
PGDI Governance and Institutional Development Support Project
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PREA Administration Efficiency Reform Programme
PRIBG Good Governance Capacity Building Project
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADC Southern African Development Community
SIPFM System of Integrated Public Finance Management
TFP Technical and Financial Partners
TI Transparency International
UA Unit of Account
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WB World Bank
ii
LOAN/GRANT INFORMATION
Client Information
BORROWER : Republic of Madagascar
EXECUTING AGENCY : Prime Minister’s Office, Administration Efficiency Reform
Programme (PREA)
Financing Plan
Source Amount
(UA) Instrument
ADF (including balance from loan
cancellation of UA 0.97 million) 4.320 million Loan
ADF (reuse of balance from grant
cancellation) 0.180 million Grant
Government 0.318 million
Total amount 4.818 million Loan /Grant
Key ADF Financial Information
* relating to
ADF loans
Timeline –
Main
Milestones
(Expected)
Activities Dates
Preparation October 2012
Appraisal April-May 2013
Negotiation July 2013
Project Approval September 2013
Effectiveness December 2013
Mid-Term Review June 2015
Completion December 2016
Last Disbursement March 2017
Loan / Grant Currency UA
Interest Type * Not Applicable
Interest Rate Margin* Not Applicable
Commitment Fee * 0.5% (5 basis point)
Other Charges* 0.75% (service charge)
Tenor 50 years
Grace Period 10 years
NPV (baseline scenario) Not Applicable (NA)
ERR (baseline scenario) N/A
iii
PROJECT SUMMARY
Project
Overview
Project Name: Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI)
Geographic Scope: Nationwide
General Schedule : 36 months, from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016
Financing: UA 4.818 million (ADF: UA 4.5 million; counterpart contribution: UA 0.318
million)
Operational Instrument: Institutional Support Project
Expected Outcomes: The main outcomes sought by PAGI are: (i) a better public resource
mobilization framework leading to a revenue increase from 10.9% of GDP in 2012 to 13%
in 2016; (ii) strengthening of internal and external control; (iii) strengthening of anti-
corruption structures; and (iv) promotion of transparency in extractive industries
management in Madagascar.
Direct Project Beneficiaries: Institutions engaged in public finance management, notably
DGB, DGD, DGI, DGT, DGCF, ARMP, Audit Bench, BIANCO, Ministry of Mines, EITI
Executive Secretariat.
Needs
Assessment and
Relevance
Madagascar is going through a protracted political crisis that has weakened its institutions,
leading to a deterioration of public finance management (PFM) and governance. PAGI’s
objective is to contribute towards restoring material, human and technical capacity for
public resource mobilization, expenditure control, the fight against corruption in and good
governance of the extractive sector. Therefore, the project rationale falls within the broader
context of supporting Madagascar's efforts to promote growth and reduce poverty, through
improved governance, notably in public resource management. The Malagasy
government’s finances face several challenges including: weak public resource
mobilization (the tax ratio dropped from an average of 11.8% between 2004 and 2008 to
10.9% in 2012), weak decentralization and devolution of fiscal management, weak internal
and external control of State budget management, conflicts of interest, corruption, low
level of fiscal resources, illicit trafficking, fraud, non-transparent and inefficient
management of extractive industry resources.
Bank’s Added
Value
The project aims to assist the Government to gradually halt the deterioration of public
finance management and help restore the achievements of previous interventions.
Furthermore, this operation forms part of concerted efforts by development partners to lay
the groundwork for rapid and effective resumption of financial support, in response to
various development challenges. The Bank has acquired substantial knowledge and
experience on Madagascar’s economic challenges through its previous interventions, such
as PRIBG. The Bank’s presence on the ground also constitutes a major advantage that
enables it to participate fully in dialogue with the authorities on improving public finance
management and extractive sector governance.
Knowledge
Management
The project will contribute to institutional development and knowledge building in
Madagascar, notably in the areas of public finance management and governance.
Knowledge will be acquired through skills transfer from advisors and consultants to staff
of beneficiary institutions. Additionally, different information, data platforms, users’
manuals and various training courses and workshops will also contribute to knowledge
building. The project will finance a pilot project to address the entire Tuléar town, PEFA
self-assessments and studies. Procedures manuals in several public finance management
areas will also be produced. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired from this project will be
built upon through a rigorous system to monitor and evaluate expected outcomes and
outputs. Project supervision and completion missions will also be fielded, and the related
reports prepared.
iv
Results-Based Logical Framework
Country and Project Name: Madagascar – Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI)
Project Goal: To contribute to strengthening institutional capacity for improved public resource mobilization, strengthening of financial governance and
transparency in the extractive sector
RESULTS CHAIN PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
MOV.
RISKS/MITI
GATION
MEASURES Indicator (including CSI) Baseline Target
IMP
AC
T
Impact : Economic
management and control
capacity are enhanced and
contribute to improved
corporate governance
Economic growth rate (GDP) 1.9% (2012) 4% (2018)
AfDB, Mo-
Ibrahim
report
Mo Ibrahim "accountability" and "public
administration" rating
51.7/55.5
(2012) 54/58 (2018)
Outcome I: Public resource
mobilization and control
systems are improved
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 10.9% (2012) 13% (2016)
PREA
reports on
the execution
of the
project;
MFB, PEFA
self-
evaluation,
Audit Bench,
BIANCO, TI
and EITI
Risk 1:
Political and
Institutional:
The
deterioration of
the political
situation,
institutional
fragility and
economic
shocks
constitute
political and
economic risk
factors.
Mitigation
measures:
Project
activities aimed
at
strengthening
governance and
capacity, and
prospects of
holding
elections in
2013 help to
mitigate this
risk.
Risk 2:
Operational:
Inadequate
institutional
capacity
implies a risk
of delay in
project
implementation
and inadequate
coordination of
TFP
interventions.
Mitigation
measures: The
training
activities under
the project and
the institutional
anchoring and
Number of newly identified taxpayers 4 500 (2012) 10 000 new taxpayers
(cumulative 2013-16)
Time-frame for tabling budget review bills
before Parliament after receipt by the Audit
Bench (number of months) (*)
Over 24
months (2006)
Less than 15 months by
2016
Outcome II : Anti-
corruption and transparency
in the extractive sector are
strengthened
PEFA PI-21-i and ii) Effectiveness of internal
audit
PI-21 i: A and
ii : B (2008) P-21-i and ii: A (2016)
Transparency International Perception of
Corruption Index 32 (2012) 36 (2016)
Madagascar’s EITI status Suspended
candidate EITI compliant in 2016
OU
TC
OM
ES
I. IMPROVEMENT OF PUBLIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
I.1. Improvement of the public resource mobilization framework
(I.1.1.) Improvement of the
fiscal and para-fiscal
revenue collection
framework
Studies on internal revenue mobilization and
addressing of Tuléar town No study
Reports and studies
available before 2016 DGI and
MFB reports Number of taxation centres operational
Not available 20 by 2016
(I.1.2.) Improvement of the
customs revenue collection
framework
Number of officers trained in: the fight against
fraud, audit, control, customs operations, IT ,
training of trainers, management and related
subjects (of which % women)
50 officers in
2011
150 officers
cumulatively between
2014 and 2016, of
which 25% women
DGD report
I.2. Improvement of accounting and auditing
(I.2.1.) Improvement of
public accounting system
Feasibility study on dematerialization of
accounting operations processing No study
Feasibility study report
available before end
2015 MFB and
DGT
reports
Accounting data collection and securement
tools None
Tools put in place and
being used at end-2015
(I.2.2.) Improvement of
accounts auditing system
Number of DBIV officers trained in
international auditing norms (including %
women)
No officers
trained
15 officers trained, of
which 25% women in
2015.
I.3. Improvement of internal and external control
(I.3.1.) Strengthening of the
internal budget
implementation control
system
Number of Financial Control Delegations
operational
Not available 21 delegations equipped
before project
completion
MFB and
DGCF
reports
Number of staff trained on services rendered
and post-auditing, monitoring and evaluation,
change management (including % women)
5 persons 50 officers trained in
2016, of which 25%
women
Monitoring and evaluation system None System in place at MFB
by 2015
v
(I.3.2.) Improvement of the
external control system
Computer system (SIPFM module) to prepare
the Budget Review Act None System in place in 2015
CDC report
close
coordination of
TFPs
Risk 3:
Fiduciary
Weakness of
internal control
system and
procurement,
and PFM
capabilities
increase
fiduciary risks
Mitigation
measures:
Adoption of a
procedures
manual, annual
audits, Bank
supervision and
use of the
Bank’s rules
and procedures.
