[mahmood davari] the political thought of ayatolla(bookos.org)

THE POLIT ICAL THOUGHT OFA Y A T U L L A H

MURTA Z.

A MU T. AHHARI

Ayatullah Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari was a significant figure in the movement that

brought into being the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mut.ahhari, a particularlyclose student of Ayatullah Khomeini, is considered one of the most promi-nent intellectual figures among Iranian and Shi‘ite scholars of his time.

This book presents the life and works of this philosopher, jurist, preacherand writer, who was educated in the Qum Seminary and worked in Tehran.It describes how Mut.ahhari became familiar with Marxism and secularism,and how he responded to the challenge of these two movements. It demon-strates how he gradually represented himself as a major theorist, offeringideological analyses of Islam. The book highlights Mut.ahhari’s non-radical,non-violent way of action.

Mahmood T. Davari is uniquely qualified to write about this influentialman, having been one of Mut.ahhari’s students, as well as the student ofMut.ahhari’s lifelong friend, Ayatullah Montazeri. Drawing upon firsthandreports, notes and interviews with Mut.ahhari’s family and friends, theauthor highlights less-documented parts of the political trends in contem-porary Iranian society. This book will appeal to scholars and studentsinterested in modern Iranian politics and those with an interest in repre-sentations of Islam and Shi‘ism.

Mahmood T. Davari is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Qum.

ROUTLEDGECURZON/BIPSPERSIAN STUDIES SERIES

Editorial BoardProfessor C.E. Bosworth, Dr V.S. Curtis, Dr R.M. Gleave,

Dr V.A. Martin

In this series, RoutledgeCurzon in association with the British Institute ofPersian Studies (BIPS) publishes scholarly books in the social sciences andhumanities on Iran. Such works include: original research monographs;suitably revised theses; specially planned books deriving from conferences;specially commissioned, multi-authored research books and translations.

1. Iranian History and PoliticsThe dialectic of state and society

Homa Katouzian

2. The Making of Modern IranState and society under Riza Shah 1921–1941

Edited by Stephanie Cronin

3. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern IranNew perspectives on the Iranian left

Edited by Stephanie Cronin

4. Religion and Society in Qajar IranEdited by Robert Gleave

5. The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari

An Iranian theoretician of the Islamic stateMahmood T. Davari

THE POLITICAL THOUGHTOF AYATULLAH

MURTAZ.

A MUT. AHHARI

An Iranian theoreticianof the Islamic state

Mahmood T. Davari

First published 2005by RoutledgeCurzon

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby RoutledgeCurzon

270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2005 Mahmood T. Davari

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced orutilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, nowknown or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or inany information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing

from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0–415–34159–0

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’scollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

(Print Edition)

ISBN 0-203-33523-6 Master e-book ISBN

DEDICATED TO THE EVERLASTING ANDTREASURED MEMORY OF AYATULLAH

SHAHID MURTAZ.

A MUT. AHHARI(MAY HIS SOUL REST IN PEACE)

vii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix

Introduction 1

1 The period of education 6

From a clerical family 6The Mashhad Seminary: centre of traditionalism 7Reza Khan and the religious seminaries 9The uprising of the Gauharshad Mosque 12With the family again 13Move to the Qum Seminary 14Finding the second ideal man 15A classmate and a friend for life 16In search of the third ideal figure 17Higher education 18A close friend of Fadaiyan-i Islam 20Fear of the Tudih Party 24Unsuccessful efforts at reform 29

2 Academic works and political activities 31

An architect of modern Islamic theology 31A desirable chair for the young philosopher 32An active speaker at the Islamic associations 34At the core of the political arena 35A theorist of the Islamic coalition groups 38Epic of the righteous, stories for moralists 40H. usainiyih-i Irshad, the unfulfilled expectations 41A debate with the secularists on women’s rights 50

viii

C O N T E N T S

A debate with traditionalists and secularists on women’s veils 51Islam and Iran, a debate with the nationalists 55A harsh attitude towards the Marxist guerrillas 61A message to the Muslim activists 67A bridge between shifting time and permanent Islam 69A debate with a poet about H. afiz.’s gnosticism 70Return to Qum 72Debates with Muslim leftist guerrillas 74A key figure in the Islamic Revolution 84

3 Economic perspectives 86

Writings on economics 86What does ‘Islamic economics’ mean? 89Principles 97The state and economics 115

4 Political views 121

A glance at the past 121The necessity of having a ruler 127Relationship between ruler and ruled 129Islamic rule 130A reconsideration of the different interpretations of the

theory of Islamic rule 142

Conclusion 161

Notes 167Bibliography 186Index 195

ix

I would like to thank the Ministry of Sciences and High Education of Iran fora grant which enabled me to do research in Manchester. I owe very specialthanks to the late Mulla Asghar-Ali, Muhammad-Ali Taskhiri, Muhammad-Mahdi Muvah. h. idi, Ja‘far Hadi-Hasan, Farhad and Farrukh Sekalishfar,Muhsin Tavangar, Muhammad Musavi Bahreini and the late John Cooperfor their support in a variety of ways. I am most grateful to Paul Luft,Vanessa Martin and Muhammad Legenhausen for their scholarly comments.My thanks also go to Jonathan Price, Dorothea Schaefter, Joe Whiting, ZoeBotterill, James Cooke, Frances Nugent and other members of the editorialteam for their valuable co-operation. I thank and pray for my son Entez. arwho assisted me whenever I needed him.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The manifestations of Islamism are quite visible, today, not only in theIslamic world, but also in the West among Muslim minorities. Islamicpractices, such as wearing the Islamic veil (h. ijab), growing a beard,consuming Islamically slaughtered (h. alal) meat, non-alcoholic drinks, etc.,are all familiar to Western people. These rituals are currently observed, notonly in traditional and ordinary Muslim circles, but also by enthusiastic topMuslim academics and political activists who have been educated in well-known Western universities.

While most Islamic societies were under the influence and severe pressureof (state-) secular ideologies such as Marxism, socialism and nationalism foralmost half a century, the tendency towards Islamism rose and graduallyexpanded in reaction to those state-propagated ideologies. At first, theIslamist movements were relatively limited and local; however, theyprogressed and intensified, covering the vast majority of people, influencingtheir lives and ideals, mobilizing them towards independence and self-reliance. Thus an international network was established after the victory ofthe Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) that has become a source of hope evenfor many non-Islamic movements. This revolution undoubtedly played a rolein promoting Islamic feelings and consciousness among the Muslim massesaround the globe. The Islamists, regardless of their differences in policy,adopted Islam as their identity, their way of living and their strategy.However, they may be classified into three groups: (i) the rigid, extreme,superficial; (ii) the moderate, logical and truthful; and (iii) the liberal,pragmatist and compromising. All three share the view that Islam holds thekey to their present and future problems.

This present massive tendency towards Islamism or, in my own words, anIslamic type of living, among Muslims, is indeed the result of several lifetimeendeavours by Muslim theoreticians and political activists, includingAyatullah Mut.ahhari. His role is more visible than others, perhaps, inrendering Islam an up-to-date comprehensive social-political ideology com-patible with modern times and present needs. His writings are still widelydistributed and massively read in Islamic groups and Shi‘ite communities. As

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a distinguished Islamic leader, he played a very important role, particularlyin the case of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Therefore, he can be considered as amajor force behind present-day Islamism and Islamic movements, especiallyin its Shi‘i branch.

Ayatullah Hajj Shaikh Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari Farimani (1920–79) was from

a clerical family, a pupil of Ayatullah Khomeini, a university Professor ofPhilosophy and a Mujtahid (jurist) in Islamic law at the Shi‘ite seminary. Heis highly regarded among the most distinguished and respected scholars, notonly in the Islamic world, but also by Islamologists in the West. He has beendescribed and praised with words and phrases that are rarely used for others,such as ‘the Son of the Time’,1 ‘one of the most prominent contemporaryintellectual figures among the Iranian clergy’,2 ‘a powerful intellectual forcefor almost a quarter of a century’,3 ‘one of the principal architects of the newIslamic consciousness in Iran’,4 ‘a scholar who best delivered the Islamicideology from the very depths of the Islamic sacred history, and rendered it alegitimate historical updating of the Muslim doctrinal self-understanding’,5

‘an outstanding political theorist, reformer and radical activist’,6 ‘a highranking thinker, philosopher, jurist, and a rare Islamologist’,7 ‘a reformist ofIslamic thought in modern times’,8 ‘a guardian of the frontiers of the Islamicideology’,9 ‘a theoretician of Islamic rule’10 and ‘the ideologue of Islam-ifiqahati [an interpretation of Islam which maintains that only Mujtahids areauthorized to interpret the Islamic texts and rule the people]’.11 The thenPresident (and present leader) Khamenei stated that ‘Mut.ahhari’s views haveformed the theoretical foundations of our (Islamic) Republic’.12 Hence,the importance of Mut.ahhari for understanding modern Islamic socialand political philosophies, the Islamic movement and Islamic Iran, isindisputable.

The importance of Mut.ahhari’s works is based, first, on their compre-hensiveness and complexity. Similar to Marxist totalism, they cover almostall parts of human social-political issues, including theology, philosophy,history, sociology, ethics, education, the law, economics and politics. Simul-taneously challenging traditionalism, Marxism, secularism and monarchism,Mut.ahhari presents an alternative total Islamic system, Islamic world viewand social political ideology. Second, Mut.ahhari offers a unique type ofanalysis. He neither builds his arguments by means of reason (‘aql) alone – asdoes the liberal – nor does he limit himself to a literal understanding ofreligious texts – as do conservatives. Supporting his arguments with religioustexts, Mut.ahhari prefers rational interpretations. While referring to theIslamic texts, he does not neglect man’s intellectual achievements.

Although a number of articles and books concerning Mut.ahhari’s life andviews have been published in the West and in Iran after his assassination,nevertheless, owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the sources, no majorcomprehensive study of his life and socio-political philosophy has yetappeared. In his ‘Introduction’ (1985), Hamid Algar deals only with


3

Mut.ahhari’s biography, not his works and philosophy.13 Michael J. Fischerand Mehdi Abedi’s Debating Muslims (1990) deals with Mut.ahhari only as apart of their anthropological studies on dialogues about postmodernity andtradition within Muslim communities.14 Apart from their brief biography ofMut.ahhari, they restrict themselves to Mut.ahhari’s Islam va Iran and hisviews about Iranian nationality. Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema’s analysisof Mut.ahhari’s political thought (1990) is part of their post-RevolutionIranian studies. However, they did not mention the events of Mut.ahhari’slife. Further, they deal mainly with some less important aspects of hispolitical views and economic philosophy. Mut.ahhari’s milestone books oneconomics, Naz.ari bi Niz.am-i Iqtisadi-yi Islam and Mas’alih-yi Riba and alsohis views on the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih are not discussed in their studies.15

Although J. G. J. Haar’s interesting article on Mut.ahhari’s life and thought(1990–2) does not leave out any major event of Mut.ahhari’s life, it isconcerned with three subjects of his works and academic activities: namely,Iranian nationality, the Islamic veil and the Islamic Revolution. AlthoughHaar refers to a considerable number of Persian publications aboutMut.ahhari, he does not use Vathiqi Rad’s collection, which is regarded as themain source about Mut.ahhari’s life in Persian literature.16 Hamid Dabashi’sscholarly study on Mut.ahhari (1993) is part of his research on the ideologicalfoundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although he discusses almostall political aspects of Mut.ahhari’s Islamic ideology, his book does notinclude much in the way of discussion of the economic dimension of thisideology, failing to mention two of Mut.ahhari’s major economics books.17

Vanessa Martin’s interesting analysis of Mut.ahhari’s political philosophy(2000) constitutes a part of her book on Ayatullah Khomeini’s ideology ofthe Islamic state, although it does not include Mut.ahhari’s social work andpolitical activities.18

The Yad-namih-yi Ustad-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, edited by ‘Abdul-Karim Surush in 1360/1981, is in fact the first publication in Persian aboutMut.ahhari. It includes statements by various personalities from all over theworld after his assassination. Apart from two articles written by Montazeriand Va‘iz.-zadih about Mut.ahhari’s life, the rest includes different theologicaland philosophical articles presented by Mut.ahhari’s friends, in his memory.19

M. H. Vathiqi Rad’s two-volume Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha(1364/1985) is regarded as a major source for Mut.ahhari’s life. It is mainly acollection of statements, interviews and articles issued and published byMut.ahhari’s teachers and friends after his death, but it also includes aconsiderable number of valuable documents about him. Although it deals tosome extent with the socio-political background of some of Mut.ahhari’sworks, it does not assess them, in particular his philosophical analysis.20

These two volumes were republished in 1379/2000 under the title of Mus.lih-iBidar with a different structure. The Jilvih-ha-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Ustad(1364/1985) is another collection of interviews and statements made by

4


Mut.ahhari’s friends and students about his life and works, and includes anumber of articles about his social philosophy.21 The Sairi dar Zindigani-yiUstad Mut.ahhari (1370/1991) begins with an article written by H. ujjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani about the role of Mut.ahhari in Iran’s Islamicmovement, and continues with a relatively comprehensive analysis ofMut.ahhari’s personality, his way of thinking, his academic works and hispolitical activities.22 It is particularly useful for some unpublished letters byMut.ahhari about the H. usainiyih-i Irshad and Dr Ali Shariati. The two-volume Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Ustad-i Shahid Murtaz.aMut.ahhari (1375/1996) is another collection of interviews with the friendsand students of Mut.ahhari,23 which is full of information concerning his lifeand political activities. They provide some background information toMut.ahhari’s works and activities in Qum and outside the clerical establish-ment, and end with a number of documents about him, including AyatullahKhomeini’s letters to him before the Islamic Revolution. However, they donot deal with Mut.ahhari’s own works and views. Ali Baqi Nas. r-abadi’sscholarly book, Sairi dar Andishih-ha-yi Ijtima‘i-yi Shahid AyatullahMut.ahhari (1377/1998) has provided a relatively comprehensive study ofMut.ahhari’s social and historical philosophy, but it does not deal withhis political philosophy and Islamic ideology. Ustad-i Shahid bi Rivayat-iAsnad (1378/1999) provides a unique collection of SAVAK’s reports onMut.ahhari’s political views and activities. The seven-volume Yad-dasht-ha-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari (1378/1999–1382/2003) is also a very useful collectionof Mut.ahhari’s notes, comments and unpublished manuscripts.

This study aims to introduce Mut.ahhari to Western readers. To draw aclearer picture of his unique role as a major theoretician of the Islamistmovements and a main architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the studytakes a comprehensive form and covers almost all major aspects ofMut.ahhari’s works, political activities and social-political philosophy.

To enable the reader to gain a better understanding of Mut.ahhari’s life, abiography of him, in chronological order, is provided in Chapter 1. Thiscovers the period between his childhood and his move to Tehran to work in1951. Throughout this chapter, the major sociological elements surroundingMut.ahhari and influencing his life, feelings and personality, including hisfamily, friends, education, religious seminaries, his charismatic teachers andmentors, as well as some relevant political events and movements, arediscussed. To provide a better image of his times, the discussion goes behindthe political events, sketching a wider panorama for the reader.

The second chapter focuses on Mut.ahhari’s academic works and politicalactivities. This part is indeed a sort of sociology of the intellectual, explainingthe mutual exchange between Mut.ahhari and his times, demonstrating thereflection of the communal political needs on his works, and also theinfluences he left on his society. It covers the period from the beginning ofhis employment at Tehran University to his assassination in 1979. While


5

clarifying Mut.ahhari’s influence on Muslim activists and the Islamic move-ments, the chapter draws an overall picture of the formation of these militantgroups and religious associations. The well-known Islamic Associations ofTeachers, Engineers and Physicians, the Islamic Coalition Groups (Haiat-ha-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami), the Institute of H. usainiyih-i Irshad, the Society of theMilitant Clergy (the Jami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat-i Mubariz), the Qum Seminary(the H. auzih-i ‘Ilmiyih-i Qum), as well as the Muslim leftist guerrillas(Mujah. idin-i Khalq and Furqan) are discussed in this section. The chapteralso covers discussions of non-religious groups including Marxist activistsand guerrillas. Moreover, it deals with Mut.ahhari’s philosophical works on avariety of issues relating to man, religion, society and history.

The focus of Chapter 3 is on Mut.ahhari’s analysis of the Islamic economicsystem, in contrast with the two main economic theories of capitalism andsocialism. Mut.ahhari’s two major economic writings, Mas’alih-yi Riba andNaz.ari bi Niz.am-i Iqtis. adi-yi Islam are examined carefully. To present atheoretical foundation for an ideal Islamic banking system, Mut.ahhari’sattention is directed, in the first book, to the analysis of the baselessness andunlawfulness of usury; whereas the second book provides his socialist viewon ‘machine’ as the main characteristic of modern capitalism. While trying tostand between capitalism and socialism, Mut.ahhari’s analysis tends,eventually, towards a preference for a state economic system. However,this chapter benefits, from time to time, from S.adr’s Iqtis. aduna and hiseconomic analysis.

Chapter 4 covers Mut.ahhari’s political perspectives from his earlierwritings and later interviews and lectures, around the time of the IslamicRevolution. It puts his ideas within the framework of previous interpre-tations of the theory of Islamic rule (Vilayat-i Faqih), beginning withMuh.aqqiq Karaki (d. 1533), and focusing on particular issues relating toquestions of authority, sovereignty and legitimacy – such as the necessity ofhaving a ruler or the nature of the state, the ideal type of relationship betweenruled and ruler, what kind of Islamic rule: rule only by enforcement ofIslamic law (Shari‘at) or rule also by a just and well-qualified jurist (vali -yifaqih). This part also reflects Mut.ahhari’s views on the role of the clergy inpolitics, secularism (Islam minha-yi Ruh. aniyat), his analysis of theconsistency between Islam and republicanism, and the need to protect theIslamic Republic from secularists and imperialists.

The transliteration system will mainly follow that used in the Journal ofIslamic Studies (published by Oxford University Press) with the diacriticalmarks. However, where proper names have an established spelling in English-language texts, that has been preferred to the transliterated version.

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1

THE PERIOD OFE D U C A T I O N

From a clerical family

Nearly one year before Reza Khan’s coup d’état (22 February 1921)1

Ayatullah Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari2 was born into a clerical family on 2 February

1920 (13 Bahman 1298/12 Jamadi I, 1338) in Fariman,3 a town 75 kilo-metres south-east of Mashhad,4 one of the famous centres of Shi‘itepilgrimage and learning in the east of Iran.

His grandfather Muhammad Ali, the author of Vaqayi‘a al-ayyam, wasborn in Zabul, a city in Sistan where he received most of his education. Hecontinued his secondary education at Mashhad Seminary. As a local Mulla,he settled in ‘Abdul-abad, a small village outside Turbat-i H. aidariyih andtook up preaching. Hajj Muhammad Husain, Mut.ahhari’s father (d. 1972 atthe age of 102),5 was one of four children in the family. He was primarilyeducated by his father Muhammad Ali, then went to Iraq to start his higherreligious studies in Najaf.6 After finishing higher studies, MuhammadHusain returned to his family in ‘Abdul-abad but did not find satisfactoryemployment.7 At the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution (1905), hemoved to Qalandar-abad, a suburb of Turbat-i H. aidariyih, leaving after ashort time for Fariman, at the invitation of some of his friends. As the city’smain scholar, he carried out normal clerical duties as well as giving religiouslessons at the elementary level. Being a traditionalist and externalist (z.ahir-gira) he was much attracted by ‘Allamih Mulla Muhammad Baqir Majlisi’s(d. 1699) ethical writings.8 But no books or articles have been ascribed tohim, nor any political activities reported about him. Mut.ahhari describedhim, in the preface of his Dastan-i Rastan, which is dedicated to him, asfollows: ‘For the first time, his belief, piety, good deeds and truthfulnessintroduced me to the right path.’9

Muhammad Husain had seven children: five boys and two girls. His thirdchild – the second son – was named Murtaz

.a. There are some stories reported

from Mut.ahhari’s childhood which indicate how strongly he was attractedby religious rituals and how much he was striving to gain knowledge. It issaid that when he was three years old Mut.ahhari took his mother’s jacket

T H E P E R I O D O F E D U C A T I O N

7

(using it as a cloak (qaba)), went to an empty room and started praying;10

similarly, when he was about six or seven years old, early one morning, heput on a mantle and went to the Maktab Khanih (traditional primaryschool), sitting down behind the door until the school was opened.11

After he had finished his elementary education at the Maktab Khanih,Mut.ahhari was introduced to elementary religious studies by his father.When he was 12, he moved, together with his elder brother Muhammad Ali,to Mashhad to start the formal religious curriculum.12

The Mashhad Seminary: centre of traditionalism

At that time, the H. auzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Mashhad (the traditional educationalcentre of Mashhad) was famous among the ‘ulama. In academic terms, it wasconsidered to be on the same level as Najaf and Qum;13 because of its eminentreligious teachers (mudarrisin), it attracted students from all over thecountry. Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Adib Naishaburi (d. 1976),14 Aqa BuzurgShahidi Raz

.avi known as ‘H. akim’ (d. 1936)15 and his son, Mirza Mahdi (d.

1936),16 Mirza Mahdi Isfahani (1885–1946),17 Hajj Muhammad KafaiKhurasani known as ‘Aqa-zadih’ (d. 1937)18 and Hajj Aqa Husain Qumi (d.1946)19 respectively taught Arabic literature, ethics and philosophy, theologyand jurisprudence.

A new hermeneutical theory in religious studies had emerged, which soonbecame a powerful and dominant movement in the seminary. The theory,later called Maktab-i tafkik (segregationism),20 defends the independentunderstanding of Quranic knowledge (ma‘arif-i Quran) from allegorical andrational inferences from Islamic texts, and firmly rejects Islamic philosophyand mysticism. Muhammad Reza H. akimi, a distinguished Iranian Islam-ologist, has described this theoretical approach as follows:

The aim of this school [of thought] is the purification of Quranicknowledge, to remain unmixed and to be understood clearly, with-out using any ta’vil [allegory] and mixing with other thoughts andschools, without using tafsir-i bi ra’y [interpretation by personalopinion] and analogy, to protect revealed facts and the principles oftrue knowledge from mixing and being tainted with human thoughtand talent.21

According to this theory, the Quran has its own language, logic andmethod of interpretation which can only be understood by using the exegesesof members of the Prophet’s family. Therefore, pure Islamic knowledge is notknowledge based upon Greek philosophy, Indian gnosticism, Aristotelianlogic, analogical method, rational argumentation or esoteric intuition. Onthe contrary, it is a knowledge acquired through systematic research into thesayings, deeds and writings of the Shi‘ite Imams. Hence, for them, all rational

8


Islamic sciences, namely logic, philosophy and gnosticism, were alien toQuranic teachings.22

Although there appears to be a difference between this movement andAkhbarism (traditionalism) there is, in fact, none in its basic assumptions andmethods.23 Akhbarism opposes Us.ulism (rationalism) in the field of fiqh(jurisprudence), while the tafkiki doctrine in theology is in contrast tophilosophy and mysticism.

The forerunner of this school was Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, a Najaf-graduated Mujtahid (a religious student who reached to the degree ofIjtihad), who probably came to Mashhad in 1921–2. Although he was astudent of Mirza Muhammad Husain Naini (1860–1936)24 and wastherefore supposed to have been a firm supporter of Us.ulism, he had clearlymoved in the opposite direction. His anti-rationalistic opinions were foundattractive by almost all traditionalist ‘ulama and soon became a dominantmovement in the Mashhad Seminary. Therefore, the adherents of the rationalsciences lost their academic positions and respectable status.25

This intense climate did not, however, overwhelm the young Mut.ahhari;instead, it prepared a useful ground for his philosophical outlook:

Regarding my spiritual development, as far as I can remember, fromthe age of 13, an urge developed in me and I encountered an intensesensitivity relating to theological issues. The questions [about thoseissues] of course, in relation to the mental level of that age, were oneby one crowding my mind.26

After his arrival at Mashhad, Mut.ahhari settled, together with his elderbrother, in the Abdal-Khan school and continued his introductory religiouseducation there.27 As a first step, Mut.ahhari evaluated various intellectualtrends and academic orientations, as well as looking at the eminent person-alities in the fields of religious and secular sciences, in order to select the mostdistinguished branch of knowledge and the most prestigious personality:

I remember that from the beginning of my religious education, whenI was studying the elementary Arabic language in Mashhad, theviews and works of philosophers, mystics and theologians –although I was not familiar with their thoughts – preoccupied mymind and exerted their influence on me with greater profundity thanother great scholars, inventors and explorers had done. It was purelyfor this reason that I considered them to be the heroes in the field ofthought. I clearly remember that at the age of 13 to 15, among all the‘ulama, learned people [fuz

.ala] and high-ranking teachers of the

Mashhad Seminary, there was one person who captivated andattracted the attention of my mind more than the others, [namely]the late Aqa Mirza Mahdi Shahidi Raz

.avi a teacher [mudarris] of


9

divine philosophy in that seminary. I liked to look at his face, sit inhis presence, consider his facial expressions and movements, andhoped that I could, one day, attend his lessons. That hope wasnot realized because, sadly, the great man passed away in 1355q/1936–7.28

Mirza Mahdi originated from a famous clerical family – the Shahidis –who had held the reins of spiritual authority in the Mashhad Seminary formany decades.29 His father, Aqa Buzurg H. akim, a philosopher, was teachingMulla S. adra’s philosophy and enjoyed, for his spiritual character, a highreputation among his students.30 Mirza Mahdi himself was lecturing onMulla Hadi Sabzavari’s philosophical poem, Sharh. -i Manz.umih,31 and waswell known for his fluent explanations, proficiency in philosophical textsand rationalism. Before he reached his fortieth year, Mirza Mahdi passedaway.

Unfortunately, no notes or scripts illustrating his views have survived, norany transcripts of his influential mystical sermons.32 However, what madeMirza Mahdi a great figure in the eyes of the young Mut.ahhari was appar-ently his professional integrity and personal character. Mut.ahhari had foundhis preferred academic field and also his spiritual ideals in the youngtheosopher Mirza Mahdi. With no understanding of any philosophicalterminology, he often went to Mirza Mahdi’s lectures and benefited from histeachings.33

At this period, Mut.ahhari was seeking to clarify his future. He eventuallyrecognized his academic aspirations and field of research. Henceforth, hepreferred the rational and analytical sciences to other Islamic sciences.

Reza Khan and the religious seminaries

As an aid to understanding the state–religion relationship, it is appropriatehere to give a brief description of Reza Khan’s relations with the religiousauthorities and clerical seminaries.

It has been asserted that Reza Khan’s position, vis-à-vis the phenomenonof religiosity and religious institutions, varied during his political career, andgenerally passed through three stages.34

The first period, 1921–5, was the period after the coup d’état, when hewas appointed Minister of War and then (in 1923) became Prime Ministerand Commander of the Army.

At the beginning of this time, the Qum Seminary was re-established byShaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H. a’iri Yazdi (d. 1937).35 The institution of the marj‘a-itaqlid (the foremost cleric in respect of religious knowledge who was a sourceof imitation)36 was, after the demise of Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi (d.1920)37 divided between three prominent Mujtahids, one in Iran and two inIraq: Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H. a’iri, Mirza Muhammad Husain Naini (d.

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1936)38 and Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946).39 The seminaries inNajaf, Karbala, Qum and Mashhad not only enjoyed the traditionalveneration of the people but were also respected by the regime during theseyears. It has been said, for instance, that Ahmad Shah went to Qum tocongratulate H. a’iri on the re-establishment of the seminary40 and later, afterthe expulsion of Naini and Isfahani from Iraq by British mandatoryauthorities, the monarch, accompanied by Reza Khan and Vusuq al-daulihand other officials paid a flying visit to Qum and warmly welcomed the greatMujtahids.41 At this time, Reza Khan was trying to present himself as aperson who showed an interest in religion and religious manifestations byorganizing religious ceremonies and going on pilgrimages to the HolyShrines. He was seeking to draw the ‘ulama’s favourable attention to himself.In this respect, some incidents are quite remarkable. In June 1922, heorganized a public mourning for the Imam Husain, in a mosque in Tehran.Then, on ‘Ashura 1341q/1922, he organized a religious demonstration by hismilitary staff.42 Later, during his premiership, Reza Khan went to Iraq andvisited the Holy Shrines of Karbala and Najaf.43 Lastly, in his meeting withthe ‘ulama in Qum, he reaffirmed his loyalty to Islam and to the Islamicleaders and accepted their request not to propagate republicanism.44

The second stage of the relationship between the ‘ulama and Reza Shahstarted in 1925, after the latter’s accession to the throne. During the earlyyears of the Pahlavi Monarchy (that is from 1925 to 1927), state–religionrelations were mutually respectful. Reza Shah was keenly aware that hisposition was not secure as long as the ‘ulama remained powerful. However,he had only recently ascended the throne and his authority had not yet beensufficiently strengthened. Naturally, he needed support from religiousofficials. For this reason, he performed royal observances such as attendingreligious ceremonies, visiting holy places and showing loyalty to Islam.During this period he never indicated that he had plans to challenge anddiminish the position of the ‘ulama.45

In the third stage, namely from 1927 onwards, the regime clearly movedtowards secularization and modernization. The state bureaucracy altered thewhole military, legal, judicial, educational, economic and administrativesectors of society, creating a totally new structure. The policy was seeminglyaimed at destroying the foundation of the ‘ulama ‘s power and the base oftheir influence. In the light of these measures, the natural follow-up was anincrease in hostility towards religious leaders, thus darkening forever thepreviously peaceful relations and mutual respect. This change has beendescribed in the following way:

One can say that modernization in Iran sought to achieve twoexplicitly and implicitly basic goals. On the one hand, it sought totransform the country’s primitive agricultural economy into a semi-industrialized and commercialized agricultural system. On the other


11

hand, it aimed at expanding the power of central government overall segments of society, with the purpose of administrative and econ-omic centralization and political unification.46

The first major clash between the government and the ‘ulama occurredwith the introduction of the compulsory military service law in 1927.47

According to the law, the clergy and the tullab (students of religious studies)were only exempt from it after passing an examination before an officialboard. Although the government had announced that the examination wasaimed purely at improving the academic position of the tullab, neverthelessthe matter was a source of suspicion among the ‘ulama. The law was amilitary measure for the government, but for the ‘ulama it represented a clearinterference in their area of authority. It also fulfilled the government’s planto unify the education system and to gradually open a way for the regime’sinfluence on religious seminaries, eventually bringing them under its control.In effect, it permitted the state to draft into military service those elementsamong the ‘ulama whom it felt were acting against the regime’s policies.48 Asa result, it drastically reduced, if not terminated, the ‘ulama’s power andauthority over state and society.

However, as a counter-measure, a number of leading ‘ulama tooksanctuary in the Holy Shrine of Qum and sent a telegram to the Majlis (theConsultative Assembly), demanding a modification of the conscriptionlaw.49 In order to prevent further conflict, Reza Shah temporarily retreatedfrom his position and sent the Prime Minister, Mahdi Quli Hidayat(Mukhbir al-Salt.anih), and the Minister of Court, ‘Abdul-HusainTaimurtash to Qum, and then a delegation to Najaf, to give the ‘ulama theassurance they sought.50 Although guarantees of exemption and promises ofamnesty were granted to the ‘ulama and the conflict was peacefully resolved,nevertheless this incident marked the beginning of a new hostile era whichnever really came to an end until the abdication of the ruler.51 From thisincident onwards, Reza Shah, regardless of the opposition of religiousleaders, gradually introduced his modernizing projects. These included thereorganization of the judicial system by replacing the religious courts led byMujtahids with those chaired by judges who had graduated in a modern non-religious educational system.52 Certain measures were taken – such as puttingauqaf (religious endowments) and all income arising from the Holy Shrines,which were previously under the ‘ulama’s mandatory control, under govern-ment authority.53 The expansion of a modern educational system aimed atreaching all parts of the country, whilst limiting religious teachings,54 andfinally unifying the external appearance of society by the compulsoryuniformization of men’s dress and the removal of women’s veils.55

Whilst these major developments which were fateful for the position of thereligious establishment were taking place, the young Mut.ahhari was, asmentioned before, thinking about his future and his spiritual desires. It was

12


during this formative phase in his life that the uprising of the GauharshadMosque occurred.

The uprising of the Gauharshad Mosque

The violent uprising of the Gauharshad Mosque occurred on 11 July 1935,almost two years after Mut.ahhari had come to the Mashhad Seminary, butbefore he had finished the primary levels (Sut.uh).56

The uprising started when the high-ranking clerics of the MashhadSeminary began demonstrating against the government’s radical law of 27December 1928 on the uniformization of men’s dress and the abolition of theveil for women. It is worth mentioning that among the clerics only theMujtahids and their wives were exempted in this bill, while everyone else,namely the large component of the clerical stratum, had to have exemptioncertificates from a governmental board.57 Soon after the passing of the law,the police forced women to remove their veils and men to change their dress.This included the traditional clothes worn by the clerics. One incidenthappened following the objection by Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Bafqi Yazdi,to the Queen entering the Holy Shrine in Qum without a veil, which angeredReza Shah and caused the programme for the removal of the veil (Kashf-ih. ijab) to become violent.58 A great deal of pressure, therefore, was put on thereligious establishment by a number of ‘ulama all over the country, callingupon the Grand Ayatullah H. a’iri Yazdi to take action against the govern-ment programme. Although he sent a telegram to the Shah asking for themodification of the law, the monarch did not pay attention to his request.59

This situation has been described by Ayatullah Sult.ani Tabatabai, a promi-nent Mudarris of the Qum Seminary, as follows:

As a result of Reza Khan’s pressures and machinations, the situationof the h. auzih became very difficult. The problems started from thetime of the removal of veil and the uniformization of the Iranians.[As a result] the number of tullab residing in religious schoolsdecreased to 300. They [the police] arrested the tullab and at thepolice station they cut their [traditional] clothes in half with scissors.Enduring these difficulties was very hard. One night, they rushedinto the Faiz

.iyih Seminary and announced: from tomorrow, nobody

in his clerical dress is permitted to go outside the school. As aconsequence some tullab hid in the gardens and in the outer quartersof Qum during the daytime, returning to the school at night. Life inthe gardens and in the outer quarters was very hard [due to theshortage of facilities]. But the pressure increased and decreased,depending on the situation. When a new instruction had been issued,the officials were quite severe. Then, after a few days, the situationbegan to improve. However, it was a tiring situation.60


13

The situation in Mashhad was no better than that in Qum. ProminentAyatullahs, hoping for a change in the law, gathered, a few days before theGauharshad Mosque incident, at the house of Sayyid Yunus Ardibili61 anddecided to send a delegation, headed by Hajj Aqa Husain Qumi, to Tehran todiscuss the law with the government. Shortly after arriving in Tehran, thehead of the delegation was seized, in the area of Shah ‘Abdul-‘Az. im, andplaced under house arrest.62 This act, understandably, led to an immediatereaction among the ‘ulama and their followers in Mashhad. They tooksanctuary in the Gauharshad Mosque, requesting the release of Qumi and thecancellation of the dress law. The preacher, Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Buhlul,was in fact the key figure on the scene and his emotional speeches stirred upthe feelings of the gathering protesters.63 The authorities were not able torestore order for two days, and only when Reza Shah sent one of his eliteregiments did the military attain the upper hand. The regime ordered themilitary forces to scatter the crowd in the mosque. As a result, the processended with much violence, many were killed and many more injured.64

Soon after this event, almost all the leading ‘ulama of the city werearrested. Hajj Aqa Husain Qumi and Mirza Muhammad Aqa-zadih were sentinto exile to Najaf and Yazd respectively.65 Religious schools were closed andthe tullab were forced to change their clerical dress. All religious sermons andmournings were prohibited and the continuity of religious studies becamedependent on the permission of the government. As a consequence, almost allthe academic activities of the Mashhad Seminary were cancelled.

At this time, Mut.ahhari was not present in Mashhad, as he had gonehome to Fariman.66 After learning of the event, he returned immediatelyto Mashhad. Although it was too late to participate, he probably wantedto observe the aftermath of the uprising and make his own judgementabout it.

With the family again

It was just a few days after his return to Mashhad that further disturbingnews arrived from home: his father had been arrested by the police andforced to abandon his traditional clothes. At the same time, their house wasdestroyed in a major project of the administration to rebuild the city. Toshare the family’s sorrow, therefore, he returned to Fariman. His father, atthis time, remained at home, because of the shame of appearing as a mukalla(a man without traditional dress) in public. As a result, his older brotherMuhammad Ali gave up for ever his religious training as a cleric andcommenced farming to support the family. Despite his mother’s insistence onhis staying with the family, in 1937–8, after the young Murtaz. a had spentmore than a year with his parents, he decided to move to Qum with his clericuncle, as the Mashhad Seminary no longer enjoyed its previous status andposition.67 It was at this time that Ayatullah Sayyid Hasan Mudarris

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(d. 1937), the famous Shi‘i politician, was assassinated by the regime duringhis exile in Kashmar.68

It is strange, indeed, that this event, the first major political incident of hislife, has not found any reflection in Mut.ahhari’s prolific writings andlectures. Once, while expressing his interest in religious studies, he referredonly in general terms to the events in Khurasan:

While I was a child, in 1314–15/1935–6 I was living in Khurasan. Ifsome individuals, especially those who were living in Khurasan afterthose events, can remember them, they know that there were nomore than two or three mu‘ammam [clergy with traditional clothes]in the whole of Khurasan. Old men in their eighties and Mullas intheir sixties and seventies, Mujtahids and Mudarrises all becamemukalla. The doors of religious schools were all closed and nearly allthe functions in the mosques had stopped. Seemingly, nobodybelieved religion could revive again. At the time, when I was 15 or 16years old, I thought about everything and was not satisfied exceptthrough studying the religious sciences.69

Perhaps, as suggested by some of his close friends, he gradually become aman of thought, interested in research and academic discussions and wastherefore probably not inclined to express and show his political views andactivities openly.70

Move to the Qum Seminary

When the 17-year-old Mut.ahhari arrived in Qum, Shaikh ‘Abdul-KarimH. a’iri, the reconstructor of the Qum Seminary and marj‘a-i taqlid of his time,had been dead for a year (January 1937). Although the seminary had beenseriously damaged by modernizing projects, it had not been totally dis-mantled or closed, like the Mashhad Seminary. Perhaps H. a’iri’s clevernessand moderate policies played a major role in its survival and continuity.71 Inother words, as some scholars have mentioned, with his patience, prudenceand wisdom he protected the religious establishment.72

At that time, the seminary in Qum was considered by tullab andMudarrisin as Iran’s most important religious establishment. Its authorityand reputation were, after H. a’iri, mainly upheld by three prominent Aya-tullahs: Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khunsari (d. 1951),73 Sayyid MuhammadH. ujjat (d. 1952)74 and Sayyid S.adr al-Din S. adr (d. 1953).75 At the same time,Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946) was generally considered to be themost important figure in the Shi‘ite communities in the Najaf Seminary.

In fact, each of the three Mujtahids had his own character and followed hisown course of action. It has been said that H. ujjat was a man of dignity, orderand discipline,76 S.adr was a free-minded person with great organizing ability,


15

supportive of the internal reformist activities and political movement of thetullab, albeit seeking no explicit confrontation with the regime,77 whileKhunsari was considered a Mujtahid (a religious champion) and politicalactivist. During the Iraqi independence movement, together with his life-longfriend Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani (d. 1962),78 he opposed the Britishauthorities and was therefore sent into exile to India. He had an obviouslyrevolutionary and uncompromising stance.79

When he entered Qum, Mut.ahhari had not yet finished the preliminaryreligious curriculum, which is mainly devoted to the learning of Arabic. Theprevious spiritual climate no doubt still had a dominant influence on his souland mind. He describes this stage in the following manner:

In the early years of my move to Qum, when I had not yet finishedpreliminary Arabic classes, I was so overwhelmed by the ideas [ofphilosophical matters] that they provoked in me the intense desirefor seclusion. I could not tolerate [even] the presence of a room-mate. . . I was learning preliminary Arabic, jurisprudence and canonicfundamentals [fiqh and us. ul]as well as topics of logic for the purposeof preparing, gradually, to analyse the thoughts of the great philo-sophers.80

Finding the second ideal man

In order to fulfil his strong spiritual desires, Mut.ahhari then attendedAyatullah Khomeini’s weekly ethical lessons and became fascinated by hismystical teachings and spiritual course of action. He himself has describedthis situation:

At the beginning of my move to Qum . . . the ethical lessons deliveredby the figure I adored [each Thursday and Friday] made meinebriated. The lessons were, in reality, lessons of divine knowledge[ma‘arif va sairu suluk] and not only ethical lessons in the narrowtechnical sense. These lessons, without exaggeration, caused me tobecome so ecstatic that I was conscious of little else until thefollowing Tuesday.81

Hajj Aqa Ruh. ullah Musavi Khomeini (1902–89)82 was a Mudarris ofphilosophy at that time and had not yet started teaching jurisprudence andcanonic fundamentals (fiqh and us. ul). In order to improve the moralprinciples of the religious students, he was also teaching Islamic ethics –which he presented in gnostic form and content – each Thursday and Friday.Perhaps this was the reason why these lessons were attracting a lot ofstudents who were highly appreciative of them.83

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A classmate and a friend for life

During his studies with Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Muh. aqqiq Damad in1941–2, Mut.ahhari met his close friend Husain Ali Montazeri Najaf-abadi(the prospective successor of Ayatullah Khomeini between 1985 and 1989).84

Ayatullah Damad had been teaching the first volume of Kifayat al-us. ul (areference book in us. ul al-fiqh, written by Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kaz. imKhurasani). Although, in the beginning, Montazeri refused to discuss hisdaily lessons with Mut.ahhari, he finally agreed, at the latter’s insistence, toestablish a discussion session. Despite their different ages (Mut.ahhari was afew years older than Montazeri), they soon established a close friendship.Montazeri also, at Mut.ahhari’s request, moved from Madrasah-yi HajjMulla Sadiq to Madrasah-yi Faiz

.iyih. Therefore, the two friends were both

living in the same school, attending the same lessons and discussing themdaily, consulting on important philosophical and political matters andtravelling to each other’s regions during holidays and vacations.85 As neitherwas financially well-off, they shared each other’s money and possessions.Montazeri considered his new friend to be intelligent, talented, hardworking,ambitious, pious and traditionalist.86 Although their teachers were the sameand their basic education was similar, their academic desires were different.Mut.ahhari concentrated mainly on philosophy, while Montazeri continuedwith jurisprudence. They were in favour of reform of the religious establish-ment. Therefore they were jointly in charge of the reformist programme onbehalf of the Grand Ayatullah Burujirdi, in the Qum Seminary.87 In fact, bothwere in favour of an Islamic government,88 supporting the political activitiesof young Islamic fighters, namely the Fadaiyan-i Islam89 and opposingmonarchic rule, but their courses of action in political events were, as waslater revealed, different. Montazeri was a dedicated, fearless, politicalactivist and when Khomeini was sent into exile in Iraq he was considered tobe the leader of the militant ‘ulama, whereas Mut.ahhari was regarded as anIslamic theoretician who chose a cautious position, and did not reveal hispolitical views. Despite their different approaches, they were never criticalof one another. Once, remembering his close 12-year fellowship withMontazeri, Mut.ahhari praised him as a great Mudarris and Mujtahid of theQum Seminary.90 His campaign for Montazeri’s release in 1977 is notable.When the latter was sent into exile in 1975, his location remained unknown.Mut.ahhari cancelled his philosophical lectures in Qum and visited theauthorities of the seminary, namely Sayyid Muhammad Reza Gulpayigani(d. 1991), Sayyid Kaz. im Shari‘atmadari (d. 1985) and Sayyid Shahab al-DinNajafi Mar‘ashi (d. 1990), requesting that they take the initiative in securingMontazeri’s release.

In statements and interviews issued after Mut.ahhari’s assassination,Montazeri described in detail his 12-year partnership with Mut.ahhari,praised his academic achievements and acknowledged the significant role he


17

played in the Islamic Revolution and in the introduction of Shi‘ite seminaries.He also justified Mut.ahhari’s political approach and commemorated him asa Mujtahid and Ustad in Islamic sciences.91

In the summer of 1941, in order to avoid the hot weather in Qum,Mut.ahhari travelled to Najaf-abad, the homeland of his friend, and fromthere they both visited an eminent Mudarris in Isfahan who afterwardsbecame Mut.ahhari’s third spiritual guide.92 It is appropriate, therefore, toascertain who this Mudarris was and what Mut.ahhari learned from him.

In search of the third ideal figure

Mirza Ali-Aqa Shirazi (d. 1957) was a Mudarris at the Madrasih-yi S.adr inIsfahan. He has been described as a theologian, jurist, physician and literarycritic.93 Besides his expertise in Islamic studies, he was proficient intraditional medicine and therefore sometimes taught Ibn Sina’s Qanun. As apious Mulla his preachings influenced many tullab. Hence, he was widelyrespected within clerical circles.94

Mut.ahhari attended his lessons at the Madrasih-yi S. adr, where he wasteaching from Nahj al-balaghih, one of the major textbooks of Shi‘i teaching.His clear expressions and emotional style, sometimes mixed with tears,attracted Mut.ahhari and led him to establish a close relationship later onwith the Shaikh. Whenever he came to Qum, he was a guest of Mut.ahhari,who highlighted the significance of this Mudarris in his life in the followingwords:

I always consider his lessons a precious part of my life that I am notprepared to exchange for anything else. He is always in my mind andI always remember his good company. I dare to say that he was trulya Divine scholar.95

The Sairi dar Nahj al-balaghih was, in fact, written as a result of thoselessons. In the preface to it, Mut.ahhari has written that Mirza Ali-Aqaintroduced him, for the first time, to the unknown world of the Nahj al-balaghih.96 However, Mirza Ali-Aqa was not a man of politics andMut.ahhari’s ideal world was that of political activities. The world of Nahj al-balaghih, according to Mut.ahhari, is not solely a world of worship, prayer,preaching and ethics, it is also a world of jihad, social justice and politics.97

An ideal man, for him, therefore, was a man who could gather within himselfboth religious moral principles and socio-political activities, a man, that is, ofprayer at night and of jihad during the day.98 Therefore he implicitly statedthat he was not politically influenced by the Shaikh.

Before Mut.ahhari had finished his undergraduate education (daurih-isat.h. ) the country was occupied by the Allied forces, in World War Two, on25 August 1941. Reza Shah consequently abdicated the throne and a major

18


socio-political crisis developed within Iran.99 It is quite surprising to see thatthe Qum Seminary kept completely silent and aloof at that time.100 Perhapsthis was due to the damage which the religious establishment had sufferedduring the last decade and it was now looking towards a new era. AlthoughSayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani commenced opposition to the British after ashort time, and was therefore sent into exile, his activities did not have anyclear impact on the seminary.101 Mut.ahhari and his friend Montazeri finallyreached the last stage of their undergraduate curriculum by attending thejurisprudential lessons of Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Muh.aqqiq Damad(d. 1968) in 1941–2 and prepared themselves to enter higher education (dars-i kharij).102

Higher education

This period, the most important part of Mut.ahhari’s theological training,lasted almost ten years, from 1942 until 1952. It is during this time thatMut.ahhari strengthened his academic mind. He benefited from three well-known teachers: Hajj Aqa-Husain Burujirdi (d. 1961), Hajj Aqa Ruh. ullahKhomeini and Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabai (d. 1981)103 in fiqh,us. ul al-fiqh and falsafih. Although he later came under the influence of otherprominent teachers, he undoubtedly gained much more from these three thanfrom the others.104

In December 1944, when Grand Ayatullah Burujirdi was invited by someteachers, Khomeini included, to stay in Qum, as the head of the seminary,Mut.ahhari was studying us. ul al-fiqh with the latter. They were bothattending Burujirdi’s classes when he started to teach jurisprudence. Perhapshe became close to Burujirdi when the Grand Ayatullah appointed Khomeinias the Chief of Staff of his office. In an article which he wrote after Burujirdi’sdeath, Mut.ahhari summarized Burujirdi’s achievements and praised hisreformist role in the religious establishment.105 His moderate approach –between Akhbarism and Us. ulism – in jurisprudence; his unremitting effortsfor more convergence between Shi‘i and Sunni leaders against sectarianism;his programme for sending a missionary delegation to propagate Shi‘ism inEurope and America; his positive attitude towards a modern educationalsystem and his order to establish an office for calculating and controllingreligious taxes were some of Burujirdi’s positive services.106 Mut.ahhari alsomentioned that he learned many other things from Burujirdi during the eightyears he spent as his disciple, but he wished that the situation (probablyinside the religious establishment) had been open enough to have allowedhim to take a critical view of Burujirdi’s works and achievements.107

Regarding his philosophical studies (‘ulum-i ‘aqli), Mut.ahhari firstattended Khomeini’s philosophy lessons in 1944 and was introduced toMulla Hadi Sabzavari’s and Mulla S.adra Shirazi’s philosophies.108 Khomeiniwas the only Mudarris of philosophy at that time, but after his arrival in Qum


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in 1946, Tabatabai remedied this. Those lessons, which lasted almost untilthe end of that decade, fostered many students who later became distin-guished teachers in this field.109 Mut.ahhari implicitly praised Khomeini manytimes in his books and speeches. Once, remembering his past and describingwhat he learned from Khomeini, Mut.ahhari mentioned that Khomeinishaped his philosophical mind:

I remember the time that, when I was studying in Qum, one day Ievaluated myself, my studies and the direction which I had chosenfor my life. I asked myself whether it might not be better to pursue abranch of modern [Western] education in place of these traditionalstudies. With regard to my feelings and the importance of faith andspiritual knowledge to me, the first thing that came to my mind wasto question my spiritual and mental situation at that time. I thought:now I believe in the principles of unity of God, prophethood,resurrection, imamat and so on and they are intensely dear to me.What would have been my situation had I been studying in a branchof natural, mathematical or literary sciences? I told myself thatbelieving in those principles or basically being a true scholar doesnot depend on being a student of traditional [Islamic] sciences . . . Atthat time I had just become familiar with Islamic philosophy. I waslearning it from a teacher . . . who had really tasted Islamic theologyand understood its deepest ideas and was explaining it with thesweetest expression. The pleasure of those days, especially the deep,delicate and sweet expressions of the Ustad, is one of theunforgettable memories of my life . . . In short, a fundamentalpattern was formed in my mind which was a basis for solving myproblems in a broad world view . . . I realized at that time that if Ihad not studied Islamic philosophy and had not benefited from thegraceful presence of the Ustad, I might have had everything better,as is the case now, be it material or spiritual; all the things which Ihave now I would have, also, or at least at the same level andprobably even better than this, except this pattern of thinking [t.arh. -ifikri] and the results of it [which I got from him].110

In order to understand Khomeini’s opinion of Mut.ahhari, it might beuseful to look at the statements issued by Khomeini after Mut.ahhari’sassassination. Undoubtedly Khomeini remembered him very positively,giving him laudatory titles which he reserved exclusively for Mut.ahhari, suchas ‘my very dear son’, ‘a part of my flesh’, ‘a fruit of my life’, ‘a strongsupporter of religious seminaries’, ‘a rare Islamologist’, ‘a high-rankingthinker, philosopher and jurist’, ‘a great martyr’, and so on.111

To study Ibn Sina’s philosophy, Mut.ahhari attended Tabatabai’s privateand general lessons and soon became one of his well-established students:

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In 1329/1950–1, I attended the general lessons in philosophy of thegreat Ustad Allamih Tabatabai. He had arrived in Qum only a fewyears previously, and was not well known [among the ‘ulama]. Ilearned about Ibn Sina’s philosophy from him and also attended hisprivate lessons about materialism.112

When Tabatabai came to Qum in 1946, the remaining Soviet troops hadjust left the country. As a result of the new situation, people again started todiscuss political questions in public and became involved in politicalmovements of all kinds. Royalist, nationalist, leftist and religious groupsrenewed the political activities which had been dormant for the last 20 years.The struggle for the reins of power became more intense. The main issue atthe centre of their heated discussions was the nationalization of the oilindustry.113 It is interesting to see what the impact of this new situation wason the Qum Seminary and the religious authorities there.

A close friend of the Fadaiyan-i Islam

Despite the popularity of the Fadaiyan-i Islam (1945–55) – the only organizedgroup of religious activists at that time – among the religious students andsome religious leaders, such as Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani in Tehran, SayyidMuhammad Taqi Khunsari in Qum, Sayyid Muhammad Hadi Milani inMashhad and ‘Abdul-Husain Amini (the author of Al-Ghadir) in Najaf, theiraims and activities always remained suspicious in the eyes of AyatullahBurujirdi.

The Fadaiyan-i Islam was established in May 1945 by a young and notvery well-educated cleric called Sayyid Mujtaba Mirlauh. i, better known asNavvab S.afavi. He was born in Tehran in 1924 or 1925 in a religious familyof a lower socio-economic status. He graduated from the German TechnicalHigh School in Tehran and moved to Iraq for religious studies. Although hespent more than two years in Najaf Seminary, pursuing Islamic studies, hedid not attain a high level of education (dars-i kharij).114 From a smallreligious gathering in southern Tehran, his ideas rapidly attracted numerousmembers and supporters from among the lower class and urban poor andalso from the religious middle class, some wealthy bazaar merchants, shop-keepers and influential figures among the clergy. Their leading figures, such asSayyid ‘Abdul-Husain Vah. idi, Sayyid Hashim Husaini, Sayyid MuhammadAli Lavasani, Sayyid Husain Imami, Khalil T. ahmasibi and Hamid Dhulqadr,were all from religious lower-class backgrounds. It has been mentioned that,at the peak of its popularity and strength, Fadaiyan-i Islam had some 7000regular members.115 The Fadaiyan was an independent, self-inspired religiouspolitical organization. The movement was initially religious, challengingAhmad Kasravi’s theological notions, but later became more political. Intheir first statement, after their unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Kasravi


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on 28 April 1945, the leaders totally focused their attention on individualswho were causing divisions between Muslims.116 Then they used the moreorthodox and heroic ideas of Islam, largely in protest against domestictyranny, foreign influence and domination and all ideas coming from theWest. The most important point about them is that they resorted to violentmethods and armed activities to achieve their purposes. They finally assassi-nated Kasravi on 11 March 1946; ‘Abdul-Husain Hazhir, the Minister of theCourt, on 4 November 1949; and the Premier Ali Razmara on 7 March 1951.They also attempted to kill Dr Husain Fat.imi (editor of the newspaperBakhtar-i Imruz, the political assistant and later Foreign Minister of DrMusaddiq) on 14 February 1952, and the Premier Husain ‘Ala on 16November 1955, but these attempts ended in failure. During the negotiationperiod of the nationalization of the oil industry (1949–51) they acted as alliesof Musaddiq and the nationalists, and as an instrument for Kashani. Theywere propagating Kashani’s views and collecting votes for his candidatesduring the election periods.117 Their disagreement with Musaddiq andKashani became obvious when they demanded that Islamic law be put intooperation in the country, after the oil industry had been nationalized on 20March 1951. In their manifesto, Rahnama-yi h. aqiqat, issued duringRazmara’s premiership in 1950–1, they sought to clarify their foreign anddomestic policies, but their ideas about Islamic rule (h. ukumat-i Islami)remained rather ambiguous. To disseminate their ideas, the Fadaiyan laterpublished a weekly magazine called Manshur-i Baradari which only con-tinued for 14 weeks, owing to the disagreements between the editor and theothers. Generally, their programme may be divided into the following prin-ciples:

1 application of Islamic law, especially prohibition of alcohol, drugs,prostitution and Western movies; use of the veil for women andseparation between male and female in educational and workingenvironments;

2 reform of state administration;3 struggle against ignorance, disease and vice;4 struggle for the liberation of Iran and the entire Islamic world from

foreign dominance and domestic tyranny;5 unification of all Muslims of the world by bridging the gap between and

among different sects within Islam.118

On the one hand, the Fadaiyan insisted that the Shah and his governmentmust rely on the Constitution, which originated from Islamic bases. On theother hand, they explicitly declared that Iran was an Islamic country, andtherefore Islamic law must be implemented in it; the Shah was the usurper ofIslamic rule and the government was illegitimate; the usurper of Islamic rulemust be killed and the illegitimate government banished.119 Although it is

22


true that in his writings, Navvab S.afavi does not always spell out theincompatibility of the monarchical system with a state in which Islamic lawhas been made mandatory, he offers no explanation as to who the truelegitimate alternative Islamic ruler might be.120

In regard to their assistance for Musaddiq and Kashani, the Fadaiyanexpected more sympathy for their h. ukumat-i Islami when the former was inpower. However, their ideas were unacceptable to Musaddiq who was infavour of a reformed secular order. Perhaps Kashani considered that the timewas not appropriate, as there was no highly educated figure among theMuslim activists. The relationship between the Fadaiyan and PremierMusaddiq worsened when the latter arrested Navvab S.afavi on 4 June 1951.He was accused of inciting the people of Sari – by his emotional speeches – todestroy the liquor shops. The unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Dr HusainFat.imi on 14 February 1952 finally brought the precarious relationshipbetween the Fadaiyan and the nationalist groups to an end. AlthoughNavvab S. afavi was released from jail on 5 March 1953, he did not renew hisalliance with Musaddiq. After the royalist coup of 19 August 1953, NavvabS.afavi was visited by the Imam Jum‘ih (the chief cleric for Friday prayers andceremonies) of Tehran, Dr Sayyid Hasan Imami, who, as the representativeof the Shah, offered him the highly respected post of Superintendent of theShrine of Imam Reza (Tauliyat-i Astan-i Quds-i Raz.avi) in Mashhad.Navvab S. afavi did not accept it.121 After the unsuccessful attempt to kill thethen Premier, Husain ‘Ala, on 16 November 1955, and also because of theiroutright opposition to the Baghdad Pact – signed by Iran, Pakistan, Turkeyand Iraq against communism and supported by America and the UnitedKingdom – he and seven of his colleagues were arrested on 22 November1955. The military court finally condemned three of them, including NavvabS.afavi, to death. Accordingly, they were executed on 17 January 1955.

It is appropriate now to have a closer look at the relations between theFadaiyan and the authorities of the Qum Seminary. Their vision of Islamicrule, which they called h. ukumat-i Islami, was undoubtedly attractive to anumber of young ‘ulama, but not to Burujirdi. In his opinion, the Fadaiyandid not explain who would ultimately be the ruler in their ideal Islamicsociety. Was it to be Burujirdi or another marj‘a-i taqlid, or the leader of theFadaiyan, Navvab S.afavi, or one of his men?

It was clear that Burujirdi’s neutral policy towards the state authorities,during various events, was not acceptable to the Fadaiyan activists. Theywanted him to do more. In their manifesto, without mentioning his name,they heavily criticized him and accused him of doing more for his leadershipthan for the survival of the Shari‘at in the country.122 Their clerical membersin the Qum Seminary, such as Sayyid ‘Abdul-Husain Vah. idi and SayyidHashim Husaini, or even Navvab S.afavi himself, sometimes spoke afterprayers in the Shrine of H. az

.rat-i M‘asumah and in the Madrasih-yi Faiz

.iyih,

criticizing the Shah and the government but also the religious leadership.


