mainstreaming governance in country programs: insights from the governance partnership facility in...

Insights from the Governance Partnership Facility

in Zambia

Mainstreaming Governancein Country Programs

Lessons Learned

© 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street NWWashington, DC 20433202-473-1000www.worldbank.orgAll rights reserved.

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Contents

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

1. WHAT IS THE GPF? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. THE GPF LESSONS LEARNED SERIES: A BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3. ZAMBIA: COUNTRY CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

World Bank Engagement in Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

4. THE GPF IN ZAMBIA: MAIN RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4.1 Component 1: Strengthen DFGG in Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4.2 Component 2: Increasing Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4.3 Component 3: Improving Governance in the Road Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

4.4 Component 4: Supporting the Efficiency of Mineral Revenue Collection and Investment . . . . . . . . 12

4.5 Component 5: Supporting EITI Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.6 Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5. THE GPF IN ZAMBIA IN SIX SNAPSHOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

GPF Snapshot 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Supporting the Development of Watchdog Media: Building Journalistic Capacity in Zambia . . . . . . . . 16

GPF Snapshot 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Can Information and Communication Technology Enabled Feedback Improve Service Delivery? A Case Study of the Accountability through Community Radio Pilot in Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

GPF Snapshot 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Assessing the Evidence: Lessons from a Stocktaking of DFGG Mechanisms in the Zambia Project Portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

GPF Snapshot 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26How Can World Bank Knowledge Work Be Used to Inform Public Debate? A Case Study of the Communication for Reform Pilot in Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

GPF Snapshot 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Supporting Civil Society to Engage with Government in an Informed Manner: Supporting Zambian Coalitions on Procurement, Extractive Industries and Access to Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

GPF Snapshot 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Can Partnerships Between Government and Civil Society Improve Outcomes in the Road Sector? A case study of the Good Governance in Roads Pilot in Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

ANNEX: EVALUATION OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH COMMUNITY RADIO PROJECT . . . . . . 39

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Preface

It is well-established today that governance reform is both a long-term and comprehensive agenda,

often requiring complex changes in attitudes, values, behaviors and incentives. The challenging nature of this agenda, as well as the fact that the mainstream-ing of governance activities in World Bank projects is still fairly recent, makes it critical that we proceed with significant humility and stress the importance of learning and evaluation. This publication and the lessons shared herein are a very welcome contributor to the learning process in that regard.

As can be seen from the following sections, the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) has been well utilized in Zambia both to test existing theories of change and to pilot innovative mechanisms with the intent of providing models and insights that could then be scaled up and mainstreamed.

The lessons have indeed been plentiful, three of which I would particularly like to highlight:

Firstly, it is clear that governance tools and mecha-nisms remain reliant on their enabling environments. Alone, an elaborate information and communication technology (ICT) mechanism for accountability or a citizen charter for improved service delivery can achieve little and can even be counterproductive. This can be seen with our analysis of the “Accountability through Community Radio” project, where we find that success was highly dependent on the different levels of incentives for service providers to engage with the radio stations for example. It is clear that mechanisms and tools, no matter how effective in and of themselves, need to be thoughtfully complemented by demand for accountability on the side of citizens, capacity to account on the side of institutions, a con-ducive political and legal environment and a host of other enabling factors.

Secondly, we have increasingly learnt via the GPF the value of going beyond simplistic oppositions between “supply” and “demand”. In none of our pilots does user demand alone appear to be a sufficient factor for improving service delivery. It is apparent that in the absence of top down performance pressure and

institutional coherence, bottom-up demand tends to have little overall impact. In other words a more holistic approach is needed. The “Good Governance in Roads” project provides an excellent example of how we can better implement mechanisms that involve a collaboration with rather than an opposition to government. Since our recent evaluations indicate that governance challenges are fundamentally about getting both state and non-state actors to find ways of acting collectively in their own best interests, far more must be done in bringing these actors together.

Finally, we have seen that innovation and exploration remain essential elements of success for governance initiatives. The emphasis of the GPF in Zambia has been on discovering what works and learning from what does not. The innovative communication strat-egy that was used to create widespread public debate around World Bank knowledge products in Zambia provides a particularly successful example of this exploratory approach in action. The GPF has been an invaluable mechanism allowing both the evalu-ation and flexibility necessary for such innovative approaches. For instance, project teams were able to adapt the activities focused on Access to Informa-tion, shifting from Government advice to civil society campaign support once it became apparent that the Government required more citizen demand before it would allow the tabling of a bill. The Facility has also allowed us to leave room for failure as well as success, and the country team has been quick to capture lessons from each, adapting each successive initiative accordingly.

It remains the case that as we continue to embrace the governance agenda as an institution, we will need funding mechanisms that allow the analysis, innovation and flexibility described above. The GPF has been an excellent catalyst in that regard and in Zambia I am pleased to say that there are various hopeful signs of its lessons being absorbed and its successes being sustained.

Kundhavi KadiresanCountry Director for Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AtCR Accountability through Community Radio

ATI access to information

C4R Communication for Reform

CSO civil society organization

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

DFGG Demand for Good Governance

DIP Decentralization Implementation Plan

DFID Department for International Development

E-ISR+ External Implementation Status and Results Report Plus

EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

GAC Governance and Anti-Corruption

GGRP Good Governance in Roads Project

ICT Information and Communication Technology

MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa

NGO nongovernmental organization

PIM Public Investment Management

PEA Political Economy Analysis

RDA Roads Development Authority

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Acknowledgements

This publication was compiled by Elena Georgieva-Andonovska, a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist at the Secretariat of the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF), based on inputs and a series of reports

produced by Kate Bridges, Public Sector Specialist (AFTP1) and Task Team Leader of the GPF components in Zambia. The evaluation of the “Accountability through Community Radio” project was prepared by Victoria Cabral, Consultant (AFTP1). The authors would like to thank Deryck Brown, Senior Governance Specialist (AFTP1), who is the current task team leader for the Window 1 grant in Zambia, as well as Bryan Land, Lead Mining Specialist (SEGM2), and Gael Raballand, Senior Public Sector Specialist (MNSPs) who previ-ously managed some of the components of the GPF in Zambia. In addition to those mentioned above, other invaluable members of the GPF team in Zambia have included Kutemba Kambole, Team Assistant (AFCS3); Hellen Mungaila, Program Assistant (AFCS3); and Kunda Mando, Consultant (AFTP1). Editorial support was provided by Ashish Sen. Tomoko Hirata, Senior Graphic Designer, developed the design of the cover.

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Executive Summary

What Is the GPF?The Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) was founded by the World Bank in collaboration with the United Kingdom’s Department for International Develop-ment (DFID) and the Norwegian and Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It was formally launched in December 2008 with a Multi Donor Trust Fund of about US$82 million. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) joined the GPF in 2012 with an initial contribution of AUS$10 million. The GPF program budget of US$89 million has been allocated through four Windows to 126 projects spread across 37 countries. Despite relatively modest resources, over the past five years, the GPF has played a major role in facilitating the implementation of the Bank’s Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy. The GPF leverages change in how the Bank carries out its governance work and supports promising activities that are starting to yield exciting results in many countries and different thematic areas, such as public financial management, governance in extractive industries, political economy analysis (PEA), and demand for good governance, among others.

The GPF Lessons Learned SeriesAs part of its knowledge and learning activities in fiscal 2013, the GFP Secretariat is developing a series of publications documenting the achievements and challenges of its most notable grants. The goal is to derive useful lessons and draw operational conclusions about what is working and what is not in different GPF grants. This issue of the GPF Lessons Learned Series details the achievements of the GPF program in Zambia. It contains an overview of the main accom-plishments of the program and six “Snapshots” with results stories and lessons learned. An evaluation of one sub-component—the “Accountability through Community Radio (AtCR)” pilot—is also included.

The GPF in ZambiaThe objective of the GPF in Zambia was to assist the government in maximizing the development impact

of its programs and policies by supporting increased accountability for results, greater transparency and access to information, more effective oversight over development programs, and enhanced citizen voice and participation. The program was funded through a US$2 million grant from Window 1 of the GPF, which supports leading country teams to implement programs that address the governance impediments to development in a given country. Implementation of the grant began in 2009, and all activities will be finalized by February 2015.

Main Results The program was structured around five components, which delivered results in the following five areas:

Strengthening Demand for Good Governance in Zambia

The main objective of Component 1 was to improve public accountability at the local level in selected districts and sectors. In line with the government’s own priorities, the underlying objective of the Bank’s citizen engagement in Zambia is to strengthen pub-lic service delivery. This was achieved by: (i) sup-porting investigative journalism through training journalists on basic investigative skills and good practices; (ii) conducting political economy analyses, which provided a realistic assessment of achievable outcomes in different sectors, formed the basis for dialogue with the government, and helped align Bank priorities toward more engagement with civil society, media, and public debate; (iii) support-ing local accountability in three selected districts through the AtCR pilot aimed at improving the flow of information and feedback between citizens, civil society, and duty bearers; (iv) applying a demand-side governance filter in the Bank’s Zambia portfolio by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) mechanisms in the lending portfolio and providing recommendations for improvement; and (v) improving the ways in which Bank analytical and knowledge work is used to inform public opinion.

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MAINSTREAMING GOVERNANCE IN COUNTRY PROGRAMS: INSIGHTS FROM THE GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP FACILITY IN ZAMBIA

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Increasing Accountability

The main objective of Component 2 was to contribute to improving accountability of the government to citizens. This was accomplished by: (i) supporting freedom of information legislation—the GPF has had a major impact on the access to information (ATI) campaign in Zambia; and (ii) piloting the Exter-nal Implementation Status and Results Report Plus (E-ISR+) in Zambia during 2011–13—the E-ISR+ is an innovative effort, designed to incorporate the views of beneficiaries and bring key stakeholders and civil society into the monitoring and evaluation of Bank projects.

Improving Governance in the Road Sector

The main aim of Component 3 was to improve gover-nance in the road sector in Zambia by: (i) conducting an institutional assessment of the Road Development Agency, which identified institutional weaknesses and informed the World Bank on how to address them; and (ii) piloting third-party monitoring through the Good Governance in Roads Project, which focused

on raising the capacity of civil society and journalists for more informed involvement and monitoring of the road sector in Zambia.

Supporting the Efficiency of Mineral Revenue Collection and Investment

The goal of Component 4 was to increase the transpar-ency of mineral-related revenues and the efficiency of public investment by: (i) conducting political economy analyses on public investment management and mining; and (ii) supporting a coalition of civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in sensitization activities around the Extractive Industries Transpar-ency Initiative (EITI).

Supporting EITI Implementation

The fifth and last component of the GPF in Zambia supported the implementation of the EITI through the establishment of the EITI Secretariat, which continues to exist today. The impact of the GPF on the EITI process has been significant and has culminated in the Zambia reaching EITI compliance in 2012.

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1. What Is the GPF?

BOX 1. THE GPF—A QUICK LOOK

• Established in 2008 as a partnership between the World Bank, the Netherland’s Foreign Ministry, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Australia’s AusAID (now known as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

• The main goal is to support the implementa-tion of the Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy.

• Supported by a multi-donor trust fund with total donor contributions amounting to US$95 million and program budget of US$89 million.

• All existing funds have been allocated to 126 projects spread across 37 countries and different thematic areas.

“The GPF is designed to help the Bank deliver on its commitment to scale up engagement in governance and anti-corruption work in developing partner countries in conjunction with comparable efforts by participating Devel-opment Partners. It aims to establish a global strategic partnership on governance among like-minded multilateral and bilateral develop-ment partners.”

—GPF Program Document

The Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) was established in 2008 to help the World Bank

deliver on its commitment to scale up engagement in governance and anti-corruption (GAC) work in developing countries. The founding Development Partners of the GPF are the Netherland’s Foreign Ministry, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Australia’s AusAID (now known as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) joining the GPF in 2012.

The World Bank and Development Partners recognize that good governance is critical to successful develop-ment and poverty reduction. They are committed to implementing ambitious governance strategies that will build more capable and accountable governments that can deliver services to the poor, promote private sector-led growth, and effectively tackle corruption. They believe that by working together more system-atically in complementary ways, they can have more impact than through the current plethora of ad hoc formal and informal partnership arrangements.

Donor understanding of governance has broadened and deepened significantly over the past decade. It has gone beyond the frontiers of economic governance and the management of the economy, and beyond

analyzing and reforming public services and the public sector. As stated in the World Bank’s GAC Strategy, governance work now recognizes the importance of focusing on the “new frontiers” of governance, includ-ing a better understanding of the political economy of development and the importance of giving citizens a voice and a right to information. As the demand for better government and political accountability grows, this will create the conditions for faster growth and poverty reduction.

Despite relatively modest resources, over the past five years, the GPF has played a major role in facilitating the implementation of the Bank’s GAC Strategy. With an appropriate structure in place (see Box 2) and by working strategically in partnership, the GPF leverages change in how the Bank carries out its governance

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work and supports promising activities that are start-ing to yield exciting results in many countries.

Selected GPF results in thematic areas of governance achieved in the last reporting year (April–May 2013) include the following.

Moving Forward in the Fragile States Agenda: In innovative ways, GPF grants have included the demand and supply side of governance to solve fragility-related issues. The grants managed to create a holistic approach that aims to encourage civil society organi-

zations (CSOs), governments, and citizens to mitigate fragility in countries such as Sierra Leone, Haiti, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Governance in Extractives Industries: In total, 22 out of the 126 grants are explicitly targeted at addressing the unique governance challenges of countries with significant extractive industry (EI) sectors. These grants support efforts toward integrating EI concerns into the Bank’s work and country dialogue. The most successful interventions appear to be those that couple supply- and demand-side strategies, allowing progress toward greater transparency and accountability to be simulta-neously pursued across several fronts. As evidenced by more and more governments seeking Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidacy/compliance and in light of the EITI Standard expansion, there may well be an appetite among even more Bank clients for initiatives fostering greater transparency and accountability around extractive industries.

Information and Communication Technology (ICT)Applications and Tools: The application of informa-tion and communication technology (ICT) tools opens new avenues to improve transparency of public sector management and to strengthen accountability for ser-vice delivery. Over the past few years, the number of experiments and pilot efforts to develop mechanisms and tools to benefit from these new opportunities has increased enormously. The GPF has supported several of these innovations, and the results show promise. GPF support and encouragement has led to the creation of the Open Development Technology Alliance (see Figure 1). Most GPF projects that applied ICT-enabled approaches were targeted at strengthen-ing the demand side of accountability, while some aimed to improve governance and accountability in sectors such as agriculture, health, and education.

Strengthening Institutions of Accountability: GPF grants have had a substantial impact on strengthening the capacity of anti-corruption agencies/authorities and parliaments. Several instruments, such as the interactive public complaint mechanism, the Anti-

BOX 2. THE GPF STRUCTURE

• Window 1: 20 active grants, budget of US$45.4 million. Objective: create strong incentives for leading country teams to imple-ment programs that rigorously and systemati-cally address the governance impediments to development.

• Window 2: 51 active grants, budget of US$26 million. Objective: support cutting-edge governance activities in sectors and thematic areas; spread best practice examples of governance in sectors and thematic areas across client countries; develop approaches to governance in sectors and thematic areas that can be used Bank wide and by other development partners.

• Window 3: 29 active grants, budget of US$11.8 million. Objective: stimulate stra-tegic shared learning from implementation of innovative governance activities; promote innovation in measuring results and impact of governance activities.

• Window 4: 26 active grants, budget of US$5.6 million. Objective: strengthen open-ness and accountability of institutions in the executive branch of government with a focus on Public Financial Management (PFM).


1. WHAT IS THE GPF?

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Corruption Initiative Assessment, and the National Observatory of Corruption Risks, have been devel-oped and continue to be used by the anti-corruption agencies that host them. Eleven projects supporting access to/right to information, totaling US$2.1 mil-lion, have helped create 10 legal frameworks (laws, bills, and task forces) for this key transparency measure in countries across South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Accountability in Public Financial Management (PFM): Donor efforts to address governance issues in client countries rely heavily on PFM reform. This approach is founded in the fact that efficient PFM creates effectiveness in government expenditures and accountability for public resources. In the past year, GPF-funded grants have supported client countries and the Bank in strengthening PFM systems. Results show evidence of improved PFM systems involving policy makers and non-state actors alike. GPF activi-ties in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Mongolia, Nigeria, and Tajikistan are examples of how different stake-holders from both within and outside the Bank can come together to form strategic alliances for large and small PFM projects.

