1

Maïlys Gantois

Doctorante en science politique

CESSP/CRPS

Université Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne

mailysgantois@yahoo.fr

6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik

25-27 August 2011

Section ID 38, Social roots of political processes

Panel Bringing ethnography back in : ethnographic approaches in political science

About observing an in “camera session” or how to realize collective bargaining process ?

When we did our first interview with a negotiator in the north of France, a CGT

syndicalist1 in a public sector, a local authority, said “there is no negotiation with the

direction, sometimes they say that : “it is a meeting point for negotiate”, but it’s not a

negotiation”; in an other case, a syndicalist negotiator of FO2 in a private sector, a bank in

Paris, said “I’m used to say that they are false collective bargaining”. Negotiators of different

labor unions say that there is no negotiation, but collective bargaining organized by the

directions. This paradox justifies our ethnographic approach on collective bargaining to

understand what is a collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining is a classical subject of study in industrial relationship and labor studies

in France and in United States, with diversified approaches. Studies approach collective

bargaining with economic, management, law or organizational functioning questions. The

anchoring in traditions of theoretical and methodological research partly pre-established at the

studied object condition the obtained results and the framing to think the object collective

bargaining. By another way, in France and in United States, the collective bargaining is

valued in social space as being a “good practice”, a practice allowing to solve situations of

conflict, to establish a dialogue between employers and representatives of employees, the

establishment of a social link, a practice presented as the proof of the existence and the best

way for a democracy of enterprise. Furthermore, the French legislation undertook the

“rénovation de la démocratie sociale” and the “modernisation du dialogue social”3, in the

1 One of the French labor unions, “Confédération Générale du Travail”

2 A french labor union, « Force Ouvrière »

3 Loi du 20 août 2008 « portant rénovation de la démocratie sociale et réforme du temps de travail » et loi du 5

juillet 2010 « relative à la rénovation du dialogue sociale ».

2

private and the public sectors, these reforms modified “naturally” the rules of collective

bargaining, and impose more themes and there occasions to negotiate.

There are two main Schools on the collective bargaining : the School of the Human Relations

which is the school of the best practices oriented, and the School of the Professional Relations

which is based on the law. This communication proposes to shed light on differently this

object, with an ethnographic and comparative approach to, on one hand, report the daily of the

negotiators, processes of collective bargaining and the nature of the relationship between

employers and representatives of employees, and on the other hand, to deconstruct the

meliorative image commonly conveyed on this social practice. The idea is to study

negotiations being made / which are doing (“en train de se faire”) by direct or indirect

observations. The collective bargaining takes place in principle behind closed doors, so we try

to make an ethnography of what is supposed to be invisible with the eyes of a person outside

of the circle of the negotiators. In the lineage of the School of Chicago, we focus our attention

on the practices of negotiation and particularly on the interactions in situation of collective

bargaining.

We try to show why an ethnographic approach – approach anchored in political science –, on

the collective bargaining allows to shed light on differently the object4. At the first time, we

present the classical made researches on collective bargaining. Secondly, we clarify our

theoretical and methodological approach. In the third point, we restore the main results of our

approach.

1.Traditions of research on collective bargaining

In this part, we try to restore the classical ways taken by the researcher to trait the

object collective bargaining in scientific and academic spaces, to determine how an

ethnographic approach allows to show differently collective bargaining.

The School of the Human Relations

In international relations, the theoretical base – dominating all the questionings – leans

on the theory of the games. The strategy of conflict, by Thomas C. Schelling, first edition in

1960 by the press of the University of Harvard establishes the reference. The first chapter

constitutes an essay on negotiation or collective bargaining, presented like a way to avoid the

conflict, the war. Until now, a double framing structures the analyses in international relations

and spreads in economy, in management and in sociology : first, conflict is presented as the

opposite of collective bargaining, second, the situations are defined by the actors’ strategies.

4 Edward Schatz, Political ethnography. What immersion contributes to the study of power, The University of

Chicago press, 2009.

3

So, in management and in the School of the Human Relations such as it built itself in Harvard,

the theoretical base is made on the Theory of the games and the scientists suggest seeing

interactions between negotiators through typical models where the value plan is the

negotiation “win-win”, without to establish difference between international negotiation,

commercial negotiation and social negotiation (collective bargaining). Books and methods

develop recommendations to allow the actor to reach the “best possible solution” towards its

situation and towards its resources. Getting to yes : Negotiating agreement without giving in,

by William Ury and Roger Fisher is a best-seller of 8 millions of books translated in 30

languages. William Ury, American sociologist (whose works are also classified in social

psychology), and Roger Fischer, American Professor of law at Harvard, contribute to

crystallize the apprenticeship of the “best practices” of the negotiation through the

implementation of the program of negotiation at Harvard, taken as reference both in

international relations and in economy. In France, Business School and Institutes of

Management use – by adjusting them – the typical models established by the Americans from

the Theory of the games. For example, Lionel Bellanger establishes a plan used as a mark or a

chessboard : the negotiator must to go to the zone of compromise, then to the zone of the

consensus, the only able to establish the negotiation “win-win”5.