23

Neither was their attack against the Shah and the government tolerated bythe police, nor their criticism against the religious leadership acceptable toBurujirdi’s companions. Therefore, this sometimes caused conflict betweenthe two sides in Qum. The situation was not helped by the fact that it wasrepeatedly reported to Burujirdi that the Fadaiyan had been collectingreligious taxes by threatening rich people.123 Initially Burujirdi had taken agentle, fatherly and admonitory position towards the Fadaiyan, and hadeven sometimes privately sent considerable sums of money to Navvab S.afavi.Nevertheless, over time, he had altered his standpoint.124 He sought to keepthe Holy Shrine and the Qum Seminary clear of any political conflict and asfar as possible free from any trouble with the police. Hence the Fadaiyan’spolitical activities in these places were not acceptable to him.125 Once, in oneof his lessons, while justifying his neutral position towards the politicalevents, Burujirdi pointed out that the failure of the ‘ulama’s efforts in theConstitutional Revolution was a guideline for his course of action.126 Onceagain, perhaps during the period of the nationalization of oil, he pointed outthat he would not take part or support any movement if he was not familiarwith it, did not know its beginning and end, and could not anticipate itsfuture.127

Although Mut.ahhari was not a member of the Fadaiyan group, he was aclose friend of Navvab S.afavi and its other clerical leaders. He was supportiveof their political views but was not in favour of their violent course of action.He tried to act as a mediator between Burujirdi and the Fadaiyan, making thelatter more lenient and closer to the marj‘a-i taqlid. As a result of his closefriendship with them (which has been acknowledged in his prolific writingsand speeches in one place only – Piramun-i Inqilab-i Islami, p. 177), andfollowing his advice, the Fadaiyan-i Islam began to teach among theirmembers Burujirdi’s Tauz.ih al-masail.128 They went even further. In ameeting with Burujirdi they expressed their loyalty to the leader of Islam andthe Muslimin.129 However, this short period of a closer relationship betweenthe Grand Ayatullah and the radicals did not seem to have altered hisfundamental mistrust of them and their activities. When eight of the leadingfigures of the Fadaiyan were arrested by the government, shortly aftermaking their unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Premier Husain ‘Ala, andwere put to death, he kept silent and did not seem to have consideredintervening on their behalf. Even Khomeini’s mediatory efforts could notchange the Ayatullah’s refusal to take steps to prevent their execution andturn the situation in favour of the young activists.130 His position wasjustified by some of his companions who maintained that he was sure, or hadbeen assured by members of his staff, that the government would neverexecute the Fadaiyan. If he had known of the government’s plan, he wouldalmost certainly have taken steps to prevent their execution.131 After theexecution, however, he cancelled his daily activities because of deepsadness.132

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Fear of the Tudih Party

The relations between the clergy and the left, namely the Tudih Party, wereeven worse. Despite similarities between the clergy and the Tudih Party intheir struggle against British imperialism, the senior religious authoritiesnever trusted members of the party and were always in fear of the growingimpact of their Marxist–materialist views on the people. Since this party isconsidered to be the first Marxist group in the country, and since its Marxistideology has been constituted as a major lifetime challenge to Mut.ahhari, it isappropriate to look more closely at its origins and activities, and then seewhat reaction the young philosopher made in response to the increasingactivities of this movement.

The Tudih Party had been founded in September 1941, immediately afterthe abdication of Reza Shah, by 27 of the famous 53 Marxists imprisoned in1937. Their spiritual founder, Dr Taqi Arani, had died in prison three yearsearlier. Arani, the son of a minor official in the Finance Ministry, was born inTabriz and had graduated in Tehran with first-class honours from the Dar al-Funun and the Medical College. While studying for a doctorate in chemistryat Berlin University, he had immersed himself in the works of Marx, Engelsand Lenin, taking a keen interest in European left-wing movements.133 AfterArani had returned to Iran in 1930, when teaching at Tehran University, heformed student discussion groups, and with former colleagues from Europefounded a highly theoretical journal called Dunya. In a series of articlesentitled ‘Historical materialism’, ‘Knowledge and the elements of matter’,‘The materialist concept of humanity’, ‘Women and materialism’ and ‘Thematerial basis of life and thought’, he explained for the first time to a Persian-reading public the academic Marxist approach to contemporary problems inthe social sciences. In his most explicitly political work, the ‘Materialistconcept of humanity’, Arani summarized Engel’s Origin of the Family,Private Property and the State, and stressed that society’s economic structuredetermined its institutional, ideological and political superstructure.134 Thoseintellectual gatherings were terminated by the police in 1937, after Arani’sgroup had distributed a May Day manifesto on the university campus andhad established links with a few veteran trade unionists. He stressed at histrial that ‘If you wish to adopt Western clothes, Western styles, Westerninstitutions, Western technology and the Western way of life, you must alsoadopt Western political philosophies.’135 He received the maximum sentenceof 10 years in solitary confinement and died in a prison hospital 16 monthslater.

The Tudih Party, however, published its provisional programme in lateFebruary 1942. The programme stressed the need to protect constitutionallaws, civil liberties and human rights. To avoid attacks from the ‘ulama, theTudih initially kept Marxist demands out of its programme. Although theywere Marxists (and, as later events showed, staunch supporters of the Soviet


25

Union) they did not call themselves ‘communists’.136 In an article entitled‘H. izb-i Tudih chi madhhabi darad’ in the party’s journal Rahbar theyexplained their attitude towards religion in general and Islam in particular:‘The Tudih Party has sincere faith in the true religion of Islam. Most of themembers of our Party are Muslim by background and believe the religion ofMuhammad. We shall never divert from the straight path of Islam.’137

Again, in a manifesto called Dar barih-i Islam, addressed to the ‘ulama,the Tudih stated that:

Not only is the Tudih Party not against religion in general, but wefeel a particular allegiance and deep respect towards Islam. We donot see any contradiction between the teachings of Islam and theprinciples that our party is advocating. We follow the same path andstruggle for the same objectives. We hope that the ‘ulama of Islamjoin us in this holy struggle and assure them of our loyalty to the truefaith.138

Their most notable success was with organized labour. Despite their pro-gressive popularity among workers, artisans, craftsmen, university studentsand intellectuals, the Tudih failed to attract middle-class proprietors andbazaari shop-keepers. This failure was explained partly by the economicconflicts between employees and employers, and partly by the ideologicaldifferences between Islam, as interpreted by the ‘ulama, and the secularradicalism espoused by the Marxist Tudih Party.139 In the elections for thefourteenth Majlis, in mid-1943, they were able to send eight members toparliament. They reached the zenith of their strength in August 1946, whenthe Prime Minister Qavam al-Salt.anih allocated three cabinet ministries tothe Tudih Party. Although the party was scattered and persecuted by thegovernment after the unsuccessful assassination attempt against the Shah on4 February 1949, it re-emerged during the premiership of Ali Razmara(1951–2). The election of Musaddiq helped them to return to the politicalforum, because the new Prime Minister accelerated the pace of liberalizationand realized that he needed all the public support he could muster in order tooust the British from the oil industry and expel the Shah from politics.140 Itwas during his government that the Tudih Party established an impressivearray of newspapers and front organizations, each with a periodical openlypropagating its Marxist demands and ideology. The Tudih published thedaily Bisu-yi Ayandih as their official paper. In order to give themselves anew and broader-based appearance, they founded a number of societies suchas the Society of Democratic Youth, the Society of Democratic Women, theSociety to Help Peasants, the Society to Fight Illiteracy, the Society for a FreeIran, the Coalition of the Workers’ Syndicates of Iran, the National Societyof Democratic Journalists, the National Society against the Imperialist OilCompany, the Iranian Society of Peace Partisans, the Organization of High

26


School Students, the Society of Democratic Lawyers and numerous occupa-tional associations such as the Union of Teachers, the Union of Engineers andthe Union of Government Employees. With the formation of these organiza-tions, the Tudih Party established themselves as a major political force in thecountry.141

However, in spite of the previous statements from the Tudih Party thatthey were sincere in their attitude towards what they called ‘the true religionof Islam and Islamic teachings’, the ‘ulama remained generally suspicious oftheir sincerity. The period of the movement for the nationalization of the oilindustry may be considered as the most peaceful time in the relationshipbetween the two sides. A day before the forced resignation of Premier Qavam(21 July 1952) the Tudih appealed to all anti-imperialist groups to establish asociety for the struggle against imperialism and specifically requestedKashani to take the initiative towards this goal. When Kashani sent an appealto the working and youth members of the Tudih Party, the Tehran pressreported that an alliance had come into being between the‘ulama and theIranian Communist Party. This was welcomed enthusiastically by the TudihParty. The alliance with the ‘ulama and with the nationalists not only gavethe Tudih an opportunity to revive the party, it also prepared the ground forthe rapidly growing influence and popularity of the party, as it gave theiractivities a patriotic, and not a communist colouring.142 The day afterQavam’s resignation, Kashani sent a public letter to the pro-Tudihorganizations thanking them for their invaluable contribution toward thenational victory.143 But, in an interview held at that time with a Frenchreporter, Kashani made it quite clear that despite the ‘ulama ‘s associationwith different political organizations (i.e. the Tudih Party) the country wouldnever turn towards an alien ideology such as communism because of the‘ulama’s loyalty to, and defence of, Islam.144 This short-term alliancebetween the religious, nationalist and communist groups against Britishimperialism and Qavam’s provisional government had a positive result, but itdid not continue when the relationship between Musaddiq and Kashanibroke down. The conflict between the Court and Musaddiq in February1953 (owing to his request for full authority) and Kashani’s switch tosupporting the Court, resulted in a new alliance between the Tudih Party andthe government. In fact, the‘ulama’s shift of loyalty to the Court can beexplained by their growing fear of communist influence and the increasingreliance of Musaddiq’s government on the Tudih Party. It is interesting tonote that although initially the party leadership was clearly divided – due toits support/non-support for the Musaddiq administration – it becamecompletely united against Kashani when his alliance with Musaddiq came toan end.145 From February 1953, until the coup d’état in August the cordialrelations between the Tudih and the government continued to develop. TheTudih supported Musaddiq in his confrontation with the Court over theconstitutional interpretation of the Shah’s authority (‘the monarch must


27

reign not rule’), in the Premier’s demand for the extension of his plenarypower and in his debates with the parliament, and finally in Musaddiq’sreferendum to dissolve the Majlis in July 1953. These manoeuvres contri-buted both to the growth of communist activities and the rise of the Tudih’sinfluence and power. Musaddiq brought three of the Tudih’s sympathizersinto the cabinet and publicly announced that the party was an integral part ofthe Iranian nation. By July, the Tudih was the strongest and most organizedpolitical force in the country. Its strength reached the point that it could exertpressure on the government and openly demand that the governmentrecognize communist China, legalize the Communist Party of Iran and expelAmerican military advisers from the country.146 When Stalin died in March1953, the Tudih mobilized its members and sympathizers and held massivemarches around the country. On 16 August 1953, as the Shah fled from thecountry, Tudih crowds poured into the streets, destroying royal statues,demanding a republic and criticizing Musaddiq for not acting decisivelyenough. In some provincial towns, Tudih demonstrators occupied municipalbuildings and raised red flags. It appeared then as if the royalist defeat hadbecome more of a communist than a nationalist victory.147

Kashani, however, accused Musaddiq of suppressing the opposition,restricting political activities and the freedom of speech of his opponents,whilst simultaneously giving the Tudih Party a free hand to spread unrest. Hewarned Musaddiq that these attitudes would drive Iran toward the edge of acommunist revolution. The reaction of the Tudih to these attacks andcharges was angry, and followed immediately. Demonstrations werearranged in support of Musaddiq, while communist newspapers began toattack Kashani and other leading ‘ulama as reactionary and backwardelements.148 A number of incidents occurred during these months whichintensified the opposition against the Tudih Party among the clergy. Amongsuch incidents were the disorders at the Masjid-i Shah in the bazaar ofTehran, in late 1952. One of the country’s most popular preachers, ShaikhAbul-Qasim Falsafi, was allegedly prevented from speaking and was set uponby a crowd of leftist demonstrators, whom he only narrowly escaped.149 Abook called Nigah-banan-i Sih. r va afsun (‘Guardians of magic and conjur-ation’) was published in the summer of 1953, attacking the clerics, usinghumour and satire. Reportedly the Tudih supporters, whilst riding bicycles,snatched and rode away with the turbans of some ‘ulama in the streets ofTehran.150 Perhaps the most important of these incidents was the Burqa‘iaffair in Qum, in January 1953, which deeply affected Burujirdi and hiscompanions. Sayyid Ali Akbar Burq‘ai a modernist cleric, who had areputation as a leftist and who had openly campaigned for the Iranian branchof a front organization, the International Partisans of Peace Movement,during the Musaddiq years, arrived in Qum after he had attended a peaceconference in Vienna and was warmly welcomed by the members andsupporters of the Tudih Party. A demonstration by a number of tullab and

28


other religious groups followed immediately, condemning the Sayyid and hisconnection with the Tudih Party. Insults were allegedly directed againstBurujirdi by Burq‘ai’s partisans and this led ultimately to the intervention ofPremier Musaddiq.151 Although the demonstration ended peacefully after thePrime Minister and his police forces had intervened, nevertheless the leading‘ulama considered the event as a threatening sign in their own realm – thatthe enemy had entered the Qum Seminary and had begun to influence someof its students. The clerical distrust towards the Tudih Party was not onlybased on the fact that the latter advocated Marxism but also because itattracted the support of anti-clerical intellectuals, such as Sadiq Hidayat, andespoused secularism, equal rights between Muslims and non-Muslims, co-educational schools and the discarding of the veil.

Understandably, the growth of the Tudih Party’s influence in society, theirpossible access to power, and the uncertain future of the religious establish-ment under their government, were not easy or simple matters for thereligious leadership. All these disturbing events happened during Musaddiq’sshort-lived government. Thus this fear and worry seemingly pushed Burujirdiand Kashani, as the two main religious leaders, into a position in which theyfelt they could no longer support Musaddiq and his Nationalist Party, at atime when they themselves were confronting the Shah and his royalistgroups. Indeed, as their telegrams to the Shah after the coup of 19 August1953 prove, they were ultimately in favour of the Court and the monarchy.152

In this critical situation, however, as a response to the propagation of theTudih Party’s so-called scientific philosophy, ‘Allamih Tabatabai organizedregular private weekly sessions, lecturing on the characteristics of Islamicphilosophy in comparison to Marxist epistemology and methodology. Theselectures, which were accompanied by students’ questions and criticism werethen followed up by Mut.ahhari’s detailed footnotes and commentaries. Hisbook Us. ul-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism (‘The principles of philosophy andthe method of realism’, 5 vols), which has become a main source and a majorreference work for modern Islamic philosophy during recent decades, was infact Mut.ahhari’s first academic contribution to the field. This work, writtenjointly with Tabatabai, which continued until his assassination, also provedMut.ahhari’s academic credentials. The first volume was published in 1953–4,followed gradually by volumes 2, 3 and 5; however, the fourth volumeremained incomplete and was not published until 1985.

Although Mut.ahhari criticized some of Tabatabai’s philosophical views inhis books, their close relationship never became overshadowed by thesedifferences.153 Perhaps it was as a result of Mut.ahhari’s influence thatTabatabai organized weekly team working sessions with his senior students,including Mut.ahhari and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti (head of the Revolu-tionary Council, 1978–81),154 discussing the matters concerning the situationof various religious movements and answering the questions they hadreceived from different parts of the world. This close relationship between


29

the two men was also evident in more personal matters. When, in 1977,Tabatabai needed urgent medical treatment in England Mut.ahhari made thenecessary arrangements.

In an interview after Mut.ahhari’s assassination, Tabatabai praised notonly his piety and great intelligence but remembered him also as a man whohad his own views (s. ah. ib-naz.ar). When he emotionally described hismemories of his previous student, Tabatabai mentioned that he felt hewanted to dance for sheer happiness when Mut.ahhari came to his lessonsbecause Mut.ahhari did not miss anything of the lessons and understoodeverything he taught.155

In 1951, however, when the struggle for the nationalization of the oilindustry ended successfully, the demand for comprehensive reform withinthe clerical establishment came to the fore.

Unsuccessful efforts at reform

In response to the expectations of young ‘ulama for reform, two seniorMudarris of the Qum Seminary, namely Hajj Aqa Ruh. ullah Khomeini andHajj Shaikh Murtaz

.a H. a’iri Yazdi (the elder son of Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim

H. a’iri Yazdi), who were close to Burujirdi, took the initiative and prepared aplan for a comprehensive change within the clerical administration.Although Burujirdi had previously appointed a group of his colleaguesincluding Khomeini and H. a’iri as the Governing Council (Haiat-i H. akimih)for the tullab ‘s daily affairs at the Qum Seminary, their achievements did notgo far enough for the two teachers.156 By taking advantage of Burujirdi’sunique position, they proposed to reorganize the seminary much more in linewith the needs of the time. Presumably, some junior teachers of the seminary,such as Mut.ahhari, were behind these steps towards reorganization. The firstdraft of the reform plan was signed by the members of the Governing Councilat a night session and was sent to Burujirdi for his final approval the samenight. Although this was never published, it covered, as a close companion ofBurujirdi revealed, all aspects of the future religious organization: education,finance, administration, ceremonial, missions and leadership.157

The first draft, surprisingly, was received with scepticism by Burujirdi.It made him suspicious about the intentions of Khomeini, H. a’iri andMut.ahhari. Burujirdi realized that he had no significant power left in theplanned new structure. All his authority concerning decision-making in theseminary was to be divided up between several officials and executedthrough separate committees. Although he convened a meeting with theGoverning Council, in order to question their intentions, their explanationswere unable to change his attitude towards the ‘ulama involved in drawingup the scheme. Khomeini and H. a’iri consequently resigned from theirpositions as members of the Council. The relationship between Burujirdi andMut.ahhari became definitely cooler, and the plan for comprehensive reform

30


ended in failure. In a letter to Burujirdi, Mut.ahhari tried to explain his aimsand to show his loyalty to his teacher, but Burujirdi did not accept hisletter.158

After this incident, the possibility of studying or teaching in Qum wasunderstandably no longer bearable for Mut.ahhari. His poor financialsituation, which had become worse after his marriage in 1950–1, wasincreasingly putting pressure on him. Therefore, he desperately needed toleave Qum and find new employment. In this respect, perhaps the relativelycomfortable life of his two fellow citizens in Tehran, Husain Ali Rashid andMuhammad Ibrahim Ayati, attracted him to move to the capital city.159

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2

ACADEMIC WORKS ANDPOLITICAL ACTIVITIES

An architect of modern Islamic theology

Mut.ahhari preferred to be generally known as a philosopher, but his worksand tasks seem to be more those of a modern theologian. The term ‘modernIslamic theology’ covers a branch of the Islamic sciences which deals withsocial and political matters. It is concerned with the new problems raised bymodern developments within Islamic societies. On the other hand, it deals, asa part of Islamic theology (‘Ilm-i kalam), with the questions advanced by themodern scientists and philosophers about the function of religion and thetruth of religious principles. As Mut.ahhari pointed out, it argues, explains,and defends the Islamic belief system and Islamic ordinances and edicts as itsmain task.1 Although the roots of modernity and the extent of modernizationare completely different in Western countries and Islamic societies, yetbecause of similarities in its philosophical and theological consequences,modern Islamic theology is in some ways very similar to that of modernWestern theology, which deals fundamentally with theoretical issues.2 Onthe other hand, it is similar to Latin America’s liberation theology inparticular, which is largely concerned with justifying the struggles against thesocial and political problems of that area.3 In this respect, evidence from hisacademic works and political activities, which is presented in this and thefollowing chapters, clearly supports the aforementioned view aboutMut.ahhari:

From about twenty years ago, when I took a pen and started to writean article or a book, the only thing that I was always considering, asthe purpose of all my writings, was to solve problems or respond toquestions propounded on the subject of present Islamic theologicalissues. Some of my writings are related to philosophy and others toethics, jurisprudence, history and social phenomena. Although thesubject matter of each of these writings is completely different,nevertheless, they all spring from one common factor, which is thefact that Holy Islam is an unknown religion. The reality of this

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A C A D E M I C W O R K S A N D P O L I T I C A L A C T I V I T I E S

religion has gradually become misrepresented to the people. Theessential cause of the people’s estrangement [from Islam] is due tofalse teachings which occur under the heading of ‘Islamic teachings’.This religion is at present harmed more by persons who claim theyare defenders than by any other group. The pressure of Westerncolonialism, with its visible and invisible agents on the one side, andthe shortcomings and faults of many Mullas claiming to bedefenders of Islam on the other, has caused Islamic thought to beregularly under attack for its different principles, be they primary orsecondary. It is for these reasons that I see it as my duty to actresponsibly, in so far as I am capable, in this area.4

For almost three decades, Mut.ahhari’s speeches, teachings and writingshad constantly targeted materialist, Marxist, secularist, traditionalist andpro-Westernization movements. Initially, his academic works were con-cerned mostly with issues of a more ethical, religious and philosophicalnature; however, they gradually shifted towards topics relating to sociology,economics and politics.

A desirable chair for the young philosopher

After his move to Tehran between 1952 and 1953, Mut.ahhari was, whileinterpreting the Quran in a weekly session held by a factory owner calledHajj Muhammad Hasan Kushanpour, invited by the authorities ofMadrasih-yi Marvi, to teach philosophy at the seminary. His lessons on IbnSina and Mulla Hadi Sabzavari’s philosophy continued over a period ofalmost 25 years. The books Sharh. -i ‘Arabi-yi Manz.umih and Dars-ha-yiIlahiyat-i Shifa were published posthumously and were the outcome of theselessons. Although his employment at the Madrasih, and some financialassistance he received from the factory owner, clearly eased his criticalfinancial problems, he often seemed unhappy. The collapse of his rela-tionship with Burujirdi and his feeling of disappointment about his departurefrom the Qum Seminary were not simple matters for him. No doubt he wasalso concerned about the political divisions which had intensified among thenationalist and religious leaders during these years, notably the divisionbetween Musaddiq and Kashani, Burujirdi and the Fadaiyan-i Islam, andbetween the Fadaiyan and Musaddiq and Kashani; or rather he was generallyworried by the disputes within the religious establishment with respect to themajor political affairs of the country. At this time, he became occupied withcomposing commentaries on Tabatabai’s philosophical articles.5

On 29 February 1955, Mut.ahhari applied to the Danish-kadih-yi M‘aqulva Manqul of the University of Tehran for the advertised post of associateprofessorship in Islamic philosophy and theology.6 After being successful in aformal examination, he was employed by the Faculty of Theology as a


33

mu‘allim (associate lecturer) of philosophy from autumn 1955. It is worthmentioning that although a chair was finally given to Mut.ahhari in spring1974, he had never been properly acknowledged by the university’sauthorities as a distinguished academic. The regime was always suspicious ofhim and eventually, in 1977, after a heated dispute with Amir HusainAryanpour, a Professor of Modern Western Philosophy in the Faculty ofTheology, they forced him into retirement.7 Undoubtedly his status at theuniversity opened up a unique opportunity for Mut.ahhari to gain access tothe intellectual circles of society. He could also gain benefit from well-knownscholars, educated students and up-to-date books which were easilyaccessible to him at the university. Therefore his achievements must be partlyattributed to this chair at the university. It is interesting to note that manyPh.D. theses by well-known figures such as Muhammad Taqi Shariati (acontemporary religious writer), Muhammad Javad Bahunar (Prime Minister,1981) and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti (Head of the Revolutionary Council,1979) were supervised by Mut.ahhari.8 Many students who later becamesenior officials of the Islamic Republic were also taught by him. It would beappropriate, therefore, to learn who was behind the scenes in encouraginghim to take up a university career. Although none among Mut.ahhari’sfriends or biographers have alluded to this point, it may be ascribed to hisclose friendship with the two eminent professors in the Faculty of Theologyat that time, namely Husain Ali Rashid and Muhammad Ibrahim Ayati.Rashid was also a well-known speaker on religious matters on Radio Tehranand it was most probably as a result of his influential position thatMut.ahhari’s speeches were broadcast on the radio for almost two years. TheBist Guftar is in fact a compilation of those speeches he delivered from 1959to 1961.9 The speeches, however, did not continue, because they werefollowed by criticism damaging his reputation. He was accused by someactivists of co-operating with the regime. Regarding Dr Ayati, the two hadhad a close friendship since the days at the Mashhad Seminary. He wasprobably Mut.ahhari’s oldest friend. In his introduction to the book DahGuftar, Mut.ahhari praised him as follows:

The first seven discourses were delivered during monthly meetings inTehran from Mihr 1339 to Mihr 1341. These meetings were held ina house near Zhalih Square, attended by hundreds of people ofdifferent backgrounds. They were organized by the Anjuman-iMahanih-i Dini [Monthly Religious Association], and continued fortwo and a half years. Thirty lectures were given there by differentscholars. During the thirty months that the Association was active,the late, great scholar and researcher Dr Muhammad Ibrahim Ayatiwas more co-operative and helpful than others with respect to thecurrent issues of the Association.10

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In fact, the Anjuman-i Mahanih-i Dini was one of the important religiousassociations established in the capital city. Besides Mut.ahhari and Ayati,many well-known ‘ulama like Taliqani, Beheshti, Musa S.adr and GulzadihGhafuri were lecturing. The books Guftar-i Mah (three vols) and Guftar-i‘Ashura are the results of their lectures at the Association. These books dealpartly with the current affairs of the Muslim world but mostly concentrateon theological and moral issues. Mut.ahhari’s speeches included Taqva, Amr-i bi M‘aruf va Nah-yi az Munkar, As. l-i Ijtihad dar Islam, Ih. ya-yi fikr-i Dini,Fariz.ih-yi ‘Ilm and Rahbari-yi Nasl-i Javan.11

An active speaker at the Islamic associations

It has lately been disclosed that, after the royalist coup d’état of August 1953,some Islamic dignitaries of the capital city, including Mahdi Bazargan (PrimeMinister of the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran afterJanuary 1979) and Murtaz

.a Mut.ahhari, decided to clarify their policy

towards the new situation and to establish a programme for their activities inthe future.12 The programme, abbreviated to MAT‘A (Maktab-i Tarbiyati,Ijtima‘i, ‘Amali) was basically aimed at improving the religious under-standing and practice of the younger generation. According to theprogramme, new publications needed to be produced, scholarly teachings ofIslam expanded and the activities of pro-religious supporters with academicbackgrounds co-ordinated. Evaluating contemporary religious literature,Mut.ahhari stated:

Religious publications are provoking disorder. Some writings areeven fundamentally harmful and shameful. Moreover, our usefulones are produced without previous evaluations: that is, without acalculation of their requirements and the orderly arrangement oftheir necessities. Each person, according to his taste, writes andpublishes everything which he considers useful. There are manyareas in which nothing has been written, whilst other subject matterhas been over-published.13

In order to fulfil this programme, four well-known religious associationsof contemporary Iran – namely, Anjuman-i Islami-yi Muhandisin (the IslamicAssociation of Engineers), Anjuman-i Islami-i Pizishkan (the Islamic Associ-ation of Physicians), Anjuman-i Islami-i Mu‘allimin (the Islamic Associationof Teachers) and Anjuman-i Mahanih-yi Dini (Monthly ReligiousAssociation) – were established during this decade. The first was founded in1957–8 by Mahdi Bazargan, Must.afa Katirai, Ali-Akbar Mu‘infar, Salur,Shakibniya, T. ahiri, ‘At.ai, Zanginih and Lavasani. The second wasestablished in 1958–9 by Kaz. im Yazdi, Ibrahim Yazdi, Husain ‘Ali, ‘AbbasH. a’iri, Kaz. im Sami, Muhammad Maulavi and Pishbin. The third was


35

organized, probably in 1960–1 by Mut.ahhari, Bazargan, Yadullah Sah. abi,Ghulam ‘Abbas Tavassuli and Muhammad Ali Rajai. And the fourth wasformed at the same time in 1960 by two merchants – Ahmad Ali Babai andhis partner, Navid.14 Many of Mut.ahhari’s lectures were given at theseassociations. As a result, a great number of their members who later becamemembers of the Islamic governmental establishment were under hisinfluence. The books Mas’alih-yi H. ijab, Masalih-yi Riba, Khadamat-iMutaqabil-i Islam va Iran, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman, Imamat vaRahbari, Fit.rat, T‘alim va Tarbiyat dar Islam, and the articles on Bimih,S. ulh. -i Imam H. asan, Mas’alih-yi Vilayat-‘ahdi-yi Imam Reza, Khit.abih vaManbar were Mut.ahhari’s contributions to the activities of the first threeassociations.

Moreover, another relatively well-known group, Anjuman-i Islami-yiDanishjuyan (the Islamic Association of Students) must not be forgotten.This association was in fact the earliest foundation of the religious studentsat Tehran University and was established in 1942–3 by a number of medicalstudents who were against the Tudih Party. Among their number wereHusain Mans. ur-baigi, Husain ‘Ali, Azadih Bidukhti and ‘Abbas Nikufar. Itwas later expanded by a group of technical students and benefited largelyfrom Bazargan’s lectures in their sessions. After the royalist coup of August1953, following the scheduling of future activities by MAT‘A, the Anjuman-iIslami-yi Danishjuyan reorganized themselves and moved their weeklysessions to the Shaibani Library. Then they joined with the Islamic associ-ations Anjuman-i Islami-yi Muhandisin, Pizishkan and Mu‘allimin after theformer (the Islamic Association of Students) graduated from university. Theyfinally established a new political movement in May 1961, called Nihz.at-iAzadi-yi Iran (the Liberation Movement of Iran).15 The first threeassociations held joint annual congresses in Tehran in the years 1962 and1963 and chose Mut.ahhari as a permanent member of their secretariat, butsurprisingly he did not attend either of the two congresses. As Va‘iz. -zadih, aclose friend of Mut.ahhari explained, he was aware of the politicalenvironment of the congresses and liked to act more cautiously, in particularas Bazargan openly and heavily criticized the Shah and his governmentduring his speeches.16 To improve their understanding of Islamic philosophy,Mut.ahhari invited them to attend his lessons on Tabatabai’s philosophicalarticles at the Marvi School in 1954–5.17 They also invited Mut.ahhari – inorder to increase their Islamic knowledge – to their weekly sessions tocomment on the Quran. Hence, they regularly benefited from his knowledge.

At the core of the political arena

On 30 March 1961, when Grand Ayatullah Burujirdi passed away and as anew religious authority had not yet been well established in Iran, the regimetook advantage of the situation, and took steps which finally led to the

¯

36


violent uprising of 5 June 1963. Indeed, the Shah’s telegram of condolence toAyatullah Sayyid Muh. sin H. akim (d. March 1970) in Najaf (and not to theleading Ayatullahs of Qum) after the demise of Burujirdi, was considered as aclear indication that he preferred to keep the religious authority outside thecountry.

On 6 October 1962, when Asadullah ‘Alam was the Prime Minister, thegovernment ratified a bill which angered the Iranian religious authorities. Itis worth mentioning that although his predecessor Ali Amini had previouslyannounced his programme for the land reforms on 10 January 1961,nevertheless the programme remained inoperative owing to his disagreementwith the Shah, which ended in his resignation on 18 July 1961. For thisreason, the programme did not raise any visible opposition among theleading Ayatullahs.18 The bill, however, called Layihi-yi Anjuman-ha-yiIyalati va Vilayati (the Bill of the Regional and the State Associations), wasaimed at altering the law governing elections. The conditions for both theelectors and the elected, according to articles 7 and 9 of the governing localcouncils’ regulations, were previously as follows: that they believe in Islam,that they take an oath on the Quran and that they be male; whereas the newbill required only that they believe in one of the revealed religions; that theytake an oath on one of the revealed books; and allowed that they could alsobe female. After the news of this modification was published by the press on16 Mihr (7 October), four leading Ayatullahs of Qum – Khomeini,Gulpayigani, Shari‘atmadari and Murtaz

.a H. a’iri Yazdi immediately sent a

telegram to the Shah on 17 Mihr (8 October), demanding the cancellation ofthe bill. They argued that the bill violated the Constitution and had also notbeen approved by the Majlis, due to its enforced closure. Perhaps theirdiscontent was due to their fear of the growth of the power of religiousminorities in the state apparatus and the legislation that women must beunveiled in public. Although the government insisted on the operation of thebill, they were forced to cancel it on 28 November 1962, because of theenormous pressure applied by the religious establishment.19 On 9 January1963, the Shah declared his ‘White Revolution’ and pointed out that hewould hold a referendum on it. His programme consisted of six articleswhich included: land reform, nationalization of the forests, selling statefactories, giving shares to factory workers, electoral law reform andestablishing a Literacy Corps.20

After consultation with each other, the religious authorities of Qum andMashhad separately issued statements forbidding the referendum andarguing that there was no basis for it in the Constitution. Presumably theyfeared that it might become the norm for the Shah’s secular intentions in thefuture. The Shah did not pay any attention to their request. Instead, on hisvisit to Qum on 24 January 1963, which was not welcomed by any of thereligious authorities, he angrily labelled them ‘the Black Reaction’ (Irtija‘a-iSiyah) who were supported by Egypt. Although he announced his victory in


37

the referendum two days later, the outcome was not acceptable to the clerics.In protest, Khomeini issued a statement declaring that the believers shouldnot celebrate the New Year. Following this, two violent incidents intensifiedthe situation. These occurred on 22 March 1963, when mourning ceremoniesfor the anniversary of Imam S. adiq’s martyrdom were held in the Madrasih-yiFaiz

.iyih in Qum and the Madrasih-yi T. alibiyih in Tabriz. Police attacked the

mourners attending the seminaries whilst the speakers were openly criticizingthe government’s policies. Consequently, a number of people were killed andmany were injured.21 Again in May 1963, coinciding with the holy month ofMuh. arram, Khomeini issued guidelines for the preachers, asking them tospeak about the political events in the country. In his famous speech of 5 June1963, Khomeini directly criticized the Shah, condemned his strategy togetherwith his internal and foreign policies.22 Subsequently, at midnight on thatsame day, he was arrested by the police and put into a military prison inTehran. This incident was followed by massive protests and demonstrationsheld by the religious circles in Qum, Tehran, Varamin, Mashhad, Shiraz andelsewhere. As a result, many were killed and injured in Varamin; in addition,two well-known Ayatullahs, namely Hajj Aqa-Hasan Qumi from Mashhad,and Baha al-Din Mah. allati from Shiraz, were arrested and imprisoned inTehran; furthermore, the city of Tehran itself was put under martial law.Although the two Mujtahids were freed on 2 August 1963, Khomeini wasplaced under house arrest in Tehran. Soon after his release on 6 April 1964,another major incident disturbed the religious leaders. On 13 October 1964,the Premier Hasan-Ali Mansur passed a bill, entitled Layihi-yi Capitulasion(the Bill of Capitulation) in the parliament, offering diplomatic immunity toAmerican military servicemen in Iran. A copy of the detailed discussions ofmembers of the parliament was secretly sent to Khomeini by one of hisfollowers. Khomeini delivered his famous speech on the capitulation on 26October 1964. According to him, by taking a loan from the USA to pursuehis military aims, the Shah had sold the country’s sovereignty andindependence. He also condemned the Shah’s close friendship with Americaand Israel, characterizing the government and the parliament as treacherousto the nation.23 The speech was immediately distributed all over the country.It has been mentioned that almost 40,000 copies were handed out all overTehran by 500 members of the Hai’at-ha-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami (the IslamicUnited Groups) in less than an hour.24 Thereafter, large numbers of telegramsand letters were sent by the ‘ulama and religious groups to the governmentand the parliament, condemning the approval of the bill and demanding itscancellation. The government did not pay attention to the protests; instead,they arrested Khomeini at midnight on 4 November 1964 and exiled himdirectly to Bursa (Turkey). Then, in October 1965, after spending 11 monthsin Bursa, he was sent to Najaf (Iraq).25

During those years, Mut.ahhari played the major role in propagatingAyatullah Khomeini’s views and distributing his statements and cassettes in

38


Tehran.26 During the night of ‘Ashura (5 June 1963) he was arrested by theSAVAK (the Secret Police) and put in jail. In prison, he wrote his first and lastpoem in which he complained about his separation from Khomeini,expressing his affinity towards him:27

The companions have no knowledge of the beloved’s abodeThe song of the bell [of the caravan] is heard from a far distance

Oh zephyr, for a moment carry our message to the spirit of God[Tell him] that his memory is our companion in this cage day andnight

Despite the enemy’s attempt, our relationswill not be ruptured so long as we breath

Oh heart, you do not deserve to live in the corner of the prisonIt is appropriate if we constantly shed blood from both eyes

The porch of the eye is prepared for your arrivalBe generous and kindly accept our invitation

The whole Iranian nation is looking forward to your arrivalWe do not fear anyone in the cause of freedom and justice.

After 43 days he was finally released from prison. When he met his wifeagain, he expressed his gratitude for a clever act she had performed on thenight of his arrest. When Mut.ahhari asked her to bring him his tunic beforeleaving his home for prison, she had chosen a different tunic to the one he hadbeen wearing on the day of his arrest, thus preventing the disclosure ofKhomeini’s statements to the security forces.28 Soon afterwards, he and anumber of his associates together formed a clerical society, later calledJami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat-i Mubariz (the Society of Combatant ReligiousScholars) in Tehran, not only with the aim of organizing but also co-ordinating various political activities which later played an important role inthe Islamic Revolution.29

A theorist of the Islamic coalition groups

In 1963, after the events of 5 June, three small religious groups in Tehranannounced a new coalition entitled Hai’at-ha-yi Mu’talifih-i Islami orJam‘iyat-ha-yi Mu’talifih-i Islami. These groups were influenced by NavvabS.afavi and were mostly, like the Fadaiyan-i Islam, from non-academic but –unlike the Fadaiyan – from middle-class backgrounds. Before the coalition,they had been separately, and without knowing each other, visiting Qum andhad been accepting Khomeini’s guidance and orders for their politicalactivities. Khomeini introduced them to each other and expressed his


39

confidence and trust toward each of them.30 The central committee of theMu’talifih consisted of 12 members who were all bazaarmen. Some of them,such as Hajj Mahdi Iraqi, H. abibullah ‘Asgar-Auladi, Muhammad SadiqIslami, Sa‘id Amani and Asadullah Lajivardi, who had established a closerrelationship with Khomeini, were put in charge of governmental mattersafter the Islamic Revolution. With a five-man clerical committee, namely AliGulzadih Ghafuri, Muhammad Maulai, Muhyi al-Din Anvari, SayyidMuhammad Beheshti and Mut.ahhari, this union found credibility among the‘ulama and religious circles. The distinguishing characteristic of the unionwas that they were totally pro-clerical groups, propagating Islam asinterpreted by the ‘ulama. They considered themselves as the followers(muqallid) of the religious authorities. Besides distributing Khomeini’sstatements and propagating his ideas as their first immediate priority, theMu’talifih announced guidelines for expanding Islamic ideology at their firstmeeting in Tehran. Supported by Ayatullah Milani from the MashhadSeminary, they established classes in Tehran and Qum to teach Islamicprinciples to their members and supporters. Then, they organized a newbranch called Jam‘iyat-i Tarbiyat-i Sukhangu (the Group for TrainingSpeakers) for training speakers and teachers for the new members andsupporters.31 Although there are no reliable statistics about the number ofMu’talifih’s members and supporters, it can be said that they reached thezenith of their popularity among the religious people when they started toorganize their sympathizers into semi-secret 10-person groups, to teach themIslamic ideology. It was precisely after Khomeini’s exile to Turkey inNovember 1964 that their Central Committee decided, despite Mut.ahhari’sdisagreement, to establish a military branch for targeting the regime’s so-called anti-Islamic figures. It is interesting to note that despite the existenceof this militant component in the union, Mut.ahhari was consistentlyopposed to any military action. Although he was not excluded fromimprisonment when the Mu’talifih were disbanded in March 1965, after theassassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansur by a member of this unioncalled S. adiq Amani, Mut.ahhari apparently preferred cultural andeducational solutions.32 He expressed the view that religious thoughts anddogmas had not yet been logically and reasonably presented to the people. Agreat number of believers were not properly taught and trained by reliableIslamic sources. Therefore, to insist on violent ways to construct an Islamicsociety, before presenting its ideological foundations, was not consideredfruitful by him: ‘Every social movement must be backed by a theoretical andcultural movement, otherwise it will be caught up in [social] currents whichwill benefit from it and will modify its path.’33

The Insan va Sarnivisht is a compilation of Mut.ahhari’s lectures whichwere presented regularly to the members of this Union. It was used as a coretext for the Mu’talifih’s training programme and repeatedly taught by theirteachers to members and supporters. In this book, he mainly concerns

40


himself with issues relating to the sociology of the backwardness ofcontemporary Muslim societies. Although he mentions some purelysociological theories, such as Western imperialism, he deliberately movestowards the internal causes and the cultural hypotheses.34 In his analysis,Mut.ahhari examined different hypotheses to ascertain which doctrine wasresponsible for the retrograde situation and finally concentrated on thetheory of fatalism (mashiyatgirai). He asked whether belief in God’s will andthe theory of mashiyatgirai had caused the social decline or whether it wasrather a case of misrepresenting and misunderstanding theory. According toMut.ahhari, Muslim backwardness arose as a result of a particular illusorynotion belonging to a school of thought that acquired dominance in thehistory of Islamic theology – namely the Asha‘irih’s anti-rationalist doctrinewhose predominance in the minds of the Muslim communities owed itself toSunni pro-Asha‘irih monarchs. Therefore, for Mut.ahhari, it was the falserepresentation of fatalism which was at fault, rather than the doctrine itself.If a Muslim believes that God, according to his knowledge, predestinedman’s and society’s future, should he consider applying any socio-politicalmodification? Mut.ahhari’s answer here is positive. By justifying the belief indivine knowledge and also in being an activist in the matter of making one’sown destiny, Mut.ahhari sought to construct, with the aid of theological,historical and philosophical arguments, a new vision about the theory ofmashiyat. The core of his arguments in this book and his message to theyoung audience at the Mu’talifih can be summarized as follows: changing adestiny and hence making a new destiny is necessarily the destiny of humanbeings and it is this which is predestined by God’s will and which is inharmony with divine knowledge.35

Epic of the righteous, stories for moralists

For improving people’s deeds and visions, tales and stories are alwaysconsidered as effective instruments. In this respect, Mut.ahhari’s contributionis remarkable. Again in 1964–5, when he was analysing the question ofdestiny for the young activists, the second volume of his anecdotes, Dastan-iRastan, was published. The stories, 125 in all, had a strong influence on thereaders because of their realism. Their significance spread beyond theborders of Iran, being declared ‘Book of the Year’ by UNESCO (1964–5).Thereafter, it was frequently broadcast on national radio, in the form ofplays.36 The stories’ international recognition made Mut.ahhari knownabroad; however, it did not protect him from some of his associates’criticisms. They maintained that the collection was useful and instructive,but argued that the project did not fit in with his social status as a jurist,philosopher and university professor. Mut.ahhari alluded to these remarks inthe preface to the book and referred to them as portraying a regrettableattitude evolving into a social illness. He explained:


41

If this type of conduct had been attributed to one or to a few persons,I wouldn’t have raised the issue. However, unfortunately, thisbehaviour, which is nothing but a social anomaly and a grievousdeviation from superior Islamic teachings, has become widespreadin our society . . . It is for this very reason that today, as far as theavailability of beneficial books is concerned, especially those with areligious content, we are too impoverished. Each one claims to beknowledgeable in this field; writers are willing to spend ten or moreyears just fabricating a mixture of fact and fiction into a scientificcompilation – with their name honourably inscribed on the frontcover – which does not contribute to any profitable use for society.Furthermore, they fail to compile a useful piece of work due to thelack of simplicity in their approach – something which does notharmonize with their status. As a result, the essential and neededwritings are not produced, while irrelevant, superfluous works areconstantly printed, one after the other.37

His sense of duty towards the moral education of the younger generation,who would eventually take over the reins of government in his ideal Islamicsociety, motivated him to write such moral fables with enthusiasm. In thepreface to Dastan-i Rastan, he elucidated his reform policies and how theydiffered from others. He argued:

It is a wrong notion, generally adopted by some partisans of socialchanges, that one should start with the higher echelons of the upperclasses. However, [historical] experience has taught us that any suchapproach, instead of providing beneficial guidelines to society,presents propaganda and demagogy.38

In short, Mut.ahhari’s theory is that any social reform must originateamong the masses and not emerge via the minority dominant upper classes.In order to achieve this, public culture and the people’s style of living has tobe modified by programmes which include publishing tales and stories.

H. usainiyih-yi Irshad, the unfulfilled expectations

From about 1964, Islamism was on the increase and religious awarenessgrew amongst university graduates. It appeared that the old-fashionedreligious centres such as the mosque, the Takiyih and the H. usainiyih, withtheir lack of facilities, were not very attractive to the educated youngergeneration. Although the Islamic Associations of Engineers and Physiciansseemed to provide suitable arenas for theological-political discussions, infact, due to the lack of space and materials, they were not the ideal locationsfor a large-scale religious movement. It was probably due to an incident in

42


1965 that the ground was prepared for Mut.ahhari and his associates,Muhammad Humayun, a factory owner, Abdul-Husain Ali-abadi, aphysician, and Nasir Minachi, a lawyer, who joined together to establish amodern cultural complex, equipped with up-to-date audio-visual facilities.39

Mut.ahhari was the founder, Humayun the financial supporter, Dr Ali-abadithe general adviser and Minachi the secretary and legal adviser. A ten-day-long session of a mourning ceremony was held by Humayun and Minachi (hisfinancial assistant) at a garden (under a marquee) in Qulhak, during the holymonth of Muh. arram 1965. Many well-known religious speakers of thecountry, including Mut.ahhari, were preaching there. Surprisingly, also, agreat number of people with academic backgrounds attended the ceremony,demanding its expansion. Subsequently the ceremony continued until thefollowing month of S. afar. In order to present Islamic principles with moderntechniques, the above-mentioned individuals decided to establish a newIslamic institute called Mu’assasih-yi Tah. qiqati va T‘alimati-yi H. usainiyih-iIrshad (the Husainiyih-yi Irshad Institute for Research and Education).Although, eventually, this Institute did not meet Mut.ahhari’s expectations, itplayed a major role in the religious movement of young activists before theIslamic Revolution. Hence, it is appropriate to see what measures he thoughtshould be adopted at the Institute and what factors ultimately forced him toresign in 1970–1. Virtually everything concerning his short-term relationshipwith the Institute may be found in letters which remained unpublished untilrecent years:

My objective is to use this Institute as an organization fordisseminating and researching Islam at a high level, in order torespond to the theoretical needs of the present volatile society. Iwant this Institute to be shaped in such a way as to provide a truepicture of Islamic ideology, in contrast to the current ideologies ofthe present world. Naturally, I believe the message which will betransmitted from this Institute, be it in writing or in a lecture, mustbe based on logical reasoning and not on emotions.40

Mut.ahhari’s approach was completely different from that of Minachi (theMinister of Islamic Guidance during Bazargan’s Provisional Government of1978–89). As the letters reveal, Mut.ahhari sought to put the Irshad Instituteunder the guidance and leadership of ‘the Senior Clergy Council’ as afoundation for studies of and research into Islam, devoid of left- or right-wing influences.41 Normally, any programme had to be approved andconfirmed by the Mujtahids of the Council – a similar approach to that beingfollowed by the Mu’talifih, although Minachi, as the head of Irshad’s boardof directors, was strongly opposed to this. Gradually, he was able to bring thedepartments for employment, administration, finance and media mattersunder his control, thus preventing the formation of a clergy council.42 It is


43

worth mentioning that in November 1967, when Mut.ahhari was a memberof the board of directors, he sent a letter to Dr Ali Shariati (1933–77), whowas then a lecturer in Persian history at the University of Mashhad, askinghim to contribute to a book to be published by the Institute about the life ofthe Prophet Muhammad. It was later entitled Muhammad Khatam-iPayambaran.43 Soon afterwards, Shariati was also invited to lecture at theInstitute. His lectures were delivered with emotion, firing his audience withenthusiasm and were warmly welcomed by the young students. Histeachings, too, had a major influence among the older men and womenstudents. This eventually turned the Irshad Institute into the most attractivereligious centre of the country. In a letter to the consultative council of theH. usainiyih-yi Irshad, Mut.ahhari mentioned that initially, whilst searchingfor a proper location for the Institute, he never anticipated such publicity:‘[The Institute] became so popular during the four years that it exerted aninfluence on all groups of the country from the Grand Ayatullahs to thegovernment officials.’44

An important point should be noted here. Minachi, with his liberal viewregarding the ‘ulama, considered himself to be more a colleague than afollower of Mut.ahhari. Formerly, he had not shown much interest inbecoming involved with Mujtahids who were respected by Mut.ahhari andhad seemingly attempted to make the Institute primarily a centre for non-clerical religious lectures. For this purpose, Shariati, who was educated at theSorbonne and who held a vision totally opposed to that of Mut.ahhari’sconceptions, seemed the ideal man. As a result, Shariati’s progressiveinfluence and authority, which was fostered by his emotional speeches andhis immense knowledge of Persian history and literature, and above all hisnovel method of explaining Islam, had reduced Mut.ahhari’s power andefficiency to a minimum. As Minachi recently revealed – in a privateinterview in August 1993 – he and Shariati had come to a secret agreementwhen the latter moved to Tehran.45 They agreed to render the Institute moreattractive to the younger generation by changing its appearance from anacademic quietist religious centre to a politically revolutionary institute. Inorder to achieve this, Shariati presented more sociologically and politicallyorientated speeches. Indeed, Mut.ahhari had been aware of Minachi’s policiesand intentions for some time; hence, in a letter after his resignation in1970–1, he referred to it as a ‘coup’.46 Furthermore, he remarked:

In every religious institution, the presence of a fully qualified clericof supreme legal rank is necessary and, moreover, eliminates anynotion that the institute is not in need of the ‘ulama . . . On the otherhand, these gentlemen [Minachi and his companions] are notprepared to tolerate the presence of even five virtuous, intellectual,well-educated ‘ulama in an institute entitled Islamic; thus thesituation becomes problematic and arouses suspicion.47

44


Shariati’s view of the clerical establishment is notable. In his early lectures,while analysing the foundations of Western civilization, he repeatedlypraised the affirmative function of the Protestant movement and hoped thatsuch a movement might be formed in contemporary Islamic societies:

If we had considered the value of the works of such Westernreformers as Luther and Calvin and of the Protestant movement forreligious reform which rescued Christianity from the petrified, dulland decadent framework of Catholicism, and if we had known towhat extent this movement had contributed to the awareness andprogress of the foundation of power and civilization in con-temporary Europe, we would come to the conclusion that ourIslamic, petrified, sleepy society is in need, before anything else, ofsuch Protestant reformers, that is of protesting reformers who arefamiliar with Islam, with the society and with the needs anddeficiencies of the age.48

As he clarified his view, by giving the example of Muhammad IqbalLahuri, it was apparent that Shariati’s protestant reformers were entirelyfrom the intelligentsia (Raushanfikran-i Agah) and not from the clericalestablishment. This attitude, which was termed and propagated by hisstudents ‘Islamic Protestantism’ and ‘Islam-i Minha-yi Ruh. aniyat’ (Islamwithout clergy) created an intense anti-clerical environment among Shariati’sfollowers and raised questions among the traditionalist ‘ulama aboutMut.ahhari’s friendship with Shariati and his contribution to the IrshadInstitute as an anti-clerical centre. But it can be argued that Shariati probablychose a different strategy to attract the Tehran middle class. In his lateinterviews and lectures, although Shariati sought to modify his views andpresent an affirmative image of the ‘ulama by mentioning their revolutionaryand anti-imperialist role in contemporary Islamic movements and theirexclusively clerical methods of education, he was not able to resolve thedifficulties.49 In a letter to Ayatullah Khomeini in 1977–8, Mut.ahharidescribed the situation as follows:

It is a matter of fact which is not deniable that the only issue whichthe different groups – from the regime’s officials to the communists,the Munafiqin-i Khalq [Sazman-i Mujahidin-i khalq] and someseemingly religious groups who are pro-Shariati – all share is thesame desire, that is, to damage fundamentally the cleric and toremove this obstacle from the scene. Of course, each group has itsown purpose . . . As a consequence of his [Shariati’s] teachings, acleric [Ahl-i ‘Ilm] is, in the eyes of a youth of today, worse than asecurity officer.50


45

As has been mentioned, Mut.ahhari was, from the time of his education inQum, in favour of a comprehensive reform of the clerical establishment.51

His view, however, was that reforms had to originate from inside the clericalsystem, through a leading Mujtahid or a group of leading Mujtahids and notfrom outside, through the intelligentsia. Clearly, this aim was completelydifferent from that of Shariati and was also unacceptable to Minachi.Therefore, he left the Irshad Institute with unfulfilled expectations.

Mut.ahhari’s departure from the Irshad Institute led ultimately to thedisintegration of the Islamic forces. This was a development much welcomedby the secular government and may, in fact, have diverted the direction of thestruggle away from the Pahlavi regime to the Muslim community itself.Nevertheless, he declined to target the Irshad Institute and to criticize itslecturers explicitly. During all this time, he never publicly mentioned theIrshad incident and never disagreed with Minachi or Shariati in public. Once,in a private letter addressed to the consultative board of the H. usainiyih-yiIrshad (1971–2), whilst reporting the situation of various religious groups inthe country, he, very generally and implicitly, emphasized his reactionstowards Shariati’s theoretical and practical procedures:

Fortunately, at present, a new class [of religious intellectuals] hasdeveloped – being educated in the modern Western culture andsimultaneously having interests in Islam and Islamic studies. Theyrepresent Islam with a modern style which is normally welcomed bythe young generation who are naturally Muslims but who havebecome attracted to this Western culture. People have repeatedlyasked my views concerning this latest religious group which isexpanding every day. Therefore, it is necessary for me to express myopinion in respect of their connection with the Husainiya, for theyare becoming a social issue. Although there exist two extremistviewpoints [among the people], nevertheless I agree to employ themas speakers but only under certain conditions. In the past, the IrshadInstitute benefited from them under my proposals and agreement.This new group can be a mediator between Western and Islamiccultures, but with the condition that their lectures and programmesare supervised by persons who were trained in the Islamic cultureand who have had expertise in Islamic sciences including tafsir, fiqh,us. ul-al fiqh, kalam, philosophy, and literature. If there is no seriousand precise supervision, the harm of their programmes outweighsthe benefits.52

It is clear that Mut.ahhari insisted that Shariati’s writings on Islamictheological issues should be supervised by well-educated ‘ulama. Heconsidered Shariati’s views generally as a summary of those of his teachers at

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the Sorbonne: Professor Louis Massignon (1883–1962) in Islamic studies,Professor Georges Gurevitch (1894–1965) in sociology and Jean-Paul Sartre(1905–80) in philosophy:53

It is not enough that we mix some chosen elements of foreignphilosophies, such as Marxism and existentialism or similarphilosophies, with our philosophy and then disguise them with asuperficial Islamic stratum in order to guide our revolt towards thepath of Islam. We must collect the philosophies of ethics, history,politics, economics and religion through perspectives which areinspired by Islamic texts.54

Therefore, his mode of religious and Islamic apprehensions was unaccept-able to Mut.ahhari, as he asserted in a joint letter with Bazargan (23 Azar1356/14 December 1977):

Since his culture and higher education were Western and he had notfound a suitable opportunity to study Islamic sciences sufficiently,he remained unaware of some of the indisputable facts of the Quran,sunnat, ma‘arif [gnostic knowledge] and fiqh – although, he wasgradually, with many endeavours, increasing his information in thisarea – [and] he has made many mistakes on Islamic issues, even inprinciples.55

Now, what were those suggested mistakes? Perhaps, for Mut.ahhari,Shariati’s most significant errors were the application of the Marxistmethodology of dialectical and historical materialism in his analysis. AsActon pointed out in his articles entitled ‘dialectical materialism’ and‘historical materialism’, the view of the world as a whole is called ‘dialecticalmaterialism’, a title devised by the Russian Marxist G. V. Plekhanov, and theview of human society is called ‘historical materialism’, the name bestowedupon it by Friedrich Engels.56 The Marxist philosophers regard dialecticalmaterialism as the basis of their philosophy and generally begin compre-hensive expositions of that philosophy with an account of it. It might be saidthat dialectical materialism constitutes the logic, ontology and epistemologyof Marxism-Leninism and historical materialism its ethics, politics andphilosophy of history. Sometimes, however, the term dialectical materialismis used for the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism as a whole. Whendialectical materialism is addressed, the natural sciences are the working-outof dialectical materialism in the non-human sphere, and historical material-ism is the working-out in the sphere of human society. The dialecticalmethod, as explained by Hegel, consists of three phases: thesis, antithesisand synthesis, whereas the historical method, as explained by Karl Marx,


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consisted of five stages, these being the original state of primitive commu-nism, the ancient slavery system, feudalism, capitalism and communism.

In his well-known book on Islamshinasi, Shariati interpreted alltheological issues concerning God, man, society, history and Islam with thehelp of the above-mentioned methods. When examining the story of Adam,he defined the human being as a combination (synthesis) of two contra-dictory elements – the spirit of God (thesis) and putrid clay (antithesis).57

Then, some of the most important human philosophical issues like sin,rebellion, loneliness, freedom and love are analysed by Shariati in anexistential manner.58 In his sociological approach, Shariati was in favour ofthe Marxist style of classification, based on the dichotomy of society into theruler and the ruled. He started to interpret various Quranic social verses in asimilar manner. According to his analysis, only the ruled pole – whichconsisted of the people (al-nas) – is monotheist, whilst the other, the rulingpole – composed of three outwardly different powers, namely political,economic and religious – is polytheist:59

These three manifestations are referred to in the Quran as mala’,mutraf and rahib, meaning, respectively, the avaricious and brutal,the gluttonous and the overfed, and the official clergy, the long-bearded demagogues. These three classes are constantly engaged in,respectively, dominating, exploiting and deceiving the people.60

Shariati’s three distinct illustrious expressions, ‘the despondent trinity ofking [malik], owner [malik], and clergyman [Mulla]’,61 were rapidly dis-persed throughout the country and treated by the public as a joke aimedagainst the clergy. Moreover, this method was also used by Shariati whenelucidating political developments in the primordial history of Islam.62 Hisanalysis on the history of man’s collective life is quite remarkable:

History, like man, consists of a dialectical process. The contra-diction begins with the killing of Abel by Cain. Abel represents theage of a pasture-based economy, that of primitive socialism whichpreceded ownership, whilst Cain represents the agricultural systemand that of individual or monopolistic ownership. Thereafter, apermanent war began so that the whole of history became the stagefor a struggle between the party of Cain, the killer, and Abel, hisvictim, or, in other words, the ruler and the ruled.63

According to Shariati, history began with an economically classless societyand will ultimately end with the same. Hence, the promised ideal society(ummat) which would appear at the end of history’s evolution is that of aclassless society which will abolish private property:64

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The story of Cain and Abel depicts the first day in the life of the sonsof Adam on this earth [their marriage with their sisters] as beingidentical with the beginning of contradiction, conflict and ultimatelywarfare and fratricide. This confirms the scientific fact that life,society and history are based on contradiction and struggle, andthat, contrary to the belief of the idealists, the fundamental factors inall three are economics and sexuality, which come to predominateover religious faith, brotherly ties, truth and morality.65

It is noteworthy that this format of historical analysis (which considersthat the nature and the motor of history have a materialistic entity, andexplains all human historical struggles, uprisings and revolutions – includingreligious and non-religious ones – by the theory of economic contradictions,with the old and rich versus the new and poor classes) was totally contrary toMut.ahhari’s theory of fit.rat (nature). According to Mut.ahhari, althoughman’s history has outwardly consisted of wars and contradictions betweenthe poor and the rich, or the ruling and the ruled classes, they were inwardlybetween right and wrong, good and evil. He argued:

Does Islam accept the theory of historical materialism? Is theQuranic logic based on historical materialism regarding theinterpretation and analysis of historical events? There is a group ofpeople who claim that historical materialism was put forward by theQuran at least one thousand years before Marx. Dr Ali al-Vardi, aShi‘i scholar in Iraq and author of several controversial booksincluding one entitled Mahzalat al-‘aql al-Bashari [The Comedy ofHuman Intellect], is most probably the first to raise this issue. It hasbecome a fashion among a group of contemporary Muslim writersto analyse history in Islamic phraseology from this point of view,which is considered a mark of being an intellectual. But in our viewthose who think in this way either do not correctly understand Islamor historical materialism, or both.66

According to Mut.ahhari’s letter to Khomeini, mentioned above, herepeatedly invited Shariati to take part in a debate, but the latter did notaccept his request. He also mentioned that Shariati, in the last months of hislife, finally agreed to modify his writings, and in a letter to Muhammad RezaH. akimi (when Shariati decided to move to Europe in May 1977) committedhis writings to H. akimi and asked for his criticism.67 Mut.ahhari praisedShariati’s courage when he became aware, at a private meeting, that Shariatiwas intending to visit Mut.ahhari in Europe to consult him about themodification of his writings. Whilst Mut.ahhari was travelling with ‘AllamihTabatabai to London for urgent medical treatment, Shariati was simul-


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taneously dying of a heart attack in Southampton, on 19 June 1977.Therefore, the two eminent scholars found no opportunity to rebuild theirprevious friendship.