FIGURE 1. Open Development Technology Alliance website home page

Political Economy Analysis: For many years, devel-opment partners have recognized that the interaction between political and economic incentives shapes the reform process—it affects what policies are adopted and how they impact poverty reduction and shared growth. At the World Bank, political economy analysis gained significant momentum after the adoption of the first GAC Strategy in 2008. As a result of the GPF, between 2009 and 2013, World Bank teams conducted more than 200 political economy studies. In addition, there was greater interaction between staff from the World Bank and other donor agencies working to mainstream a political economy perspective into their operations.

Voice, Accountability, and Demand for Good Governance: The GPF has funded 42 projects with a demand-side component at a combined value of US$16.2 million. This has led to greater accountability through access-to-information bills, better allocation of public resources through tools such as the Budget Transparency Initiative (see Figure 2) and Citizens’ Visible Audits, and the development of websites and social media platforms like iamtax.org for direct citizen engagement.



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FIGURE 2. Budget Transparency Initiative website home page


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2. The GPF Lessons Learned Series: A Background

As part of its knowledge and learning activities in fiscal 2013, the GFP Secretariat is developing a

series of case studies documenting the achievements and challenges of its most notable grants. This effort is in line with the monitoring and evaluation plan of the GPF Secretariat. One of the outlined additional activities included in the plan—“Evaluations and Reviews of Individual GPF Projects”—foresees that the Secretariat (or independent consultants) will assess specific results of and lessons learned from individual projects as well as their prospects for sustainability and potential for scaling up.

The goal of these case studies and evaluations is to derive useful lessons and draw operational conclu-sions about what is working and what is not among the GPF grants. In addition, the case studies may also contribute to the Bank-wide effort to develop the “science of delivery,” which systematizes evidence-based multidisciplinary approaches in program design and implementation to better achieve development outcomes. The approach is aimed at addressing service-delivery failure by better understanding local implementation problems.

This issue of the GPF Lessons Learned Series1 details the achievements of and lessons learned from the “Governance Partnership Facility in Zambia.” The project was funded through Window 12 of the GPF, which supports leading World Bank country teams to implement programs that rigorously and systematically address the governance impediments to development in a given country. This publication contains short background information on Zambia and the Bank’s engagement in the country (Section 3), an overview of all GPF-funded activities in Zambia (Section 4), a series of “Snapshots” with lessons learned from different components of the grant (Section 5) and a fully fledged evaluation of the “Accountability through Community Radio” pilot project, which is part of Component 1 of the GPF in Zambia (Annex 1).

1 So far, the GPF Secretariat has published a number of issues of the Lessons Learned Series that present lessons from GPF Window 1 pro-grams, including those in Mongolia, Kenya, Nigeria, Albania, Tajikistan, and Cameroon. 2 For an overview of the different GPF Windows, please refer to page 2 of this report.


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3. Zambia: Country Context

Zambia, which gained inde-pendence in 1964, is riding

on a number of successes. It has experienced five success-ful multiparty elections since 1991. The peaceful general election in September 2011 strengthened the country’s democratic credentials and underscored its enormous eco-nomic potential grounded in a rich endowment of natural resources, which include land and water.

Zambia has achieved an aver-age annual growth of about 5.7 percent during the past decade as a result of a combina-tion of prudent macroeconomic management, market liberalization and privatization efforts, investments in the copper industry and related infrastructure, and a steep increase in copper prices. Zambia was among the 10 fastest-growing economies of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012. Fast growth has enabled it to attain lower middle-income country status with a nominal per capita income of US$1,299 (2011).3

However, Zambia is also presented with difficult development challenges. Economic growth has not significantly reduced poverty levels. Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42 percent are considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about 6 million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to population growth. The economy

3 Source: World Bank. 2013. Zambia—Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13–FY16. Washington, DC: World Bank.

is largely undiversified and mainly dependent on copper, with economic activity mostly concentrated in the urban areas. Income distribution is unequal and on several development dimensions, the country performs the same or worse than many low-income countries.

Zambia is also lagging behind on a number of targets of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly those on extreme poverty and maternal and child mortality. Institutional capacity remains weak, and according to recent public sector governance surveys, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index where Zambia ranked 91st out of 153 coun-tries, the country’s governance challenges need to be addressed.4

4 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview.

Mafinga Hills(2301 m)

Kaulishishi(1420 m)

Machechete(1488 m)

MulongaPlain

BusangaSwamp

LukangaSwamp

Muchinga

Mts

.

Mumbwa

Mutanda

Mwinilunga

NamwalaKafueMazabuka

Kaema

PokumaSenkobo

Kalomo

Choma

Bowwood

Pemba

Chirundu

KaribaShangombo

Kasempa

Chisasa

Chingola

Kapiri Mposhi

Rufunsa

Old Mkushi

Mkushi

Nyimba

Petauke

Mfuwe

Mpika

Chambeshi

Kope

Chembe

Samfya

Luwingu

Mpulungu

Mbala

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ZAMBIA

0 15010050

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ZAMBIACITIES AND TOWNS

PROVINCE CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

GSDPMMap Design Unit



8

World Bank Engagement in ZambiaThe World Bank is working with the Government of Zambia, development partners, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders to tackle the above-mentioned challenges. The World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy5 (CPS) for Zambia for fiscal 2013–16 is the main document defining the priorities of the Bank’s engagement over the next four years. The CPS is closely aligned with the Zambian government’s own development agenda through its Vision 2030 and Zambia’s National Development Plans.

5 Source: World Bank. 2013. Zambia—Country Partnership Strategy for the Period FY13–FY16. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Through the CPS, in a country that displays both low-income and middle-income characteristics, the World Bank supports three objectives that speak to the dual nature of Zambia’s development challenges and opportunities by recognizing the importance of governance and strong institutions. These objec-tives are: (i) reducing poverty and the vulnerability of the poor; (ii) improving competitiveness and infrastructure for growth and employment; and (iii) improving governance and strengthening eco-nomic management.6

6 Source: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/04/05/000350881_20130405104746/Rendered/PDF/750890CORRIGEN0IC00IDA0R20130002703.pdf.


9

4. The GPF in Zambia: Main Results

There is recognition within the Government of Zambia that accountability, transparency, and good governance remain the cornerstones for prudent management of public affairs and provide the enabling environment for private sector development and for development outcomes to benefit the people of Zambia. As a result, the objective of the GPF in Zambia is to assist the government in maximizing the development impact of its programs and policies by implementing initia-tives that support increased accountability for results, greater transparency and access to information, more effective oversight over development programs, and enhanced citizen voice and participation. This is in line with the third objective of the Bank’s strategy for Zambia mentioned in the previous section, namely, “improving governance and strengthening economic management.”

The GPF in Zambia was funded through a US$2 million Window 1 grant. Implementation began in 2009, and all activities will be finalized by February 2015. Five individual components (child trust funds) have been established to manage the range of activities being supported under the grant, with the following goals:

(i) Strengthen demand for good governance (DFGG). The main development objective is to improve public accountability at the local level in selected districts and sectors (Component 1).

(ii) Increase accountability. The main develop-ment objective is to contribute to improving accountability of the government to citizens through freedom-of-information legislation (Component 2).

(iii) Improve governance in the road sector by supporting the efficiency of the Roads Devel-opment Authority (RDA) Integrity Committee, generating information and data, and strength-ening audit mechanisms (Component 3).

(iv) Increase the efficiency of mineral revenues collection and investment. The main aim is to enable increased transparency of mineral-related revenues as well as increased efficiency of public investment (Component 4).

(v) Support the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) with the objective of disclosing mineral-related rev-enues to the general public to limit occurrences of fraud and corruption (Component 5).

4.1 Component 1: Strengthen DFGG in ZambiaTraditionally, the World Bank has focused on work-ing primarily with state actors and institutions (the “supply-side”) in its attempt to support development and public management reforms around the world. But in the past decade, there has been a realization that, in and of itself, the interaction with state actors is insufficient to bring about development. There is a tendency to assume, rather optimistically, that govern-ments want and need help to honestly and effectively deliver development. Development practitioners have increasingly shifted focus to engaging citizens, civil society, and other non-state actors (the “demand-side”) with the aim of holding government accountable for its actions7 (Box 3).

The Bank’s support to DFGG is grounded in the recog-nition that institutional reforms will be most effective when supported by genuine demand from an informed citizenry. Strengthening this demand is one of the main objectives of the GPF in Zambia. As a whole, 42 of the 126 GPF projects include DFGG initiatives.

The main objective of the DFGG component of the GPF in Zambia is to improve public accountability at

7 Source: WDR 2004 Accountability Framework.



10

the local level in selected districts/sectors, build on existing initiatives or mechanisms, and strengthen them. In line with the government’s own priorities, the underlying objective of the Bank’s citizen engage-ment is to strengthen public service delivery.

Key results of the DFGG component of the GPF in Zambia include the following.

Support for investigative journalism: An empowered and well-informed media can create strong incentives for accountability. The Zambian Informed Journal-ism Project designed and delivered training for 60 journalists on basic investigative skills and good practices over two successive years. The resulting publications, “Truth-Seekers: A Collection of Stories from Zambia’s Investigative Journalists” and “Truth-Seekers II,” have changed the conversation about journalism in the country and created momentum for reform. In 2012, the project received the World Bank African Region Vice-Presidency Award. For more

details on this project, see Snapshot 1, “Supporting the Development of Watchdog Media,” on page 16 of this publication.

Political Economy Analysis: An important political economy analysis (PEA) was conducted with GPF support to inform the current World Bank Strategy for Zambia for the period 2013–16. The study shaped the decision to include a dedicated foundational objective in the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) related to governance, namely Objective 3, “Improving governance and economic management” and its two related outcomes, “Strengthened systems and processes for public sector performance” and “Citizen’s access to information increased.” Other GPF-supported PEAs not only provided realistic assessments of achievable outcomes in sectors, but also formed the basis for dialogue with government and helped align priori-ties, such as the move toward more engagement with civil society, media, and public debate. A synthesis of the lessons learned from political economy studies done in Zambia was also published as a World Bank working paper.8

Support to local accountability in three selected districts: The GPF provided funding for the imple-mentation of the Accountability through Community Radio (AtCR) pilot that sought to improve the flow of information and feedback between citizens, civil society, and duty bearers,9 all with a view to improv-ing governance and public-service delivery. The AtCR project helped community radio stations run weekly interactive governance and rural development talk shows with content driven by and representative of the community’s concerns. When the AtCR project was completed in March 2013, the World Bank com-missioned an evaluation, the results of which can be found in the annex of this report on page 39. More concise information about the AtCR project can be found in Snapshot 2, “Can Information and Com-munication Technology Enabled Feedback Improve Service Delivery? A Case Study of the Accountability through Community Radio (AtCR) Pilot in Zambia.”

Applying a demand-side governance filter in the Bank’s Zambia portfolio: This subcomponent resulted

8 The publication, “Political Economy Studies: Are They Actionable? Some Lessons from Zambia” is available online at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5656.9 “Duty bearers” refers to persons occupying civil service or elected positions with a duty to public service.

BOX 3. DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

There is a growing recognition worldwide that citizen involvement is critical for enhancing demo-cratic governance, improving service delivery, and fostering empowerment. Demand for Good Gov-ernance (DFGG) refers to the ability of citizens, civil society organizations, and other non-state actors to hold the state accountable and make it responsive to their needs.

DFGG encompasses initiatives that focus on citizens as the ultimate stakeholders and include activities relating to information disclosure, demystification, and dissemination; beneficiary/user participation and consultation; complaints handling; and independent and/or participatory monitoring. DFGG aims to strengthen the capac-ity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the media, local communities, and the private sector to hold authorities accountable for better development results. DFGG mechanisms can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens, or both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom up.

Source: World Bank.


4. THE GPF IN ZAMBIA: MAIN RESULTS

11

in a comprehensive review of the application of DFGG mechanisms in Bank projects in Zambia. The review analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms in the lending portfolio and pro-vided broad recommendations for improvement. Its findings were considered in the formulation of the CPS and have informed the Bank’s current non-state actor engagement in Zambia. The Africa Core Opera-tions Department of the World Bank published the review, which has been widely disseminated within the Bank. For more details about this subcomponent, please refer to Snapshot 3, “Assessing the Evidence: Lessons from a Stocktaking of DFGG Mechanisms in the Zambia Project Portfolio.”

Communication for reform: This pilot helps Bank teams improve the ways in which their knowledge work is used to inform public opinion. The project has directly impacted the way in which economic data, in the form of the World Bank’s biannual Eco-nomic Brief produced by the Zambia Country Office, is disseminated. This subcomponent has resulted in greater engagement of the Bank with Zambian soci-ety in a way that informs public opinion. A detailed overview of the achievements of the pilot is presented in Snapshot 4, “How Can World Bank Knowledge Work be Used to Inform Public Debate? A Case Study of the Communication for Reform Pilot in Zambia,” on page 26 of this publication.

4.2 Component 2: Increasing AccountabilityThe Bank’s 2007 Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy underlined the importance of trans-parency in good governance. It pointed out that citizens and media that have access to information on the operation of state institutions are crucial for fostering accountability. This component of the GPF in Zambia aimed at improving accountability of the government toward citizens through three subcom-ponents as detailed below.

Access to Information: Over the past two decades, the number of countries with right-to-information (RTI) laws, also known as freedom-of-information and access-to-information (ATI) laws, has exploded (see Box 4). In 1990, only 13 countries had right-to-information laws, all of them Western liberal democ-racies. By 2012, this number had risen to more than 90. Most of the new adopters are countries in Eastern

Europe, Asia, Latin America, and, most recently, Africa and the Middle East—countries with diverse political histories, difficult governance environments, and persistent development challenges.10

In Zambia, the GPF has had a major impact on the ATI campaign and the sensitization of officials. This led to the rewriting of the bill, which was promised 24 years ago, when in 1990 Zambia reverted to democratic rule. In addition, through the GPF, the Bank played the role of facilitator by helping a coalition interested in ATI deepen its understanding of the subject and broaden its appeal beyond media-focused nongovernmental organizations. Since then, civil society representatives have been engaged as key voices on the Ministry of Information’s ATI taskforce, which had the specific mandate of preparing the ATI bill. For more details on the GPF and ATI in Zambia, please see Snapshot 5, “Supporting Civil Society to Engage with Government in an Informed Manner: A Case Study of Support to Zambian Coalitions on Procurement, Extractives, and Access to Information,” on page 31 of this publication.

Piloting the External Implementation Status and Results Report Plus (E-ISR+): E-ISR+ is a feed-back, transparency, and accountability tool for the World Bank. The Implementation Status and Results

10 Source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1343934891414/8787489-1344020463266/RTI-IPP-Web-Final.pdf.

BOX 4. THE GPF AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Right-to-information laws, also known as freedom-of-information and access-to-information (ATI) laws, are laws that establish citizens’ “right” to have access to public information or that opera-tionalize such a right found in the constitution.

In the past five years, the GPF has funded 11 proj-ects supporting access to/right to information, totaling US$2.1 million. These projects have had an influence on or contributed to the drafting or passage of 10 legal frameworks (laws, bills, or task forces) in countries across South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Source: GPF Annual Report 2013.



12

Report, instituted in 2005, is an internal reporting tool on project-implementation progress. In 2010, the Implementation Status and Results Report process incorporated E-ISR+ as a new pilot effort, designed to incorporate the views of beneficiaries and bring key stakeholders and civil society into the project monitoring and evaluation process. E-ISR+ is intended to disclose current project information to external stakeholders, obtain feedback from non-state players on project progress and results, and systematically reflect external feedback in implementation reporting.11

The GPF supported the piloting of the E-ISR+ in Zambia, which has been carried out during 2011–13. Using the tool was acknowledged as a good practice—it won an award from the World Bank’s Africa Region Vice-Presidency—and was extended to the entire Zambia portfolio in 2011. The E-ISR+ approach is currently being adapted, together with the World Bank Institute, to include an ICT component that would ensure regular and objective beneficiary feedback and follow-up.

Political Economy Analysis on Decentralization: In 2010, following the approval in 2009 of the Decen-tralization Implementation Plan for Zambia, the GPF financed an update on a PEA that studied the readiness of local governments to implement the plan. The study resulted in some recommendations on how to best support the implementation of the decentralization plan. For example, the study suggests that the Bank and other donors should promote policy dialogue and demonstrate the advantages of decentralization in the provision of services in order to sensitize the public and officials in the ministries targeted for devolution. These findings have since been absorbed into ongoing technical assistance that the Bank is providing to the Government of Zambia regarding local government indebtedness.