5 Lionel Bellanger, La négociation collective, col. Que sais-je ?, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1984.

4

Lionel Bobot made a PhD at the Essec (Business School close to Paris, in concurrence with

the HEC, Haute Ecole de Commerce de Paris) then a post-PhD at Harvard, he proposes to

establish a synthesis between the American works and the French works in a book untitled Le

négociateur stratège6. He tries to define the strategies and the practices of the negotiator, with

a normative approach of the behavior, this developments arises from the Theory of the games

also.

“Sociology of the negotiation” or science of management ?

Collective bargaining can be situated as a specific theme of management. Fabienne

Pavis proposes a typology in her thesis7, we can take this typology and the distinction

established by the sociologist about academic productions in management. She showed three

sources of productions : business schools, schools of engineers and universities. We note that,

by the means of smugglers (in French “passeurs” au sens de “passeurs de savoirs”), as they

refer or not to a scientific legitimacy, on one hand, the knowledges circulate between the

various places of production, and, on the other hand, the spaces of distribution can be

academic, scientific or more widely anchored in the social space (for example, in the labor-

union or employers’ trainings). If we can refer to this typology to show the places of

production of the knowledges produced on the collective bargaining and their fastenings with

scientific disciplines, with relatively delimited borders, is not obvious. The book untitled

Sociologie de la négociation8 is a marker (reference point), its authors try to synthetize the

produced knowledges on this theme, and more specifically on collective bargaining. They try

to classify the references under different disciplines : international relations, economy,

management, sociology. But, on one hand, as we specified it previously, the knowledges

circulate between the disciplines, and, on the other hand, labels can be multiple. So, Thomas

Schelling is a reference in international relations and he is strongly legitimate in the academic

and scientific field as economist : he received the prize of the Royal Bank of Sweden in honor

of Alfred Nobel in 2005. Besides, both authors of this work come in as sociologist. Now,

Reynald Bourque9, canadian, tries to found a School in Canada by developing a “sociology of

the negotiation” close to the dominant School of Human Relations in United States, and

Christian Thuderoz, Professor of sociology, researcher in a School of engineers in Lyon

(INSA), produces books which mobilize stemming references of classical sociology

6 Lionel Bobot, Le négociateur stratège, éditions Choiseul, 2008.

7 Fabienne Pavis, thèse intitulée Sociologie d’une discipline hétéronome. Le monde des formations en gestion

entre universités et entreprises en France, effectuée sous la direction de Michel Offerlé, soutenue le 6 janvier

2003 à l’Université de Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne.

8 Reynald Bourque, Christian Thuderoz, Sociologie de la négociation, col. Repères, La Découverte, Paris, 2002.

9 Reynald Bourque have a PhD in economy and in industrial relations at the University of Aix-Marseille, in

France, he is the director of the School of Industrial Relations in Montréal, and he is the responsible of the

teaching of the collective bargaining in the School of Industrial Relations and in the Center of the High Business

School at the University in Montréal.

5

(Durkheim) as concepts used in Business School or Institute of Management (BATNA10

)11

.

This example invites to take the typology of Fabienne Pavis towards the studied specific

theme, because this theme is the object of a “scientific production” in economy, in

management but also in labor studies. Some people refer to the “sociology of the negotiation”

as label of scientific character to justify their trainer’s place. So, members of ESSEC tried to

institutionalize the apprenticeship of the “best practices” oriented to establish a negotiation

“win win” and to legitimate the learning by the implementation of an institute said “of

research” on the subject : IRENE [Institut de Recherche et d’Enseignement sur la

Négotiation]. Co-founders of IRENE, Aurélien Colson have a PhD in political science, his

thesis made on collective bargaining. He defines himself as a political analyst and sociologist,

“specialist of the negotiation”. Researcher, teacher at the ESSEC and at the ENA [Ecole

Nationale d’Administration], Aurélien Colson can be identified as a smuggler (“passeur”) of

knowledges in management between the private sector and the public sector. These

established facts bring us to distinguish the productions between the management and the

sociology. So, the producers anchored in established types by Fabienne Pavis raise more from

the management science than the sociology, even if some people use the term sociology as a

label.