PIU within
PREA and in
common with
PGDI-II
Number of officers trained in external control-
related areas (including Audit Bench training
of parliamentarians) (of which % women)
None 100 officers trained
(25% women) by 2016
Public Entities Audit Manual Draft
manual
Manual finalized,
validated and used by
2015
(I.3.3.) Improvement of
transparency of the
government procurement
system
Public procurement post-audit report
Last report
dates back to
2010
At least one report
finalized and available
in 2015 ARMP
reports Number of contracting authorities under the
Code making correct entries on SIGMP 119 (2102)
834 at end- 2015 and
900 in 2016
II. STRENGTHENING OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION FIGHT AND IMPROVEMENT OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR
II.1. Strengthening the fight against corruption and fraud
(II.1.1.) Strengthening of
anti-corruption
Number of people trained in investigative and
prevention techniques, IT and anti-corruption
(of which % women) None
300 persons trained
(25% women)
BIANCO
reports Number of campaigns and % entities
sensitized and mobilized to adopt the culture
of integrity and transparency (workshops,
audio-visual and radio campaigns)
None 9/ 70% cumulatively in
2013-16
II.2. Improvement of transparency in the extractive sector
(II.2.1.) Strengthening of
mining sector information
Statistical monitoring mechanism and
information system set up in the Ministry of
Mines None
System put in place and
functional in 2014 Mining
observatory,
Ministry of
Mines Number of Ministry of Mines officials trained
in IT (including % women)
Not
available
100 officers trained by
2016 (25% women)
(II.2.2.) Improvement of
transparency in extractive
sector governance
Number of people trained in extractive
resources None
50 persons between
2014 and 2016
EITI
Secretariat
reports Number of sensitization and communication
campaigns conducted (workshops, radio
campaigns, press, TV) on extractive industries
None
10 (cumulatively
between 2013 and
2016) sensitization and
communication
campaigns conducted
KE
Y A
CT
IVIT
IES
ACTIVITIES RESOURCES
Component I (Cf. Activities Matrix, Technical Annex C1)
- Technical assistance activities: provision of national and international experts and consulting firms in the
following General Directorates: Taxation, Customs, Budget, Treasury, Financial Control and Good Governance
Enhancement Department, the Audit Bench and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority.
- Human capacity building activities: training for all of the above structures.
- Capacity building in equipment: computer, automotive and office equipment for all of the above structures
Component II (Cf. Activities Matrix, Technical Annex C1)
- Technical assistance activities: provision of national and international experts and consulting firms at BIANCO,
the mining observatory and the EITI Secretariat.
- Human capacity building activities: training for all of the above structures.
- Capacity building in equipment: computer and office equipment for all of the above structures
Resources :
Component I : UA 3.134
million
Component II : UA 1.203
million
Component III : UA 0.481
million
Total cost: UA 4.818
million
vi
Estimated Project Implementation Schedule
Years
Activities/Months J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
Prior to Start-up
Board presentation
Grant effectiveness
Loan effectiveness
Selection of other BdG members
Project launching mission
Equipment and Supplies
Bid invitation for IT and office equip.
Bid invitation for vehicles& other wheeled mach.
Bid invitation for other equipment
Goods delivery
Consultancy Services
Preparation of BDs and SLs
Bid invitation, analysis and contract award
Delivery of consultancy services
Training and Miscellaneous
Preparation of BDs and SLs
Bid invitation, analysis and contract award
Delivery of consultancy services
Operating expenses
Mid-term review
Monitoring/Evaluation
Audit
Annual accounts audit
Final accounts audit
2013 2014 2015 2016
1
MANAGEMENT’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS CONCERNING A PROPOSAL FOR ADF FINANCING OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT (PAGI)
This proposal submitted by Management to the Board concerns the granting of an amount of
UA 4.5 million from ADF-12 resources to the Republic of Madagascar to finance the
Institutional Governance Support Project (PAGI). The ADF financing comprises a loan of UA
4.32 million under ADF-12 (including a loan cancellation balance of UA 0.97 million) and a grant
of UA 0.18 million, following a grant cancellation. This is an institutional support operation
designed to contribute towards restoring public resource mobilization and control capacity, ensuring
good governance in the extractive sector and preparing for re-engagement by technical and financial
partners (TFPs) after the political and institutional crisis.
I. STRATEGIC THRUST AND RATIONALE
1.1. Project Linkages with Country Strategy and Objectives
1.1.1. The country’s development strategy (Madagascar Action Plan) which covered the
2007-2012 period laid special emphasis on improving governance, including strengthening
public finance management (PFM) and fighting corruption. This strategy having expired,
another national strategy will be prepared by the new authorities that will emerge from the
upcoming elections to be held before end 2013.
1.1.2. Currently, despite the absence of a national development strategy formally adopted
by the Government, the authorities place a high premium on good governance and
transparency in government action. Accordingly, the implementation of the National Good
Governance Policy adopted in 2006 is on-going. Indeed, the activities of the Administration
Efficiency Reform Programme (PREA) and of the Council for the Safeguard of Integrity (CSI) put
in place under the said Policy, continue. Also, Madagascar adopted a National Anti- Corruption
Strategy in 2004. It is still being implemented by the Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau
(BIANCO). This strategy aims to substantially curb corruption in Madagascar by 2015.
Furthermore, during a government workshop on Public Governance in January 2012, the authorities
reiterated the need for good governance, notably in public finance management.
1.1.3. The Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB) is preparing a short- to medium-term
action plan (MFB), with a view to improving public finance management. The said action plan
focuses on priority activities that are crucial to sound financial and economic governance, and aims
to consolidate public finance management gains. PAGI will support the MFB in preparing the
action plan. Thus, this project is in line with the national policy on good governance, the national
anti-corruption strategy and the priority activities of the public finance management action plan
being prepared. Therefore, it aligns with the country's priorities.
1.1.4. The project is in line with the Bank’s strategy for Madagascar. The Country Strategy
Paper (CSP)1, which was extended to 2013, has two pillars: improving infrastructure (Pillar 1) and
improving governance (Pillar 2). The CSP objectives include: (i) contributing towards reducing the
country's fragility and the vulnerability of its people by responding to some of its pressing needs,
notably in terms of rehabilitating the productive and transport infrastructure; (ii) strengthening
public finance management, the anti-corruption drive and illicit trafficking; and (iii) preparing for a
more speedy re-engagement of the Bank in case of normalization of the political situation through a
number of analytical and project preparation works. Under CSP Pillar II, this will notably include
institutional support to strengthen economic and financial governance. Thus, PAGI is fully in line
1 Combined Report of the Portfolio Review and the 2012-2013 Extended Country Strategy Paper (ADF/BD/WP/2012/32/Rev.1)
2
with Madagascar’s CSP. As operational priorities, the Bank’s Ten-Year Strategy, 2013-2022
(approved in April 2013) has, inter alia, governance and accountability (including improving PFM),
resource mobilization and strengthening of institutions that support the accountability process.
Therefore, PAGI is consistent with the Bank’s Ten-Year Strategy. Lastly, the project is in line with
the operational priorities of ADF-12 which lays emphasis on the promotion of sound financial and
economic governance.
1.2 Rationale for Bank’s Involvement
1.2.1. Since 2009, Madagascar has endured a political crisis with severely adverse socio-
economic effects. International mediation led to the signing by almost all Malagasy political groups
of a roadmap in September 2011. Thus, the transitional institutions (Government, Parliament and
Independent Electoral Commission) were put in place and Presidential and Legislative elections
could be held before end 2013. On the economic level, the growth rate that stood at 7.1% in 2008
fell sharply to -4.1% in 2009 following the outbreak of the crisis which severely crippled the
productive system, before averaging 1.1% over the period 2010-11. With a Human Development
Index of 0.483 in 2012 (151st out of 187 countries), the lowest among Indian Ocean countries (with
the exception of the Comoros), and 76% of the population living below the poverty line in 2010, the
incidence of poverty in Madagascar is among sub-Saharan Africa’s highest. This situation stems
from the political crisis that was accompanied by a 40% drop in international aid between 2009 and
2011, and the consequent plunge in the State budget. Therefore, the Government has been forced to
pursue a fiscal austerity policy, thanks to which it was able to contain the budget deficit at 3.1% of
GDP in 2012.