In early 1970, the Irshad Institute sent a delegation – including bothMut.ahhari and Shariati – to the Hajj and arranged a meeting with thePalestinian delegation in Mecca. After his return, under the influence of thismeeting, Mut.ahhari gave a lecture on Zionist aggression and the necessity fornational support for the Palestinians, on the night preceding ‘Ashura (10Muh. arram). This ended with his arrest by the police.68 He then published ajoint declaration with ‘Allamih Tabatabai and Ayatullah Sayyid Abul-Faz

.l

Zanjani proposing to open a special bank account in order to collectdonations in financial support of Palestinian refugees. The police arrestedhim for a second time in less than a year.69 Nevertheless, his position inpolitical matters was sometimes strongly criticized by both traditionalistsand leftists, and as a consequence he lost his influence among young Muslimactivists. Mut.ahhari was accused by traditionalist clergymen of propagatinga Western kind of lifestyle and culture in his writing and discourses and ofalienating the Muslims from their original Islamic rites and customs.70 Bycontrast, the radicals among the youth were referring to him as a non-revolutionary thinker, not interested in keen socio-political debates.71

Rumours and propaganda concerning him had their effect on his standing inthe eyes of the public. Thus his lectures and writings did not receive muchpublicity at the end of this period. He therefore turned towards moreacademic work, like commentary on the Quran, and lecturing to a limitednumber of students, at the Al-Javad Mosque.

The government’s laissez-faire policy did not last long. The politicalactivities of the young Muslims ended the government’s tolerance of them.Consequently, they closed the Al-Javad Mosque, arrested Mut.ahhari andeventually suspended the academic and political activities in the H. usainiyih-yi Irshad (10 November 1972).72

During a period of nearly five years with the Irshad Institute (1965–71)Mut.ahhari gave many lectures on issues which, in the words of HamidDabashi, have been classified as the ‘Theology of Discontent’. The booksJadhibih va Dafi‘ih-yi Ali, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, Khatm-i Nabuvvat, Khatamiyat,Niz.am-i H. uquq-i Zan dar Islam, Mas’alih-yi H. ijab, Sairi dar Nahj al-balaghih and Khadamat-i Mutaqabil-i Islam va Iran, and the articles ‘Azadi-yi ‘Aqidih’, ‘Azadi-yi M‘anavi’, ‘Ih. ya-yi Tafakkur-i Islami’, ‘‘Ibadat va Do‘a,Taubih’, ‘Buzurgi va Buzurgvari-yi Ruh. ’, ‘‘Uns.ur-i Amr-i bi M‘aruf va Nah-yi az Munkar dar Nahz

.at-i H. usaini’, ‘D‘avat-ha-yi Sih-bu‘adi’, ‘Muaj-i

Islami’, ‘Mushkilat-i Ali’, ‘Khirafih-yi Sizdih’, ‘Mujibat-i Shihadat-i ImamMusa Kaz. im’, ‘‘Adl-i kulli, Mahdi-yi Mu‘aud’, ‘Tah. rifat dar Vaqi‘ih-yiKarbala’, ‘H. amasih-yi Husaini’, ‘Khilafat va Vilayat’ and ‘Kitab Suzi-yi Iranva Mis. r’, are included among these lectures.

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A debate with the secularists on women’s rights

In relation to the phenomena of Westernization, particularly those basedupon liberal sexual relationships, nakedness and hedonism, Mut.ahharipublished seven articles in the religious journal Maktab-i Islam in 1965–6.His Akhlaq-i Jinsi dar Islam va Jihan-i Gharb is in fact a reflection of thosearticles. The articles mainly deal with Bertrand Russell’s (1872–1970) sexualdoctrine as explained in his book Marriage and Morals.73 Russell’s conceptsof sex had been based on two essential principles, both originating fromother philosophers. His notion on liberal sexual pleasure had been influencedby Freudianism, and his ‘Racial Reformation of Mankind’ – which means thelegal right of reproduction being exclusively restricted to men and womenwho possess superior inherited physical abilities – had emanated from Plato’sRepublic. Both principles reflected Christian ethical views which are basedupon the sanctification of sexual mortification, celibacy and the prohibitionof divorce – currently defended by Western churches, in particular RomanCatholicism. According to Mut.ahhari, these ideas differ from Shi‘i ethicsconcerning sex, which are founded on the sanctification of legal sexualrelationships – whether permanent or temporary, single or numerous – theliberty of divorce and society’s disapproval of celibacy.74

During this time, in 1966–7, the modification of Iran’s civil codes and thedesire for the introduction of further Western legal norms became anexplosive social issue in the press. A vigorous debate developed in public.Ibrahim Mahdavi Zanjani, a judge, wrote 40 articles asserting his approvalfor this modification. This matter disturbed the religious authorities andimpelled them to react. Undoubtedly, Mut.ahhari, as an eminent jurist,appeared to be the most suitable candidate for this task and so all hopes werepinned upon him. He has meticulously described the current socialmovements and also made clear his role in the introduction to his book,Niz.am-i H. uquq-i Zan dar Islam, published in 1974–5, in which all hisdiscussions with Judge Zanjani were made known.75 The judge’s defence ofhis proposals was printed in a series of articles, page by page, in the journalZan-i Ruz, and Mut.ahhari’s arguments, supporting the continuation ofIslamic civil laws, were on the opposite side of the page. These discussionsbecame a major issue of the day and attracted the attention of many readers.Mut.ahhari’s reasoning, explanations and thorough knowledge of Islamicjurisprudence placed the judge in a difficult position. However, after only sixweeks, the debate was ended by the sudden death of the judge from a heartattack.76 Although Mut.ahhari’s response to the views of the judge shouldhave ceased as a mark of respect for Zanjani’s death, their publicationcontinued with the remaining 33 issues, due to numerous requests from thepublic and the editor of the magazine. The Niz.am-i H. uquq-i Zan dar Islam isa collection of these articles (1974–5) presenting a comparative study ofIslamic family rights from a philosophical and sociological viewpoint. This


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book (whilst not mentioning the government’s Westernizing policy), waswritten as a clear response to the infiltration of the Western customs andvalues so ardently supported by the monarchy. The flaws in governmentpolicy became indirectly clear. The large number of devoted readers whichthe book attracted was a clear sign of how well the religious argument wasreceived in public.

A debate with traditionalists and secularists on women’s veils

During the early years of the H. usainiyih-yi Irshad (1968–9), Mut.ahhari’slectures on the question of the Islamic veil, and on the criticisms with regardto the edict on the ‘Removal of the Veil’ (kashf-i h. ijab, 7 January 1936), had,surprisingly, angered the traditional clergy and their devotees. This criticalattitude against him in this respect continues to this day. The abolition of theveil during Reza Shah Pahlavi’s rule had changed the appearance of women,giving them a more Westernized image. This action led to great psychologicalpressure on pious women which gradually gave rise to a more extremeposition on their part. The women from clerical backgrounds still wore thetraditional clothing, namely the chadur va ruband (a large veil covering thewhole body and a white or black piece of cloth just covering the face). Thisslowly made an impact on the mind of religious communities who began toaccept this particular mode of veil as the correct dress for Muslim women.Consequently those female employees, students and academics wearingother forms of the Islamic veil, the scarf and manteau, for example, cameunder pressure from two extremist stances: one rejected this ‘modern’clothing as improper, while the other, the Westernized view, referred to themas fanatics. The use of the traditional Islamic dress in professional andeducational areas was mocked and derided by the country’s Westernizedpeople and caused women much trouble in various fields of life, atuniversities for instance. Wearing the scarf and manteau encountered fewerdifficulties. However, these moderately dressed women came under pressurefrom the more traditionally minded women, in particular when entering holyplaces, namely H. usainiyihs, shrines and mosques. They were made to feelthat they did not maintain the high standards of Islamic veiling and that thisaffected their religious conscience. There was no simple solution to thisproblem, save intervention by someone whose knowledge and personalitywere respected by the religious authorities. Mut.ahhari, again, was the idealperson to deal with this situation. In his Mas’alih-yi H. ijab he maintained thatsuch shortsightedness would cause the formation of a hypocritical group inIslamic society which would eventually ‘open the path to imperialism’. Hepointed out:

Whatever folly may be abundant, the concept of hypocrisy willbecome more intense. Struggle with simple-mindness and foolishness

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is also struggle with hypocrisy, for a fool is the hypocrite’s puppet;and so naturally, conflict with folly is a hypocrite’s disarmament.77

It was naturally felt by the leading ‘ulama that Mut.ahhari alone couldhandle such a controversial case. Although there were more well-known‘ulama in the country, they either lacked education in this field, or they werenot prepared to deal with such a problem which they considered an incorrectpassion of the pious and simple-minded. Mut.ahhari, on the other hand, hadput to discussion the issue of Islamic veiling at one of the most distinguishedreligious associations at that time, namely that of the physicians. Hecriticized, with theological and historical arguments, Will Durant’s theory onthe Islamic veil, which was that this mode of veiling is an importedphenomenon which originated in the customs surrounding menstruation inancient Persia, namely being veiled and leading a sequestered life.

In his The Story of Civilization, Will Durant maintained that

In the time of the Prophet [Zoroaster] the position of woman inPersia was high, as ancient manners went: she moved in public freelyand unveiled; she owned and managed property, and could, likemost modern women, direct the affairs of her husband in his name,or through his pen. After Darius, her status declined, especiallyamong the rich. The poorer women retained their freedom ofmovement, because they had to work; but in other cases theseclusion always enforced in the menstrual periods was extended tothe whole social life of woman, and laid the foundations of theMuslim institution of purdah [ = pardih]. Upper-class womencould not venture out except in curtained litters, and were forbiddento see even their nearest male relatives, such as their fathers orbrothers.78

While describing the position of women in Islam, he stated that

The Muslim male, separated from women before marriage bypurdah, and surfeited with them after marriage by the harem, fellinto irregular relations; and women, secluded from all men butrelatives, slipped into similar perversions. The contact with Persiapromoted both pederasty and purdah in Islam. The Arabs hadalways feared, as well as admired, woman’s charms, and hadrevenged themselves for instinctive subjection to them by the usualmale doubts about her virtue and intelligence. ‘Consult women’,said Omar I, ‘and do the contrary of what they advise’. But theMuslim of Muhammad’s century had not secluded their women; thetwo sexes exchanged visits, moved indiscriminately throughthe streets and prayed together in the mosque . . . Under Walid II


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(743–4), however, the harem and eunuch system took form, andpurdah developed with it. Harim, like h. aram, meant forbidden,sacred; the seclusion of women was originally due to their being tabubecause of menstruation or childbirth; the harem was a sanctuary.79

Mut.ahhari answered:

Is the reason for the presence of the Islamic veil among Muslimslinked to the rough regulations that were carried out againstmenstruant women? We all know that such precepts have neverexisted in Islam. Women, during menstruation are excused,according to Islamic jurisprudence, from various obligatory acts ofworship such as prayer and fasting. Also, sexual intercourse is notpermitted during the menstrual flow. However, there isn’t anyprohibition from the point of view of associating with others whichwould thus bring about her seclusion. If it means that Muslims’customary veiling is a custom conveyed by the Iranians to otherIslamic regions after the former’s acceptance [of Islam], this is also awrong notion; for the Quranic verses relating to h. ijab had beenrevealed before the Persians’ conversion to Islam.80

Although Mut.ahhari acknowledges that the custom of veiling was inexistence before Islam, among Jews, Iranians and Indians, and that Arabwomen were unveiled at that time, he does not agree with Will Durant’shistorical analysis. He believes that veiling in Islam originated from theQuranic verses. However, he agrees that the Islamic veil moved towardsextremism when the Arabs communicated with the new Muslims from othernations. Supporting his view, Mut.ahhari refers to a h. adith (saying) from‘Ayishih (the wife of the Prophet). She repeatedly praised the women ofAns. ar:

Well done the women of Ans. ar! When the verses from the Surah al-Nur [:27–31, relating to the veiling] were revealed, none of thewomen were seen going outside in the same fashion as before. Theycovered their heads with black scarves, as if black crows were sittingon their heads.81

Analysing different hypotheses about the function of Islamic veiling,Mut.ahhari then explained that the Islamic veil had emanated from a generalethical principle governing social relations between Muslim men and womenand being consistent with Islam’s social philosophy:

Veiling in Islam arose from a more general and essential principle,namely that it desired to confine all forms of sexual pleasure, be they

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visionary, manual or of a different nature, to family life and legalmarriages. Communal relationships must revolve exclusivelyaround work and activities. Thus, contrary to the contemporaryWestern system which mixes work and daily activities with sexualhedonism, Islam wants to totally separate these two environmentsfrom one another.82

On collecting evidence from the Quran, h. adith and fatwas, Mut.ahhariclearly illustrated the restrictions of Islamic veiling.83 Although he did notcomment on which version of the veil should be worn, he indicated thatwomen wearing the traditional chadur and ruband did not have a monopolyon piety. Consequently he endorsed the newer type of religious veiling – thescarf and manteau – which became increasingly popular with the workingand educated women. This encouraged many of the country’s unveiled‘Westernized’ women to adopt this more up-to-date Islamic dress. Further-more, Mut.ahhari revived the practice of religious life in the minds of manynon-religious women. Nevertheless, the book encountered opposition fromtwo sides – one being that of the Westernizing movement which was infavour of women being bareheaded and normally in disagreement with anyform of Islamic veiling; the second comprising the pious formalists who didnot recognize the new style of veiling as Islamic. This latter traditionallyminded movement had organized intense propaganda against Mas’alih-yih. ijab and towards the end of this period (1970–1), they wrote strongcriticisms against it – to which Mut.ahhari neatly responded. Later, all thesearguments were jointly published in one volume.84 In 1971–2, the non-religious part of society, led by the house of Pahlavi, produced a film entitledMuh. allil (‘Mediator’) which mocked the sexual relations of religious familiesand questioned the piety of religious institutions.85 Although this film wasbroadcast throughout the country, nevertheless it could not suppress theincreased propensity of the people towards a religiously based lifestyle. Thefilm’s scenario was founded on some comical concepts. First, mosques wereportrayed as meeting places for some professional mediators, receiving highsalaries for their jobs. Second, the country’s religious men were shown ashaving no trust in their wives, like the European knights of the Middle Ageswho, before leaving their homes, locked their spouse’s chastity belt, takingthe key with them. Third, the film suggested that it was permitted, accordingto Islamic law, for a man to divorce his wife three times at one session, and afew hours following the third to be able to remarry her, just by paying moneyto a muh. allil.

Being the only clergyman who wrote an article against the film, Mut.ahhariconsidered it mainly as a propaganda exercise which did not reflect any of therealities in regard to religious families and Persian society. According to him,the chastity belt was unknown to Persian society. Moreover, among thosepeople who went to the mosque one never heard of a specific person or group


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known as muh. allils. Last, this system of divorce was discordant with Shi‘ijurisprudence and never occurred, due to the people’s intense antipathytowards such action.86

Mut.ahhari did not see the film but he had read the transcript. He thenpublished his critical views in Ruz-namih-yi Kaihan during the same year,under the heading Film-i Muh. allil. He stated:

The duty of a film director is to display and criticize real affairs, notto produce some totally imaginary picture, falsely accusing hissociety and thus creating misleading notions in relation to it. Thismovie is a perfidy from both the Islamic and the national point ofview.87

Islam and Iran, a debate with the nationalists

During the period 1968–9, when the question of the veil was underdiscussion at the Association of Islamic Physicians, another importantphilosophical and historical case was under debate at the Association ofIslamic Engineers. Further talks took place in the H. usainiyih-yi Irshad, whichwere published under the title Khadamat-i mutaqabil-i Islam va Iran, in1970–1. The discussions included a philosophical theme – that is, therelationship between two consciences: one being religious and Islamic, theother Persian and patriotic – and two sociological issues relating to thehistory of Islamic civilization, namely the services of Islam to Iran andvice versa, and totally against the idea of pan-Iranianism and Persiannationalism. These much-needed discussions, which were strengthening theabilities of young Muslims in arguing and reasoning against secular and anti-religious groups, were welcomed on a large scale.

In the preface of his book, Mut.ahhari asserted that common acceptance ofthese discussions was unparalleled. None of his lectures had ever receivedsuch publicity;88 although a résumé of these arguments had previously beenpublished (1966–7) in three articles in Maktab-i Islam, then a well-knownmonthly religious journal, they had hardly created any publicity and did nothave any special significance. Mut.ahhari argued:

We, as followers of a spiritual path and ideology named Islam, inwhich race and nationalism are non-existent, cannot be neutraltowards certain movements which are opposed to this ideology andpractise under the headings of nationalism and ethnicism. We allknow that in recent years a widespread struggle has been generatedin opposition to Islam, under the pretext of the defence of Iraniannationalism and ethnicism, insulting the sanctity of Islam in thename of anti-Arabism. The reports of this conflict [with Islam]which we observe in Persian books, newspapers, journals and

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so forth, point out that this struggle is not of an accidental oroccasional nature but rather a component of an overall plan, with aclearly defined purpose. The growth of Zoroastrianism which isbecoming more and more fashionable, is an organized politicalactivity. Everybody knows that the present Iranian people willnever return to Zoroastrianism. Al-Muqann‘a, Sandbad, BabakKhurramdin and Maziyar can never replace Ali ibn Abi-Talib,Husain ibn Ali or even Salman. Everybody is aware of these facts.However, these may stimulate the ethnic, racial and nationalprejudices and the emotions of naive, ignorant young people whomay then, as a result, cut their relations with Islam.89

Indeed, the restoration of Iran’s ancient inheritance, which was empha-sized at various gatherings such as the Ramsar Educational Conference(1966–7) and the International Congress of Iranologists (1966–7), possessedtwo important social functions for the Pahlavi dynasty (1920–79) and thusgave them two political achievements. First, sanctity was conferred upon themonarchy as an institution deeply rooted in the country’s history, with thePahlavis as the legal and legitimate heirs to the throne. Second, the Arabinvasion, with its introduction of Islam, was presented as the ultimate causeof the downfall of the splendid and magnificent ancient empire of Persia andconsequently was responsible for the lack of progress and the social problemscharacteristic of present Persian society. Therefore, these nationalist eventsimplicitly created suspicion as to the sincerity and truth of present religiousmovements, thus hindering the latter’s growth and influence. With thesupport of the monarchy, a powerful cluster of academic men and women –writers, poets, men of letters, historians, linguists, philosophers, artists,anthropologists and sociologists – redefined different branches of Persianhistory and culture such as literature, language, poetry, religion andphilosophy, all from nationalistic perspectives. Such views, which quite oftenneglected or even ignored the role of Islam in Iran’s culture and history, onthe grounds that it had originated in a foreign land and was imposed by force,were naturally criticized by the ‘ulama including Mut.ahhari. In factMut.ahhari was not opposed to ‘relative nationalism’ – emphasizing thepositive aspects of national culture serving as a basis for internationalrelations. According to him, it was in accordance with the Islamic universaldoctrine.90 However, he was firmly against nationalism in its absolute sense,believing it to be the cause of humiliation for other nations, and of creatingracial conflicts. Simultaneously, he considered it contrary to Islamic andhumanitarian ideals.91 Hence, with great compassion, he deliveredsociological explanations concerning both Islamic fundamentalism andPersian nationalism. According to his arguments, Islam is in harmony withthe people’s mentality, paving the way for common unity and displaying apositive discouragement of external imperialism. On the other hand,


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nationalism is an imperialistic and reactionary philosophy which causes thesegregation of Islamic territories. In this respect he argued:

Occasionally, nationalist thoughts and feelings may create someuseful and positive results in terms of national independence, butrather than having good results, they have caused separationbetween Islamic countries. These nations have passed from this stage– nationalism – and have been advancing to a further level – namelythat of Islamic universalism – in their development for manycenturies. During this time, Islam has produced a unity based onthought, faith and ideology. In the course of the twentieth centuryIslam has shown its explicit role towards anti-colonial struggles.Yes, these nations have proven for many centuries that they arecapable of establishing unity and rising with a motivation foundedon thought, faith and ideology rescuing themselves from the claws ofcolonialists. In truth, such forcing of the people towards national-istic feelings can only be described as reactive [irtija‘a].92

Clearly, Mut.ahhari was rejecting the criteria generally adopted in thesocio-political sciences when determining what constitutes a nation – namelyrace, geography and language. Moreover, he was neither seeking Iranianidentity in the Aryan race, in the ancient Persian language nor in customsexclusive to Persia. Why? According to him, Islam and ideology apart, theAryan race, the Pahlavi language and the Iranian traditions had ceased toexist in reality. The Aryan race in Iran had become mixed with Turk, Mongoland Arab races, thus making racial separation, or even distinction,impossible.93 The Persian language, whether literary or scientific, has becomestrongly blended with the Arabic language; different areas of prose andpoetry, calligraphy, fables and even science are full of Arabic diction. Thusthe idea of cleansing Persian literature of Arabic terminology was a vain hopeand futile. Moreover, Islamic customs and rites had extended throughout allechelons of society such that only a vestige of ancient Persian traditionremained, of which Jashn-i Nauruz (the first day of the Persian year and thenational festival of Iran) continued to be popular. However, these traditionswere still influenced by many Islamic rites such as du‘a (prayer), ghusl (ritualablution), infaq (making donation) and s. ilih-i rah. im (strengthening the tiesof kinship). Others, such as chaharshanbih suri (the custom of jumping onfire in the last Wednesday before Nauruz) and sabzih bastan (the custom oftying up grass on the thirteenth day of Nauruz) were less common. Now,with regard to the above-mentioned changes, one may ask what the Persiannationalists were hoping for, and what was their real purpose?

As mentioned before, Persian nationalism was seen as having two politicalaims for the royal family. These, in addition to sanctity and legitimacy,were providing an appropriate cultural environment for their political

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propagandist aims – that is the reconstruction of Persepolis, together with theimperial festivals and the substitution of the H. ijrat calendar by themonarchical calendar in 1976–7, which seemed to be useful weapons forconfronting growing Islamic movements in times of need. Mut.ahhari totallyrejected the popularity of this movement and explicitly argued:

What factor caused the Iranians’ affinity towards Islam, centuriesafter the decline of Arab political supremacy? Is there one, but thatof the attraction of Islam and its harmony with the Iranian spirit? . . .The Iranians were capable of freely restoring their ancient customsand rites after their independence but, on the contrary, theydiscarded the old traditions and consented to Islam. Why was that?Because they saw Islam as compatible with their thoughts, wisdomand natural will. They never considered the idea of a renewal of oldcustoms and rites which had caused them spiritual pain for so manyyears. According to history, it is a fact that during the 14 centuriesIslam has been present in Iran, it has always remained stable. If youobserve a few persons at present or in the past who speak about therenewal of old customs and rites, it must not be attributed to thenation of Iran.94

Among the nationalist writers who were heavily criticized by Mut.ahhariwas Ibrahim Pour-Davud, Professor of Literature at Tehran University.Mut.ahhari referred to him with very harsh words.95 In books, most criticismswere directed against Muhammad Mu‘in’s Mazd-yasna va Adab-i Parsi(‘Mazdaism and Persian Literature’). Dr Mu‘in was an eminent Professor ofPersian Language at the University of Tehran. During the years before hisdeath, Mut.ahhari developed a good relationship with him, describing him asfair and interested in Islam, and thus excused his work, Mazd-yasna va Adab-i Parsi, on the grounds that he was still under the influence of his mentor,Ibrahim Pour-Davud, during his youth. Thus, whilst showering him withharsh criticisms, at the same time Mut.ahhari was requesting forgiveness forhim.96 Later on, in 1977, he expressed a similar regret in a letter to his teacherAyatullah Khomeini, with regard to Shariati’s articles on the subject ofmilliyat-i Irani (Iranian nationality).97 In this letter, he reported that Shariatiwas in favour of the 2500-year-old Persian culture and considered that theArab invasion of Iran was more destructive than those of the MacedonianAlexander the Great or the Mongol Chenghiz Khan; moreover, he praised theNihz.at-i Shu‘ubiyih (the nationalist movement), considered Shi‘ism as‘Persian Islam’ and considered Iranian Muslim philosophers and scholars tobe the followers of Persian culture (not Islamic culture). On this point, heactually joined the line of Persian nationalists.

Furthermore, Persian nationalists argued that the continuance andsurvival of Farsi, and not Arabic, indicates that Muslim rites were being


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imposed on the Iranians.98 Mut.ahhari raised the question that if the revival ofPersian as the main language was solely for the struggle with Islam or theArabic language, the Iranians must have at least restrained themselves fromcirculating or developing their enemy’s language; so, why did they spend agreat deal of time and energy on the maintenance of Arabic terminology,syntax, rhetorics and philology, choosing it as their scientific language?99

Persian nationalists declared Shi‘ism to be a Persian innovation for theprotection of their national independence and ancient mores.100 Theirreasoning was that since Imam H. usain married Shahrbanu (the daughter ofYazdgird III, Persia’s last monarch before the advent of Islam), as a result, hischildren and grandchildren are all related to the magnificent Persian dynasty,which will ultimately provide the continuance of Persian dominationand glory.101

However, the reality of this marriage was very much doubted byMut.ahhari on the grounds of historical evidence.102 There was a Byzantineslavegirl among the wives of the Shi‘ite Imams, called Narjis Khatun (themother of the Hidden Imam) whose honour and reputation, amongst theIranians, is much more than that of the Persian princess.103 Furthermore heargued that even if this reasoning were true, and the respect towards theProphet’s family was due to their relationship with the Persian monarchs,then the Ummayyad dynasty (41–132/661–750) must be revered by Iranianssince one of Yazdigird’s granddaughters, Shah Afarid, married Walid ibn‘Abdul-Malik Ummayyid (86/705) and gave birth to Yazid ibn Walid.Therefore, according to the reasoning of these nationalists, Yazid ibn Walidmust be counted as a prince of Persia worthy of utmost respect, whilst in facthe is practically unknown.104 Thus, the mystery of Iranian Shi‘ism must bestudied from a different angle:

In truth, the reason for Iranian Shi‘ism and for Iranians becomingMuslim is the same. An Iranian person found his/her spiritharmonious with Islam and discovered his/her missing ideals withinit. The people of Iran were naturally intelligent, possessing cultureand civilization, more than that of any other nation and, in addition,were enamoured of Islam, bestowing services upon it. They, morethan any other race, paid full attention to the soul and thesignificance of Islam; for this reason their deference to the Prophet’shousehold was unmatched and so Shi‘ism had found much moreefficacy amongst the Iranians for they discovered the soul andmeaning of Islam through the Prophet’s progeny. The one factorwhich mostly attracted the Iranians’ thirsty spirits towards Islamwas Islamic justice and equality. The Iranians had suffered privationfor many centuries and had been waiting for such an ideology. Theyobserved that the people who paid extreme attention to Islamicjustice and equality, with no trace of prejudice, were of the Prophet’s

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household. The Prophet’s household was the centre for Islamicjustice, particularly for non-Arab Muslims.105

The nationalists, those in agreement with Sir John Malcolm,106 called theeras from the Arab invasion of Iran until the establishment of someindependent Persian governments – AH 50–250 – ‘two silent centuries’;107

whereas Mut.ahhari argues that these two centuries were full of vigour,uproar and speeches containing the views of the ordinary people, namely thesons and daughters of cobblers and potters and not those of the monarchy orof other ruling classes, because it was during these centuries that the Iraniansbecame familiar with the humanitarian, universal and supra-racial ideologyof Islam, accepting its language as the language of revelation and preferringit to their native tongue when they were forced by an order of the caliph‘Abdul-Malik in 78/697 to use only Arabic in official and academic use.Their liberated potential was concentrated in the spheres of literature andscience. Among them were many great figures, such as Sibivaih, Abu-‘Ubaidih Zamakhshari, Abu-H. anifih, Al-Naubakht and Al-Shakir, whobecame literary, scientific and religious leaders of various (Muslim)communities, a unique occurrence in Iranian history.108 In regard to the socialfunction of Islam in Persian society, Mut.ahhari also argued that Islamgathered people under the flag of religious unity, thus preventing theinfluence of Christianity which was spreading towards the East, and, ingeneral, the rise of other medieval civilizations surrounding the area. Islamabolished the social restrictions on relationships between classes, openingIran’s door to other ‘nations’ and making its people familiar with othercultures. Consequently, these phenomena helped to develop the spiritualacuity of the Iranians and promoted many of their personalities to religiousleadership in other regions of Islamic civilization:109

The services of Islam to Iran and Iranians were not restricted to thefirst Islamic century. From the time Islam came to this country, itburied every dangerous event the country faced. It was Islam whichabsorbed the Mongols; changed these murderers and cannibals intopatrons of learning, created Muhammad Khuda-bandih from theChengiz family; Baysunqur and Amir Husain Bayqara from theTaimur generation. It is Islam that, even today, resists destructiveand exotic philosophies and is the source of dignity, glory andindependence for its people. Today, that of which the nation of Irancan be proud and boast to others is the Quran and Nahj al-balaghih,not the Zand and Avista.110

Mut.ahhari then started to explain extensively the services the Iranians hadrendered to Islam in practice and thought, namely art, science, philosophyand mysticism.111 It was his belief that all these were signs indicating the


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Iranians’ true fidelity to Islam, maintaining that scientific and artisticmasterpieces are created by love and faith; compulsion or money could neverproduce such outstanding achievements. In general, it is possible to use forcein order to make a nation obedient, but not in order to create movement,motivation, love and faith.112

As is usually the case, this book, Khadamat-i Mutaqabil-i Islam va Iran,like Mut.ahhari’s lectures on this subject, was welcomed by the majority ofeducated people. It was reprinted yearly in increasing numbers (the eighthreprint being published in 1978, the last year of his life, with a new prefaceand many footnotes added) and now, after more than two decades it is stillthe most important book presented by the religious faction when dealingwith the subject of Islam and Iran.

It is understandable now that this book granted strength to the Islamicgroups and exonerated them from any political accusations.

A harsh attitude towards the Marxist guerrillas

In 1971–2, whilst Mut.ahhari was keeping his distance from the IrshadInstitute, and started interpreting the Quran amongst a limited number of hisstudents, a new book of his was published, which had been briefly discussedin the Anjuman-i Islami-yi Danishjuyan-i Danish-sara-yi ‘Ali (the IslamicAssociation of Students of the Teachers’ Training College). This work,named ‘Ilal-i Girayish bi Maddigari (‘reasons for the turn to materialism’)was written in opposition to the Marxist-materialist guerrillas calledSazman-i Chirik-ha-yi Fadai-yi Khalq-i Iran (the Organization of the IranianPopular Guerrillas) who had a strong influence upon the university studentsof that time.

The Fadai organization, which adopted its name in March 1971, wasformed from two separate groups. The first group had been established inlate 1963, by five Tehran University students: Bizhan Jazani, ‘Abbas Surkhi,Ali-Akbar S. afai Farahani, Muhammad Ashtiyani and Hamid Ashraf. Jazani,the intellectual father of the Fadai organization, was a student of politicalscience who had been in and out of prison since the mid-1950s. He was bornin Tehran in 1937 and completed higher education in his home town. He wasactive in the youth section of the Tudih Party, later leaving the party andforming his own secret group. In later years, while serving a 15-year prisonsentence, he wrote a series of pamphlets for the Fadai organization, amongthem Nabard ba dictaturi-yi Shah, Tarikh-i Si Salih-i Iran and ChigunihMubarizih-i Musallah. anih Tudih-i Mishavad. Four years after the group hadbeen formed, SAVAK arrested 14 members including Jazani, but Ashrafavoided arrest and kept the group alive. Jazani was kept in prison until April1975, when he was shot trying to escape.113

The second group, which was established in 1967, was led by two univer-sity students who had come to Tehran from Mashhad. Mas‘ud Ahmad-zadih

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and Amir Parviz Puyan were both from religious families. During hiseducation at high school in Mashhad, Ahmad-zadih, the more prominentpersonality, formed an Islamic student club, joined the National Front andparticipated in demonstrations against the Shah. While studying mathe-matics in the Aryamihr Industrial University in Tehran during the mid-1960s, he turned toward Marxism, and in 1967 formed a secret society todiscuss the works of Che Guevara, Regis Debray and Carlos Marighella, theBrazilian revolutionary who developed the theory of urban guerrilla warfare.In 1970, Ahmad-zadih wrote one of the main theoretical works of the Fadaiorganization, a pamphlet, entitled Mubarizih-i Musallahanih. The Ahmad-zadih group, many of whom were from the National Front, insisted on therole of mass spontaneity and heroic activities, whereas the Jazani group,whose leaders were mainly former Tudih members, stressed the importanceof establishing a viable organization. The two groups merged in 1970, withthe first group constituting its rural team and the second its urban one.114

The Fadai’s central thesis was simple: guerrilla warfare. Taking itsexample from the victories of Castro, Giap and Mao, as well as the LatinAmerican guerrillas, they criticized the other political organizations in Iran.They dismissed the National Front and the Liberation Movement as ‘pettybourgeois paper organizations’ still preaching the false hope of peacefulchange. They also accused the Tudih Party of blindly following Sovietpolicies, of hastily denouncing Stalin, and of underestimating the country’sintegrity – especially in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. They made preparationsfor guerrilla warfare and sent the rural team to Gilan to establish a base in themountains there. The plan, however, was revealed in early February 1971when a Fadai sympathizer was arrested by the police in the village ofSiyahkal. Afraid that torture would be used to extract vital information, theFadai guerrillas attacked the police station to release their colleague. After amassive manhunt lasting three weeks, the military authorities announcedthat the whole guerrilla band had been eliminated and its 13 membersexecuted. Later, the Fadai organization divided into two factions. Themajority, headed by Hamid Ashraf until his death in mid-1976, insisted oncontinuing the armed struggle, whereas the minority faction argued in favourof avoiding armed confrontation, an increase in political activities, especiallyamong factory workers, and the forging of closer links with the TudihParty.115

Mut.ahhari considered ideological dispute with the Fadai organization, orany other Marxist-materialist group, as his duty as an Islamic theologian.This domain, as he pointed out in the preface of the book, was alwaysconsidered to be one of the important branches of his work during his life. Inthis respect he stated:

From 1323/1944–5 when I commenced my formal studies in specu-lative sciences, I always felt I was familiar with the logic and thought


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of materialists and could communicate with the views and opinionsin their books . . . I carefully read every book written by Dr TaqiArani . . . constantly reading, taking notes and observing . . . to suchan extent that his sentences were imprinted in my mind . . . In 1329/1950–1, I began attending the classes held by my eminent teacher,‘Allamih Tabatabai . . . about Ibn Sina’s philosophy and his fruitfulspecial lessons on materialism. Us. ul-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Rialism,which has played a key role in the presentation of the philosophicalbaselessness of materialism during the past 20 years in Iran, origi-nated from these faithful sessions . . . the years in Qum made mefirmly conclude that materialism is, in my understanding, not truly aphilosophy.116

Mut.ahhari’s understanding of Marxism was based on various Persian andArabic secondary sources. He was reading Taqi Arani’s books, the trans-lations published by the Tudih Party, some Arabic translations published inEgypt, the translation of Georges Politzer’s Principes élémentaires de laphilosophie and the translation of Andre Peter’s Marx and Marxism – thelatter two being simplified Marxist views of philosophy.

It is worth mentioning that Marxism, like imperialism and capitalism, wasconsidered by Mut.ahhari as the more explicit enemy. He was opposed to anykind of silence vis-à-vis leftist ideologies and did not even accept theestablishment of a united front or incorporation with the Marxist groupsagainst the Pahlavi monarchy. In this respect he once opposed Dr Shariati ata private session, who viewed Marxism as the competitor rather than theenemy – the latter being imperialism and capitalism.117 Understandably,these two visions produced two different religious ideological positions,giving rise to two different socio-political results. The group underMut.ahhari’s guidance considered Marxist groups as najis (impure) and asatheists, and continuously abstained from collaborating with them; while theother, under Shariati’s training, never refused to co-operate or communicatewith the Marxists. This issue caused a considerable division between themilitant ‘ulama. Therefore, a delegation was sent to Najaf requesting ajudgement from Ayatullah Khomeini.118 They asked Khomeini to tell themwhat strategy they should follow vis-à-vis the political activities of non-religious groups in their fight against the Pahlavis. Was it correct to make analliance with the Marxist activists and be silent about their atheist ideology,or was it necessary to separate oneself from the left wing and speak out abouttheir ideology? Although Khomeini took a cautious position and did notissue a statement, he privately supported Mut.ahhari.

In ‘Ilal-i Girayish bi Maddigari, Mut.ahhari sought to discover the causesfor the wide dissemination of materialistic ideas during the last century andto ascertain the ‘mystery’ behind its attraction. In other words, he was tryingto find out why materialism, as an intellectual vision rooted in the history of

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human thought, had suddenly arisen in the twentieth century, after centuriesof stagnation, as the most alluring philosophical school and powerful socio-political movement in the West. How did it spread around the world, like aviolent storm, conquering many minds and causing so many politicaluprisings? Had some special cultural conditions in Europe caused thisphenomenon, or had materialism used new propaganda techniques? In replyto these questions he tested many hypotheses. First, he asked whether theMarxists’ claim that materialism’s sudden popularity was due to progress inscience and the scientific achievements in the twentieth century containedany truth. He answered:

This claim is more of a joke than a truth. Philosophical materialisticinterests have existed from the ancient eras until today, among bothscholars and the ignorant classes. One observes people believing inmaterialism in all classes of society, as one similarly observes, amongall classes, especially scholars, much interest in theism, spiritualismand metaphysics. If the materialists’ claim is true, one must find anincrease in materialistic interests among scholars with theprogression of science; and as the individuals’ knowledge grows,their materialism must extend; however, this is not borne out by thefacts.119

According to Mut.ahhari, neither the weakness of Christian theology, northe rigidity of the churches, nor the inspection of religious notions, nor theshortcomings of Western philosophical concepts in metaphysical issues, northe antilogy between theism and Darwin’s biological evolutionism, nor theputative relationship between theocracy and political dictatorship, all onthe one side, nor atheism and democracy on the other, nor the spreading ofmoral corruption in the West, may solely or jointly be an adequate andreasonable cause for modern materialistic tendencies around the world.However, these could have provided favourable environments for the growthof atheism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although theaforementioned factors disseminated materialism throughout Europe, theydid not bring about the same effect elsewhere in the world and had notinitiated any historical transformations. Thus there must exist other reasonsinvolved in this expeditious diffusion of materialism. In this respect,Mut.ahhari inferred:

Today, it is more or less established in the minds of youth thatone must either be a theist – a peacemaker, complacent, calm,motionless, neutral – or a materialist – active, rebellious, opposed tocolonialism, exploitation and despotism. Why has such an ideainfiltrated the minds of young people? . . . From whence have thesequalities in materialism and theism been extracted? The answer to


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these questions is quite clear! It is not necessary for the young tostudy all the characteristics of materialism and theism in order todraw logical conclusions. Young people do not deal with this kind oflogical deduction. They only see one aspect and that is enough toarrive at a result. They observe that it is just the supporters ofmaterialism who lead uprisings, revolutions, battles and struggles,while theists are mostly static and neutral. For the youth, this issufficient to judge and condemn the theists, and support thematerialists. At present, the majority of heroic struggles againstdespotism [and exploitation] are guided by persons with more or lessmaterialistic feelings. Undoubtedly, to a high extent, they haveoccupied the heroic trench.120

So, according to him, the propagation of materialism employed a new,attractive technique and also coalesced with socialism – a popular socialtheory at the time – thus penetrating the thoughts of the oppressed and thelower classes, resulting in revolts. Materialism’s present status and dignitytherefore are, to some extent, dependent on false precepts earned bysocialism (= Marxism). Mut.ahhari was considering theists in general, andMuslims in particular, as the true historical heirs of the previously mentionedpropagating technique; and to provide evidence for his view he alluded to thehistory of the Prophets’ struggles and pointed to some Quranic verses on thesubject of jihad (holy struggle) and shahadat (martyrdom). Therefore, heseriously regretted the fact that such an important legacy was snatched fromthe hands of the believers by the enemy, through meagre and unconstrainedmeans. Now who was responsible for this great indolence and treachery?Mut.ahhari answered:

The church, more than any other organization, is liable because, aswe mentioned before, there were some unreasonable imagesregarding God, Jesus Christ and eschatology which were notacceptable to free minds. That which was presented as divinephilosophy was also church-dependent; gradually, some artificialconnections took shape – between faith in God and the legitimacy ofdespotism and strangulation from the one side, with atheism,national sovereignty and the struggle for people’s rights from theother – creating social reforms rejecting the concept of God,spirituality and the like, thus inclining towards materialism. Littleby little, their enamoured followers, from the social viewpointof life, conjectured that perhaps such a miracle [revolutionarybehaviour] is due to materialism which is creating such contendingpersons; while, in fact, it was materialism which benefited fromthe spirit, credibility and dignity of individuals and not viceversa.121

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Now on the subject of Islamic countries, especially Iran, which party couldbe held responsible for this tragedy? Mut.ahhari stated:

When the morale of self-indulgence was raised amongst those whoclaim they were religious leaders, this [revolutionary] front fell fromthe hands of theists. In more precise terms, this phenomenonoccurred when extravagant and mammonish people sat in the placeof Prophets and true religious leaders. Their morale was unlike themorale of Prophets, Imams and the persons who had trained them. Ifthere were to be a similarity, it would be only in their shape andclothing! But people erroneously regarded them as the representa-tives and successors of Prophets and Imams. They supplied inter-pretations of religious texts that wouldn’t involve any [political]duty for themselves, thus not colliding with their self-indulgence.Whether they knew it or not, they altered the significance ofreligious concepts impugning religion itself.122

In the conflict with such powerful enemies (such as materialistic Marxism)and the struggle for the restitution of the historical heritage to Islamicsocieties, who should make the first move? And how must one go about it?The ‘ulama, Mut.ahhari answered. They must first endeavour to representreligious concepts as being both logical and rational to the intellectual andeducated groups; and, second, they must distinguish religion and its rolewithin other sections in society, for example politics and economics. In otherwords, those in confrontation with Marxist and secular ideologies mustprovide the masses with a new religious doctrine, one in which it is necessaryto revitalize Islamic epic terms like jihad and shahadat: ‘Of course it requiresan intellectual, verbal . . . and practical jihad.’123

Mut.ahhari invites his readers very explicitly, but without any furtherexplanation, to practise jihad. If one adjoins the above quotation to his otherdiscourses at that time (1970–1), namely, Imamat, Khilafat va Vilayat,Jihad, and Hijrat va Jihad, plus his notes concerning leadership (in Islam),one can clearly conclude that, during this period, he was seriouslyconsidering practical methods for political action. But it does not necessarilymean that he changed his view and accepted armed struggle. Herecommended the religious scholars to use quarrels, criticisms and jihadevents in their speeches. But why did he only approve of ‘ulama and clericalspeakers? Probably the sad experience during his career at the Irshad Instituteinfluenced him, for he had lost his confidence forever in non-clericalintellectuals. Perhaps he thought that these non-clerical speakers woulduse the propagandist weapon, unskilfully, against themselves and theirassociates rather than against the enemy.


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A message to the Muslim activists

A substantial section of Mut.ahhari’s lectures was allocated to man, ethicsand education. In the three books of Fit.rat, Insan dar Quran and Insan vaIman he was seeking to elucidate his philosophical views, comparing themwith those of Western and Eastern philosophers. Nietzsche, Marx,Feuerbach, Russell, William James and Sartre were among the Westernphilosophers addressed and criticized by him.124 Among Muslim scholars,Muh. yi al-Din ‘Arabi, Maulavi and S.adr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla S. adra) werealso regularly referred to by Mut.ahhari.125 It is worth mentioning that hisunderstanding of Western philosophy came through Persian translations, buthe was able to understand the ideas, sometimes even better than thetranslator.126 He constantly referred to the Quran and h. adith as the criteriafor the verification or falsification of each theory. For instance, the theory offit.rat, which in his view is the basis of Islamic philosophy and the key tounderstanding man, society and history, is deduced from the Quran.127

The term fit.rat, according to Mut.ahhari, is one of the exclusively Quranicexpressions portraying man for the first time in human philosophical litera-ture. It signifies all the special potentialities and characteristics which humanbeings possess by creation and which distinguish them from other subjects,namely inanimate bodies and animals. Some of these special attributes arerelated to consciousness, understanding and knowledge. This category isnamed idrakat-i fit.ri. Others are in the category of will, desire and feeling,called girayishat-i fit.ri. The search for truth, excellence and beauty,inquisitiveness, creativity and love are the important human fit.ri desireswhich establish the most essential branches of human knowledge: that is,science, philosophy, ethics, art, technology, mysticism and religion, resultingin man’s social evolution in history. In this respect he argued:

Man has some special characteristics which make his social life evol-utionary. One of these characteristics and talents is memorizing andcollecting experiences. Man guards and puts as a base for his futureexperiences all that he learns by experience and acquisition. Thesecond is the ability to learn through explanations and the pen. Healso transfers the experiences of others to himself via speech and on ahigher level through handwriting. One generation’s experiences fillup and remain for the next generation through conversation andwriting. For this reason, the blessings of speech, pen and writinghave particular importance in the Quran . . . The third feature isMan’s being equipped by intellect and innovation. Man has thepower of creativity and initiative by these mysterious forces. He isthe manifestation of divine creativity and initiative . . . There existsneither the disposition of creation and initiative which are the

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functions of rational faculties, nor the intense desire for innovation,in other animals. It is for this reason that animals remain constantwhile Man advances.128

Many aspects of different ethical systems such as Hinduism, Marxism,existentialism and evolutionism were considered by Mut.ahhari in his ethicaldiscussions and were later published under the titles Falsafih-yi Akhlaq andT‘alim va Tarbiyat dar Islam. In these books, he deals with Plato, Kant,Darwin, Marx, Sartre, Ghazzali, the Sufis and Asha‘irih (anti-rationalism)and is in favour of the Mu‘atazilih (pro-rationalism). Therefore he is amongthose few ethical philosophers who are searching for the roots of man’sethical values – social or individual – in his rational faculty. In this respect, hewas in favour of rationalism, but against the schools of ethical empiricismincluding scientific, naturalistic, positivistic, evolutionary and the Asha‘irihtheological school of ethics. According to him, all human values such asjustice, liberty, equality and honesty are sacred for mankind, simply due tothe fact that they emanated from the transcendental reality of man, namelyintellect, and not because they were praised by divine religions or circulatedin the natural world or accepted by human societies. Naturally, this meansthat the criterion for all good and evil, permission and non-permission,ugliness and beauty, values and anti-values, is man himself and not nature,society or history. According to his argument, the system of Islamic ethicsrevolves on the axis of man’s honour and dignity and, consequently, religiousteachings must concentrate on deeds and habits which will eventuallyliberate the believers’ character from any personal or social inferiority,alienation, abjectness and captivity:

Around thirteen years ago [1338/1959–60], on the third day ofSh‘aban [the birthday of the third Imam], I was invited to lecture atthe Danish-sara-yi ‘Ali. I remember speaking there under theheading ‘The question of selfness in ethics’. Since then, a newthought has entered my mind and whatever I have studied since, Ihave become much stronger in this opinion which is that, in Islamicethics, the pivot . . . is the honour and magnanimity of the soul.129

At the time of the above-mentioned discussions (during the 1970s) whichwere simultaneous with the growth of religious interest among young people,Mut.ahhari’s ethical theory had a clear message for young activists: that thejudgement of the secular ruling class or the approval of leftist groups are not,and should not be, the real criteria for the rightness or wrongness of theirbehaviour. It was probably this kind of theoretical approach which preparedthe ground for their being more decisive in choosing a religious lifestyle. Themessage is repeated again in the Sayri dar Sirih-yi Nabavi, Sayri dar Sirih-yiA’immih and Insan-i Kamil. In these books Mut.ahhari is seeking to present


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his educated audience with an ideal picture of a real Muslim. His definitionof a real Muslim of course, as mentioned before, depended much on imitatinga learned Mujtahid.

A bridge between shifting time and permanent Islam

In 1966–7, when the growth of religious practice became visible in the younggeneration, a fundamental question arose among the Islamist activists. Thequestion was whether Islam – according to Muslim beliefs – is an eternal andnon-abrogatable religion, whereas man’s needs, which Mut.ahhari termed‘the demands of the age’, are alterable and modernizable matters. How canthe immutable religion harmonize with those temporary, changing require-ments? In other words, the relationship between Islam and the necessities oftime is similar to that of two opposites – one being permanent and non-evolutionary in its nature, the other indeterminate and evolutionary.Therefore, how can these two naturally opposite subjects harmonize withone another? Either the permanent religion must surrender itself to theunstable desires of time and accept these developments or the necessities oftime and the demands of the age must remain stable and be proportionate todivine law: ‘It must be admitted that it is a difficult matter and the rightanswer can not easily be presented.’130

The question was discussed for a month in the Ittifaq Mosque during thewinter of 1966 and then continued at meetings of the Association of IslamicPhysicians in 1972–3. The book Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman (two vols) isMut.ahhari’s contribution to this issue. In his justifications, he first of alldenies the common understanding of Islam and time:

Neither is Islam absolutely permanent, having no changes in itslaws, nor are the conditions and necessities of the age of such a formthat is usually pictured as being a requisite of a time in whicheverything must change. There are some fixed and some temporarymatters in Islam as there are in time.131

Then he argued that the proper answer to this problem must be sought intwo terms, namely Ijtihad and Vilayat-i Faqih.132 According to Mut.ahhari,there are some matters in the Islamic Shari‘at called ah. kam-i avvaliyih(primary ordinances) which are not changeable by Ijtihad in any situation,whereas the others, called ah. kam-i thanaviyih (secondary ordinances), arechangeable by Ijtihad, according to different circumstances. For instance,zakat (obligatory alms) is one of the primary rules which is fixed for all timeand for all societies, but the kind of crops and products which zakat is takenfrom, belonging to the secondary rules, are changeable from one society toanother, from one period to the other. Therefore, according to Mut.ahhari, itis the secondary rules that Ijtihad can be operated in and in which the Islamic

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ruler (vali-i faqih) has the authority to make law. The Islamic ruler’s base forthe fixed matters is the Kitab (the Quran) and Sunnat and for changeablematters he refers to ‘aql (reason); for the Quran and h. adith, as two sources ofIjtihad, are always permanent whilst the other source, namely ‘aql, is basedon improvement and evolution.133 Indeed, the ‘aql of the Mujtahid, as thelegitimate ruler of Shi‘ite society, is the ultimate solution that Mut.ahharipresented to the question above. He explained furthermore:

Islamic rules are based on the mas. alih va mafasid [worldly interestsand corruptions relating to Man] which can be discovered by ‘aqland ‘ilm [science]. On the other side, the Islamic legislative systemis framed in general terms (in which every h. ukm [ordinance] isuniversal and does not refer to the specific). These two mattersprovide Mujtahids with numerous possibilities for announcingdifferent fatwas under different conditions of time and place; and,indeed, to discover that a thing may be h. alal [lawful, permitted] atone time and h. aram [unlawful, prohibited], or vajib [obligatory], ormustah. ab [recommended] at another.134

It is interesting to see that Mut.ahhari’s views are quite similar to those ofKhomeini. In a letter from Khomeini, dated 16.10.1366/6.1.1987, in whichhe explained his interpretation of the theory of Islamic rule, he presentedsimilar views on these subjects which had already been discussed byMut.ahhari some 20 years earlier.135 The role of zaman va makan (place andtime) in Islamic law, and the broad authority of a Mujtahid as the legitimateruler of Islamic society, which Khomeini pointed out in his letter, wereprecisely as explained in Mut.ahhari’s lectures. He argued:

These options are transmitted from the Prophet to the Imams, andfrom the Imams to the Muslims’ lawful leader. Many of theprohibitions and permissions offered by our fuqaha – with which all[Mujtahids] are in accordance today – are based on this principle.With whose lawful permission did Mirza Shirazi temporarily forbidtobacco? If tobacco was prohibited [h. aram] it would have beenprohibited for ever. So why did he say ‘it is prohibited today’?Yesterday is the same as today. Why, after a period, did he himselfgrant permission? It is because Mirza Shirazi knew that the Islamiclegitimate ruler [h. akim-i shar‘a] has some options which can beexercised in times of necessity.136

A debate with a poet about H. afiz.’s gnosticism

In 1975–6 a book introducing H. afiz. was published by the contemporary poetAhmad Shamlu, which prepared the ground for major discussions between


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religious and non-religious scholars over H. afiz. ’s vision of reality. For the‘ulama, the significance of Shamlu’s work lay in his courageous interpre-tation of H. afiz. ’s poems in a materialistic way, presenting an atheistic pictureof the celebrated Persian-speaking poet who was commonly termed lisan al-ghaib (Tongue of the Unseen). Shamlu explicitly stated:

H. afiz. is a mystery. Who, indeed, is this qalandar [dervish], asceticblasphemer who – during the darkest periods of the hypocriticalrulership, at the table of the wily ones and in an era where even theproud, cannibalistic executioners like Amir Mubariz al-Din and hisson Shah Shuja‘a based their government on giving lashes, breakingwine jars, nah-yi az munkar and religious wars – solely denies thepromise of resurrection, considers God as love and Satan as reason,while passing, jumping around and dancing, he is chanting:

This cloak of mine better given in pawn for wine,And this register of nonsense better drowned in pure wine.

Or, H. afiz. , openly admits that he does not believe in religious coven-ants, for instance:

I, who can already gain Paradise todaywhy should I believe the zahid’s promise of tomorrow?137

It is worth mentioning that Shamlu had set foot on the path of otherwriters who had recently given an atheistic interpretation of Persian history,culture and literature. For example, Ih. san T. abari, one of the maintheoreticians of the Tudih Party, wrote Barkhi barrisi-ha dar barih-ijahanbini-ha va junbish-ha-yi ijtima‘i-yi Iran (‘Brief research into worldvisions and social uprisings in Iran’), denying the spiritual personalities ofMaulavi, H. afiz. , Qut.b al-Din Shirazi and Khajih Nas. ir al-Din T. usi.138 Ajournalist called Ali Mir-Fat.rus published H. allaj, presenting a materialisticpicture of that outstanding mystic.139

Mut.ahhari discussed the issue at the conferences held in the Faculty ofTheology. His ‘Irfan-i H. afiz. consists of five lectures which he presented atthose conferences:

Recently, the Iranian materialists have had recourse to strange things.This illustrates their philosophy’s poverty and weakness more thanbefore. One of these recourses is the distortion of personalities. Theyattempt, via the distortion of respected figures, to bring to theattention of the public their ideology and philosophy.140

Shamlu, by referring to the outward appearance of some of H. afiz. ’s mysti-cal poems, described the poet as an atheist, an infidel and a denier of religious

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beliefs.141 Mut.ahhari maintained that this rationale was not sufficientbecause:

With mysticism, apart from its own special expressions, as with anyother science, its language is symbolic. The mystics themselves, insome of their books, have presented the key to these mysteries. Afterbecoming acquainted with the key to these mysteries many of theerrors and ambiguities will disappear.142

Needless to say, a number of poems written by Shi‘ite fuqaha – such asthose by Mulla Muh. sin Faiz

. Kashani,143 Mulla Ahmad Naraqi,144

Muhammad Husain Isfahani (Kumpani)145 and Ruhhullah Khomeini146 – arereplete with mystical language. Therefore, these materialistic interpretationsseemed strange to Mut.ahhari. He pointed out that the apparent meaning ofsome poems will never reveal the depth of their authors’ personality, because,as is the case with H. afiz. , their works are full of paradoxes and seeminginconsistencies. H. afiz. was described by his schoolmate, who had collectedhis poems after his death, as m‘adan al-lat.a’if al-ruh. aniyah (the mine ofdelicate spirituality) and makhzan al-ma‘arif al-subh. aniyah (the treasure ofdivine knowledge). H. afiz. did not succeed in collecting his ghazalliyat (lyricalpoems) by himself, owing to the fact that he was quite engrossed in givingQuranic lessons and in his theo-ethical duties.147

Return to Qum

It has now become clear that in 1971–2, when Khomeini was in exile in Najafand Montazeri was not often in Qum (because of being temporarily in exileor even in prison), a number of Khomeini’s younger students in Qum decidedto invite Mut.ahhari to teach modern philosophy. In addition, and probablyat the same time, Khomeini, in a letter to his son-in-law, asked Hajj ShaikhShahab Ishraqi to prepare facilities for Mut.ahhari’s teaching at the QumSeminary.148 It is worth mentioning that Mut.ahhari gradually came to feelthat the university was not the appropriate place for him. Once, when givinga consultation to a friend, he mentioned that he thought his time was wastedat the university because he believed that 90 per cent of students attendedlessons only in order to gain a degree or to pass examinations (not foracademic reasons or the lessons themselves) whereas the tullab attendedlessons in the seminary primarily in order to gain knowledge. Furthermore,he would be a free Mudarris in Qum, while in the university he wasconsidered by some people as a government-paid professor.149 Perhaps hisbreaking off relations with the H. usainiyih-i Irshad furthered this conclusion.He welcomed the invitation to go to Qum, and regularly spent three days aweek (from Wednesday evening to Friday evening) there, teaching oneprivate and one general class. In his private lessons, which were attended by a


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number of well-known ‘ulama such as Muhammad Mu’min, the previousdirector of the H. auzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Qum, and Husain Mudarrisi Tabatabai,now a professor at the University of Princeton, Mut.ahhari taught thephilosophy of history, comparing Islamic views to those of Hegel. He alsogave philosophy lectures on the subject of movement and time in his generallessons, comparing the views of Islamic philosophers with those of Westernphilosophers.