Small history of French School of Professional Relations

In sociology, according to Olgierd Kuty12

, the interest for the collective bargaining

draws its origin from the crisis of 1929 and the studies led to transform the modalities of

production of companies. In France, one of the first ones to anchor the collective bargaining

as object of sociology of the work is Jean-Daniel Reynaud. In the trail of George Fridemann

and stemming from the sociology of the work, he is at the origin of a tradition of research for

which he institutionalizes under the label of “sociologie des relations professionnelles”13

. He

takes support on the French legislation and its evolutions. He tries to establish the “sociologie

des relations professionnelles” as a sub-field of sociology. His heirs pursue the researches on

the collective bargaining in his way. Professor of sociology at the CNAM [Conservatoire

National des Arts et Métiers, close to the School of engineers], in the trail of Alan Flanders’

works on the autonomous regulation, Jean-Daniel Reynaud theorizes about the collective

bargaining as a mean or a tool of the social regulation in company14

. According to his

10

BATNA : best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

11 Christian Thuderoz, Qu’est-ce que négocier ? Sociologie du compromis et de l’action réciproque, col. Le sens

social, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2010.

12 Olgierd Kuty, « La naissance de la négociation (1933 – 1962). Mayo, Friedmann, Crozier et Reynaud »,

Sociologies, octobre 2008.

13 Frédéric Rey, « La recherche française sur les relations professionnelles. Retour sur trente ans d’expériences

collectives (chantier). » Terrain et travaux, 2008/1, n°14, pp190-201.

14 Gilbert de Terssac (dir.), La théorie de la régulation sociale de Jean-Daniel Reynaud. Débats et prolongements,

col. Recherches, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.

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developments, the practice of collective bargaining would participate to regulate the relations

between employers and representatives of employees in a relatively autonomous space (the

company). His theory considers the collective bargaining mainly through the prism of the

standards produced via the agreements, the output of the negotiation, leaving in the shadow

the processes and the interactions between negotiators. In Les syndicats, les patrons et l’Etat.

Tendance de la négociation collective en France15

, he makes an inventory on the collective

bargaining in France from the analysis of the content of the agreements, the positions taken by

the negotiators and the distinction established between the levels and the spaces of the

negotiations. His heirs decline his approach, they concern their interest on the levels and on

the spaces of collective bargaining. Studies in collective bargaining in France are situated in a

descriptive tradition, collective bargaining perceived through the framing of laws and

retranscribed views of negotiators. Researchers in “sociologie des relations professionnelles”

always think about laws and their evolutions, themes and space of negotiation, strategies and

positions of the actors. This model of research to think collective bargaining is due to Jean-

Daniel Reynaud. He is the first sociologist to have an interest for collective bargaining in

France and he worked with a lot of sociologists in “sociologie des relations professionnelles”.

Furthermore, one of the reasons of the success of this model is that it’s legitimized by the

Ministry of Work, which pay for few researches.

The studies on the negotiation consider mainly the outcome and not the whole process16

, so

leaving the social interactions in the shadow. So, in one of the last research on collective

bargaining in France, members of collective research show the social relations between

employers and labor unions, they give more details on collective bargaining in companies in

the lineage of sociology of law and sociology of professional relations. They establish

distinctions according to their size, degrees of negotiators’ professionalization and the

consequences on the degree of “judiciarisation” of the relations, but they work mainly on the

actors’ representations with interview and questionnaire, they leave the social interactions in

the shadow17

.

Collective bargaining is a classical subject of labor studies in France, but the researches

confine to establish an inventory more and more detailed on sectors, levels, spaces, themes of

negotiation. The analysis are based on laws, the reflections are guided on the strategies,

produced norms and the actors’ games, but interactions and processes stay in a black box.

15

Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Les syndicats, les patrons et l’Etat. Tendances de la négociation collective en France,

col. Relations sociales, Les éditions ouvrières, Paris, 1978

16 Christian Thuderoz, Annie Giraud-Héraud (coord.), La négociation sociale, col. CNRS sociologie, CNRS

éditions, Paris, 2000.

17 Thomas Amossé, Catherine Bloch-London, Loup Wolff (dir.), Les relations sociales en entreprises. Un portait à

partir des enquêtes « Relations professionnelles et négociations d’entreprises » [REPONSE 1992-1993, 1998-

1999 et 2004-2005], col. Recherches, La Découverte, Paris, 2008.

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2.Ethnography back in to approach collective bargaining in political science

We decided to study collective bargaining with an ethnographic approach to shed light

on differently this object. We try to opposite the fact observations to cross this representations

on collective bargaining.

Ethnography made by actors

Our tentative isn’t the first. Christian Morel, son and grandson of military, studied the

sociology in France with Raymond Boudon, one of French leaders of the mainstream on the

Theory of the rational choice, his disciple was interested on the links between the ideas and

the action, and studied social relationship in United States. He gets a PhD in political science

in 1974, but he chooses to work in a company. After the Grenelle’s Agreements (“Accords de

Grenelle”), so after the events of May 1968 in France, companies tried to transform

responsible of the employees : instead of choose military from military school as the

prestigious School “Polytechnique”, the directions choose to put persons in charge of the

employees formed more widely in law and human sciences. So, Christian Morel is hired at

Dunlop, then at Renault, as a person in charge of the employees. These two companies were

in industrial sectors, in full restructurings, he was in charge of dismissing employees. After

these two experiences, he describes what he sees social relationship with labor unions in a

work, The cold strike18

. He says why he wrote this book in an interview in the newspaper Le

Monde : “ I wrote it because what I lived didn’t correspond to what told sociologists or

journalists. Negotiation was described as a process where each makes a step towards the

other one to reach an agreement. I had rather the feeling to live negotiations-demonstrations.

