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Main changes in recent months • Advanced economy (AE) performance slightly weaker than expected in April amid weak
investment; monetary policy set to remain accommodative for longer
• Emerging market (EM) growth performance improving; financial market sentiment toward EMs has become more upbeat; commodity prices firmed and capital flows have picked up
• But it’s a heterogeneous world:
o AEs continue to differ significantly in extent of post-crisis repair
o Some of the emerging market and developing economies (EMDE) face challenging conditions; others are expanding very fast
• Growing political discontent and the rise of inward-looking policy platforms is a concern
1
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
APSP crude oil (USD/barrel;rhs) 1/
Feb. 16
Some recovery in commodity prices, especially for oil
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; IMF, Primary Commodity Price System; and International Energy Agency (IEA). 1 Latest available data are for September 15, 2016. 2 APSP (Average Petroleum Spot Price): average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighted.
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
United States OECD exc.United States
Oil inventories1 (days of forward demand)
Commodity price indices1
(Jan. 1, 2014 = 100)
2
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16
Metals Food Crude Oil (APSP) 2
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
11 12 13 14 15 16
S&P 500
Euro Stoxx 50
Nikkei 225
MSCI emerging market
Financial market volatility1
(index; Jan. 1, 2007=100)
Equity prices1
(index; Jan. 1, 2007=100)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
11 12 13 14 15 16
VIX
G7 FX volatility
Emerging market FXvolatility
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations. 1Latest available data are for September 21, 2016.
Calmer financial markets
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
11 12 13 14 15 16
U.S.
Euro area
Japan
EMBIG sovereign
Government bond yields1
(percent)
3
Effective Exchange Rate Changes since March 2015
4
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Aug. 2016 relative to Jun. 22, 2016
Jun. 22, 2016 relative to Mar. 2016
Latest relative to Mar. 2016
-12
-9
-6
-3
0
3
6
9
12Aug. 2016 relative to Jun. 22, 2016
Jun. 22, 2016 relative to Mar. 2016
Latest relative to Mar. 2016
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Advanced Economies (Percent)
Emerging Market Economies (Percent)
… capital flows to EMDEs have picked up
Net Capital Inflows to Emerging Market Economies
(2013Q1-2016:Q2, billions of U.S. dollars)
5
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Net derivatives Net Other Investment
Net Portf. Debt Net Portf. Equity
Net FDI Reserves
Net inflows excl. reserves
Major global trends
Advanced economies
• Varying degrees of post-crisis repair
• Low inflation
• Demographic trends
• Weak productivity growth
• Low interest rates
• Weak trade
Emerging market and developing economies
• Rebalancing in China
• Adjustment to lower commodity prices
• Demographic trends
• Slowing convergence
• Weak trade
6
World
Advanced
Economies
U.S. U.K. Japan Euro Area Germany Canada
Other
Advanced
Asia
2015 3.2 2.1 2.6 2.2 0.5 2.0 1.5 1.1 2.1
2016 3.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.5 1.7 1.7 1.2 2.2
Revision
from Jul.
2016 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0
2017 3.4 1.8 2.2 1.1 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.9 2.5
Revision
from Jul.
2016 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Growth projections: Advanced economies (percent change from a year earlier)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook July 2016 Update; and IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2016. 7
World
Emerging
Market and
Developing
Economies China India Brazil Russia
Commodity
Exporting
Economies
Low Income
Developing
Countries
2015 3.2 4.0 6.9 7.6 -3.8 -3.7 0.8 4.6
2016 3.1 4.2 6.6 7.6 -3.3 -0.8 0.9 3.7
Revision from
Jul. 2016 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.6 -0.1
2017 3.4 4.6 6.2 7.6 0.5 1.1 2.5 4.9
Revision from
Jul. 2016 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Growth projections: Emerging markets and LIDCs (percent change from a year earlier)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook July 2016 Update; and IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2016. 8
Baseline assumptions for the medium term
• A gradual return to growth in stressed economies, and in commodity exporters, albeit to modest rates
• A gradual slowdown and rebalancing of China’s economy, with medium-term growth rates that (at about 6 percent) remain well above the average for other EMDEs
• Resilient growth in other EMDEs (e.g. India)
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2000 04 08 12 16 21
October '08 October '11 October '16
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2000 04 08 12 16 21
October '08 October '11 October '16
AEs: Real GDP Growth (percent; various WEO forecast vintages)
Sources: IMF Staff estimates.