4.3 Component 3: Improving Governance in the Road SectorThe main aim of this component is to improve gov-ernance in the road sector in Zambia by supporting the efficiency of the Integrity Committee of the RDA, generating information and data, and strengthening

11 Source: http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2013/03/14/000356161_20130314162109/Rendered/PDF/759850ESW0Whit00PUBLIC00Citizen0web.pdf.

audit mechanisms. This has been accomplished by supporting the following.

An institutional assessment of RDA with a focus on potential policy recommendations: The study has led to the identification of institutional weaknesses and has informed the World Bank on how such weaknesses can be addressed. The recommendations were presented to the management of the RDA and its Integrity Com-mittee. They were subsequently taken up by World Bank task team leaders responsible for managing road projects in Zambia and by the RDA itself.

A third-party monitoring pilot: This second sub-component has resulted in the Good Governance in Roads Project (GGRP), which focuses on raising the capacity of civil society and journalists for more informed involvement and monitoring of the road sector in Zambia. The GGRP kicked off with a week-long training session in July 2013 for 30 participants from the media and civil society organizations (CSOs) from across Zambia. The training’s main objective was to improve the participants’ understanding of the road sector and facilitate joint action between them and the RDA to improve roads in Zambia. More details on the results achieved so far can be found in Snapshot 6, “Can Partnerships Between Government and Civil Society Improve Outcomes in the Road Sec-tor?” on page 35 of this publication.

4.4 Component 4: Supporting the Efficiency of Mineral Revenue Collection and InvestmentThis component of the GPF in Zambia has resulted in two important analytical pieces: a diagnostic study on public investment management and a political economy study of mining. The PEA paper is an analysis of the agents and their stances on taxation issues in the Zambian copper industry. Drawing on literature on mineral taxation in developing countries, the study discusses the positive and normative aspects of the recently installed mineral tax regime.

A third subcomponent focused on supporting a coali-tion of CSOs, which engaged in sensitization activities around the EITI (see Box 5). The coalition serves as an extractives watch group of CSOs, which uses the newly available information on mining for monitoring industry performance. More details on the results of


4. THE GPF IN ZAMBIA: MAIN RESULTS

13

this CSO engagement can be found in Snapshot 3, “Supporting Civil Society to Engage with Government in an Informed Manner: A Case Study of Support to Zambian Coalitions on Procurement, Extractives, and Access to Information.”

4.5 Component 5: Supporting EITI ImplementationOne of the key areas for which the GPF has received significant demand is in the management of natural resources, particularly in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The current “resource boom,” driven by high commodity prices and increased demand from emerg-ing economies, is shining the spotlight on issues of transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness. The GPF has funded 17 initiatives related to the extractive industries, accounting for nearly US$15 million. The majority of grant-financed activities are in Africa, and around half of all projects are linked to greater transparency in the sector, including supporting EITI implementation.

In Zambia, Africa’s largest producer and exporter of copper and cobalt, the GPF has had a major impact on the EITI process, culminating in the country reach-ing EITI compliance in 2012. Zambia became the 15th EITI compliant country and the first in the East, Central, and Southern Africa region. EITI compliance means that the country has an effective process for annual disclosure and reconciliation of all revenues from its extractives sector, allowing citizens to see how much their country receives from oil, gas, and mining companies.

GPF funds supported the implementation of EITI through the establishment of the EITI Secretariat, which continues to exist since the closing of the fund. Several public awareness events were organized on mining taxes, and mining taxation data was released to the public for the first time, as is required for compli-ance with the EITI. This produced an unprecedented public debate.

4.6 Moving ForwardAs can be seen from the above, the GPF activities have yielded several innovative pilots and a number of publications. Over the next months, it is expected that these initiatives will continue to demonstrate their influence on World Bank projects, particularly where there is high willingness on the part of Bank Task Team Leaders to engage on governance issues. A number of other development partners have also used the World Bank pilots to inform their own work and determine their subsequent funding focuses. The United Kingdom Department for International Devel-opment, for example, is launching a large media trust fund that has gathered much of its design insights from the GPF investigative journalism work. In terms of sustained governance structures within the Bank, one staff position is currently funded under the GPF, and when the GPF ceases, this position will continue to be funded. It is worth noting that this Governance Advisor position would not have existed without GPF. Further details of possible next steps are outlined in the following individual snapshot notes.

BOX 5. EITI EXPLAINED

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-tive (EITI) is a global coalition of governments, companies, and civil society, working together to improve openness and accountable manage-ment of revenues from natural resources. The EITI maintains the EITI Standard. Countries imple-ment the EITI Standard to ensure full disclosure of taxes and other payments made by oil, gas, and mining companies to governments. These payments are disclosed in an annual EITI report. This report allows citizens to see for themselves how much their government is receiving from their country’s natural resources.

Source: EITI website.


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5. The GPF in Zambia in Six Snapshots

This section presents the lessons learned from six selected subcomponents of the GPF in Zambia in

the form of “Snapshots,” as listed below.

Snapshot 1: An explanation of the development of watchdog media in Zambia.

Snapshot 2: An introduction to the community radio project, whose results are discussed in the annex.

Snapshot 3: A Stocktaking of Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Mechanisms in the Zambia Project Portfolio.

Snapshot 4: An explanation of how Bank knowledge products, such as economic briefs, can be used to inform public debate.

Snapshot 5: A discussion on how the World Bank can support civil society to engage with the Government of Zambia in an informed manner on issues such as procurement, extractive industries, and access to information.

Snapshot 6: A case study of the Good Governance in Roads Project (GGRP), which sought to foster part-nerships between the government and civil society to improve outcomes in the road sector.

All snapshots were prepared by Kate Bridges, Public Sector Specialist at the World Bank, with inputs by Victoria Cabral, Consultant, on Snapshot 5.


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GPF Snapshot 1Supporting the Development of Watchdog Media

Building Journalistic Capacity in Zambia Dates: April 2011–June 2013

The InterventionThe overall aim of this initiative was to increase the quality of informed journalism in the Zambian media, thereby improving the ability of citizens to hold government and service providers accountable.

The World Bank has offered journalism training pro-grams in the past, so the team was aware that one of the key challenges in the Zambian environment is encouraging journalists to implement their new skills, post-training.

The focus of this pilot was not just to build journalistic capacity, but also to incentivize the trainees to remain engaged beyond the training period itself. With this

in mind, the activity was carried out during 2011–12 in three stages.

The ResultsThe main outcomes of this pilot include:

1. Measurable improvements in the journalistic skills of those who attended the training.

2. Increased number of investigative articles in the media, including:

• “Lobbyists and the Fight to Control Zambia’s Tobacco Politics”

• “Is Public Education Teetering on the Brink of Collapse?”

• “CDF—Questions of Local Ownership and Accountability”

• “An Appalling Water and Sanitation Situation in Zambia”

Stage Components

1. Application and training

In April 2011 and April 2012, Zambian journalists were invited to apply for the training offered by the World Bank and were selected based on the relevance of submitted articles and the content of their applications. The emphasis was on selecting the most passionate and promising candidates. A prominent investigative trainer held a week-long session on informed journalism skills and principles.

2. Submission and publication

After the training, each journalist had three months to research, complete, and publish an in-depth piece of journalism demonstrating their newly acquired skills. They each received close mentoring during this time. As an added incentive, the journalists’ articles were featured in a book, which was unveiled in Lusaka.

3. Competition and internship

The submitted articles/television/radio programs were judged by a panel of experts. The two journalists that were judged to have produced the best examples from the perspective of informed journalism were offered a media internship. For three months, they spent time improving their skills alongside world-renowned investigative departments in the United Kingdom and South Africa, thus becoming recognized outside Zambia for their work. Runners-up attended world-renowned journalism conferences.

TABLE 1. Project stages and components


5. THE GPF IN ZAMBIA IN SIX SNAPSHOTS

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• “The Availability of Medicines in Public Health Institutions”

3. Increased marketability of journalists under-taking investigative journalism.

4. Development of mutually beneficial networks and contacts between the World Bank and Zambian media.

5. Publication of “Truth-Seekers: A Collection of Stories from Zambia’s Investigative Journalists” and “Truth-Seekers II” (Figures 1 and 2), which changed the conversation on journalism in the country and created momentum for reform.

It is also worth noting that after each publicity/awards event, there were numerous press reports on the need for Zambia to improve its journalistic capacity, the independence of its media, and the quality of reporting. The events were widely reported across the media, in print, radio, and on TV. Some of the winners of the competitions have since gone on to hold prestigious positions in both state and independent media houses.

Perhaps even more promising has been the fact that a core of the trained journalists has shown an interest in creating an investigative center in Zambia. The World Bank has put them in contact with similar centers in the Philippines, South Africa, and London, as well as with the Global Investigative Journalism Network. They are now at the stage of developing a robust concept. Time will tell if these effects are emblematic of sustained reform, but initial signs are certainly promising.

Success Factors• Addressing incentives: The project picked the

most passionate and motivated candidates. It incentivized trainees to put their skills into practice by offering an internship for winning assignments.

• Not just a one-off training: One-off training tends to have a limited effect and so this project sought to supplement the training with a more sustained process of mentoring as well as an internship component.

• Linking supply and demand: This project made specific attempts to work with stakeholders on the

FIGURE 1. Cover of the 2011 investigative reporting publication

FIGURE 2. Cover of the 2012 investigative reporting publication



18

supply and demand side as it relates to journalism. This meant ensuring “buy-in” from media house heads prior to sending out the initial advertise-ments for the training/competition.

• Responding to the enabling environment: It was important for the team to opportunistically use the awards events. For example, given the recent change in government and some high-profile statements by the Minister of Information regard-ing the need for more professional, nonpartisan media, the World Bank team decided to frame the 2011 publicity event much more broadly as “A celebration of the practice and potential of Zambian journalism.”

• Engaging local journalist mentors to support the trained journalists during the assignment.

• Bringing in content managers: There was increased engagement with the journalists’ super-visors and content managers, achieved by inviting them to a half-day training with an international expert to hear about the journalists’ training in and learn how they can support investigative journalism in the workplace.

• Smart partnerships: The project greatly benefit-ted from collaborations with the Mail & Guardian Centre for Investigative Journalism in South Africa and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in London. Both provided three-month internships to the best-performing journalists.

• Assessing and monitoring: The project team conducted various focus group discussions and ran online surveys with Zambian media practi-tioners to: (i) inform the design of the program and (ii) assess the impact of the intervention.

“Journalists need their capacities strength-ened and enhanced with adequate materials and trainings. Though this is not enough, there is need for more media houses that are not government-owned, are there for the public’s interests, and tackle key development issues. Freelancers also need a body that can support them and promote their works.”

— Zambian Journalist, Survey Respondent 2013


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GPF Snapshot 2Can Information and Communication Technology Enabled Feedback Improve Service Delivery?

A Case Study of the Accountability through Community Radio Pilot in ZambiaDates: June 2011–March 2013

The InterventionThe Accountability through Community Radio (AtCR) pilot uses a combination of SMS technologies and com-munity radio to: (i) provide information on governance and rural service delivery issues to rural communities and (ii) create direct means of engagement between communities and their service providers/public officials.

The project pilots innovative ways in which radio audi-ences and presenters/panelists can interact with one another. Combining mobile phones and FrontlineSMS software—a free open source software used by a variety of organizations to distribute and collect information via text messages (SMS)—local constituents are able to ask direct questions, take part in polls, and receive immedi-ate feedback via text while the radio shows are on air.

To ensure that it achieves the goals outlined above, each weekly show aims to incorporate three elements:

1. Disseminate

Provide information on community entitlements andcontent of policies that affect local constituents.

2. Gather

Gather feedback from communities on their receipt ofentitlements, concerns with service delivery, and questions/

concerns on policies that affect their lives.

3. Follow-up

Encourage service providers and public officials to improveservice delivery based on audience feedback.

The World Bank’s role was to provide training in presentation, research, and technology skills; convene stakeholders (radio, citizens, civil society organiza-tions (CSOs), public officials, and service providers); and cover the costs associated with research, pro-duction, and the sending of reminders to listeners.

The ResultsThe project is completed and its evaluation can be found in the annex of this report. Some positive find-ings from the review include the following.

A radio show can increase the number of people accessing services to which they are entitled.

• Example: For some time, the Chifwebe clinic in Mkushi has been trying to encourage greater male involvement in activities related to the preven-tion of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. But statistics for couples coming to use this service remained low: between one and seven couples per month for January–June 2012. After Mkushi Community Radio Station aired a show that highlighted citizen entitlements and services in relation to PMTCT and asked for citizen feed-back as to how they were making use of these services, this same clinic saw an increase in the number of couples coming to avail themselves of their PMTCT services. More than 50 couples attended the clinic in the month after the show aired.

SMS interactions prove to be an effective channel for sensitive issues.

• Example: During a radio show that highlighted services related to gender-based violence, the Mkushi Victim Support Unit saw a significant increase in the number of cases reported. The SMS feature on the radio show was considered to be a significant factor in the increased response because it ensured anonymity of the responders.



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Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been using the radio show to better connect citizens with services.

• Example: One of Zambia’s largest gender advocacy NGOs—the NGO Coordinating Council—testifies that the show has enabled it to provide a much faster and more targeted response when it comes to providing assistance on gender-based violence cases. Its ability to provide advice and informa-tion to victims was previously inhibited by the cost and time required to respond to requests for help or to distribute information.

Government officials are making good on promises.

• Example: Mosi-o-Tunya Community Radio aired an AtCR show that highlighted the poor state of sanitation in the Potters Market in Livingstone. The radio station managed to get Zambia’s vice president on its show. He subsequently promised a substantial donation to improve sanitation in the markets.

ChallengesOften, there are significant challenges with the use of information and communication technology and community radio in a rural/peri-urban setting. Table 1 provides a list of some of the challenges faced by the AtCR pilot.

Going ForwardThe evaluation showed that there were a number of instances where the radio show can be shown to have had a positive impact on service provision. Nonetheless, these instances were anecdotal, and the public was still not confident about their ability to bring about change through interactions with duty bearers. Governance and behavior change initiatives often show results and impacts over the long term. For the project to mature and realize the contributions it made to service delivery, it would need to run for a minimum of three years.

Challenge Description

Political interference

Community radio stations are often utilized by savvy politicians to promote a certain political agenda. One of the stations that the project initially began working with had to be dropped from the pilot when it became apparent that it had become heavily compromised by virtue of substantial political funds and political members on its board.

Quality of information

Community radio staff tend to have fairly basic journalism skills and few resources with which to ensure that they adequately research a topic. The project tried to supplement this by linking the radio station more closely with CSOs that could help journalists create content, but there is still a long way to go. The information being disseminated often suffers from poor research and bias.

Poor infrastructure

All of the stations involved in the pilot suffer from issues common to rural communities: poor Internet connections, frequent power cuts, and weak telephone signals.

Radio station skills and resources

Because staff at community radio stations typically have very low levels of training, this pilot has tried to offer supplemental training in presentation, technology, and research skills. The problem is that as soon as staff become well-trained, they tend to start searching for a more lucrative jobs.

Information and communication technology skills

Although FrontlineSMS is considered to be a relatively simple, easy-to-grasp SMS software, many of the community radio staff struggled to get a handle with it. As a result, additional training beyond what was initially thought to be sufficient was needed.

Follow-up The shows have proven to be better at disseminating data and receiving feedback from citizens than they have been at ensuring follow-up on the issues raised. Follow-up needs to improve if citizens are to avoid becoming disillusioned with the process.

TABLE 1. Challenges with the use of information and communication technology in rural settings


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GPF Snapshot 3Assessing the Evidence

Lessons from a Stocktaking of DFGG Mechanisms in the Zambia Project PortfolioDates: 2011–12

The Background

Given the potential benefits of multistakehold-er engagement for improved delivery of public services, it has become increasingly clear that a greater commitment to DFGG activities is desirable for the World Bank. A number of recent World Bank speeches and papers strongly assert this point. It is also common nowadays to hear Bank promises of improved engagement with non-state actors being referenced at the highest level of management and reiterated within major policy papers. What is not quite so well established or discussed, however, is the significance of the organizational shift that is required or the challenges faced when attempting to translate DFGG commitments from rhetoric into practice. As a result, the question that needs to be asked is: How smoothly is this high-level discourse translating into practice? And what challenges is it encountering along the way?

