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Malicious Code as Malicious Code as Weapon Weapon

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Page 1: Malicious Code as Weapon Malicious Code as Weapon

Malicious Code as WeaponMalicious Code as Weapon

Page 2: Malicious Code as Weapon Malicious Code as Weapon

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ReadingReadingRequired:

– Government-built malware and cyber weapons will run out of control, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/22677/malware/government-built-malware-cyber-weapons-will-run-control.html

Recommended: – Ukrainian computer systems attacked by sophisticated malware with

"Russian roots,” Homeland Security News Wire, March 10, 2014, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140310-ukrainian-computer-systems-attacked-by-sophisticated-malware-with-russian-roots

– NSA planted sleeper malware in 50,000 computer networks, Homeland Security News Wire, Dec. 11, 2013, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131211-nsa-planted-sleeper-malware-in-50-000-computer-networks

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Information Warfare OffenseInformation Warfare Offense

Which of these offensive IW operations are impacted by malware?

– Open sources– Psyops and perception management– Seizing the signals– Computer break-ins and hacking– Masquerade

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Aim of MalwareAim of Malware

Multiple possibilities:– Unauthorized access– Unauthorized modification– Unavailability of resource for authorized users– False authorization– Fake non-repudiation

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State-level ActivitiesState-level Activities

Disruption of the opponent’s services– All aspects of malware aims

Information gathering– Unauthorized disclosure and false authentication

Perception management– Data leakage, false information, psychological

effects

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Cyber WarfareCyber Warfare

“Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption”

R.A. Clarke, Cyber War

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High-Valued TargetsHigh-Valued Targets

National Defense componentsSupporting industryCritical infrastructure

Exploitation: individual system vulnerability + connectivity

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Societal ImpactSocietal Impact

Safety of citizens Stability of government

COL Thomas Goss, chief of the command’s Strategic Initiatives Group:“While technology plays an important role in the cyberspace domain, it is not technology that will win on the 21st century’s cyber battlefields […] Time after time, in operations and in exercises, it is the people that will make the difference.”

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USA Cyber CapabilitiesUSA Cyber Capabilities

2009: President Obama– Declared America’s digital infrastructure to be a

“strategic national asset”

2010:  establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)– defending American military networks – conduct full spectrum military cyberspace

operations

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Major PlayersMajor Players

At least 140 countries are developing cyber weapons– USA– Russian Federation– People’s Republic of China– Others: Germany, India, Iran, South Korea,

UK, etc.

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What is a Cyber Weapon?What is a Cyber Weapon?

There is no formal and legal definition DoD The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: no

definition for cyber weapon Nonlethal weapon: “A weapon that is explicitly designed and

primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.” Also called NLW.Source: JP 3-28

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Cyber WeaponCyber Weapon Stefano Mele, Italian Lawyer:

“A cyber weapon is [an] appliance, device or any set of computer instructions designed to unlawfully damage a computer or telecommunications system having the nature of critical infrastructure, its information, data or programs contained therein or pertaining there to, or to facilitate the interruption, total or partial, or alteration of its operation.”

Other definition: “An appliance, device or any set of computer instructions designed to offend the person through cyberspace.”

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Impact of No DefinitionImpact of No Definition

Impossible to distinguish a cyber weapon and its proper use

Impossible to evaluate the legal and political responsibility of the aggressor and the real level of threat

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Development of Cyber Development of Cyber WeaponWeapon

Cost effectiveOrigin of the attack not obviousEasy to hide the developmentComplements traditional military strikes:

– Destroy enemy defense infrastructures– Probe the technological capabilities of the

enemy

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IW Attacks against USAIW Attacks against USA1. Titan Rain (2003-on): form China

– Target: US military intel– Sensitive military networks (Lockheed Martin and

Sandia) infiltrated by hackers

2. Moonlight Maze (1998-2000): from Russia– Target: Military maps and schematics, U.S. troop

configurations– Hacked computers at Pentagon, NASA, the

Department of Energy and even from universities and research labs

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IW Attacks against USAIW Attacks against USA

3. China's "750,000 American zombies“ (2007)– Target: U.S. computer networks, all levels

4. "The Most Serious Breach“ (2007) from ?– Target: U.S. military computer network– A corrupt flash drive. Inserted into a military

laptop

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IW Attacks against RussiaIW Attacks against Russia

1. The Original Logic Bomb (1982): From USA– Target: Siberian gas pipeline in Soviet Russia– CIA’s "logic bomb" caused a Soviet gas pipeline

in Siberia to explode

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IW Attacks against EstoniaIW Attacks against Estonia

1. The Estonian Cyberwar (2007), The Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth group in Transnistria– Target: Estonia– Took down key government websites, news

sites and generally flooded the Estonian network to a point that it was useless

2. Other targets of Russia: Georgia, Azerbaijani

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IW Attack against IranIW Attack against Iran

Stuxnet (2010): suspected from USA, Israel– Target: nuclear facility in Natan– Destroyed nuclear centrifuges and threw back

the Iranian atomic program by 2 years

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Warfare or EspionageWarfare or Espionage

Motivation for “warfare”– National attention– Additional defense funding– Justify government control of cyber space

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New Use of MalwareNew Use of Malware

Espionage – old story DOS attacks using spyware

– Application-level vulnerability combined with malware exploitation

– E.g., SQL Injection (gain control) malware (run functions to exhaust resources)

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Malware DOS AttacksMalware DOS Attacks Buffer overflows Raise unexpected exceptions Create race conditions SQL Injection recursive CPU-intensive queries Overly-complex regular expressions within search

queries Excessively large files uploaded to the server Etc.

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How about Twitter? How about Twitter? Is it only a “tool of the self-absorbed”?Real time reporting service

– 2008: Mumbai terrorist attack– 2009: Iranian protest against President

Ahmadinejad’s reelection

Distribute attack information– Link to attack tools– Link to target identity

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Twitter as Perception Twitter as Perception ManagementManagement

2009: Israeli military attack on the Gaza– Large number of civilian casualties– International criticism of Israel

Israeli Air Force counteractions on YouTube and Twitter:– Showed Hamas using civilians as cover– Downloaded sensor imagery onto YouTube – Tweets warned of rocket attacks – 'help-us-win.com' blog was used to gain public support

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/online/twitter-is-a-weapon-in-cyber-warfare-1900535.html

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Twitter Tunisian RevolutionTwitter Tunisian Revolution

2010-2011: Tunisian revolution (Jasmine Revolution)– Intensive campaign of civil resistance– Ousting of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali

in January 2011

What are the positive and negative aspects of social media wrt. Social movements?

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Next ClassNext Class

Computer Break-ins

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