“managing” corporate community involvement
TRANSCRIPT
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate
Community Involvement
Judith M. van der VoortKatherina Glac
Lucas C.P.M. Meijs
ABSTRACT. In academic research, many attempts have
been undertaken to legitimize corporate community
involvement by showing a business case for it. However,
much less attention has been devoted to building
understanding about the actual dynamics and challenges
of managing CCI in the business context. As an alterna-
tive to existing predominantly static and top-down
approaches, this paper introduces a social movement
framework for analyzing CCI management. Based on the
analysis of qualitative case study data, we argue that the
active role of employees pressuring for CCI policies and
practices, as well as the organization audience responses to
their efforts, are at the core of the challenges involved in
managing CCI. These challenges also pose limits to how
far CCI can be extended to a ‘‘business as usual’’ activity.
KEY WORDS: corporate community involvement, cor-
porate social responsibility, employee volunteering, social
movement, framing, mobilization, double-edged effect,
qualitative research, case study research
ABBREVIATIONS: CCI:Corporate community involve
ment; CSR: Corporate social responsibility; SMO: Social
movement organization; HR(M): Human resource man-
agement
Corporate community involvement (CCI), which
refers to the provision of goods and services to non-
profit and civic organizations by corporations (Burke
et al., 1986), is an issue that is often treated as merely a
peripheral component of corporate strategy or even as
falling outside of legitimate business endeavors. Despite
this peripheral status, the amount of money spent on
such activities has been on the rise, as have the variety
and organizational complexity of CCI activities. For
example, a 2007 analysis of corporate giving by 155
leading US companies showed that the total amount
spent by the surveyed companies on cash and non-cash
giving in 2007 was 11.6 billion dollars, which is around
1% of pre-tax profits (Committee Encouraging
Corporate Philanthropy, 2008). The survey also
revealed that 88% of the surveyed corporations had
corporate foundations for organizing CCI and spent a
significant amount of funds on the administration and
management of CCI (around 6% of the total giving
amount). Furthermore, many companies had multiple
national and international outlets for their giving
and engaged in a wide variety of community involve-
ment projects, thus further increasing the demand for
organization and management (American Association
of Fund-Raising Counsel, 2008).
Perhaps due to the amount of money dedicated to
corporate giving, several attempts have been under-
taken to legitimize CCI by making a business case for it
(Griffin and Mahon, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel,
2001). Despite the increasing complexity of CCI,
however, much less attention has been devoted to
building an understanding about the management of
CCI and the challenges that can arise in this context.
For example, in response to pressures for a strategic
approach to CCI, managers might attempt to institu-
tionalize grassroots corporate social activities (Saiia
et al., 2003), as the corporate context offers many
opportunities for doing so. In response to such insti-
tutionalization efforts, managers might encounter
unexpected side effects and resistance from stakehold-
ers. The organizational dynamics existing between
pressures for and responses to CCI management have
not been studied in detail.
A number of researchers have documented and
begun to examine the risks and complexities that
managers of CCI face as they attempt to bring
corporate social activities into the realm of standard
business practice (Choi and Wang, 2007; Ellen et al.,
2006; Peterson, 2004). These studies draw upon
Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 90:311–329 � Springer 2009DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0051-y
social psychology to explore the critical intervening
processes that may underlie the reception of CCI by
a company’s stakeholders. While providing impor-
tant insight, this work neither considers the active
role that employees can take in pressuring for CCI
policies and practices, nor addresses the responses of
the organization’s audience to their efforts. We
argue, however, that the interplay between these
actors is at the core of the challenges involved in
managing CCI within an organization.
As an alternative to existing approaches, most of
which are top-down (i.e., focused on the power and
activities of managers) and static (i.e., excluding
change from the analysis), this paper introduces a
social movement framework for analyzing CCI. In
line with Rao et al. (2000, p. 244), we define social
movements as ‘‘organized collective endeavors to
solve social problems […] that occur over longer
term time stretches, are driven by long-term goals,
and develop formal organizations.’’ By presenting
CCI through this lens, this paper provides a more
complete and dynamic picture of CCI management
challenges than previous studies. Understanding the
complexities of CCI management is an important
addition to the debate about strategizing corporate
social activities, as it shows the double-edged effects
that can confront managers. Double-edged effects
are the practical limits and unexpected or unwanted
audience effects arising from the development of
CCI strategy.
The social movement framework is particularly
suitable for this analysis for two reasons. First, in
contrast to existing static approaches to understanding
CCI, the social movement framework appreciates the
active role of organizational agents and the tactics they
choose to influence their audiences’ reception of CCI.