The Aim

The aim of the World Bank paper, “Avoiding Tokenism in DFGG Activities: Lessons from World Bank-financed Lending Projects in Zambia,” and the underlying report, “Stocktaking of DFGG Mechanisms in the Zam-bia Project Portfolio—A Review of DFGG Mechanisms in 9 World Bank Zambia Lending Projects,” was to answer the above question. It identifies the current strengths and weaknesses of DFGG mechanisms in the Zambia lending portfolio. Specifically, the goal is to identify within each project the existing mecha-nisms of transparency and information, participation and consultation, monitoring and oversight, and

capacity-enhancement that contribute to improving a non-state actor’s ability to engage with the state. In addition, the report aimed at providing broad recommendations for future improvement as well as identifying areas for future pilot interventions. The relevance of this Zambian case study is that it demonstrates some of the particular challenges of trying to move DFGG commitments from “paper to practice.” As evidenced, the complexity of the shift should not be underestimated.

The Method

The paper is based on an evaluation of the Zam-bian lending portfolio carried out in early 2011. The desk-based evaluation utilized various World Bank documentation—project appraisal documents, project



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implementation plans, operational manuals, perfor-mance frameworks, environmental and social impact assessments, aide memoires, mission documents, project evaluations, midterm reviews, and special studies on governance and accountability—as pri-mary sources of information. The data gathered via documentary analysis was further verified through in-depth interviews with task team leaders and through perceptions of beneficiaries using the beneficiary feedback mechanism, External Implementation Status and Results Reports Plus (E-ISR+). Nine projects were considered in total. Each project was assessed for DFGG mechanisms in the following four catego-ries: transparency and information, participation and consultation, monitoring and oversight, and capacity enhancement. The established mechanisms were then considered according to a set of four criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, inclusiveness, and sustain-ability (see Table 1).

The Findings

The findings of the paper were organized around six of the main contributors to current successes and failures regarding the Zambian portfolio’s DFGG activities.

1. Organizational Commitment

The study found that there was a preference for abstract, non-specific language around commitments to trans-parency and accountability. The abstraction around language is sometimes compounded by a reluctance to make DFGG mechanisms a requirement. Several task team leaders have observed that unless something

is explicitly required in project documentation, it is unlikely to be effectively undertaken by implementing partners. A further symptom of how organizational commitment may not yet have caught up with rhetoric is the lack of adequate financial and human resourcing for DFGG activities. In the case of Zambia, the study found that there is a lack of adequate resourcing—both financial and human—for DFGG activities. As a result, implementation ends up being overly reliant on the individual personalities and priorities of the project management and implementation units.

2. Organizational Value System

Closely linked to the notion of organizational com-mitment is the idea of “organizational culture” or “organizational identity.” The organization displays a recognizable identity, or culture when there is con-siderable agreement, similarity, or overlap among the individual belief systems that outweighs the differences among them. The report maintains that within the World Bank, the current value system has not quite caught up with the rhetoric being espoused by key

“If this really is a priority then it needs to be better emphasized within the Bank. No one ever asks me about this. If it’s important then it needs to begin to be reflected in Bank systems, in quality enhancement require-ments, and guidelines for the concept note.”

—Task team leader

Criteria Questions

Effectiveness Has the mechanism contributed to better service provision?Has it built trust and confidence between the user and the provider?Are user’s preferences being communicated and are they being enabled to act on their entitlements?Is the mechanism preventing slippage of performance or political capture of the utility/project?Does it ensure that users participate in key decisions?

Inclusiveness Who is involved in the mechanism?Is access equitable?Are the intermediaries representative and effective?Are the underserved and unheard being empowered?

Efficiency What are the costs of applying the tools (direct costs and transaction costs for users)?How do the costs compare to the benefits?

Sustainability How long have these tools been implemented?Have they remained ad hoc or become institutionalized?

TABLE 1. Criteria for evaluating DFGG mechanisms



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reformers and Bank management. This is significant because among Bank staff and project implementers, more broadly, it is apparent that personal attitude and beliefs about beneficiary engagement are having a direct impact on the priority that DFGG mechanisms are being accorded in their project. At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume that everyone involved in Bank projects automatically ascribes to the view that citizenry should be given a broader influence over the development activities that affect them.

3. Location in a Broader Governance Agenda

The report finds that older DFGG mechanisms more often appear to be implemented as one-offs, done to a minimum requirement on an ad hoc basis and with little attempt at institutionalization. By contrast, the newer projects in the Zambian portfolio take a broader view, which explicitly requires project man-agement to implement the mechanisms in a more sustained manner on the basis of sound political analysis and with a view to long-term empower-ment. Thus, they tend to focus on the engagement of beneficiaries with a specific view to improving governance. The Irrigation Development and Sup-port Project, for example, locates the majority of its beneficiary engagement mechanisms directly in a broader Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) agenda. The presence of such a clear philosophy and rationale for the DFGG mechanisms in the Irrigation Development and Support Project seems to have directly led them to being well resourced, clearly defined, and broadly monitored.

4. Evaluation

Robust evaluation studies on the effectiveness of key demand-side measures make it more likely that task team leaders and clients would adopt measures that have greater operational value. Another major reason to ensure more effective monitoring and evaluation of projects is to guarantee that good lessons are not being lost. However, the most conspicuous trend across all the projects included in the report was that the DFGG mechanisms being implemented are generally not being monitored and evaluated. As such, the follow-up to demand-side measures is weak. Supervision missions make no systematic attempt to find out whether beneficiaries are being engaged or whether the existing mechanisms are inclusive, efficient, effective, or sustainable. There are in fact few, if any, financial provisions for them to do so.

5. Importance of Context

The issue with implementation of mechanisms is compounded by a propensity for neglect toward the mechanism’s “enabling environment.” In Bank-funded projects in Zambia, it is often the case that a promising mechanism is referred to in the design documentation but fails as a result of broader personal-ity, capacity, politics, or other factors. Of course, not all possible eventualities can be accounted for, but a failure to consider the broader enabling environment certainly increases the likelihood of mechanisms being ineffectively implemented. Thus, many of the projects—older ones in particular—find that after designing comprehensive mechanisms, there is no incentive on the behalf of implementing partners to actually execute them. In addition, although com-mendable, new demand-side projects are still being implemented with a rather one-size-fits-all approach. The reality is that different projects and different sec-tors will require different approaches. Since DFGG is primarily a political rather than a technical solution, cookie-cutter approaches will always remain limited in their effectiveness.

6. Persistent Myopia

The study reports that there is a continued myopia that exists in the development field and reflected in the DFGG approach taken by Bank projects: the prioritization of upward over downward account-ability. While all of the projects assessed during the review insist on comprehensive reporting systems, financial auditing, and monitoring mechanisms that go up the financial chain or across to implementing partners, there is still little evidence of prioritizing such mechanisms in a downward direction. This leads to a critical gap in the overall DFGG approach.

Conclusions

This review has sought to identify some of the broad gaps and trends that are currently characterizing DFGG mechanisms in the Zambia lending portfo-lio. The overall message is positive in that it points toward generally progressive improvement in these mechanisms, particularly when comparing older and newer projects. But continued work is required before the practice on the ground matches the aspirations being espoused by Bank management. The approach moving forward needs to be far more comprehensive, strategic, and sustained than it has been so far. Based



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on this summary review of current trends and in keeping with the nature of DFGG itself, the following recommendations are more guiding principles than absolute rules.

Recommendations

Recommendations suggested by the report fall under three broad headings:

1. Be experimental

2. Be analytical

3. Be managerial

Be Experimental

The approach to non-state actor engagement needs to be experimental. The centralizing of DFGG activi-ties in projects is still too recent and unexamined for the World Bank to proceed without significant humility and without putting considerable emphasis on the importance of monitoring. The focus must be on discovering what works and learning from what does not. It means leaving room for failures as well as successes, and taking lessons from both. On a more practical level, this means adapting structures so that they enable both evaluation and flexibility.

“There is a case for external action, but the intervention needs to be designed in ways that take account of these constraints, with a particular emphasis on a process of discovery and experimentation of what works.”

— Devarajan, and others 2011

Be Analytical

Mechanisms are reliant on their enabling environ-ments. Alone, they achieve little and can even be counterproductive. As such, it is insufficient to take a tool and implement it without first conducting a considerable analysis of the existing context and characteristics of demand and supply. These initial analyses need to be a key part of any pilot. They are an important way of ensuring that a “tick box” approach is avoided. The crucial point to recognize here is that a DFGG tool or mechanism is unlikely to ever succeed in isolation; its effectiveness is reli-ant on it building upon certain preconditions and an existing enabling environment. There also needs to be demand for accountability on the side of citi-zens, capacity to account on the side of institutions, a conducive political and legal environment, and a host of other enabling factors.

2Willingness and capacity

of beneficiaries todemand accountability

1Mechanism:

4Enabling

environment

3Willingness and capacity

of service providers tobe accountable

SOCIO-CULTURALFACTORS

ECONOMICFACTORS

LOCALFACTORS

POLITICALFACTORS

FIGURE 1. Necessary factors for success of DFGG mechanisms

Source: Adapted from Agarwal and Van Wicklin 2011



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Be Managerial

The World Bank aims to change the external culture as it relates to norms around transparency, gover-nance, and accountability. This is a laudable pursuit, of course, but the summary of project trends strongly suggests that internal normative change has not yet been sufficiently accomplished. As observed, down-ward accountability is still a much lower priority than upward or horizontal accountability. The following are broad ways in which the World Bank could manage internal dynamics and thus accelerate the internal enabling environment for DFGG:

• Managing DFGG resources sufficiently: As previously highlighted, downward accountability, unlike upward accountability, is not essential for organizational survival. Being discretionary, it is often the first thing to be cut when resources (time or financial) are low. If the Bank does highly

value downward accountability, then it needs to back up its claims by dedicating significant time, sustained funds, and experienced staff to build-ing appropriate relationships and implementing appropriate mechanisms.

• Managing attitudes and values: Focusing on DFGG-related strategies, structures, and sys-tems is necessary, but not sufficient. The World Bank needs to implement a clear organizational value system that provides depth, stability, and consistency to their management systems. With downward accountability, it is clear that the soft subject of values has direct implications for the hard facts of performance. The implementation of demand-side governance mechanisms hinges on the extent to which project staff and implement-ing partners value multistakeholder engagement.


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GPF Snapshot 4 How Can World Bank Knowledge Work be Used to Inform Public Debate?

A Case Study of the Communication for Reform Pilot in Zambia

The ConceptThe Problem

The Communication for Reform (C4R) initiative was born out of the recognition that although the World Bank’s knowledge work in Zambia is typically of very high quality, it does not adequately stimulate broad and timely public discussion and debate in Zambia. As a result, the Bank often finds that the reforms it pursues are not well supported by a major-ity of Zambians or sufficiently owned by the client.

The Aim

With the above problem in mind, the C4R pilot (man-aged by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Man-agement Governance team of the Bank and funded by the GPF) sought to pilot an innovative method of disseminating Bank knowledge work so that it would:

• inform public opinion on a critical development topic;

• build the debating and writing capacity of key Zambian stakeholders, particularly students; and

• facilitate an informed and inclusive discussion among a diverse set of stakeholders on a key development topic.

In doing this, the initiative would also operationalize the Zambian Country Partnership Strategy’s commit-ment to “ensure enhanced attention to communication

and dissemination of Bank data and analysis amongst varied stakeholders.”

The Method

Using the second edition of the Zambia Economic Brief “Zambia’s Jobs Challenge: Realities on the Ground,” the team created a program that would incentivize both written discussions of the economic brief as well as live debates. During the launch of the Sec-ond Zambia Economic Brief (on “Jobs”), the World Bank simultaneously launched a debate and writing competition on the topic of “Think Jobs.”



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The competition would train competitively selected Zambian students on how to engage with develop-ment issues (in this case the issue of job creation) on a public platform. Finalists would get the oppor-tunity to debate on live television, have their articles published, and win top prizes, including internships with the World Bank.

Key to the success of the initiative has been the fact that the economic brief was written more as a diagnostic than a prescriptive manual for reform. A number of stakeholders have since commented that the lack of overt prescription has allowed them the space to develop and own their own solutions to the problems presented.

The Intervention So FarBaseline Survey

With a view to carefully evaluating the effect of this communication strategy, the team began with a baseline survey among the World Bank’s target population (Zambian students) to identify current awareness of and use of Bank knowledge products. Highlighted findings include:

• 47 percent of survey respondents had used World Bank information. This placed the Bank in fourth position behind Bank of Zambia, the United Nations, and the Zambia Revenue Authority.

• 68 percent had used Bank products for studying.



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• 80 percent trusted World Bank data compared to 49.7 percent for government data, 80.5 percent for the United Nations, 29.4 percent for African Development Bank, and 59.9 percent for the European Union.

• 57.5 percent said they accessed World Bank data on the Internet.

• 90.3 percent felt statistics were important for society as a basis for political decisions, research, and debate.

Zambia Economic Brief Forum and Competition Launch

The debate and writing competitions were launched in September 2013, alongside the launch of the brief itself. More than 150 people attended the launch, which included a panel debate and responses from academia, the private sector, the government, and youth. The event was widely covered in the media.

To stimulate interest in the competition, a video that captured Zambian voices on the topic of Zambia’s jobs challenges was produced and shown during the event. Flyers for the competition were widely distributed.

Discussion on Social Media

A Facebook page was launched in October 2013. As of May 2014, the page had 862 “likes,” mostly com-ing from Zambia.

Youth Forum

Twenty influential young people attended an in-depth discussion on the brief. They represented business, banking, agriculture, academic, and informal sectors. A number of them later applied for the competition and joined the Facebook page. The lively and engag-ing event was covered on CCTV.



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Bite-Sizing the Data

An infographic was designed and published online in order to provide a more user-friendly, accessible means to understand the data contained in the Zambia Economic Brief.

With a view toward keeping the jobs data in the public eye, sections of this infographic have since been regularly featured in a weekly “Did You Know” series that appears in one of Zambia’s most widely read newspapers.

Competition

More than 80 university students from across Zam-bia applied to take part in the debate and writing competition. The entries were of very high quality, demonstrating that all entrants had read the Zambia Economic Brief and used the data in the applications.

Strong support was demonstrated from the students’ academic institutions, with a number requesting that faculty members also attend training. It was clear that the possibility of an internship with the World Bank was a major motivating factor for applications.

Training

Four debate teams (made up of four persons each, plus a debate coach) from four universities were trained by a world-renowned debate expert in the skills of public debate as well as the economic brief itself. Twenty selected students were simultaneously trained by a veteran journalist in the skill of writing on economic affairs for a public audience. Students participating in the debate and writing trainings have since been given essay questions and debate topics to prepare for the run-up to the final competition.

Assignment

Students who participated in the writing competition were required to submit their final discussion pieces by March 2014, up to which point they received men-torship from an expert mentor. Their submissions were judged by a panel and compiled into a single World Bank publication. At the same time, students who took part in the debate competition had one month to prepare for the final competition in March 2014. The debate students were provided with their motions and positions during this phase.



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Final Event: Televised Debate Series and Launch of Publication

The finale of the debate competition was filmed over three episodes, consisting of two semifinals and one grand finale at which the winners of the Think Jobs competition were announced. It was during this event that the writing competition publication was launched and winners announced.

The World Bank collaborated with the national televi-sion company and its existing debate program to air the three-part Think Jobs special as part of its program-ming, allowing the World Bank to take advantage of preexisting viewership for the televised debate. Key stakeholders in policy making were present during the filming, allowing them to listen to the students and give them a voice and presence in policy-making circles. The recording of the finale, along with record-ings of the preceding semi-finals were then aired nationwide by the national broadcaster and were viewed by millions of Zambians.

What’s Next?Internships with the World Bank

Two of the writing competition winners and one of the debate winners will be offered an internship with the World Bank Zambia Country Office. This will be an opportunity for the individuals to gain invaluable experience in a renowned development institution and for the Bank to benefit from the input of young, innovative minds who come with fresh ideas for Bank work in Zambia.

Mainstreaming C4R?

After completing the competition, re-running the survey, and assessing the pilot’s impact, it will be up to the Bank’s country office to identify whether this communication strategy is one that can be ben-eficially mainstreamed across other Bank products in the Zambia portfolio.

“As we are brought into and connected with such organizations that we have traditionally been excluded from, we can participate in active and equal decision making at a high level and will therefore move from being inactive citizens to fully engaged stakeholders in developing our country.”