Labor unions conceived the negotiations as a mead to obtain advantages but refused the

counterparts. And, as in demonstrations, they always repeated the same slogans.”19

There are several limits in his work. First, he makes an analysis only based on a sector, the

industrial sector during a specific moment of this sector. So, his analysis is oriented by the

specific situation in this sector. Second, he is a member of negotiators’ delegation for the

employers’ side. So, his glance is guided by his actor’s position in the game. He hasn’t a

social distance with his observations. He can’t observe the work in the labor unions premises.

Third, his anchoring in the Theory of the rational actor structures his interpretations, he

perceives only actors strategies, without a regard on the actors’ trajectories and the possible

impact on the interactions of collective bargaining.

The second example is a work made by an actor of the second side. Bernard Dugué is a

negotiator for a labor union and he gets a PhD on sociology in 2004 at the University of

Toulouse in France. In his work The work of negotiation. Regards on collective bargaining in

18 Christian Morel, La grève froide, Stratégies syndicales et pouvoir patronal, Les éditions d’Organisation, 1981.

19 Christian Morel interview, Le Monde, 20 juillet 2002.

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company20

, stemming from his thesis, he tries to understand the activity of negotiation as a

work, with concepts stemming from the ergonomics and from the sociology. He compares

four companies in four different sectors (bank, assurance, agricultural cooperative,

slaughterhouse of animals) in which he participated in collective bargaining as a syndicalist.

He mobilizes his memory of the events, the analysis of the legislative texts and the

agreements.

There are also several limits. First, he tries more to legitimate the activity of negotiation as a

work that to report the interactions in daily situation. As a labor union negotiator, he wants to

diffuse the activity of negotiation as a work. He says : “We simply want to contribute to the

understanding of the practices of collective bargaining of company from the analysis of the

activity of negotiation considered as an activity of specific work, subjected to specific

constraints.”21

. Second, he is in the same situation as Christian Morel, but of the labor-union

side. His glance is directed by its membership in a specific labor union during the

observations and by his actor’s position in the game. His labor union, the CFDT22

, is

favorable to collective bargaining in companies, his trajectory is shaped by his membership in

this syndicate, the “a priori” before the research shape the construction of his ethnographic

approach. That’s why he leans on several references to justify his approach : the heirs of Jean-

Daniel Reynaud, Erving Goffman, but also Christian Thuderoz who develops an approach for

the ethics of the compromise23

.

We want to approach collective bargaining neither the employer’s side nor the labor union

side but from both directions with an ethnographic and comparative approach.

Main hypothesis of our research

First, if we recognize the contributions of the works made in the sociology of

professional relations, we choose not to leave the law as the preliminary centring to our

reflections. We master the legal rules to know what forces legally the relations between the

negotiators of companies and to be competent in front of negotiators. But our first hypothesis

is that it’s possible to compare public sector with private sector, and more widely to compare

the various sectors. So, to define what is a collective bargaining, we leave definitions giving

by negotiators and not only by laws. The hypothesis is that sectors culture contributes to

impact practices of collective bargaining. We try to understand how and why the membership

in a specific sector impacts the practices of negotiators.

20

Bernard Dugué, Le travail de négociation. Regards sur la négociation collective d’entreprise, col. Travail et

activité humaine, Octarès éditions, Toulouse, 2005.

21 Ibid, p 9.

22 Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail.

23 Christian Thuderoz, Négociations. Essai de sociologie du lien social, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris,

2000.

9

Secondly, we make the hypothesis that the conflict and the negotiation do not oppose, on the

contrary, both mode of actions are interdependent. Collective bargaining is not perceived as

the opposite of the conflict but as a practice belonging to the repertory of collective action of

the representatives of employers and the representatives of employees24

. This change of focal

allows to apprehend interactions in various spaces of meeting between negotiators, and not

only about the outcome of agreements or the actors’ strategies. We consider the process of

negotiation through the interactions between negotiators. We have neither “a priori” or

judgment on the progress of collective bargaining nor the nature of the exchanges between the

negotiators, on the scene or behind the scene, to take back the Goffman’s metaphor on the

social interactions. Contrary to Bernard Dugué, we don’t postulate that negotiate is a work “a

priori”, we think that it can depend on degrees and forms of investment. Contrary to Christian

Thuderoz, we don’t postulate that collective bargaining creates a social link “a priori”.