Growth projections beyond 2017
10
EMs: Real GDP Growth (percent; various WEO forecast vintages)
Downside risks continue to dominate the outlook
• Protectionism. Inward-looking policy approaches could harm trade and integration, leading firms to defer investment and hiring decisions.
• Stagnation in AEs. An extended period of weak demand could lead to persistently lower growth and inflation in advanced economies. An unmooring of inflation expectations could raise real interest rates and weaken demand further.
• China’s transition. China’s rebalancing path could prove bumpier than expected. With continued reliance on credit and slow restructuring, the risk of an eventual disruptive adjustment is growing.
• Financial threats to EMs. Underlying vulnerabilities in some large EMs (high corporate debt, declining profitability, and weak balance sheets) together with the need to build policy buffers still leave EMDEs exposed to sudden shifts in investor confidence.
• Non-economic shocks. A range of factors could hurt sentiment, from the drought in East and Southern Africa; civil was and domestic strife in the Middle East and Africa; the refugee situation in neighboring countries and in Europe; terrorism; and the spread of the Zika virus.
• Upside potential. Comprehensive policy action to repair balance sheets, enact structural reforms, and support near-term demand would foster a stronger path for global growth.
11
0
5
10
15
20
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
A widespread slowdown in global trade
12 Source: United Nations Comtrade; and IMF staff calculations.
Difference in Average Real Import Growth between 2003-07 and 2012-15 (Percentage points)
Distribution of Average Real Import Growth Across Different Goods (Percent)
Less than –12 –4 to 0
–12 to –7 More than 0
–7 to –4 No data
2003-07
2012-15
ADVANCED ECONOMY TRENDS
13
Uneven progress with recovery
14
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Greece, Italy,Portugal, Spain
Japan Asian AEs Other AEs
Investment Domestic Demand GDP
Deviation from Precrisis Trend and Level (Colored bars show percentage difference from precrisis trend; black squares show percentage differences from 2007 levels)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Output still below potential
15
Output Gap (Percent of Potential Output)
Source: IMF staff estimates.
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Maximum output gap (2008-16) 2016
Labor market scars still visible
16
Unemployment Rate (Percent of the Labor Force)
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development labor statistics; and IMF staff estimates.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Peak unemployment rate (2008-16)
2007
2016
AE workforce to shrink over the next 5 years
17
Population Growth (Percent)
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
"Old" AEs "New" AEs EMsexcluding
China
China LIDCs
1995-2004 2005-2015 2016-2021
Sources: United Nations Population and Development database; and IMF staff estimates.
Working-age population defined as the population with age between 15 and 64.