At this time, Dr Beheshti, who had previously served in the capacity ofdirector of Hamburg’s Mosque (1965–70, 71), was prohibited by SAVAKfrom leaving the country after his arrival in Iran in 1349/1970–1. Then,together with several of his friends (among them Ali Quddusi, the StateProsecutor between 1979–81), he was able to establish a modern, well-organized religious school, known as Madrasih-yi H. aqqani, in the QumSeminary. He managed to teach Western philosophy, and also established acourse in the comparative study of religions. The H. aqqani School had aunique educational system and was renowned all over the country for itsacademic progress, intellectuality and political activities. A number of tullabfrom this school were strongly influenced by Dr Ali Shariati and were tryingto propagate his idea of Islam-i inqilabi (revolutionary Islam) inside theSeminary. Undoubtedly, the arrival in Qum of these two eminent Ayatullahs,with their vast academic knowledge, was considered as a blessing by theyoung clergy and seemed to prepare the ground for a comprehensive reformof the clerical establishment. At that time, Mut.ahhari’s influence in Qum wasmuch wider than Beheshti’s and much more far-reaching in terms ofinfluential students.

Mut.ahhari opened the debate about Andre Peter’s Marx and Marxism – arelatively comprehensive collection of Marxist ideology and world vision – inhis weekly private sessions.150 These meetings continued until 1977 andthe details of the discussions were published under the title Naqdi barMarxism (‘Criticism on Marxism’). The issue of zaman va h. arakat (timeand movement) was also brought under discussion at his weekly generalsessions. These meetings continued until 1978. The H. arakat va Zaman is, infact, Mut.ahhari’s explanations on the subject from his general lessons.Another general seminar about Islamic ideology and world vision, calledMa‘arif-i Quran (‘Gnostic knowledge of the Quran’), was held in Qum,probably in 1977. This continued for little more than a year, because of theRevolution.

On the other hand, when Mut.ahhari was invited to Qum in spring 1971,new lectures were organized at the Faculty of Theology under the headingAshnai ba ‘ulum-i Islami (‘An introduction to Islamic sciences’) for thepurpose of teaching the general principles of Islamic sciences, namely logic,philosophy, kalam, ‘Irfan, fiqh and us. ul-i fiqh. These lectures were all givenduring the first year of the academic bachelor’s degree. Before long, theselessons were repeated at other universities, including the Aryamihr Technical

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University (now Sharif Technical University), the centre of anti-regimeactivities, and were repeated many times.151

In 1976, the Shah changed the Iranian Solar Calendar to a royal one,starting with the coronation of Cyrus II. When Mut.ahhari, together with alarge number of ‘ulama from Qum, Mashhad and Tehran protestedvehemently against this change, he was prohibited by the SAVAK fromlecturing.152 In the same year, he went to Iraq and visited Ayatullah Khomeiniin Najaf.153 Although he left no reports about this meeting, his subsequentenhanced presence at the Qum Seminary probably reveals that he wasinstructed by his teacher to be more involved with the seminary’s daily affairsand academic matters.

Debates with Muslim leftist guerrillas

In June 1977, Mut.ahhari wrote an article which finally caused hisassassination in May 1979. In this article, entitled Matiryalism dar Iran(‘Materialism in Iran’), while introducing the recent materialistic interpre-tations of Islamic texts and of Muslim academic figures, he heavily criticizedsome Islamic groups who were influenced by the Marxist methodology:

We have noticed a group who really depend on other schools,especially materialistic schools. Since they know that they are lessable to attract the Iranian youth with materialistic symbols andslogans, they present foreign ideas with Islamic emblems. It isevident that if Islam influences the youths’ mind throughmaterialistic content and solely possesses Islamic cover, then thiswill be rejected swiftly. And also, we observe – which is moredangerous – that some Muslims, unfamiliar with Islamic sciencesand enamoured of foreign schools, are writing about ethics andpropagating these writings in the name of Islam; however, these areforeign ethics. Similarly, they write on the subjects of the philosophyof history, philosophy of religions, prophethood, world vision andQuranic interpretations. As a responsible individual, with responsi-bility from God, I warn all great Islamic authorities (all of whom Irespect – and I am performing my duty which is between AlmightyAllah and myself) that these external influential ideas under thepretext and banner of Islam are a danger that threatens the influenceof Islam – whether they be ill-intentioned or not.154

Among all Muslim activists, two radical groups, namely the Sazman-iMujahidin-i Khalq-i Iran (the Organization of the Iranian Popular ReligiousFighters) and the Guruh-i Furqan (the Furqan Group) were the core targetsof Mut.ahhari’s criticism.

The first group, the Mujahidin-i Khalq was established in 1965 by


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Muhammad H. anif-nizhad (the group’s chief ideologue), Sa‘id Muh. sin (itschief organizer) and Ali-As.ghar Badi‘a-zadigan (its main arms expert); theywere all students at Tehran University. They were raised in religious familiesand were active in religious organizations such as the Anjuman-i Islami-yiDanishjuyan and Nihz.at-i Azadi-yi Iran, but had broken with them becausethey did not consider them to be revolutionary enough. They praised theuprising of 15 Khurdad 1342/5 June 1963 as ‘a turning point in Iranianhistory’ and were, like the Mu’talifih in favour of armed struggle, but unlikethe Mu’talifih, they did not consider themselves as the followers (muqallid)of Ayatullah Khomeini or any other religious authority (marj‘a-i taqlid). Intheir view, one did not need a cleric or the clerical method of Islamic studiesfor the understanding of Islam.155 After graduation from the university in1963, they spent the next two years doing their military service. On 6September 1965, they established a secret discussion group to explorecontemporary issues, with some 20 trusted friends. This group, and the datethey first met, are now regarded as the beginnings of the Mujahidin. Thediscussion group continued to meet regularly for the next three years andgradually established smaller groups in Qazvin, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz andMashhad. Their main focus, however, was to study religion, history andrevolutionary theory. They read the Quran, the Nahj al-balaghih, the worksof Bazargan and T. aliqani, literature on modern revolutions in Russia, China,Cuba and Algeria, and studies on major critical events in Iranian modernhistory. They also adopted Ammar Quzegan’s Le meilleur combat as theirmain handbook. At that time, this book was the main theoretical guide of theAlgerian FLN. It had been written by a former communist-turned-nationalistwho argued that Islam was a revolutionary, socialistic creed and that the onlyway to fight imperialism was to resort to armed struggle and appeal to thereligious sentiments of the masses. After three years of study, the group set upa central committee to work out a revolutionary strategy and assembled ateam of ideologues to provide the organization’s own theoretical handbooks.The central committee included, besides H. anif-nizhad, Muh. sin and Badi‘a-zadigan, nine others who were also from religious, academic (except AhmadRezai) backgrounds: Mahmood As.ghar-zadih, ‘Abdul-Rasul Mishkin-fam,Ali Mihan-dust, Mas‘ud Rajavi, Ahmad Rezai, Nasir S. adiq, Ali Bakiri,Muhammad Bazargani and Bahman Bazargani. The ideological teamconsisted of nine members: six from the central committee (H. anif-nizhad,Muh. sin, As.ghar-zadih, Mihan-dust, Rajavi and Bahman Bazargani) andthree others with religious backgrounds: Reza Rezai, Husain Ruh. ani andTurab H. aqshinas.156

The ideological team prepared a series of pamphlets: Takamul andShinakht, discussing the theory of evolution and the theory of knowledge;Iqtis. ad bi Zaban-i Sadih, a free translation of Marx’s Wage, Labour andCapital; Mut.ali‘at-i Marksisti, a brief summary of the materialist conceptionof history and society; Chigunih Quran Biyamuzim, a two-volume

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introduction to Quranic studies; Rah-i Anbiya, Rah-i Bashar and Nihz.at-iH. usaini, two major works in which the history of the Prophets and ImamHusain were interpreted as a class struggle between rich and poor, ruled andruler. As later explanations revealed, the ideology of the Mujahidin was infact a combination of Islam and Marxism:

Our original aim was to synthesize the religious values of Islam withthe scientific thought of Marxism . . . for we were convinced thattrue Islam was compatible with the theories of social evolution,historical determinism, and the class struggle . . . we say ‘no’ toMarxist philosophy, especially to atheism. But we say ‘yes’ toMarxist social thought, particularly to its analysis of feudalism,capitalism and imperialism.157

It seems that the Mujahidin’s ideology was fundamentally similar to thatof Shariati. They both considered Shi‘ite Islam as an inherently radicalmovement opposed to feudalism, capitalism and other forms of class-stratified society. Both were socialists – in fact, if not in name – borrowingheavily from Marxist literature while at the same time rejecting the label ofMarxism. Both were anti-clerical, viewing the intelligentsia as the trueexponents of Islam, and calling for a Muslim renaissance and reformation.And, finally, both viewed the ‘dialectical method’ as the key to understand-ing the scriptures: sociology and political economy were more importantthan traditional theology.

Despite these similarities, Shariati and the Mujahidin differed in someviews. Shariati insisted that the countries of the Third World could find athird way to development – one that would be neither capitalist nor socialist,whereas the Mujahidin stated that these countries had only two choices: acapitalist road towards stagnation or a socialist road leading to economicdevelopment. The Mujahidin also argued that Islam could not offer a thirdroad. There were also differences in their political outlook. Whereas Shariatioften attacked vulgar Marxism and international communism, especially inthe Soviet Union, the Mujahidin were eager to build political alliances, andtherefore were willing to mute their criticisms of the international communistmovement in general, and of the Soviet Union in particular.158

To obtain Ayatullah Khomeini’s public support, the Mujahidin sent twomembers of its ideological team, Ruh. ani and H. aq-shinas (both becameMarxists in 1975) to Najaf in 1972. It has been said that the delegationsvisited Khomeini with letters of introduction from T. aliqani, Montazeri(whose son Muhammad at that time sympathized with the Mujahidin) andMut.ahhari who had met some of the Mujahidin through the H. usainiyih-yiIrshad.159 Khomeini listened to the delegations’ explanations about theirideology, in a series of secret audiences (probably 24 sessions). He also triedto test their religious beliefs by asking them some questions on theological


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issues, but they failed to present satisfactory replies. Furthermore, he urgedthem to change their views about Marxism and international communism, aswell as about the ‘ulama and the clerical establishment. Although he avoidedissuing a statement of public support for the Mujahidin guerrillas, he wroteprivate letters to some of his followers in Iran asking them to help the familiesof those recently executed by the Shah. But after the Islamic Revolution, andafter Mut.ahhari had been killed, in a public speech on 25 June 1980, entitled‘A hypocrite [munafiq] is worse than an unbeliever [kafir]’, Khomeinireferred to these Najaf visits. He explained that he had agreed to meet with‘these gentlemen who claim they are Muslims’ only because some respected‘ulama in Tehran had asked him to do so in a letter. He then disclosed thatthe Mujahidin representatives had come with a mouthful of dangerous lies,claiming to champion Islam but all the time planning secretly to use their‘irresponsible talk of armed struggle’ to destroy Islam and the ‘ulama. Heconcluded his attack by mentioning that he had not been fooled by thesecompulsive liars, for he had kept in mind the old parable of the recent Jewishconvert in Hamadan who incessantly quoted the Quran without having thefaintest notion about Islam.160

Immediately after the events in Siyahkal on 8 February 1971, theMujahidin organization had decided to start its military activities. To disruptthe festivities to celebrate the anniversary of 2500 years of the monarchy inAugust 1971, they planned to blow up the main electrical plant in Tehranand thus throw all the festivities into darkness. Searching for dynamite, theyapproached a veteran communist with whom they had shared a prison cellduring the 1963 uprising. However, since he had meanwhile turned policeinformer, SAVAK arrested 69 of the Mujahidin leaders and members, a fewdays before the scheduled bombing. In April and May 1972, when theMujahidin delegations had been in Iraq, the regime executed nine of itsleading figures, including three of the founding leaders.161 In mid-1975, whenthe Mujahidin had created a nationwide reputation for its organizationalefficiency, revolutionary fervour and religious martyrdom, after someinternal bloody conflict, they published a vehemently anti-Islamic manifestoentitled Bayaniyih-i I‘alam-i Mavaz.i‘a-i Idiuluzhik-i Sazman-i Mujahidin-iKhalq-i Iran (‘Statement about the ideological stand-points of the SMKI’)which deeply shocked the ‘ulama and the religious opposition. The manifestodeclared that the organization was henceforth discarding Islam in favour ofMarxist-Leninism, because Islam was a mass opiate and at best petitbourgeois, a utopian ideology, whereas Marxist-Leninism was the realscientific philosophy of the working class and the true road to the liberationof mankind:

At first we thought we could synthesize Marxism with Islam andaccept historical determinism without dialectical materialism. Wenow realize that this is impossible . . . We have chosen Marxism

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because it is the true road to the emancipation of the workingclass.162

Although a number of the Mujahidin, who called themselves the ‘MuslimMujahidin’ and managed after the Islamic Revolution to fully re-establish theoriginal title, remained religious, they were unable to regain their previousposition among the leading ‘ulama such as Mut.ahhari and Montazeri.According to Mut.ahhari, the real explanation for this incident lay partly inthe materialistic methods which the Mujahidin adopted when studyingIslam, society and history; partly because of the lack of religious publicationswhich could reasonably and logically present the Islamic ideology and worldview; and also owing to the Mujahidin’s open friendship with the left wing,especially with the Chirik-ha-yi Fadai-yi Khalq. In order to prevent moreconversions to Marxism, Mut.ahhari established a number of discussionsessions in Tehran and wrote a series of books and articles. He began to teachIslamic philosophy in a weekly session which was attended by a number ofyoung scholars such as Hamid Enayat, Manuchihr Buzurg-mihr, Ghulam AliHaddad-‘Adil, Sayyid Jalaluddin Mujtabavi, Reza Davari, Daryush Ashuri,Ahmad Jalali. The Sharh. -i Mabsut-i Manz.umih (four vols) is the result ofthose lessons. In other private sessions for discussion about the philosophy ofhistory, various sections of translated books – Pleasures of Philosophy,written by Will Durant; E. H. Carr’s What is History, and Andre Peter’sMarx and Marxism – were read by students under Mut.ahhari’s supervision.These discussions led to the writing of his Naqdi bar Marksism and Falsafih-iTarikh.

In his Qiyam va Inqilab-i Mahdi az Didgah-i Falsafih-yi Tarikh,Mut.ahhari undertook a philosophical analysis, in order to explain thedoctrine of Messianism according to Quranic historical views, criticizingcommunism as the Marxist ideal community. Again, in his H. aqq va Bat.il,while rejecting the Marxist socio-economic classification, he theorized aboutthe typology of Quranic social classes by classifying the sociological termsused in the Quran. Despite the interdiction on lecturing from 1974,Mut.ahhari put the philosophical issue of ‘understanding’ – in the context ofthe Marxist theory of knowledge – under discussion in Kanun-i Tauh. id in1977, which was followed by his arrest by the SAVAK.163 The Mas’alih-yiShinakht is a compilation of these lectures. To present a sociological analysisof the latest Muslim uprisings, he prepared a lecture entitled Barrasi-yiIjmali-yi Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami dar S. ad Salih-i Akhir (‘A short review of Islamicmovements in the last hundred years’) for a public conference, but wascancelled by the police. Finally, in response to the requests of AyatullahBeheshti and Dr Bahunar, Mut.ahhari began to write about the characteristicsof the Islamic world view. The series of five volumes, entitled Muqaddamih-ibar Jahanbini-yi Islami (‘An introduction to the Islamic world vision’) (Insan


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va Iman, Jahan-bini-yi Tauh. idi, Vah. y va Nabuvvat, Insan dar Quran andJami‘ih va Tarikh) presents his final philosophical considerations about man,society and history. The most important book of the series, Jami‘ih va Taikh– a criticism of the Marxist theory on society and history and an explanationof Mut.ahhari’s views on the philosophy of history – remained unfinished.164

There is no mention of the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq-i Iran inMut.ahhari’s writings, save two concise special points, one being explicit theother implicit. In a letter to Ayatullah Khomeini in 1977–8, Mut.ahharireported the situation of Iranian politico-religious groups and explained hisopinion on the Mujahidin organization (describing them as the munafiqin-ikhalq, hypocritical people), but stated that his sources were collectedindirectly:

The second movement which is idiomatically named Mujahidin, wasin the beginning a political group, but they are gradually becoming areligious sect just like the Kharijis [a political sect of early Islamichistory] whose movement, in the beginning, was of a political nature,but later became a religious movement with a series of primary andsecondary principles. Their [the Mujahidin’s] most simple inno-vation is that they have, according to themselves, attained self-sufficiency in [matters of] religion and thus reject any clerical officialand religious authority. All the others may be understood in asimilar manner. Another [of their innovations] is that – whilstexpressing their loyalty to Islam – in their view, Karl Marx is just assacred and respected as Imam Ja‘far S. adiq [the sixth Shi‘i Imam].Although my sources are indirect, nevertheless there are some wise,good believers who have spent many years with them in prisonwhom I believe your excellency must ask – all of them, and not onlyone – to write individually and send their observations and opinions[concerning the Mujahidin] to your presence. It is surprising thatthere still exist some of our friends and your sincere followers whojustify and account for their [the Mujahidin’s] works.165

With regard to Mut.ahhari’s second piece of writing about the Mujahidin-iKhalq, there is a phrase criticizing their famous slogan, Bi Nam-i Khuda va biNam-i Khalq-i Qahraman-i Iran (‘In the name of God and in the name of theheroic people of Iran’), by stating:

In the Islamic tauh. idi method, every work must be started in thename of God (and no-one else). To start an act in the name of people[khalq] is idolatry and in the name of both God and khalq thisbecomes dualism and idolatry; but, only in the name of God is ittauh. id and monotheism.166

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The second group, namely the Guruh-i Furqan, was probably formed in1975, when the Mujahidin announced their conversion to Marxism. Thenumber of its members reached, at the peak, some 60 persons. AkbarGudarzi, the Furqan’s founder and leader, who was born to a religiousfarming family in Aligudarz, was only 20 years old when he was executed in1979 for his terrorist activities. While still at high school, he had attended theIslamic primary lessons at the religious seminaries in Khunsar, Qum andTehran. He spent some three to four years learning Arabic, logic, fiqh andus. ul al-fiqh. While his first level of religious education (daurih-i sat.h)remained unfinished, he left the seminary and with it traditional educa-tion.167 As he mentioned in an interview after his arrest in 1979, he read theQuran, the Nahj al-balaghih, the writings of Ayatullah T. aliqani, Shariati,and a few Mujahidin-i Khalq leaders such as Sa‘id Muh. sin, H. anif-nizhad andthe Rezai brothers.168 At the age of 16, Gudarzi started to teach the Quran toa small number of young people in Tehran. During these three to four years,he gradually chose new members from participants at the Quranic sessions.Furqan termed these three or four years preceding the Islamic Revolution the‘period of assembling its ideology’. It also stated that the group achieved itstauh. idi ideology solely through collective discussions and not by studyingand being educated in the religious seminaries. Initially, these Quraniclessons were published in pocket-sized booklets which soon developed into abook, mentioning neither author, publisher nor date of publication. TheUs. ul-i Tafakkur-i Qurani (‘The principle of Quranic thinking’) is in fact acompilation of these booklets.

In it, Gudarzi described God as absolute evolution (not absoluteperfection); s. alat as the connection between party members; ghaib andshahadat (the invisible and visible worlds) as two hidden and overt stages ofstruggle and revolution; and akhirat (the world after) as a socio-politicalsystem of a higher world.169 By the theory of class antagonism and classstruggle, (terms which he borrowed from Shariati and the Mujahidin’sliterature) he started to interpret the Quranic historical verses. Finally hecame to the conclusion that ownership is basically nothing more than acolonial phenomenon.170

Mut.ahhari, however, considered the ideology of the Furqan as much moredangerous than that of other groups who were in favour of dialecticalmaterialism:

In the past two years, materialism has approached Iran with a newstratagem which is much more dangerous than the distortion of[Islamic] personalities; that is, the distortion of Quranic verses,together with the materialistic expositions of the verses’ content(using these terms, in their works). This technique is a new ruse,which has been alive in Iran for less than two years.171


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Needless to say, the Furqan’s mode of exegesis had no similarity to thespiritual approaches of the traditionalists. Indeed, in Mut.ahhari’s view, thiswas a conspiracy in order to attain the metamorphosis of peoples’ religiousfeelings, and the theoretician of the Furqan group was contributing to this,willingly or unwillingly, by supporting the materialistic and secular move-ments.172 He argued:

I am aware of the point that reflection on the Quran is the right ofeach Muslim and is not restricted to any individual or any group. Iam also aware of the fact that [our] approach, whether it be devoidof personal interest or not, does not come to the same conclusions.Each person may have a particular view. He has the right to reflecton the Quranic verses with regard to his understanding of theconceptions of the [Quranic] terms, his expertise in the style of theArabic language and in the particular form of the Quran; withregard to the occasions of revelation of the verses, and the history ofthe early years of Islam; with regard to the traditions we receivedfrom the Imams about the exegesis of the Quran; and with regard tothe developments in science . . . But we know that some viewspresented by the Bat.iniyih [esoterics], and others – from the past –cannot be considered as [the Quranic] approach or exegesis. Theyare metamorphosis and distortion rather than approach andexegesis.173

Mut.ahhari also mentioned that owing to the several signs and points of‘rawness’ and illiteracy he had seen in the Furqan publications, he preferredto describe its materialistic method of interpreting the Quranic verses as‘gullible materialism’ (Matiryalism-i Ighfal Shudih). If the group continuedits deviational way after this notification, he would declare its materialisticmethod to be ‘hypocritical materialism’ (Matiryalism-i Munafiq).174 He thenaddressed the academics thus:

Here, I am inviting all eminent people and the learned scholars of thecountry – who are of good intentions – to examine carefully andimpartially everything I am about to say. If they really feel that I ammistaken, [they should] inform me and in a logical way prove myfaults. I call God to witness that I am ready to admit my own errorsopenly.175

The Furqan declared that it considered the Pahlavi regime, clergy andcommunists as the three fundamental elements, dominant over the Iranians’destiny which must be destroyed by armed struggle.176 Although they wererepeatedly speaking of armed struggle, they did not call for any military

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action during the Pahlavi regime. In order to prepare guns and a location forthe group, it committed several bank robberies.177 Attempting to realize theirvision of an Islam without institutionalized religious leadership (Islam-iminha-yi ruh. aniyat), the Furqan begun to assassinate a number of theleading ‘ulama and Iranian officials after the Islamic Revolution. On 23 April1979 they assassinated General Muhammad Vali Qarani, the first Chief ofStaff of the Iranian armed forces after the Revolution. On 1 May theymurdered Ayatullah Murtaz

.a Mut.ahhari, and three weeks later they made

an attempt on the life of Hujjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani. On 26 Augustthey assassinated Hajj Mahdi Iraqi, a close associate of Ayatullah Khomeiniand a leading member of the Mu’talifih-yi Islami. On 1 November theFurqan murdered Ayatullah Qaz

.i Tabatabai, the Imam Jum‘ih of Tabriz and

the representative of Khomeini for northern Azarbaiajan. On 18 Decemberthey also assassinated Ayatullah Dr Muhammad Mufattih, the head of theFaculty of Theology.

In a statement issued after the assassination of General Qarani, theFurqan had threatened that its next target would be a cleric. When he readthe Furqan’s statement in a newspaper, in the house of Hujjat al-IslamMuh. aqqiq Damad, a close student of Mut.ahhari and a senior lecturer in theFaculty of Law at Shahid Beheshti University, Mut.ahhari remarked that hewould become their next victim.178 The Furqan had indirectly threatened himbefore when Mut.ahhari published the article ‘Matiryalism dar Iran’. Givingreasons for Mut.ahhari’s assassination, the Furqan accused him of being aleading member of the ruling clerical regime and the man who had labelledthe Furqan group ‘hypocritical materialists’.179 In his preface to Shariati’sMarxism and other Western Fallacies, Algar has mentioned that it is probablethat the Furqan was ultimately under the command of persons owing theirallegiance to the former regime, and possibly also to the American patrons ofthat discredited tyranny. He considered the interest of American officials inthe ‘anti-clerical’ work of Shariati, and also in the destabilizing activitiesof the Furqan, as remarkable.180 However, Mut.ahhari’s assassination onthe night of 1 May 1979 was followed by worldwide condemnation andcondolences. The following day he was buried in the Holy Shrine of Qum,and later on the day of his martyrdom – 2 May – was officially declared bythe government as ‘Teacher’s Day’.

It appears that what influenced the young left-wing Iranians to a consider-able degree was, in some part, a result of the rejection of the clericalorganization and their educational system. The Ruh. aniyat did not see anybenefit in an up-to-date educational system. Religious writings were oftenblended with superstitions, lacking logic and rationale. Religious lectureswere empty of political criticisms and emotions. Religious places had beenimpoverished during the previous decades and had therefore becomecompletely unattractive to the younger generation. Hence, it may be


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asked whether Mut.ahhari’s views on the revolutionary groups were tooharsh and extreme, and whether he put too much pressure upon thosemilitants who were not interested in the clergy’s opinions. The response ofsome well-known radical ‘ulama like Anvari was affirmative. They objectedto Mut.ahhari’s course of action and considered the theoretical challengesto the Muslim activists as a damaging influence on the anti-regimemovements, and ultimately not in accordance with the interests of theRevolution. Nevertheless, they reconsidered their views later, when theideology of those activists became clearer and also when terrorism appearedon the scene.181

However, Mut.ahhari was justifying his course of action which were laternamed the line of iltiqat.-zudai (purifying of eclecticism), emphasizing thenecessity for the separation of political directions in theory and in practicebetween Islam and Marxism during anti-regime revolutionary activities. Hewas certainly aware of all the shortcomings mentioned which existed inclerical organizations and criticized them in his lectures, articles and books;he was also constantly reminding the religious authorities of their responsi-bility vis-à-vis the younger generation. He went to Qum and gave manylectures to prepare the ground for change in the religious educational system;he had even publicly admitted the shortcomings of the religious establish-ment in his book: ‘It is we, the ‘ulama who are responsible; we haven’tpresented enough up-to-date books in various Islamic spheres. If we hadsupplied adequate pure refreshing water, they [young people] wouldn’t haveheaded towards the polluted water.’182

Nevertheless, he was not absolutely in favour of radical changes in theclerical establishment; or in favour of any exciting revolutionary youthmovement which would heat the furnace of the Islamic Revolution withleftist conceptions and literature:

Surprisingly, it has been claimed that we want to transform theIslamic culture into a revolutionary culture. Is Islamic culture’s beingrevolutionary and/or, in your view, becoming revolutionary, basedon taking its spiritual content and replacing it with a materialisticone? Are revolutions only confined to the stomach, and originatefrom privation and class system? Didn’t the Prophet of Islamestablish a revolution in head, spirit and heart? Does not this type ofunderstanding of a revolution, consciously or unconsciously, benefitmaterialism?183

Mut.ahhari was in favour of Islam-i fiqahati and on the subject of (thepriority of) struggle, he did not perceive any difference between the right’sconservative monarchical regime and the left’s desired consultative system.According to him, imperialism and communism are similar to the blades of a

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pair of scissors which are apparently opposite to each other, but in realitymove in unison to cut one root.184

A key figure in the Islamic Revolution

Suddenly, after the mysterious death of Hajj Aqa Mus. t.afa, the son ofAyatullah Khomeini, on 23 October 1977 in Najaf, the operations of theIslamic Revolution intensified. In order to guide the Revolution, the Jami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat-i Mubariz reorganized itself with the senior ‘ulama of Tehran,namely Ayatullah Dr Muhammad Mufattih, Ayatullah Muhammad RezaMahdavi-Kani (Prime Minister, 1981), Ayatullah Dr Sayyid MuhammadBeheshti and Ayatullah Murtaz

.a Mut.ahhari. It has been said that all the

political announcements of the Jami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat were issued underMut.ahhari’s guidance, and all demonstrations were organized under hissupervision.185

On 4 October 1978, Ayatullah Khomeini left Iraq for France andMut.ahhari was able to travel to Paris in order to visit him. It was during thisvisit that the foundation for the first political centralization of the futureregime, that is the Revolutionary Council (Shura-yi Inqilab), was planned,and Mut.ahhari, as its first member (the others were Beheshti, Bahunar,Musavi Ardibili, Mahdavi Kani, Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsanjani), wasappointed to nominate the members of the future cabinet, in consultationwith some of the above-mentioned ‘ulama. Hashemi Rafsanjani mentionedthat Mut.ahhari had a peremptory influence on the Revolutionary Council’spolicies before the victory of the Revolution. Since he was the only oneinformed of Ayatullah Khomeini’s intentions and programmes, he had thefinal word in the collective decisions of the Revolutionary Council.186 Inprotest at the ban on Ayatullah Khomeini’s revival to Tehran by PrimeMinister Shahpour Bakhtiyar, the Jami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat, at Mut.ahhari’ssuggestion, took sanctuary in the mosque of Tehran University on 27January 1979. The official welcoming text which was read at Mihrabadairport at the time of Khomeini’s arrival in Tehran (1 February 1979), waswritten by Mut.ahhari.187 Although, after the victory of the Islamic Revo-lution on 11 February 1979, he had not taken any post in the temporarygovernment under Bazargan, nevertheless, owing to Khomeini’s totalconfidence in him, he was still counted as an influential member of theCouncil. Many officials were appointed as a result of his proposals. Thenumerous political activities during those days exhausted him and hepersonally would have preferred to return to academic work. Hence he didnot attend the Revolutionary Council regularly.188 During these months hegained, in his interviews and lectures, an opportunity to draw a generalpicture of the future Islamic society. Three of Mut.ahhari’s books, namelyBarrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami dar S. ad Salih-i Akhir, Piramun-iInqilab-i Islami (‘About the Islamic Revolution’) and Piramun-i Jumhuri-yi


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Islami (‘About the Islamic Republic’), contained his ideas on the subject ofthe nature, aim and future of the Islamic Revolution, political liberty, therights of the minorities, the authority of religious leaders and the position ofwomen in the Islamic Republic, all of which were collected from thoseinterviews and lectures. Finally, his television interviews, prepared by Abdul-Karim Surush, represented the later stages in his political thinking.

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Writings on economics

Some years before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, theoretical research onIslamic economics and the principles distinguishing it from capitalism andsocialism had been commenced by a number of well-known scholars. Forinstance, Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmood T. aliqani wrote Malikiyat dar Islam,Imam Musa S.adr published Iqtis. ad dar maktab-i Islam, Ayatullah SayyidMuhammad Baqir S.adr compiled Iqtis. aduna, while Ayatullah SayyidMuhammad Beheshti established a clerical discussion group for analysingKarl Marx’s Das Kapital. In response to the question of why Mut.ahharistarted work on economic studies, Ayatullah Musavi Ardibili maintainedthat it was rather to be expected of him, as a distinguished Islamologist, totake this initiative and put to discussion a subject of such widespread interestas economics.1 Perhaps the visible lack of interest in the field of economicstudies by the majority of the fuqaha and ‘ulama drove Mut.ahhari to do so.Or it might be more probably considered to be a part of his anti-Marxistacademic activities. Katouzian, however, argued that because Marxismappeared to be the main alternative, Shi‘i writers developed a dual attitudetoward it: on the one hand, they tended to argue their own case throughrefutations of Marxism, while, on the other, they tried to interpret Islamiclaws and traditions as being no less revolutionary, just and so on, thanMarxist ideals. In fact, even the attacks on capitalist economics seem to bepart of the attempt to prove to the Marxists that Shi‘ism is not a capitalistsystem.2

From 1973 onwards, Mut.ahhari began to research, lecture and writeabout issues relating to the Islamic economic system. First, he put the issue ofinsurance (bimih) under discussion at the Association of Islamic Physicians,and explained its justification based on the Islamic jurisprudential method.

Insurance, as a well-established phenomenon of modern civilization,originated in the Western economic system and had no formal example inIslamic history; therefore, it could well have caused a problem in regard tothe legality of the people’s economic activities. This was a new case for thefuqaha and a convenient subject for Mut.ahhari’s economic analysis. Its

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lawfulness was conditioned in conformity with Islamic jurisprudentialregulations. According to Shi‘ite jurisprudence, each of the two parts of anytransaction is to be totally clear.3 In insurance, the premium the insured mustpay weekly, monthly or yearly is definite, whilst the dividend the insurer willpay, in the event of an accident or damages, is indefinite. Mut.ahhari, in replyto this, and to the question of ‘What lawful interest may this transactionhave?’, argued:

That which makes bimih such a lawful and reasonable act is only theinsurer’s guarantee. In insurance, the insurer undertakes that he/shewill compensate or pay such and such an amount of money in theevent of an accident or any damages. Such a guarantee from theinsurer is useful for the insured, because if such a guarantee did notexist, the insured would continuously be in a state of uncertainty . . .Thus, the insurer provides the insured with security [t’amin] andpeace of mind. The importance of the insurer’s cover lies not in theamount of money which he/she may have to pay in future. There-fore, one cannot say that the transaction is void, since the amount ofmoney (which the insurer will pay in the future) is unknown.4

Also, in response to the question of whether insurance has any equivalentin Islamic law, he replied: ‘The nearest jurisprudential case to the issue ofinsurance is the issue of guarantee [z.iman and Kitab-i z.imanat] for z.imanat isan undertaking.’5

It is clear that this jurisprudential analysis distinguished the issue of bimihfrom any false and forbidden agreements such as usury (riba) and gambling(qimar), provided a lawful foundation for it in Islamic law, removed thetheoretical problems obstructing the Muslim practitioners’ path in financialactivities, and finally signalled to revolutionary activists that they were ableto form their Islamic society with a modern style of life (albeit with thoseelements of modernity viewed as beneficial) and not as a completely freesociety.

Again, the Association of Islamic Physicians arranged some importantconferences in 1975 on the subject of ‘Riba in Islam’ and invited Mut.ahhari,Beheshti and Bazargan to speak. Mut.ahhari’s lectures at these conferences,together with his lessons on this issue at the Marvi School, were published,after his assassination, under the heading Mas’alih-yi Riba. This issue will bediscussed later in the chapter.

However, from 1976 onwards, a more organized and advanced form ofthe economic studies mentioned was carried out weekly in Mut.ahhari’shome, with the participation of a group of his students including HusainNamazi (Professor of Economics at the University of Shahid Beheshti and theMinister of Finance 1981–5).6 At these weekly sessions Mut.ahhari taughtfrom a translated and summarized book on Marxist economic views entitled

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Us. ul-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis. ad. Abdul-Husain Nushin, the translator, was an actor anda member of the Tudih Party who escaped to Russia after the collapse ofMusaddiq’s cabinet and later settled in the German Democratic Republic.The Us. ul-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis. ad consisted of five parts: value, additional value,wage, theory of profit and the cost of production, commercial capital andcommercial profit. The title of the original book and its writer is notmentioned. Although Nushin refers to a second volume of the book, thisvolume was apparently unpublished. It is not clear, however, why Mut.ahharipreferred teaching from this secondary source of Marxist economic literatureto working from an authentic one, such as Marx’s Das Kapital, translatedinto Persian by Ih. san T. abari. Perhaps it was due to the book’s simplicity andfluent style of writing. Because of the Revolution, these economics lessonsremained unfinished, but a collection of Mut.ahhari’s notes has remained.These notes, first entitled Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Mabani-yi Iqtis. ad-i Islami,were published in November 1982 by Husain Ghaffari, a member of thediscussion group. Major discussions started across the country, especiallyamong the clerical establishment, immediately after the distribution of thebook. One group believed that this book should not be attributed toMut.ahhari because it consisted of his uncompleted writings in long-hand,whilst another insisted that it certainly contained Mut.ahhari’s views, for itaccorded with his social philosophy and sociological perspectives. A fewmonths after publication, two well-known Ayatullahs, Mahdavi Kani andAdhari Qumi, visited Ayatullah Khomeini to request that the circulation ofthe book should be limited to the academic centres, so that it would not beaccessible to the public. They argued that before publishing his writings,Mut.ahhari used to take advice from some of his close friends by sending thema copy in long-hand. This, clearly did not happen in the case of this book.Khomeini accepted their request, and therefore the book was no longer soldto the public. In this respect an interesting incident happened a few yearslater. Celebrating Labour Day in May, the newspaper Ittilaat published apart of the book relating to labour. However, the page on which it appearedhad been excluded from the copies of Ittilaat which were distributed in theJamaran area, where Ayatullah Khomeini was then living. While reading thenewspaper, Khomeini realized that a page was missing. Searching for themissing page he quickly found out the story. Therefore, the newspaper wasplaced under interdiction, but the ban was lifted a day later.

The similarity between Khomeini’s views and those of Mut.ahhari aboutstate ownership and governmental authority in economic fields became quiteevident when the former issued a series of statements (from November 1987onwards) in response to the letters of the Council of Guardians (Shura-yiNigahban) and the Minister of Labour.7 The Majlis speaker HashemiRafsanjani, declared that Mut.ahhari’s economic views would be publishedvery soon. Finally, the notes were rearranged with a few alterations andpublished in spring 1989, under the heading Naz.ari bi Niz.am-i Iqts. adi-yi


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Islam. The book consisted of an introduction and eight parts, concerning: thedefinition of economics and economic terms; ownership from the philo-sophical point of view; value; additional value; capitalism and socialism fromthe Islamic point of view; economic articles (land ownership from the Islamicpoint of view, the issue of inheritance, socialism from the viewpoint ofphilosophy of history); notes on Islam and economics; and theoretical noteson the Islamic economic system.

Besides the Us. ul-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis. ad, Mut.ahhari also refers in his notes to someIslamic sources (Quranic verses, quotations from Traditions and classicaljurisprudential books) and writings on liberal and Marxian economics: Islamva Malikiyat written by Sayyid Mahmood T. aliqani; Al-Madhhab al-Iqtis. adibain al-Shuyu‘iyih va al-Islam by Sa‘id Ramaz

.an; The History of Economic

Thought, written by Louis Baudin and translated by Hushang Nahavandi;The Thoughts of the Greatest Economic Scholars, written by George HenrySaville and translated by Husain Pirniya; Capitalism and Socialism writtenby Felician Jalet and translated by Ghulam Husain Zirak-zadih; Socialism,written by George Bourgeon and Pierre Rimbert and translated by Mans. urMus. lih. i; Anti-Dühring written by Friedrich Engels and translated by Ih. sanT. abari; and An Introduction to Philosophy, written by Oswald Kolpe andtranslated by Ahmad Aram.

What does ‘Islamic economics’ mean?

As an aspect of a more fundamental difference between Sunni and Shi‘iapproaches to economic issues, Sunni writers tend to assume thatcontemporary Muslim societies and the past civilization from which theyevolved are – even with important qualifications – Islamic, whereas generallyShi‘i views assume that – apart from the short periods of Muhammad’s andAli’s rule – the true Islamic state and political economy have no precedent inhistory. Many of the strengths and weaknesses of the specifically Shi‘iteeconomic literature arise from this basic point of departure.8

The Shi‘i jurists have recently made great efforts to present a clear pictureabout the term ‘Islamic economics’. To prevent any confusion and mis-understanding about the term, they immediately recognized two types ofeconomic thought. The first was economics as an empirical science (‘ilm-iiqtis. ad, or iqtis. ad-i ‘ilmi, or iqtis. ad-i tah. lili) which particularly concernsitself with those causal relations which modern economics treats as objectiveand scientific laws and tendencies. It explains economic life and the linksbetween economic facts and the causes and factors which determine them. Inthis sense, there is no meaning to the term Islamic economics, just as there isno meaning to Islamic physics for instance. Second, economics was seen as atheo-philosophical science (maslak-i iqtis. adi, or madhhab-i iqtis. adi, ormaktab-i iqtis. adi, or niz.am-i iqtis. adi, or iqtis. ad-i tashri‘i, or iqtis. ad-ibarnamihi) which is essentially prescriptive.9 It demonstrates the way to

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follow in the economy, and does not explain the way economic events occur.In this sense, Islam’s teachings affect economics in two ways: directly andindirectly. Islam directly affects economics owing to its having a series ofeconomic regulations concerning ownership, exchanges, taxes, prohibitions,inheritance, donations, charities, bequests, fines for financial wrong-doing,and so on. Thus a major part of Islamic jurisprudence consists of kitab al-bai‘a, kitab al-ijarih, kitab al-vikalih, kitab al-rahn, kitab al-irth, kitab al-hibih, and kitab al-vaqf. The indirect effect of Islam on economics is to beseen in its moral ordinances. Islam recommends people to be trustworthy,just, pure, benevolent and generous. It also tries to prevent them frompractising bribery and robbery or even committing treacherous acts. All thesemoral concepts are undoubtedly linked (more or less) to the exchange ofwealth.10 The Islamic jurists explicitly and repeatedly state that whereverthey apply the term ‘Islamic economics’ in their discussions or writings, theymean this second type of economics. For instance, Muhammad Baqir S. adr, aleading Shi‘i jurist, stated that ‘Islamic economics is not a science of politicaleconomy. Rather, it is a revolution (that is, a revolutionary ideology) forchanging the corrupt reality, and turning it into a pure one. It is clearly not anobjective analysis of existing reality.’11 Hence it can be said that Islamiceconomics deals with social and economic problems on the basis of Islamicvalues/principles and with analytical techniques derived from Islamic textsand traditions. In other words, it is constituted from economic doctrinesoriginating from or referring to, those Islamic ordinances, injunctions andprohibitions relating to the people’s social and economic life. Therefore,Islamic economics is not really economics as a branch of the modern intel-lectual sciences; rather it is an ideology, like Marxism and capitalism, yetbased on Islamic texts. In fact, it is a theo-philosophical or philosophical-jurisprudential science that deals with general principles of economic activityin Muslim societies.

Subject, method and goal

While modern economic theory tries to explain the economic behaviour ofsecularized man, who seeks to secure his livelihood and maximize hishappiness and pleasure, Islamic economic doctrine is established to guideboth mu’minin (believers) and the Islamic ruler towards its worldly anddivine aims. It has been argued that

Islamic economic theory is different from neo-classical or Marxianeconomic theory because the Islamic man’s nature is believed tobe part man-made and part divinely determined. This volatilecombination of real and ideal, human and divine, secular and sacred,worldly and other-worldly, presents a problem in terms of predict-able behaviour.12


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But Islamic jurists consider the problem to be, rather, a shortcoming in thepresent scientific method than in Islamic man’s mixed characteristics.

A believer (a mu’min), according to the Quranic verses, is a person whobelieves in Allah and the Last Day and works righteously (‘amal-i s. alih)(Maidih: 69); who believes in what has been revealed to the Prophet andwhat was revealed before him, and who establishes regular prayer (s. alat) andpractises regular charity (zakat) (Nisa: 162); who, when Allah is mentioned,feel a tremor in his heart and when he hears His signs rehearsed, finds hisfaith strengthened, and puts all his trust in his lord (tavakkul); spends (freely)out of the gifts He has given him for sustenance (infaq) (Anfal: 2–3); humbleshimself in his prayers; avoids vain talk; is active in deeds of charity; abstainsfrom sex, except with those joined to him in the marriage bond (Mu’minun:2–6); has never since doubted, but has striven with his belonging and hisperson in the cause of Allah (jihad) (H. ujurat: 15).

The mu’min, according to a Tradition relating to Ali ibn Abi-T. alib, divideshis time into three periods: the period when he is in communion with his lord;the period when he manages for his livelihood; and the period when he is freeto enjoy what is lawful and pleasant. It does not behove a wise person to beaway (from his house) save for three matters: namely for purposes of earning,or for something connected with the next life or for enjoying what is notprohibited (Nahj al-balaghih, H. ikmat: 390).

Islamic economists believe that, to produce Islamic economic theory,economic hypotheses have to be based on assumptions derived from theShari‘at. The validity of a theory is not simply obtained by measuring itagainst empirical evidence; first, it has to be put to the ultimate test ofcompliance with Islamic axioms and criteria found in the Shari‘at. Anytheory put forward by a human being is tested against these Islamic criteriaand if there is a clear and undeniable contradiction the theory is rejectedimmediately without further examination.13 This complicated methodo-logical process of testing hypotheses, which is called Ijtihad or ravish-iIjtihadi is based on having a comprehensive knowledge of the Islamicsources, namely Kitab (Quran), Sunnat (Prophet’s or Imams’ sayings, deedsand acknowledgements), ijma‘a (consensus of the fuqaha), ‘aql (reason), andsirih (the conduct of wise people or the conduct of Muslims).14

According to Dar-amadi bar Iqtis. ad-i Islami, a recent book on economics,published in the Qum Seminary,

The Islamic economic system has legislated not only for providingpeople’s material requirements namely food, clothing, housing,hygiene, defensive instruments and so on, but it also covers people’scultural and psychological needs. It provides for people’s welfareand comfort in regard to production, distribution, and consumptionof goods and services. Although this goal seems very general,because there is no specific limitation for taking benefit from or

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having comfort by material blessings, the Islamic moral systemplays a sensitive, dominant role in directing such unlimited desirestowards their ultimate moral perfection. In this sense, the goal ofthe Islamic economic system will be changed by the Islamic moralsystem. It means that welfare and comfort would be recommendableonly to such an extent as to provide [what this book called]eternal happiness and open a path towards man’s ultimate per-fection.15

It is clear that Mut.ahhari presented another position concerning this issue.He maintained that the possibility for the growth of wealth is one of theprimary principles of a healthy economy, and a healthy economy is a primarycondition of a healthy society. A healthy economy is a self-subsistenteconomy, not dependent on another. From the Islamic point of view, Islamicideals cannot be attained without a healthy economy. To present a clearerpicture of what he meant by a ‘healthy economy’, Mut.ahhari went on toexplain three points: first, Islam wants to see that the non-Muslim has noinfluence and no dominance over Muslims. This goal is attained when aMuslim nation is self-sufficient in its economy and does not beg from a non-Muslim nation, because being in need, is in fact equal to captivity andslavery. He then refers to a Saying narrated from Ali ibn Abi-T. alib: ‘If youask a man for something you will be his prisoner; if you rely on yourself youwill be equal to him; if you do a man a favour, you will be his master.’Second, Islam is in favour of a middle and moderate (economic) way andopposed to the two poles of extremism (ifrat. va tafrit.). One pole basicallyfails to understand the value of having a healthy economy and is in favour ofpoverty, dreaming that poverty is not a fault in a society, just as it is not afault in a person. The other, understanding the value of the economy,considers human interests and the people’s demands (whatever they mightbe) as a driving force for gain. The pro-capitalist economists believe thateverything must be offered if the demand for it exists, even if it is a danger orweakening to society. But an ill society demands toys and luxury items,like a sick person with an appetite for something which is harmful forhim. It is for this reason that in Islam there are prohibited transactions(makasib-i muh. arramih). Third, as wealth must not be earned illegitimately,the economic system must not be of such a form as to prevent growthand progress (in economic activities). Hence, the Marxist doctrine of thefinancial stage in human development, the classless society ‘from eachaccording to his ability, to each according to his need’ is not acceptable,because it prevents people’s enthusiasm for economic activity. People enjoywork when they know that the results of their work return to themselves notto others.16


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How is the Islamic economic system to be understood?

In order to understand the Islamic economic system, Shi‘ite jurists agree thatthe way to proceed is to start from fiqh, and from the operation of fiqhdevelop the mechanisms of the economic structure. To achieve this objective,some jurists started to present a clear definition of the term ‘ownership’(malikiyat) by analysing the Quranic verses and the Traditions relating to theterm. Others began to interpret verses and Traditions concerning the term‘wealth’ (tharvat) and ‘property’ (mal).17 According to Mut.ahhari, ‘When wewant to see what kind of economic system the Islamic economy is, we have tosee first what kind of perspective is expressed by Islam about wealth andproperty [mal]’. One might imagine that wealth is fundamentally to berejected, refused, and regarded as unclean in Islam. So a matter which ischaracterized as dirty, rejected and prohibited is not in a position to haveregulations and laws. In other words, any school of thought which considersa particular thing as prohibited, cannot have a regulation about that matter.The only regulation might be not to produce it, not to touch it, not toexchange it, not to use it. An example of such a regulation existed (amongIslamic Traditions) about wine: ‘Allah has cursed whoever sells it, buys it,uses its price, serves it, or drinks it.’ But the reply to this supposition is that itis a big mistake. Property and wealth have never been considered as base inIslam, neither their production, nor their exchange of goods, nor theirconsumption; rather all of these are recommended and emphasized, andconditions and regulations are provided for them. From the Islamic point ofview, wealth is never considered as something to be thrown away; rather it isabsolutely forbidden to throw it off because that is squandering (israf),dissipation (tabdhir), and wasting of property (taz. i ‘a-i mal). Mut.ahhari thenformulated his analysis as follows: Islam condemned money-worshipping,but never condemned wealth itself, because the production of wealth byagriculture, animal husbandry and craftsmanship are recommended in Islam;the exchange of wealth, namely commerce and transaction, is recommended;using wealth and property for personal needs without engaging in luxury andsquandering is recommended; squandering, dissipation and wasting ofproperty are prohibited. Intense penal and judicial regulations concerningwaste, stealing and treachery have been enforced; defending personalproperty is considered by Islamic Traditions similar to waging holy war(jihad), and someone killed protecting property is considered a martyr(Shahid); some rights in Islam have legislated against man, but in favour ofproperty; and wealth itself is explicitly termed good (khair) in the Quran(Baqarih: 180).18

On this subject S.adr, however, has chosen a more complicated method-ology. He initiated his analysis with the notion that

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One of the fundamental differences between Islamic economicdoctrine and those of capitalism and Marxism is that the Islamiceconomic system must be discovered through jurisprudential andTraditional sources, whereas those of capitalism or Marxism areformulated and constructed by Western economists. Hence, the taskof an Islamic researcher is to recognize the Islamic economic systemin its true colours, to define its general structure, to discover itstheoretical principles, to express its main distinguishing features andto purge it of every phenomenon gradually added through time.19

In doing so, S.adr then explained, the scholar must begin his study first at thesuperstructure level. This research includes: studying the Islamic legal system(that is, civil law); studying Islamic financial ordinances; studying thedominion of the Islamic ruler; and studying Islamic economic terms andconcepts such as malikiyat and tijarat. The researcher must then deepen hisstudy at the infrastructure level. At this stage, the researcher chooses andcollects, from amongst all he has studied before, those key concepts,regulations and ordinances which could harmoniously represent the wholebody of the economic system. Showing the result of his analysis, S.adrexplained that the concepts of h. alal and h. aram in Islam are present in allwalks of life. They cover different types of human behaviour in variouscircumstances: the relations between ruler and ruled; seller and buyer; tenantand proprietor; worker and jobless. For every one of these relations is eitherh. alal or h. aram, and at the next stage is either justice or oppression. There-fore, through the idea of prohibited and permissible actions, it is possible todiscover the details of the doctrine of the Islamic economic system.20

Islamic economics is a part of the Islamic social system

As S.adr pointed out, it would be incorrect to analyse the Islamic economy asan independent entity, separate and distinct from the other principalcomponents of the Islamic system, such as the social and political domains,21

because Islam presents itself as a well-integrated, comprehensive anduniversal whole which possesses the means of solving man’s basic problems.As an all-embracing ideology, it does not seek to influence single aspects oflife but life in its totality. It does not intervene in people’s lives, since it is itselfthe clay of which the people in the system are moulded. Since the objectives ofthe Islamic system are incompatible with those of economic man, thepractical success of Islamic economic theories hinges on the emergence anduniversalization of Islamic man’s outlook. Islamic economics is, therefore,based on the internalization and total incorporation of the Islamic value-system by all members of the Islamic community (ummat). This requires thedevelopment and prevalence of an Islamic individual and social psychology.This in turn is dependent upon a conducive social environment, the creation


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of which necessitates an Islamic state capable of promoting and upholdingthe Islamic value-system. The Islamization of society, and consequently theeconomic system, therefore hinges on the establishment of an Islamic statecapable of enforcing the Shari‘at. The Islamic state established by believers ischarged with the transformation of all Muslim members of society intobelievers with an Islamic economic outlook. Ultimately, the prevalence ofsuch an outlook leads to the creation of an Islamic economic system. Thebehaviour of the mu’min, or the Muslim as laid down in the Shari‘at,constitutes the basis of any theory of Islamic economic behaviour.22

According to S.adr, the interrelation between Islamic economics and otherIslamic systems is illustrated in eight areas: first, the interrelation betweenIslamic economics and the Islamic belief system, which forms Islamiceconomics as an ideological and value-based system and provides a spiritualprotection for it. Second, the interrelation between Islamic economics andthose philosophical terms such as private ownership and utility. These termsmust be understood as Islamic concepts by using the particular style ofinterpretation which is applied by Islam. Third, the interrelation betweenIslamic economics and those moral feelings and sensations such as commonbrotherhood which Islam creates in society. Fourth, the interrelationbetween Islamic economics and the financial policies of an (Islamic)government, which must be considered as a part of the Islamic economicsystem. Fifth, the interrelation between Islamic economics and the Islamicpolitical system. This means that studying the (Islamic) economic systemseparately from the (Islamic) political one inevitably leads to misunder-standing, because the ruling body has a wide-ranging economic authorityand owns considerable economic resources, and can therefore bring abouteconomic changes on the basis of Ijtihad. Sixth, the interrelation between theprohibition of usury and other (Islamic) ordinances relating to the issues ofpartnership (muz.aribih), public co-operation, and social balance. If theprohibition of usury were to be considered separately, it would cause manyproblems in the economic system. Seventh, the interrelation between someordinances about private ownership and the ordinances relating to holy war(jihad), since, for instance, the Islamic ruler is permitted to take the propertyof prisoners of war as spoils of war and distribute it between the fighters astheir private property. Eighth, the interrelation between Islamic economicsand Islamic criminal law. This means that Islamic law can only be applied inthe economic sphere where Islamic economics is applied in the framework ofan Islamic society.23

Is there a single Islamic economic system?

Despite the general consensus that Islamic economics has to be based onIslamic jurisprudential sources, there is a controversial debate amongMuslim jurists about which type of Ijtihad is capable of resolving all present

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economic problems. Opinions on this issue can be broadly divided into twocategories.

First are the traditional jurists, who argue that Islamic economics, like anyother aspect of life in an Islamic society, has to be deduced from divine lawswith the minimum of human discretion. Since Islamic law has been laid downfor all times and places, it is not in need of adaptation and updating and is,therefore, capable of addressing all present and future economic problems.

Second are the rationalist jurists, who argue that the primary Islamicsources concerning transactions (mu‘amilat) do not contain sufficientinformation for the construction of an integrated economic system capableof resolving all present-day economic problems. Subsequently, a consider-able part of Islamic economics has to be based on human reasoning. In anattempt to salvage the essential particularity of Islamic economics, namely itsdivine base, they immediately acknowledge the fact that human discretionhas to be based on (or must not be contradictory to) the principles laid downin the Quran or the Traditions.24

As an adherent of this second opinion, Mut.ahhari maintained that it is nottrue that all Islamic ordinances are fixed and unchangeable. Islam, as acomprehensive system, has two types of ordinances: primary principles(ah. kam-i avvaliyih) which are permanent and unchangeable; and secondaryprinciples (ah. kam-i thanaviyih) which are non-permanent and changeable.Reason (‘aql) as a permanent source of Islamic jurisprudence is, in fact, themain source for deducing non-permanent ordinances. Giving an example,Mut.ahhari first raised a question, which was

Modern medicine is largely based on anatomy, including autopsy,whereas autopsy of a dead Muslim is prohibited by some primarysources. According to Islamic jurisprudence, a Muslim’s dead bodymust be washed and prayed over and buried as soon as possible.Now how can medicine be improved in Islamic countries with thiskind of ruling?

In response to this question, he then maintained that although the dead bodyof a Muslim is accounted respectable and its immediate burial is consideredobligatory for each person (vajib-i kifai) by Islam, the improvement ofmedicine in Islamic society, and everything which the progress of medicine isdependent on, is also considered obligatory by Islam. Therefore, there aretwo obligatory ordinances: one of them important – which is the respect tothe body of a Muslim, and the other more important – which is the progressof the science of medicine which serves Islamic societies. There is no doubtthat in these circumstances the dissection of a dead Muslim’s body would bepermissible.25

According to Mut.ahhari’s analysis, the existing economic problemscan only be resolved by a rationalist Mujtahid who by his reasoning has


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the ability to deduce new ordinances from Islamic primary and secondarysources.

However, it has been said that the difficulty of presenting a generic Islamiceconomic system lies in the different conceptions of what an Islamic econo-mic system should be. Varying interpretations of the different characteristicsthat constitute an economic system have found their reflection in differentIslamic subsystems. Even though all subsystems accept and utilize thecommon features of the Islamic value-system, each has searched for andprovided references and proofs for its particular view of what constitutesIslam’s socio-economic position.26 Generally, four causes can be identified toexplain the absence of a distinct, integrated and coherent theoreticalconstruction of an Islamic economic system. First, the subjectivity ofdifferent Islamic jurists, in their study and analysis of the primary sources,leads to different interpretations of the same texts. Second, the existence, inthe primary sources, of disparate and even contradictory positions andinjunctions, on a single economics-related issue, such as the permissibleextent of accumulating wealth, enables different subsystems to use differenttexts within the primary sources as proof of their particular position. Third isthe lack of Traditions, in the primary sources, relating to modern economicrelations and institutions. Fourth, the prevalence of different secondarysources (ah. kam-i thanaviyih) allows for the pronouncement of unprece-dented religious edicts by Islamic jurists, which in turn affect and influencethe economic system.

Principles

The general characteristics of the Islamic economic system can be formulatedin the following principles: diverse ownership, limited economic freedom,prohibition of usury and social justice.

Diverse ownership

According to Mut.ahhari, Islam (in contrast to capitalism which believes inprivate property as its basic (unique) principle, and also in contrast to social-ism which considers communal (ishtiraki) ownership as its fundamentalprinciple), acknowledges simultaneously three forms of ownership. Theseare: individual (fardi, which refers to ownership by the individual in relationto factors outside the means of production) (it seems Mut.ahhari deliberatelyprefers this word to private property (khusus. i, which alludes to private sectorownership in relation to means of production)), public (‘umumi), and govern-mental (h. ukumati).27 Natural resources like wastelands, pasture lands,forests, rivers, lakes, mines, and fuels are counted as anfal or governmentalproperties. Public property includes mosques, shrines, schools, religiousseminaries, roads, bridges, gardens and places devoted to the use of the public.

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Mut.ahhari’s position here is much closer to that of state capitalism thanone based primarily upon private ownership. There is no limit, on the onehand, to the amount of legitimate individual property. Although there is aSaying from Ali ibn Abi-T. alib that ‘Ten thousand dirhams cannot be gainedin a legitimate way’, this certainly belongs only to that particular period.According to Mut.ahhari, it means that legitimate income cannot be earnedfrom every kind of financial transaction. However, if it is gained in a lawfulway, it must not be collected by the government. He then continued that it iswrong to put a ceiling on people’s property.28 On the other hand, the rightsfor using individual property are not unlimited. An individual cannot use hisproperty in prodigality and in a dissipating way – for example, an instructionin a will that one’s bequeathed property should be spent on a dog. This isconsidered as a nonsensical act, and is not recognized as an owner’s right byIslam.29

However, Mut.ahhari’s most important contribution to this debate isundoubtedly related to his analysis of the nationalization of machines ormeans of production. Hence, it is appropriate to see what kind of analysis hepresented and the responses it drew from other Islamic jurists.