1.2.2. Against this backdrop, the project aims to contribute towards addressing a number
of challenges facing the public finance management system highlighted by the main
recommendations of recent studies2 (see Technical Annex A2 on the sector overview). In so doing,
the Bank will help to gradually restore the State’s public finance management capabilities to enable
it to fulfil its economic role, including poverty reduction. Since the outbreak of the political crisis in
2009, revenue has declined by 20% in real terms. Furthermore, the lack of government credibility
and visibility limits its borrowing capacity on international private capital markets. Besides the
decline in financial resources for State intervention, poor monitoring of budget execution and
control of public spending are unlikely to lead to efficient public finance management.
1.2.3. Despite improvements in the performance of tax (Directorate General of Taxation -
DGI) and customs (Directorate General of Customs- DGD) administrations, notably in 2010,
public revenue collection remains weak. The tax ratio, which went from 13% in 2008 to 10.9% in
2012, remains among sub-Saharan Africa’s lowest. For instance, the VAT recovery rate is a mere
24% of its potential tax base, whereas it stands at 78% and 47% in Mauritius and Senegal,
respectively. Regarding customs duties, the collection rate is barely 29% of the potential amount
that could be generated from imports declared in Madagascar, while it reaches 41% in Mozambique
and 60% in Senegal (see Technical Annex C1 for a detailed presentation of the tax context). This
weak public revenue mobilization capacity is attributable to: (i) the existence of a number of
companies, which although registered, pay little or no tax due to the tax administration’s weak
capacity; (ii) under-taxation of large companies, whereas they are the country’s largest taxpayers;
2 World Bank (2011) Public Expenditure Review. Bitz, Michael (2011), Assessment of the Implementation of the Malagasy Integrated Public
Finance Management System (SIPFM), Interim Report, World Bank. Ibrahim, Mamane (2011), Madagascar: Public Finance Management
Assessment Mission, World Bank, Public Finance Management Performance Measurement Report of the Republic of Madagascar, March 2008.
European Union (2012), Budget Support Assessment and Public Finance Management Review of the health and education sectors - Madagascar:
Update on Public finance management and health/education sector analysis, review of eligibility criteria; Phase 2 Report (Summary of the
Interim Report).
3
and (iii) the attitude of taxpayers who are unconcerned about fulfilling their civic duty, especially
given the extremely low risk of sanctions. Lastly, the inadequate capacity and logistics of public
finance management institutions is not conducive to devolution and decentralization for greater
public revenue mobilization in the regions.
1.2.4. The control system is marked by inefficiency, duplication of interventions of the
bodies concerned and lack of control of services provided and reference prices. The lack of
human and material resources also limits the control system’s efficiency. Although all internal
control services focus on controlling regularity of expenditure, there is none that checks results and
performance. The system is undermined by the weak capacity of public institutions or lack of
accountants in some of these institutions as well as the lack of appropriate penalties for perpetrators
of misappropriations revealed through controls conducted by the General Financial Control
Directorate (DGCF), the Treasury and the General Inspectorate.
1.2.5. External control remains weak despite some progress illustrated notably by the
adoption of the Budget Review Act reports for the 2005 and 2006 fiscal years. External
monitoring institutions have neither the information nor the tools to analyze and, where necessary,
punish deviations. The external audit conducted by the Audit Bench remains inefficient because of
non-enforcement of the penalties provided by law. With no regular reporting on external control,
Parliament exercises no control. No audit of management of the State’s central administration has
been validated by the National Assembly. Since 2008, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority
(ARMP) routinely publishes information on all contracts, resulting in a significant drop in the
number of directly negotiated contracts between 2008 and 2012 (i.e. from 25% to 6.84% between
2008 and 2012). However, a review of works procurements casts doubt on the quality of the
controls carried out by ARMP or, at least, the information it publishes on its website.
1.2.6. In terms of governance, conflicts of interest, corruption, illicit trafficking, lack of
transparency and inefficient management of mining resources also constitute obstacles to the
promotion of good governance. While Madagascar had already lost 13 points between 2007 and
2010 in the ranking of the Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index, with an index of 46%, it ranked
35th
in 2011 compared to 33rd
in 2010. Having attained the candidate country status in February
2008, Madagascar was suspended in October 2011 from EITI, pending normalization of its political
situation. With the political crisis, the opportunities for corruption and related offences increased
sharply in 2010, according to BIANCO.
1.2.7. Thus, the project will contribute to efforts by Malagasy authorities to gradually
restore the public finance management capacity in a context of protracted political crisis that
has weakened institutions and led to the deterioration of governance3. In this regard, several
Malagasy institutions are making efforts to improve. Despite the difficult environment, the Bank is
determined to maintain its leadership role in economic and financial governance. PAGI is also part
of concerted efforts by development partners to lay the groundwork for a speedy and effective
resumption of financial support in response to various development challenges.
1.2.8. The Bank’s experience in implementing institutional support projects in difficult
contexts of fragile institutions also gives it a significant comparative advantage that justifies
its intervention in Madagascar. Through similar interventions in countries such as Guinea, Côte
d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Bank has acquired experience in designing these operations,
whose primary objective is to restore technical, material and human capacity in public finance
management. PAGI complements other Bank interventions in Madagascar given that by restoring
the public revenue mobilization capacity, it will first facilitate the mobilization of various
counterpart funds to help finance these projects (e.g. The Agricultural Infrastructure Rehabilitation
3 Madagascar: “Towards an Agenda of Economic Recovery” June 2010 and the World Bank Public Expenditure Review of October 2011.
4
Project in the South-West region, whose counterpart contribution stand at UA 3.2 million).
Secondly, by restoring good governance and transparency conditions, PAGI will contribute
indirectly towards improving the management of different projects.
1.3 Donor Coordination
1.3.1. Due to the political crisis, donors have suspended many of their interventions and
currently few donors are involved in the area of public finance management. The pre-crisis
partnership framework has slackened significantly. The Bank will actively contribute towards
revitalizing the partnership framework once the current crisis ends. Despite the lack of formal
coordination mechanisms, the Bank has coordinated closely with other TFPs in preparing this
project. Coordination meetings among the donors, on the one hand, and between TFPs and the
authorities, on the other, were held. A two-day workshop was organized during the preparation
mission between TFPs and the Malagasy authorities to identify needs and the potential support that
TFPs could provide to meet them. The meetings helped to identify priority activities that
complement the support of other TFPs and that should be supported by PAGI. The Bank has
reviewed the MFB’s draft action plan with development partners to ensure that PAGI is
complementary to the activities of other TFPs. Thus, PAGI will finance emergency priority
activities with a rapid and significant impact on improving public resource mobilization, good
financial governance, the fight against corruption and transparency in the extractive sector.
1.3.2. Besides the Bank, the Government is also supported by the French Cooperation and
the World Bank (WB). More specifically, French assistance has focused exclusively on tax
revenue from customs and tax administrations, while the public spending cycle was supported by
the Bank and the World Bank. The World Bank and the Bank provide funding for the deployment
of taxation centres. WB and French Cooperation are also working to develop a culture of activity
monitoring and control. Lastly, the PAGI appraisal mission coincided with a European Union (EU)
preparation mission for the Institutional Governance Support Project that will be approved and
implemented once elections are held and the crisis ends. The EU support will mainly cover the
strengthening of the budget making process, citizen participation, civil service reform and judicial
reform. This synergy and complementarity of TFPs will create conditions conducive to effective
restoration of physical, human and institutional capacity for better public finance management,
increased transparency and further pursuit of the fight against corruption.
1.3.3. Using a common project implementation unit (see § 4.1.1) to implement projects attached
to the Prime Minister’s Office will facilitate interdepartmental coordination of interventions by
institutions (see Table 1 below for a summary).