Working Age Population Growth (Percent)
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
"Old" AEs "New" AEs EMsexcluding
China
China LIDCs
1995–2004 2005–15 2016–21
Weaker growth, stronger employment: downgraded forecasts of labor productivity…
18
Employment, Fixed Investment, GDP (Percent; average growth rate for 2014-16)
Potential Growth (Percent; average growth rates)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Oct. 2014 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2016
GDP
Investment
Employment
Source: IMF staff calculations.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Oct. 2014 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2016
2010-15 2016-21
… and expected interest rates
19
WEO Long-Term Nominal Interest Forecasts (Percent)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
0
1
2
3
4
5
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Oct-16 Apr-16 Oct-15 Apr-15 Oct-14
EMERGING MARKET AND DEVELOPING ECONOMY TRENDS
20
A slowdown and rebalancing in China
The share of industry in GDP is shrinking… …as is the share of investment
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Share of Gross Value Added(percent of GDP)
Real GDP growth (percent; year-over-year)
Industry (including construction: RHS)
Services (RHS)
35
40
45
50
55
60
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Consumption:Nominal Investment: Nominal
Consumption: Real Investment: Real
Share of Gross Value added by Expenditure (Percent of GDP)
21
22
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Outflow pressures have abated (Net capital flows, billion USD)
Acute anxiety earlier in the year has faded…
-1,000
-500
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
5.9
6.0
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
en
e/1
5
mar/
15
may/1
5
jul/15
sep/1
5
no
v/1
5
en
e/1
6
mar/
16
may/1
6
jul/16
sep/1
6
Onshore CNY spot (RMB/USD)
Offshore CNH spot (RMB/USD)
CNH-CNY basis (pips; rhs)
Spread between Onshore and Offshore exchange rates has narrowed
23
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.886
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
Jan-1
5F
eb-1
5M
ar-
15
Apr-
15
May-1
5Jun-1
5Jul-1
5A
ug-1
5S
ep-1
5O
ct-
15
Nov-1
5D
ec-1
5Jan-1
6F
eb-1
6M
ar-
16
Apr-
16
May-1
6Jun-1
6Jul-1
6A
ug-1
6S
ep-1
6
CFETS Index (Dec. 31,2014)
RMB/USD daily central parity fixing (RHS)
Onshore CNY/USD (RHS)
Daily Exchange Rate (Jan. 1, 2015-today)
…even as the exchange rate has steadily depreciated
24
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016:Q2
Real Credit Growth
Credit to GDP Ratio(right axis)
Rising Dependence on Credit (Percent)
But vulnerabilities continue to accumulate with continued reliance on credit
Reinvigorate growth, improve its distribution, and make it durable
Continue comprehensive and consistent three-pronged approach to growth
• Accommodative monetary policy alone is not enough
• Fiscal support—calibrated based on available fiscal space—remains crucial for lifting economic activity
• Structural reforms—prioritized to maximize impact and combined with macroeconomic policies—are essential
Also need to enhance financial stability
• Complete and implement regulatory reform
• Monitor macroprudential and systemic aspects of capital flows
• Improved global financial safety net
Reinvigorate multilateral cooperative efforts
• Sustainably higher and inclusive growth needs more forceful, comprehensive, and well-communicated policies
• Refocus the trade discussion towards the benefit of integration
• Recognize need to address cooperatively other public-good problems, including refugees, between-country
inequality, epidemics, and extreme weather
13 25
Thanks
26
Additional slides
27
What explains the pick up in global growth between 2016 and 2021?
• Shifting weights contribute one-third of the 0.70 percentage point increase
• Projected growth recoveries in six stressed EMs contribute slightly more (0.36 percentage point)
• Small increases in growth for other EMDEs and AEs explain the rest
28
Increase in World Growth (Percentage points)
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
Other EMDEs
Selected EMDEs
AEs
Change in country weights
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Note: Selected EMDEs: Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela.
Forecast for 2016-17
Subdued growth in 2016 followed by a recovery in 2017:
• AEs: Growth projected at 1.6 percent in 2016 and 1.8 percent in 2017, down from 2.1 in 2015
• A weak second quarter in the United States
• Impact of Brexit on the UK
• EMDEs: Slight improvement to 4.2 percent in 2016 (from 4.0 in 2015); a more meaningful pick up in 2017 (4.6 percent).
• Wide diversity in growth rates:
• Conditions beginning to normalize in some stressed economies (Russia, Brazil)
• Incipient or deepening recessions in others (Nigeria, Venezuela)
• Continued fast growth in India, ASEAN, some economies in Sub-Saharan Africa
29
Shifting weights have an important bearing on the medium term global growth forecast
• 2021 Real GDP growth is lower than its 1995-15 average for both AEs and EMDEs.