Third and the most important, we make the hypothesis that interactions are dependant to the

negotiators’ trajectories. So, we try to observe the negotiators negotiating, in situation of

negotiation, and to collect information on their social trajectories, degrees and forms of

membership in the company and in the syndicate of employers or employees, two mains

institutions framing collective bargaining. The idea is to understand what are the creations in

situation of negotiation and what is determined by social dispositions25

.

These hypotheses are opposite to the works of sociologists of the Human Relations or the

Professional Relations and justify an ethnographic approach to shed light on collective

bargaining.

Access to the field

We research to approach the whole process of collective bargaining. For that way, we

consider we must have a particular attention on daily interactions between negotiators. In a

study on two psychiatric hospitals26

, Anselm Strauss shows the impact of the laymen –

patients and users – on rules determined by the professionals – the hospital staff. By an

ethnographic approach on the daily relations between professionals and not professionals,

Anselm Strauss observes the part taken by the not professionals in the modifications on the

“negotiated order”. That’s why Strauss invites to take into account the complex report

between daily process of negotiation and process of periodic evaluation (as outcome or

24

Miche Offerlé, « Retour critique sur les répertoires d’action collective (XVIII – XXIe siècle) », Politix, 81, 2008,

p 189 ; Baptiste Giraud, thesis Faire la grève. Les conditions d’appropriation de la grève dans les conflits du

travail en France, Michel Offerlé (dir.), 30 novembre 2009, University of Paris I, Panthéon Sorbonne.

25 Bertrand Geay, La protestation étudiante. Le mouvement du printemps 2006, col. Cours et travaux, Raisons

d’agir, Paris, 2009.

26 Anselm Strauss, Leonard Schatzman, Bue Bucher, Danuta Ehrlich, Melvin Sabshin, „The hospital audits

negotiated order“, in Eliot Freidson (ed), The hospital in modern society, 1963, New York, The Free Press, p 147-

168.

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agreement). But a company isn’t an hospital, the entrance isn’t opened to the public. Even if

to study an hospital with an ethnographic approach is not obvious, we also have to negotiate

our presence on the place27

.

To approach collective bargaining, we choose neither to belong the employer side nor in the

labor union side. Collective bargaining takes place behind closed doors, so it’s difficult when

you are a researcher outside companies where you would like to observe social interactions.

Forced by the opportunities of field, we approach differently the public sector – where we

observe directly the social interactions, and the private sector – where we proceed to an

indirect observation.

Contrary to Nicolas Jounin28

, we choose not to move masqued. To be able to observe social

interactions both employers’ side and labor-union side, with an accepted presence during their

work of preparation and an access to on the scene and behind the scene of collective

bargaining, it seemed to us necessary to say to the actors one part of the object of our

observations. The idea is to legitimize our presence by guaranteeing the confidentiality of the

discussions and the exchanges in both sides. Furthermore, the negotiators, about is the level or

the size of the company, know all between them, our presence would have noticed from the

first meeting, so to be able to be there in an environment as a rule closed in any foreign

presence, we think that the solution is to show white dough and ask the authorization to all the

participants.

In fact, to observe scenes in public sector, we did a contract of research with a local authority,

a Department. We were hired by the local authority, the salary was paid off in three quarter by

the Ministry of Research. We tried to contract with companies in the first time, but we failed.

Companies refused the entrance of a researcher to observe their social interactions, then

public sector was agree. I negotiated the terms of the contract. I asked for the possibility of

being present like an observer during all the meetings between representatives of employers

and representatives of employees within the framework of collective bargaining and other

meetings. At the beginning, the members of the administration department asked me to expect

for the end of the professional elections before from meeting the union activists. After

professional elections, the responsible of social relations sent a letter to all the labor unions in

explaining my presence as an observer of “social dialogue”. First, few unions activits were

reticent because the year precedent our arrival, the administration had presented a student who

must write a report for her training but the report was used by the administration as an audit

on labor unions. The long immersion and the guarantee of the confidentiality of the

interactions allowed us to reach gradually to all the labor unions premises and the human

resources department. The fact is that people of both side want to tell us “what is the reality of

27 Benjamin Derbez, « Négocier un terrain en milieu hospitalier : Un moment critique de la recherche en

anthropologie médicale », Genèse, 2010, volume 78-1

28 Nicolas Jounin, Chantier interdit au public. Enquête parmi les travailleurs du bâtiment, La Découverte, Paris,

2008.

11

collective bargaining in this place”. They saw in my presence a mean to tell what they live

daily. That’s particularly true for labor unions who are marginalized by the direction. We

observe that, even if we had an access to all the meetings, the access was more open in these

labor unions premises (CGT, FO, SUD). For the others, we had to take “rendez-vous” before

to come in their premises (CFDT, CFTC, UNSA). So, we were able to observe the daily

interactions during meetings of preparation in both side, meetings of “collective bargaining”

(said by actors), meetings between employers and unions activists for questions of collective

order, the interactions in corridors before and after the meetings, the interunion meetings, and

debriefing in both sides. For example, once we accompanied the employers’ delegation in a

car in the way out and in the way back, we had access to the preparation of last minute and to

“the hot” debriefing. At the next time, we made the same thing with representatives of the

CGT.