5
Table 1
Donor Interventions in Areas Covered by the Project
Partners
Public
Finance
Management
Extractive
Industries
Governance
Fight
Against
Corruption
Justice
Public
Service
World Bank X X
European Union 4 X X X X
AfDB X X X
French Cooperation X
2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 Project Components
2.1.1 The project’s overall goal is to contribute towards restoring institutional capacity for
better public resource mobilization, strengthening financial governance and transparency in
the extractive sector. The project will also contribute towards preparing for donors’ re-
commitment after the political and institutional crisis. The project’s specific operational objectives
will be to: (i) improve public resource mobilization and control systems by improving the
mobilization of tax and quasi-tax revenues and customs revenues, public accounting and accounts
auditing, and internal and external ex-post control, (ii) strengthen anti-corruption and improve
transparency in the extractive sector, by supporting anti-corruption and improving transparency in
the extractive sector
2.1.2. PAGI comprises two operational components, namely: (i) improving public resource
mobilization and control systems; (ii) strengthening the fight against corruption and
improving transparency in the extractive sector. There is a third component concerning project
management, research and knowledge management. The three components are mutually
complementary and reinforcing. Indeed, increasing public resource mobilization without
strengthening public expenditure control cannot lead to increased and improved efficiency of
government interventions. The fight against corruption cannot improve without an appropriate
public spending control system. Furthermore, greater transparency in the extractive sector improves
the mobilization of tax and non-tax revenue. Table 2 below provides details on the components.
Technical Annexes B1 and C1 provide detailed costs for each component’s activities and a
comprehensive list of goods and services to be procured under the project, as well as a detailed
description of project activities.
4 The EU Institutional Support Project is being prepared.
6
Table 2
Project Components and Sub-Components
Code Components Costs (UA ‘000) Description of Components
I. Component I 3 119.6 Improvement of public resource mobilization and
control systems
I.1.
Improvement of the
public resource
mobilization framework
1 274.2
Improvement of tax and quasi-tax revenue collection:
technical support for addressing Tuléar town, study on
the assessment of tax reforms, deployment of a
computerized monitoring and evaluation system at MFB,
monitoring and evaluation training for DGI and MFB
officials;
Improvement of the customs revenue collection
framework: training in several customs-related domains
(fight against fraud, strategic management,
popularization of e-learning, etc.).
I.2. Improvement of
accounting and auditing 656.9
Improvement of public accounting: feasibility
study/implementation of paperless processing of
accounting transactions; Improvement of auditing: SIPFM system deployment,
training of trainers on the new SIPFM system, training
IPSAS, IAS / IFRS in fraud and collusion;
I.3.
Improvement of internal
and external ex post
control
1 188.5
Strengthening the internal control system: training in ex
post control of services rendered and exchange of
experiences abroad;
Improving the external ex post control system: production
of the public institutions audit manual for the Audit
Bench; training on several performance-related terms;
and logistic support to control and audit missions.
Improving transparency in public procurement:
logistic/operational support for sensitization on the public
procurement code of ethics, assessment of procurement
after ex post control, sensitization of the private sector
stakeholders and civil society on public procurement.
II. Component II 1 203.0 Strengthening the fight against corruption and
improving extractive sector transparency
II.1.
Strengthening the fight
against corruption and
fraud
610.0
Strengthening the fight against corruption and fraud:
study on illicit trafficking; develop a computerized data
processing system, training on illicit trafficking,
corruption prevention techniques; nationwide
sensitization on corruption and fraud , updating and
maintenance of the BIANCO website;
II.2.
Improvement of
transparency in the
extractive sector
592.0
Improving extractive sector information: setting up a
statistical monitoring system and an information system;
training in statistical monitoring, acquisition of computer
hardware;
Improving transparency in extractive sector governance:
preparing mining sector audit reports; support to
Madagascar’s EITI validation process and extractive
industries, sensitization on extractive industries;
procurement of sundry equipment;
III. Component III 495.4 Project Management
Coordination 386.5 Compensation and miscellaneous operation; material
assets and office equipment
Audit 66.9 Project financial audit
Knowledge Management 42.0 Studies, PEFA Self-Assessment
Total Project Cost 4818.0
7
2.2 Technical Solutions Adopted and Alternatives Considered
2.2.1 During project preparation and appraisal, and in light of lessons learned from
implementing the Good Governance Capacity Building Project (PRIBG)5, several options
were presented concerning notably the project’s institutional anchoring. To enhance the
efficiency and complementarity of activities, it was deemed that the project should be anchored at
the Prime Minister’s Office (see para. 2.7.2). The establishment of a Centralized Project
Management Office (BdG) attached to the Prime Minister’s Office will ensure improved
interdepartmental coordination within the government and among the TFPs.
2.2.2. In addition, important and fruitful discussions were held on the intervention areas,
the number of institutions to support and the type of capacity building. Trade-offs were made
to be able to: (i) set project objectives that are consistent with the country's priorities; and (ii) factor
in synergy with interventions of other TFPs. PAGI has chosen the option to reduce the number of
direct beneficiary institutions (10 under PAGI against 32 under PRIBG) and focus on a limited
number of components and activities to ensure the project’s success.
2.2.3. Regarding training arrangements under this project, several beneficiary institutions
proposed the option of training abroad. However, in light of experience from PRIBG, the project
team, following discussions with the authorities, opted for short-term training in the country or in
Africa by/in known institutions or regional/international experts. This choice will increase the
number of people trained and help to develop and strengthen the training capacity at country and
regional level.
2.3 Project Type
PAGI is an institutional support project that focuses on improving public finance
management systems, internal and external control, and mining sector governance. It was designed
to gradually put a halt to the deterioration of public finance management and contribute towards
restoring the achievements of previous interventions in the area of revenue mobilization, internal
and external auditing, the fight against corruption and transparency in the extractive sector.
2.4 Project Cost and Financing Arrangements
The total estimated project cost, excluding taxes and customs duties, stands at UA 4.818
million. Through ADF resources, the Bank will provide UA 4.5 million and the Government UA
0.318 million (6.6% of total project funding) as counterpart contribution to partially cover operating
costs. ADF funding is broken down as follows: UA 4.32 million as a loan, and UA 0.18 million as a
grant6. Provisions of 3% and 2% respectively for price escalation and physical contingencies have
been included in the project cost. Tables 3 to 7 present the project
cost estimates by component and sub-component, by source of financing and expenditure category
per year. A detailed table of costs is presented in Technical Annex B1.
5 The Good Governance Capacity Building Project (PRIBG) was executed between 2004 and 2012, and financed by the World Bank through a UA
5.86 million grant (Project Completion Report- ADF/BD/IF/2012/144) 6 It should be noted that despite budgetary constraints, the Government of Madagascar has always demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the
financing of Bank projects. Accordingly, it was recommended that the ADF finance 93% of the project’s local currency and foreign exchange
costs under the Bank Group’s Policy on Eligible Expenditure (ADB/BD/WP/2007/106 / Rev.2 ADF/BD/WP/207/72/Rev.2-2 May 2008). This
departure from the 10% counterpart funding required was approved by OPSCOM at the 11April 2013 Concept Note review.
8
Table 3
Project Cost Estimate by Component
Component Total Cost (MGA million) Total Cost (UA ‘000) %
F.E. F.E. L.C. Total F.E. L.C. Total
Improvement of public resource
mobilization and control systems 7 262.7 2 655.5 9 918.2 2.175.6 795.5 2 971.1 73.2%
Improvement of public resource
mobilization framework 3 288.4 762.8 4 051.1 985.1 228.5 1 213.6 81.2%
Improvement of accounting and auditing 1 709.9 378.5 2 088.4 512.2 113.4 625.6 81.9%
Improvement of internal and external
control 2 264.5 1 514.1 3 778.7 678.4 453.6 1.131.9 59.9%
Strengthening the fight against
corruption and improving extractive
sector transparency
2 378.8 1 445.8 3 824.5 712.6 433.1 1.145.7 62.2%
Strengthening the fight against corruption
and fraud 924.7 1 014.7 1 939.4 277.0 304.0 581.0 47.7%
Improvement of transparency in the
extractive sector 1 454.0 431.1 1 885.1 435.6 129.1 564.7 77.1%
Project Management 300.6 1 274.4 1 575.0 90.0 381.8 471.8 19.1%
TOTAL BASE COST 9 942.1 5 375.7 15 317.8 2 978.2 1 610.3 4 588.6 64.9%
Physical contingencies 2% 198.8 107.5 306.4 59.6 32.2 91.8 64.9%
Price escalation 3% 298.3 161.3 459.5 89.3 48.3 137.7 64.9%
TOTAL PROJECT COST 10 439.2 5 644.4 16 083.6 3 127.2 1 690.8 4 818.0 64.9%
Table 4
Sources of Financing
Sources Total cost (MGA million) Total cost (UA ‘000)
F.E. L.C. Total F.E. L.C. Total
Loan - ADF 9 838.3 4 582.9 14 421.2 2 947.2 1 372.8 4 320.0
Grant - ADF 600.9 - 600.9 180.0 - 180.0
Malagasy Government - 1 061.6 1 061.6 - 318.0 318.0
TOTAL PROJECT COST 10 439.2 5 644.4 16 083.6 3 127.2 1 690.8 4 818.0
Table 5
Project Cost by Expenditure Category (UA ‘000)
EXPENDITURE CATEGORY F.E. L.C. Total % F.E.