—Delia Banda, Winner of “Best Debater”

HOMEGROWN RESPONSES: STUDENTS’ OPINIONS ON THE ZAMBIAN JOBS CHALLENGE

“The last fifty years have been characterised by maize production; the next fifty should be char-acterized by cornflakes production and possibly exportation.” Mercy Zulu, economics student

“Government must remove the constraints that inhibit the achievement of high returns in the informal sector.” Mazuba Banda, law student

“The quality of education at vocational schools should be improved to put special emphasis on technical, vocational, and entrepreneurship skills.” Esanju Maseka, commerce student


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GPF Snapshot 5Supporting Civil Society to Engage with Government in an Informed Manner

Supporting Zambian Coalitions on Procurement, Extractive Industries, and Access to InformationDates: January 2012–January 2014

The ConceptThe Background

Zambia has an active civil society, which has been working toward greater representation of citizens’ voice in government. Despite progress in some areas, civil society’s influence continues to be limited by a lack of institutionalized mechanisms, inadequate information and knowledge of policy processes, poor use of com-munication strategies, and weak links with other actors.

On development issues that are usually of technical nature, Zambian civil society often lacks the skills and understanding to engage with government and service providers in an effective and credible manner.

Using funding from the GPF, the Zambia Governance Team supported the building of linkages between state and society around three specific technical development issues:

The Aim

The support to each area was aimed at increasing civil society’s ability to dialogue with government on techni-cal development topics that have previously received minimal engagement. This was pursued through a combination of methods including: (i) intensive technical trainings; (ii) mentorship; (iii) convening of diverse actors; (iv) technical assistance for campaign development; (v) financing of advocacy campaigns; (vi) South-South exchange; and (vii) support for coalition building.

The Three Areas of Support1. Access to Information

In September 2011, a new government was voted in during Zambia’s tripartite elections. The newly appointed Minister of Information as well as the newly appointed Vice President were both strong proponents of the access to information (ATI) bill and insisted that it be passed during their terms. The passing of the bill also was a key commitment of the Party’s election manifesto.

Access toinformation

Transparency in theextractives industry

Procurement



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Results

• Committee created: A technical committee was appointed that included representation from the government, academia, NGOs, and think tanks. This committee was mandated with revising the bill, disseminating the draft, and sensitizing the public. The World Bank was asked to provide technical support to the committee.

• Bill revised: With the assistance of international and local ATI experts funded by the Bank, the technical committee reviewed and revised the bill. In its draft form, it is now considered to be one of the most progressive ATI bills.

• Coalition initiated: As government support for the bill stalled, the Bank began supporting CSOs that were conducting sensitization on ATI. As a result of Bank support, the ATI Coalition was formed.

• ATI campaign undertaken: The Bank funded an ATI campaign in collaboration with the ATI Coalition over 18 months. This included pro-duction of ATI manuals, branding materials, production and airing of an ATI documentary, radio shows, and holding various sensitization events.

• Forums held: The Bank facilitated a number of ATI events wherein experts and practitioners from India and South Africa were brought in to share lessons on ATI. Members of Parliament, civil society, and the media attended these events (Figure 1).

Challenges

• Government reticence: Despite continued prom-ises to disseminate and table the revised draft, the government repeatedly failed to present the bill to the Cabinet and to Parliament. It appears that the commitment to passing the ATI bill has diminished as the government has become accustomed to the benefits of information control.

• Ministry shuffles: Initially, ATI had significant support from within the Ministry of Information. But shortly after the creation of the technical committee, the minister was moved to another ministry. In the course of Bank’s support, the minister has been changed at least four times. Permanent secretaries have also been regularly shifted. This has made it difficult to maintain momentum and support from within the ministry.

• Civil society weaknesses: It remains the case that in Zambia there are only a few strong, institutional-ized civil society groups. The strongest tend to be overused by donors and therefore find it difficult to absorb additional activities and funds. The campaign struggled to crowd in a broader segment of civil society, often as a result of fragmentation and competition among the organizations.

2. Procurement Watch Coalition

The Procurement Watch Coalition began with the Bank-funded participation of some Zambian CSO representatives in a regional conference on extractive industries and subsequent “Quick wins” funding, provided by the World Bank Institute. The funding was supplemented with GPF support and concentrated on building an active membership base, developing sound internal governance structures and foundational tools, such as a baseline study and a procurement database.

Results

• Developed the coalition’s strategy and road-map: The strategy includes the development of the first online portal on procurement in Zambia in partnership with the Zambia Public Procurement Agency. The portal will serve as a database for procurement information from the national and district levels. It includes information on all stages of the contracting process and provides resources for procurement monitoring and analysis.

FIGURE 1. Chief Chikanta speaking during a village ATI sensitization event



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• Developed and disseminated a baseline study: The coalition produced a study, “Analyzing the Public Procurement System in Zambia: A Case for Procurement Monitoring,” which provides the basis for its engagement in fiscal 13.

• Secured additional funding: Funding was secured for the lead coalition member through the World Bank Civil Society Fund, specifically to involve communities in procurement.

• Launched the coalition: The coalition had its public launch in June 2012 for which many public officials were present.

Challenges

• Lack of sufficient ownership: The Procurement Watch Coalition came together primarily as a result of initial “quick wins” funds provided by the World Bank Institute. There was little evidence of an initial, homegrown initiative. It slowly became apparent that many of its members were not truly engaged and even those that were had little time to focus on the procurement-related tasks.

• Activities remain dormant: Although the Pro-curement Watch Coalition’s strategy was prom-ising, a number of the components have failed to launch. The online portal, for example, was developed but never launched because of lack of follow up with the Public Procurement Authority and lack of funding for a website host.

3. Transparency in the Extractives Industry

In September 2011, at the request of two of the more proactive members of the Extractive Industries Trans-parency Initiative (EITI) multistakeholder group, the World Bank Zambia Governance Team decided to use some of the GPF funds to support capacity building of civil society actors on EITI. The support to civil society was a subcomponent of a broader piece of work aimed at increasing the transparency of mineral-related revenues and the efficiency of public investment.

The intervention was centered on hiring a local consultant with NGO and mining sector experience to coordinate the NGO coalition. A world-renowned international mining expert was also hired to coordi-nate a training of core coalition members and journal-ists on the topic of extractives and mining taxation.

Results

• Trainings completed: An intensive training with civil society members and journalists on the extractives sector was completed. Positive feedback was received on the scope and depth of the training.

• Zambia Mining Watch Coalition created: A number of workshops were organized with CSO representatives and journalists. These resulted in the creation of a Zambia Mining Watch Coali-tion mission statement, a terms of reference and activities roadmap, a coalition structure (e.g., secretariat), and a formalization of the coalition membership.

• Forum held: A one-day forum was organized to launch the Zambia Mining Watch Coalition and share the work that had been implemented since its formation as a means of meeting the core objective of influencing policy and public debate on governance and mining management.

• Further funding secured: Further funding was secured to support the coalition via EITI direct funding to CSOs.

• Publication of report and EITI compliance: The coalition published a synthesis of the EITI recon-ciliation report, and in September 2012, Zambia became EITI compliant.

Challenges

• Still building a brand: The Zambia Mining Watch Coalition still has some way to go before it can be considered a true, credible brand. This will take time and further support.

• Delays with supplementary funding: Additional funding did not materialize in a timely manner as a result of the World Bank procurement processes and contractor issues. This significantly affected momentum within the coalition.

• Reliance on external factors: The absence of timely additional funding and the departure of



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the GPF-funded consultant greatly affected the group’s proactiveness. The group’s members have struggled to commit time and organizational funds to the meetings and products.

Lessons

The Bank’s engagement with coalitions has been instructive, and there are now a number of lessons that will inform future engagements.

• Identify homegrown ownership: Engagements have been more sustainable when the Bank was responding to existing initiatives (e.g., Extractives Watch), as opposed to when funds were provided to grow coalitions from scratch (e.g., Procurement Watch Coalition). Wherever possible, the World Bank should focus on working with existing initiatives, rather than attempting to generate motivation with the promise of short-term funds. Where civil society is prone to opportunism, as it is in Zambia, the latter approach tends to produce unsustainable interventions.

• Expert training must be supplemented with incentives to put skills into practice: Although all the trainings were of a high quality, it is clear that these need to be combined with follow-up initiatives geared toward putting new skills and learning into practice. With other trainings (e.g., investigative journalism), the Bank provided incentives (e.g., internship prizes) to encour-age the trainees to produce assignments after the training in a demonstration of their newly acquired skills. The incentive to implement the

skills post-training is very important, otherwise these newly acquired skills are quickly forgotten.

• Mentorship is critical: In light of the weaknesses within Zambian civil society and the technical nature of the development topics in question, mentorship proved to be a critical component of support. In general, each of the coalitions required greater levels of mentorship than the available Bank funds could supply. Thus, it is important that mentorship forms a greater component of the Bank’s support in the future.

• Boots on the ground: Linked to the above point, the World Bank needs to consider the staff and time that it can dedicate to capacity-building initiatives. All of the above initiatives could have benefitted from a closer engagement of the country-based Bank staff with the coalition representatives. Engagement with civil society requires constant monitoring and relationship-building, particularly in a context like Zambia’s where coalitions are still fairly weak.

• Long-term vision: Strengthening of civil society requires a long-term vision and impact is not necessarily demonstrated in a linear fashion. It is problematic, therefore, that funding for support was short-term and piecemeal. It was unrealistic to expect clear results in a short time. This con-tributed to disillusionment among civil society representatives. Hence, if the World Bank is serious about civil society engagement, it should develop longer-term funding mechanisms for that purpose.


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GPF Snapshot 6Can Partnerships Between Government and Civil Society Improve Outcomes in the Road Sector?

A Case Study of the Good Governance in Roads Pilot in ZambiaDates: June 2013–January 2015

The ConceptThe Problem

Over the past four years, large investments have been made to build road infrastructure in Zambia, making it a major area of focus for the government. Despite this anticipated growth in the road sector, there are concerns about governance. Historically, the road sector has been viewed as a technical one, which has deterred CSOs and journalists from most types of engagement.

The Aim

The Aim of the Good Governance in Roads Project (GGRP) is to improve accountability and service deliv-ery in the road sector by: (i) developing the capacity

of CSOs and journalists to engage in the sector in an informed manner and (ii) incentivizing collaborative partnerships across road stakeholders.

The Method

To help raise the capacity of civil society and journal-ists for more informed involvement and monitoring of the road sector in Zambia, the Road Development Agency and the World Bank entered into a collabora-tion to create the GGRP. The GGRP is funded by the GPF and includes training and a competitive small-grant program. The pilot has four phases.

The InterventionTraining phase: (Table 1) The first phase of the GGRP was a week-long training course that took place in July 2013. There were more than 150 appli-cants from across Zambia, of which 30 media and CSO representatives were selected on the basis of the potential and passion demonstrated in their applications (Figure 1).

Phase Description

Training phase A week-long training course was delivered by experts and targeted at civil society and media representatives. The emphasis was on giving participants a practical understanding of governance challenges in the sector and ways in which they can be involved in enhancing accountability.

Proposal-writing phase

Following the training, the participating journalists had eight weeks to produce a funding proposal to undertake an in-depth public interest piece of journalism focused on the road sector. The civil society participants also had eight weeks to develop a funding proposal targeted at increasing transparency and value-for-money in the road sector.

Competition phase

An impartial panel of World Bank experts judged the proposals. The three best proposals from journalists will be awarded contracts of up to KR15,000 to undertake their research, while the two best CSO proposals will receive funding of up to KR250,000.

Project implementation phase

The grantees take part in compulsory mentorship at certain stages throughout the one-year implementation. A roadmap and deliverables will be jointly agreed upon with the mentor.

TABLE 1. GGRP Phases



36

The main objective of the training was to improve the participants’ understanding of the road sec-tor and to facilitate action between them and the Roads Development Authority (RDA) to improve roads in Zambia. During the training, partici-pants learned about the procurement process, road contracts, road sector setup, monitoring and evaluation, and responsible and investigative journalism. The emphasis was on giving participants a practical understanding of governance challenges in the sector and ways in which they could enhance accountability.

For more details on the training, including interviews with the project team leader, please consult the blog hosted on the Open Contracting website.

Proposal writing and competition: After the train-ing, the 30 participants were given eight weeks to develop their action plans into full proposals (Fig-ure 2). During this time they continued to have access to expert mentorship. The proposals were judged by

a three-person panel. During a large, well-attended awards dinner, the two best CSO proposals were offered grants of US$50,000 each, while the three best proposals from the journalists were offered grants of US$3,000 each.

Implementation: The winners attended an additional three-day training session to finalize their proposals and prepare for implementation of their projects (Fig-ure 3). Implementation of the projects began in January of 2014 and will run for up to one year. The grantees will receive mentorship throughout the process.

The Results• Strong citizen-monitoring proposals have been

developed and funded: Under the project, three journalists are producing road advocacy media materials (e.g., radio shows, documentaries, and dramas), and two CSOs are coordinating citizen road monitoring initiatives—the first of their kind in Zambia.

• Communities of practice built between journal-ists and civil society: One of the most exciting things about the GGRP is that it is the first time that CSOs and journalists have worked together to engage in the road sector in Zambia.

• Greater collaboration between traditional state and non-state actors: Throughout the training, government officials who represent road and procurement institutions were brought in to show how both groups can work together and benefit from increased collaboration. This has resulted in strong collaborations on the actual grantee projects, particularly between the RDA engineers and civil society monitors (Figure 4).

FIGURE 1. Participants at an on site training

FIGURE 2. Participants developing joint proposals

FIGURE 3. Some of the trainees



37

• Radio shows produced, and monitoring projects underway: Although implementation is still in its early phases, a number of radio shows have already been aired on the topic of road governance and monitoring. The CSO grantees have begun developing their monitoring tools and training communities.

Success Factors• Expert trainers and highly participatory train-

ing methods: The training made use of experts with many years of experience in road governance and contracting. It also benefitted from the pres-ence of CSO practitioners from Ghana and India. The World Bank Institute assisted by providing innovative and engaging participatory training methods (Figure 5).

• High-level supply side engagement: High-level government representatives, such as the Minister of Transport and heads of the road institutions, have been engaged in the project from the beginning. Their presence at the project launch, press briefings, and the grant awards event was an important signal of government commitment. The RDA engaged with the Bank during the advertising phase and launch and also sent representatives to present during the trainings. They have continued to engage during grant implementation.

• Strong partnerships in the Bank: The Open Government Practice of the World Bank Institute has been a valuable partner in supporting the

training and small-grant program. The program has also benefitted from inputs from colleagues in the World Bank Zambia Country Management Unit who work on procurement and manage the ongoing road project. The Country Director has also been a strong supporter.

• Training with mentorship and incentives: Part of the success, so far, has been due to fact that this was not just a training, but a holistic pro-gram focused on providing skills and then giving ongoing mentorship and incentives to put those skills into action.

Next StepsThe GGRP is midway through implementation and the World Bank Institute has so far undertaken one monitoring mission. The three journalist projects and two CSO projects will be completed by the end of 2014. Over the next months, the focus will be on:

• assisting the CSOs develop training materials and monitoring tools;

• following up with the monitors, once monitor-ing has begun, to establish whether there have been any challenges and whether tools need refinement;

• assisting grantees in engaging with the gov-ernment to uncover issues revealed during the monitoring activities; and

• sharing results and lessons, first with Zambian stakeholders, and then, once the project is com-pleted, more widely.

FIGURE 5. Training participants from media and civil society

FIGURE 4. Loyce Saili, public relations manager at RDA, gives a brief talk about the makeup of a road before going on a site visit


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1. Background and Report OrganizationThe objective of the World Bank’s Accountability through Community Radio (AtCR) project was to improve the flow of information and feedback between citizens, civil society, and duty bearers,12 with a view to improving governance and public service delivery. The project was piloted in January 2012, and involved working with three partner radio stations across Zam-bia: Radio Mano in Kasama, Radio Mkushi in Mkushi, and Radio Mosi-O-Tunya in Livingstone. The AtCR project helped community radio stations run weekly governance and rural development interactive talk shows with content driven by and representative of community members’ concerns. The radio station staff implemented the program using manuals provided by the World Bank.

When the AtCR was completed in March 2013, the World Bank commissioned an evaluation of the project to understand how its strategies and activities may have contributed to enabling citizens to demand improved governance and public service delivery. The objective of this evaluation is to share with develop-ment practitioners the lessons learned by the World Bank in piloting the utilization of hybrid technologies, such as radio and SMS, by citizens and the state to demand and provide better governance, respectively. This paper analyzes the Bank’s experiences piloting community radio and SMS technologies as a tool to bolster rural demands for good governance in Mkushi and Livingstone. The overall purpose is to share best practice lessons as well as to provide analysis and evaluation of the contribution project inputs had on achieving outputs, outcomes, and impact.