We observed two negotiations in particular. A negotiation opened following a conflict

impulse by all the labor unions and a negotiation opened following a strike notice in a port.

More, we followed all the daily meeting for more two years.

Our contract with this local authority is finished in September 2011. But until now, we also

tried to have an access in private sector. We would like to have access to social interactions in

private enterprise, but only as a PhD student, we failed. We have an access to the private field

by our participation in collective researches, but for the moment, this access is limited. We

proceed to interview and compendium of archives. To observe social interactions between

employers and representatives of employees, managers refuse. Employers and labor unions

are agree to diffuse archives and give interviews. But employers refuse the entrance at the

researcher in their company. For example, at the end of an interview, we asked the manager to

have an access at the collective bargaining in a bank :

“Oh no, negotiations it’s impossible !

Why it’s impossible ?

Because we have no observer, that doesn’t work for negotiations, we aren’t a school !

I know…

We aren’t a school, we aren’t a university, we are a company !

Even if I guarantee…[He cuts me]

No, it isn’t the problem.

Ok. And for a works council, is it possible ?

It’s a problem.

Ok. Why ?

Because it’s the same ! The members of works council are clearly appointed and there is no observer !

And if it’s with the agreement of labor unions, it would be possible ?

The problem isn’t there. It’s me the Boss. I am the President of the works council”29

.

Before this interview, we had the agreement of members of the CGT and the CFDT. So, we

have a limited access for two banks, a local bank and a national bank. We proceed to an

indirect observation of the interactions, by compendium of practices during interviews and

stepping of information by archives. In September 2011, we will have a privileged access to

29

Extract of an interview with the director of human resources at the local bank in Paris, February 23th, 2010.

12

the labor unions premises during annual collective bargaining about salaries, it’s an

opportunity to observe degree and forms of investment of union activists in labor union and

the link with language and behavior during social interactions. More, with a collective

research, we have an access to an middle industrial company, we will have an access to social

interactions also during annual collective bargaining in January 2012.

3.Validity of the approach demonstrated by the first main results

After presenting our theoretical and methodological approach by distinguishing it from

others studies on collective bargaining, the presentation of some results on the observations

can attest the added-value of a comparative ethnographic observation. Our research falls in

sociology of institution and political sociology, we consider that focus on the comparison of

institutional affiliations during humdrum and conflictual situation allows to illuminate the

way which the actors invest their role of negotiator, represent it and may have to change it.

We present here only third results because we need more reflection time for the others.

1st result : the belief in the negotiation as an « effective » practice

Some people say not to believe in the existence of negotiations within the institution,

while participating in "meetings" they call themselves "negotiation". Thus, during the first

collective interview conducted in the CGT room of the local authority, several activists decry

the existence of negotiation within the local authority ; nevertheless the main detractors

happen to be the firsts to claim the opening of collective bargaining on a topic - object of a

collective inter-unions mobilization and to participate in open exchanges on the subject. Their

initial representation of a "lack of negotiation" in the institution tends however to be

reinforced by a diversion of the trade union demands by the administration. During the

preparatory meetings and those against the employer, we observe recurrently that the

representatives of employees and employers require alternately the holding of a "real

dialogue", of "real negotiations". This paradox brings into question studies exposing only the

theatricality of exchanges, not forming part of the belief that supports them.

In the public as in the private sector, employer side as labor union side, a shared belief is

tending to impose itself: the negotiation can be the way – or the tool – appropriated or

effective for conveying its requests or intentions. On the labor union side, many

representatives of employees believe that the opening of a negotiation can enable them to

obtain a listening window from the responsible leaders, on condition to know the subject, this

window is more or less opened depending on the types of topics discussed and interests

granted by both sides. On the employers side, the negotiation is used as a mean to challenge

the state of existing rules to introduce some news, previously thought or pre-written but not

only, the practice of negotiation may prove to be an institutional facade, within the Goffman

meaning. The representation of the collective bargaining usually claimed by employers is to

present in their speech as a good practice, a necessary and legitimate practice. Concretely, this

one is imposed on them by legislative obligations – not necessarily respected, by conflict or

13

by their desire to transform the existing order. On the labor union side, the representations of

the collective bargaining tend to be shaped by positions previously developed by their

respective organizations on this practice. However, a paradox exists : they defend or denigrate

them, sometimes even, they are contesting its existence within the institution, employees’

representatives believe in the existence of a "real" practice of negotiation which allows

achieving their demands. If this practice does not exist as such in their institution, they

imagine as being able to happen. This belief is fed in the representative bodies such as in

"collective bargaining session" by the existence of "small success" provided by the

employers, accessing in some cases to the labor union demands. Two of the main conditions

for achieving these "small success " is first of all to master the employer’s language in order

to translate the claims in the language which dominates the interactions, and secondly that the

cost for the employer to accede to this demand have to be less than the cost to not access.