Second, the social movement framework also allows
us to draw on related work in the field of organiza-
tional studies. This research also uses social movement
theory to examine the dynamics of non-standard
business practices in organizations (Spicer and Bohm,
2007; Zald and Berger, 1978). For example, processes
resembling social movements have been identified as
triggers of organizational change (Den Hond and De
Bakker, 2007; McAdam and Scott, 2005).
This paper proceeds as follows. We begin by
highlighting the tensions and problems in the debate
concerning CCI to demonstrate the need for a new
approach to understanding CCI. We then describe
the central ideas of social movement theory and
apply these concepts to CCI using an in-depth case
study of CCI in a Dutch financial conglomerate.
The paper concludes with an analysis of the dilem-
mas and double-edged effects of CCI leadership that
become apparent when applying a social movement
perspective.
From confusion and contests
to complexities: the evolution of CCI
Both managerial and scholarly attention to CCI and
other socially responsible corporate behaviors have
been booming since the 1950s. Despite its relatively
long history, the literature on CCI reflects an ongoing
conceptual debate about the relationship of CCI with
the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR)
movement (Carroll, 1999; Godfrey and Hatch, 2007).
The same debate appears in the literature on related
topics, including corporate philanthropy (Seifert et al.,
2003), corporate social initiatives (Hess et al., 2002),
and charitable giving (Brammer and Millington,
2004).
One possible reason for the continuing flux in the
conceptual debate is the relatively broad conceptu-
alization of CSR (Carroll, 2006). Carroll (1979)
considers CSR to encompass ‘‘the economic, legal,
ethical and discretionary (philanthropic) expectations
that society has of organizations at a given point in
time’’ (p. 500). Depending upon the interpretation
of these expectations, CCI can thus be considered as
a synonym, as an aspect of, and even a measure for
CSR (Barnett, 2007; Carroll, 1999; Keim, 1978).
This conceptual ambiguity reflects the social con-
structionist nature of these practices: ‘‘socially respon-
sible corporate behaviors may mean different things
in different places to different people and at different
times’’ (Campbell, 2007, p. 950).
Acknowledging that terminology in this area of
research is still in flux; we do not add another separate
definition of CCI, choosing instead to delineate the
phenomena we are addressing here. Consistent with
Burke et al. (1986), we define CCI as the donation of
funds, the contribution of goods and services, and the
volunteering of time by company employees that is
aimed toward non-profit and civic organizations.
Because many sources subsume CCI under CSR, we
will draw on the CSR literature to inform our analysis
312 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
while keeping our focus on CCI and more spe-
cifically, employee volunteering. Employee volun-
teering involves volunteer services performed by
employees who are in some way encouraged and
supported by employers in the form of formal and
informal policies and programs (Tschirhart, 2005).
We emphasize employee volunteering for three
reasons. First, this aspect of CCI reflects a broader move
toward employee activities in the area of corporate
social initiatives (Hess et al., 2002). Second, leadership
challenges are most clearly manifested in situations in
which active employee participation and involvement
is warranted. Third, employee volunteering is central
to theCCI policyof our case study and, more generally,
to the Dutch interpretation of CCI.
Similar to CSR, CCI remains a topic of debate.
Debates concerning CSR and CCI center on a tension
about the role of socially responsible business activities
in the overall business context. One perspective is that
CSR and CCI activities are not normal business prac-
tices. They are peripheral to the core objectives of a
company, and therefore, are not directly connected to
the bottom line. Furthermore, these activities involve
personal values and emotions more than other business
issues do (Howard-Grenville and Hoffman, 2003).
Another perspective is a strategic stance toward
CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2002) and CCI (Buchholtz
et al., 1999) that attempts to legitimize these activities
by framing them as normal business practice. For
example, Godfrey and Hatch (2007) argue that CCI
investments trigger a ‘‘balance sheet effect through
which firms build long-term loyalty, legitimacy, trust,
or brand equity that reinforce the corporation’s other
strategic objectives’’ (2007, p. 88). Hemphill (1999)
refers to this strategic approach as the dual purpose of
contributing funds to charitable non-profit causes that
simultaneously benefit the firm’s bottom-line and
political legitimacy.
The strategic stance implies a proactive, top-down
corporate approach toward CCI. In this approach, the
programs and activities are designed to fit a corpora-
tion’s core competencies, strategy, and values (Husted
and Allen, 2000) and to produce measurable benefits
to the firm (Hess et al., 2002). A similar move toward
the blending of strategic and social goals has been seen
for some time in the larger CSR literature (Porter and
Kramer, 2002).