12 “Duty bearers” refers to persons occupying civil service or elected positions with a duty to public service.

Annex: Evaluation of the Accountability through Community Radio Project

January 2014By Victoria Cabral

This paper contributes to current literature by detail-ing development practitioners’ experiences utilizing information and communication technology (ICTs). It also seeks to contribute to information on what forms, methods, and systems ICTs should follow in order to achieve desired results. As opposed to framing the discussion in terms of project impact, this paper looks at how the project’s strategies and activities may have contributed to the three main project objectives. The findings and results will determine whether or not the AtCR project made positive contributions to service delivery and will assess the responsiveness of duty bearers in the three targeted localities.

Section 2 of this paper details the AtCR project, including its methodologies and strategies. It contains information on the project partners and stakeholders, including on how each stakeholder contributes to the project and what assumption or factors need to be in place for them to do so.

Section 3 details the project team’s rationale to employ outcome mapping as an evaluation tool, the team’s sources of information, methods of data collection, and limitations of the evaluation. This section pro-vides the framework for understanding the project inputs and strategies and their relation to meeting the project’s objective of improved governance for citizens in the locality.

Section 4 details the AtCR’s performance against the project objectives to support civil society in effectively engaging with government and service providers. The findings and results are used to determine whether the AtCR project made positive contributions toward improved governance.

Section 5 presents the lessons learned by the imple-mentation team on community radio interventions.



40

There is an acceptance that the Bank does not have a comparative advantage in implementing commu-nity radio projects. The aim of extracting the lessons learned in this evaluation is to provide a body of practice-based evidence that outlines at a broad level how community radio and mobile phone technology can contribute to citizens’ demand for improved governance.

Section 6 discusses eight key conclusions that emerged from the evaluation of the AtCR project as well as four recommendations.

2. Characteristics of the AtCR ProjectThe World Bank proposed a pilot project that uses mobile phones and community radio to improve information dissemination and community feedback as part of its broader aim to help civil society in Zam-bia effectively engage with government and service providers. The idea was to work alongside community radio stations to create exciting, interactive weekly radio programs focused on highlighting rural devel-opment issues13 of local interest. The project piloted innovative tools that radio audiences and presenters/panelists could use to interact with one another (e.g., using SMS to PC linkups so that local constituents can ask questions and receive immediate feedback while the radio shows are on air).

Aims and Objectives

The AtCR pilot used a combination of SMS tech-nologies and community radio to fulfil three main objectives.

(i) Empower citizens through information dissemi-nation and constructive dialogue to hold duty bearers accountable for improved governance and rural development.

(ii) Compel duty bearers to respond to citizen demands for improved governance.

(iii) Increased capacity of the radio station to act as a mechanism by which citizens can hold their elected representative and duty bearers accountable.

13 Selected key issues could be: fertilizer input support program, land titling, energy (electricity) sector policies, infrastructure provision, HIV/AIDS and malaria, access to finance, private sector development, employment and job creation, and governance, among others.

More generally, the aim was to improve the flow of information and feedback between citizens, civil society, and duty bearers, all with a view to improved governance and public service delivery. The radio sta-tion was to act as the channel through which these lines of communication were improved (see Figure 11).

Each week, audiences were sensitized on key policy issues that related to their lives, and they were asked to send in their views on the topic of discussion. Emphasis was on audience-driven topics and on establishing direct feedback between citizens and duty bearers. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and members of Parliament were to be regularly informed by the radio station of audience feedback on the issues that matter to communities so that their own awareness of local-level concerns and thereby their ability to communicate effectively is improved. By using open-source SMS software, the community radio staff would be able to easily collect and sort the incoming text data so that patterns of audience interaction could be traced and collected over time.

The program was piloted for one year at the follow-ing radio stations: Radio Mano in Kasama,14 Radio Mkushi in Mkushi, and Mosi-o-Tunya Radio in Liv-ingstone. These stations had governance programs that received funding and support from the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Zambia) and Panos Zambia.15 The aim was to add value to these existing programs rather than to start new ones.

Radio Show Elements

To achieve the aims outlined above, the weekly radio show incorporated three elements: dissemination, gathering audience feedback, and follow-up.

Dissemination

The objective of this component was to: (i) contribute to greater awareness in the community on the content of government/party policies related to rural develop-ment, service provider’s commitments to delivery, and the community’s entitlements; and (ii) improve

14 The program in Kasama was discontinued after the first quarter of implementation.15 Panos Institute Southern Africa is a regional nonprofit, nongovern-mental communication for development organisation that uses innova-tive communication methodologies to amplify the voices of the poor and marginalised to shape their own development. Source: http://www.panos.org.zm/.


ANNEX: EVALUATION OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH COMMUNITY RADIO PROJECT

41

Communityradio

Citizens

Civilsociety/NGOs

Serviceproviders/

governmentofficials

linkages between community radio station and local/central NGOs doing policy analysis and information dissemination around the relevant policy issues.

Each weekly show was to be dedicated to a specific governance topic relevant to local communities. A major aim of the show was to improve citizens’ understanding of that specific topic, particularly about any entitlements and the services to which they can have access. Prior to airing, the radio station was to conduct its own research and work with NGOs to provide valuable content on the topic, which is both comprehensible and relevant to the local community. Additionally, the station was to ascertain from service providers the specific entitlements that they have committed to provide citizens.

Gathering audience feedback

The objective of this component was to: (i) achieve great-er interactivity between the radio station and its audi-ence; (ii) gather evidence that provides NGOs/Members of Parliament with a clear basis on which to advocate for reform of policies or improvement in service delivery; and (iii) create greater awareness at the radio station about issues that affect and matter most to local citizens.

Each weekly show was to request feedback from listeners via SMS on the topic under discussion. The

audience was encouraged to submit direct questions/comments to the experts/duty bearers featured on the program. They could also be surveyed on their particular experience (e.g., they were asked to text in about whether they have ever received the entitlements under discussion). Polls on a specific subject were also run, with results revealed at the end of the show. The use of FrontlineSMS enabled the radio station to gather the text data in a quick and easy way so that it could easily gain a sense of audience perceptions and concerns. The data was to be regularly forwarded to

FIGURE 11. Using Radio and ICT to improve the flow of Information and feedback

BOX 6. WHAT IS FrontlineSMS?

FrontlineSMS is a free, open-source software used to distribute and collect information via text messages (SMS). The software can work without an Internet connection and with only a cell phone and computer.

By leveraging basic tools, including those in “last-mile” settings—computers and low-cost modems—FrontlineSMS enables instantaneous two-way communication to any mobile handset.It’s easy to implement and simple to operate.

Source: Wikipedia and FrontlineSMS.com.



42

civil society and government officials who expressed an interest in receiving it.

Follow-up

The objective of this component was to: (i) incentivize elected representatives to meaningfully engage with constituents and stand by their spoken commitments; (ii) incentivize service providers to improve service delivery in line with their commitments and commu-nity entitlements; and (iii) encourage communities to further engage with the radio station as a result of having seen previous follow-up efforts.

The dissemination of information and the gathering of audience feedback were all done with the aim of enabling communities to directly hold their service providers to account. The feedback was to translate into follow-up actions. Follow-up was crucial in maintaining an incentive for communities to provide feedback; unless they saw that the feedback is acted on, they would soon become disillusioned with the process.

In order to ensure follow-up, it was critical to take a number of actions:

• Invite service providers/government representa-tives to directly respond to texts during the show.

• Gather data on commitments made by govern-ment officials/service providers during the show. Distribute that data to an NGO mailing list so that they the representative can be encouraged to stand by their commitments.

• Make sure instances of follow-up or lack of follow-up were highlighted during later shows, thus ensuring that good performance was acknowl-edged and unfulfilled commitments noted.

The intention was that by publicly acknowledging good and bad follow-up efforts, service providers would be incentivized to be accountable to citizens and to uphold their commitments. For this to hap-pen, the show focused on seeking realistic reforms not beyond the provider’s current capability. There was an emphasis on collective and realistic solutions to guard against the show becoming a complaining session in which citizens make unreasonable demands of service providers and become disillusioned with the process.

World Bank Input

Input from the World Bank consisted of:

• Undertaking initial surveys in the selected loca-tions to enable a baseline on existing knowledge levels, ascertain priority topics for dissemina-tion, and identify possible obstacles to audience engagement.

• Organizing and financing collaborative meetings/consultations at the design stage between the radio stations, local Members of Parliament and civil society organizations (CSOs)/NGOs to develop the pilot and ensure “buy-in” from all the stakeholders.

• Organizing and financing collaborative meetings/consultations during implementation to ensure that the project is meeting its objectives.

• Financing and facilitating the collaborative devel-opment of model radio programs (or improvement of existing governance shows), which can then be tailored from week to week.

• Providing an expert to train the radio staff to run the shows, manage panels, deal with feedback, collate data, use FrontlineSMS, etc.

• Financing production of publicity materials to generate citizen awareness of the show.

• Funding the setup costs for FrontlineSMS and the running costs associated with the weekly program.

• Financing and facilitating all the research and impact evaluation around the project.

3. Evaluation MethodologyCitizen voice and accountability projects involve a wide and diverse group of actors who pursue goals with varying incentives and interests, creating a large web of formal and informal interactions that are dif-ficult to unravel and analyze.16 Most citizen voice and accountability intervention results tend to be diverse and not amenable to linear theories of change, so a flexible yet rigorous methodology is suited to analyze the findings.17 Outcome mapping was selected as the AtCR monitoring and evaluation tool because the

16 Tembo, F. 2012. Citizen Voice and State Accountability: Towards Theories of Change that Embrace Contextual Dynamics, pg. 1. Found at www.odi.org.uk. Accessed October 17, 2012.17 Ibid.



43

impacts and changes brought about by the project are nonlinear and unlikely to be realized within the project’s lifespan.

Outcome mapping enables program managers to not only understand an intervention’s results in terms of inputs, but also to analyze contributions made by other actors. The outcome mapping methodology is especially relevant because it accepts social change as nonlinear, complex, and long-term, all of which are common characteristics of the impact of commu-nication on reform projects. It focuses on monitoring three key areas—outcomes achieved in terms of the behavior of partners, program strategies, and the organizational aspects of the initiative.18 It shifts away from the focus on developmental impact and puts emphasis on the contributions programs have made to actors within their spheres of influence.

For this study, the outcome mapping methodology utilized mixed methods, including the measurement of outcome indicators during regular intervals through-out the pilot’s lifespan and surveys. The idea was to use the mapped outcomes as indicators pointing to whether the project has achieved its objectives or not. The team conducted an independent baseline survey that was repeated after project completion with the aim of triangulating both quantitative and qualitative data gathered by project teams. The AtCR project team developed a set of evaluation instruments to measure a set of process and outcome indicators and to capture the perspectives of the project’s boundary partners.

18 Sadie Watson and Juliet Pierce, Monitoring Policy Dialogue: Lessons from a Pilot Study, (DFID 2008) at www.oecd.org, accessed August 21, 2013.

Various instruments were developed to capture this data. These included: (i) a strategy journal for all project boundary partners; (ii) an outcome journal for all boundary partners; (iii) a performance journal for the project implementers; and (iv) qualitative and quantitative surveys with sample groups from each of the boundary partners.

Limitations

The evaluation has been shaped by a number of limitations which include the following.

• A limited number of people represented the non-treatment group during quantitative and qualitative assessments.

• There were limited opportunities to interview duty bearers due to their relocation from the locality, which was a result of the creation of new districts and reshuffles of public service officials.

• Interventions aimed at strengthening citizen voice involve usually complex power-driven relation-ships between citizens and duty bearers. Actual behavioral change can take place only in the long run. Given the short duration of the AtCR project, it has only contributed to the long-term goal of citizen empowerment.

• Sample sizes during quantitative and qualitative interviews were relatively small due to limited project funding. Thus, this evaluation is not con-clusive, but seeks to illustrate a of the realities on the ground.

• Due to limited information technology skills among some radio staff and technical faults with information and communication technology equipment, limited data was collected during the reporting phases because it was often missing or corrupted.

• It was impossible to observe the partner radio stations’ operations firsthand. Thus, to a large extent, the evaluation relied on self-reporting by the stations’ staff. Their data was triangulated by obtaining and contrasting accounts given to the evaluators by the radio station staff and by additional stakeholders.

• In most cases, due to language barriers, it was impossible for the Bank team to listen to the recorded shows.

BOX 7. OUTCOME MAPPING

Outcome Mapping is an innovative approach to project and program planning and monitoring and evaluation with a strong focus on participatory learning. The major innovation is the emphasis on the behavior change of key actors with whom the program has an influence, rather than focus-ing on changes within state that may or may not be attributed to the program.

Source: World Bank.



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4. Results and ImpactsThe main purpose of this section is to assess the proj-ect’s performance against its objective of empowering citizens to constructively call for improved governance and rural development while compelling duty bearers to respond to these calls. The findings and results can be used to determine whether the AtCR project made positive contributions to the citizens’ calls for improved governance. The emerging evidence of results and impact is reviewed for each objective. Examples of specific instances of short-term results gathered are also included.

4.1. Results for Objective 1: Empower citizens through information dissemination and constructive dialogue to hold duty bearers accountable for improved governance and rural development

Four indicators are used to measure the achievement of this objective: (i) levels of audience participation; (ii) quality and accessibility of information; (iii) qual-ity and accessibility of discussions with duty bearers; and (iv) instances and perceptions of citizens holding their elected representatives accountable. Each of these indicators is discussed in detail below.

(i) Levels of audience participation: Did listeners directly engage with the radio show?

Results show that listeners did directly engage with the radio show, although the numbers were lower than the Bank had anticipated. One issue that came out clearly in the study of monitoring documents

and the qualitative evaluation was that participation varied according to the topic discussed. An example is from Livingstone, where the AtCR project solicited an average of 15–20 text messages per show com-pared to 100 text messages in response to a show on homosexuality.

Figure 1219 below shows statistics obtained on levels of participation during the Bank’s quantitative sur-vey. The results show that more people have never interacted with the radio station at the endline when compared with the baseline. One important limiting factor to bear in mind is that the baseline took place during the election period when people are more politically engaged. The summary of the evaluation results showed that although people did engage directly with the AtCR show, the levels were often too low to be considered substantial.

(ii) Quality and accessibility of information: Did the awareness of target communities about rural development policies increase?

The potential for the AtCR to increase awareness among citizens of government policies related to rural development and public service delivery was extremely high in Livingstone and Mkushi. In Liv-ingstone, most people did have access to radio with

19 The source of the graphs in Figures 12–17 is a research company called IPSOS which conducted quantitative and qualitative baseline surveys for the AtCR project. In order to obtain consistent and reliable results, the Bank team outsourced feedback collection. The research expert’s data collec-tion was guided by the Bank program team who provided inputs to the research methodology and advised on the selection of the groups and/or communities to target for feedback.

Mosi O Tunya Listeners(Livingstone)

Radio Mkushi Listeners

Written a text message

Written a text messagePhoned-in to show

Phoned-in to show

Sent a letter Sent a letter

Been interviewed byradio station

Been interviewed byradio station

Given feedback via alistener group

Given feedback via alistener group

Never interacted withradio station

Never interacted withradio station

Benchmark Endline

35%16%

13%15%

4%4%

7%2%

2%1%

48%70%

17%18%

16%12%

8%8%

3%8%

2%2%

55%59%

Benchmark Endline

FIGURE 12. Q. Have you ever used any of the following to interact directly with the station?



45

over 50 percent saying that they listen to the radio a minimum of two to five days per week. In addition, 91 percent of respondents to the Bank’s survey said they had mobile technology. Thus, the AtCR utilized both mobile technology and radio to increase rural access to information. However, it is not clear whether the utilization of these hybrid technologies led to an increase of awareness among target communities on the content of policies related to rural development and public service delivery.

During qualitative interviews, citizens were positive about the radio show and many agreed that radio was one of their main sources of information. The program itself did not perform well in the quantitative evaluation with regard to increasing awareness among target audiences, as shown in Figures 13 and 14.

The fact that the baseline study was performed during the general election period has limited the Bank’s abil-ity to get a true representation of political knowledge

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Benchmark Endline Benchmark Endline

Treatment Non-Treatment

Improved a lot

Improved a little

Remained the same

Don’t know

5%

15%

51%

29%

2%

30%

40%

28%

5%8%

37%

49%

6%

41%

38%

16%

FIGURE 13. Livingstone, Q. In the past year, which statement applies best to you regarding your knowledge of these types of issues?