Maxime Rodinson believed that,

the partial orientation of Muslim societies towards socialism hasnothing to do with the precepts of Islam . . . And the allegedfundamental opposition of Islam to capitalism is a myth, whetherthis view be put forward with good intentions or bad. On thetheoretical plane, the Muslim religion presents no objection to thecapitalist mode of production.30

In contrast, Mut.ahhari maintained that modern capitalism is a newphenomenon which has no example in the past, and therefore must beseparately analysed as a new jurisprudential issue (Mas’alih-yi mustah. dathih)by the fuqaha. Although Islamic jurists have recently discussed some newissues relating to banks, insurance, cheques and bank drafts, they have failedto realize that capitalism itself is the most important of those modern issues.This is because it has been mistakenly imagined by the Islamic traditionaljurists that capitalism is a pre-modern issue of economic relations aboutwhich Islam has already legislated. They think that trade, rent, landedproperty, companies, investment partnership (muz.aribih), contracts foragricultural purposes (muz.ari‘ih and musaqat) are all capitalist relationswhich are regulated and legalized by Islam, regardless of how much theamount of capital might be. Mut.ahhari argues that this idea is incorrect,because modern capitalism, like modern trade, is a totally new phenomenonand has no example in the past. Therefore, it must be independently con-sidered by a separate Ijtihad.31

The general characteristics of capitalism (and capitalist society) are


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described, although in a rather unsystematic fashion, by Mut.ahhari asfollows: individual property; inherited property; individual differences inwealth and ownership; the gaining of wealth by the possession of means ofproduction or making profit by possessing capital; earning wealth by theemployment of labour or by the system of employee and employer; owningthrough usury; the legalization of establishing cartels and trusts and there-fore the legalization of the exploitation of producer and consumer; controlover all economic activities in the capitalist society by a small number ofpeople; the legality of ownership of means of production, whether it bemovable or immovable property; the legality of usury; the purpose of pro-duction being for individuals’ profits rather than the public’s best interests;and no relation between wealth and work. In other words, earning of profitwithout being involved in work; the amount of a worker’s wage beingpractically determined by the employer; one group’s fortune being due toanother’s misfortune; slavery and servitude being practically the result ofcapitalism; the dominance of wealthy men in politics and national sover-eignty; raising conflict for profit; competition for making more money.32

These characteristics (institutions and mentality) are better formulated byRodinson in the following principles: private ownership of the means ofproduction, free enterprise, striving for profit as the chief motive force ineconomic activity, production for the market, money economy, themechanism of competition, rationality in the conduct of an enterprise.33

According to Mut.ahhari, the main characteristic of modern capitalism isnot ‘additional value’, as socialists claim. Instead, it is machinery whichmakes modern capitalism a unique phenomenon in human history. Althoughthis term (machinery) is thought to be at the centre of Mut.ahhari’s economicthinking and caused major discussions among the ‘ulama, it is not clearlyexplained in his notes and writings. However, it is clear that Mut.ahharimeant industrial capitalism. In order to get a better understanding of thisterm, it is appropriate to consider Mut.ahhari’s philosophical analysis.

Machinery, the main characteristic of modern capitalism

In his analysis of the difference between past and present economic systems,Mut.ahhari argued that

In the past, a rich man was merely buying the ability of a worker,giving him a simple tool and then selling his output, whereas at thepresent time, the owner of capital buys a machine which has theability to produce a hundred times more than a worker, and thusman has been replaced by machinery. Machinery is a metallic manand has the power to produce additional value, and the value ofhundreds of times as much as the work which was used in its produc-tion. Machinery is a legitimate slave of human society . . . It is the

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main characteristic of modern capitalism that the owner of capitalcan bring machinery with its great power under his control, whereashe is not the creator of the machine, nor its inventor, but only thebuyer and the owner.34

The socialist view is that:

the main characteristic of modern capitalism is that the owner of thecapital buys the ability of labour only for sale, not because he ispersonally in need of it. He owns the profit which belongs to labour.It is labour that creates additional value (the difference between thereal cost of production and the market price). Therefore, the moderncapitalist system is in fact exploitation of labour.

In response Mut.ahhari argued that this cannot be considered the maincharacteristic of modern capitalism. Large carpetmaking factories, textilefactories, dressmaking and shoemaking factories, factories for making thetools for carving, and for the goldsmith’s or the silversmith’s trade all existedin the past. These factories were all employing workers, giving them adefinite amount of wages, and carrying out transactions and trade with theproducts of their workers. Although this phenomenon was largely expandedin the modern age (the age of machinery), the quantitative expansion anddevelopment cannot singly change the nature of a matter as long as it doesnot cause the qualitative transformation:35

In our view, the main characteristic of capitalism, which makes it anew subject for fiqh and Ijtihad, is the mediation of machinery[between its owner and labour]. Machinery is not simply theexpansion of means and tools of production which improve man’swork; rather, it has taken man’s place. Machinery is the manifesta-tion of man’s thought, will and power. It is the manifestation ofman’s social evolution, the embodiment of man’s historicalcivilization, and the outcome of thousands of years of great humanintellectual endeavours. Machinery is the successor of the humanbeing, not his tool or means. It is an artificial human . . . It does everything which man was doing by his direct consciousness.36

It seems that Mut.ahhari’s words about the phenomenon of invention arerather contradictory. On the one hand, he maintained that nobody can besingly considered as the inventor or innovator of machinery, because it is themanifestation of the evolution of society (not of the individual). Theproducts of machinery cannot be considered to be the indirect output ofthe capital owner; rather it is the indirect output of the intelligence and the


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genius of the inventor. Products of intelligence and genius cannot have apersonal owner. A machine is in fact a human with metallic hands, run byelectricity and steam power. It is in reality the talent of the inventor whoworks with tools. It is the manifestation of the inventor’s talent and thoughtor, in other words, it is the manifestation of the mind and the evolution ofsociety. It represents man’s replacement in work, not simply an instrumentfor production. The invention of machinery is, in fact, creating a source forthe creation of labour, not only the creation of labour which is saleable. Inthis respect, it is different from handmade instruments, art products, booksand poetical works. Therefore it belongs to the public, not to an individual,not even to its inventor, because the inventor himself is a product of theprogress of society. It cannot come under private ownership and cannot beowned by the capitalist. Hence, if an owner of capital who possesses amachine does not exploit either producer or consumer, he is still able to gainenormous profits, because he has brought under his control a social outputwhich is creative and productive. This is why the origin of modern capitalismis illegitimate. In the modern capitalist system, the owner of capital can buyand bring under his control a product which is not buyable and sellable. Itbelongs to society and must come under public control.37

Yet, on the other hand, while attacking the socialist theory of ‘value =labour’, he expressed the view that

people’s different abilities, talents and innovations are notconsidered in this theory. Are the values of writings, paintings,calligraphies, inlaid works, the making of glazed tiles dependent onthe amount of the work spent on them? Had H. afiz. and S‘adi, forinstance, wished to profit from their compilation fees and gainenormous wealth, would it have been due to the amount of theirlabour [compiling their books] or would it have been due to theirinnovation and inspiration?38

It can be deduced from the explanations above that ‘machinery’, inMut.ahhari’s analysis, does not simply mean every invention which couldimprove the ability of personal production. Instead, it is every means ofproduction which could produce outputs or provide services at the publiclevel and could be attributed to society. This kind of invention can, in fact, betermed the manifestation of society or the manifestation of man’s evolutionin history. Owing to its nature, this kind of machine cannot, according toMut.ahhari, come under the control of the private sector; therefore it must bein public or state ownership. In more detail, the invention of modernmachinery means the introduction of those big industries dependent onwater, electricity and oil, such as the car industry, railways, ships, airplanes,radio and television, which, historically, started almost two centuries ago,

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and which were developed and improved during the last 100 years. In otherwords, it means all major industries, basic factories and big technologieswhich created industrial capitalism and are generally termed ‘means ofproduction’ in the economic literature.

It is worth mentioning that when Ayatullah Beheshti, as Deputy Speakerof the First Majlis-i Khubrigan (The Assembly of Experts) was involved indrafting the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, he was successful inmaking Mut.ahhari’s conclusions into law. As a result, all large-scale andbasic industries were declared to be State property. However, he did notagree with Mut.ahhari’s philosophical analysis.39 Beheshti argued that:

it has been said that society as a whole is creative but that is no morethan a joke. Creativity is usually connected to one individual or anumber of individuals who share some common work. Not allhumans are creative and innovative. If they are, their initiatives arenot the same. Therefore, each individual has his own special share inthese different forms of creativity.40

Ayatullah Adhari-Qumi, a distinguished Mudarris of the Qum Seminarybecame generally known as the main opponent of Mut.ahhari’s economicview. According to him, there is no limit to having legitimate privateproperty in Islam, and nationalization of industries, trade and mines turnsthe government into a big monopolist manager and leaves the nation as hiredworkers. Although a faqih has the authority to nationalize the basicindustries, this is only possible when he comes to the conclusion that thisprivatization might cause a loss for and corruption to society, or when theprivate sector is not able to run basic industries efficiently because of a lack offacilities.41

It is interesting to note that, while Shariati considers the distinguishingfeatures of the Islamic economic system to be basically anti-capitalist, social-istic and egalitarian, Mut.ahhari categorizes it as fundamentally differentfrom socialism.

Shariati‘s ideal society (ummat) is based on equity and justice, publicownership, equality, human brotherhood, and a classless society. His idealMuslim, Abu-Dhar Ghifari – a companion of the Prophet – is (according toShariati) a socialist, but a believer in God, who has spent his life strugglingagainst a class-based society, discrimination, injustice and the unequaldistribution of wealth among the people. But Shariati concludes that hissocialism must be considered as a principle of the Islamic vision of realityrather than a goal in itself, in contrast to Western socialism.42

Mut.ahhari, however, does not deny being a socialist. But his socialism isnot absolute egalitarianism, mainly based on shared income (of communalwork) and common/public property. Hence, it is appropriate to see whatkind of analysis he offered for his position.


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Seeking to stand between capitalism and socialism

The general characteristics of socialism (and a socialist society) weredescribed by Mut.ahhari as follows: denial of individual ownership of meansof production; condemnation of wealth-based class differences, as suchdifferences bring oppression and injustice; economic power, like politicalpower, to be under public control; property to be inherited; no profit to bemade on unearned property; prohibition of usury; illegality of establishingtrusts and cartels; the goal of production to be to give the profits to societyrather than to individuals; owning natural resources prohibited; the priorityof the work of the hands over the work of the brain; the principle of work forwork’s sake, rather than for competition; the principle of work for all or foreach according to his ability, and to each according to his needs, whichmeans all share each other’s work (income) and gain the same share;necessity of employment for all people; common ownership of property.43

Mut.ahhari then compared the general characteristics of an Islamic economicsystem to those of capitalism and socialism in order to find out similaritiesand differences. He maintained that individual property, related to thosethings produced by the owner him/herself, is acknowledged by all threesystems, the Islamic, the capitalist and the socialist. However, in thecapitalist system the deceased owner of property still has the absoluteauthority over it – that is, the same as when he was alive – while in the Islamicsystem, his authority only continues over one-third of his property, and therest must be divided between his heirs. Socialists only acknowledge theinheritance of children. Differences in wealth, no matter how great, are con-sidered by the capitalist system as natural phenomena. These are considered,in Islam and also in socialism, as oppression and exploitation, if thesedifferences cause poverty among people, even through unemployment or alow-wage system. It is no problem in Islam (or in socialism) to gain wealth byusing tools of production without employing labour, just as it poses noproblem in employing workers for non-productive projects. Gaining wealthby employing labour and using means of production (basic industries) ispermitted only in the capitalist system. Usury is clearly prohibited in Islam(and also in socialism), whereas it is permitted in the capitalist system. Islam(and also socialism) does not consider it legal to establish a monopoly inorder to bring production and sale of a particular commodity under exclusivecontrol. Only in the capitalist system is the formation of a cartel permitted.Co-operation between persons, companies and institutions is not prohibitedby Islam, unless the purpose of co-operation is to create a monopoly, inwhich case it is prohibited. But it is legal in the capitalist system. In thatsystem, individuals are in principle free to produce everything they want,but their production is restricted in the socialist system to products whichsociety is in need of. Although individual ownership is respected by Islam,individuals are not permitted to produce harmful or useless commodities

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(makasib-i muh. arramih). The dominating position of a few individuals, whopossess capital, over society’s economic relations, is permitted in capitalistsocieties, but not in Islam nor in a socialist system, because it concerns thebest interests of society and negates ultimately the liberty of the public. Thesocialist principle of an exact accord between wealth and work is notcompletely acceptable to Islam. Although inheritance, gifts, donations,awards and prizes are not generated by work, yet they are permitted inIslam.44 In addition, Mut.ahhari considered two things as important in orderto prevent the growth of wealth in society: one is the accumulation of capitalby a small number of people (which is permitted in capitalist societies), asaccording to the Islamic view the sources of wealth must be free (frommonopoly) and attainable by all people; the second is the socialist principleof ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his need’, as aresult of which every individual’s work must be respected. Islam does notteach that every adult has to work and that the output of their work bynecessity belongs to society. People can work jointly and communally, buttheir share must be definite.45 Regarding the first of these two views, it is clearthat the present capitalist societies have demonstrated that the accumulation ofcapital cannot be considered as a barrier for the growth of wealth, although itmight be a barrier for the growth of social balance and social justice.

In conclusion, Mut.ahhari went on to maintain that private ownership ofnatural and industrial (machine) resources is not permitted in Islam (nor insocialism) and they must remain in public ownership. Common ownership of(output of) work is also unacceptable in Islamic law, just as it is alien to thecapitalist system. Yet if common property (ishtirak-i sarmayih) is consideredthe main characteristic of socialism, Islam can be thought of as a socialistsystem (maslak-i ishtiraki), although it must be remembered that individualproperty is also simultaneously acknowledged by Islamic law. But ifcommunal work (and sharing each other’s output) is regarded as the maincharacteristic of socialism, Islam is not a socialist doctrine.46

It is worth mentioning that although Mut.ahhari did not deny being asocialist, he is clearly not supportive of an egalitarian or classless society.Criticizing the socialist view that inheritance is unearned property for theheir and would reinforce differences between classes in society, he argued that

there is no problem in the mere existence of different classes insociety, as there is no problem in people’s living in different andunequal situations, provided the law is equally enforced for allpeople and the differences are generated by the merit and activitiesof oneself or one’s ancestors.47

Although Mut.ahhari has no faith in a flat model of equality andacknowledges the function of the existence of different classes in society, yethe does not believe in intense class differences based on wealth. The goal of


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the Islamic economic system is, according to Mut.ahhari, to reduce classdifferences, not to wipe them out. Even the philosophy of Islamic taxes suchas zakat, khums, and those special taxes which the Islamic ruler has beenauthorized to legislate and collect in times of need, is the prevention ofintense class differences, and the creating of social balance.48 Had Mut.ahharibeen questioned about what solution he would provide for class modifica-tion when the wealthy were able to change the attitude of the politicalestablishment to suit their interests, he would probably have replied that

Islam does not permit, for two reasons, the economic destiny ofsociety to be shaped by a small number of capitalists. From the view-point of people’s democratic rights, it cannot be justified that a smallnumber of individuals gains authority over the destiny of others.And from a practical viewpoint, those few people would surely workfor their own benefits, against that of others.49

Therefore, their capital or property must be nationalized.

Limited economic freedom

Although there is no limit to the amount of legitimate wealth, possessing aninfinity of private property has two limitations. The first of these is asubjective one, and derives from the moral values of wealth-sharing taughtby Islam. These values cannot be quantified and are independent of statecoercion. Islamic sources (i.e. the Quran and Traditions) encourage Muslimsto share their wealth generously with those who are poor, needy or orphans,to make donations and self-sacrifice, and to refrain from prodigality and theaccumulating of wealth. It is said that the existence of many charitable worksand activities in Islamic societies – such as feeding the poor, endowingproperties, caravanserais, public baths, schools, clinics, hospitals, librariesand orphanages, special bank accounts offering loans without interest(s.anduq-i qarz. al-h. asanih) to people who are in need and so on, are, in fact,the results of these moral teachings.50 The second limiting action is objectiveand carefully defined by law, and functions on two levels. The first includesthose limitations which originate from the prohibition of a set of economictransactions and social activities that are generally called, in Islamic juris-prudence, ‘makasib-i muh. arramih’, such as the prohibition on producing,buying and selling idols and items used in other religions (such as the cross),statues (of living beings), alcohol, drugs, gambling equipment, deviantbooks, immoral films, and gold and silver dishes. Included in the prohibitionare also usury (riba), fraud (ghishsh), bribery (irtisha’), monopolies (ih. tikar),extravagance (israf ) and consumption of luxury (tajammul).51 The secondlevel contains the two types of obligatory taxes: the fixed and the eternalones, khums and zakat; and the indeterminate and occasional ones imposed

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when necessary by the Islamic ruler with the aim of creating social justice.52

Article 49 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Chapter IV)can be considered as a reflection of this principle. According to the article

The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealthaccumulated through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement,theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of governmentcontracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and otherresources subject to public ownership, running corrupt companiesand institutions, and other illicit means and sources, and restoring itto its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, itmust be entrusted to the public treasury. This rule must be executedby the government with due care, after investigating and providingthe necessary evidence in accordance with the law of Islam.

Social justice

According to Mut.ahhari, the term ‘adl (justice) has been used in fourdifferent senses in Quranic verses: justice in creation, ethical justice, justice inlaw and social justice. Justice in creation means that the universe and itscomponents are well balanced and well proportioned. Each part of nature isin harmony with all others. If it were not so, no order and no mathematicswould exist in the world. According to the Quranic verses (Al-i ‘Imran: 18and Al-Rah. man: 7), justice and harmony constitute the criteria on whichGod created the world. The Prophet is reported to have stated that ‘Heavenand earth are established on the basis of justice’. Although the existence ofdifferences and discrimination between creatures is not deniable, these arenecessary for the balance and equilibrium of the world as a whole.Mut.ahhari then concludes that the opposite of this meaning of justice isbeing unbalanced and lacking harmony, rather than oppression.53

Ethical justice refers to educating the just man. The Islamic ideal man mustbe just and fair in his relations with others. There are a number of verses inthe Quran concerning the just man (Maidih: 95 and T. alaq: 2), who givestestimonies and judgements (on the basis of fairness and honesty).54

Justice in law (tashri‘a) refers to the principle of justice being the guidinglight illuminating all Islamic injunctions in the Shari‘at. Islamic ordinanceshave been called justice (qist.) in some Quranic verses (A‘araf: 29 andBaqarih: 282). Prophets were sent to people to establish just societies.According to the Quran (H. adid: 25), in past times God sent His messengerswith clear signs (by which right and wrong are differentiated) and sent downwith them the book and the balance that men may stand forth in justice, andsent down iron (in order to punish the transgressors).55 Justice in law, on theother hand, means that people, regardless of their class, race and gender,must be treated equally by the laws, and the laws must also be implemented


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equally to them. The opposite of this concept of justice is injustice andoppression.

Finally, it is upon social justice that the Quran focuses most attention, andtherefore it can be argued that its realization is of the greatest importance informing an ideal society.56 In contrast to ethical justice, which is a privateconcern, social justice is a social obligation. To establish social justice, theprecept of ‘giving a fair share to whom it is due’ has to govern society. Whileethical justice can be attained passively, social justice requires an activecommitment against injustice and oppression, a commitment that may evenlead to martyrdom, as it did in the case of Imam Ali.57 Noting the importanceof the principle of justice in Islamic teachings, Mut.ahhari refers to a Saying ofImam Ali, who was asked ‘Which of the two is preferable; justice orgenerosity?’ Ali replied: ‘Justice puts things in their places whereas generositytakes them out of their place; justice is the general caretaker [guiding line forall time] while generosity is a particular benefit [at occasional events]; conse-quently, justice is superior and the more distinguished of the two.’ To justifythe Saying, Mut.ahhari then maintained that one may at first sight think thatgenerosity is, from the viewpoint of individual ethics, better than justice,because he might imagine that justice is defined as only regarding and notinvading the rights of others, while generosity is explained as giving one’s ownrights (on property) to others, or dispensing with one’s own rights in favour ofthe others. But from the viewpoint of social ethics, Mut.ahhari continued, thisis unacceptable because justice means regarding everybody according to hisactual and natural capability, whereas generosity is showing munificence tosomebody regardless of his actual and natural ability. While justice putseverything in its natural place, generosity removes it from that place. The roleof justice in society can be likened to the foundation of a building and the roleof generosity as the painting and decorating of it. It is evident that people canlive in a building with a strong foundation even if not painted and decorated,yet they cannot live in a building that has a weak foundation no matter howwell it is painted and decorated. society cannot be governed by charity andgenerosity; rather it must be ruled by justice. Therefore, justice must beadopted as a general principle for all times, whereas generosity must beconsidered as an exceptional principle for occasional situations.58

On the socio-economic implications of Islamic social justice opinionsdiffer amongst Islamic theoreticians. Moderate Islamic theoreticians haveinterpreted a just Islamic society as one which would abolish discriminationand provide equal opportunity for all, so that each would be rewardedaccording to his ability. Radical Islamic theoreticians, however, have inter-preted Islamic social justice as a call for revolutionary change and the creationof a classless society based on the absolute equality of income, wealth andeven consumption.59 The different definitions and explanations of socialjustice can be traced back to different deductions from the Islamic sources.

Commenting on Shariati as a radical, Nomani mentioned that the radical

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interpretation of social justice takes a hard line against the capitalist systemand the market allocation of resources. The market system is condemned,since it gives free rein to exploitation and increases injustices by rewardingthose who already possess more than their share. It is ultimately viewed asthe mechanism which polarizes society into the rich and poor, thuspreventing the establishment of a classless monotheistic (tauh. idi) society.However, it should be noticed that tauh. idi generally means, in its theologicalsense, the unity of the community in worshipping one God. Based on theargument that in Islam the real ownership of all God’s creations on earthbelongs to Him and is only left to man in trusteeship (amanat), it is arguedthat all men should share equally in the bounties of God. This argument isfurther supported by reference to the Quran which explicitly states that thepoor have a share in the wealth of the rich (Dhariyat: 19 and Ma‘arij: 25).The proponents of this interpretation of social justice argue that the onlyform of property ownership compatible with Islam is a social or collectiveone, since it prevents the polarization of wealth and poverty. A certain typeof class analysis is also used in their methodology. They maintain that whenIslamic social justice prevails in society, the relentless war between the ‘haves’and the ‘have-nots’ will come to an end in favour of the disinherited and thepoor, thus realizing the socio-economic aspect of tauh. id.60

Presenting Mut.ahhari and Maudoodi as moderate Islamic modernists,Nomani also mentioned that:

the moderate Islamic modernists believe that the Islamic concept ofsocial justice expresses distributional equity rather than equality.Equity means fairness. Differences in human capability, effort,aptitude, dexterity, work habits and entrepreneurship should berewarded. Mut.ahhari argues that the system of reward on the basisof differences in capability is not discriminatory, since God intro-duced such differences among men in the act of creation. In thisinterpretation, justice requires a system of reward according tovarying individual contributions. Rewarding different contributionsequally would actually constitute an act of injustice. Perfect equalityof money incomes would be as unjust as, if not more unjust than, theglaring inequalities that afflict many a society in the world today.This concept of Islamic social justice places great emphasis onequality of all before the law and equality of opportunity formembers of the Islamic community. Maudoodi emphasizes the pointthat equity rather than equality constitutes the basis of the Islamiceconomic system. He says: Islam does not envisage equal distri-bution of economic resources among individuals at all.61

It is worth mentioning that Mut.ahhari’s definition of social justice is notconstant in his writings and can sometimes be conceived as an egalitarian


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concept. For instance, while formulating the general characteristics of theIslamic promised society (Jami‘ih-yi Mahdi-yi Mau‘ud), he briefly mentionedthat ‘a perfect equality [musavat-i kamil] between people in wealth would beestablished in that society’.62 However, this phrase has to be understood inthe context of his other writings. Explaining the two egalitarian and non-egalitarian concepts of the term ‘Islamic classless society’, Mut.ahhari main-tained that ‘An Islamic classless society must be understood as a societywhich has no discrimination, a society in which base and nonsensical privi-leges are invalidated, not a society which compulsorily abolishes [people’spersonal] aptitudes, capabilities, privileges, and acquired properties.’63

Furthermore, he maintained that

the real meaning of social justice is that of observing people’s rightsand priorities, because people find some kind of rights andpreferences in relating to each other and in comparison to eachother. For instance, a person who produces an output with his effort,normally finds some kind of prior right to his output. This priorityoriginates from his work and activity. Therefore, oppression meansviolating the other’s priority, taking possession of the other’s rightand committing aggression against the other’s boundaries. If bysocial justice is meant [absolute] equality, in the sense of giving thesame share to all and distributing a similar amount to each, withoutobserving different capabilities [i‘ata-yi bi al-saviyih], it is exactlyoppression. If it means observing [absolute] equality wherever arefound equal capabilities, this meaning can be accepted.64

Indeed, two different interpretations of the issue of social justice, eachleading to different and opposed socio-economic and political policies, canbe readily identified. From the radical interpretation, one can derive theblueprint for the construction of a classless society, while on the basis of themore traditional interpretation one can construct a modern class-dividedmarket economy. Even though both positions derive their legitimacy fromIslamic sources, the rift between them as to what constitutes ‘true Islam’seems unbridgeable.65

Prohibition of usury

The Islamic jurists generally agree that usury is prohibited in Islam andeconomic activities must not be based on the principle of usury. Althoughone can find differences between Shi‘i and Sunni jurists in some cases, thesedifferences arise from whether those cases are to be regarded as usury or not.

The prohibition of riba which etymologically comes from the root verbraba, yarbu, and means ‘increase’, ‘more’, ‘extra’, and ‘growth’, can betraced back to the earliest Islamic sources. The Quran states that

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Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whomthe evil one by his touch has driven to madness. That is because theysay: trade is like usury, but Allah has permitted trade and forbiddenusury . . . Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, but will giveincrease for deeds of charity . . . O you who believe, fear Allah, andgive up what remains of your demand for usury if you are indeed abeliever. If you do it not, take notice of war from Allah and Hismessenger, but if you turn back, you shall have your capital sums;deal not unjustly and you shall not be dealt with unjustly.

(Baqarih: 276–80)

There is also a h. adith by Ali ibn Musa al-Rez.a, the eighth Shi‘ite Imam, that

the reason for prohibiting riba is because of the decrease of gooddeeds, the decrease of wealth, the desire of people to win and theirabandonment of lending [without interest], while lending leads togood deeds, and because it [riba] will result in corruption, injusticeand the vanishing of wealth.66

In order to explain the reason for the prohibition of usury, Mut.ahharibegan examining six existing hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis,usury is prohibited so as to improve humanitarian feelings among Muslimcommunities. To achieve this goal, interest-free lending is, on the one hand,recommended (not obligated) by Islam. On the other hand, usury is pro-hibited, while an annual tax (zakat) is mandatory upon accumulated money.Mut.ahhari argued that this theory could not be accepted in its entirety.Although in some cases this justification for the prohibition of usury is valid,such as when lending to people who are in need for their necessaryrequirements, it cannot justify other cases such as the prohibition of usury inlending to people who borrow in order to expand their economic activities.67

According to the second hypothesis, usury is prohibited because lending withthe condition of interest is economically harmful and leads to economicrecession. This theory is also criticized by Mut.ahhari. He maintained that if itmeant that it would eventually lead to recession because the usurer takes thecapital out of circulation by storing it, this is not true, as in fact he puts it intocirculation. And if the usurer himself indulges in laziness and a parasitic life,and does not develop his natural capabilities, and improve his humanitarianfeelings, that is true, but the principle is equally violated by the permittedproperty in land and the investment partnership (muz.aribih) (for those whogive land and capital to their agents and partners for a share of the profitswithout any work).68 While these two hypotheses are based on moralprinciples, the third and fourth views emerge from principles of social justice.This third hypothesis arises from the view that wealth generally must beearned by labour. Since the usurer’s profit is not attained by his work and


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effort, it is unjust, illegitimate and religiously forbidden (h. aram). Mut.ahharimentioned that in response to the question of leased and landed property(where there does not seem to exist a relation between wealth and labour),the supporters of this view consider the properties as equating with theaccumulated and solid works of its owner, and the profits as equivalent to thegradual deterioration of the property which is missing in usury. Rejecting thisview, Mut.ahhari stated that the relation between wealth and labour as ageneral principle for all economic activities is not approved in Islamicjurisprudence. Wealth which comes from inheritance and gifts is legitimateand religiously permitted (h. alal), even though not earned through labour.The profits which the owner of a property earns from the lease often varyfrom the actual amount of depreciation, whereas according to this view itmust be exactly the same. Furthermore, in some cases there is no connectionbetween benefiting from hired property and its deterioration, because there isno deterioration such as in the case of hiring an animal. Even the owner ofcapital in an investment partnership receives profit (from the agent) althoughhe does not share the work. Finally, receiving money in return for thecancelling of legal rights is permitted, as it cannot be considered an economicactivity.69

According to the fourth hypothesis, usury is prohibited because it wouldintensify class differences among people and would eventually lead to thedestruction of society. Mut.ahhari rejected this view on the grounds thatalthough discrimination in law is not acceptable, class differences whichoriginate in people’s different natural abilities, capabilities and activities areacceptable, would be just and would actually lead to a strengthening ofsociety. The intense class differences and destruction of society by aneconomic system based on usury could be avoided through governmentsupervision over the rate of interest, and also by putting taxes on wealth.70

The fifth hypothesis maintains that usury is prohibited because it is basedon the effort to make money productive, whereas money is barren andunproductive. Aristotle states that money is unproductive. In other words,usury can be regarded as a legitimate economic system only when moneyitself is productive. However, the main function of money (besides being usedin economic transactions) is to be a mediator in economic dealings, whilebeing the medium of exchange in economic dealings does not create anyadditional value for the money itself. Therefore money itself is not productiveand usury which is based on the productivity of money is illegitimate.Rejecting this hypothesis, Mut.ahhari stated that the prohibition of usuryin the Islamic economic system is not because of the infertility of money,for usury is totally h. aram in Islam whether with money or through othermeans.71

Finally, deducing the sixth theory from Quranic verses, Mut.ahhariexplained that the reality of usury is lending (qarz.) and lending as anindependent transaction within Islamic jurisprudence must not be profitable.

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In fact, lending as the reality of usury is not like trade (bai‘a) which isprofitable; rather they are two different types of economic activity. Bai‘a is atransaction which consists of the exchange of two different commodities,whereas lending is not an exchange of two things. It is simply investing thepossessory rights of the lender in the borrower, against a guarantee. Theborrower only gives a guarantee to return the same amount of money or asimilar commodity at the agreed time. As a result, the lender does not sharewith the borrower in the loss or profit of the loan, because by his loan thelender transferred all his possessory rights to the borrower. In contrast to aninvestment partnership (muz.aribih), where the owner of capital shares withhis partner in any loss or profit, and in a lease where only the proprietor notthe lessee is responsible for possible loss, the provider of a loan does not shareany loss or profit with the borrower. This is because the owner of capital inan investment partnership and the lessor in a lease are still considered, afterthe agreement, to be the owners of their capital or property, whereas thelender of a loan is not considered after lending to be the owner of it. For thisreason he can only ask for repayment of the amount of the loan, not theinterest. Therefore, lending is unproductive in its nature and cannot produceprofit. As a consequence, usury is an unnatural and prohibited transaction,whereas lending is a non-profit transaction. The usurer consistently earns afixed profit by it without any risk of loss.72

According to Mut.ahhari, two types of economic activities are generallytermed ‘usury’ by the Islamic jurists. First, lending usury (riba-yi qarz.i or ribaal-nasiah) is the classical form of usury which entails – as in a loan – a fixedincrease in the amount of money over a time period. This act is also dividedinto two types, namely taking interest by lending to persons who are in needfor their personal requirements (qarz.-i istihlaki), and receiving interestthrough lending to those who need the loan for the development of theirbusiness (qarz.-i istintaji). Mut.ahhari mentioned that although someEgyptian theoreticians have forbidden usury only in the case of lendingmoney for personal needs, Shi‘i jurists declare both types of usury to beunlawful.73 Second is exchange usury (riba-yi mu‘amili or riba al-faz.l), whichis defined by the majority of Shi‘i jurists as a contract of sales of two similarproducts which are usually traded by volume (kail) or weight (vazn), whenthere is an increase in the terms of exchange themselves. For instance, tradinga pound of wheat for two pounds of wheat, or trading a pound of low-quality dates for a pound of high-quality dates, is considered as usury andprohibited.74 A h. adith from the Prophet mentioned that

gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley,dates for dates, salt for salt, each kind for each kind, in hand: he whoincreases or asks for an increase commits usury, alike whether hegives or takes.75


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Consequently, they (the majority of Shi‘i jurists) believe that there is noprohibition in the exchange of two countable things, like bank-notes, withincrease. Criticizing the view, Mut.ahhari mentioned that there is nothingspecial in the case of kail and vazn in usury, as they are two examples ofquantity, and measuring all measurable products and outputs, includingcountable things, must be considered as cases for possible usury.76 Regardingthe usury in bank-notes (iskinas), he stated that it is a new case for Ijtihad asit had no history in the past. Although bank-notes, like gold and silver coinsin earlier times, serve as a mediator in economic activities, they are notexactly the same as coins. While gold and silver coins kept their natural valueafter being replaced by other coins, bank-notes lose all value after beingwithdrawn as currency by a government. It is merely a document like a stampwhich is given its value by a government. It can also be measured bycounting. Since property or a commodity, not their documents, are putforward for selling or hiring, bank-notes as official documents which aremediated for economic activities cannot be traded or hired. Receiving anadditional amount above the value of the bank-notes of the same currencythrough trading, not exchanging two different currencies, is usury andtherefore prohibited (h. aram).77 However, two cases are regarded in Islamicjurisprudence as being exempt from the prohibition. One is the usurybetween wife and husband, and the other is usury between son and father.Justifying these cases, Mut.ahhari maintained that the philosophy for theprohibition of usury does not in reality exist there. Usury between people,even between two brothers, might eventually lead to class differences, andwould ‘make one fortunate and the other unfortunate’ – for example,advantage one and disadvantage the other – whereas usury between son andfather or wife and husband is in reality bringing money from one pocket andputting it in the other of the same person. They share their life and areconsidered as one.78

Banking without usury

The question of usury represented for Islamic economic philosophers likeMut.ahhari, as well as S. adr and Beheshti, the main obstacle to legalizing themodern banking system in Islamic countries. For them, the premise was thatusury simply meant interest and therefore loans based on paying interest –one of the fundamentals of banking operations – could not be accepted. Thequestion revolved around the possibility of having a bank, as in Westerncapitalist countries, which lends its money, but makes profits withoutcharging interest on these loans, and attracts deposits from its clients withoutrewarding them with fixed interests. In theory, the answer was relativelyclear. The key concept was investment partnership (muz.aribih), and thecontract of investment partnership was to replace the loan and the deposit

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for interest. Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, an eminent Egyptian jurist andphilosopher had already given an answer on this issue at the turn of thecentury.79

Hoping for the realization of the theory, S. adr wrote a treatise on aninterest-free bank, Al-Bank al-larabavi fi al-Islam, following a query by theKuwaiti Ministry of Endowments (auqaf). Later, Beheshti and Mut.ahhari,apart from their separate lessons about Islamic economics, organized jointlywith Bazargan a conference on the question of riba in Islam in the Anjuman-iIslami-yi Muhandisin, in 1975. Beheshti’s Riba dar Islam and Mut.ahhari’sMas’alih-yi Riba, which were published after their assassinations, are in factthe collections of their public and private lectures on the issue.

Although Beheshti and Mut.ahhari shared the view that the existingIranian banking system was, like the Western capitalist banking system, inprinciple based on usury, they differed as to the extent people might benefitfrom its non-usury facilities and services. While Beheshti insisted thatbenefiting from the facilities and services should be totally restricted to thetime of severe need, Mut.ahhari did not share this view. According toBeheshti, all Western types of banking are based on usury. Therefore all itsfunctions and services, even those which are not related to loans, trading andselling, are regarded as h. aram and illegitimate. Receiving interest whichbanks regularly pay to their customers and collecting the prizes which banksoccasionally distribute by lottery to account holders, are prohibited. Evenopening a savings account, not for receiving interest but for safety, ispermitted solely in the time of necessity when an Islamic bank is notavailable.80 However, Mut.ahhari maintained that customers’ intentions canchange the matter. If the purpose of putting money in a bank account is onlyfor safety or for benefiting from its non-usury facilities, the interests orawards which banks give regularly or occasionally to its customers cannot beconsidered as h. aram and illegitimate as it is not clear whether the moneywhich banks give to their customers is collected from usury or not. If themoney were put into a bank account in order to benefit from its fixed interestor usury facilities such as loans and mortgages, then the interest and usurycontracts are illegitimate. Opening an account in a usury bank cannot itselfbe regarded as a prohibited action, nor can receiving prizes from the bank becalled a forbidden deed, because it is not clear that those prizes were paidfrom the usury money.81

It is interesting to note that, in his lectures about banking and usury,Mut.ahhari came to another conclusion. Besides investment partnership,which was also mentioned by the other Islamic jurists as the solution to anon-usury banking system, Mut.ahhari realized that if he could prove, on thebasis of Islamic sources, that the government could be considered as thefather of the nation, and the relation between government and people couldbe regarded as being similar to the relation of a father and his son, theproblem of usury and fixed interest would then be solved, because, as


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mentioned before, the usury between a father and his family is accepted bythe Islamic law. Although he supported this view by legal analysis and also byfatwas from some recent fuqaha like Ayatullah Burujirdi, Husain Qumi andAbul-Qasim Khui about state ownership, he did not use any h. adith orQuranic verses.82

Whereas a private or state bank in a secular system should not bepermitted, according to Mut.ahhari and Beheshti, to lend its money and makeprofits by charging interest on these loans, nor to attract deposits from itsclients by rewarding them with a fixed interest, the nationalized banks in alegitimate Islamic system are authorized to do so. It is because the reason forthe prohibition of usury does not exist there. As Mut.ahhari mentioned, theusury activities of nationalized banks, namely making profits by charginginterest on loans, would not create a higher class and would not intensifyclass differences in society. In reality, the profits which are made bynationalized banks would go to the government’s treasury and would returnin another way to the people.83

However, the conference ended with a practical proposal that localIslamic banks (S. anduq-ha-yi Qarz. al-H. asanih-yi Islami) must be establishedand expanded by religious groups. These local interest-free institutionswould be permitted to charge their customers for their current expenses (kar-muzd). Then, two significant practical developments ensued. In the firstplace, a number of Islamic banks were established all over the country.Second, as a result of Beheshti’s efforts, the Iranian banking system wasdeclared as nationalized in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran(1979). Recently, some Islamic countries have started examining the possi-bility of replacing their whole banking system with interest-free institutions.Yet, almost three decades after this proposal, the debate about riba is stillopen in clerical circles. The gulf between theory and practice remainssignificant, but it would be difficult for institutions and countries which areconcerned either with the civil legislation or the establishment of Islamicbanks to ignore the jurists’ opinions on this question.

The state and economics

The role of the state in the economic field has always been a matter of disputeamong Islamic social scientists and jurists. While some scholars considerstate intervention as a major obstacle to economic growth, others regard it asa necessary means to the fulfilment of social justice in society.

It may be mentioned here that about 600 years ago the Islamic philosopherand historian Ibn-Khaldun (d. 1406) had already given his views on thesubject, being against the intervention of the state in the economic life of theprivate citizen. In his historical analysis on the rise and fall of nations,Ibn Khaldun insists that state intervention is even more tyrannous to peoplethan forced and unpaid labour. In a section of his Muqaddamih entitled

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‘Commercial activity on the part of the ruler is harmful to his subjects andruinous to the tax revenue’, he argues that this is because

farmers and merchants will find it difficult to buy livestock andmerchandise and to procure cheaply the things that belong tofarming and commerce. The subjects have [all] the same, orapproximately the same, amount of wealth. Competition betweenthem already exhausts, or comes close to exhausting, their financialresources. Now, when the ruler, who has so much more money thanthey, competes with them, scarcely a single one of them will [anylonger] be able to obtain the things he wants, and everybody willbecome worried and unhappy. Furthermore, the ruler can appro-priate much [of the agricultural products and the availablemerchandise], if it occurs to him. [He can do it] by force, or bybuying things up at the cheapest possible price. There may be no-onewho would dare to bid against him. Thus, he will be able to force theseller to lower his price. He is also able to force the merchants to buyfrom him. He will be satisfied only with the highest prices and more.[The merchants and farmers] will exhaust their liquid capital in suchtransactions . . . The trouble and financial difficulties, and the loss ofprofit which it causes the subjects, takes away from them allincentive to effort, thus ruining the fiscal [structure].84

Of course, this analysis refers to a period which is in socio-economic termscompletely different from our modern industrial societies, but it reflects thecenturies-old dispute about the role of authority in the private of life of thesubject.

Beside the socio-historical analysis, pro-free-market Islamic scholars holdthe view that subject to restrictions on the exchange of certain goods – suchas wine, pork, gambling instruments, icons, gold or silverware and musicalinstruments which are generally in Islamic jurisprudence termed as makasib-imuh. arramih – Islam accepts the market as the basic co-ordinating mechan-ism of its economic system. The principle of freedom of exchange, privateproperty and the security of contract, which constitute the necessary andsufficient conditions for the operation of a market system, can all be deducedfrom the primary sources of Islam. There are several direct references to thesignificance of the freedom of exchange and trade in the Quran. Believers areenjoined to engage in trade based on mutual goodwill (Nisa: 29). Rejectingthe contention that trade, like usury, leads to the accumulation of wealth orcapital, and is therefore prohibited, the Quran emphasizes that exchange ortrade is different from usury (riba) since exchange (bai‘a) is permitted andusury forbidden (Baqarih: 275).

Many Traditions of the Prophet can be cited which provide further prooffor the position that the market mechanism should be the basic co-ordinator


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of the Islamic economic system. Before his Prophethood, Muhammad hadmanaged Khadija’s commercial affairs and was thus familiar with theoperation of the market. He had traded on her behalf between Mecca andDamascus and had proved himself an astute, honest and capable merchant.The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘Welfare and blessedness are composedof ten parts, nine-tenths of which is attained through trade.’85 Even thoughgovernment intervention in the market is tolerated and even encouragedunder specific circumstances, it can be argued that perfect competition,operating through its own self-adjusting automatic mechanism, shouldconstitute the primary co-ordinating mechanism of the Islamic economicsystem, providing it fulfils the Islamic system’s first-order priorities.Numerous general guidelines can be found in the primary sources whichguarantee a free market, under normal conditions.

First, Islam prohibits price fixing by a handful of buyers or sellers whohave cornered the market. It encourages exchange in a market characterizedby numerous buyers and sellers, in which none possesses a controlling share.In the days of the Prophet, it was customary in the city of Medina for smallgroups of merchants to rush out of the city to meet the agricultural producersof the surrounding countryside, once they were informed of their arrival, inorder to buy their whole crop. The agricultural goods were later sold at ahigher price within the city limits. A small group of merchants also under-took the transportation and sale of town-produced goods to the rural popu-lation, again at a price set by the seller. The fact that a small number of buyerscould meet with producers created a quasi-monopoly situation, in which thefew buyers could bid down the price below what it could have been in anopen market, where producers could meet the majority of consumers.Furthermore, the provision of town-produced goods to the rural areas by ahandful of suppliers created a monopoly situation where the sellers could setprices higher than those that would have prevailed had numerous producers,each possessing a small share of the market, met with the consumers. TheProphet is reported to have condemned this custom and called upon Muslimsto refrain from such business practices, since they caused injury and loss tothe weaker party in the transaction. His argument can be interpreted to meanthat a contrived price established under conditions of imperfect competitioncauses damage and loss to the weaker party in the transaction, be theyconsumers or producers.

Second, the above-mentioned traditions can also be put forward as evidencefor the position that the Islamic market is characterized by free information.Meeting producers outside the city of Medina denied the producers access toinformation about the prevailing demand conditions inside the city. The factthat their source of information became confined to a handful of merchants,whose interest was to buy cheap and sell dear, led producers to exchangetheir goods at a price lower than their free-market price.

Third, according to numerous Traditions of the Prophet, hoarding, which

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decreases supply and thereby causes artificial price increases, is categoricallycondemned in Islam. The act of hoarding has the same impact on marketsupply, and therefore price, as erecting barriers to the entrance of potentialproducers. Both measures seek to prevent market supply from increasing andthe price of the goods under consideration from decreasing. The Prophet isreported to have said ‘Whoever hoards food for forty days to sell it at ahigher price has distanced himself from God and shall be detested by Him.’ Itis reported that when the Prophet saw someone bringing large quantities of acommodity to the market and selling it at a price lower than the prevailingone, the Prophet asked him the reason for his behaviour. The seller told himthat he was doing it for the sake of God’s pleasure. The Prophet is thenreported to have said ‘Those who increase the supply on the market aresimilar to those who fight for the cause of God and those who hoard in theIslamic market are similar to apostates and unbelievers.’

Fourth, based on the Prophet’s Traditions, it can be argued that, in theideal Islamic market, consumers should have access to homogeneous or non-differentiated goods. In the Islamic market, as in a perfect competitivemarket, consumers would be indifferent as to the source of their goods, sinceall the goods offered by producers would be identical in quality. The Prophetis reported to have prohibited the sale of good-quality wheat mixed withbad-quality wheat at a given price. Although this and similar injunctions areprimarily aimed at discouraging fraudulent practices, they indirectly supportthe aim of a homogeneity of goods in a perfectly competitive market.86

Finally, as long as there is mutual consent between the buyer and the seller,interference with the market mechanism to enforce a set price is discouragedin the Islamic market. According to Makarim Shirazi, a contemporaryAyatullah at the Qum Seminary, even though under exceptional circum-stances, such as the protection of public interest, where the pursuit of privateinterest undermines social well-being or for reasons of state, governmentintervention is justified and even promoted by Islam, and non-interference bythe government is considered as a primary ordinance which should berespected and upheld under normal conditions.87 Furthermore, numerousverses in the Quran can be cited to show that inequalities in wealth andincome, resulting from the operation of market forces, are not considered asanomalous and reprehensible in the Islamic economic system, since theyreflect God’s will and His view of the ideal Islamic socio-economic organ-ization (An‘am: 165, Nah. l: 71, Nur: 38, Zukhruf: 32). A socio-economicallystratified society, characterized by differences in rank, wealth and income, istherefore compatible with the Islamic social order. Based on the primarysources cited, any interference with the outcome of market operations – forinstance, prices and legitimate incomes – may therefore be considered asmeddling with God’s intentions. Any attempt to place a ceiling on incomes inan Islamic economic system may therefore be considered as a violation ofdivine optimality. The price-signalling device, functioning through what in


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part resembles a perfectly competitive market system, is therefore held,according to one interpretation, to represent the Islamic economic system’smajor co-ordinating mechanism.

However, in the planned economic system, scholars argue, the fact thatcertain primary sources explicitly designate the market as the legitimatearbiter between producers and consumers does not prove that only anIslamic market economy can be deduced from the Shari‘at. It would bepremature and inaccurate to conclude that all the evidence indicates that theIslamic economic system is simply a morally constrained replica of thecapitalist economic system. It can be convincingly argued that the spirit ofthe Shari‘at is governed by a strong sense of social justice, fraternity, equalityand co-operation. If the promotion of social justice is positioned as a first-priority objective, then all factors, institutions and arrangements hinderingthe attainment of such an objective have to be replaced. Where marketforces, left to their own self-regulation mechanisms, fail to attain socialjustice as recommended by the Quran, intervention, regulation and planningby the Islamic state become imperative. Particular national levels of capitalaccumulation, rates of growth, disparities in wealth and income distribution,and levels of absolute and relative poverty, among other factors, determinethe duration (short-run or long-run) and degree (partial or complete) of stateintervention in the market.88

As Nomani has mentioned, the whole argument of the proponents of theIslamic planned economy rests on the Quranic verses, which (i) recommendthe fulfilment of the poor’s basic needs; (ii) prompt the rich to ensure therealization of this recommendation by giving away their surplus wealth forthe needy; (iii) remind the rich of their financial responsibility by arguing thatthe poor possess a divine and social right in their wealth; and (iv) warn therich that if they treasure their wealth, which really belongs to the poor, theywill go to hell and there they shall be branded.89

In his Vilayat al-faqih, Montazeri considers that it is a duty of the Islamicruler to care about justice and equality in the distribution of wealth insociety. In doing so, he must confiscate all illegitimately earned money andproperty. The Islamic ruler must also care for the poor, needy, orphans, andthose who are not able to care for themselves. To provide proper jobs toprotect the honour of those who are poor and needy, the government and itsadministration have to prepare different plans and arrangements, because itis better than giving them alms and charity.89

The proponents of the free market, however, argue that even though theprovision of basic needs is a Quranic recommendation, its fulfilment is notobligatory through the appropriation of the surplus of the rich. The rich areonly obliged to pay zakat and khums, while all other types of recommendedcharity are voluntary. Makarim Shirazi maintained that the suppression ofthe market system could be legitimately justified as long as the basic needs ofa social group were not provided for, and the rich refused to help the poor.

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Once essential basic needs are provided for all, and a mechanism is put intoplace to assure its continuation, then the market system and the security ofprivate property would have to be reinstituted; obligatory injunctions,primary ordinances and the explicit letter of the Shari‘at cannot be suspendedindefinitely in favour of ethical recommendations, secondary ordinances andthe equitable spirit of the law. How can one claim that Islam is a universaland eternal religion while, in an Islamic planned economy, the majority of itseconomic laws would be based on extraordinary ad hoc injunctions based ontertiary sources? The indefinite suspension of the letter of the law would onlyprove that primary Islamic laws are incomplete and incapable of securing thefelicity of man.91

It seems that Mut.ahhari’s views on this subject are also contradictory. Onone hand, he maintained that, for the fulfilment of social justice in societyand greater public benefit, a powerful Islamic government that keeps all majorsources of national wealth and income (including natural and industrial) underits control is authorized to make plans at national level, is permitted to fix rateson taxes and other impositions, and is even authorized to confiscate the wealthand property of those capitalists whom the government fears will dominate theeconomic market.92 On the other hand, he maintained that

A healthy economy, which could increase national wealth andmultiply the national ability for the acquisition of materialisticproducts and spiritual life, is conditioned by two things: first, thesources of wealth must be free in it and not be banned or haveceased. Second, economic activity must be free and respected, whichmeans that the result of everyone’s activity must be returned tohimself (not to others).93

He also mentioned that

the basic principle is that the sources of wealth be movable anduseable, the force of labour be free and active, and private ownershipbe respected, but a complete supervision of the legality of types ofincome must be applied, which means that the economic systemmust be shaped to a form in which no-one can exploit another byforce or under necessity [need].94

Furthermore, Mut.ahhari criticized the Marxist principle of ‘From eachaccording to his ability, and to each according to his need’ because hebelieved that this principle would destroy the free field of economiccompetition and would prevent the growth of economic activities. As heexplained ‘The principle of freedom must be protected, not only in societyand politics, but also in economics.’95 Now it is appropriate to ask how theseeconomic ideals can be achieved by the state.

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4

POLITICAL VIEWS

It is useful to note first that this chapter encountered a specific obstacle, i.e.Mut.ahhari did not have the opportunity to develop his political philosophyseparately and systematically. What he left in this regard are a variety ofrough and general political ideas which, in turn, make this chapter essentiallydifferent from the others. Two of the three of his major works on politicalissues namely Piramun-i Inqilab-i Islami (‘About the Islamic Revolution’)and Piramun-i Jumhuri-yi Islami (‘About the Islamic Republic’) are in factcollections of his articles, notes, speeches and interviews about the nature ofIslamic authority and Islamic revolution. The third, namely Nihz.at-ha-yiIslami dar S. ad Salih-yi Akhir (‘Islamic movements in the last one hundredyears’) was a draft of a public lecture in 1978 which was cancelled by theSAVAK. These were all published after his assassination in 1979, but do notform a well-developed, comprehensive, cohesive, and integrative work aboutthe Islamic political system or Islamic political ideology. They must beregarded as the result of an urgent need at the beginning of the IslamicRevolution in Iran for presenting an alternative political theory. At that timeMut.ahhari was fully engaged in revolution and the eventual structure of theIslamic Republic was not clear yet.

First, an explanation of the jurisprudential traditions and previoustheories within which Mut.ahhari was brought up in and belonged to will beprovided in this chapter. Then their influences on him and his views on eachpolitical issue will be pointed out at the end of a comparative discussion.

A glance at the past

Although Shi‘i political thought has not yet been gathered together in a majorcollection, it can be studied in books relating to Quranic exegeses and thepronouncement of the Imams; in parts of the philosophical literature relatingto practical philosophy, including books entitled Siyasat-namih, Andarz-namih, and Siyasat-i mudun; in parts of the theological publications relatingto the issues of nubuvvat, imamat and ghaibat (occultation); in historicalreports, particularly those relating to the ‘ulama’s actions when confronting

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P O L I T I C A L V I E W S

monarchs and governors, as well as major political events of their time; andalso in different areas of jurisprudence. However, those parts of the fiqh inwhich the fuqaha’s political views were presented are numerous.1 It isremarkable that in the Shi‘ite jurisprudential literature there did not exist anyindependent parts relating to the issues of vilayat, imarat or siyasat before the1850s. Most parts of fiqh consisted of ordinances and commandmentsconcerning individuals rather than the public or the state. Issues relating tothe government or state were usually explained in a normative form such as‘who should be the ruler, what qualifications he must possess, or what are tobe his duties’. This fact can be explained partly by the absence of a favourableenvironment for the development of literature. Throughout history, theShi‘ite have lived mostly as a minority under regimes which denied thembasic freedom. Therefore, they were kept in fear and far away from power.Yet it has been argued that the absence of freedom was less important thanthe absence of the social and political conditions which should precede oraccompany the emergence of any democratic system, such as the develop-ment of commerce and industry, and connected with it the rise of anautonomous bourgeoisie.2 However, this objection raises a host of issueswhich are not always related to political thought as an independent anddistinct branch of intellectual activity, which anyway is a fairly recentaddition to Islamic culture.

Apart from political and social factors, there is also a theological reasonfor the absence of an independent political section in Shi‘i jurisprudence. Itseems that Shi‘i law was gradually influenced by the doctrine of the ‘InfallibleImam’ as the legitimate ruler. Since temporary rule was considered asillegitimate, the fuqaha saw no need for developing the theory of the rule ofthe illegitimate ruler in their writings.3 Notions such as ‘infallibility is acondition for the ruler’, or ‘any uprising during the period of occultation israising the flag of deviation’,4 and discounting a long-lasting occultation bythe fuqaha, are among the elements responsible for the stagnation of Shi‘ipolitical law.5 Consequently, idealism and living at a distance from thesocial-political reality became the hallmarks of Shi‘i jurisprudence.

However, two social matters have been traditionally placed at theforefront of the fuqaha’s considerations. They are: qaz.avat (making legaljudgement) and umur-i h. isbiyih (or h. isbih).6 The latter was a suitable issuefor developing a political theory, so that a theory of Islamic government as aninstitution whose function is to be in charge of the umur-i h. isbiyih, could beconcluded from the expansion of these matters. But it was not developeduntil the period of the Constitutional Revolution. The contribution of thefuqaha towards the improvement of Shi‘i political thought has passedthrough four historical stages, as follows.

The first stage includes the period from the beginning of the ShortOccultation (Ghaibat-i s.ughra, Rabi‘a I, 260/874) until the establishment ofthe S. afavid dynasty in Iran in 1501. This stage was the period of formation,


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development and progress of Shi‘i jurisprudence relating to individuals.Matters concerning the public, government and basic rights had not yet beenconsidered in fiqh. Neither internal nor external conditions were ready for anopen discussion of these issues, and nor were the minds of the fuqaha.Although words such as h. akim-i shar‘a, sult.an and Imam with defined duties,like fulfilling some aspects of amr-i bi m‘aruf (calling people to good things)and nah-yi az munkar (prohibiting people from doing evil), making legaljudgement, implementing punishments, collecting and distributing religioustaxes (khums and zakat), saying special prayers, declaring the beginning ofparticular months for fasting and religious festivals, preparation for Hajjceremonies, guardianship of people who do not have guardians, and somespecial marital problems which cannot be solved by a local judge were seen aspart of the fuqaha’s responsibilities. Yet this does not necessarily mean thatwhen the fuqaha accepted these matters (as their general duties) they sawthemselves as the sole legitimate Islamic rulers. Although some political ideasmight be deduced from the passages in the Al-Muqni‘ih of Shaikh Mufid orAl-Khilaf of Shaikh T. usi, yet no political theory about the rule of a faqih or ajust ruler can be derived from these nor from other jurisprudential works ofthis period.7

The second stage covers the period between the S.afavids and the rise of theConstitutional Movement in the later era of the Qajar dynasty. Theformalization of Shi‘ism as the national religion of Iran and the growth of thefuqaha’s power are the distinguishing signs of this period. For the first time anumber of pamphlets about the land tax (Risalih-yi Kharajiyih), the FridayPrayer, and jihad were published during the period of the S.afavids and theQajars.8 These must be seen as the primary steps taken by the fuqaha towardsinvolvement in social and political affairs. It has been said that Muh. aqqiqKaraki (d. 1533), a distinguished Mujtahid of the S.afavid period, is the faqihwho set forth explicitly, although only briefly, the theory of the ‘Vilayat-iFaqih’ for the first time in Shi‘ite jurisprudence.9 In his thesis about the FridayPrayer, Muh. aqqiq Karaki argued that:

Our Shi‘i scholars fully agree that a just Imami faqih who possessesall conditions necessary for giving fatwas, and who is calledMujtahid in understanding religious ordinances, is the deputy[nayib] of the Imams in all aspects which involve the position ofdeputyship during the time of the Occultation. However the fuqahaprobably excluded [from the authority of the faqih] those matterswhich related to killing and punishment [h. udud]. Pleading to themfor justice and submitting to their judgement is obligatory [foreverybody]. He [faqih] is authorized to sell in times of need, theproperty of a [sentenced] person who refuses to settle his debt. Hehas authority [vilayat] over the properties of vanished people,orphans, the insane, financially irresponsible people [safih] and

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bankrupt businessmen. He can put under his authority the propertyof those people who are prohibited by a judge to use their properties. . . It means that a faqih who possesses certain qualifications isappointed by the Imams in all areas in which a deputyship ispossible.10

It is not clear whether Karaki had been thinking of establishing an Islamicrule by a faqih or not. His later move to Iraq, after his disagreement with theS.afavid ruler (Shah T. ahmasb) might be considered as a positive sign on thispoint.

However, the influence of the ‘ulama in society and the political establish-ment reached its height at this period when a monarch of the Qajars (Fath. -AliShah) received permission for his sovereignty from a well-known Mujtahid(Shaikh J‘afar Kashif al-Ghit.a), and set off for a (Russo-Persian) war after thefaqih had granted him permission.11 While the traditional religious mattersremained the responsibility of the fuqaha, the ruler as the administrator ofthe common matters (umur-i ‘urfiyih) was still in charge of worldly affairs atthis period.

Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1832), a distinguished Mujtahid of the Qajarera, is the man who formulated a more detailed theory of Vilayat-i Faqih andpresented it as an independent jurisprudential matter. In his ‘Ava’id al-ayyam, Naraqi pointed out that for the first time in the history of Shi‘itejurisprudence it is a duty of the fuqaha to manage and organize people’sworldly matters.12 This is certainly the first stipulation about the fuqaha’spolitical duty. Although he explained in detail the traditional duties of thefuqaha, he did not specify what he saw as the fuqaha’s duties concerningpeople’s worldly requirements. Yet he considered among the tasks of thefuqaha all the duties which a ruler (sult.an) must carry out for his people.Needless to say, this was a big step towards concluding a political theoryfrom the jurisprudential analyses.