The compilation of speeches confronted to the practices observed in situ can (re)define what

is the collective bargaining in the eyes of those who practice it. The idea is not to impose a

model that it be legislative or typify but try to understand what is or not the negotiation for the

negotiators, and what tends to institutionalize them within companies or local authorities.

2nd

result : negotiation and conflict, a couple «which works well »

Many researchers would oppose negotiation to the conflict. If negotiators have

divergent interests, they would have in negotiating the willingness to find a common ground.

However, we can note that if the law forces the private sector employers, including employers

of big companies, to open meetings of "negotiation", it does not force them to agree. For

Goffman, the entry into negotiation means "the end of the exchange of blows" and the

beginning of the "discussion" between the parties30

. Now if we can observe a distinction

between conflict and collective bargaining as two different actions of the repertoire of

collective actions, the negotiation is not necessarily devoid of conflictuality, that it be routine

or extraordinary – in the sense of leaving the predictable exchanges without leaving the

ritualized side of exchanges – on one hand ; and on the other hand, a conflict can be triggered

by militants in order to open some negotiations, even "real negotiations", this shows the

interdependence between the two types of actions31

. The direct observation of negotiations,

the work on archives, and the compilation of stories of practices in interview provide to

nuance the Goffman Proposal: this is not so much an exchange which taking place without

any "blows" – we can divest ourself of strategist wording and not receive the exchanges in

dichotomous manner (with blows: conflict, lack of blows: exchange) – than variable degrees

of participation in the situation of negotiation depending of the representations of the situation

30

Erving Goffman, Strategic Interaction, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971, [1ère éd.1969].

31 This demands are at the origin of two observed conflicts at the local authority and at the local bank. In both

cases, conflict allowed to open collective bargaining on the demanded subjects. We try to understand and

determine condition of success or defeat, it’s possible with comparison negotiators’ trajectories, not only

based reflection on actors’ strategies.

14

and to the trajectories lived within the institution. By analogy with the perception of various

forms and degrees of belonging to the Catholic Church established by Jacques Lagroye32

, we

can distinguish for the practice of collective bargaining in company and local authority,

various participation degrees of the rite depending on the type of belonging to the institution,

as well as personal stories lived in this institution or in adjacent institutions, these

participating to shape the perceptions and practices in situation.

For example, a FO union representative, secretary of the association, weakly included in the

superior bodies of her union, weakly critical in representative bodies except when something

affects directly activists or union members of her union who they asked her to intervene, this

class C agent passed B by seniority, with a low cultural and union capital is regularly at the

beginning of our observation a part of the votes with unions close to the decisions of the

employer (CFDT and UNSA). She joined the Inter-Unions initiated by CGT and SUD in early

2010, like all other union leaders with, at the beginning, a common demand (but UNSA left

the Inter-Unions after the first negotiation meeting with the employer, CFDT done the same

soon after). The inclusion in this group will participate to modify representations and

practices of the FO Representative: she acquired a relative confidence in her public speaking

against the employer and her positions became more radical in bodies and in the residual

Inter-Unions (FO, CFTC, CGT, SUD). Then, her votes will be regularly associated with those

of SUD and CGT, and dissociated themselves from those issued by CFDT and UNSA in joint

committees.

Third result : the impact of the social trajectory on the practice of collective bargaining

If there is a part of creation during the social interactions, the practices are partially

structured by the social dispositions of negotiators. Interactions are partially shaped by the

actors’ inheritances worn and brought in social scenes. The practices of collective bargaining

vary according to the social trajectories of the actors, the previous experiences of negotiation,

degrees and forms of membership in the company and in the syndicate of employers or

employees.

In both observed banks, we can shed light on the practices of negotiation by the trajectories of

employers’ negotiators. A new law in France (law of the August 20th

, 2008) forced employers

to sign with the most representatives of employees. To be valid, an agreement must have the

equivalent of 30 % voice of employees by the representatives of employees. Some managers

change their strategies, others no, but the explication is neither in the terms of the law nor

only in the strategies of employers’ negotiators, but practices are in link with trajectories of

employers’ negotiators associated with the trajectories of representatives of employees and

the daily interactions.

32

Jacques Lagroye, Appartenir à une institution. Catholiques en France aujourd’hui, col. Etudes politiques,

Economica, Paris, 2009.

15

The annual collective bargaining at the local bank finish traditionally by a report of discord.

This practice allows the direction to decide one-sidedly on wage modifications. At the

beginning of the year 2010, three meetings for annual collective bargaining are organized : on

February 2nd

when the direction puts back the documents in session, on February 23rd

when

labor unions present their demands and on March 16th

when the session ends on a discord.