0% 1%10%

34%

55%

1%

23%

41%

35%

1%11%

49%

39%

1%

34%

50%

15%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%



Improved a lot

Improved a little

Remained the same

Don’t know

FIGURE 14. Mkushi, Q. In the past year, which statement applies best to you regarding your knowledge of these types of issues?



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and engagement outside those periods to compare to the endline. Although the qualitative interviews sup-port the theory that the AtCR may have contributed to increasing awareness in some cases, it cannot be credited as the only contributor. The AtCR was one of the factors that played a role in increasing citizen awareness of rural development policy because it was not the only governance show running at the time in Livingstone and Mkushi.

The results showed that some perceptions of the quality and accessibility of information were low. CSO respondents to a qualitative survey said they noticed gaps or inaccuracies in information disseminated by the radio station, while other respondents said that, overall, the information was of good quality. The Bank’s evaluation of data gathered through monitoring the project did show gaps and inaccuracies of infor-mation in most shows in Livingstone and Mkushi. This finding supported the perceptions of the CSOs who, on average, have a higher capacity to determine the quality of information compared to the average person in the target communities.

With regard to accessibility of information, the results were mixed. The positive aspects were the fact that the AtCR project utilized community radio as a con-duit to disseminate information. As one of the most widely used sources of information, radio was one of the best means to reach a large number of people. The negative perceptions and responses with regard to accessibility of information related to the target community’s ability to understand the disseminated information and contribute by SMS. Some people were only able to participate at the end of the show after all information had been discussed. This was because they were unable to think of questions until after the information was delivered. In addition, low literacy levels or the complexity of a topic implied that there were limitations to giving feedback only by SMS; this was perceived as a weakness of the project.

(iii) Quality and accessibility of discussion with duty bearers: Did citizens directly engage with duty bearers in the AtCR program?

The principles of the AtCR include collective solution finding, pragmatism, follow-up, ethics, and balance. A strategy to ensure the project abided by these prin-ciples was to ensure that duty bearers appeared on the show to directly engage with citizen feedback. The

AtCR project did provide a platform for citizens to engage with duty bearers in Livingstone and Mkushi. Although engagement with politicians did take place, the listeners had mixed perceptions about the quality and accessibility of discussions between themselves and duty bearers.

The SMS-only mode of participation inhibited the ability of the most vulnerable groups to directly engage with duty bearers on the show because they either lacked the capacity or means to use SMS. In addition, duty bearers did not appear to respond to citizen concerns and feedback during most shows. This inhibited the projects’ ability to maximize the possibilities for collective solutions. The consequence of low incidence of duty bearers appearing on the show was that citizens did not frequently engage directly with duty bearers. The reasons behind why duty bear-ers may not have appeared on a large proportion of shows are discussed in the Lessons Learned section.

(iv) Instances and perceptions of citizens holding their elected representatives accountable: Were there any improvements to service delivery as a result of the show and do citizens feel better able to hold their duty bearers to account?

There is anecdotal evidence of incidents where the AtCR program has had a positive impact on service provision in Livingstone and Mkushi. One of the most frequently mentioned examples by listeners in Livingstone was regarding garbage collection by the Livingstone City Council. Complaints about the frequency of garbage collection around Livingstone were aired and reported on the AtCR program. The council addressed these concerns a few days later. Interestingly, in this case there was no direct interac-tion between citizens and the council. Instead it came as a result of council officers listening to the show while they worked. The radio station staff hinted

“After they started selling stands [at the new market], there were rumors there was corruption going on. We called the people, we called the finance committee to come on radio. They were willing to come and they featured on the program and they were able to clear out their case.”

—Program Manager, Livingstone



47

that some members of the council were participating anonymously through phone calls and SMS to protect their identities due to a culture of fear that can be found in some public service offices.

There are instances in Mkushi where citizen interac-tion with the duty bearer on the radio show has led to improvements in service delivery. One example cited by respondents to the Bank’s survey concerned roads and how after a show discussing the poor roads in the area, the state responded by making improvements. Another example was a show on which citizens said the area did not have sufficient depots for farmers to sell their produce through the Farmer Input Support Program, which is a government program that sup-plies subsidized farming inputs for farmers in Zambia. The issue was resolved after the interaction with the duty bearer on the show.

Statistical data shows conflicting results with regard to whether citizens felt more able to hold their duty bearers to account. Although qualitative figures showed that in both treatment and nontreatment groups, more people had done something to address service delivery issues, this cannot be directly tied to the AtCR program. There were competing shows on both radio stations at the same time, and data on the method of participation in addressing governance issues was not isolated to radio and SMS technology. The AtCR did, however, enable some citizens to hold duty bearers accountable by providing a platform for citizen engagement.

4.2. Results for Objective 2: Compel duty bearers to respond to citizen demands for improved governance

Three indicators are used to measure the achievement of this objective: (i) levels of duty bearer participa-

tion in the show; (ii) reports by radio stations to civil society for advocacy purposes; and (iii) incidences of activities undertaken by public officials that utilized data obtained from the show. There is evidence of partial success for one of the three indicators, while the project did not fare well against the remaining two indicators.

(i) Levels of duty bearer participation in the show: Did duty bearers regularly appear on the show?

The results regarding the performance of the AtCR against this objective varied according to geographical location. Mkushi performed exceptionally well under this component, with duty bearers appearing in more than 70 percent of the shows. This is in contrast to Livingstone, where duty bearers appeared on fewer than 20 percent of the shows. The Lessons Learned section will expand on why results were varied and also what may have caused such low levels of duty bearer appearance in Livingstone.

(ii) Reports by radio stations to civil society for advocacy purposes: Did the radio station gather data from shows and send the reports to civil society organizations?

The project did not perform well against this indica-tor in Livingstone and Mkushi. Data reports were occasionally sent out in both locations, but in most of those cases NGOs requested the data. On a broader level, however, in Mkushi and Livingstone, most NGOs reported they received no data reports from the station and radio staff confirmed this. This was further confirmed by the fact the stations did not have a mailing list for duty bearing stakeholders to provide information or feedback from citizens. Livingstone initially sent out data reports, but stopped doing so after temporarily losing Internet connectivity at the station.

A review of the data report showed that the data was often unreliable and statistically irrelevant. Often, the FrontlineSMS program data was scrambled due to viruses in the computers used by radio stations, or the forms were not completed to a satisfactory level by the station. The German development aid organization Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-menarbeit, provided some mentorship to Radio Mosi-O-Tunya in the first quarter of the project to improve

“. . . even if the government people never came . . . they took note of what was going on as they listened in their offices . . . It has brought change because if we are talking about sanitation in Livingstone [and they are not on the show, definitely they will know we are talking about the council and then the following day you will see the council trucks collecting garbage around.”

—Radio Presenter, Livingstone



48

the quality of the data reports. Although there was an improvement in the quality of forms, this was short-lived because the low participation levels and computer viruses meant data was often not useable for advocacy purposes.

(iii) Incidences of activities undertaken by public officials that utilized data obtained from the show: Did duty bearers receive actionable data reports and utilize them?

The results for this indicator are similar to the previous one in that government officials reported that they received no data reports from the station. Radio sta-tion staff confirmed this during qualitative interviews in the first quarter of the project and during the final evaluation period. As with the previous indicator, this was confirmed by the fact the stations did not have a mailing list for duty bearing stakeholders.

The divergence in results between this indicator and the previous one comes from the fact that, although no data reports were sent out, there were instances where government officials did respond to feedback from the AtCR using alternative channels. For example, Livingstone reported that this was the case with the local council. According to staff at Radio Mosi-O-Tunya, council officials obtained AtCR data by listening to the show as opposed to receiving data reports. The duty bearers and radio station staff in Mkushi also confirmed that the poor Internet connectivity in the area meant the station transmitted some feedback to government officials by word of mouth. This was evident during the first quarter evaluation, which noted the geographical proximity between the radio station and police station and the informal relation-ships between those who utilized word of mouth as the main form of communication.

4.3. Results for Objective 3: Increase the capacity of the radio stations to act as a mechanism by which citizens can hold their elected representative and duty bearers accountable

Two indicators are used to measure the achievement of this objective: (i) linkages between the media and local/central NGOs; and (ii) utilization of ICTs to facilitate discussion between duty bearers and citizens, especially vulnerable groups.

(i) Linkages between the media and local/central NGOs: Did the radio station consult CSOs with the aim of informing the program and did it disseminate data reports to CSOs on a weekly basis?

Livingstone performed fairly well against this indi-cator, although there is room for improvement. The radio station relied heavily on NGOs for program content and capacity building. With regard to content building, the radio stations had CSOs as one of their main sources of information, as was confirmed by some CSOs in the area. In addition, CSOs, including independent citizens, represented the majority of the guests appearing and directly engaging with citizens on the radio. There was room for improvement on the linkages between Radio Mosi-O-Tunya and local and national CSOs. The radio station performed poorly in sending weekly data reports to CSOs. This prevented it from building deep and meaningful relationships with CSOs that could have resulted from sharing reliable and actionable data.

Another area where improvement could be made in the Livingstone’s case was to have a wider outreach strategy for CSOs. Only a limited number of CSOs contributed to the shows despite the fact that there was a larger pool of CSOs and willingness from them to engage. In the quarterly review, interviews with CSO representatives who attended launch meetings revealed that some CSOs were unaware that the show had begun, and they had not been invited to participate despite registering their interest. Further-more, CSOs linked to the community radio revealed that the community radio staff were not responsive to their needs for information, as was the case with one CSO’s repeated requests for data reports.

To improve project performance against this indicator, links between the radio station and CSOs as sources

“Instead of a panel of three, at times we would end up with one person, because if it is land issues . . . the council person wouldn’t have come, the Ministry of Lands person wouldn’t come. So all you will have is maybe headmen or whatever from the village and you would end up with an incomplete panel.”

—Former Panelist, Livingstone



49

of information needed to be strengthened by greater outreach and the transfer of actionable data between the radio station and CSOs. There were positive ele-ments that emerged from the evaluation with regard to CSOs with which the station engaged. CSOs linked to Radio Mosi-O-Tunya reported that these links supplemented their outreach work. Specifically, the Non-Governmental Organizations’ Coordinating Com-mittee was able to rapidly respond to feedback arising from communities in areas that were hard to reach. Radio and mobile phone technology allowed for the organization to cover a broad area in its information dissemination and engage with citizen feedback.

In Mkushi, the project performed very well against this indicator when compared with Livingstone. Mkushi radio had a smaller number of CSOs in the locality and thus the outreach task was smaller. The CSOs interviewed during the evaluation, much like the CSOs in Livingstone, felt the AtCR programs supplemented their organization’s work. There were, however, limitations in the performance against this indicator. CSOs in Mkushi felt the links could be deepened by the project strategy. One way of doing that would be to increase the gratuity for NGOs, enabling them to travel farther. Mkushi is a large area with poor transport links and many said that the allocated funds did not adequately cover these costs and that their organizations did not allocate funding toward such costs.

In addition, although outreach was performed, the radio station did not give the CSOs adequate notice of their appearances. It was observed during monitoring phases that, contrary to the provided guidance, the radio station often did not prepare for the show until a few days before it aired. Qualitative interviews with CSO representatives also revealed that many of them felt the radio station did not allow them enough time to prepare, especially because most of them needed clearance from headquarter offices in Lusaka. Better planning is needed on the part of the station to ensure these linkages are fully utilized.

(ii) Utilization of ICTs to facilitate discussion between duty bearers and citizens, especially vulnerable groups: Did the station use FrontlineSMS to solicit feedback from listeners, especially vulnerable groups?

The project yielded mixed results against this indica-tor for multiple reasons, which include high expec-tations in project design on the part of the World Bank, technical and infrastructure problems in the localities, and low levels of ICT capacity and utiliza-tion in both localities.

As shown in Figure 15, both Mkushi and Livingstone residents had high levels of utilization of ICTs, specifi-cally mobile phones and radio, and thus the project strategy incorporated FrontlineSMS as a tool for

Treatment

Livingstone

91%

62%

79%

61%

83%

41%

53%

40%

80%

68%

77%

82%

8%

3%

32%

24%

Own a Phone

Own a RadioShare a Radio

Access to Phone of Friend/Family

Livingstone MkushiMkushi

Non-Treatment

Treatment

Livingstone Livingstone MkushiMkushi

Non-Treatment

FIGURE 15. Phone and radio ownership in Mkushi and Livingstone



50

the radio station staff to process SMS data gathered from citizens. The objective was to better enable the dissemination of information as well as to create a platform for citizens and duty bearers to interact.

Staff at both radio stations utilized the FrontlineSMS technology on most of their shows to solicit and gather feedback from listeners. The staff reported that they enjoyed using the technology, although they did face difficulties understanding the system in the beginning. The general perception among staff at both radio stations was that FrontlineSMS was a useful tool that added value to their work, enabling them to organize contacts and messages according to topics discussed.

The cost of running FrontlineSMS was relatively low. The program had sustainable features and staff at both radio stations used it on additional program-ming, such as chat and music request shows. Radio Mkushi reported that FrontlineSMS allowed for a level of anonymity not granted by oral communication, which was positive for groups that were vulnerable or during shows that covered sensitive issues such as gender-based violence. Radio station staff reported few incidents of intimidation when people aired negative feedback during the election period. SMS provided audiences with the comfort that their voices would not be heard on air and the radio station would not pass on their contact information to duty bearers. The Victims Support Unit of the police reported that FrontlineSMS helped them with enforcing the Anti-Gender Based Violence Act 2011 by encouraging third-party anonymous reporting through this technology.

Despite the positive results in both districts on the utilization of FrontlineSMS technology, staff in both localities faced technical and infrastructure problems. Internet connections and phone signals were unstable in both regions, with Mkushi suffering worse than Living-stone. Mkushi is less developed than Livingstone—the

tourist capital of Zambia—and thus the infrastructure in Mkushi is not as advanced as that in Livingstone. In addition, Mkushi’s geographical location meant high winds affected phone and Internet signals. The effect of these interferences was to render the FrontlineSMS system ineffective by delaying text messages from listeners or not transmitting them at all. Livingstone also suffered problems in this regard. The studio’s soundproofing obstructed the phone signal. The sta-tion innovatively adapted the system to include using social media and the Internet to transmit feedback on FrontlineSMS from technicians outside the studio and the show’s presenter inside.

“Sometimes the Internet reception was poor . . . we never used to have access to Internet even phones because depending on the weather here, it affects the phone lines.”

—Station Manager, Radio Mkushi

The frequent power cuts faced by both radio stations offered the Bank lessons on the limitations of ICTs in localities with weak infrastructure. Shows were often rescheduled or cancelled. Radio stations said they did not have enough funds to cover the cost of powering the generator, which was not included in the project design with the understanding that the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) in Zambia provided the funding to cover such costs.

The limited ICT capacity of staff in Mkushi and Liv-ingstone inhibited the use of FrontlineSMS among AtCR staff. Although six people were trained in both locations before project implementation, only one staff member from Livingstone and two from Mkushi were conversant with FrontlineSMS. During qualita-tive interviews conducted in the first quarter of the project’s lifespan, radio staff said they did not try to get a grip on the system because they could rely on the presenters and technicians for assistance. The reasoning for this was that most staff had very basic or no computer skills, and using FrontlineSMS proved challenging. The difficulties faced by Livingstone with regard to soundproofing meant that many staff were discouraged from using FrontlineSMS. Nonetheless, the Bank conducted a second training after the first quarter and capacity levels did improve in both loca-tions as demonstrated by the data reports. More staff in both locations, including those with no computer

“For me it was a great experience . . . it was helping me [by] organizing contacts. It’s a good software. You can select if you want to talk about agriculture, you select agriculture where the SMSs will just come for agriculture issues.”

—Technician, Radio Mosi-O-Tunya



51

skills, were now able to manage the basic functions of FrontlineSMS.

5. Lessons LearnedThis section presents lessons learned in two main areas: (i) program design and strategy; and (ii) radio commitment and capacity.

5.1. Program Design and Strategy

Length of each AtCR radio show

Listeners felt that the one-hour slot for the radio show was too short. Respondents to the Bank’s survey felt the show could have maximized its informa-tion dissemination potential by being split into two one-hour segments, with the first hour dedicated to information dissemination and the second to audi-ence participation.

Utilization of local languages

The project design allowed the radio stations flexibility in selecting the language to be used when presenting the AtCR program. Most community radio stations in the country broadcast in the majority language of the locality. The AtCR program was aired in English and the majority language of each locality. This strategy had some limitations that impacted levels of participation, especially in Livingstone. A city located in Southern Province, Livingstone has a rich mix of

languages and dialects. The rural populations speak Tonga or Lozi with most speaking some Bemba or Nyanja.