While accepting the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih, Muhammad Hasan Najafi(d. 1850), a contemporary faqih of Naraqi argued in his Javahir al-kalamthat ‘This theory was not fully discussed among the ‘ulama. Therefore, manyquestions about it remained unanswered.’ Giving an example, Najafimentioned that ‘no clear discussion had taken place concerning particularsources of the faqih’s authority in the theory of the Vilayat-i Faqih. If hisauthority was due to the expansion of the umur-i h. isbih, why was hisauthority preferred to the authority of a just, believing ruler? And if it wasnot the case, was the authority granted to him by God, and the Imams whoappointed him for this position? Should his position be considered asdeputyship (niyabat) of the Imams or as representation (vikalat)?’13

In his Kitab al-Bai‘a, Shaikh Murtaz.a Ans. ari (d. 1864), a well-known

student of Naraqi, offered a brief discussion of the theory and presented acritical view of his teacher’s arguments.14 Ever since, the discussion about the


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theory of Vilayat-i Faqih has continued in the classes of the fuqaha toconcentrate on the issues of selling and buying (Kitab al-Bai‘a). In short, thisperiod can be considered as the beginning of the rise of the political doctrineof the Shi‘i fuqaha.

The third stage started from the time of the Constitutional Revolution andcontinued until the Uprising of 4 June 1963. At this stage, the fuqaha wereconfronted with a number of new social and political problems but alsobecame more familiar with political concepts beyond their area of compe-tence. Concepts such as the rights of people, freedom, social justice, divisionof powers, equality, attorneyship, guardianship, arbitrary rule, voting,legislation and constitution were used by the fuqaha in their debates anddiscussions. Therefore, the Constitutional Movement resulted in twodifferent approaches by the fuqaha. The traditional one was absolutelyagainst any changes in the political structure of society, and the other, themodernists’ approach, was in favour of changes and of formulating acompromise between the Shari‘at and the Constitution.

In fact, the political dispute between two eminent Mujtahids in theConstitutional Movement – namely Mirza Muhammad Husain Naini (1860–1936), the author of Tanbih al-Ummah va Tanzih al-Millah, and ShaikhFaz

.lullah Nuri (1843–1909), the author of Tadhkirat al-Ghafil va Irshad al-

Jahil – is considered as an important phase in the improvement of the Shi‘ipolitical doctrine.15 According to Naini, an Islamic rule cannot only be legiti-mized by a faqih, but also through the supervision of the fuqaha over thelegislative body. He argued that in a constitutional regime, where a faqih isnot able to establish a government, the legitimacy of the regime can beachieved through the supervision of the just Mujtahids over the parliament(Majlis). Surely, he argued, the just Mujtahids will keep the laws inaccordance with the Shari‘at.

Naini’s endeavours to provide a jurisprudential basis for the politicalrights of people and democratic institutions such as the Constitution, Majlis-i Shura (the parliament) and ‘Idalat Khanih (modern judiciary) under Islamicrule which was based on Shari‘at and religious orders is remarkable. Althoughhe developed and expanded Shi‘i political literature, his endeavours were notacknowledged by his successors and were not continued. Perhaps the execu-tion of Shaikh Faz

.lullah by the supporters of constitutionalism prepared the

ground for this discontinuance. Later, even the theory of Vilayat-i Faqihitself faced severe criticism from a number of fuqaha.

However, Ayatullah Burujirdi’s contribution to this issue, at the end ofthis stage, is of some interest. Although he rejected the jurisprudentialarguments for the theory of the Vilayat-i Faqih, he accepted the theologicalbase for the theory. While rejecting secularism, he argued that religion is notseparate from politics. He pointed out that it is the duty of a faqih in anIslamic society to manage social matters and political affairs.16 Evidently,these political views were not confirmed by his own courses of action when

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he became Grand Ayatullah and the Marj‘a-i taqlid for all Shi‘i communitiesin the world. As mentioned before, he did not support the Fadaiyan-i Islam intheir demand for the establishment of Islamic rule.

The fourth stage commences with the political views of AyatullahKhomeini. He is the only faqih in Shi‘ite history who was able to establish anIslamic government. His political views about the necessity of establishingIslamic rule and his opposition to the monarchy were secretly published inIran in 1970, when he taught Kitab al-Bai‘a in Najaf. He applied for the firsttime the term ‘h. ukumat-i Islami’ in fiqh and was clearly influenced by thearguments of Naraqi.17 Beside Kitab al-Bai‘a, Khomeini’s other publications,such as Kashf al-Asrar, al-Rasail, Tah. rir al-Vasilih, S. ah. ifih-yi Inqilab and theseries of S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, also cover his political thinking.18 His doctrine wasbased on four principles: first, it is necessary to establish a government foroperating Islamic laws in society; second, establishing Islamic rule andpreparations for its establishment, including opposition to oppressive rulers,are obligatory upon the just fuqaha. It is also obligatory for people to helpthe fuqaha and obey their orders. Third, h. ukumat-i Islami means the vilayah(custodianship) by the just fuqaha who are appointed by the Prophet of Islamin all the areas in which the Prophet and the Imams have the right ofcustodianship. Fourth, h. ukumat-i Islami and the governmental ordinancesare considered as the primary rules (ah. kam-i avvaliyih) which must beregarded prior to all other secondary ordinances. Therefore, preserving thewhole Islamic system is obligatory by the Shari‘at for everybody, whetherclerics or ordinary people.19

The first principle of Khomeini’s political doctrine is in fact a developmentof Burujirdi’s view of the combination of religion and politics. The secondprinciple is regarded as the theological basis for the Iranian Islamic Revo-lution, whereas the fourth principle must be seen as the theologicalfoundation for its continuity. The answer to the question of why the IslamicRevolution was led successfully by Khomeini, whereas other forms of socialchange (the Constitutional Revolution led by the fuqaha of Najaf andTehran, and the industrialization of oil movement led by the fuqaha ofTehran and Qum) all failed, certainly lies in the second principle. Hisparticular understanding of the issue of amr-i bi m‘aruf (calling people togood things) and nahyi az munkar (prohibiting people from doing evil)played a key role in this movement. Khomeini believed that calling thegovernment to do good things and prohibiting them from doing evil ones,especially in important matters relating to the dignity of Islam and thedestiny of Muslims, were obligatory for everyone no matter what the resultmight be, even the loss of life and property or being faced with difficulties.The existence of a T. aghuti (a most immoral transgressive regime) in anIslamic society was a great evil, and co-operation with this government wascreating an even greater evil.20 Furthermore, the silence of the ‘ulama wasprohibited in such a situation if it strengthened the oppressive regime.


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Protesting about and declaring hatred of oppressive persons are obligatoryupon the ‘ulama, even if it does not remove their oppression.21 On the otherhand, Khomeini considered the establishment of Islamic rule to be the mostimportant step in order to call people to do good. As a result, Khomeini,unlike the other fuqaha, was able to develop some jurisprudential argu-mentation for the Islamic Movement in Iran and he led the Revolution notonly to victory, but to the establishment of an Islamic government. This wascertainly not within the jurisprudential capacity and professional ability ofthe other fuqaha. Perhaps the most categorical difference between Khomeiniand the other fuqaha who believed in the Vilayat-i Faqih, is the former’s viewabout the preparations for establishing the rulership of a faqih. While theybelieved that rulership is obligatory for a faqih when the situation isprepared, Khomeini went a step further when he maintained thatpreparations for the rulership of faqih are also obligatory upon all Muslims.

Montazeri’s Vilayat al-Faqih (four vols) is generally regarded as the bestjurisprudential text that the Shi‘ite fuqaha have ever published on thismatter. Perhaps his position as the speaker of the Assembly of Experts(Majlis-i Khubrigan) for the codification of the constitutional law in 1979provided him with an opportunity to analyse the issue in more detail. LikeKhomeini, he supports the rulership of the faqih, yet his interpretation differsfrom that of his teacher.22

The necessity of having a ruler

As in the writings of a number of Shi‘i fuqaha such as Naini, S.adr, Montazeriand Khomeini, the necessity for establishing a government appears inthe writings of Mat.ahhari as an indisputable proposition.23 He firstrecognizes two types of discussions, namely sociological – which describedifferent types of political structures which have existed and continue toexist – and philosophical, which explain the nature and the function of theinstitution of governance. It deals with questions such as ‘What is theultimate justification for the existence of any form of government?’Preferring the second type of discussion, he argued, although in a ratherunsystematic fashion, that

Each society is in need of having a ruler, legislation, enforcement oflaw, preference for the general interests of society against thoseof individuals, unity, provision of social facilities, defence of itssubjects from foreign attacks, preventing people’s aggressive actsagainst each other, protecting people’s freedom and security,management, judiciary and settling hostilities, education, healthcare and protecting the cultural inheritance.24

He then concluded that

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rulership can be, in fact, regarded as the manifestation of the powerof society against foreign attacks, the manifestation of justice andinternal security, the manifestation of law inside the country, andthe manifestation of collective will in respect to foreign relations.25

Considering the issue to be self-evident, Khomeini pointed out that

The necessity of having a government in order to spread justice andexpand education in society, to protect society and to guard thefrontiers, to prevent oppression and foreign aggression, is regardedas self-evident. There is no difference in this matter between the timeof the presence of an Imam or the time of [his] occultation.26

Montazeri also saw it as an absolute necessity to have a ruling authority,no matter what its origins might be, whether it was formed rightfully byelection, or wrongfully by usurpation or by force or by inheritance. Heargued that despite its evil and corruption, an aggressive government iseventually better than sedition and chaos. Montazeri then supported his viewwith a Tradition from Ali ibn Abi-T. alib, who said ‘The most tyrannous andoppressive ruler is better than ever-lasting sedition’. It is also reported thatwhen Ali ibn Abi-T. alib heard the cry of Kharijites that ‘The verdict is onlythat of Allah’ he said:

The sentence is right but what [they think] it means, is wrong. It istrue that the verdict lies alone with Allah, but these people say that[the function of] governance is only for Allah. The fact is that there isno escape for men from rulership, good or bad. The faithful personperforms [good] acts in his rule while the unfaithful enjoys its[worldly] benefits . . . Through the ruler, tax is collected, the enemyis fought, roads are protected and the right of the weak is taken fromthe strong till the virtuous enjoy peace and are allowed protectionfrom [the oppression of] the wicked.27

As so often happens, Mut.ahhari’s main concern is again the Marxisttheory about the origin of rulership. According to the Marxist analysis, afterthe stage of primitive communism, the phenomenon of government appearedimmediately after the formation of ownership in history, merely to protectthe interests of the owners by force, against the interests of the exploitedclass. Rulership will only disappear in the classless society after passing thestage of socialism at the end of history. In his criticism, Mut.ahhari arguedthat justice is not fulfilled and crime does not disappear by itself in a classlesssociety. For its internal security it is in need of a centralized power.Communist society is also in need of national defence, foreign relations,enforcement of law and punishment. If the Marxists reply that there is no


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need for force and government because man will be united in future, andtherefore no external enemy, no foreign relations and no Defence Ministrywill exist, and if there is also no need for judiciary or security forces, becausethe origins of all crimes and violence, namely ownership, will disappear in thecommunist classless society, Mut.ahhari argues that the question of whethergovernment will disappear or not still remains unanswered, because thenew requirements which are created by the evolutional development incivilization demand an office for direction, guidance and management at thefinal stage. Therefore, the need for the institution of government andrulership as the manifestation of that demand will exist at that era.28

Another point which the fuqaha stress is that, since it is normal andindispensable to have a ruler, reason demands that the Islamic communityshould not be left without any instructions regarding rulership. Conse-quently, the Prophet could not, by any means, have died without appointinga ruler as his successor. From this reasoning emerges the Shi‘i doctrine of theImamat and the Imam’s function as ruler.29

Relationship between ruler and ruled

In order to approach the Islamic view about the type of relationship betweenruled and ruler, Mut.ahhari deals with the question of whether Islamconsiders the ruler to be the master and the owner of people, and the ruled hisslaves and servants, or regards the ruler as the attorney, representative andtrustee of his subjects and the ruled as the true holder of rights. Rejecting thefirst notion, Mut.ahhari explained that the Imam and the ruler are considered,in the Islamic texts, as the trustee who is the guardian of the rights of peopleand responsible to them. He argues that the position of rulership is regardedin the Quranic verse (Nisa: 58) as God’s Trust (amanat-i Ilahi) to people.Therefore it must be occupied by a reliable and honest person who canmaintain the rights of the people and not violate them. However, the rights ofpeople are not explained in his writings. Confirming his view by giving aterminological analysis of the two well-known words in Islamic politicalliterature, ‘ra‘iyat’ and ‘ra‘i’ which are applied to the ruled and the ruler,Mut.ahhari argued that these two words originated from ‘ra‘i ’ which meansprotecting and guarding. Therefore, ‘ra‘i ’ means protector and guardian and‘ra‘iyat’ a protected and guarded person. These two words were applied bythe Prophet for the first time in the meaning of ruler and ruled. It is reportedfrom the Prophet that he said: ‘All of you are regarded as guardians [ra‘a] andall of you are considered responsible. So, the Imam [the ruler] is guardian andhe is also responsible.’30 Then, Mut.ahhari seeks to highlight the mutual rightsof the ruled and the ruler. He refers to a saying from Ali ibn Abi-T. alib,delivered at the Battle of S. iffin, that

So now, Allah has, by placing me over your affairs, created my right

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over you, and you too have a right over me like mine over you. Aright is very vast in description but very narrow in equitability ofaction. It does not accrue to any person unless it accrues against himalso, and right does not accrue against a person unless it also accruesin his favour. If there is any right which is only in favour of a personwith no [corresponding] right accruing against him, it is solely forAllah, and not for His creatures.31

Mut.ahhari continues: ‘It is also reported from Ali ibn Abi-T. alib that hestated: “It is a duty of the Imam to rule [the society] in what Allah hasrevealed and to perform the Trust (amanat) to people. If he does that, itwould be the duty of the people to listen to him, and obey him and respondwhen he calls them”.’32

However, although Mut.ahhari did not clearly explain what the relation-ship between ruled and ruler should be in a situation when the ruler turns toaggression and oppression, he briefly pointed out that if one of the two (ruledand ruler) must be condemned for the benefit of the other, it is certainly theruler, not the ruled.33

Islamic rule

Despite his enthusiasm about h. ukumat-i Islami, it is not clear whyMut.ahhari did not develop the theory independently. He became familiarwith the theory during his friendship with the Fadaiyan-i Islam in Qum.Once, during his education in Qum, together with his classmate Montazerihe went to Ayatullah Khomeini and asked him to discuss the issue. As amember of Ayatullah Burujirdi’s office, Khomeini referred the request toBurujirdi, the head of the Qum Seminary. However, Burujirdi was notinterested in openly discussing the issue.34

In 1962, Mut.ahhari supervised a BA thesis about the issue, entitled‘Vilayat-i Faqih’. The 68-page thesis, which is still kept unpublished in theFaculty of Theology of the University of Tehran, was written by MuhammadJavad Bahunar, later a member of the Revolutionary Council and the PrimeMinister in 1981. This thesis stresses two points. First, Bahunar rejected thearguments which were presented by the supporters of Vilayat-i Faqih, amongthem Khomeini, namely that a faqih as a legitimate Islamic ruler gains hispolitical authority through appointment by the Imams (Naz.ari-yi nas.b). Heargued for the first time that a faqih should gain his political authority solelyfrom the people through elections (Naz.ari-yi intikhab). Second, Islamic rule,he maintained, does not consist of only one permanent and fixed form ofpolitical structure. As a result, Vilayat-i Faqih is not necessarily the only formof the legitimate Islamic ruling system. Islamic rule is a unique type of ruling.It might be considered similar to democracy in the form of the republic,because its ruling group and those who are in charge of the legislative system


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must be elected by the people. But it differs from the republican system inthree ways: it is based on the Islamic law and fatwas of a Mujtahid or a groupof Mujtahids; the aim of governing is fulfilling the real interests of the people,not their carnal desires; and the ruling group must be chosen from amongpious people.35 Therefore, each Islamic society, having regard to its ownsituation and interests, can have its own particular form of politicalstructure, whether it is headed by a faqih or not. The Islamic character of asociety can be completely achieved through operating the Islamic laws andelecting a pious ruler, whether he is a faqih or not. Indeed, it is exactly thesame idea that the Fadaiyan-i Islam were seeking to implement.

In his Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman (two vols) on which he lecturedduring 1967–72, Mut.ahhari is talking about the wide-ranging authority of alegitimate ruler (h. akim-i shar‘i), who gains his authority through a positionrecognized by the Imams and the Prophet. The legitimate ruler who is incharge, according to Mut.ahhari’s h. ukumat-i Islami, is certainly a Mujtahidor a faqih, not simply a pious ruler.36 In fact, it is exactly the same view thatwas presented by Ayatullah Khomeini at about the same time (January 1970)in Najaf.

However, in his notes on the issue of rulership which were published afterhis assassination, Mut.ahhari explained that the Islamic ruler must be chosenfrom within the framework of Shi‘i law, from among those who are qualifiedwith justice and fiqahat. The people are the electors. They choose eitherdirectly as in the selection of a marj‘a-i taqlid or indirectly by electing a groupof fuqaha who will eventually determine the Islamic ruler.37

In this book, Mut.ahhari’s approach to the issue is jurisprudential, notpolitical. When he was questioned on how Islam, as an eternal and non-abrogatable law, can provide answers for the broad number of complicatedmodern issues, he replied that not all Islamic laws and regulations are fixedand permanent. Some of them are temporary and changeable. A faqih as thelegitimate Islamic ruler (h. akim-i shar‘a) has a wide-ranging authority tolegislate new laws and regulations or abrogate old ones for the benefit ofsociety.38

In June 1978, Mut.ahhari was invited to lecture about the recent Islamicmovements at a conference in Tehran. Although the conference wascancelled by the police, the lecture was published soon after under the titleBarrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami dar S. ad-Salih-i Akhir. The first partof the book comprises Mut.ahhari’s analysis of recent Islamic reformers suchas Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asad-abadi, Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, Shaikh‘Abdul-Rah. man Kavakibi and Muhammad Iqbal. He then highlights brieflythe role of the Shi‘i ‘ulama in the recent political movements (in Iran andIraq) such as the Tobacco Uprising, the Constitutional Revolution and theIraq Revolution.39 The second part of the book, the more important one,relates to the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Mut.ahhari deals, at the beginning ofthis chapter, with the question of how the nature of an uprising could be

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recognized. He replied ‘Through different ways: from the groups and thepeople who carry out the uprising; from the causes which prepared theground for the uprising; from aims that the uprising follows; and from theslogans which mobilize and drive the uprising’. In his analysis, Mut.ahhariargued that

the Iranian Revolution does not belong to a particular class or partof the people. It belongs neither to workers, nor farmers, norstudents, nor intellectuals, nor the bourgeoisie. Rich and poor, manand woman, citizen and villager, religious and non-religious student,peddler and artisan, cleric and teacher, literate and illiterate arecontributing similarly to this uprising.

He then continued

A statement from the eminent Grand Ayatullahs who are leading theuprising has the same echo among all classes around the country. Itsecho in the city is the same as its echo in the village. Its sound in thefarthest parts of Khurasan and Azarbaijan is the same as its soundbetween the Iranian students in the furthest cities of Europe orAmerica. It excites the oppressed, deprived and exploited as well asthe exploiter . . . It is an uprising of the same type as the Prophets’uprising, namely raised from the depth of human nature, fromGod-consciousness [Khuda agahi] or God self-consciousness [khudagahi-yi Ilahi].40

Mut.ahhari then asked why the Revolution happened. He explained:

The reason for this uprising must be sought in the incidents whichhappened in Iran during the recent half-century. These incidentswere opposite to the Islamic sublime purposes and against the idealsof the Islamic reformers of the recent century. Normally, it could notcontinue forever without any reaction’.

He reasoned:

The wild and rough despotism, and the negation of freedom; theinfluence of modern colonialism, namely the unseen and dangerousform of colonialism, whether political, economic or cultural;secularism, namely removing religion from the political arena; thesearch for the restoration of ancient Iran and the revival of theMagian slogans and the destruction of the Islamic customs: that is,the substitution of the Hijrat calendar by the Magian calendar;distortion of the valuable heritage of Islamic culture and falsifying


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the evidence for this culture as Iranian [superstitious] culture; propa-gating state Marxism, namely the atheistic part of Marxism withoutits social and political sections; cruelly killing people and dis-honouring the blood of Iranian Muslims, and also imprisoning andtorturing political opponents; discrimination and intensified classdivision in spite of the claimed reforms; the dominance of non-Muslims over the governmental apparatus; the clear violation of theIslamic laws, whether directly or indirectly, in the form of propa-gating corruption; cleansing Islamic-Persian literature, which is theguardian of the Islamic spirit in Iran, under the pretext of combatingforeign terminologies; cutting relations with Islamic countries, andestablishing relations with non- or probably anti-Islamic countries,such as Israel. Such things as these have wounded the religiousconscience of our society for half a century, and driven it to the pointof explosion.41

Mut.ahhari’s type of analysis is remarkable. As mentioned before, healways seeks to explain a given social phenomenon (such as revolution) withcertain cultural and psychological elements or with its roots in humannature. His theory is called the theory of fit.rat, and is considered by him asthe key to understanding the Islamic view about human social history.42 Healso refuses to analyse a social fact merely through social elements; thereforehe never turns to a mere sociological theory. Unlike Shariati, he never uses inhis analyses the Marxist theory based on class division and class struggle.

However, the issue of leadership, in and after the Revolution seems to bethe centre of the second part of the book. Brushing aside non-clerical leaderssuch as Shariati and Bani-S.adr (the first President of the Islamic Republic ofIran, 1981), Mut.ahhari argues that a movement which is Islamic in its natureand has an Islamic objective is in need of a leadership knowledgeable aboutthe ideology of Islam, and its moral, social and political philosophy. Hemaintained:

It is evident that only those who have been brought up and aresteeped in an Islamic culture and who are thoroughly familiar withthe Quran, the Sunnat, fiqh, and ma‘arif-i Islami, can occupy theposition of leadership and thus it is only the ruh. aniyat [clergy] whocan lead such an Islamic movement.43

Mut.ahhari’s view about Abul-Hasan Bani-S.adr is interesting. Whilediscussing the issue of the leadership in the Revolution, Mut.ahharimentioned that he was encouraged by a friend to read an article entitled DarRavish. He also mentioned that he had not yet visited the writer of the article,who had been living in Europe (France) for many years, but that he wassincerely disposed towards him and recognized him as a Muslim with good

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intent. In this article Bani-S.adr had criticized the traditional leadership of the‘ulama (rahbari-yi sunnati). Bani-S.adr argued that

The traditional leadership who are the guardians of the [petrified]cultural frames can do nothing, because all areas of [their creative]thinking were (and are still) dried out. Occasionally, the resistanceof this leadership works, but eventually surrenders. Of course, SayyidJamal, Mudarris . . . and Khomeini belong to this kind of leadership.They were (and they are) incapacitated by the traditional leadershipbefore they became disabled by the enemy. They are friends. Helpshould be given to them and should be taken from them.44

Mut.ahhari first acknowledges that a progressive social (cultural)movement may sometimes lose its vital function and change to a series ofnon-effective mores and ceremonies. Nevertheless, he denies that the oldIslamic culture, which was guarded by the traditional leadership such asSayyid Jamal, Mudarris, T. aliqani and Khomeini, is the same as the dead andpetrified mores and customs: ‘Which type of [modern] leadership [led by theintelligentsia] could create such a wave and movement [in society] in themanner of the traditional leadership?’ He argues

Which type of non-traditional leadership (left or right) couldgenerate only one-tenth of the movements generated by thetraditional leadership during this century, which coincidentally hasbeen the period in which intellectuals have travelled to Europe andbeen modernist and anti-traditional.45

Without naming anybody, Mut.ahhari then mentioned that other indi-viduals had discussed in different ways to that of Bani-S.adr, the necessity ofremoving the leadership of the Islamic movement from the ruh. aniyat to theintelligentsia. Criticizing the view in a caustic passage, he stated:

Those honourable intellectuals have unfortunately woken up a bitlate, since the old guardians and custodians of this huge reservoir ofenergy and force [Islam] have already demonstrated [during theRevolution] that they are well aware of how to tap and make use ofthis source.

Then he concluded that

the ruh. aniyat will not allow anyone else to expropriate it. These dearintellectuals, who wake up with the hope of the shift of power everymorning, and who [sleep with the] dream of expropriating [it] everynight, would be better thinking of another job and another service to


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humanity. It is better that they let Islam and Islamic culture and thesources of the mental force generated by Islam remain under theauthority of the same custodians who have been trained in the sameenvironment, and whose words and intentions are better known bythe people.46

Furthermore, Mut.ahhari envisaged an Islamic society with the ‘ulama asthe ultimate decision-makers and was alarmed and distressed at the possiblepolitical ascent and domination of Islamic intellectuals. Even though theRevolution placed the ‘ulama in the position of leadership, Mut.ahhari warnsagainst the possibility of the intellectuals taking over the leadership andpredicts that if this happens, after one generation, Islam will undergo ametamorphosis and become completely distorted and mutilated.47

Mut.ahhari’s concern with the leadership of the ‘ulama and his misgivingsabout Islamic intellectuals are shared by Ayatullah Khomeini who uses thesame terminology as Mut.ahhari when he attacks the concept of an Islamwithout clergy (Islam-i minha-yi ruh. aniyat). Mut.ahhari calls it a ‘colonialistthesis’ and points out that nothing can replace our clergy. AyatullahKhomeini maintained:

Islam without the clergy is treason. They want to do away withIslam, so first they have to do away the clergy. First they say we wantIslam but we do not want the clergy. If the clergy is excluded, therewill be no Islam left. Islam has reached this point owing to the hardwork of the clergy . . . This thesis denies Islam. Beware, I warn you,of this great danger.48

In order to stress his point that the Revolution is in danger from theelements which might derail its course, Mut.ahhari turns to biological theoryand makes a comparison between social phenomena and living creatures. Inthe final part of his book, he shows how movements (revolutions), like allother living phenomena, can be infected by pests and diseases:

It is a duty of the leader of the movement to take measures for theprevention or eradication of such pests. The movement wouldcertainly become infertile, or change its aims, with adverse results, ifthe leader fails to pay attention to those pests or acts sluggishly intheir treatment.49

Six elements are generally considered by Mut.ahhari as being threats to theIslamic Revolution. They are as follows: the influence of alien thoughts(ideologies); the blind acceptance of modernity; penetration by opportunistsof the Islamic movement; ambiguity in planning the future; turning towardstemporary purposes and intentions; leaving the Revolution unfinished.

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Regarding the last point, Mut.ahhari explains that

Unfortunately, the history of Islamic movements in the presentcentury displays a [particular] deficiency in the ‘ulama ‘s leadership.It is that the ‘ulama led a number of movements successfully, butthey left the scene soon after the victory. Therefore, the result oftheir endeavours was gained by others and probably by the enemies.

Giving examples, he maintains that

The Revolution of Iraq succeeded due to the resistance of the Shi‘i‘ulama, but the result was not put into operation by them. Now wesee its consequences [in Iraq]. The Constitutional Revolution in Iransucceeded owing to the efforts of the ‘ulama, but they did notcontinue their efforts after the victory and did not benefit from theresults. Later, a rough dictatorship came on the scene and thereremained nothing of constitutionalism, except the name. Gradually,people became suspicious and thought that the dictatorial regimewas better than the constitutional order and constitutionalism was asin. It is much to be regretted that the ‘ulama considered their task asfinished at the time of the Tobacco Uprising after the cancellationof the Tobacco Concession. They could have benefited from thepeople’s readiness and put into operation a real Islamic regime.

In respect of the Islamic Revolution, he pointed out that

The Islamic Revolution of Iran is presently at the stage of refusal andnegation . . . Certainly the stage of fulfilment and reconstruction ismuch harder than the stage of negation and protesting. Now theintelligent people are worried whether the ‘ulama will leave theirtask uncompleted again.50

In his interviews with the press, held after the victory of the IslamicRevolution, Mut.ahhari made it clear that he does not mean that the ‘ulamamust necessarily hold the governmental posts and become a part of the stateapparatus. But they should continuously lead the Revolution and guide thenation:

Vilayat-i Faqih does not mean that a faqih should put himself in aposition as the head of government and govern practically [thesociety]. The position of a faqih in an Islamic country, whose peopleaccepted Islam as their ideology and are committed to it, is theposition of an ideologue, not the position of a governor. The task ofan Islamic ideologue is to watch carefully that the Islamic ideology is


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implemented correctly. He considers and confirms the suitability ofpersons who want to be the head of the Islamic government andenforce the laws.51

Proposing the return of the ‘ulama to their traditional centres (mosques)for continuing their traditional tasks as the spiritual guides of the people,Mut.ahhari warns that they should not leave the political arena. They shouldkeep their other role as the controller of governments and the challenger oftheir corruption. Furthermore, he also expressed his wishes that those ‘ulamawho occupied governmental posts because of the necessity of the Revolutionshould leave them as soon as possible. He did not mean that each clergyman,even if he was considered to be a suitable person for a particular post, must beprohibited from any governmental post because of his clerical position.52

In order to see how much the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iranwas influenced by Mut.ahhari’s political views, it is appropriate to considerthe passages and articles concerning the issues of Islamic governance and theauthority of the leader.

According to part of the preamble of the 1979 Constitution entitled‘Islamic Government’,

The plan of an Islamic government based upon Vilayat-i Faqih, as setforth by Imam Khomeini at the height of the period of repression andstrangulation practised by the despotic regime, created a new,distinct and consistent motive for the people, opening up beforethem the authentic path of Islamic ideological struggle. This in turncaused militant and committed Muslims to intensify their struggleboth within the country and abroad.

Another part of the preamble entitled ‘The form of government in Islam’maintains that

In creating, on the basis of ideology, the political institutions andorgans that are the foundation of society, the righteous will assumethe responsibility for governing and administering the country, inaccordance with the Quranic verse ‘Verily My righteous servantsshall inherit the earth’ [Anbiya: 105]. Legislation setting forthregulations for the administration of society will be established onthe basis of the Quran and the Sunnat. The exercise of meticulousand painstaking supervision by just, pious, and committed scholarsof Islam [al-fugaha al-‘udul] is an absolute necessity.

The importance of the office of a qualified faqih for the establishment ofthe Islamic Republic was also explained in another part of the preambleentitled ‘Governance of the Just Faqih’, as follows:

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In keeping with the principles of governance [Vilayat al-amr] andthe permanent necessity of leadership [Imamat], the Constitutionprovides for the establishment of leadership by a faqih possessing thenecessary qualifications [jami‘a al-sharayit.] and recognized as leaderby the people. This is in accordance with the h. adith ‘The conduct of[public] affairs is to be in the hands of those who are learnedconcerning God and are trustworthy guardians of that which He haspermitted and that which He has forbidden. Such leadership willprevent any deviation by the various organs of government fromtheir essential Islamic duties.

Although the Constitution was approved in a referendum held throughoutIran on 2–3 December 1979, nevertheless after a decade of sweet as well asbitter experiences of the Revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini realized that it wasnecessary to make certain amendments to it. The confusion, associated withthe lack of clarity in delineating responsibilities and in the assignment ofduties in the state machinery, had a direct impact on the functioning of thestate, particularly in the sectors which had sprung from the Revolution andthe birth of the Islamic Republic. The ambiguity over the role of the President(which had been evident during the political struggle between President Bani-S.adr and Prime Minister Rajai in 1980–1), and the differences between theCouncil of Guardians and the Consultative Assembly over legislation, forexample, were two areas needing urgent attention. So, on 24 April 1989, onAyatullah Khomeini’s instruction, a 25-member Constitution Review Panel(Shura-yi Baznigari-yi Qanun-i Asasi) was set up to discuss the reform of theConstitution. The main areas which needed further clarification were: theissue relating to the qualification of the leader; the centralization of theexecutive power; the centralization of judicial power; refinement of Article64 of the 1979 Constitution, about the membership rights and number ofDeputies elected to the Majlis from the recognized minorities in Iran; thecentralization of management of the radio and television services; and theclarification and formalization of the duties and rights of the ExpediencyCouncil (Majm‘a-i Tashkhis. -i Mas. lah. at). By 11 July, the final amendmentsto the Constitution had been made and, while Khomeini had passed away, itwas put to a referendum on 28 July 1989 and was ratified by the majority ofthe people.

Regarding the issue of leadership, the 1989 amendments proposedchanges, particularly to the sections relating to the selection and administra-tive responsibilities of the leader. Some five alterations to the 1979Constitution addressed the status of the leader and his role and duties.Articles 5, 107 and 109–11 deal with these matters. Article 5 of the amendedConstitution is particularly important, as it erases an important qualificationclause present in the 1979 version which stated:


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During the Occultation of the Vali-i ‘As. r (may God hasten hisreappearance) the vilayat and leadership of the ummat devolve uponthe just and pious faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances ofhis age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrativeability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority ofthe people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized bythe majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council, composed offuqaha possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will assumethese responsibilities in accordance with Article 107.

Article 107 (of the 1979 Constitution) deals with the procedure forelecting the leader or the Leadership Council and maintains:

Whenever one of the fuqaha possessing the qualifications specifiedin Article 5 of the Constitution is recognized and accepted as marj‘a[the source of imitation] and leader of the people by a decisivemajority – as has been the case with the exalted marj‘a-i taqlid andleader of the Revolution, Grand Ayatullah Imam Khomeini – he is toexercise governance and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. Ifsuch should not be the case, experts elected by the people will reviewand consult among themselves concerning all persons qualified toact as marj‘a and leader. If they discern outstanding capacity forleadership in a certain marj‘a, they will present him to the people astheir leader; if not, they will appoint either three or five marj‘apossessing the necessary qualifications for leadership and presentthem as members of the Leadership Council.

The qualifications and conditions for the leader or members of the Leader-ship Council were described in Article 109 (of the 1979 Constitution) asfollows: ‘a. suitability with respect to learning and piety, as required for thefunction of mufti and marj‘a; b. political and social perspicacity, courage,strength, and the necessary administrative abilities for leadership’.

However, Article 107 of the amended Constitution refers to the appoint-ment of the leader as being the task of

the experts [in Islamic sciences] elected by the people, who willreview and consult among themselves concerning all the fuqahapossessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. If in theevent they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations, thesubjects of the fiqh, or in political and social issues, or possessinggeneral popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifi-cations mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the leader.Otherwise, in the absence of such a superiority, they shall elect and

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declare one of them as the leader. The leader thus elected by theAssembly of Experts shall assume all the powers of the Vilayat al-amr and all the responsibilities arising therefrom.

Then Article 109 of the amended Constitution describes the essential quali-fications and conditions for the leader as follows:

a. scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti indifferent fields of fiqh; b. justice and piety, as required for theleadership of the Islamic ummat; c. right political and socialperspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities andadequate capability for leadership. In case a multiplicity of personsfulfil the above qualifications and conditions, the person possessingthe better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be givenpreference.

It is clear that A. Ehteshami’s argument that ‘The proposed changes,published after Ayatullah Khomeini’s death, finally removed the position offaqih as the most powerful single authority in the land’, is not true.53 It isexactly the position of marj‘a-i taqlid in Article 107 which was replaced byfaqih or experts in the amended Constitution. Undoubtedly, these expertshave also to be Mujtahids in fiqh and other Islamic sciences.

While many of the functions of the leader under the new amendedConstitution remained the same as under the old, there were certain instanceswhere his powers were subject to re-examination. His supervisory role wasexpanded, and a new consulting body, as the ultimate decision-maker attimes of disagreement between the Islamic Consultation Assembly and theCouncil of Guardians, was proposed. In spelling out the functions and dutiesof the leader, Clause 1 of Article 110 reads as follows: ‘Delineation of thegeneral policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with theNation’s Expediency Council [Majm‘a-i Tashkhis. -i Mas. lah. at]’. No suchprovision existed during Ayatullah Khomeini’s leadership. This Article alsolists eleven functions and authorities for the leader, ranging from makingappointments to religio-political and military establishments to declare waror peace and mobilize the armed forces, (Clause 5). By contrast, the 1979Constitution listed six ‘functions and authorities’ of the leader, including theabove clause. The 1989 amendments removed the leader’s power to dismissthe President. This can happen only at the suggestion of the Majlis whenendorsed by the judiciary. The final draft of the amendments also dropped areference to the leader’s constitutional right to dissolve the ConsultativeAssembly under certain circumstances. Encountering strong opposition fromthe Majlis Deputies, the new leader instructed the Constitution Review Panelto erase this clause altogether.

In order to ensure continuity in the political establishment, the amended


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Constitution made specific provisions, in the events of the death, resignationor removal of the leader. Article 111 states that

Till the appointment of the new leader, a council consisting of thePresident, head of the judiciary power, and a faqih from theGuardian Council, upon the decision of the Nation’s ExpediencyCouncil, shall temporarily take over all the duties of the leader.

The 1979 Constitution required only that provision should be made for theexperts to be convened for the purpose of studying and implementing thisArticle.

Although the highest official of the Islamic Republic, namely the leader,must, according to both Constitutions, be chosen from the high-rankingofficials of the clerical establishment, nevertheless there is no restrictionconcerning his ethnic origin or his nationality; he does not, therefore, need tohave Iranian nationality. As can be deduced from Article 109, which relatesto the qualifications and attributes of the leader or members of the Leader-ship Council, there is no mention of Iranian origin or Iranian nationalityamong the required qualifications.

The most significant constitutional development was the abolition of theoffice of the Prime Minister. Article 60 of the new Constitution stated that‘The functions of the executive, except in the matters that are directly placedunder the jurisdiction of the leadership by the Constitution, are to beexercised by the President and the Ministers.’ Article 60 of the 1979 Consti-tution had proclaimed: ‘The exercise of the executive power is by means ofthe President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers, exceptfor matters directly assigned to the leadership by this Constitution.’

However, the Iranian Constitution considers the President of the IslamicRepublic as the second official of the country. According to Article 113(Chapter IX) of the Constitution,

After the office of leader, the President of the Republic is the highestofficial position in the country. His is the responsibility for imple-menting the Constitution, ordering relations among the threepowers, and heading the executive power, except in matterspertaining directly to the leadership.

Although the President must be of Iranian origin and also an Iraniannational, there is no mention of being a cleric. Article 115 of bothConstitutions states that

The President of the Republic must be elected from among religiousand political personalities possessing the following qualifications:Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative and managerial

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capacities; a good past record; trustworthiness; piety; convincedbelief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iranand the official madhhab [religion] of the country.

Another significant amendment is to be found in the Constitution’streatment of the judiciary. First, it abolished the five-member Judicial HighCouncil as the highest judicial authority in the Republic and replaced it witha single appointment (made by the leader), to be known as the Head of theJudiciary (Chief Justice). Article 157 maintains that

In order to fulfil the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all thematters concerning judiciary, administrative and executive areas,the leader shall appoint a just Mujtahid, well versed in judiciaryaffairs and possessing prudence and administrative abilities, as thehead of the judiciary power for a period of five years, who shall bethe highest judicial authority.

Second, that the leader appoints instead two Mujtahids as the chief of theSupreme Court and the Public Prosecutor-General (as was the case underArticle 162 of the 1979 Constitution); the appointments are to be made bythe head of the judiciary. Finally, it can generally be concluded that,consistent with the procedures regarding the presidency of the Republic andthat of the choice of the leader, the 1989 amendments moved towards thecentralization of the structure of power.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, two interpretations ofIslamic rule (h. ukumat-i Islami) have existed among Iranian Islamist groupsand scholars. According to one interpretation, Islamic rule can be achievedby operating Islamic laws in society, without regard to whether the ruler is aMujtahid or simply a just (non-clerical) individual. The second interpretationdefines Islamic rule not only in terms of Islamic laws, but also in terms of anIslamic ruler. Hence, it is not enough for an Islamic ruler to be simply a justpolitician able to implement the Islamic laws; he must be, rather, a jurist ableto deduce the needed laws and regulations systematically from the Islamicsources. Such a ruler can only be a Mujtahid, a faqih.

Mut.ahhari was clearly in favour of the second interpretation. Hislegitimate ruler (h. akim-i shar‘a) is granted broad authority which wasexplained in detail in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A reconsideration of the different interpretations ofthe theory of Islamic rule

The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran clearly played an importantrole in the development of Shi‘ite political doctrine. Soon after the IslamicRevolution, discussions about the theory of the Vilayat-i Faqih emerged in


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clerical seminaries in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon as a matter of immediateconcern. Existing interpretations of the theory were clarified with furtherexplanations, and a number of new interpretations appeared.

A major characteristic which these interpretations and theories have incommon is that they all belong to the class of mainstream classical politicaltheories, in that they can be defined, roughly, as offering advice aimed atachieving an ideal society. One of the most difficult and perplexing questionsin political philosophy is: ‘Who should rule?’ Almost all the classical theorieshave dealt with this question and they can all be classified according to howthey attempt to answer it. A person who holds that ‘the people should rulethemselves’ is advocating democracy; one who advocates ‘one-man rule’ maybe a monarchist, or a supporter of an Islamic rule in the form of the Vilayat-iFaqih. As opposed to such classical theories, modern theories are based on‘philosophical analysis’, with the purpose of clarifying given political orachieved advice towards the attainment of an ideal society, and the termsused in political discussions. Thus such questions as ‘What is meant by thephrase “universal human rights” as this appears in the Charter of the UnitedNations?’, are discussed, and ‘What is the correct analysis of the word“state”?’ and so forth. The fuqaha’s interpretations of Islamic rule can bedivided into five groups: (i), interpretations which regard the fuqaha ascollectively appointed custodians of the people (Vilayat-i Intis. abi-yi Faqih);(ii), interpretations which limit the authority of the fuqaha to particularsocial matters, which are generally called umur-i h. isbih; (iii), the interpre-tation which maintains that the fuqaha should have a supervisory role only,and leave politics for the people (Niz.arat-i Faqih va Khilafat-i Mardum); (iv),interpretations which regard an elected faqih as being the custodian of thepeople (Vilayat-i Intikhabi-yi faqih); (v), interpretations which see any rulingfuqaha merely as the representatives of the people (Vikalat-i Faqih).

Regardless of their specific interpretations of the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih,all Shi‘i fuqaha are in agreement with the Shi‘i theologians (mutikallimin) infive principles: first, that absolute sovereignty over the world and manbelongs to God, and that it is He who has placed man in charge of his socialdestiny, so that the establishment of rulership without His permission orapproval is illegitimate; second, that in the era of the Infallible Imams’presence, it was they who were the most preferred persons for the task of thepolitical leadership of society; third, that the institution of government is anecessary element for the existence of society; fourth, that government mustbe humble before the religious teachings, that laws and regulations must notbe repugnant to the Islamic ordinances, and that a suitable environment forthe improvement of religious social objectives must be established; fifth, thatbeing Muslim and a believer, trustworthy and just, a manager andexperienced are six fundamental qualifications of an Islamic ruler.54

The theories mentioned above have in common that the three specificareas of giving fatwas, making legal judgements, and directing matters

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generally (called umur-i h. isbih) should be regarded with certainty as parts ofthe fuqaha’s authority. They also agree that people’s personal interests,beliefs and property are totally excluded from the fuqaha’s authority.55 Thisprinciple is fully reflected in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.According to Articles 22–3 of Chapter III (the Rights of the People):

The dignity, life, property, rights, dwelling, and occupation of theindividual are inviolable, except in cases sanctioned by the law. Theinvestigation of individuals’ beliefs is forbidden, and no-one may bemolested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief.

In Article 25 it is mentioned that

The inspection of letters and the failure to deliver them, therecording and disclosure of telephone conversations, the disclosureof telegraphic and telex communications, censorship, or the wilfulfailure to transmit them, wiretapping, and all forms of covertinvestigation are forbidden, except as provided by law.

Similarly, Article 28: ‘Everyone has the right to choose any occupation hewishes, if it is not opposed to Islam, the public interest, or the rights ofothers’. Articles 32 and 33:

No-one can be arrested except in accordance with judgement andthe procedure established by law. No one can be banished from hisplace of residence, prevented from residing in his preferred location,or compelled to reside in a given locality, except as provided in law.

According to Articles 37, 38 and 39,

Innocence is to be presumed, and no-one is to be regarded as guiltyunless his guilt has been established by a competent court. Any formof torture for the purpose of extracting confessions or gaininginformation is forbidden. It is not permissible to compel individualsto give testimony, make confessions, or swear oaths, and anytestimony, confession or oath obtained in this fashion is worthlessand invalid. Punishments for the infringement of these principleswill be determined by law. All affronts to the dignity and honour ofpersons arrested, detained, imprisoned or banished in accordancewith the law, whatever form they may take, are forbidden and liableto punishment.

It is now interesting to look more closely at each of these five interpretations.The first of them, in which the fuqaha are regarded as appointed custodians


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of the people (Vilayat-i Intis. abi-i Faqih) is the interpretation presented byAyatullah Khomeini which is based upon four major pillars: vilayat, vilayat-imut.laqih, intis. ab, and fiqahat.

The first, vilayat, etymologically derived from valiya (nearness, closeness),is used in several different meanings such as closeness, assistance, kindness,principality, domination, sovereignty and a city over which a ruler domi-nates.56 It is the usage of vilayat in its senses of principality, domination andsovereignty that are important in understanding the Islamic political texts.

Turning first to the Quranic verses, that God is the master (vali) of thosewho have faith (Baqarih: 257); the Prophet is closer (aula) to the believersthan their own selves (Ah. zab: 6); wrongdoers stand as protectors (auliya) ofeach other but Allah is the protector (vali) of the righteous (Jathiyih: 19); thebelievers, men and women, are also protectors (auliya) of each other(Taubih: 71), for the Quran commands the believers not to take for friendsand helpers (auliya) unbelievers rather than believers (Al-i ‘Imran: 28); whilethe authority (vilayat) of unbelievers and oppressors over believers is seenas the authority of Satan and T. aghut (the most immoral transgressive)(Taubih: 71).57

With regard to Tradition, it is widely reported in the famous Tradition ofal-Ghadir, that upon his Farewell Pilgrimage, the Prophet broke his journeyat a place called Ghadir-i Khum, and addressed his companions thus: ‘Who isyour protector [vali] and closer (aula) to you than yourselves?’ They all said:‘Allah and his messenger.’ Then the Prophet stated: ‘He whose master[maula] I am, his master is [also] Ali.’58 Similarly the Fifth Shi‘i Imam, al-Baqir, is reported as having said to Zurarih, one of his companions: ‘Islam isbased on s.alat [prayer], zakat [alms tax], h. ajj [pilgrimage to Mecca], s. aum[fasting], and vilayat [accepting the Imams’ authority].’ Zurarih is said tohave asked him: ‘Which one is the preferred?’ The Imam said: ‘Vilayat is thepreferred, since it is the key to the others, and the vali [ruler] is the guide tothe others.’59

In Shi‘ite theology, vilayat and Imamat, vali and Imam have the samemeaning. Apart from the position of prophethood, which came to an endwith the Prophet Muhammad, the Imams share the other positions with him.They are interpreters of the book of God (the Quran), judges amongMuslims, and also the Imams and valis of their society.60

In fiqh, Vilayat means ‘having authority over others and being in charge oftheir affairs’. For instance, the heirs of a victim are seen as authorized (havingvilayat) to retaliate, forgive or take compensation (blood-money).61

In his jurisprudential lessons on the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih, Khomeiniargued that

All political and governmental matters which were placed under theauthority of the Prophet and the Imams, are to be laid, with nodifference, under the authority of a just faqih. This is because the

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Islamic ruler, whoever he might be – the Prophet, the Imams, or thefuqaha – is positioned to operate the Shari‘at and God’s orders, andto collect Islamic taxes and distribute them in the interests ofMuslims. Therefore, if the Prophet and the Imams punished anadulterer with a hundred lashes, or collected religious taxes follow-ing a particular procedure, a faqih must operate [in the position ofan Islamic ruler] the same procedure. If a faqih issues, anywhere orany time, orders that accord to the extent of his authority, it isobligatory upon all to obey these orders.62

Second, Vilayat-i mut.laqih, or Vilayat-i ‘ammih, means that the authorityof a competent faqih is not restricted to the matters which are generally calledumur-i h. isbih. Instead, all public, social, political, governmental and statematters are placed under his authority. Although the fuqaha’s authority overgovernmental and state affairs (umur-i sult.ani) was seen by AyatullahKhomeini as being unlimited, it is in fact conditioned upon the interests of theIslamic society. Consequently, the fuqaha are not authorized to take anymajor decision without determining the interest of the nation.63 AyatullahKhomeini argued that

The right of custodianship [vilayat] for the fuqaha has been estab-lished by the Shi‘i Imams in all areas in which they were authorizedby their Imamat over the ummat. All the authorities which wereapproved for the Prophet and the Imams regarding their rights ofsovereignty and vilayat over the people can also be claimed for thefuqaha. The fuqaha have authority in all governmental matters, andtheir orders, concerning the general interests of Islamic society, areto be obeyed.64

While explaining his understanding of the full authority (Vilayat-i mut.laqih)of the legitimate Islamic ruler, in his well-known letter to the then-PresidentKhamenei on 5 January 1988, Khomeini argued

The issue of governance, which is regarded as a part of the Prophet’sfull authority, is one of the primary ordinances [ah. kam-i avvaliyih]which has to be considered as being prior to all secondaryordinances [ah. kam-i far‘iyih] such as prayer, fasting and h. ajj. TheIslamic government is authorized to cancel unilaterally all legalcontracts held with the people, when these contracts are shown tooppose Islam and the interests of the country. The Islamicgovernment can prevent the practice of any affair related to worshipor non-worship, as long as it is considered to oppose the interests ofIslam. I say explicitly that all that has been rumoured, that someIslamic economic agreements such as muz.aribih and muzari‘ih


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would be removed by the view of the full authority of the Islamicgovernment, is not true. Had it been so, it would be among thoseissues placed under the discretion of the government. There are someother issues about which I do not like to disturb you.65

A number of contemporary Grand Ayatullahs such as Sayyid MuhammadReza Gulpayigani (d. 1993) and Sayyid ‘Abdul-A‘ala Sabzavari (d. 1994) areregarded, although with some minor differences, as being among the sup-porters of this interpretation.66 However, it has been argued that althoughthe authority of the faqih, as the ultimate decision-maker of Islamic society,is restricted to the interests of Islamic society, nevertheless that authority isnot, according to this interpretation of Islamic rule, subject to constitutionallaw. Since the legitimacy of the constitutional law is due to the ratification ofthe faqih, this law cannot put restrictions on his authority.67 Perhaps the estab-lishment of the nation’s Expediency Council (Majm‘a-i Tashkhis. -i Mas. lah. at)for solving problems relating to the legislative power, in February 1988 inIran, is the best example of this point. While it had not been mentioned in theConstitution of the Islamic Republic, Ayatullah Khomeini ordered theformation of this Council, and appointed its members. Similarly, by his orderof 24 April 1989, a number of experts were appointed to amend the consti-tutional law on a number of issues, including the authority of the leader.Their conclusions were put to a referendum on 28 July 1989 and were rati-fied by a clear majority. According to Article 57 of the amended Constitution:

The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in thelegislature, the judiciary, and the executive, functioning under thesupervision of the full authority of the faqih [Vilayat-i Mut.laqih-yiFaqih] in accordance with the forthcoming Articles of this Consti-tution. These powers are independent of each other.

Section 8 of Article 110 of the amended Constitution, which is about theduties and powers of the leadership, removed the problem of illegality on theacts of such a fully authorized faqih in the future: ‘Resolving those problemswhich cannot be solved by conventional methods through the Nation’sExpediency Council’ are henceforth placed under the duties of the leadership.

In response to the objections to the apparently unconditional nature of thefaqih’s authority and power, and its superficial resemblance to dictatorship,Khomeini relies on the moral qualifications of the Islamic ruler:

since the vali-i faqih must meet the condition of being qualified with‘adalat [justice], dictatorship is excluded, according to the doctrineof Vilayat-i mut.laqih-yi faqih, because the faqih would immediatelybe dismissed by himself (due to his failing to meet the qualification),if he practised dictatorship.68

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However, the Assembly of Experts is posited by the Constitution of theIslamic Republic as the means of determining whether the leader stillpossesses the qualifications for the position of leadership or has failed.According to Article 111 of the Amended Iranian Constitution:

Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his consti-tutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned inArticles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possesssome of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed. Theauthority of determination in this matter is vested with the expertsspecified in Article 108.

Intis. ab (appointment), the third foundation of Ayatullah Khomeini’stheory, means that the fuqaha were appointed generally (nas.b-i ‘amm) by theImams as the custodians (vali) of the Shi‘ite communities. This is exactly thesame in substance as the appointment of the first Imam, Ali ibn Abi-T. alib,although his was a particular appointment (nas.b-i khas. ), made by theProphet at Ghadir-i Khum in 633 as his successor and as the vali of Islamicsociety. A number of examples of this view can be found in Khomeini’swritings and speeches. For instance, ‘The faqih is “appointed” by theInfallible Imams for the purpose of making legal judgement, Vilayat andh. ukumat, in all aspects which the Muslims need for organizing their lives andbusinesses.’69 In his order to Mahdi Bazargan of 3 February 1979, author-izing the establishment of a Provisional Government, he stated that

I appointed him as the governor [h. akim] because of the authority[Vilayat] I hold by the holy Shari‘at. His orders must be obeyed[vajib al-ittiba‘a]; his governing is a Shar‘i rule, not an ordinary one;opposing this government is opposing the Shari‘at.70

This idea is also repeated in his statement for the confirmation of thepresidency of Muhammad Ali Rajai, on 1 August 1981.71 However, it seemsthat he eventually changed his view and adopted the theory of vilayat of anelected faqih, which was presented by Ayatullah Husain Ali Montazeri afterthe establishment of the Islamic Republic. In his letter of 9 Urdibihisht1368/28 April 1989, to Ayatullah Ali Mishkini, head of the ConstitutionReview Panel (Shura-yi Baznigari-yi Qanun-i Asasi), Ayatullah Khomeiniargued that

Concerning the issue of leadership, it is obvious that we cannot leavethe Islamic society without a custodian [sarparast]. We must ‘elect’ aperson who can defend our Islamic prestige in the world of politicsand fraud. If people vote for experts to choose a just Mujtahid forleading their government, and then the experts choose somebody (a


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Mujtahid) for the position of leadership, he would necessarily beaccepted by the people. In this situation, he would be considered asthe ‘elected’ custodian [vali-i muntakhab] of the people and hisorders should be obeyed.72

Needless to say, a Mujtahid considers himself, according to the doctrine ofthe appointment, as the general deputy (nayib-i ‘amm) of the Imam and gainsthe legitimacy for his leadership and rule (vilayat) from the Shari‘at, whereasthe legitimacy and legality of his political authority, according to the doctrineof vote and election, originate with the people. While the Assembly ofExperts represents the people in discovering among the qualified Mujtahidswho is to be the appointed custodian, it then hands over, on the people’sbehalf, their right of sovereignty to the chosen Mujtahid.

The major characteristics of the doctrine of ‘general appointment’ can bedescribed as follows: first, it is not so much that a particular person is chosenand appointed; it is his qualifications or titles such as fiqahat and ‘adalat thatare in fact chosen and appointed respectively. Second, it is possible that theremight exist no-one suitable at a particular time, and at another a number ofqualified persons. Third, all such qualified persons are actually appointed,and no-one is, in this respect, preferred to the others. Fourth, no suchqualified person is permitted to oppose another competent individual, if he isable to implement his authority before the others.73 Consequently, it can beconcluded that: all just fuqaha, rather than a particular just faqih, havevilayat over the people; should there be a number of just fuqaha, all of themare considered as appointed; all just fuqaha have an actual, rather than amerely potential, vilayat over the people; if a just faqih finds the opportunityto practise his vilayat, the other just fuqaha must respect his authority, andare not permitted to challenge him.

Fourth is fiqahat. Although the Islamic ruler must be qualified on anumber of conditions, including being a Shi‘i, born legitimately, male, just,and a competent manager, he must definitely be a faqih, a Mujtahid. It isbecause of the importance of this condition that the theory is termed Vilayat-i Faqih. Khomeini argues that according to a letter from the Twelfth Imam,the Shi‘i communities are permitted to refer their major affairs (h. avadith-ivaqi‘ih) solely to those who narrate the sayings of the Imams (ruvat-ih. adith).74 Needless to say the fuqaha are regarded by Khomeini as thetrue narrators of the sayings of the Imams. Consequently, establishing apolitical regime in a Shi‘i community without the authority of a faqih isconsidered by this theory as an aggressive (T. aghut) and illegitimategovernment.75

Ayatullah Khomeini’s understanding of the importance of fiqh among theIslamic sciences differs from that of the traditionalist fuqaha. While thetraditionalists continue to concentrate mostly on personal matters, forKhomeini fiqh mostly concerns political and governmental issues:

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A Mujtahid should have a comprehensive understanding of his era.Rulership [h. ukumat] is regarded by a true Mujtahid as the practicalreason for the whole of fiqh in all aspects of human life. Governmentis the guide for the practical aspects of fiqh in its confrontation withall social, political, military and cultural problems. Fiqh is thefactual and comprehensive theory for directing man and societyfrom cradle to grave. The essential objective is to see how we wantthe firm principles of fiqh to be operated and practised by theindividual and society, and how we want to combat the problems.76

It can be concluded, therefore, that Khomeini sought to discern solutions forall social, political and cultural problems, not by modern intellectualsciences, but solely by Shi‘i jurisprudence. It has been said that he was infavour of establishing a type of management based on fiqh, rather than usinga scientific one.77 Undoubtedly his latest jurisprudential initiative for solvingthe country’s social and governmental problems by ‘orders’ (h. ukms), ratherthan mere fatwas, is regarded as a new phase in Shi‘i jurisprudence in itsadaptability towards temporal matters. While a fatwa is general (kulli), anh. ukm is specific (juzi). Fatwas are deduced from the Islamic jurisprudentialsources (Quran, Traditions, reason and consensus) whereas h. ukms areaddressed to the Mujtahid’s understanding of his time and place (zaman vamakan). While all fuqaha are positioned to make fatwas, only a faqih inauthority over the people’s governmental matters is permitted to issue anh. ukm. In giving a fatwa, a Mujtahid has no need to consult with others,whereas the vali-yi faqih issues his orders in consultation with the experts.While a Mujtahid issues his fatwa on the supposition that the fatwa is for thebenefit of whoever implements it, in the position of the Islamic ruler he issuesgovernmental orders (ah. kam-i h. ukumati va sult.ani) after being assured,following consultations with the experts, that his order is in accordance withthe public’s interests. However, these orders are similar to fatwas and theIslamic ordinances in that they are regarded as obligatory and must beobeyed by the public.78

Turning to the second group of interpretations, two distinguished con-temporary Ayatullahs, Sayyid Abul-Qasim Khui (d. 1992) and ShaikhMuhammad-Ali Araki (d. 1994) were considered among those whosupported the idea that a faqih is authorized to direct those particular socialmatters which are generally called umur-i h. isbih. Khui argued

The position of Vilayat is exclusively delegated to the Prophet andthe Imams. During the time of absence [of the Twelfth Imam], thisposition cannot be confirmed by any reasoning for the fuqaha.Although two traditional positions of the fuqaha, namely making


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legal judgements and giving fatwas, can be addressed to the sayingsof the Imams as one source of Ijtihad, the fuqaha’s state authority[vilayat] over people’s lives and properties cannot be proven by anyjurisprudential argumentations. However, a number of specificmatters which are generally called the umur-i h. isbih were put by theShari‘at under the fuqaha’s authority. Cases such as looking afterthe affairs of orphans, the insane and the financially irresponsible[safih], lost and bankrupt persons, are considered as such areas. Thevilayat on these matters does not mean that the fuqaha or theiragents are granted the authority of the state over the lives andproperties of these people; rather that they are permitted by theShari‘at merely to look after and direct their affairs for the benefit ofthese people’.79

Providing more explanations, Araki maintained that the position of asuitably qualified faqih is to enforce the punishment laws, issue fatwas, makelegal judgements, and organize the affairs of disappeared and abnormalpersons (ghayib va qas. ir) who cannot do so for themselves. The reasonspresented for the necessity of Islamic rule – that is, protecting the territory ofIslam, safeguarding the people’s lives, their reputation and properties, andpreventing the aggression of non-Muslims against the Muslim frontiers – aregeneral and do not apply to a particular group. There is no particular basis inShi‘i texts for the argumentation that people’s worldly matters must beexclusively directed by the fuqaha. If a non-faqih ruler is able to implementthe above-mentioned duties, and is ready to submit his sovereignty to theTwelfth Imam (until his reappearance), his rulership cannot be counted asaggressive and illegitimate.80

The establishment of the Islamic Republic influenced the debate further.This became visible in the argumentation about the theory of h. isbih inparticular, when a supporter of this theory, Ayatullah Shaikh Javad Tabrizi,added a new argument to those already stated. Tabrizi argued that

It is evident that the Shari‘at does not accept a corrupt andoppressive person to be in charge of the daily affairs of Muslims. If afaqih or a person authorized by a faqih takes charge of the people’sdaily matters, others (including the other fuqaha) are not permittedto weaken him. It could be argued that submission to his ruleconcerning matters relating to the order of society is obligatory.However, his authority does not exceed protecting the territory ofIslam and the Muslims’.81

The third set of interpretations – that the fuqaha have a supervisory role butmust leave politics for the people (niz.arat-i faqih va khilafat-i mardum) – was

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best presented by Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir S.adr (d. 1980) in aseries of pamphlets generally entitled Al-Islam Yaqud al-H. ayat (‘Islam, theguide to life’) at the time when the Islamic Revolution was successful in Iran.These pamphlets were presented by S.adr as a gift to the Islamic Republic. Thefirst pamphlet was entitled Lamh. a Tamhidiyih ‘an Dustur al-Jumhuriyih al-Islamiyih (‘An introduction to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic’); thesecond and also the third, Khut.ut. Tafs. iliyih ‘an Iqtis. ad al-Mujtam‘a al-Islami(‘Detailed discussion about the economy of Islamic society’); the fourth,S. urah ‘an Iqtis. ad al-Mujtam‘a al-Islami (‘A form of economics for Islamicsociety’); and the fifth, Manabi‘a al-Qudra fi al-Daulah al-Islami (‘Thesources of the Islamic state’s power’).