Goods 1 530.5 64.4 1 594.9 96.0%
Services 1 447.7 774.7 2 222.4 65.1%
Operation - 771.3 771.3 0.0%
TOTAL BASE COST 2 978.2 1 610.3 4 588.6 64.9%
Physical contingencies 2% 59.6 32.2 91.8
Price contingencies 3% 89.3 48.3 137.7
TOTAL PROJECT COST 3 127.2 1 690.8 4 818.0 64.9%
Table 6
Expenditure Schedule by Component (UA ‘000)
COMPONENTS 2014 2015 2016 Total
Improvement of public resource mobilization and control systems 1 536.5 936.9 646.2 3 119.6
Strengthening the fight against corruption and improving extractive
sector transparency 687.4 409.9 105.6 1 203.0
Project management 172.6 161.4 161.4 495.4
TOTAL PROJECT COST 2 396.5 1 508.2 913.3 4 818.0
9
Table 7
Expenditure Schedule by Category (UA ‘000)
EXPENDITURE CATEGORY 2014 2015 2016 Total
Goods 1 124.2 322.2 228.3 1 674.7
Services 988.4 916.1 429.0 2 333.4
Operation 284.0 270.0 255.9 809.9
TOTAL PROJECT COST 2 396.5 1 508.2 913.3 4818.0
2.5 Project Area and Beneficiaries
The project area is the Malagasy territory. The main project beneficiaries are: (i) the State
of Madagascar as a whole, whose institutional capacity will be strengthened (about 800 different
supported structures will be trained, and the material capacity of these structures restored, the
SIPFM system will be deployed nationwide, the country’s public resources will be increased, its
accounting and auditing accounts improved, its internal and external control systems improved, its
anti-corruption institutions strengthened (e.g. as direct beneficiary, BIANCO’s computer system
will be developed, over 100 people will be trained in investigative techniques, and about 80 persons
will be trained and sensitized on illicit trafficking and corruption control); the mining observatory as
well as the EITI Executive Secretariat will also be strengthened; (ii) the Malagasy people who will
be the indirect end beneficiaries of the improved management of public finances, the strengthening
of corruption control and transparency in the extractive sector; and (iii) government departments
and agencies, non-state actors, civil society and the private sector will also be indirect beneficiaries
of PAGI.
2.6 Participatory Approach in Project Identification, Design and Implementation
The participatory approach was used at project appraisal and design, in close
collaboration with the technical services of the Malagasy Government and various donors
operating in Madagascar. During the preparation and appraisal missions, the project team held
several meetings with Malagasy Government stakeholders, namely the MFB directorates, the
Ministry of Justice, PREA, IGE, the Audit Bench, the Council for the Safeguard of Integrity (CSI),
BIANCO, the Ministry of Mines, the EITI National Secretariat, the private sector and civil society.
During the preparation mission, a 2-day workshop was held between donors and the Malagasy
authorities to identify needs and potential donor support to cover them. During both missions, the
team also held discussions with donors, including the World Bank, EU, UNDP, Norway, the United
States, Switzerland, Japan, Britain, and French Cooperation. The purpose of the meetings was to
harmonize and coordinate the different interventions and initiatives in Madagascar. Project
implementation will also follow a participatory approach, through quarterly meetings of the
Technical Committee involving all project beneficiaries. The workshops that will be organized
during the mid-term and project completion report missions will be further opportunities for public
consultation.
2.7 Bank Group Experience and Lessons Reflected in Project Design
2.7.1 The volume of the Bank's portfolio in Madagascar in late May 2013 represented UA
187.95 million for eleven (11) operations. The sectors covered by the portfolio are: industry
(52%), water and sanitation (23%), agriculture (17%), social (5%) and energy (3%). The public
sector comprises nine (9) projects amounting to UA 83.2 million or 44% of the portfolio. Besides
projects financed through loans, there are two emergency aid and two other operations7 financed
through grants. The performance of the Bank's public sector portfolio, rated at 2.18 out of 3 exceeds
7 Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for the Prevention of Epidemics; (ii) Emergency Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Social Infrastructure
Following the Passage of Cyclone Giovanna Irina (iii) PPR-Rehabilitation and Extension of the Lower Mangoky Scheme (iv) PPF - Mid-West Young Rural Enterprises
10
the 2012 and 2009 performance levels (1.8 and 2.14 out of 3, respectively). As at 10 May 2013, the
public portfolio’s disbursement rate was 37% against 44.1% in March 2012. The low disbursement
rate is partly due to the poor performance of four projects in terms of disbursement8 and the
completion of two projects (PRIBG and PRPT9) in 2012. The portfolio has no problematic project.
However, there are three risky projects representing 33.33% of the public portfolio (Annex II).
2.7.2 The implementation of PRIBG (closed in 2012, Completion Report ADF/BD/IF/2012/144)
contributed to improving public finance management in Madagascar, notably through PFM training
of 11,000 government officials, the deployment of ASYCUDA + + (Customs) and SIGTAS
(Taxation), the establishment of SIEA (Registration) and the deployment of procurement
management software. PRIBG helped to improve tax mobilization, budget preparation and
management, and strengthened the procurement system. Besides the aforementioned gains, the
PRIBG completion report highlighted a number of lessons that are reflected in the design of the
operation under consideration. Table 8 summarizes the key lessons and how they were factored in
during PAGI preparation (Technical Annex A4 on lessons learned in Madagascar, Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Burundi).
Table 8
Lessons Learnt from Previous Institutional Support Projects
Lessons Learnt Measures to Reflect Lessons in the Project
Too broad a scope
At identification, discussions focused on limiting the number of project beneficiary
structures and continued during the preparation and appraisal missions. They helped to
limit the number of beneficiary structures to 10 against 32 under PRIBG.
Too many micro-
activities
At identification, discussions focused on limiting the number of project beneficiary
structures and continued during the preparation and appraisal missions. They helped to
limit the number of project components to 3 with 6 sub-components.
Project
Implementation Unit
anchored at the
Presidency
The Project Implementation Unit was identified at preparation and an agreement was
reached with the Malagasy party on the institutional anchoring of the PIU at the Prime
Minister’s Office, more specifically at COS/PREA. As a technical body, its anchoring
at the Prime Minister’s Office strengthens efficiency and complementarity with other
donors whose projects are also attached to it. The project will be managed by a
centralized management office which is common to all projects that are institutionally
attached to COS/PREA.
Weak coordination of
different technical and
financial partner
interventions in the
sector
The project design was closely coordinated with the interventions of other
development partners. Using the same Project Implementation Unit with all projects of
the same type attached to the Prime Minister’s Office (e.g. the World Bank’s on-going
PGDI-II) will help harmonize the interventions of the two banks in the sector.
8 (i) Tuléar Fishing Communities Support Project (60%, 7 months to the end), (ii) Drinking Water Supply Project (31%, 7 months to the end) (iii)
Supplementary Loan to PRBM (1% over 4 years after approval but with only one year of implementation due to the crisis), and (iv) PPF for the
preparation of PRBM -II (0%). 9 The PRPT completion report was prepared in May 2013. Its validation is on-going.