Two mains labor unions of this bank are first SUD and second CGT, this labor unions

mobilize conflict to open negotiation in April. Employees invest in a strike for five weeks, at

the end, even if members of the CFDT and the CFE-CGC would like to sign an agreement

before, members of SUD and CGT obtain the initially wished bonus. The local bank did the

best benefits in 2009 but the annual collective bargaining was lower than the other local

banks. This argument mobilized near a third part of the employees and forced the manager in

charge of negotiation to consider differently his first position. Contrary to the local bank, at

the national bank observed, first annual collective bargaining after the application of the law

crystallized by new positions from the managers. First, the person in charge of social relation

treat with the most important labor union (CFE CGC, a labor union of managers) which

obtain 30 % at the professional elections in June 2009. Second, this responsible decided to

talk with the others labor unions, particularly with less important in voice (FO, CGT, CFTC).

Third, during the annual collective bargaining in September 2010, he treat with FO, CGT and

CFTC. Since few years, the direction decided to treat with CFDT and with CFE CGC. A new

responsible arrives in 2007, first he treats like the others in first time then he decides to treat

with other labor unions. In September 2010, there is no conflict after the annual collective

bargaining.

We can shed light on these two different situations with informations on employers’

trajectories. The responsible of social relations at the local bank has this charge for ten years.

He has a university formation, a bachelor in law, and a PhD in economics. His first job was at

the IGAS (general inspection of social affairs). He has a professional career in public and

private sectors. He is director of employment at Usinor Sacilor, an industrial factory, during

the restructurings. Then he is appointed adjunct general director of the ANPE (national

agency for the employment). After he takes responsibilities for ministries from 1988 to 1993 :

from 1988 to 1991 at the Cabinet of the Ministry of Work, where he was in charge of the

consistent of laws, from 1992 to 1993 at the cabinet of the Prime Minister. He gave courses

on restructurings at the ENA (National School of Administration) and at the University of

Créteil. He defines himself as a “professional nomad”. The Bank is a member of the Medef

(Union of employers, “movement of French enterprises”), he goes to two meetings in a year,

in January and during the summer at the University of the Medef, but only for seeing his

contacts. He considers the organization lesser meaningful than the UIMM (specific Union of

employers in industrial sector, which is a member of the Medef). During an interview, he

said: “What plays most for me it’s what I knew in the steel industry, because I exercised

responsibilities to Usinor Sacilor, the UIMM, yes, the UIMM with regard to the big

companies of the steel industry and the metal industry, yes, it is pregnant”33

. He is a member

33

Extract of an interview with the director of human resources at the local bank, February 23rd, 2010.

16

of employers’ delegation for the group, but he participates mainly to the annual collective

bargaining, not really for the others collective bargaining for the group. He thinks that the law

August 20th

, 2008 doesn’t change social relations. He perceives social interactions in

Manichean manners : there is actors who block and actors who advance things, in other words

in the sense of the Direction of the Management.

The responsible of social relations at the national bank has a different profile. Responsible in

charge of the management of social relations since four years, he was director of a local group

Loire Atlantique Vendée for the national bank. He was responsible of social relations in a

local bank a first time in 1990’s. He defines himself as a banker, a professional passed at the

social relations. He said : “the social dialog is anchored in the gene of the company”34

. He is a

member of the AFB (French Association of Banks) since October 2009, he participates to

meetings of the network ANVIE, he is a member of the ANDRH (National Association of

directors of human relations) and of the associations DIALOGUES which does a work of

lobbying to promote collective bargaining and social dialog. Finally, he is a member of a

commission of work, employment and formation at the Medef. He said that the law August

20th

, 2008 was necessary and “the law didn’t change anything on the manner to negotiate

agreement, but the law changes positions of labor unions in the collective bargaining. There

are modifications more in the labor union side than in the employers side.”

In a case, the employer delegation is daily lead by a director of human relations who had

experiences of collective bargaining shaped in industrial sector, and the annual collective

bargaining traditionally ends with a report of discord, and in the other case a responsible of

social relations who had experiences of negotiations shaped in the bank sector, and no conflict

after annual collective bargaining. So, if conflict and collective bargaining are interdependent,

we see that trajectories of employers negotiators is also a variable to consider when we regard

social interactions.

We observed a paradox : behaviors of resistance against the tentative of imposed

language by the employers and in the same time works of preparation in labor union premises

to acquire the language of employers to present demands ; we saw different behaviors to

civilize the representatives of employees and impose the “best manners”. If we need more

time to have a social distance with these observations and be able to analysis it, these

observations question the idea of a social link and reinforce the ethnographic approach as a

good way to restitute processes of collective bargaining.

34

Extract of an interview with the responsible of social relations at the national bank, February 24th, 2011.