His views can be described in the following principles: first, God isregarded as the origin of all powers, and true vilayat belongs exclusively toHim; man is created free and no particular individual or group is granteddominion (siyadat) over him. Second, the Islamic Shari‘at is the source for thelegislation of the Islamic Republic. Islamic ordinances are of three types: (i),ordinances on which all Mujtahids share the same view, and which areregarded as the permanent part of the laws; (ii), ordinances on whichMujtahids do not share the same view, where the legislators are free to choosewhichever ordinance they prefer; (iii), and cases which have no permanentordinances and are left to Muslims themselves, though legislation in thesematters must not oppose the Constitution and should be in accord with theinterests of society.

The third of S.adr’s principles, namely the position of the deputyship of theTwelfth Imam (niyabat-i ‘ammih) is generally granted to the suitably quali-fied Mujtahid who is considered as the true successor of the Imams and theProphet. A marj‘a or a suitably qualified Mujtahid has three general duties toperform: protecting religion; interpreting God’s ordinances; and safeguard-ing people’s sovereignty and the purity of their society (taking measures toprevent social deviations). Although the qualifications for the position of themarj‘a (such as fiqahat and ‘adalat) are mentioned in Shi‘i sources, and werenot left to the people, the discernment of these qualifications in a particularMujtahid is left to the people.

The fourth of S.adr’s principles is that the right of governing (khilafat-i‘ammih) has been left by God exclusively to the people. The people are theholders of God’s trust, in that the institution of ruling is considered theamanat-i Ilahi to the people and they are responsible to God for the accom-plishment of this trust. They fulfil this task under the supervision of a marj‘aand on the basis of the principle of consultation (shura). The President iselected by them from amongst those candidates introduced by the marj‘a.They also elect the members of a consultative assembly. For their decision,the people are only responsible to God. They are equal before the law, andhave freedom of (political) speech, of political activities, and in practisingtheir religious rites and ceremonies. Despite his supervisory role, however,


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the marj‘a is regarded as the first man of the country and the commander ofthe whole armed forces. Thus he has the following duties: introducingcandidates for the election of the President; giving fatwas concerning newgovernmental issues; signing the decree of the laws and regulations passed bythe legislative power; making legal judgements. He carries out his dutiesthrough consultations with an assembly of ‘ulama and specialists includingat least 10 Mujtahids.82

It seems that S. adr is inconsistent in some parts of his interpretation. Whilehe seeks to define a supervisory role for the marj‘a, his marj‘a is in factentrusted with a broad range of executive authority. Despite S. adr’s notionthat the right of governing is exclusively left to the people, their right mustalways be confirmed by the marj‘a. The first person in the executive power,the President, is to be elected from among those candidates whose candi-dacies were confirmed by the marj‘a. The ratified laws of the legislativepower elected by the people must also be confirmed by the marj‘a. Similarly,S. adr does not clarify how or indeed whether his powerful marj‘a is respon-sible to the people. He also leaves unclear the mechanisms for choosing amarj‘a in a situation where there are a number of fully qualified Mujtahids tochoose from. Although S.adr is clearly influenced by Naini in drawing asupervisory role for the fuqaha, his departure from Naini in placing thefuqaha at the command of the military, and as the leader of society, isundeniable. S.adr’s niz.arat-i faqih is similar to Khomeini’s Vilayat-i Faqih, inwhich no laws and major decisions can be operated without the approval ofthe just faqih. However, they are different in three cases: first, according toS.adr’s interpretation, the faqih has only a dispossessive (salbi) role in society,whereas according to Khomeini’s explanation he has both dispossessive andaffirmative (ijabi) roles. Second, the faqih has no executive role in S.adr’stheory, and cannot therefore appoint any official, whereas he is able,according to Khomeini’s theory, to appoint or dismiss officials. Third, inS.adr’s view, the government’s condition of being ‘Islamic’ is achieved by thesupervision of Mujtahids over the state apparatus, whereas in Khomeini’sview it can be achieved solely by the fuqaha’s authority over all aspects ofsociety. However, the importance of S.adr’s gift (the pamphlets) to the IslamicRepublic, or more precisely to the Assembly of Experts for the codificationof the constitutional law (3 August 1979 – 15 November 1979) cannot bedenied when the period of publishing these pamphlets is being reconsidered.These were certainly the first explanations about the Islamic rule which theShi‘i fuqaha had published in such detail until that time.

The fourth set of interpretations, which seeks custodianship for an electedfaqih (Vilayat-i intikhabi-yi faqih), was presented by Ayatullah Husain AliMontazeri. Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran andthe completion by the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-i Khubrigan) underMontazeri, which had the task of codifying the constitutional law, he

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expounded the theory of the Vilayat-i Faqih in his lessons at the QumSeminary, and discussed in detail different aspects of the theory.

In these jurisprudential lessons, which lasted nearly five years (from 25December 1985 to 16 September 1989) the terms Vilayat, Imamat andh. ukumat are used as synonyms, as are their derivatives valí, Imam andh. akim. An Imam, for Montazeri, is a person who is followed or obeyed bypeople, not merely spiritually but politically. Therefore the office of Imam (aswell as vali or h. akim) is regarded as the ultimate office for resolving people’sdifficulties.83 Agreeing with Khomeini in according a governmental authorityto the fuqaha, Montazeri argues that besides possessing the essentialqualifications – such as considerable intellect, faith, justice, ability to manageseveral affairs, masculinity, purity of birth, and moral virtues – the Islamicruler must be qualified by deep knowledge of Islam and fiqahat. While aMujtahid who knows the Islamic ordinances by his own discretion (Ijtihad) ispresent among the people, the rule of an ordinary ruler who is not trained inIslamic law or is knowledgeable only through imitation (taqlid), is notlegitimate. In confirming this view he refers to a number of h. adith andQuranic verses. One such Quranic verse (Unus: 35) states: ‘It is Allah Whogives guidance towards truth. Is then He who gives guidance to truth moreworthy to be followed, or he who finds not guidance [himself] unless he isguided?’ On this basis Montazeri maintained that since the ruler is to befollowed and obeyed by people, those scholars who are guided to truth bythemselves are to be preferred for this position.84 Similarly, it is narrated fromAli ibn Abi-T. alib that: ‘The caliph of the ummat should be the most learnedof them in the book of God [Quran] and the Traditions of the Prophet.’Further, is also reported that Ali ibn Abi-T. alib said:

O people, the most rightful of all persons for this matter [thecaliphate] is he who is most competent among them to maintain it,and he who knows best Allah’s commands about it. If any mischief iscreated by a mischief-monger, he will be called upon to repent. If herefuses, he will be fought.85

Montazeri differs from Khomeini in the matter of whether the fuqaha areappointed by the Imams. Montazeri argues that this notion is theoreticallyunthinkable, for if in a society in which five fully qualified Mujtahids exist atthe same time, all of them are actually, not merely potentially, regarded asthe appointed rulers, so that their different orders should be obeyed by thepeople simultaneously. This, for Montazeri, is inconceivable, and in that itwould undoubtedly result in anarchy and the disintegration of society, it isunacceptable for practical reasons.86 Montazeri further argued that thenotion is jurisprudentially not approvable. Although the infallible Imamswere, according to Shi‘i theology, ‘appointed’ by the Prophet as hissuccessors, for Montazeri, the fuqaha were not ‘appointed’ by the Imams as


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the rulers of the people. And while the texts (h. adiths) which were presentedby the Shi‘i theologians for the appointment of the Imams are consideredauthentic, the sayings of the Imams relied upon by the supporters of theDoctrine of Appointment (Muh. aqqiq Karaki, Najafi, Naraqi and Khomeini)do not prove their case. The Traditions that support the Shi‘i theologiansclearly indicate the appointment of the Imams, but the h. adiths used toconfirm the appointment of the fuqaha do not indicate that they were‘appointed’ and entrusted with the governmental authority during the timeof Occultation. Rather, they guide and recommend the Shi‘i communities to‘choose’ their rulers from among those who are known as ‘fuqaha’, ‘ruvat-ih. adith’ (the narrators of the sayings of the Prophets and the Imams) and‘arif bi h. alal va h. aram’ (aware of the permitted and the forbidden).87

Montazeri goes on to argue that a government can be established by theappointment of God, by force (qahr) or by choice and election, and that sincethe first two methods cannot be supported by the jurisprudential sources, thethird method remains valid. Considering the phenomenon of rulership(h. ukumat) as a mutual agreement (mu‘aqidih) between ruler (vali) andummat (people), Montazeri maintained that this agreement cannot beachieved without the people’s direct or indirect choice and election.88 Insupport of this view he refers to a number of Quranic verses and the sayingsof the Imams. According to one such Quranic verse (Shura: 38) the believersconduct their affairs (amr) by mutual consultation (shura). Montazeri arguesthat the word ‘amr’ in Quranic terminology usually refers to the issue ofrulership (h. ukumat) and political affairs, and that, as a consequence, peoplemust be consulted, according to the Quranic verse, for the establishment ofgovernment.89 He also cites Ali ibn Abi-T. alib as having said:

As an obligatory matter for Muslims by God’s order and by theIslamic law [Shari‘at], they must do nothing, start nothing, andmove nowhere, after their ruler [Imam] has died or been murdered,until they ‘choose’ for themselves a chaste, learned, pious ruler whois familiar with Tradition [sunnat], law and judgement, and able todirect their affairs.90

However, although this interpretation acknowledges the people’s right ofsovereignty, the people are not permitted to choose any ruler they wish. Theyshould choose solely a well-qualified Mujtahid as their leader (vali-yi faqih).It seems that Montazeri’s elected Mujtahid, like Khomeini’s appointed faqih,enjoys full-ranging authority. Although the terms Vilayat-i mut.laqih orVilayat-i ‘ammih are not used in Montazeri’s books, and he does not statethat the Islamic ruler is authorized to hold full-ranging authority, neverthe-less he puts all three powers – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary –under the authority of the ruler. Montazeri’s elected faqih, in opposition toS.adr’s chosen Mujtahid, holds not only a supervisory role, but is regarded as

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the highest official in Islamic society, in charge of protecting people’s prestigeand dignity, and directing their affairs. The heads of the three powers areconsidered by Montazeri as the ruler’s aides and assistants.91 In his privatediscussions with some of his students, Montazeri acknowledged that thepeople are recognized by the Shari‘at as being sovereign, and can thereforelimit the authority of the Islamic ruler, even electing a well-qualifiedMujtahid for a temporary period rather than for his full life-time, yet theseideas were not published.92

According to Montazeri, Islamic rule differs from Western democracy intwo matters. While people in a democratic system are supposedly free to electany person as their ruler, in a Shi‘i society Muslims may not choose any otherruler except a just faqih. In a democratic society, people are free to legislateany law according to their collective wishes, whereas in an Islamic regime thelegislation must be in accord with Islamic laws and ordinances. Therefore,according to Montazeri, Islamic rule is essentially different from democracyin the West.93

Finally, the fifth interpretation of the Islamic rule is that presented by DrMahdi Ha’iri Yazdi, a former student of Ayatullah Khomeini and a Professorof Islamic Philosophy at Tehran University. This interpretation is calledVikalat-i Malikan-i Shakhs. i-yi Musha‘a (representation of private, jointowners), and is the latest interpretation presented by the Shi‘i fuqaha onIslamic rule.

In his H. ikmat va H. ukumat (‘Philosophy and governance’) which waspublished in London in 1995, Ha’iri deals fundamentally with the theory ofthe Vilayat-i Faqih. Although he prefers to refer to Naraqi, rather thanaddressing himself to Khomeini or Montazeri, he openly criticizes the IslamicRepublic of Iran as a realization of Naraqi’s theory.94 His main argumentscan be summarized in the following principles. First, the term ‘h. ukumat’ isdefined in two senses. On the one hand, it is generally applied by the Islamicphilosophers to the technique for governing a country, fairly and thought-fully taking measures for directing and organizing the internal and externalaffairs of the citizens of a territory. This meaning is derived from h. ukm(definite decision) and h. ikmat (wisdom), and is regarded as a branch ofpractical philosophy. On the other hand, it is used for authority (h. akimiyat),dominion (salt.anat), the ordering of subordinates, and even for custodian-ship (Vilayat) and guardianship (qaimumat) of people. This meaning isapplied by politicians and has no relation to h. ikmat and practicalphilosophy.95

Second, people’s affairs must be managed only by consultation, not byrevelation or God’s messenger.96 Third, a territory which is occupied by itsinhabitants belongs, like an inherited property, to each and every one of itsoccupants. As an inherited property is regarded as private property andbelongs jointly to all its heirs, so the territory belongs jointly to each and


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every one of its occupants (malikiyat-i shakhs. i-yi musha‘a). The occupants ofa territory are regarded as the private, joint owners of that territory(malikan-i shakhs. i-yi musha‘a).97 Fourth, society is philosophically con-sidered to be a union of each of its citizens, not a whole or a collection (vah. id-i jam‘i) of its parts.98 Fifth, the citizens of a territory possess equally the rightof sovereignty over their land. Their individual personalities, independence,free will, beliefs, speech, and the reasonable deeds of each of them areregarded as the sole valid source and reliable criteria for the establishment ofa government. This is similar to an agreement or a contract (qarardad-ivikalat) held between an agent or an attorney (vakil) and the joint heirs to aproperty. Consequently, governance is no more than a power of attorneygranted by the true owners of the country, namely the citizens. Since suchrepresentation is, according to Islamic law, revocable and dispensable (‘aqd-ijayiz va ghair-i lazim al-vafa), it can unilaterally be resolved or cancelled bythe clients whenever they so decide. Similarly, the clients have the right toreplace the attorney or representative with any other person or persons theyprefer, while an agent or a representative has no authority wider than thelimitations set by his clients. He should do his best for the benefit andinterests of his clients.99

The sixth point Ha’iri makes is that the Prophet and the Imams weremerely sent by God to improve the morality and spirituality of the people;establishing a government was not part of their mission. Although theProphet established a government in Medina, it was due to his objective ofestablishing a centre for his mission. The political leadership of the Prophetand also of Imam Ali was confirmed by the bai‘at (allegiance) of thepeople.100 Seventh, Ha’iri argues that the principle of ‘Calling people to goodand prohibiting them from evil’, must be interpreted as a moral principle,with the purpose of reminding people to deliberately do good things and towarn them from doing evil deliberately. It does not mean that people must beforced to do good things and to avoid evil. Therefore, there is no justificationfor the argument that Islamic government should be established due to theprinciple of ‘calling people to good things and prohibiting them from doingevil’.101 Eighth, Muslims are left free by Islam to establish their favoured formof political structure. As a result, there exists in Islamic sources no particularform of political system. Although the Prophet and Imam Ali held agovernmental office, they did not introduce or recommend any particularform of Islamic governance. People are ordered to choose the most perfect(akmal) and most suitable (as. lah) person of their society as the ruler of theircountry.102 Ninth, while the position of Imamat does not depend on thechoice and allegiance of the people, the office of caliphate does need to beaccepted by the people. While the Imamat is, like prophethood, regarded as aspiritual and transcendental position, the caliphate is considered a worldlyoffice. An Imam is positioned to explain the principal features of religion(ma‘alim al-din), whereas a caliph is to be in charge of people’s social and

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political affairs.103 Tenth, Ha’iri maintains that the term Vilayat is essentiallyand conceptually different from h. ukumat and political authority. Vilayatmeans that the guardian (valí-yi amr) of persons (muvalla ‘alaih) who areeither immature or insane or whose financial position is precarious, or whoare bankrupt businessmen, is charged with the management of their personaland private affairs, whereas h. ukumat means that the h. akim is placed incharge of the affairs of a country. While a valí (or qayyim) is granted byIslamic law absolute mandate over his subordinates, an Islamic ruler, as arepresentative (vakil) of the people, holds only the authority granted to himby his clients. Technically, Vilayat cannot therefore be used for political andgovernmental matters. Historically, too, Vilayat was never used in Shi‘itefiqh for government before Naraqi.104 Eleventh, according to Ha’iri, theTraditions used by Naraqi for the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih, though theygrant some degree of authority to fuqaha over public affairs, do not supporthis argument. Although the ‘ulama and fuqaha are highly honoured in thoseTraditions, yet they were not granted a governmental office. Moreover, thewords ‘ulama and fuqaha have spiritual meanings and are to be interpretedas those who were morally well trained and achieved a high degree oftranscendental knowledge. They cannot be simply interpreted as the commonconcepts of those who have just graduated from a clerical seminary.105

The twelfth point which Ha’iri makes is that Naraqi’s argument that ‘afaqih is preferred to other categories, as a ruler’ has no basis in reason (‘aql).While a faqih is a specialist in fiqh and his main concern is with juris-prudential issues, executive power needs a manager possessing the necessaryqualifications for directing the country’s daily affairs. The necessary qualifi-cations of a ruler, for Ha’iri, are as follows: the ability to direct people’saffairs, experience of governmental matters, the ability to understand thesituation of time and place (zaman va makan), decisiveness, bravery,trustworthiness.106 Thirteen, since it is possible that advantage will be takenof the religious feelings of the people by those fuqaha who have taken agovernmental office, they should be seriously prohibited from involvementwith political sectors and executive matters.107 However, the fuqaha’sposition as guardians of the constitutional law is considered a manifestationof democracy and of the people’s rights to their sovereignty.108 Fourteen, therelation between the two terms ‘Islamic Republic’ and ‘Vilayat-i Faqih’ isparadoxical, for while a republican system is based on the will andsovereignty of the people, a political structure established on the theory ofVilayat-i Faqih refers ultimately to the sovereignty of a Mujtahid.109 Ha’iri’stheory appears to be a combination of the second and the third theories. Hisacknowledgment of the authority of fuqaha upon matters generally knownas umur-i h. isbih lays him among those traditionalist fuqaha such as Khui andAraki who seek to keep the ‘ulama away from the political arena. His supportfor the role of guardianship of the constitutional law for the fuqaha puts himin line with those moderate Mujtahids such as Naini and S. adr who see the


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fuqaha as the guardians (naz.irs) for operating Islamic law in society. Histheory of ‘representation of private, joint owners’ is similar to Rousseau’stheory of ‘social contract’. Although he explained that both the Prophet andImam Ali formed their rulerships by the allegiance of the people, he does notclarify whether they were, as the rulers of Islamic society, considered solelythe representatives of the people or more as the vali of the people. WhileKhomeini and also Montazeri’s discussions are totally jurisprudential,Ha’iri’s analysis is predominantly philosophical. While Khomeini andMontazeri constantly refer to the Quran, the Prophet and the Imams, Ha’iriaddresses himself mostly to Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau andMontesquieu.110 It seems also that his dislike of the doctrine of Vilayat-iFaqih forced him to neglect most of the arguments provided by Montazeri forthis doctrine. He does not even mention those Sayings of the Imams used byproponents of the doctrine of fiqahat in the Islamic ruler.

Although Mut.ahhari should undoubtedly be regarded as a supporter of thedoctrine of Vilayat-i Faqih, nevertheless his interpretation concerning theorigin and also the type of authorities of the fuqaha, seems inconsistent. Inhis earlier writings – such as Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman – Mut.ahharisupports Khomeini’s interpretation of the vilayat of an appointed faqih, andargues that

the Islamic ruler is granted by Islam a wide-ranging authority. Thisauthority was exercised by the Prophet during the time of his rule,and was granted by him to the Imams after he passed away. It wasalso granted by the Twelfth Imam to the office of his general deputy[nayib-i ‘amm] during the time of his Occultation.111

However, in his later writings and interviews on the theory of Islamic rule,Mut.ahhari presented an interpretation which can be regarded a combinationof the third and the fourth theories listed above, which were later explainedin detail by S. adr and Montazeri. In an interview with Iranian television, afterthe victory of the Islamic Revolution, Mut.ahhari maintained:

Vilayat-i Faqih does not mean that a faqih himself is to be estab-lished as the head of government to actually run the country. Theposition of a faqih in an Islamic country, whose people have acceptedthe ideology of Islam and are committed to it, is the position of anideologue, not that of a ruler [h. akim]. The duty of an ideologue is towatch [niz.arat] how correctly that ideology is operated in society.He considers the suitability of a person who wants to be the head ofgovernment. Vilayat-i Faqih is in fact an ideological authority, andthe faqih is to be elected by the people. This is exactly the same asdemocracy. It would be against democracy if an appointed faqih

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were to appoint the following faqih. But it is clear that a marj‘a-itaqlid is also chosen by the people through consultation.112

In his notes on issues relating to governance, entitled ‘Masayil-i h. ukumat’,Mut.ahhari argues:

A ruler is a person who is legitimately [willingly], not by force,obeyed. He can legitimately be obeyed in two ways: by vilayat andalso by vikalat [representation]. However, the discussions betweenthe fuqaha in fiqh are about the [source of] vilayah of a ruler, not thevikalah of a ruler.113

He continued:

The right of choosing a ruler is left to people during the time ofOccultation. The ruler must be, according to Shi‘i law, qualifiedwith justice and fiqahat. However, the electors of the ruler are to beeither the fuqaha or, as with the choice of a marj‘a-i taqlid, thepeople. The first can be regarded as a kind of aristocratic rule, thesecond a type of democracy.114

Mut.ahhari sees no contradiction between the two terms, ‘Islamic’ and‘Republic’. According to him, a political structure based on the republicansystem equates theoretically as well as practically with an Islamic system. Heargues that the term ‘republic’ explains the political framework or structureof a given society, whereas the term ‘Islamic’ defines its content. In otherwords, the word ‘Islamic’ means that the government must rule the countrywith the Islamic laws and regulations. The ambiguity may have originated,according to Mut.ahhari, from the notion that a democratic system cannotmeet with any religion-based system, and that to be considered a democraticstructure (or a democratic person) it is necessary to be free from any religiouspractice and regulation. Rejecting this notion, Mut.ahhari argues that theprinciples of democracy do not require that the political and social structuresof a given society should necessarily be free from ideology and religion. If anation accepts consciously an ideology or a religion, demand for implement-ing the ideology and operating the religious laws in society should beregarded as a result of their democratic rights. The right of sovereignty of agiven nation requires that their demand for operating their political systemshould be acknowledged. Giving an example, Mut.ahhari concludes that atthe period of the Constitutional Revolution the Iranian people never thoughtthat adding the principle that all legislation must be in accordance withIslamic laws, or that accepting the authority of five Mujtahids over thelegislative power, would detract from their democratic rights and their rightof sovereignty.115

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Today most people in the West are familiar with the Islamic Revolution ofIran, and have some idea about the Shah, the Pahlavi regime, AyatullahKhomeini and the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Revolution was a popularmovement which started in June 1963 and succeeded in February 1979 withthe collapse of the Shah’s regime. From the beginning of the Revolution, aparticular type of Islamic ideology –Vilayat-i Faqih or Islam-i Fiqahati –rose, gradually strengthened, and eventually dominated the Revolution andformed a unique type of political system which has been constitutionalizedunder the title of Islamic Republic.

Many Islamic activists, thinkers and theoreticians were undeniably behindthis Revolution, including Mahdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, Sayyid MahmoodT. aliqani, Ruh. ullah Khomeini, Husain-Ali Montazeri, Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari,and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti. However, no-one could deliver thatideology from the very depths of the Islamic original texts and render it alegitimate historical updating of the Muslim identity except AyatullahMut.ahhari. It has been revealed throughout the previous chapters thatMut.ahhari enjoyed four achievements which collectively made him uniqueamong his contemporaries.

First, he was always considered among the top ten students during hiseducation in Qum, where he benefited from the most distinguished teachers:the Grand Ayatullah Burujerdi, Ayatullah Imam Khomeini and AllamihTabatabai. He also benefited from prominent mystics such as Mirza MahdiShahidi, Mirza Ali-Aqa Shirazi and Shaikh ‘Abbas Quchani. With theassistance of these great instructors, Mut.ahhari improved his mental abilitiesand refined his moral sensibilities, acquired the necessary educationalqualifications for his future and guaranteed his position as a young Mudarrisand Mujtahid. He successfully became educated in Islamic studies –jurisprudence, philosophy, mysticism and history – became fully familiarwith the Islamic texts and sources – the Quran and H. adith – and presentedhimself as a well-qualified Islamologist.

Second, Mut.ahhari was familiar with modern Western philosophers andscientists. He deals with Darwin, Hegel, Freud, Comte, Marx, Durkheim,

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Russell, and Will Durant. Therefore, he always includes comparativediscussions in his works between the Islamic philosophers and their Westerncounterparts. This comprehensiveness made Mut.ahhari attractive to differ-ent classes of people. For a number of distinguished university professorssuch as Nasr, Reza and Enayat, Mut.ahhari seemed a well-educated scholar, agood example of the combination of past and present. For a great manyyoung Muslim activists, such as the three Islamic Associations of Teachers,Physicians, and Engineers, Mut.ahhari was an example of a devoted intel-lectual, who knows his time, his society and his responsibility towards hispeople. For most religious authorities, Mut.ahhari was seen as a powerfulforerunner, defending Islam and Islamic doctrines. This element undoubt-edly helped Mut.ahhari to acquire a unique position in the eyes and hearts ofhis colleagues, students, friends, teachers, readers, audiences, adherents andfollowers.

Third, Mut.ahhari’s works seem unparalleled, even today two and a halfdecades after his assassination. This is for three reasons: (i) his works, eventhe most professional ones such as Us. ul-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, havebeen written for the public not solely for experts. They are, generally, clear,plain, unfussy and well developed; (ii) similar to Marx, Mut.ahhari’s worksare comprehensive and cover a vast variety of subjects and issues, frompersonal ethical matters to communal sociological issues; (iii) his method ofanalysis is typically unique, consisting of arguments based on rational,religious (referring to the Quran and H. adith) as well as historical evidence.These three elements, collectively, make Mut.ahhari’s works different fromhis counterparts.

Fourth is his high and leading position at the Islamic Revolution. Duringthe Revolution, Mut.ahhari was considered a chief assistant and mainrepresentative of Ayatullah Khomeini in Iran. During this period, he wasregarded as the chief adviser of Ayatullah Khomeini, and was appointed asthe head of the Revolutionary Council, the highest political body of thecountry at that time. Undoubtedly he played a very definite role in theIslamization of Iran’s political structure. The Constitution of the IslamicRepublic was, then, composed under the clear influence of his views andvisions. Therefore, evidence supports the view that Mut.ahhari is the maintheoretician or major architect of Islamic Iran.

Mut.ahhari’s life covered the period between the rise and the fall of thePahlavis (1921–79). He naturally dealt with the major movements of histime, such as secularism, Westernization, Marxism, nationalism, traditional-ism and Islamism. But, as has been shown throughout this book, his mainlifetime challenges were secularism and Marxist-materialism, i.e. themovements which should also, according to Mut.ahhari, be regarded as themain threats to the Islamic movement and the Islamist groups in the future.Mut.ahhari’s anti-Marxist stand can be traced back to his early education inQum where he was studying Islamic philosophy. The Iranian Marxist parties

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such as the H. izb-i Tudih and the Chirik-ha-yi Fadai-yi Khalq were, for him, afundamental threat to the religious socialization of young Muslim activists.His first publication, Us. ul-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, deals with Marxistepistemology, while his last-published work, Jami‘ih va Tarikh, tacklesMarxist sociology and historical philosophy. A considerable number of hisother books were written in refutation of Marxist ideology. He opposedShariati as well as the Muslim leftist groups, such as the Mujahidin-i khalqand the Furqan, as soon as he considered them to be influenced by Marxistideology, and as presenting Islamic ideology with materialistic interpre-tations.

However, Mut.ahhari’s anti-secularist scripts became more importantafter the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the decline of Marxistmovements in Iran, as well as in the other parts of the world. Today, anumber of his anti-liberalist and anti-secularist works such as Jumhuri-yiIslami, Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami dar S. ad Salih-yi Akhir, Mas’alih-yi H. ijab andNiz.am-i H. uquq-i Zan dar Islam have again been found at the centre ofattention of Islamist groups, not only in Iran but also in other Muslimsocieties and communities around the globe. His writings, which weretranslated into most of the principal languages of the world, are increasinglybeing published in Iran and are still broadly distributed among the youngergeneration of Muslim populations. However, it is useful to note here that topresent Mut.ahhari as still the most relevant philosopher for the presenttheoretical problems of Islamic societies and communities, an internationalconference, entitled H. ikmat-i Mut.ahhar (‘purified wisdom’), was held by hisstudents in Tehran on 25–8 April 2004 (the anniversary of his assassinationin 1979), when Mut.ahhari’s achievements were reviewed.

To provide a more comprehensive understanding of Mut.ahhari for thereader, the first two chapters of this book concentrated on other parts of hispersonality. It has been argued that Mut.ahhari was a rationalist. It wasduring his primary education in Mashhad Seminary that his attraction tophilosophy was first awoken. Although a theological current called Maktab-i Tafkik was dominant in the seminary in Mashhad at that time, he did notfollow it, but took an independent position in favour of the rational methodof interpreting religious texts. While the Tafkiki ‘ulama insisted that Islamicprinciples must be exclusively interpreted on the basis of Islamic sources,Mut.ahhari argued that they should be rationally interpreted and presented inrational ways. Furthermore, Mut.ahhari was a moralist. He believed thathuman beings can find the answers to their philosophical questions not onlythrough formal education, but also through moral qualifications such aspiety. Three scholars who were considered by Mut.ahhari as his role models,Mirza Mahdi Shahidi Raz

.avi, Hajj Aqa Ruhhullah Khomeini and Mirza Ali-

Aqa Shirazi, were all well known for the depth of their moral and spiritualcharacters.

It has also been disclosed in these two chapters that Mut.ahhari seems to

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shift from time to time between traditionalism and reformism. While thetraditional ‘ulama were mainly concerned with personal matters in religion,Mut.ahhari was mostly engaged with social and political issues. His supportfor reform in the seminaries in Qum, caused him the loss of the GrandAyatullah Burujirdi’s confidence. As a consequence, he was forced to leavethe seminary and move to Tehran University. The critical situation of thereligious institutions of the country, and the increasing demands for theirupdating, forced him to take the initiative in establishing the Husainiyih-iIrshad as a role model for the modernization of the whole religious system.This albeit unsuccessful effort, in addition to his proposal for a reform in thewearing of the veil by women, which angered many traditionalist ‘ulama, canbe seen as a part of his reformist plans and activities. However, he was notentirely against traditionalism. While Shariati and the Muslim leftist activistschose a radical approach towards the clerical establishment and called forIslamic ‘Protestantism’, Mut.ahhari supported the traditional view in favourof the survival of the clerical hierarchy. He wanted to be a part of the clericalstructure. Mut.ahhari’s support for traditional law in the judiciary, asopposed to the Westernization process, was also evident when the modifi-cation of Iran’s civil codes, heralding the introduction of further Westernlegal norms, became an explosive social issue in the press in 1966–7.

To provide the reader with a more detailed image of his economicperspectives, Chapter 3 focused on Mut.ahhari’s economic analysis. It hasbeen argued that Mut.ahhari attempted to take a position between capitalismand socialism. He finally came to support what is called ‘state capitalism’. Todecrease the gap between classes, Mut.ahhari preferred to put all the majoreconomic resources of the country, under the control of the governmentalsector. His philosophical analysis of the ‘machine’ (basic industries) as aproduct of collective intellect made him unique among Islamic economictheoreticians. He did not recognize the ‘machine’ as the property of theprivate sector; rather it must be located under the control of the Islamic state.An individual, even a very religious, pious and good-tempered one, is notimmune from favouring his own interests and doing harm to the public. Theeconomy of an Islamic society (whether in production or trade or publicservices) must eventually come under the authority of a just, public, caringstate, not under the monopoly of self-protecting economic elites. These ideaswere fully reflected, if not directly realized, by Ayatullah Dr Beheshti in theConstitution of the Islamic Republic (1979), and were put into operation bythe then Prime Minister Musavi, in almost a decade. This economic part ofthe Constitution was left unchanged at the first amendment of theConstitution in 1989. Surprisingly, Mut.ahhari’s economic views have notworked out in practice, and they gradually lost their practicality after adecade. The then President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97) prepared theground for the policy of privatization, and President Khatami is seriouslypursuing this policy today.

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Some ambiguities can be seen in Mut.ahhari’s political perspectives.Although his political views are clear and harmonious in principles, they arenot elaborated and well-developed in detail. This was probably due to hisfear of the security forces (SAVAK) during the regime of the Shah, and thelack of opportunity at the time of Revolution. Chapter 4 provided, however,a clearer view of Mut.ahhari’s political ideology. Similar to AyatullahKhomeini, Mut.ahhari was opposed to monarchism and secularism. He was asupporter of Islamic rule not in the form of the rulership of a just ruler, butthe rule of a well-qualified jurist (Vilayat-i Faqih). He envisioned a powerfulcentralized government for his ideal Islamic society. However, it is not clearwhether, like Muhammad Baqir S.adr, he sought a supervisory role for afaqih, or whether, like Ayatullah Khomeini, he proposed full authority for aMujtahid. He did not comprehensively develop the theory. However, thistheory has been formally legalized in the political section of the Constitutionof the Islamic Republic of Iran, and even more strengthened with the fullauthority of the Vali-i Faqih as the ultimate decision-maker of the countryduring the amendment of the Constitution (1989). This part as well as otherparts of the Constitution, which have been composed under the visibleinfluences of Islamic doctrines, are today challenged by non-Islamist groups,including nationalists, liberals, secularists, republicans and all those whosupport a democratic non-Islamist republican system. Again, Mut.ahhari’spolitical writings today constitute a major source to which anti-Islamicideology is addressed and is referred to by young Islamist activists.

Mut.ahhari was, like Fadaiyan-i Islam, a supporter of Islamic universalism.He criticized the then rampant Persian nationalism as a philosophypropagated by the agents of the imperialist countries, as a result of whichIran would be separated from other Islamic societies. He acknowledged,however, some positive aspects of which he called moderate nationalism –‘love your country without humiliating other nations’. Article 11 of ChapterI of the Constitution reflected this idea as follows:

In accordance with the Quranic verse ‘This your nation is a singlenation, and I am your Lord, so worship me’, all Muslims form asingle nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran hasthe duty of formulating its general policies with a view to themerging and union of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantlystrive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity ofthe Islamic world.

Mut.ahhari was a moderate political activist. The Marxist and Muslimleftist guerrillas believed in praxis and held the view that action is prior tothought. They were also in favour of armed struggle. Mut.ahhari, by contrast,believed in the priority of thought over action or the priority of educationover armed struggle. He assumed that the prime strategy for an undeveloped

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or developing country like Iran, most of whose people were illiterate anduneducated, rested on cultural and educational measures, not on semi-military practices. Although he was a friend and also a teacher of a number ofMuslim activists who were practising armed struggle, such as the Fadaiyan-iIslam and the Mu’talifih-yi Islami, he never recommended armed struggle tothem. In this respect he was visibly influenced by his teacher, AyatullahBurujirdi. Another characteristic of Mut.ahhari’s course of action is that henever agreed to campaign with the Marxist groups against the regime ofthe Shah. Unlike Shariati (and some Muslim groups), who considered theMarxist groups as competitors and the Shah and American imperialism asthe real enemy, Mut.ahhari stated his well-known phrase that ‘Bothimperialism and communism are similar to the blades of a pair of scissorswhich are apparently opposite to each other, but in reality move in unison tocut one root.’

To summarize his achievements in a few words: following the leadershipof Ayatullah Khomeini, Mut.ahhari was able to develop an alternativeideology to the Shah’s monarchism, and to the Marxists’ socialism. Hetheorized an Islamic world view and ideology, improved the argumentationof the Islamist groups, expanded the tendency towards an Islamic way ofliving among educated Muslim activists, and played a definite role in thevictory of the Islamic Revolution and the empowerment of those Islamistgroups. Iran’s Islamic system was formed under the visible influence of hisviews and he has been positioned as one of the main theoreticians of thecountry. His works are still attractive to the public and are regarded as amajor source for the Islamic way of life. The anniversary of his martyrdom isofficially remembered in Iran as ‘Teacher’s Day’.

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INTRODUCTION

1 Bazargan, Mahdi, in Mut.ahhari’s memorial speech, Abul-Faz.l Mosque, Tehran,5.2.1359/1980.

2 Nomani, Farhad and Rahnema, Ali, The Secular Miracle, London and NewJersey, 1990, p. 38.

3 Fischer, Michael and Abedi, Mehdi, Debating Muslims, Madison, 1990, p. 181.4 Algar, Hamid, ‘Introduction’ (to Mut.ahhari’s life) in: Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari,

Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, trans. R. Campbell, Berkeley, 1985, p. 9.5 Dabashi, Hamid, Theology of Discontent, New York and London, 1993, p. 148.6 Martin, Vanessa, Creating an Islamic State, London and New York, 2000, p. 75.7 See the statement of Ayatullah Khomeini on 12.2.1358/1.5.1979, in: n.a.,

S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 4, Tehran, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 104.8 Surush, ‘Abdul-Karim, ‘Mut.ahhari: Ih. ya-kunandihi dar ‘Asr-i Jadid’, in: ‘Abdul-

Karim Surush, Tafarruj-i S. un‘a, Tehran, 1366 (1987–8), p. 366.9 See an interview with Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Khamenei on 12.2.1360 (1981) in:

M. H. Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha, Vol. 1, Qum,Urdibihisht 1364 (1985), p. 222.

10 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 143.11 See interviews with H. ujjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani on 12.2.1360

(1.5.1981) and 11.2.1361 (30.4.1982), in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp.127 and 131.

12 Quoted from Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 415.13 Algar, Hamid, ‘Introduction’, pp. 9–22.14 Fischer and Abedi, Debating Muslims, pp. 181–211.15 Nomani and Rahnema, The Secular Miracle, pp. 38–51.16 Haar, J. G. J., ‘Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari (1919–1979): An Introduction to his Life

and Thought’, Persica, 1990–2, Vol. XIV, pp. 1–20.17 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, pp. 147–215.18 Martin, Creating an Islamic State, pp. 75–99.19 Montazeri, Husain-Ali, ‘H. akim-i Farzanih’ in: n.a., Yad-namih-yi Ustad-i

Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360 (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 171–3;Muhammad Va‘iz. -zadih Khurasani, ‘Sairi dar Zindigi-i ‘Ilmi va Inqilabi-yiUstad-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari’ in: n.a., Yad-namih-yi Ustad, pp. 319–80.

20 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha (2 vols), Qum, Urdibihisht1364 (1985).

21 N.a., Jilvih-ha-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Ustad, Tehran, Spring 1364 (1985).22 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992).23 N.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Ustad-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari

(2 vols), Tehran, summer 1370 (1991).

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1 For Reza Khan’s coup d’état, see S. A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown,Oxford, 1988, pp. 59–68; H. Makki, Tarikh-i Bist Salih-i Iran, Tehran, 1358(1979–80), Vol. 1; S. J. Madani, Tarikh-i Siyasi-i Mu‘asir-i Iran, Qum, Mehr1361 (1982), Vol. 1, pp. 96–128; E. Abrahamian, Iran between TwoRevolutions, Princeton, 1982, pp. 102–49; H. Sabahi, British Policy in Persia,London, 1990, pp. 157–200.

2 For the biography of Mut.ahhari see M. H. Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-iAndishih-ha (2 vols), Qum, Urdibihisht 1364 (1985); n.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-iUstad Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992); M. Va‘iz. -zadih Khurasani,‘Sairi dar Zindigani-i ‘Ilmi va Inqilabi-yi Ustad Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari’ in:Yad-namih, ed. ‘Abdul-Karim Surush, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360 (1981); n.a.,Jilvih-ha-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Ustad, Tehran, Spring 1364 (1985); n.a., Sar guzasht-ha-yi Vizhih az Zindigani-i Ustad-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari (2 vols), Tehran,Summer 1370 (1991); S. H. J. Musavi, Sima-yi Ustad dar Ayinih-i Nigah-iYaran, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992); A. Davani, Khatirat-i Man az Ustad-iShahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Aban 1372 (1993); H. Dabashi, Theology ofDiscontent, New York, 1993, pp. 147–215; M. Fischer and M. Abedi, DebatingMuslims, Madison, 1990, pp. 181–211; Hamid Algar, ‘Introduction’ (toMut.ahhari’s life) in: M. Mut.ahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, trans. R.Campbell, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 9–21; A. Rahnema and F. Nomani, The SecularMiracle, London and New Jersey, 1990, pp. 38–51; J. G. J. ter Haar, ‘Murtaz.aMut.ahhari (1919–1979): An Introduction to his Life and Thought’, Persica,1990–1992, Vol. XIV, No. 14, pp. 1–20.

3 This date is in accord with a note written by Mut.ahhari about his birth date. Thedocument can be seen in n.a., Lam‘aati az Shaikh-i Shahid, Tehran, 1st edn,1370/1991–2, p. 8. However, it has been mistakenly reported by a number ofMut.ahhari’s biographers that he was born on 13 Bahman 1299 or 12 Jamadi IIor 13 Jamadi I 1338 or 2 February 1919. See Vathiqi Rad, Vol. 1, p. 18, Fischerand Abedi, pp. 182–3, and Haar, p. 2.

4 The distance between Fariman and Mashhad is, according to Hamid Algar in his‘Introduction’ to Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, p. 9, and Fischer and Abedi,Debating Muslims, p. 183 about 60 kilometres and according to Dabashi inTheology of Discontent, p. 148, some 90 miles.

5 The date of his death is mistakenly mentioned as 1359 in Vathiqi Rad,Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 18.

6 Personal interview with Muhammad Ali, Mut.ahhari’s oldest brother, in summer1993. He is presently a farmer and living in Fariman.

7 It is said that Hajj Muhammad Husain had also travelled to Egypt and SaudiArabia. See Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 18.

8 For information about ‘Allamih Mulla Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, see C. P.Turner, ‘The Rise of Twelver Shi‘ite Externalism in Safawid Iran and its Con-solidation under Allamih Muhammad Baqir Majlisi’, Ph.D. thesis, University ofDurham, 1989.

9 See M. Mut.ahhari, Dastan-i Rastan, Tehran, Winter 1370 (1992), Vol. 2,Introduction. He also mentioned his father’s mystical character in H. aqq va Bat.il,Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), p. 173.

10 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 19.11 Ibid., p. 20.12 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-i Ustad, p. 31. But Vathiqi Rad in his Mut.ahhari, Vol.

1, p. 20, mentioned that Mut.ahhari moved to Mashhad when he was 13 yearsold. However, the formal religious curriculum consists basically of two periods:

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the first (Daurih-i Sat.h), which lasts almost eight years, includes three stages:Introductory, Stage One and Stage Two. The three years Introductory Stageprovides lessons on Arabic language and literature. The two-year Stage One,consists of courses on logic, theology, fiqh and us. ul al-fiqh. The three-year StageTwo provides lessons on fiqh, us. ul al-fiqh, tafsir, Hadith, Rijal, Dirayih, andIslamic philosophy; the second, the period of Ijtihad (Daurih-i Kharij) presentsIslamic education at the high level. It offeres free courses on fiqh, us. ul al-fiqh,Akhlaq, falsafih and ‘Irfan. It lasts almost 20 years and students come to thestate of Ijtihad at the end of this period, and become Mujtahid practising theirown views. For further reading see: Safi Gulpayigani, Sair-i Hauzih ha-yi‘Ilmiyih-i Shi‘ih, Qum, Daftar-i Intisharat-i Islami, 1379/2000; MuhammadMaliki, Ashnai ba Mutun-i darsi-yi Hauzih ha-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Iran, Qum,Muassasih-yi Intisharat-i Dar al-Thaqalain, 1376/1997; Sayyid Ali-Reza SayyidKibari, Hauzih ha-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Shi‘ih dar Gustarih-yi Jihan, Tehran, Amir KabirPublication, 1378/1999.

13 For the seminary of Mashhad see A. Khamenei, Guzarishi az Sabiqih-i Tarikhiva Kununi-i Hauzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Mashhad, Mashhad, Tir 1365 (1986).

14 For the biography of Adib Naishaburi, see n.a., Yad-namih-i Adib-i Naishaburi,ed. Mahdi Muh. aqqiq, McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran branch, 1365(1986–7).

15 For the biography of the family of Shahidi see Hasan H. abib’s introduction toDivan-i Mirza H. abibullah Khurasani, Tehran, n.d.

16 Unfortunately nothing can be found in the Persian or in the Arabic literatureabout Mirza Mahdi Shahidi Raz.avi. The information about him is based on myinterview with Shaikh ‘Abdullah Nurani (from the University of Tehran, Facultyof Theology) and Shaikh Muhammad Va‘iz. -zadih Khurasani (from theUniversity of Mashhad, Faculty of Theology) in spring 1994.

17 For the biography of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, see Kaihan-i Farhangi, No. 12,Isfand 1371 (1993), pp. 28–33; Khamenei, Guzarishi, p. 26.

18 He is the eldest son of Akhund Mulla Muhammad Kaz. im Khurasani (d. 1329/1911) one of the religious leaders of the Constitutional Revolution. For Aqa-zadih’s biography see Khamenei, Guzarishi, p. 26. For information about theConstitutional Revolution see H. H. a’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran,Leiden, 1977; E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905–1909, London, 1966;Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, Oxford, 1991.

19 Khamenei, Guzarishi, p. 25.20 N.a., Kaihan-i Farhangi, No. 12, Isfand 1371/1993 (Special issue for maktab-i

tafkik).21 Ibid., p. 6.22 Ibid., p. 5; Khamenei, Guzarishi, pp. 26–7.23 For information about Akhbarism see Andrew Newman, ‘The Nature of the

Akhbari/Us. uli Dispute in late Safawid Iran’, Parts I and II, University of London,School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin, 1992, Vol. 55, pp. 22–51 and250–61; Hosain Modarrissi, ‘Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shi‘i Juris-prudence’, Studia Islamica, 1984, Vol. 49, Paris; Robert Gleave, ‘Akhbari Shi‘iJurisprudence in the writings of Yusuf b. Ahmad al-Bahrani’, Ph.D. thesis,University of Manchester, 1996.

24 H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 109–49.25 Khamenei, Guzarishi, pp. 26–7.26 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal-i Girayish bi Maddigari, Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), p. 9.27 For the curriculum in hauzih ‘Ilmiyih, see Khamenei, Guzarishi, pp. 60–76; M.

Fischer, Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard, 1980, pp. 61–86;R. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, London, 1987.

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28 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 9–10.29 Hasan H. abib’s introduction to Divan-i Mirza H. abibullah Khurasani, Tehran,

n.d.30 For the biography and philosophy of Mulla S.adra, see Fazlur Rahman, The

Philosophy of Mulla S. adra, Albany, 1975.31 For the biography and philosophy of Mulla Hadi Sabzavari, see Sharh-i

Manzumih, trans. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu, Tehran, 1969.32 Personal interview with Shaikh ‘Abdullah Nurani on 19 April 1994 and

Muhammad Va‘iz. -zadih Khurasani on 14 April 1994.33 Personal interview with Muhammad Ali Mut.ahhari in April 1994.34 Faghfoory, M. H. ‘The Role of the ‘ulama in Twentieth Century Iran’, Ph.D.

thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978, pp. 58–60. In this respect seealso M. H. Faghfoory, ‘The ‘ulama–State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941’,International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1987, Vol. 19, pp. 413–32;Shahroukh Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, New York,1980, pp. 25–59.

35 For the biography of Abdul-Karim H. a’iri see A. H. H. a’iri, Encyclopedia ofIslam, Supplement 5–6, p. 342; A. H. H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 136–8; Akhavi,Religion, p. 27.

36 For Marj‘a-i taqlid see H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 62–5; J. Calmard, Encyclopaedia ofIslam, 2nd edn, Vol. 6, pp. 548–56.

37 For the biography of Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, see Aqa-Buzurg TehraniT. abaqat al-A ‘alam al-Shi‘ah, Najaf, 1954, Part 1, pp. 261–4.

38 For the biography of Mirza Muhammad Husain Naini, see A. H. H. a’iri, Shi‘ism,pp. 109–49.

39 For the biography of Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani, see H. Algar, EncyclopaediaIranica, London, 1988, Vol. 1, p. 302.

40 H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, p. 137.41 Ibid., p. 139; Akhavi, Religion, p. 29, albeit slightly different.42 Faghfoory, Role, p. 61; H. Makki, Tarikh, Vol. 1, p. 272; H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, pp.

146–47.43 Makki, Tarikh, Vol. 2, p. 344; Akhavi, Religion, p. 30; H. a’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 142–3.44 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 68; M. M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revo-

lution, Boulder and London, 1994, p. 32.45 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 69–72. For the state–religion relationship during the

period of modernization see M. H. Faghfoory, ‘The Impact of Modernization onthe ‘ulama in Iran, 1925–1941’, Iranian Studies, 1993, Vol. 26, No. 3–4, pp.277–311.

46 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 57.47 Ibid., p. 70; Akhavi, Religion, p. 37.48 Akhavi, Religion, p. 37.49 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 71.50 Maliki, Husain, Daulat-ha-yi Iran dar ‘As. r-i Mashrut. iyat, Tehran, 1370 (1991–

2), Vol. 1, p. 222; Sayyid Mahdi Farrukh, Khat.irat-i Siyasi-i Farrukh, Tehran,Bahman 1347 (1969), p. 225.

51 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 71.52 Ibid., pp. 73–5; Akhavi, Religion, pp. 37–40.53 Akhavi, Religion, pp. 55–6.54 Ibid., pp. 32–40; Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 75–92.55 For the removal of women’s veils see n.a., Vaqi‘ih-yi Kashf-i H. ijab, Tehran,

1371 (1992–3).56 For the Gauharshad event see Sina Vah. id, Qiyam-i Gauharshad, Tehran, Isfand

1361 (1983); Husain Maliki, Daulat-ha-yi Iran, pp. 232–4.

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57 Akhavi, Religion, p. 43.58 Ibid., p. 42; Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 79.59 Akhavi, Religion, p. 44.60 Interview with Ayatullah Sultani Tabatabai in: n.a., Majallih-yi Hauzih, Qum,

1370 (1991–92), No. 43–4, p. 47.61 Ibid., p. 201.62 Sina Vah. id, Qiyam, p. 48.63 Ibid., p. 224. In this respect E. Abrahamian in his Iran between Two Revolutions,

p. 152, has mentioned the case as follows:

The upheavals of 1935–1936 were sparked by the unveiling of womenand the introduction of the international hat. On July 10, 1935, theanniversary of the Russian bombardment of the Mashhad shrine in1911, the main preacher at the shrine took advantage of the emotionaloccasion to denounce the heretical innovations, the high consumer taxes,and the prevalence of corruption in high places. The following day, amassive crowd from the bazaar and the neighboring villages flocked tothe mosque, shouting ‘Imam Hussein protect us from the evil Shah’.Finding that the city policemen and the Khurasan army contingentsrefused to violate the sanctity of the shrine, the local authorities wereunable to act for two full days . . . The situation changed drastically onthe third day, however, as army reinforcements arrived from Azerbaijanand promptly moved to clear the shrine. In the subsequent confron-tation, nearly two hundred suffered serious injuries, and over onehundred, including many women and children, lost their lives. In thefollowing months, the shrine custodian was executed.

64 Ibid., p. 49.65 Khamenei, Guzarishi, pp. 25–6.66 Personal interview with Muhammad Ali Mut.ahhari, 6 June 1994.67 Ibid.68 Maliki, Daulat-ha, p. 225. For the biography of Mudarris see H. Makki,

Mudarris: Qahraman-i Azadi, Tehran, 1358 (1979–80).69 N.a., Jilvih-ha-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Ustad, p. 21.70 Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, pp. 350, 363, 374.71 Ibid., p. 334.72 H. a’iri, A. H., in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, Supplement, 5–6, pp.

342–3.73 For the biography of Akhund Khurasani, see Majallih-yi Nur-i ‘Ilm, Qum, No. 6,

p. 98.74 For the biography of Ayatullah Hujjat, see ibid., No. 10, p. 85.75 For the biography of Ayatullah S.adr, see ibid., No. 7, p. 74.76 Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 336.77 Ibid.78 For the biography of Ayatullah Kashani see Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 115–36; n.a.,

Fas. l-namih-yi Tarikh va Farhang-i Mu‘asir, special issue, Qum, 1372 (1993–4),No. 6 and 7.

79 Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 336.80 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 9.81 Ibid., p. 10.82 For the biography of Ayatullah Khomeini see Majallih-yi H. uz.ur, Tehran,

Khurdad 1370 (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 5, 56–61; n.a., Fas. l-namih-yi Tarikh vaFarhang-i Mu‘asir, No. 3.4, Qum, Spring and Summer 1371 (1992), pp. 9–25;Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, New York, 1993, pp. 409–84.

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83 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 388.84 For the biography of Ayatullah Montazeri see Mus. t.afa Izadi, Faqih-i ‘Aliqadr,

Tehran, Khurdad 1361 (1982).85 Montazeri, Husain Ali, ‘H. akim-i Farzanih’ in: n.a., Yad namih-yi Ustad-i

Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, ed. ‘Abdul-Karim Surush, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360(1981), Vol. 1, pp. 171–3.

86 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, pp. 675–6.87 For the biography of Ayatullah Burujirdi see A. Davani, Zindigani-i Za‘im-i

Buzurg-i ‘Alam-i Tashayyu‘a Ayatullah Burujirdi, Tehran, Autumn 1371(1992); Majallih-yi H. auzih, Qum, Spring 1370 (1991), No. 43 and 44;Majallih-yi Nur-i ‘Ilm, Qum, 1364 (1985–6), No. 12, p. 85; Hamid Algar, in:Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. 4, pp. 376–9.

88 In a personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, in spring 1994, he mentionedthat once he and Mut.ahhari visited Ayatullah Khomeini to discuss with him thejurisprudential bases of the theory of Islamic rule.

89 For information about the Fadaiyan-i Islam, see Fagfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 167–88;N.a., Naguftih-ha: Khat.irat-i Shahid Hajj Mahdi ‘Araqi, Tehran, 1370 (1991–2); Majallih-i Yad, Tehran, 1366 (1987–8), No. 6 and 7; Fas. l-namih-yi Tarikhva Farhang-i Mu‘asir, Qum, Winter 1370 (1992), No. 2, pp. 7–41 and No. 3.4,Spring–Summer 1372 (1993), pp. 36–58; Sayyid Husain Khushniyat, SayyidMujtaba Navvab S. afavi: Andishih-ha, Mubarizat va Shihadat-i Au, Tehran,Isfand 1360 (1982).

90 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 24.91 These statements and interviews are all to be found in ibid., Vols 1 and 2.92 This case was mentioned by Mut.ahhari as follows:

In 1320 [1941], I travelled, for the first time, to Isfahan to visit my dearclassmate. We had discussed our lessons with each other for 11 years.He who is now a great Mujtahid and Mudarris of the Hauzih-i ‘Ilmiyih-yi Qum suggested then to me that there was a great scholar who wasteaching Nahj al-balaghih in the Madrasih-yi S.adr. He suggested thatwe should go to his lessons . . . I accepted his suggestion because it wasmy classmate’s proposal and it was also the holiday time when I had nohomework to do.

Quoted from n.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Ustad-i ShahidMurtaz.a Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Summer 1370 (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 330–1.

93 For the biography of Mirza Ali-Aqa Shirazi, see Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj al-balaghih, Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), pp. VII–XV; Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 333.

94 Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj, p. 12.95 Ibid., p. 10.96 Ibid., p. 8.97 Ibid., pp. 99–135.98 Ibid., pp. 26–31.99 For the occupation of Iran by the Allied Forces see Makki, Tarikh, Vol. 7;

Madani, Tarikh, Vol. 1, pp. 129–55; Miron Rezun, The Iranian Crisis of 1941,Cologne and Vienna, 1982.

100 Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, summer 1994.101 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 208.102 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, p. 675.103 For the biography of ‘Allamih Tabatabai, see n.a., Yad namih-yi Mufassir-i

Kabir Ustad ‘Allamih Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabaí, Qum, Tir 1361(1982); Majallih-i Nur-i ‘Ilm, Qum, 1368 (1989–90), No. 9, p. 44.

104 Mut.ahhari’s other teachers at this level are mentioned as follows: Mirza Mahdi

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Ashtiyani, Sayyid Muhammad Hujjat Kuh-kamarai, Sayyid MuhammadMuh. aqqiq Damad, Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khunsari, Sayyid AhmadKhunsari, Sayyid S.adr al-Din S.adr, Sayyid Muhammad Reza Gulpayigani. SeeVa‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 329.

105 This article has been recently republished in: Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, Takamul-iIjtima‘i-i Insan, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 191–211.