11
2.8 Key Performance Indicators
The key performance indicators identified and PAGI’s expected outcomes on completion are shown
in the results-based logical framework. They are mainly:
Box 1
Key Performance Indicators Output indicators
Addressing of Tuléar town completed by 2016
At least 20 decentralized taxation centres operational by 2016
21 financial control delegations operational by 2016
At least 50 persons trained in extractive resources between 2014 and 2016
Outcome indicators
Improved fiscal resource mobilization with an increase in government revenue, from 10.9% in
2012 to 13% in 2016
Improved internal and external control systems with shorter timeframes for tabling budget
review bills before Parliament below 9 months between 2006 and 2016 (24 months for the last
bill tabled in 2006, less than 15 months in 2016)
The fight against corruption is scaled up with Transparency International’s corruption index
moving from 32 in 2012 to 36 in 2016;
Madagascar acquires the status of EITI compliant country in 2016
Impact Indicators
The GDP Economic Growth Rate rises from 1.9% in 2012 to at least 4% in 2018
The ratings for the Mo Ibrahim governance index relating to “accountability” and “public
management” rise from 51.7 and 55.5 in 2012 to 54 and 58 in 2018, respectively.
III. PROJECT FEASIBILITY
3.1 Economic and Financial Performance
This project does not generate direct revenue which would help establish a financial
return. Accordingly, the project’s performance is assessed based on the direct and indirect impact
of its achievements at the economic and social level in the medium and long term. The rationale for
the proposed operation is its contribution towards enhancing government’s performance by
improving public finance management. Such benefits will result from restoring human and
technical capacity to improve public resource mobilization, internal and external controls,
strengthen the fight against corruption and increase transparency in the extractive industry. Through
better public finance management, the project targets a positive medium-term impact on economic
growth, access to social services and poverty reduction.
3.2. Environmental and Social Impact
3.2.1. The proposed project will have no negative environmental impact. Rather, greater
transparency in the extractive industry sector will probably have a positive effect on the
environment. Support to capacity building for the Mining Sector Observatory will also enable better
monitoring of the environmental impact of mining. The project is classified in Category 3 in terms
of environmental impact.
3.2.2. The proposed project will improve gender equality outcomes in terms of human
resource development. For instance, in organizing training, efforts will be made to target women
candidates. This will enable the training of over 200 women in the various beneficiary institutions.
Similarly, ARMP’s training activities under this project will seek to provide capacity building for
women so as to increase women entrepreneurs’ participation in bidding for public contracts.
Generally, at least 25% of trainees in each case will be women.
12
3.2.3. Social Impact: The project will contribute to increased public resources (10.9% of GDP in
2012 to 13% of GDP in 2016), thus supporting improved access to social services and poverty
reduction (the incidence of poverty stood at 76% in 2010) thanks to an increase in pro-poor
spending and infrastructure, as well as better governance in the financial and extractive sectors.
3.2.4. Impact on overall governance: The project will contribute directly towards improving the
country’s public finance management system, notably through capacity building in public resource
management, public procurement, and control of public spending. The project will lead to, inter
alia, better collection of tax and non-tax revenue (about 90% of the municipalities will be subject to
local taxation and Tuléar town will be addressed by 2016), the deployment of transparent public
procurement systems that are consistent with the principle of accountability, and improved
transparency (establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system at the mining observatory) in the
extractive sector through support for the preparation of mining sector audit reports by 2015.
3.2.5. Involuntary Resettlement: The project will not entail any population displacement.
IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. Implementation Arrangements
4.1.1. Executing Agency: Under the guidance of a Steering and Monitoring Committee (COS),
PREA which is attached to the Prime Minister’s Office will coordinate PAGI implementation
through a Centralized Project Management Office (BdG) set up by the Prime Minister. The BdG
currently acts as implementation unit of the World Bank’s Governance and Institutional
Development Support Project, Phase II (PGDI-II). It is expected that its mandate will be extended
to PAGI’s implementation. In this regard, COS, which comprises representatives of institutions
involved in BdG-managed projects (including representatives of regions, municipalities, civil
society and the private sector), will approve the PAGI annual work programme. Furthermore, a
COS select committee will carry out quarterly monitoring of PAGI implementation. At the end of
each year, COS will approve the annual project progress report (see Technical Annex B2 on the
detailed implementation arrangements).
4.1.2. The BdG is currently headed by a Director who is assisted by a monitoring and evaluation
Officer, a PDGI-II components management officer and a fiduciary and support staff management
officer. PAGI will recruit the BdG deputy director, the fiduciary staff and other personnel to
manage and monitor PAGI components. Recruitments will be on a competitive basis in line with
the Bank’s rules and procedures, based on terms of reference approved by the Bank. The BdG will
be responsible for preparing all reports, budgets and terms of reference as well as the fiduciary
management of the project. The Government through PREA will provide the BdG with adequate
office space. The BdG was evaluated during the appraisal mission and its performance was deemed
satisfactory overall.
4.1.3. Financial Management: The BdG will carry out the financial management of project
resources according to Bank rules and procedures. The BdG already has an official for the fiduciary
management of PGDI-II. The fiduciary staff recruited on a competitive basis (administrative and
financial officer (RAF) and an accountant) have been in place for several years (the accountant’s
contract was renewed in late 2012) and master financial management procedures of the TFPs. The
terms of reference of the fiduciary team in place will be amended so that the team is in charge of the
fiduciary management of all PREA-supervised projects. Financial management software is in place
and will be adapted to also manage the ADF resources. An administrative and financial
management procedures manual already exists and will be amended to reflect the financial
management of ADF funds and factor in the external auditors’ recommendations. An assessment of
13
the BdG shows that the project’s overall financial management risk is considered moderate. The
project’s fiduciary team will be strengthened with the recruitment of an Assistant Accountant for
procurement and an internal auditor. The recruitments will be on a competitive basis and in line
with Bank procedures. The BdG will prepare an annual work programme and the related budget
before the beginning of each fiscal year, that will be approved by COS and transmitted to the Bank
for comments (cf. Para. 4.1.1 and Technical Annex B3). The BdG will prepare quarterly activity
reports and financial reports in a format acceptable to the ADF, which will be forwarded to the ADF
for comment within 45 days of the end of each quarter.
4.1.4. Disbursements: Disbursements will be made in accordance with Bank rules and
procedures. Possible disbursement methods will be: direct payment and revolving fund. A
disbursement letter will be sent by the ADF specifying the disbursement details. Two special
accounts will be opened in a bank acceptable to the ADF, to exclusively receive the revolving fund
(ADF loan and grant) managed by the fiduciary team. A deposit account will be opened at the
Treasury to receive project funds that will be included annually in the Finance Act.
4.1.5. Audit: The project’s annual financial statements and financial monitoring reports prepared
by the BdG shall be audited by a competent and independent audit firm. The audits will be
conducted according to the Bank’s auditing Terms of Reference. Each audit will cover the
Borrower’s fiscal year period. The audited financial statements will be submitted to the Bank no
later than 6 months after the end of the year to which it relates. The cost of the audit will be
financed from the ADF loan resources. The status of implementation of audit recommendations will
be monitored regularly by the Bank. In accordance with the Bank’s information policy, the project
will publish on its website, within the month following the validation of the final audit report, audit
reports including qualified audit reports.
4.1.6. Procurement Arrangements: All goods and consultancy services financed from Fund
resources (grants and loans) will be procured in accordance with Bank Rules and Procedures for the
Procurement of Goods and Works, and Rules and Procedures for the Use of Consultancy Services
(May 2008 Edition, Revised 2012), using the Bank’s standard bidding documents. The BdG (see
para. 4.1.1.) will be responsible for the procurement of goods and consultancy services financed by
the Fund. The BdG has the capability to manage procurements and has solid experience that it has
acquired by managing the World Bank-financed PGDI II. However, to efficiently implement the
additional volume of procurement activities generated by PAGI, it will be provided with
supplementary material and human resources, including recruitment of an assistant procurement
officer. A draft procurement plan prepared by the BdG will be submitted to the Bank for review and
approval prior to negotiations (see Technical Annex B4 for details on procurement).