It was difficult to find a universally understood lan-guage that could be used to relay technical and complex messages, especially among the rural, less literate groups and city-based government officials. For example, Livingstone switched between Tonga (the most widely spoken language in the region) and English. They used English when guests were not Tonga speakers, which marginalized the Tonga speakers. Similarly, Livingstone has many migrants from other parts of Zambia who felt marginalized when Tonga was used. This was also the case for those who had a better command of Lozi than Tonga.

Method of participation

The AtCR project was designed to solely use SMS as a method of audience participation. However, the key lesson learned with regard to modes of participation was that SMS is not the best platform for interacting with people, especially on sensitive issues such as governance and rural development. The evaluation showed that only using SMS limited the ability of groups to provide feedback or interact with the show.

This issue was more evident in Mkushi where literacy levels are at less than 40 percent (see Figure 16). It is worth noting that it was not just literacy that made

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


Somewhat likely

Not very likely

Very likely

Not at all likely

Don’t know

Mosi O Tunya Listeners(Livingstone)

Radio Mkushi Listeners

16%

8%

38%

6%

32%

2%12%

27%

16%

43%

0%

25%

26%

16%

33%

2%

29%

16%

20%

32%

FIGURE 16. Q. What likelihood is there that you would use text to engage in such a program?



52

listeners feel that a system using SMS alone was far from adequate. The complex nature of governance and development issues meant that it was hard for people to capture their points of view in SMS format. This format does not allow for a continuous discussion with the duty bearer or citizen representative on the show. One could send multiple SMSs, but this would disrupt the flow of conversation. Furthermore, many listeners wanted to have a call-in option, because SMS was inaccessible for some, especially the most vulnerable groups.

Community pressure around the limited ability to express feedback was so high that both radio stations had to act quickly to remedy the situation, and they began accepting phone calls. Radio Mosi-O-Tunya did so by the end of the first quarter and Radio Mkushi by the second quarter. Although these changes were introduced and citizens began to interact via voice calls, the impact on levels of participation remained largely the same, especially because radio stations did not report the number of phone calls received. Additionally, it is impossible to track whether this impacted levels of participation, as the number of people who could talk during the one-hour time slot was limited. However, there was clear evidence from qualitative interviews that citizens were requesting phone-in to be one of the methods of participation.

Marketing

Although the show attracted viewers, feedback sug-gests that the publicity for the show was not robust. In Livingstone, an area with competing local stations, for example, some groups did not know that the AtCR program had begun. Sometimes, listeners did not know what time the show was being aired, despite the fact that in the first quarter alone 83 percent of the shows were regularly transmitted, with the station maintaining the same day and time slot for the show.

The stations viewed the allowance stipulated by the Bank to market the show as a factor limiting audience participation. With a marketing budget of K200 (around US$33), the radio stations were of the view that there was very little they could have done to better market the show. The station disseminated information in the form of leaflets and posters. The K200 was allocated to the fuel needed for dissemination across the target area. The strategy of delivering leaflets to target com-munities was not ideal because it excluded the most

vulnerable groups, especially the illiterate. There was some publicity a week before the program was imple-mented, which consisted of a public address machine and drive around Livingstone. There was very little outreach to listener groups or grassroots organizations, and the stations did not build networks with a wide base of NGOs, as was noted from a review conducted in the first quarter of the project in Livingstone. This evaluation has taught the Bank that a thorough large-scale marketing campaign was needed on a sustained basis for the AtCR to compete with similar programs and get the communities’ attention.

5.2. Radio Commitment and Capacity

Program Expectations

The Bank’s expectations of the implementing partners were too high. The needs and capacity analysis of the radio station staff was too broad and did not fully consider the capacity of stations to deliver the pro-gram. For example, the Bank was not fully financially equipped to meet the implementers’ training needs. The show required staff to utilize new technology, and to conduct more frequent reporting as well as new and deeper levels of research.

The staff at Radio Mkushi said the preparation stage was taxing and time consuming with few incentives. They felt that the allowances available to cover this type of research were inadequate, especially with regard to funds for travel to remote areas. There were misunder-standings surrounding some payments, which affected the will and ability to conduct the required research. Radio Mkushi staff also felt they were extremely lim-ited in their ability to consult with local groups due to the low numbers of civil society groups in the area. Furthermore, because of problems with signals and electricity, Radio Mkushi had limited opportunities to conduct broad research using the Internet. The imple-menters faced troubles comprehending and researching the content, including translating it into language that was easier to understand.

“We only had difficulties with some mem-bers of staff because the training was short. Another training was offered for the second time. At least they were able to do one or two things on their own.”

—Station Manager, Radio Mkushi



53

The design of the AtCR project has, to some extent, contributed to the low levels of duty bearer appear-ance on the AtCR. However, the radio station is also partly responsible for this. The project design incor-porated a two-week preparation period for the radio program, aimed at allowing duty bearers appropriate time to seek clearance from the central offices. The radio stations did not perform well in this regard and notice to duty bearers was often not given on time. Many duty bearers stated that the radio stations in both Mkushi and Livingstone often only allowed less than a week’s notice for their appearance. This has been confirmed by the review of reporting documents from the stations that shows the staff did not follow the implementation manual.

It emerged during the quarterly review that there was a need to reinforce the implementers’ grasp of the concept, journalistic skills, and technological capac-ity. Although detailed training needs were identified after the first quarter, the Bank was only able to fully respond to the needs of Radio Mosi-O-Tunya. Mosi-O-Tunya received full training on all aspects and there was an improvement in the use of SMS technology, the content of shows, and the understanding of the concept. Mkushi, however, only received training on the use of FrontlineSMS, which yielded positive results in that computer illiterate staff could now use the program’s basic functions.

Balance of power between community media and the state

The Bank may have overestimated the power of com-munity radios to compel duty bearers to appear on shows. In Kasama, for instance, political interference was reported to be rife. This led to the temporary closure of the station and permanent suspension of the AtCR project after the first quarter of implementa-tion. This implied that the balance of power between those who wanted change and those opposed to it was not in the station’s favor. The government controls community radio stations’ licenses and broadcast-ing abilities, thus the stations are always potentially subject to political pressure. All radio stations have, at some point, sought assistance from the Bank to compel duty bearers to appear on their show. The Bank’s dependency on radio stations as the interlocu-tors did not take into account their capacity to act as such with or without minimal political pressure and interference.

Marketing

The issue of marketing extends beyond the program strategy to the capacity of the radio station staff. It was noted that during the first two quarters, very few adver-tisements featuring the AtCR were aimed at listeners, thus decreasing accessibility for local citizens. During some of the focus group discussions, participants said that although they had listened to the show, it was by pure chance because they were unaware of when it was aired or what topics were being covered. This is a valid concern supported by a review of reporting documents. By not preparing for shows as per the guidelines in the implementation manual, which required two weeks of preparation, stations were unable to inform the public of the topics to be discussed in the next show during AtCR programs.

Context

The political economy

Mkushi and Kasama performed better than Livingstone with regard to duty bearer appearance on shows. This did not automatically translate into good quality discussions between citizens and duty bearers since the localities’ political economy affected duty bearer appearances and the depth of discussion during the programs. The program strategy was designed with consideration of the political economy at the time of the incumbent government. During the implemen-tation of the project, elections had taken place, the government had changed, and with it the political landscape of the localities. Although the program strategy sought buy-in from government stakeholders during the design phases at the time of implementa-tion, these stakeholders no longer held these posi-tions or had moved from the area. Thus, the buy-in during the program implementation phase was much lower than it was at design, adversely affecting the willingness of duty bearers to appear on the show.

A culture of fear and inaction was reported to have gripped civil servants during the change of govern-ment, thus participants for such shows were not easy to find. Even when the radio station gave duty bearers notice to appear, they sometimes cancelled at the last minute or refused to appear on the show for fear of not having the authority to answer sensitive questions. Duty bearers in all three localities needed to seek clearance from authorities in Lusaka. Duty bearers said they would be more likely to appear on



54

the show if they knew the exact questions that would be asked of them. This was a difficult request to sat-isfy due to the nature of the show, which included a live community participation forum. Although radio station staff could give an overview of the issues to be addressed and typical questions for duty bearers to expect, they could not predict the exact questions that would be asked by audiences. Outcome mapping exercises and feedback from duty bearers showed that they were more likely to appear on shows they deemed less political, such as gender-based violence, dog management, and disease prevention.

Reasons related to survey limitations may have affected the results with regard to whether people felt they had learned more since the start of the show. The baseline was conducted during the election period so people were more politically engaged than normal. The results could have been affected by this heightened political activity. The end line survey, on the other hand, took place during a period of low political activity. The Bank’s qualitative survey provides evidence of this reduced political activity in the post-election period. Communities noted that CSOs and NGOs had reduced their outreach activities after the elections. One of the radio stations veri-fied this information, saying it received calls from community members who were unhappy with the reduced outreach by civil society in the post-election period. This prompted the radio station to undertake sensitization tours with the aim of reigniting some of the flailing radio listener clubs.

Social dynamics

According to CSOs in Livingstone, show timings were a problem and a key factor that development

practitioners should consider when working on com-munication for projects. Many CSOs working closely with women in Livingstone felt that airing the show in the evening can sometimes be a disadvantage to women. Women whose husbands have priority using radios or who may not have access to radios will generally find it difficult to leave home in order to listen to the show or join a listening group during an hour most wives are expected to be preparing meals for their family.

Thus, media practitioners need to fully understand their target audience before selecting time slots for airing radio shows. In Mkushi, many people preferred the show to air during the day. Being a largely agri-cultural community, many people listen to the radio while farming during the day. Radios are also used in group settings during this period and respondents to the focus group discussions welcomed earlier transmission times. A lesson for the Bank is that Zambia is not homogenous when it comes to peak times or preferred times for radio shows because of the disparities between different areas.

Another important factor to consider is that citizens are accustomed to reporting service issues not on radio, but through discussions with community, religious, and traditional leaders. Thus, the expectation that the AtCR project would change citizens’ behavior by having them rely on radio as their main source of information can only be met in the long term. Citizen voice and action interventions concern a change that involves complex power-driven relationships between citizens and duty bearers. Thus, after only one year, the AtCR project can only be expected to contribute to broad goals, such as changes in behavior.

Infrastructure

Radio and phone capabilities, including power sup-ply, are important aspects to consider in the design of participatory programs such as the AtCR. Twenty-two percent of AtCR programs in Livingstone and a much higher figure in Mkushi were affected by radio/phone signal problems as well as power out-ages. Power outages, for example, meant the show moved from regular time slots in order to air after the disruption, thus sometimes losing audiences. In addition, mobile phone signal was problematic in Livingstone and Mkushi, thus inhibiting the ability of people to participate and provide feedback or ask further questions. The stations were supposed to have

“[S]ome of the questions that people may raise, they could be questions that could be beyond me, and if I have clearance of my boss and sometimes if my boss knows the topic for presentation, she will even kind of know what kind of questions will be raised and she will advise on how I should respond [to] those things that are not supposed to be answered at my level. I will need to know where I would refer them to.”

— Community Development Officer, Mkushi



55

provisions from various donors, such as MISA Zam-bia, to ensure they could reduce the burden of power cuts through the use of generators. It is unknown to the Bank how these provisions work, but in many cases, especially in Mkushi, the station cited lack of resources as a reason why the generators were not up and running during power outages. The issue of power outages was especially prevalent in Mkushi.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations6.1. Conclusions

Radio is seen as an effective way to address governance and service delivery issues in both localities Mkushi and Livingstone. Quantitative surveys showed an increase in the number of people who felt radio was a method by which citizens could address service delivery problems. Before the implementation of the AtCR, a baseline study revealed that 28 percent of Mkushi perceived radio as a means by which they could improve service delivery. This figure increased at the endline by 8 percent to 36 percent of respondents to the survey. Even more positive results emerged from Livingstone with 64 percent at the baseline perceiving radio as a means by which they could improve service delivery and an increase of 28 percent at the endline.

Evaluation results showed that, although there were a number of instances where the show in both Mkushi and Livingstone districts can be said to have had a

positive impact on service provision, these instances were anecdotal, and the public was still not confident about their ability to elicit change through interactions with duty bearers.

As a result, the main conclusions that can be drawn from reviewing the use of hybrid technologies to strengthen citizen voice and interaction with duty bearers and eventually bring about improvements in governance, are as follows.

1. There is a profound need for a thorough capac-ity and needs assessment for citizens, including CSOs, duty bearers, and radio station staff.

2. Monitoring and reporting during the project cycle is important for project accountability, management, and development. However, the expectations of the radio station staff on the part of donors need to be realistic. Citizen voice and accountability interventions working with

Livingstone Mkushi

Discuss with community, religious, or traditional leaders

Joined others in the community to find a solution

Make direct complaint to local service provider(either in person or letter)

Make a direct complaint to local government officials (either in person or letter)

Text or call into the radio station

Write a letter to a newspaper


38%47%

32%15%

25%32%

16%6%

13%12%

6%15%

46%46%

10%0%

15%20%

8%9%

2%3%

13%

13 %9%

Other 2%0%

Done nothing to address the problems they see 7%3%

0%3%

4%14%

FIGURE 17. Q. How have you chosen to address the service delivery problems you see?

“When you discuss a certain issue, that issue won’t be implemented by the service provid-ers, especially when it comes to the govern-ment departments, those people working under government because what they do most of them don’t have authority. So each time you discuss certain things implementation used to be a problem because they have to get authorization from the high authority.”

—Radio Mkushi station staff



56

low-capacity radio stations need close support, management and even financial resourcing. More regular face-to-face contact, support, and encour-agement might help all to perform better.

3. Donors should take into better consideration the political environment in which their initiatives operate. The AtCR project was affected by political interference, which led to the closure of the AtCR intervention with Radio Mano in Kasama as well as the suspension of Radio Mkushi in 2013.

4. Change is more likely to take place in para-statal entities such as utility companies due to the com-mercial pressures they face when compared to strictly state-operated services.

5. Change was more likely to take place when senior officials such as chief executive officers, minis-ters, and Members of Parliament take part in the show because they have more decision-making powers, especially in a climate of political fear felt by civil servants.

6. Change can also take place when duty bearers do not physically appear on the show. Duty bearers in rural areas rely on the radio as a source of information and listen to it as they work.

7. There needs to be willingness on the part of the relevant duty bearer to address the problems. This was the case with the victims support unit in Mkushi and the council in Livingstone, which had a pre-existing willingness to address service delivery issues in Livingstone as part of the preparations for the United Nations World Tour-ism Conference.

8. Currently, Zambia is a largely federal state, thus duty bearers working away from head offices have very little decision-making powers. This situation may change as the Zambian government begins to decentralize its operations.

6.2. Recommendations

1. Donors need to consider working with the state to create an enabling environment for community radio stations to demand more from government as well as to shift the power balance through media policy. Citizen voice and accountability projects involve complex power-driven relation-

ships between citizens and duty bearers. There is often a struggle for power between those who want change and those who do not. In most cases, community radios are weaker than the state and sometimes depend on the state for their survival.

2. Levels of radio station staff performance could be improved with more frequent support visits, especially during the early months of the project. The aim of these visits would be to establish and observe the implementation routine and decide how it can be better suited to the station’s exist-ing practices. These early visits could be used to handle the donor/implementer expectations by learning how the implementers are handling the project, with the aim of providing better support by understanding their strengths.

3. Levels of station performance could be improved through tighter project management, at least in the early months of a project. This will help manage expectations, establish routines, and ensure that the partners adhere to the agreed memorandums of understanding.

4. Donors should allow for flexible project designs in order to be able to adapt to the local realities of low capacity in community radio stations. For instance, MISA supports stations through funds aimed at supporting operational costs such as backup systems for use during power cuts. However, these funds are sometimes delayed or reallocated, and the resources that a station is stipulated to have on paper do not always trans-late into the available in reality. Sometimes, this makes it impossible for stations to ensure that enough staff and resources are available to fully implement the project.

5. Frequent political economy assessments are vital to enable implementers and donors to understand what strategies work best for ensuring increased dialogue and accountability from duty bearers. The project was designed with a political economy assessment in mind, but the government changed after the elections, as did the political economy in which the project existed. By conducting regular political economy studies, the program strategy can be altered according to the context, and this is especially relevant for long-term projects.


mainstreaming governance in country programs: insights from the governance partnership facility in...

Government & Nonprofit