106 Ibid., pp. 196–211.107 Ibid., pp. 194–5.108 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 10.109 Some of these students are: Husain Ali Montazeri, Reza S.adr and Mahdi H. a’iri

Yazdi. See Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 326.110 Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, Tehran, Murdad 1370/1991, pp. 99–101.111 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Tehran, Bahman 1361/1983, Vol. 4, p. 104, Vol. 6, p. 106

and Vol. 7, p. 183.112 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 11.113 For the nationalization of the oil industry see n.a., Musaddiq, Iranian

Nationalism and Oil, ed. Bill and Roger Louis, London, 1988, pp. 143–304;Fagfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 217–43.

114 Khushniyat, S. H., Navvab S. afavi, Tehran, Esfand 1360 (1982), pp. 15–17.115 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 167.116 Khushniyat, Navvab S. afavi, pp. 21–3.117 Ibid., p. 47.118 Ibid., pp. 60–78.119 Ibid., pp. 76 and 118.120 Rahnema, Secular Miracle, p. 76.121 Khushniyat, Navvab S. afavi, p. 129.122 Ibid., p. 77; Navvab S.afavi, ‘Barnamih-yi Inqilabi-yi Fadaiyan-i Islam’ in:

Rahnema, Secular Miracle, p. 86.123 Majallih-yi H. auzih, No. 43–4, p. 37.124 Ibid., pp. 98–9; Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, p. 339.125 Majallih-yi H. auzih, No. 43–4, p. 38.126 Ibid., p. 228.127 Ibid., p. 36.128 Davani, Ali, Khatirat-i Man az Ustad-i Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Aban 1372

(1993), pp. 22–3.129 Majallih-yi H. auzih, No. 43–4, p. 229.130 Ibid., p. 37; Rahnema, Secular Miracle, pp. 86–7.131 Ibid., p. 38.132 Ibid., p. 98. Rahnema in the Secular Miracle, p. 87, maintains that the Shah

might have commuted the death sentence if Burujirdi had pleaded for clemency.133 Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, pp.

156–7.134 Ibid., p. 157.135 Ibid., p. 162.136 Ibid., p. 282.137 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 273.138 Ibid., p. 274.139 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 372.140 Ibid., pp. 318–19.141 Ibid., p. 319.142 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 274–6.143 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 320.144 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 277.

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145 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 321.146 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 277–8.147 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 324.148 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 278–9.149 Akhavi, Religion, p. 64.150 Khushniyat, Navvab S. afavi, p. 112.151 Majallih-yi H. auzih, No. 43–4, p. 226; Akhavi, Religion, p. 65; Abrahamian,

Iran, p. 373.152 Majallih-yi H. auzih, No. 43–4, pp. 100–2; Akhavi, Role, p. 92.153 See, for instance, Naqdi bar Marxism, Tehran, Farvardin 1363 (1984), p. 198;

Us. ul-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, Vol. 4, Tehran, Spring 1368 (1989), pp.161–260.

154 For the biography of Dr Sayyid Muhammad Husaini Beheshti, see Ali Qaimi,Zindigi va Guzidih-i Afkar-i Shahid-i Maz.lum Ayatullah Beheshti, Qum, 1361(1982–3); N.a., Au bi Tanhai Yik Ummat Bud, Tehran, Tir 1361 (1982).

155 See an interview with ‘Allamih Tabatabai, in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2,pp. 686–7.

156 See an interview with Ayatullah Sultani Tabatabai in: Majallih-yi H. auzih, No.43–4, p. 44.

157 Ibid.158 Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, April 1994.159 For the biography of Husain Ali Rashid see Batul Rashid, ‘Zindigi-namih-yi

Danishmand-i Faqid Hujjat al-Islam Shaikh Husain Ali Rashid’, Ettilaat,9.8.1368 (30.10.1990); Muhammad Javad Hujjati Kermani, ‘Nigahi biShakhs. iyat-i Marh. um Husain Ali Rashid’, Ettilaat, 7.8.1369 (28.10.1991);Mas‘ud Javadiyan, ‘Ashnai ba Zindigi-namih, Zindigi-i Farhangi, Athar vaFaraz-hai az Sukhanan-i Rashid’, Ettilaat, 6.8.1371 (27.10.1993). For thebiography of Dr Muhammad Ibrahim Ayati, see Iraj Afshar, ‘Zindigi namih-yiMuhammad Ibrahim Ayati’ in: M. I. Ayati, Tarikh-i Payambar-i Islam, Tehran,Khurdad 1361 (1982), pp. d–v.

2 ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

1 Mut.ahhari, Ashnai ba ‘Ulum-i Islami, Tehran, Summer 1368/1989, Vol. 2, p.15.

2 For the academic background of modern theology in the West, see Ian G.Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, London, 1972.

3 For information about liberation theology, see James V. Schall, LiberationTheology in Latin America, San Francisco, 1982.

4 Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, Tehran, Murdad 1370/1991, p. 14.5 Personal interview with Ayatullah Muhammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, July 1995.6 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, pp. 820–906.7 See an interview with Dr Mahdi-zadih, in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp.

364–5.8 N.a., Yad-namih-yi Ustad-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, ed. Abdul-Karim

Surush, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360/1981, Vol. 1, p. 553.9 Personal interview with Muhandis Ali-Akbar Mu‘infar (the Minister of Oil in the

Provisional Government after January 1979), Summer 1993.10 Mut.ahhari, Dah Guftar, Tehran, Autumn 1369/1990, pp. 11–12.11 Ibid., pp. 14 and 222.12 Personal interview with Ali-Akbar Mu‘infar, Summer 1993.13 Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, pp. 8–9.

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14 The date is, in Dr Beheshti’s autobiography, 1338. Ittilaat International, No.279, 28 June 1995.

15 For the biography of Nihz.at-i Azadi-yi Iran, see Hamid Dabashi, Theology ofDiscontent, pp. 335–8 and 354.

16 Pesonal interview with Mu‘infar, Summer 1993.17 Va‘iz. -zadih, Sairi, pp. 348 and 364.18 Rauhani, Sayyid Hamid, Barrasi va Tah. lili az Nihz.at-i Imam Khomeini, Tehran,

Bahman 1360/1982, Vol. 1, pp. 115–40.19 Ibid., pp. 142–216.20 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, The Shah’s Story, trans. Teresa Waugh, London,

1980, p. 73.21 Rauhani, Barrasi, Vol. 1, pp. 334–49.22 Ibid., pp. 456–60.23 Ibid., pp. 716–26.24 Ibid., p. 728.25 Ibid., pp. 706–44.26 See an interview with Anvari, in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 106.27 N.a., Sar Guzasht-ha-yi Vizhih as Zindigi-yi Ustad-i Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran,

Summer 1370/1991, Vol. 2, p. 160.28 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 47.29 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 49.30 See an interview with Anvari in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol.1, p. 106;

Asadullah Badam-chiyan, Haiat-ha-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami, Tehran, Tir 1362/1983, p. 35. According to Badam-chiyan three religious groups established theMu’talifih, whereas according to Anvari it was four or five groups.

31 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, p. 108; Badam-chiyan, Haiat-ha, pp. 36–7. Accordingto Badam-chiyan the clerical commitee consisted of Mut.ahhari, Beheshti,Anvari, Bahunar, and Hashemi Rafsanjani.

32 Ibid., pp. 108–9.33 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami dar S. ad-Salih-i Akhir,

Tehran, Bahman 1370/1992, p. 74.34 Mut.ahhari, Insan va Sarnivisht, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, p. 13.35 Ibid., p. 64.36 Mut.ahhari, Dastan-i Rastan, Tehran, Winter 1370/1992, Vol. 2, Preface.37 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 16.38 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 15.39 Personal interview with Reza Isfahani (August 1993), the Minister of Agriculture

in the Provisional Government of Bazagan.40 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371/1992,

p. 104.41 Ibid., pp. 121 and 126.42 Ibid., p. 101.43 This letter is printed in: Majallih-yi Surush, third year, 1360, No. 102.44 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, p. 115.45 Personal interview with Dr Nas. ir Minachi, August 1993. He furthermore stated

that despite those letters his friendly relationship with Mut.ahhari never changed,because it was Mut.ahhari who introduced him to Ayatullah Khomeini as theMinister of Islamic Guidance.

46 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, p. 111.47 Ibid., pp. 112–13.48 Shariati, Ali, Majmu‘ih-yi Athar, Tehran, 1357/1979, Vol. 5, p. 104.49 Shariati, ‘Islam va Ruh. aniyat’ in: n.a., Fas. l-namih-yi Tarikh va Farhang-i

Mu‘as. ir, No. 3 and 4, pp. 400–11.

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50 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, pp. 82–3.51 Mut.ahhari, Ruh. aniyat, Qum, Urdibihisht 1365/1986, pp. 13–144.52 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani, p. 120.53 Ibid., p. 128.54 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali, p. 74.55 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, p. 79.56 Acton, H. B., ‘Dialectical Materialism’ in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

ed. Paul Edwards, London and New York, 1967, Vols 1, pp. 389–97 and 4, pp.12–21.

57 Shariati, Ali, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar, Berkeley, 1979, pp.70–95.

58 Ibid, pp. 70–95.59 Shariati, Ali, Islamshinasi, Tehran, 1350/1971–2, pp. 90–2.60 Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 115.61 Shariati, Islamshinasi, pp. 90–1.62 See Shariati, Majmu‘ih-yi Athar, Vols 7 and 28.63 Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 98.64 Shariati, Islamshinasi, pp. 97–8.65 Ibid., p. 77.66 Mut.ahhari, Society and History, trans. Mahliqa Qarai, Tehran, 1985, p. 102.67 N.a., Sayri dar Zindigani, pp. 83 and 128.68 Ibid., p. 73.69 Ibid., p. 75.70 N.a., Pasukh-ha-yi Ustad bar Naqd-hai bar Kitab-i Mas’alih-yi H. ijab, Tehran,

Spring 1370/1991, p. 72.71 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, Interview with Jumhuri-yi Islami, 14.2.1362/

4.5.1983.72 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 56.73 Russell, Bertrand, Marriage and Morals, London, 1930, pp. 237–50.74 Mut.ahhari, Akhlaq-i Jinsi dar Islam va Jahan-i Gharb, Tehran, Bahar 1370/

1991, p. 77.75 Mut.ahhari, Niz.am-i H. uquq-i Zan dar Islam, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, pp.

26–8.76 Ibid., p. 28.77 Mut.ahhari, Jazibih va Dafi‘ih-yi Ali, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371/1992, pp. 189–

90.78 Durant, Will, The Story of Civilisation, New York, 1954, Part I, p. 375.79 Ibid., Part IV, pp. 220–21.80 Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi H. ijab, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, p. 23.81 Ibid., p. 25.82 Ibid., p. 83.83 Ibid., p. 181.84 See Pasukh-ha-yi Ustad bi Naqd-hai bar Kitab-i Mas’alih-yi H. ijab, and inter-

view with Dr Muhammad Baqir Hujjati, in: n.a., Sar Guzasht-ha-yi Vizhih, Vol.2, pp. 73–5.

85 It is worth mentioning that muh. allil, according to Shi‘i law (see Khomeini, Tah. riral-Vasilih, Kitab al-T. alaq, Beirut, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 333) is an emotional factorpreventing a third divorce. In Shi‘ite jurisprudence, each divorce is followed by adefinite waiting period, called ‘iddih (waiting until the third menstrual cycle); theseparated couple may not reunite or remarry until this period ends. However, incases where the man, for example, has divorced his wife for a third time, hecannot return to the wife (even after ‘iddih) unless she has married, in well-intentioned permanent marriage, and then has been divorced or widowed, thus

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entitling her to be free to remarry her first husband. This intermediary man islabelled the muh. allil. Therefore, if three divorces are declared in one session or ifmarriage with the muh. allil was a temporary marriage, as the film portrayed,this fourth marriage, i.e. between the original couple, is unlawful and false.

86 Mut.ahhari, ‘Film-i Muh. allil’ in: Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, Imdad-ha yi Ghaibi darZindigi-yi Bashar, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, pp. 191–203.

87 Ibid., p. 193.88 Mut.ahhari, Khadamat-i Mutaqabil-i Islam va Iran, Qum, Bahman 1362/1984,

p. 6.89 Ibid., pp. 36–7.90 Ibid., p. 44.91 Ibid., p. 38.92 Ibid., pp. 35–6.93 Ibid., p. 43.94 Ibid., pp. 88–9.95 Ibid., pp. 229, 232–3.96 N.a., Sayri dar Zindigani Ustad Mut.ahhari, p. 80.97 Shariati’s articles were published in Ruz-namih-yi Kaihan in two series: first,

the series entitled Marxism z.idd-i Islam from 26.11.1354/30.1.1976 to24.12.1354/14.3.1976 in 23 numbers; second, the series entitled Bazgasht bikhishtan from 2.2.2535/21.4.1976 to 1.4.2535/21.6.1976 in 46 articles.

98 Mu‘in, Muhammad, Mazd-yasna va Adab-i Parsi, Tehran, 1338/1958–60.99 Mut.ahhari, Khadamat, p. 96.

100 Sanii, Parviz, Qanun va Shakhsiyat, Tehran, 1344/1965–6, p. 157.101 Mu‘in, Mazd-yasna, Introduction, n.p.102 Mut.ahhari, Khadamat, p. 108.103 Ibid., p. 108.104 Ibid., p. 109.105 Ibid., pp. 112–13.106 Sir John Malcolm, The History of Persia, London, 1815, Vol. 1, p. 277.107 Zarrinkub, Abdul-Husain, Du Qarn Sukut, Tehran, 1355/1976–7.108 Mut.ahhari, Khadamat, p. 602.109 Ibid., p. 313.110 Ibid., p. 325.111 Ibid., pp. 365, 596.112 Ibid., p. 597.113 Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 483–4.114 Ibid., pp. 484–5.115 Ibid., pp. 486–8.116 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 9–11.117 See an interview with Ayatullah Ali Khamenei in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih,

Vol. 1, p. 73; Shariat Raz.avi, Puran, T. arh. i az yik Zindigi, Tehran, 1374/1995–6, p. 17.

118 See an interview with T. ahiri Khurram-abadi in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih,Vol. 2, pp. 95–7.

119 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 64.120 Ibid., pp. 238–9.121 Ibid., pp. 246–7.122 Ibid., p. 244.123 Ibid., p. 257.124 Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 98, 99, 104, 145, 146, 169,

206; Mut.ahhari, Insan dar Quran, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, p. 68.125 Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, pp. 48, 107, 120, 163.

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126 Personal interview with Hasan S.adr Vathiqi, a contemporary lawyer, Spring1371/1992. He mentioned that once Hamid Enayat, a Professor of Politics atthe University of Tehran, asked him to arrange a meeting with Mut.ahhari. Herealized during the meeting that he could benefit from Mut.ahhari. Then heregularly attended Mut.ahhari’s private lessons on Islamic philosophical issues.Once, during his lessons, Mut.ahhari stated that Hegel was an essentialist (notexistentialist). Enayat asked for his reference about the view. Mut.ahharireferred him to a phrase from Enayat’s translation of Hegel. Suprisingly, Enayatadmitted that he did not realize the point when he was translating the book.

127 Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, pp. 18, 33, 244; Mut.ahhari, Jami‘ih va Tarikh, Tehran,Spring 1370/1991, p. 248; Mut.ahhari, Naqdi bar Marxism, Tehran, Farvardin1363/1984, pp. 74–80.

128 Mut.ahhari, Jami‘ih va Tarikh, pp. 49 and 248; Mut.ahhari, Takamul-i Ijtima‘i-yi Insan, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 17–29.

129 Mut.ahhari, Falsafih-yi Akhlaq, Tehran, Bahman 1370/1992, pp. 147–8.130 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, Vol.

1, p. 13.131 Ibid., p. 137.132 For information about the doctrine of Vilayat-i Faqih, see Husain Ali

Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih (4 vols), Qum, 1409–11q.133 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat, Vol. 2, pp. 36–40.134 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 31.135 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, pp. 170–1.136 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat, Vol. 2, pp. 91–2.137 Shamlu, Ahmad, H. afiz.-i Shiraz bi Rivayat-i Ahmad Shamlu, Tehran, 1354/

1975–6, p. 25.138 T. abari, Ih. san, Barkhi Barrasi-ha dar Barih-yi Jihanbini-ha va Junbish-ha-yi,

Ijtima‘í dar Iran, Tehran, 1348/1969–70.139 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 14–15.140 Mirfat.rus, Ali, H. allaj, Tehran, Urdibihisht 2537/1979.141 Shamlu, H. afiz.-i Shiraz, p. 20.142 Mut.ahhari, ‘Irfan-i H. afiz., Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 21.143 Faiz. Kashani, Kulliyat-i Ash‘ar, Tehran, 1354/1975–6.144 Naraqi, Mulla Ahmad, Mathnavi-yi Taqdis, Tehran, 1362/1983–4.145 Isfahani, Muhammad Husain, Divan-i Kumpani, Tehran, 1338/1959–60.146 Khomeini, Ruh. ullah, Divan-i Imam, Tehran, Khurdad 1372/1993.147 Mut.ahhari, ‘Irfan-i H. afiz., p. 6.148 See an interview with T. ahiri Khurram-abadi in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih,

Vol. 2, p. 93.149 See an interview with Khusrau-Shahi in: n.a., Majallih-yi Tarikh va Farhang-i

Mu‘asir, Vols 3 and 4, pp. 369–70.150 Peter, Andre, Marx va Marxism, Persian translation by Shuja‘a al-Din

Ziyaiyan, Tehran, 1354/1975–6.151 Mut.ahhari, Ashinai ba ‘Ulum-i Islami, Tehran, Winter 1370/1991, Vol. 1, p.

10.152 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 58; However, the date is 1354. See n.a., Sairi

dar Zindigani-yi Ustad Mut.ahhari, p. 68.153 Ibid., p. 57.154 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha-yi Islami Dar S.ad Salih-i Akhir,

Tehran, 1370, p. 89.155 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 86–7.156 Ibid., pp. 88–9.157 Ibid., p. 92.

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158 Ibid., pp. 122–5.159 Ibid., p. 149.160 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Bahman 1361/1983, Vol. 12, pp. 197–9.161 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 128 and 135.162 Ibid., p. 145.163 Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Shinakht, Tehran, Spring 1368/1989, p. 8.164 Bahunar, Muhammad Javad, ‘Sair-i Tarikhi-yi Iltiqat.i va Shakhs. iyat-i ‘Ilmi-yi

Ustad’ in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp. 377–84.165 N.a., Sairi dar Zindigani, p. 81.166 Mut.ahhari, Jahanbini-yi Tauh. idi, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 83.167 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 200.168 Ibid., p. 203.169 A number of phrases from these booklets are mentioned in Mut.ahhari’s article

on ‘Matiryalism dar Iran’ in: Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal-i Girayish bi Maddigari,pp. 33–43.

170 Qasimi, Davud, Us. ul-i Tafakkur-i Qurani, n.d., n.p., p. 209.171 Mut.ahhari, Matiryalism dar Iran, pp. 29–30.172 Ibid., p. 31.173 Ibid., p. 32.174 Ibid., p. 31.175 Ibid., p. 32.176 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 201.177 Ibid., pp. 204–5.178 See an interview with T. ahiri Khurram-abadi in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha-yi Vizhih,

Vol. 2, p. 97.179 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 204.180 Algar, Hamid, preface to: Shariati, Marxism and other Western Fallacies, trans.

R. Cambell, California, 1980, p. 9.181 See an interview with Anvari in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 109.182 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali, p. 89.183 Mut.ahhari, Matiryalism dar Iran, p. 43.184 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Inqilab, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 124.185 Bahunar, Muhammad Javad, Sair-i Tarikhi, p. 384.186 See an interview with Hashemi Rafsanjani in: Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1,

p. 58.187 It is published in: Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Inqilab, p. 15.188 Vathiqi Rad, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, p. 622.

3 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

1 Personal interview with Ayatullah Sayyid Abdul-Karim Musavi Ardibili,Summer 1993.

2 Katouzian, Homa, ‘Shi‘ism and Islamic Economics’, in: Religion and Politics inIran, ed. Nikki R. Keddie, London, 1983, p. 147.

3 Khomeini, Ruh. ullah, Tah. rir al-Vasilih, Beirut, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 515.4 Mut.ahhari, ‘Bimih’ in: Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba, Tehran, Summer 1370/

1991, p. 281.5 Ibid., p. 282.6 Personal interview with Ghulam-Ali H. addad-‘Adil, the present head of the

Iranian Academy of Persian Language and Literature, 11.12.1995. MuhammadNahavandiyan, Mans. ur Pahlavan and Dr S. alih. khu were the other members ofthis group.

7 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, pp. 155, 163, 165, 170, 171.

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8 Katouzian, Shi‘ism, p. 145.9 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari bi Niz. am-i Iqtis. adi-yi islam, Tehran, Spring 1368/1989, pp.

32–3 and 238–9; S.adr, Iqtis. aduna, Beirut, 1977, pp. 290–94 and 335–46;Gulzadih Ghafuri, Khut.ut.-i As. li dar Niz.am-i Iqtis. adi-yi Islam, Tehran, n.d, pp.6–9; Musa S.adr, Iqtis. ad dar Maktab-i Islam, Tehran, Day 1350/1971, pp. 4–5;n.a., Dar-amadi bar Iqtis. ad-i Islami, Qum, Summer 1372/1993, pp. 9–14.

10 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 16–17.11 S.adr, Iqtis. aduna, p. 291.12 Nomani, Farhad, Islamic Economic Systems, London, 1994, p. 21.13 Ibid., p. 43.14 N.a., Dar-amadi, pp. 55–76.15 Ibid., pp. 44–5.16 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 21–6.17 For the first group, see Gulzadih Ghafuri, Khut.ut.-i As. li, p. 19; n.a., Dar-amadi,

p. 90; Beheshti, Iqtis. ad-i Islami, Tehran, Autumn 1368/1989, Vol. 1. p. 13. Andfor the second group see Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 17–20 and 233–6.

18 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 17–20.19 S.adr, Iqtis. aduna, p. 346.20 Ibid., p. 341; Mallat, Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Cambridge, 1993, pp.

122–3.21 S.adr, Iqtis. aduna, p. 269.22 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 44.23 S.adr, Iqtis. aduna, pp. 272–77.24 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 45.25 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat-i Zaman, Vol. 1, pp. 250–2.26 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 46.27 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 59, 154.28 Ibid., p. 25.29 Ibid., p. 159.30 Rodinson, Maxime, Islam and Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce, London, 1974,

pp. 155 and 181.31 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 112–13.32 Ibid., pp. 221–4.33 Rodinson, Islam, p. 4.34 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, p. 137.35 Ibid., p. 135.36 Ibid., p. 136.37 Ibid., pp. 58, 138 and 143.38 Ibid., pp. 79 and 124.39 According to the First (and also Amended) Constitution of the Islamic Republic

of Iran, Chapter IV, Article 44,

The economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of threesectors: state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on orderlyand correct planning. The state sector is to include all large-scale andbasic industries, foreign trade, major mineral resources, banking,insurance, energy, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio andtelevision, post, telegraphic and telephone services, aviation, shipping,roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned andadministered by the state.

40 Beheshti, Iqtis. ad, p. 25.41 Adhari Qumi, Ahmad, Malikiyat dar Islam, Qum, n.d., pp. 57–9.42 Shariati, Islamshinasi, Vols 1 and 2, p. 97.

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43 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 224–5.44 Ibid., pp. 229–331.45 Ibid., pp. 241–2.46 Ibid., pp. 143–4.47 Ibid., p. 174.48 Ibid., p. 175.49 Ibid., p. 223.50 N.a., Dar-amadi, pp. 257–8; Mallat, Renewal, p. 114.51 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 240–1.52 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, pp. 47–8.53 Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, pp. 35, 55 and 56.54 Ibid., p. 37.55 Ibid., p. 36.56 Ibid., p. 37.57 Mut.ahhari, Bist Guftar, p. 10.58 Ibid., pp. 12–17; Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj, pp. 110–12.59 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 37.60 Ibid., pp. 38–9.61 Ibid., p. 37.62 Mut.ahhari, Qiyam va Inqilab-i Mahdi, p. 60.63 Mut.ahhari, Bist Guftar, p. 136.64 Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ilahi, pp. 56–7.65 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 38.66 Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, p. 247.67 Ibid., pp. 163–4.68 Ibid., p. 165.69 Ibid., pp. 166–70.70 Ibid., pp. 170–1.71 Ibid., pp. 171–8.72 Ibid., pp. 70–2 and 178–80.73 Ibid., p. 55.74 Ibid., pp. 41–2.75 Mallat, Renewal, p. 158.76 Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba, p. 78.77 Ibid., pp. 42 and 76; Beheshti, Riba, pp. 87, 89 and 119.78 Ibid., pp. 120–1.79 Mallat, Renewal, p. 165.80 Beheshti, Riba, pp. 148–9 and 186–8.81 Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba, pp. 143–8.82 Ibid., p. 139.83 Ibid., pp. 116–22.84 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddamih, trans. Franz Rosenthal, New York, 1980, Vol.

2, pp. 93–5.85 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 56.86 Ibid., pp. 56–8.87 Makarim Shirazi, ‘Khut.ut.-i As. li-i Iqtis. ad-i Islami’ in: Va‘iz. -zadih Khurasani,

Majmu‘ih-yi Maqalat-i Farsi-yi Avvalin Majmu‘ih-yi Barrasi-ha-yi Iqtis. ad-iIslami, Mashhad, 1369/1990–91, p. 110.

88 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 59.89 Ibid., p. 63.90 Montazeri, H. A., Vilayat al-Faqih, Qum, 1409q, Vol. 2, pp. 669–700.91 Makarim Shirazi, Khut.ut., p. 113.92 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 156–7, 222–40.

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93 Ibid., p. 206.94 Ibid., p. 215.95 Ibid., p. 208.

4 POLITICAL VIEWS

1 These parts of the fiqh are as follows: Kitab al-Amr bi al-M‘aruf va al-Nahyi ‘anal-Munkar, Kitab al-Qaz.a, Kitab al-H. udud, Kitab al-Jihad, Kitab al-Khums,Kitab al-Bai‘a, Kitab al-H. ajr, Kitab al-Nikah. , Kitab al-T. alaq, Kitab al-S. aum,Kitab al-S. alat, and Kitab al-H. ajj.

2 Enayat, Hamid, Modern Islamic Political Thought, London and Basingstoke,1982, pp. 2–3.

3 Kadivar, Muh. sin, ‘Naz.ariyih-ha-yi Daulat dar Fiqh-i Shi‘ih’ in: Fas. l Namih-iRahburd, No. 3, Autumn 1373/1994, pp. 2–4.

4 H. urr ‘Amili, Vasail al-Shi‘ih, Oum, 1371/1992–3, Vol. 15, pp. 50–6.5 Kadivar, Muh. sin, Naz.ariyih-ha-yi Daulat, 2nd edn, p. 2.6 Umur-i h. isbih means matters which usually no-one takes cares of, and which

cannot be left to themselves, such as protecting those who do not haveprotectors, and directing public endowments. However, Ayatullah Khomeiniconsiders matters such as ‘guarding the frontiers of the Islamic lands’, ‘protectingyoung Muslims from deviation and wrong doing’, and ‘preventing anti-Islamicpropagation’ as cases of umur-i h. isbih which require the establishing of a justrule. See Khomeini, Shu’un va Ikhtiyarat-i Valí-yi Faqih, Tehran, Autumn 1369/1990, p. 79.

7 See Mufid, al-Muqni‘ih, Qum, 1372/1993–4, pp. 810–12, and Shaikh T. usi,Khilaf, Tehran, 1382q, Vol. 1, pp. 226, 359, 452, 458–9, 620–1, and also Vol. 2,pp. 30, 130, 477, 492–93, 500, 507, 513.

8 For a bibliography of Rasail-i Khirajiyih see n.a., al-Khirajiyat, a collection ofMuh. aqqiq Thani, Muh. aqqiq Ardibili, Faz.il Qat.ifi and Faz.il Shaibani, Qum,1413q; for a bibliography of Risalih-ha-yi Namaz-i Jum‘ih see Rasul J‘afariyan,Din va Siyasat dar Daurih-i S. afaviyan, Qum, 1370/1991–2, pp. 152–82; for abibliography of Rasail-i jihadiyih see Abdul-Hadi H. a’iri, Nakhustin Ruyarui-ha-yi Andishihgaran-i Irani, Tehran, 1367/1988–9, pp. 374–83.

9 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, 2nd edn, p. 2.10 Muh. aqqiq Karaki, ‘Risalah fi al-S.alat al-Jum‘ah’ in: n.a., Rasail al-Muh. aqqiq

Karaki, ed. Muhammad H. assun, Qum, 1409q, pp. 142–3.11 Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 56.

Quoted from Muhammad b. Suliyman Tunkabuni, Qis.as. al-‘ulama, Tehran,1304q, p. 141.

12 Naraqi, Mulla Ahmad, ‘Vilayat al-Faqih’, a part of ‘Avaid al-Aiyam, ed. SayyidYasin Musavi, Tehran, 1410q, pp. 60–72.

13 Najafi, Muhammad Hasan, Javahir al-Kalam, Beirut, 1981, Vol. 16, p. 180.14 Ansari, Shaikh Murtaz.a, Al-Makasib, Tabriz, 1375q, pp. 153–5.15 For Naini’s and Nuri’s views see Abdul-Hadi H. a’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutional-

ism in Iran, Leiden, 1977, pp. 152–64.16 See Montazeri, Al-Badr al-Zahir, Qum, 1362/1983–4, pp. 52–3.17 Khomeini, Shu’un, p. 23.18 Kashf al-Asrar (pp. 186–238) reflects Ayatullah Khomeini’s views on the

concept of Islamic rule, Vilayat-i Faqih, and the political role of the ‘ulama insociety. Al-Rasail (pp. 94–120) provides his jurisprudential argumentation andanalysis on the issue of Vilayat-i Faqih and the extent of his authority. Tah. rir al-Vasilih (vol. 1, pp. 472–83) provides Ayatullah Khomeini’s particular vision onthe issue of Amr-i bi M‘aruf va Nahyi az Munkar as the only legitimate way to

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establish of the Islamic rule. The 21-volume S. ah. ifih-yi Nur is indeed a collectionof the Ayatullah’s statements, messages, interviews, orders and letters. Thesereflect his views on a vast variety of political issues, including the constitutionalmonarchy, the Pahlavi regime, the necessity for establishing a just Islamic rule,the vast authority of the faqih, the necessity for the involvement of the ‘ulama inpolitics, Islam as a religion full of politics, the function of Islamic rule foroppressed people, religious minorities in an Islamic state, the improvement ofwomen’s rights in Islamic society and so on. These books were revised by theMu’assasih-yi Tanz.im va Nashr-i Athar-i Imam Khomeini, and republished in1378/1999, in 22 volumes, in addition to 2000 new documents. S. ah. ifih-yiInqilab, Ayatullah Khomeini’s political testament, reflects his last judgementsabout the Islamic Republic, Islam and politics, external interventions, internalfears, cultural transformation, the rights and the role of the people over theIslamic state and so on.

19 See Kitab al-Bai‘a, Vol. 2, pp. 461–72; Tah. rir al-Vasilih, Vol. 1, pp. 472–83;S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 20, pp. 170 and 176.

20 Khomeini, Tah. rir, Vol. 1, p. 482.21 Ibid., p. 473.22 Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih, Qum, 1049q, Vol. 1, pp. 425–511.23 About Naini’s view see Abdul-Hadi H. a’iri, Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran,

pp. 165–70; for Muhammad Baqir S.adr’s view, see Mahmood Taqizadih Davari,Tarikh Tafakkur-i Ijtima‘i dar Islam, Tehran, 1363, Part 2, p. 138; forMontazeri’s view see Husain Ali Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih, Qum, 1409q, Vol.1, p. 4; for Ayatullah Khomeini’s view see Khomeini, Shu’un, p. 24.

24 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Jumhuri-i Islami, p. 150.25 Ibid., p. 151.26 Khomeini, Shu’un, p. 24.27 Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, p. 4.28 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Jumhuri-yi Islami, pp. 151–2.29 Mut.ahhari, Imamat va Rahbari, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 50–71.30 Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj al-balaghih, p. 128–9.31 Ibid., p. 124.32 Ibid., p. 130.33 Ibid., p. 128.34 Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, 11 April 1994.35 Bahunar, Muhammad Javad, ‘Vilayat-i Faqih’, BA thesis, Faculty of Theology,

Tehran, Aban 1341/1962, p. 68.36 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat, Vol. 2, pp. 62–4.37 These notes are published in: Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Jumhuri, p. 154.38 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat, Vol. 2, pp. 86, 91–2.39 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha, pp. 13–58.40 Ibid., pp. 63–4.41 Ibid., pp. 65–7.42 Mut.ahhari, Jami‘ih va Tarikh, pp. 41–3 and 86.43 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha, p. 71.44 Quoted from Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha, pp. 76–7. For the

biography and views of Bani-S.adr see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent,pp. 367–408.

45 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha, pp. 80–1.46 Ibid., p. 83.47 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Inqilab-i Islami, p. 184.48 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 6, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 269.49 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijmali-yi Nihz.at-ha, p. 87.

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50 Ibid., pp. 92–3.51 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Inqilab-i Islami, p. 85.52 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Jumhuri, pp. 26–7.53 Ehteshami, A., After Khomeini, London, 1955, p. 37.54 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, 2nd edn, p. 12.55 Ibid., p. 15.56 Although the other derivatives of this word, such as vali (a person who has

superiority over another), vali (governor), auliya (plural of vali), muvalat(friendship), tauliyat (superintendence of a pious foundation or shrine), tavalla(friendship), mutavalli (custodian), istila (domination), aula (prior), maula(master and also servant), have different meanings, they all have some sense ofspiritual or material closeness.

57 For the meanings of Vilayat see Mut.ahhari, Vila-ha va Vilayat-ha, Tehran,Autumn 1370/1991, pp. 13–16; Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, 2nd edn, pp. 19–30.

58 Kulaini, Al-Us. ul min al-Kafi, Beirut, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 295.59 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 18–19.60 Mut.ahhari, Imamat va Rahbari, pp. 45–109.61 Khomeini, Tah. rir al-Vasilih, Vol. 2, p. 533.62 Khomeini, Shu’un, p. 35.63 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, 2nd edn, pp. 45 and 49.64 Khomeini, Shu’un, pp. 65–6.65 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, p. 170.66 For Ayatullah Gulpayigani’s view see Ahmad S. abiri Hamadani, Al-Hidayah ila

man lahu al-Vilayah, Qum, 1383q, pp. 46–7; for Ayatullah Sabzavari’s view seeSayyid ‘Abdul-A‘ala Sabzavari, Muhazzab al-Ah. kam, Najaf, n.d., Vol. 1, p. 121and Vol. 16, p. 402.

67 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, pp. 53–4.68 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 9, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 183.69 Subh. ani, J‘afar, Tahzib al-Us. ul, Qum, n.d., Vol. 2, p. 149.70 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 5, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 31.71 Ibid., Vol. 15, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 76.72 Ibid., Vol. 21, 1369/1990–1, p. 129.73 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, p. 62.74 Khomeini, Shu’un, p. 45.75 N.a., S. ah. ifih-yi Nur, Vol. 9, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 253 and Vol. 17, Bahman

1364/1986, p. 103.76 Ibid., Vol. 21, 1369/1990–1, p. 98.77 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha, p. 72.78 Ibid., 49–51.79 Khui, Abul-Qasim, Al-Tanqih. , ed. Mirza Ali Gharavi Tabrizi, Qum, 1410q, Vol.

1, p. 424.80 Araki, Muhammad-Ali, Kitab al-Bai‘a, Qum, 1415q, Vol. 2, pp. 13–24.81 Tabrizi, Shaikh Javad, Is. al al-T. alib ila al-T‘aliq ‘ala al-Makasib, Qum, 1411q,

Vol. 3, pp. 36–40.82 S.adr, Muhammad Baqir, Lamh. a Tamhidiyah ‘an Mashru‘a Dustur al-

Jumhuriyah al-Islamiyah, Qum, 1399q, p. 19–22.83 Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, pp. 73–81.84 Ibid., p. 301.85 Ibid., pp. 302–3.86 Ibid., pp. 409–17.87 Ibid., pp. 426–92.88 Ibid., p. 493.89 Ibid., pp. 497–9.

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90 Ibid., p. 508.91 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 51–55.92 Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, spring 1989.93 Montazeri, Vilayat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, pp. 9–10 and 538–40.94 H. a’iri Yazdi, Mahdi, H. ikmat va H. ukumat, London, 1995, pp. 215–19.95 Ibid., pp. 54–7.96 Ibid., p. 82.97 Ibid., 103–5.98 Ibid., p. 109.99 Ibid., pp. 119–21 and 132.

100 Ibid., pp. 151–3.101 Ibid., p. 143.102 Ibid., pp. 167–70.103 Ibid., p. 172.104 Ibid., pp. 177–8.105 Ibid., pp. 179–92.106 Ibid., pp. 193–207.107 Ibid., pp. 81 and 144.108 Ibid., p. 218.109 Ibid., pp. 215–220.110 See Mahdi H. a’iri Yazdi, H. ikmat va H. ukumat, pp. 55–134.111 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz.iyat, Vol. 1, p. 175 and Vol. 2, pp. 63–4, 91.112 Mut.ahhari, Piramun-i Jumhuri, pp. 85–6.113 Ibid., p. 150.114 Ibid., p. 154.115 Ibid., pp. 80–3.

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195

I N D E X

Abdal-Khan School 8‘Abdul-abad 6‘Abdul-Malik 59, 60Abel 47, 48Abu-H. anifih 60Adam 47, 48Adhari Qumi, Ah. mad 88, 102, 180Adib-Naishaburi 169Ahmad-zadih, Mas‘ud 61, 62‘Ala, Husain 21, 22, 23Alam, Asadullah 36Algar 2, 82, 167, 168, 170, 172, 176,

179, 182Algeria 75Al-Ghadir 20, 145Al-Javad 58Al-Muqann‘a 56Ali-abadi, ‘Abdul-Husain 42Ali-gudarz 80Ali ibn Abi-T. alib 56, 91, 92, 98, 128,

129, 130, 148, 154, 155Ali ibn Musa al-Reza 110Allah 74, 91, 93, 110,128, 129, 130,

145, 154‘Allamih 6, 20, 28, 48, 49, 63, 161,

168, 172, 174Allied Forces 17, 172Amani, Sa‘id 39America 18, 22, 31, 37, 132, 174American imperialism 166Amini, ‘Abdul-Husain 20Amini, Ali 36Ansari, Murtaz.a 182Anvari, Muh. yi al-Din 39Aqa-zadih, Muhammad 13Arabi, Muh. yi al-Din 67Araki, Ali 150, 184Aram, Ah. mad 89

Arani, Taqi 24Ardibili, Yunus 13Aristotle 7Aryanpour, Amir-Husain 33Asad-abadi, Jamal al-Din 131’Asgar-auladi, H. abibullah 39As.ghar-zadih, Mahmood 75Ashraf, H. amid 61Ashtiyani, Muhammad 61, 173Avista 60Ayati 30, 33, 34, 174Ayatullah 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16,

18, 20, 23, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 49,58, 63, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82,84, 86, 88, 102, 115, 118, 125, 126,130, 131, 135, 138, 139, 140, 145,146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153,156, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167,171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 179, 182,183, 184, 185

‘Ayishih 53Azarbaijan 62, 132

Babai, Ah. mad-Ali 35Badi‘a-zadigan, Ali-Asghar 75Bafqi Yazdi, Muhammad 12Baghdad 22Bahunar, Muhammad-Javad 33, 78,

84, 130, 175, 179, 184Bakhtiyar 84Bakiri 75Bani-S.adr 133, 134, 138, 183Baudin, Louis 89Bayqara, Amir-Husain 60Bazargan, Mahdi 34, 35, 42, 46, 75,

84, 87, 114, 148, 161, 167Bazargani, Muhammad 75Bidukhti, Azadih 35

196

I N D E X

British authorities 10, 15, 18, 24, 25,26, 168

Buhlul, Muhammad-Taqi 13Burqa‘i, Ali-Akbar 27Bursa (Turkey) 37Burujirdi 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29,

30, 32, 35, 36, 115, 125, 126, 130,164, 166, 172, 173

Buzurg-mihr 78Byzantine 59

Calvin, John 44capitalism 5, 47, 63, 76, 86, 89, 90, 94,

97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 164,180

Castro, Fidel 62Chenghiz Khan 58China 27, 75Chirik-ha-yi Fadai-yi khalq 61, 78, 163Comte, Auguste 161Constitution 6, 21, 23, 24, 26, 36, 102,

106, 115, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127,131, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141,142, 144, 147, 148, 152, 153, 158,160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169, 180,182, 183

Consultative Assembly 11, 43, 45, 83,138, 140, 152

Court 11, 21, 22, 26, 28, 142, 144Cuba 75

Dabashi, Hamid 3, 49, 167, 168, 171,175, 183

Danish-sara 68Dar al-funun 24Darius the Great 52Darwin, Charles 64, 68, 161Davani, A. 168, 172, 173Debray, Regis 62Dhulqadr, H. amid 20Durant, Will 52, 53, 78, 162, 176Durkheim, Emile 161

Ehteshami, A. 140, 184Enayat, Hamid 78, 162, 178, 182Engels, Friedrich 24, 46, 89England 29Europe 18, 24, 44, 48, 54, 64, 132,

133, 134

Fadaiyan-i Islam 20, 23, 32, 131, 165,172, 173

Faiz. Kashani, Muh. sin 72, 178

Faiz.iyih Seminary 12, 16, 22, 37Falsafi, Abul-Qasim 27faqih 3, 5, 69, 70, 102, 119, 123, 124,

125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 136, 137,138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145,146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153,154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161,165, 172, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184,185

Fariman 6, 13, 168Fat.imi 21, 22Feuerbach 67France 84, 133Freud, Sigmund 161fuqaha 70, 72, 86, 91, 98, 115, 122,

123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131,139, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150,151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159,160

Furqan (the Furqan Group) 5, 74, 80,163

Gauharshad Mosque uprising 12, 13,170

German 20, 88Ghadir-i Khum 145, 148Ghaffari, Husain 88Ghazzali 68Ghifari, Abu-Dhar 102Giap, V. Nguyen 62Gilan 62Grand Ayatullah 12, 16, 18, 23, 35,

43, 126, 132, 139, 147, 161, 164Greek philosophy 7Gudarzi, Akbar 80Guevara, Che 62Gulpayigani, Muhammad-Reza 16, 36,

147, 173, 184Gulzadih Ghafuri 34, 39, 180Gurevitch, Georges 46

Haddad ‘Adil, Ghulam-Ali 78h. adith (saying) 53, 54, 67, 70, 110,

112, 115, 138, 149, 154, 155, 161,162, 169

H. afiz. 70, 71, 72Haiat-ha-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami 5, 37,

38, 175, 186, 101, 178H. a’iri Yazdi, ‘Abdul-Karim 9, 12H. a’iri Yazdi, Murtaz.a 29, 36H. a’iri Yazdi, mahdi 156, 173, 185H. akim 36h. alal 1

I N D E X

197

H. allaj 71, 178Hamadan 77Hamburg 73H. anif-nizhad 75, 80H. aqqani School 73H. aqshinas, Turab 75, 76Hashemi Rafsanjani 4, 82, 84, 88, 164,

167, 175, 176, 179H. auzih-yi ‘ilmiyih 5, 7, 73, 188, 169,

172H. az.rat, Shrine of 22Hegel, G. W. F. 46, 73, 161, 178Hidayat, Mahdi-Quli 11H. ikmat-i Mut.ahhar 163Hobbes, Thomas 159holy shrines 10, 11, 12, 23, 82H. ujjat, Muhammad 173Humayun 42Husaini 20, 22, 49, 174Husainiyih-i Irshad 42, 164

Ibn Sina 17, 19, 20, 32, 63Ibn-Khaldun 115, 181Imam Husain 10, 76Imam Khomeini 137, 139, 161India 15, 53Iqbal, Muhammad 44, 131Iran 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 18, 21,

22, 24, 25, 27, 34, 35, 37, 40, 49,50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,62, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79,80, 81, 82, 86, 106, 114, 115, 121,122, 123, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133,136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143,147, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 161,162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169,170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177,178, 179, 180, 182, 183

Iranian Marxist parties 162Iraqi, Mahdi 39, 82Irshad Institute 42, 44, 45, 49, 61, 66,

76Isfahani, Abul-Hasan 10, 14, 170Isfahani, Mahdi 7, 8, 169Isfahani, Muhammad-Husain 72,

178Ishraqi, Shabab 72Islam 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 21, 23, 25, 26, 31,

32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45,46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55,56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 68, 69,73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82,83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95,

96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 117,118, 120, 126, 129, 131, 133, 134,135, 136, 137, 144, 145, 146, 151,152, 154, 157, 159, 162, 163, 166,170, 171, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179,180, 181, 183, 185

Islam-i Fiqahati 2, 83, 161Islam-i minha-yi Ruhaniyat 5, 44, 82,

135Islami, Muhammad-S.adiq 39Islamic: activists 161; doctrines 162,

165; ideology 2, 3, 4, 39, 42, 73, 78,136, 161, 163, 165; Iran 2, 162;movements 1, 2, 5, 44, 58, 78, 121,131, 136; philosophers 73, 156,162; philosophy 7, 19, 28, 32, 35,67, 78, 156, 162, 169; Protestantism44, 164; Republic 2, 4, 5, 33, 34,85, 102, 106, 115, 121, 133, 137,138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 148, 151,152, 153, 156, 158, 161, 162, 164,165, 180, 183; Revolution 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 17, 38, 39, 42, 77, 78, 80, 82,83, 84, 85, 86, 121, 126, 131, 135,136, 142, 152, 159, 161, 162, 166,170; rule 2, 5, 21, 22, 70, 124, 125,126, 127, 130, 142, 143, 147, 151,153, 156, 159, 165, 172, 182, 183;ruler 22, 70, 90, 94, 95, 105, 106,123, 130, 131, 142, 143, 146, 147,149, 150, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159;societies 1, 31, 44, 66, 96, 105, 163,165; sources 39, 89, 91, 96, 105,107, 109, 114, 142, 157, 163; state3, 89, 95, 119, 152, 164, 167, 183;studies 5, 17, 20, 45, 46, 75, 161,169; texts 2, 7, 46, 74, 90, 129,161; universalism 57, 165

Islamism 1, 2, 41, 162Islamist: activists 69, 165; groups 142,

162, 163, 165, 166Islamization 95, 162Islamologist 2, 7, 19, 86, 161Israel 37, 133

Jalali 78Jalet, Felician 89Jamaran 88James, William 67Jami‘ih-yi Ruh. aniyat-i Mubariz 84Jami‘ih va Tarikh 79, 163, 178, 183Jazani, Bizhan 61

198

I N D E X

Jesus Christ 65Jumhuri-yi Islami 152, 176, 184jurisprudence 7, 8, 15, 10, 18, 31, 50,

53, 55, 87, 90, 96, 105, 111, 113,116, 122, 123, 124, 150, 161, 169,176

Kafai, Muhammad 7Kant, Immanuel 68Karaki 5, 123, 124, 155, 182Karbala 10, 49Kashani, Abul-Qasim 15, 18, 20, 21,

22, 26, 27, 28, 32, 72, 171, 178Kashif al-ghit.a, J‘afar 124Kashmar 14Kasravi, Ahmad 20, 21Katirai 34Katouzian 86, 179, 180Kavakibi, ‘Abdul-Rah. man 131Khamenei, Sayyid Ali 2, 84, 146, 167,

169, 171, 177Khuda-bandih 60, 79, 132Khui, Abul-Qasim 115, 150, 158Khomeini, Ruh. ullah 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 18,

19, 23, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 48,58, 63, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79,82, 84, 88, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131,134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 145,146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154,155, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165,166, 167, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178,179, 182, 183, 184

Khunsari, Muhammad-Taqi 14, 15,20,

Khurasan 14, 132, 171Khurasani, Muhammad-Kaz. im 16,

169Khurramdin, Babak 56Kolpe, Oswald 89Kushanpour, Muhammad-Hasan 32Kumpani 72Kurdistan 62Kuwait 114

Lahuri, Iqbal 44Lajivardi, Asadullah 39Lavasani 20, 34Lenin, V. I. 24Locke, John 159London 48, 156, 167, 168, 169, 170,

173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180,182, 184, 185

Luther, Martin 44

‘machine’ 5, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104,164

Madrasih 32Madrasih-yi Faiz.iyih 22, 37Madrasih-yi S.adr 17, 172Mah. allati, Baha al-Din 37Mahdavi Kani 84, 88, 174Mahdavi Zanjani 50Majlis (the Consultative Assembly) 11,

25, 27, 36, 88, 102, 125, 127, 138,140, 153

Majlisi, Muhammad-Baqir 6, 125, 168Makarim Shirazi 118, 119, 181Maktab-Khanih (traditional primary

school) 7Maktab-i tafkik (segregationism) 7,

163, 169Malcolm, John 60, 177Mans.ur Baigi, Husain 35Mao Zedong 62Mar‘ashi Najafi 16Marighella, Carlos 62Martin, Vanessa 3, 167Marvi 32, 35, 87Marx, Karl 24, 46, 48, 63, 67, 68, 73,

75, 78, 79, 86, 88, 161, 162, 178Marxism 1, 2, 28, 46, 62, 63, 65, 66,

68, 73, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 86,90, 94, 133, 162, 174, 177, 178, 179

Marxist: ideology 24, 73, 163;materialism 162

Mas’alih-yi H. ijab 35, 49, 51, 54, 163,176

Mashhad 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 20, 22, 36,37, 43, 61, 62, 74, 75, 163, 168,169, 171, 181

Mashhad Seminary 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13,14, 33, 39, 163

Masjid-i-Shah 27Massignon, Louis 46Maulavi 34, 67, 71Maziyar 56Mecca 49, 117, 145Medina 117, 157Mihan-dust 75Mihr-abad 84Milani, Muhammad-Hadi 20, 39, 170Minachi 42, 43, 45, 175Mir-Fat.rus, Ali 71Mirlauhi, Mujtaba 20Mirza 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 70, 125, 161,

163, 169, 170, 172, 184Mishkinfam, ‘Abdul-Rasul 75

I N D E X

199

Mishkini, Ali 148modernization 10, 31, 164, 170Mongols 57, 58, 60Montazeri, Husain-Ali 16, 18, 72, 76,

78, 119, 127, 128, 130, 148, 153,154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 167, 172,173, 174, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185

Montesquieu, Baron de la Brède etde 159

mosque 10, 12, 13, 14, 41, 49, 51, 52,54, 69, 73, 84, 97, 137, 167, 171

Mu‘atazilih 68Mubariz al-Din, Amir 71Mudarris, Sayyid Hasan 13Mudarrisi Tabatabai, Husain 73Mufattih, Muhammad 82, 84Mufid 123, 182Muh. aqqiq Damad, Muhammad 16,

18, 82, 173Muh. aqqiq Karaki 5, 123, 124, 155,

182Mu‘in, Muhammad 58Mu‘infar 34Mujahidin-i Khalq 5, 44, 74, 77, 79,

80, 163Mujtabavi 78Mujtahid 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,

16, 17, 37, 42, 43, 45, 69, 70, 96,123, 124, 125, 131, 140, 142, 148,149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,158, 160, 161, 165, 169, 172

Mukhbir al-Salt.anih 11Mulla S.adra 9, 18, 67, 170Mu’min, Muhammad 73Munafiqin-i Khalq 44, 79Musavi, prime minister 164Muslim 1, 2, 3, 5, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28,

34, 40, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55,58, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74, 76,78, 81, 83, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95,96, 98, 102, 105, 110, 117, 126,127, 133, 137, 143, 145, 146, 148,151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162,163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 182

Muslim leftist activists 164Muslim leftist groups 163Muslim leftist guerrillas 5, 74, 165Mut.ahhari, Murtaz.a 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,

9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44,45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,

64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 96,97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 121, 128,129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135,136, 137, 142, 159, 160, 161, 162,163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169,170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183,184, 185

Mu’talifih 5, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 75, 82,166, 175

Nahavandi, Hushang 89Naini, Muhammad Husain 8, 9, 10,

125, 127, 153, 158, 170Najaf 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 36, 37,

63, 72, 74, 76, 77, 84, 126, 131,155, 170, 184

Najaf-abad 17Najafi Mar‘ashi, Shahab al-Din 16Namazi, Husain 87Naraqi, Ahmad 72, 124, 126, 155,

156, 158, 178, 182Narjis Khatun 59Nas.ir, S.adiq 75Nas.r 162nationalism 1, 55, 56, 57, 162, 165,

173Naubakht 60Navvab S.afavi 20, 22, 23, 38, 173Nietzche, Friedrich Wilhelm 67Nihz.at-i Azadi-yi Iran 175Nikufar 35Nomani 3, 107, 108, 119, 167, 168,

180, 181Nuri, Faz.lullah 125Nushin, ‘Abdul-Husain 88

Omar 52

Pahlavi 10, 51, 54, 56, 57, 63, 175Pahlavi dynasty 56, 63, 162Pahlavi regime 45, 81, 82, 161, 183Pakistan 22Palestinian 49Paris 84, 169Persia 3, 43, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,

60, 63, 67, 71, 88, 124, 133, 169,178, 179; nationalism 55, 56, 57,58, 59, 165

200

I N D E X

Peter, Andre 63, 73, 78Pirniya, Husain 89Pishbin 34Plato 50, 68, 159Plekhanov, G. V. 46Politzer, Georges 63Pour-Davud, Ibrahim 58praxis 165President 2, 133, 138, 140, 141, 146,

152, 153, 164Prime Minister 9, 11, 25, 28, 33, 34,

36, 39, 84, 130, 138, 141, 164privatization 102, 164Puyan, Amir Parviz 62

Qajar 123, 124qalandar (dervish) 71Qalandar-abad 6Qanun 17Qarani, Muhammad 82Qavam al-Salt.anih 25, 26Qaz.i Tabatabai 82Qazvin 75Quddusi, Ali 73Queen, entering Holy Shrine without

veil 12Qulhak 42Qum 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28,29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 63,72, 73, 74, 80, 82, 83, 91, 102, 118,126, 134, 154, 161, 162, 164, 167,168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177,178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184

Qumi, Husain 7, 13, 115Quran 7, 32, 35, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54,

60, 61, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79,80, 81, 91, 93, 96, 105, 106, 107,108, 109, 116, 118, 119, 133, 137,145, 150, 154, 159, 161, 162, 177

Quranic verse 53, 65, 80, 81, 89, 91,93, 106, 111, 115, 119, 145, 154, 155

Quzegan Ammar 75

Rajai, Ali 35, 138, 148Rajavi 75Ramazan, Said 89Ramsar Educational Conference

(1966–7) 56Rashid, Ali 30, 33, 174Razmara, Ali 21, 25Reformism 164Revolutionary Council 28, 33, 84, 130

Reza khan 6, 9, 10, 12, 35, 168Reza Shah 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24, 51Rezai 75, 80Rimbert, Pierre 89Rodinson, Maxime 98, 99, 180Roman Catholicism 50Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 159Russell, Bertrand 50, 67, 162, 176Russia 75, 88

Sabzavari 9, 18, 32, 147, 170, 184S.adiq 16, 28, 39, 79S.adr, Musa 34, 86, 180S.adr, S.adr al-Din 14, 173S.afai Farahani 61S.afawids 168, 169Sah. abi, Yadullah 35Salman 56Salur 34Sami, Kaz. im 34Sandbad 56Sari 22Sartre, Jean-Paul 46, 67, 68Satan 71, 145SAVAK 4, 38, 61, 73, 74, 77, 78, 121,

165Saville, George Henry 89Sayyid 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22,

27, 28, 33, 36, 39, 49, 78, 84, 86,89, 131, 134, 147, 150, 152, 161,167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175,179, 182, 184

secularism 2, 5, 28, 125, 132, 162, 165Shah 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24,

25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 51, 59,62, 71, 74, 77, 124, 161, 165, 166,171, 173

Shah ‘Abdul-‘Az. im 13Shahr-banu 59Shah Shuj‘a 71Shahidi Raz.avi, Aqa-Buzurg 7Shaibani Library 35Shaikh 2, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 27, 29,

72, 114, 123, 124, 125, 131, 150,151, 161, 168, 169, 170, 174, 182,184

Shakib-niya 34Shakir 60Shamlu, Ahmad 70, 71, 178Shariati, Ali 4, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,

49, 58, 63, 73, 76, 80, 82, 102, 107,133, 161, 163, 164, 166, 175, 176,177, 179, 180

I N D E X

201

Shariati, Muhammad-Taqi 33Shari‘atmadari, Sayyid Kaz. im 16, 36Siyahkal 62, 77Shiraz 37Shirazi, Ali Aqa 17, 161, 163, 172Shirazi, Muhammad-Taqi 9, 70, 170Shirazi, Mulla S.adra 18, 67Shirazi, Qut.b al-Din 71Sibivaih 60Sistan 6socialism 1, 5, 47, 65, 86, 89, 97, 98,

102, 103, 104, 128, 164, 166Soviet Union 24, 76, 163Stalin, Joseph 27, 62state capitalism 98, 164Sult.ani Tabatabai 171, 174Surkhi, ‘Abbas 61Surush, Abdul-Karim 3, 85, 167, 168,

172, 174

T. abari, Ih. san 88Tabatabai 12, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 32,

48, 49, 63, 73, 82, 161, 172, 174Tabriz 24, 37, 75, 82, 151, 182, 184Tafkiki ‘ulama 163T. ahiri Khurram-abadi 178T. ahmasb 124T. ahmasibi, Khalil 20Taimurtash, ‘Abdul-Husain 11T. aliqani 34Tehran 4, 10, 13, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27,

30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44,58, 61, 62, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84,126, 130, 131, 156, 163, 164, 167,168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174,175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181,182, 183, 184

traditional ‘ulama 164traditionalism 2, 7, 8, 162, 164, 169Tudih Party 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 61,

62, 63, 71, 88Turbat-i H. aidariyih 6Turk 57Turkey 22, 37, 39

T. usi, Nas.ir al-Din 71

‘ulama 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 22,23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 37,39, 43, 44, 45, 52, 56, 63, 66, 71,73, 74, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 99,121, 124, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135,136, 137, 153, 158, 163, 164, 170,182, 183

United Nations 143Us.ul-i Falsafih 28, 63, 162, 163, 174Us.ul al-Fiqh 16, 18, 45, 80, 169Us.ulism (rationalism) 8

Vah. idi, ‘Abdul-Husain 20, 22Va‘iz. -zadih 3, 35, 167, 168, 169, 170,

171, 172, 173, 175, 181Vali-yi Faqih 5, 150, 155, 182Varamin 37Vienna 27, 172vilayat (authority) 39Vilayat-i Faqih 178, 183Vusuq al-daulih 10

Walid 52, 59West, the 1, 2, 21, 64, 156, 161, 174Western philosophers 67, 73, 161Westernization 32, 50, 162, 164

Yazd 13Yazdgird 59Yazdi, Ibrahim 34Yazdi, Kaz. im 34Yazid 59

Zabul 6Zahir-gira 6Zamakhshari, Abu-‘Ubaidih 60Zand 60Zanjani, Sayyid Abulfaz.l 49Zhalih Square 33Zionist 49Zirak-zadih, Ghulam Husain 89Zurarih 145

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