4.2. Monitoring and Evaluation
In collaboration with the beneficiary institutions, COS, PREA and BdG are responsible for
all monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities. PREA and BdG will prepare quarterly project
progress reports that will be sent to COS, beneficiary institutions; project stakeholders and the ADF
(see Section 4.1 and Technical Annex B2 and B3). PAGI plans to recruit a monitoring and
evaluation specialist for the BdG. The reports shall present the project progress according to the
logical framework. These reports will also be published on the project website. Furthermore,
periodic M & E supervision missions (two per year) will be fielded, in collaboration with MGFO,
and a mid-term review to assess project implementation performance conducted in close
coordination with the World Bank. In addition, the Bank will prepare a project completion report
within three months of the last disbursement. The project milestones are indicated in the table
below.
14
Table 9
Milestones in PAGI Implementation
Timeline Milestone Monitoring Process/Feedback
Loop
September 2013 Board Approval Board Resolution /Letter to the
Government
December 2013 Effectiveness Bank
January 2014 Finalization of management team
recruitment
Government
January 2014 Project start-up/ launching mission Bank/Government
January 2014 – June
2016
Goods and services procurement Government/PREA
Twice yearly Project Supervision Bank/Government/PREA
End of each quarter Quarterly progress reports Government/PREA
3rd quarter of 2015 Mid-term review Bank/Government/PREA
January 2017 Project Completion Report Bank/Government/PREA
4.3 Governance
A rigorous project governance structure has been put in place to manage the
implementation, monitoring and fiduciary aspects, including the project audit, as presented in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above and in Technical Annexes B2, B3 and B4. The preparation and regular
updating of a procurement plan, preview of procurement operations by the National Tenders Board
(NTB), formation of the qualified Tenders Committee (TC), the application of Bank rules and
procedures for procurement and financial management, the use of a procedures manual for
administrative and financial management, the preparation of project implementation reports, regular
financial reports and regular audits will strengthen project governance. A rigorous process of
selecting training beneficiaries, the formal appointment of focal points in the beneficiary institutions
responsible for monitoring activities, the involvement of project stakeholders through COS, regular
consultations and the recruitment an internal auditor for the BdG are also measures to help mitigate
the risks. Monitoring and regular supervision, including joint supervision of the project with TFPs
mainly through the Bank’s office in Madagascar will strengthen the verification of project
governance and performance.
4.4 Sustainability
The sustainability of PAGI10
gains rests first and foremost on the determination of
the Malagasy authorities to support improvements in public finance management and
transparency in the extractive sector. By focusing on domestic revenue mobilization and
improving the effectiveness of public expenditure through reinforcement of control systems and
steady pursuit of the fight against corruption, PAGI will enable the authorities to improve the tax
revenue level. This will help to strengthen the State’s poverty reduction effort. Staff of different
beneficiary structures will be trained locally by trainers from the administration. The trainers
themselves will also be trained, to ensure continuity of training for future generations. Knowledge
acquisition and mastery of modern management tools will enable better qualification and
performance of the Malagasy public administration. Under PAGI, manuals and guides will be
prepared for beneficiary structures. The formal designation of focal points in beneficiary institutions
under the project will help to sustain activities over time within such structures. Lastly, the
establishment of a Centralized Project Management Office (BdG) with the World Bank and other
projects attached to PREA will also contribute to project sustainability.
10 However, it is difficult to strike the right balance between tangible achievements and sustainable capacity in a country that is going through a
political crisis, which has led to a weakening of the State and its institutions.
15
4.5 Risk Management
Table 10 below provides a summary of the residual risks (other than those related to governance
and sustainability) as well as mitigation measures.
Table 10
Risks and Mitigation Measures Risks Level Mitigation Measures
Political, institutional and macro-economic risk:
Since 2009, Madagascar has been going through a
political crisis that has led to a weakening of
institutions, a significant decline in revenue and the
implementation of fiscal austerity. Institutions have
been weakened by macroeconomic shocks as well
as repeated cyclones. A protracted political crisis
and macro-economic shocks could jeopardize
project implementation and attainment of project
objectives. The lack of political stability and the
fragility of institutions could delay the
implementation of reforms, due notably to the
absence of strategic orientation of the reform
programme and resistance to change.
High
The international community’s on-going support
and mediation for the holding of elections and
ending of the crisis probably before end 2013 is
a factor that can mitigate this major risk.
Improved revenue mobilization, the authorities’
continued prudent fiscal policy, project activities
and those of other TFPs to strengthen
governance are all risk mitigation measures.
Lastly, support by the project and other TFPs for
the preparation of a public finance management
reform strategy and capacity building for change
management are also risk mitigation factors.
Operational risk: The lack of institutional
capacity implies a risk of project implementation
delays and inadequate coordination of donor
interventions. There is also a risk of departure of
people trained under the project. Average
The project’s targeted approach, the
establishment of a Centralized Project
Management Office (BdG) within PREA, close
coordination between TFPs, notably in
monitoring project implementation and regular
supervision of PAGI will help to mitigate this
risk. Project activities will also reduce
institutional capacity weaknesses. The risk of
departure of trained persons is mitigated by the
large number of persons that will be trained.
Fiduciary risks and corruption. The weakness of
internal control, procurement and PFM capacity
increase fiduciary, conflict of interest and
corruption risks. This could lead to embezzlement
or misappropriation of funds or project resources Average
The risk mitigation measures are presented in
Section 4.1 and the technical annexes. The
project funds will be managed in line with
Bank's rules and procedures for financial
management, procurement, disbursement and
auditing; also, project management will be
transparent. Moreover, monitoring and
supervision by the Bank in close collaboration
with the other TFPs will help to mitigate this
risk.
4.6 Knowledge Building
Knowledge will be acquired through skills transfer, thanks to technical assistance and
training at the local, regional and international level. PAGI will contribute towards knowledge
building and skills development, notably in public finance management, fraud and corruption
control as well as transparency in the extractive industry. Under public finance management,
knowledge will be acquired through technical assistance and training in the following areas: (i)
revenue mobilization; and (ii) internal and external ex post control. The project will also develop
manuals and finance studies, including a study on illicit trafficking, assessment of the fiscal policy
and development of a public finance management strategy. Furthermore, the project will support the
PEFA self-assessment. The introduction of a mining sector statistical monitoring mechanism and
information system will allow for better knowledge of Madagascar’s mining sector.
16
V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5.1. Legal Instrument
The project’s financing instrument is an ADF-12 loan of UA 3.35 million, an ADF loan of
UA 0.970 million (reuse of the balance from cancellation of ADF loans) and a grant of UA 0.180
million (reuse of the balance from an ADF grant cancellation). The loan and grant protocol
agreements between the Government of Madagascar and the African Development Fund shall be
signed by the parties concerned.
5.2. Conditions for Bank’s Intervention
5.2.1. Conditions precedent to loan and grant effectiveness: The loan agreement shall become
effective on the date of fulfilment, to the Bank’s satisfaction, of the conditions under Section 12.01
of the General Conditions Applicable to ADF Loan Agreements and Guarantee Agreements. The
grant protocol agreement shall become effective on the date of its signature by the Malagasy
Government and the African Development Fund.
5.2.2. Conditions precedent to first disbursement of the ADF loan and grant: The first
disbursement of the loan and grant resources shall be subject to effectiveness of the said grant
protocols, and to:
(i) submission of the text: (a) attaching the Project to the Administration Efficiency
Reform Programme (PREA) to enable it supervise the project; and (b) defining the
mandate of BdG and its Director;
(ii) submission of the originals or certified true copies of the certificate showing the
opening of: (a) a special account in the name of the project with a bank acceptable to
the Fund to receive the loan resources, and bearing the complete bank references of
the account; and (b) a deposit account in Ariary with the Antananarivo General
Revenue Office to receive the Government’s counterpart contribution.
5.3. Compliance with Bank Policies
The project complies with all applicable Bank policies.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Management recommends that the Board approve the proposal to: (i) grant an ADF loan not
exceeding UA 4.320 million; and (ii) award an ADF grant not exceeding UA 0.180 million to the
Republic of Madagascar to finance the Institutional Governance Support Project, under the terms
and conditions set forth in this report.