• But 2021 world growth is roughly equal to its 1995-2015 average, since the weight of faster-growing EMDEs has increased.
30
World GDP Growth (Percent)
Source: IMF staff calculations.
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
1995-2007 1995-2015 2016 2021
World AEs EMDEs
2016 growth unambiguously weak 2021 forecast broadly in line with past averages
31
World Growth in GDP per Capita (Percent)
Sources: IMF Staff estimates.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1995-2007 1995-2015 2016 2021
World AEs EMDEs
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
1995-2007 1995-2015 2016 2021
Growth in GDP per Worker in Advanced Economies (Percent)
Winners and losers from lower commodity prices
32 Source: IMF staff estimates.
Terms-of-Trade Windfall Gains (Percent of GDP)
Terms-of-Trade Windfall Losses (Percent of GDP)
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
2015
2016-17 (Aug. 2016 commodity prices)
2016-17 (Apr. 2016 commodity prices)
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
42015
2016-17 (Aug. 2016 commodity prices)
2016-17 (Apr. 2016 commodity prices)
Exchange rate changes correlated with the terms of trade
33 Source: IMF staff estimates.
Terms of Trade Windfall and Real Exchange Rate
TUR ZAF
BRA
CHL
COL
CRI
MEX
PER
URY
IND
IDN
MYS
PAK
PHL
THA MAR
TUN
KAZ
RUS
HUN
POL
ROM
y = 2.90x + 1.11
R² = 0.14
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Change in R
EE
R b
etw
een M
arc
h a
nd J
uly
2016 (
perc
ent)
Percentage change in expected ToT windfall gains/losses for 2017-17 between
March and July 2016 (percentage points)
EMDEs: Slower convergence
34 Source: IMF staff estimates.
Growth in Real per Capita Income (Percent)
0
2
4
6
8
10
"Old" AEs "New" AEs EMexcluding
China
China LIDCs
1995-2005 2005-15 2015-20
Real per Capita Income (Percent of per capita income in “Old” AE)
0
20
40
60
80
100
"New" AEs EM excludingChina
China LIDCs
1995 2005 2015 2020
Decomposing the weakness in real goods imports growth
35 Source: IMF staff calculations.
Contribution of Demand (Percent)
-7.0
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
From Import-Intensity-AdjustedDemand Regression: Full Sample
(panel 2, B)
Unpredicted
Predicted by own and partners' domestic import-intensity-adjusted demand
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
From Product-level Regression (5)
Unpredicted
Global value chain participation
Trade policies
GVC Participation and Trade Policies (Percent)
36
Large share of countries with low inflation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
Below zero Below 1 percent Below 2 percent Below target /1
Share of Countries with Low Inflation (Percent)
Sources: Consensus Economics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The figure is based on an unbalanced sample of 120 countries. 1Target refers to long-term inflation expectations from Consensus Economics (10-year inflation expectations) or inflation forecasts from the World Economic
Outlook database (5-year inflation expectations).
Disinflation in AEs and selected EMDEs
37 Sources: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Emerging Market Economies include those economies with inflation below long-term expectations in 2015: Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, and Thailand.
Advanced Economies (Percent)
Emerging Market Economies (Percent)
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
2000–07 08–12 13 14 15
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2000–07 08–12 13 14 15
Longer-term inflation expectations more sensitive to news once inflation approaches the ELB
38 Source: Consensus Economics; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: ELB = effective lower bound. ***,**,* denote that the differences in the change in sensitivity of inflation expectations between countries at the ELB and the rest
are significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence level, respectively, using Mood’s median test.
Change in Sensitivity of Inflation Expectations to pre-2008 trend (3 years ahead)
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Before 2007 2008–2015 ***
2010–2015 ***
2015**
Countries at the ELB Countries not at the ELB