Several authors have questioned the feasibility of a
strategic approach to CCI (Barnett, 2007; Margolis
and Walsh, 2003; Rowley and Berman, 2000). They
argue that the ‘‘seemingly tractable business case for
CSR remains just as debatable as the associated
ethical dilemma’’ (Barnett, 2007, p. 795). According
to Rowley and Berman (2000), more research
attention should be paid to uncovering the internal
and external (case-specific) drivers of CCI to build
an understanding of the complexities involved in
managing CCI. A number of efforts have been taken
in that direction.
For example, Saiia and colleagues (2003) draw on
CCI officers’ accounts to show how a perceived
pressure from within the company has triggered the
shift toward a strategic stance. CCI officers experi-
enced pressure to justify their existence, prove their
value added to the bottom-line, increase the strategic
content of their activities, and professionalize their
practices accordingly (Saiia et al., 2003). Others have
documented that the business impact of social
initiatives is less than expected, as not all stakeholders
value these initiatives (Peterson, 2004) or consider
them genuine (Sen and Bhattacharaya, 2001). On
the contrary, efforts to gain or maintain (external)
legitimacy by engaging in CCI activities may
actually backfire due to stakeholder skepticism
(Palazzo and Richter, 2005).
A similar line of reasoning applies to employee
volunteering. A few authors stress the positive impact
of management support in recruiting employees for
volunteer programs (Bartel, 2001; Peloza and Hassay,
2006). Very recent studies, however, have started to
uncover the potential double-edged effects of such
top-down programs. Tschirhart and St. Clair (2008)
identify a number of aspects in the management of
employee volunteering programs that may trigger
employee skepticism. The degree of skepticism
depends on how the employees view volunteer work
and whether they desire a link with corporate
objectives. It also depends on perceived pressure to
participate and the degree of emphasis on recognition
and rewards.
The above-mentioned study provides an indication
of the complex nature of dealing with CCI in a
workplace context. Managers face a dilemma. They
must deal with the potentially conflicting pressures
and constraints posed by organizational dynamics.
At the same time, they must also consider wider
environmental influences, including the broader
external social movement that is pressuring for
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 313
increased CSR and for a strategic approach to these
activities (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Raeburn,
2004). In contrast, Bowen (2007) argues that having a
corporate social strategy is not the same as imple-
menting one, and that it ‘‘may be more complex,
contradictory, political and contested than simple
top-down explanations of corporate strategy might
suggest’’ (2007, p. 109). Bowen argues in favor of a
more interpretative research framework in which the
interpretations, experiences, and actions of a wider
variety of organizational members are taken into
account.
Other studies have begun to move in that direction
as well. For example, several studies examine the role
of organizational actors involved in processes similar
to those inherent in the management of employee
volunteering and CCI more generally (Andersson and
Bateman, 2000; Dutton and Ashford, 1993). None-
theless, the predominant approach of this existing
research remains top-down and static. It does not
systematically consider the dynamics between the
attitudes and actions of internal agents pressuring for
CCI policies and practices, and the attitudes and
(re)actions of their internal and external audiences. In
addition, more attention should to be paid to the role
of the business context and the broader environment
in facilitating and constraining these dynamics.
Although some empirical work shows how certain
environmental and company-specific factors influ-
ence the level and substance of corporate giving
(Brammer and Millington, 2004; Keim, 1978), it does
not provide a clear insight into how such factors affect
or are affected by processes of interpretation and
influence.
The following section briefly introduces the central
concepts of social movement theory. It shows how a
social movement perspective can help focus attention
on the critical issues of CCI management, particularly
as they arise in attempts to institutionalize CCI by
framing it as standard business practice. A case study is
then presented to illustrate the management chal-
lenges of CCI through the social movement lens.
A social movement approach
to understanding CCI
The social movement literature provides a coherent
framework for developing a better understanding of
the role of employees as activists in mobilizing their
colleagues’ community involvement. It specifically
draws attention to the processes by which support
for CCI may be won or lost. It also highlights the
controversy and politics involved in the interactions
between activist and their audience and to the
double-edged effects that may result from the
choices activists make in their efforts to realize their
goals (Strang and Jung, 2005).
McAdam et al. (1996) provide the foundations of
this framework. They draw on several streams of social
movement theory to identify three factors that com-
bine to explain the unique challenges of dealing with
CCI in a business context: 1) the opportunities and
constraints confronting a social movement, 2) the
mobilizing structures available to movement actors,
and 3) the framing processes (i.e., the collective
processes of interpretation, attribution, and social
construction) that characterize the interactions
between the leaders of CCI and the other organiza-
tional members. After a brief description of the three
factors, this paper illustrates how these factors are
reflected in CCI at one Dutch company and which
management challenges are associated with each factor.