Annex I
I
MADAGASCAR COMPARATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
YearMadagasca
rAfrica
Develo-
ping
Countries
Develo-
ped
Countries
Basic Indicators
Area ( '000 Km²) 2011 587 30 323 98 458 35 811Total Population (millions) 2012 21,9 1 070,1 5 807,6 1 244,6Urban Population (% of Total) 2012 31,0 40,8 46,0 75,7Population Density (per Km²) 2012 36,3 34,5 70,0 23,4GNI per Capita (US $) 2011 430 1 609 3 304 38 657Labor Force Participation - Total (%) 2012 47,5 37,8 68,7 71,7Labor Force Participation - Female (%) 2012 49,1 42,5 39,1 43,9Gender -Related Dev elopment Index Value 2007-2011 0,541 0,502 0,694 0,911Human Dev elop. Index (Rank among 186 countries) 2012 151 ... ... ...Popul. Liv ing Below $ 1.25 a Day (% of Population)2010-2011 81,3 40,0 22,4 ...
Demographic Indicators
Population Grow th Rate - Total (%) 2012 2,8 2,3 1,3 0,3Population Grow th Rate - Urban (%) 2012 4,1 3,4 2,3 0,7Population < 15 y ears (%) 2012 42,4 40,0 28,5 16,6Population >= 65 y ears (%) 2012 3,1 3,6 6,0 16,5Dependency Ratio (%) 2012 83,7 77,3 52,5 49,3Sex Ratio (per 100 female) 2012 99,4 100,0 103,4 94,7Female Population 15-49 y ears (% of total population) 2012 23,8 49,8 53,2 45,5Life Ex pectancy at Birth - Total (y ears) 2012 66,9 58,1 67,3 77,9Life Ex pectancy at Birth - Female (y ears) 2012 68,6 59,1 69,2 81,2Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 2012 34,7 33,3 20,9 11,4Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 2012 6,3 10,9 7,8 10,1Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2012 40,8 71,4 46,4 6,0Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2012 57,2 111,3 66,7 7,8Total Fertility Rate (per w oman) 2012 4,5 4,2 2,6 1,7Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 2010 240,0 417,8 230,0 13,7Women Using Contraception (%) 2012 42,9 31,6 62,4 71,4
Health & Nutrition Indicators
Phy sicians (per 100,000 people) 2004-2010 16,1 49,2 112,2 276,2Nurses (per 100,000 people)* 2004-2009 32,0 134,7 187,6 730,7Births attended by Trained Health Personnel (%) 2009-2010 43,9 53,7 65,4 ...Access to Safe Water (% of Population) 2010 46,0 67,3 86,4 99,5Access to Health Serv ices (% of Population) 2000 38,0 65,2 80,0 100,0Access to Sanitation (% of Population) 2010 15,0 39,8 56,2 99,9Percent. of Adults (aged 15-49) Liv ing w ith HIV/AIDS 2011 0,3 4,6 0,9 0,4Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000) 2011 238,0 234,6 146,0 14,0Child Immunization Against Tuberculosis (%) 2011 82,0 81,6 83,9 95,4Child Immunization Against Measles (%) 2011 70,0 76,5 83,7 93,0Underw eight Children (% of children under 5 y ears) 2004-2011 36,8 19,8 17,4 1,7Daily Calorie Supply per Capita 2009 2 117 2 481 2 675 3 285Public Ex penditure on Health (as % of GDP) 2010 3,8 5,9 2,9 8,2
Education Indicators
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)
Primary School - Total 2010-2012 148,4 101,9 103,1 106,6 Primary School - Female 2010-2012 147,1 98,4 105,1 102,8 Secondary School - Total 2009-2012 31,1 42,3 66,3 101,5 Secondary School - Female 2009-2012 30,2 38,5 65,0 101,4Primary School Female Teaching Staff (% of Total) 2011 55,8 43,2 58,6 80,0Adult literacy Rate - Total (%) 2009-2010 64,5 67,0 80,8 98,3Adult literacy Rate - Male (%) 2009-2010 67,4 75,8 86,4 98,7Adult literacy Rate - Female (%) 2009-2010 61,6 58,4 75,5 97,9Percentage of GDP Spent on Education 2008-2011 2,8 5,3 3,9 5,2
Environmental Indicators
Land Use (Arable Land as % of Total Land Area) 2011 6,0 7,6 10,7 10,8Annual Rate of Deforestation (%) 2000-2009 1,0 0,6 0,4 -0,2Forest (As % of Land Area) 2011 21,5 23,0 28,7 40,4Per Capita CO2 Emissions (metric tons) 2009 0,1 1,2 3,1 11,4
Sources : AfDB Statistics Department Databases; World Bank: World Development Indicators; last update :
UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO, UNICEF, WRI, UNDP; Country Reports.
Note : n.a. : Not Applicable ; … : Data Not Available.
COMPARATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Madagascar
May 2013
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Infant Mortality Rate( Per 1000 )
Madaga scar Africa
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
GNI Per Capita US $
Madaga scar Africa
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Population Growth Rate (%)
Madagascar Africa
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Madaga scar
Africa
Annex II
II
Table of AfDB Portfolio in Madagascar
PUBLIC SECTOR PORTFOLIO
PROJECT NAME Status Sector
Loan
Amount
(UA)
Amount
Disbursed (UA)
Disbursement
Rate
Approval
Date
Signature
Date
Disbursement
Effectiveness
Loan
Effectiveness
Last
Disbursement
Date
1. MANOMBO SCHEME REHABILITATION PROJECT
OnGo Agriculture 9 497 277 7 032 223 74% 21.11.2007 25.03.2008 06.05.2008 06.05.2008 31.12.2013
PPF- MANOMBO SCHEME REHABILITATION
PROJECT OnGo Agriculture 300 000 297 270 99% 10.07.2012 14.09.2012
14.09.2012 31.03.2015
2. PPF – MID-WEST RURAL ENTERP. PROJ. APVD Agriculture 450 500 -
24.09.2012 08.11.2012 11.04.2013 08.11.2012 31.12.2014
3. LOWER MANGOKY SUPPLEMENTARY
LOAN OnGo Agriculture 15 000 000 136 857 1% 03.12.2008 22.01.2009 22.12.2011 22.12.2011 31.12.2015
4. PPF - LOWER MANGOKY II
PREPARATION OnGo Agriculture 500 000 - 0 10.07.2012 14.09.2012
14.09.2012 31.03.2015
5. TUL .FISHING COMMUNITIES SUPPORT OnGo Agriculture 6 325 000 3 767 331 60% 16.11.2005 02.03.2006 26.10.2006 21.04.2006 30.12.2013
6. DRINKING WATER SUPPLY PROGRAMME OnGo Water
Sup/Sanit 43 839 689 13 707 900 31% 21.12.2005 02.03.2006 08.06.2006 08.06.2006 31.12.2013
7. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES CONTROL OnGo Social 6 000 000 4 353 146 73% 08.12.2004 13.01.2005 05.12.2005 13.01.2005 30.11.2013
8. GIOVANNA IRINA TORNADO
EMERGENCY AID OnGo Social 663 570 663 570 100% 12.07.2012 23.08.2012
23.08.2012 31.03.2013
9. EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE EPIDEMICS PREV. OnGo Social 623 383 623 383 100%
30.01.2012
TOTAL 83 199 419 30 581 679 37%
PRIVATE SECTOR PORTFOLIO
PROJECT NAME Status Sector
Loan
Amount
(UA)
Amount
Disbursed (UA)
Disbursement
Rate
Approval
Date
Signature
Date
Disbursement
Effectiveness
Loan
Effectiveness
Last
Disbursement Date
AMBATOVY NICKEL PROJECT OnGo Ind/Mini/Quar 99 535 501 99 535 501 100 02.05.2007 22.08.2007 26.03.2008 26.03.2008 22.08.2011
SAHANIVOTRY SMALL HYDRO POWER
OnGo Power 5 218 480 5 218 480 100 05.07.2007 25.09.2007 04.10.2007 28.09.2007 30.06.2008
TOTAL
104 753
981 104 753 981 100
Annex III
III
MAP OF PROJECT AREA
This map has been provided by the staff of the African Development Bank Group exclusively for the use of the readers of the
report to which it is attached. The names used and the borders shown do not imply on the part of the AfDB Group and its
members any judgment concerning the legal status of a territory nor any approval or acceptance of these borders.