We focus particularly on the issue of framing, as this
social movement factor is at the center of the ongoing
CCI mobilization challenge, as argued below.
Political opportunities refer to the environmental
mechanisms that are at play in the wider context
in which movement actors operate and that may
facilitate or constrain social movement activity
(Campbell, 2005). Examples of such opportunities
include specific events in the broader political, cul-
tural, and social environment (Klandermans, 1997).
The structural characteristics of these events deter-
mine which repertoires of action, frames, and modes
of organization are considered legitimate (Zald,
1996). Within the workplace movement literature,
Raeburn (2004) has identified four categories of
workplace-specific opportunities that may also
facilitate (or constrain when absent) positive move-
ment outcomes. The presence of cultural support and
influential allies are examples of such institutional
opportunities. The central arguments in the literature
are that opportunities and constraints are socially
constructed and therefore prone to manipulation and
that movement actors require access to mobilizing
structures to act upon these opportunities and con-
straints (Davis and McAdam, 2000).
314 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
Social movement activity of any sort requires
the acquisition of resources, including legitimacy,
money, and personnel. The mobilization of these
resources requires some degree of organization or
structure (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). McAdam
(1988) refers to these mobilizing structures as micro-
mobilization contexts, or ‘‘any formal organizations,
informal networks, or social relationships that serve
to ‘pull’ the potential recruit into action’’ (1988,
p. 142). As a preset structure, the workplace context
presumably simplifies the mobilization of resources,
including the recruitment of active participants.
Activists ‘‘are known to each other, share a context
and set of grievances, and are already assembled in
the convenient meeting place of their organization’’
(Scully and Segal, 2002, p. 151).
Although some degree of organization or formal
structure is beneficial to the emergence and growth
of social movements, it may also prove to be a
double-edged sword, as the survival of an organized
social movement may come at the expense of the
achievement of the movement’s social goals
(Campbell, 2005). Markowitz and Tice (2002) refer
to this risk of goal transformation as the paradox of
professionalization. Their empirical work shows how
professionalization1 may attract institutional support
(i.e., ‘‘the monetary and infrastructural resources
from established institutions.’’ see Schwartz and Paul,
1992, p. 211), but may also force actors in the
movement to make trade-offs regarding the move-
ment’s agenda for social change.
The latter is especially prevalent in workplace
contexts. Employee activists may challenge the
organizational elite (e.g., top management or a
foundation board) as part of their agenda on social
change, even though they also need elite support to
realize that change (Scully and Segal, 2002). The
support that activists seek in the context of CCI is
two-fold. Organizations provide opportunities to
change the behaviors of individuals within them and
to involve these individuals in the social movement.
Organizations also provide resources to address
directly the social ills targeted by the social move-
ment. While organizational support can be helpful
for the social movement, it also creates dependen-
cies. In order to maintain organizational support,
social movements tend to become more mainstream.
In other words, they become more tied to the core
objectives of the organization through such activities
as strengthening the bottom line and focusing on core
competencies of employees. Mobilizing structures
thus not only provide context in which movement
activists try to change how organizational members
see social issues, but also are themselves subject of
ongoing debates about how the movement should be
interpreted (McCarthy, 1996).
How individuals interpret and make sense of events
and situations depends heavily on the cognitive
schemata, or frames, that are activated by the situation
(Weick, 1995). For example, some employees might
interpret employee volunteering as an impersonal
team-building exercise. Others might interpret it as a
personal altruistic experience. In the first case, the
cognitive schema that is active falls under the ‘‘work’’
category, while the cognitive schema in the second
case falls more under the ‘‘lifestyle’’ category.
Framing processes are vital to social movement activity
because ‘‘the very existence of social movements
indicates that differences exist regarding the meaning of
some aspect of reality’’ (Benford and Hunt, 1992,
p. 37). In most cases, core activists are actively engaged
in the production of meaning, and they draw upon
collective action frames for mobilization purposes.
Mobilization refers to the ‘‘interactions between a
movement and its constituency’’ (Klandermans, 1988,
p. 388) and involves two challenges: consensus mobi-
lization (i.e., the generation of attitudinal support) and
action mobilization (i.e., the generation of behavioral
support). The notion of consensus mobilization or
frame alignment suggests that movement actors may
draw upon the way others interpret a social issue to
align with the meaning system of those they would like
to mobilize (Creed et al., 2002). This could mean that,
even though movement activists might interpret CCI
as an altruistic activity, it might be necessary for them to
embrace different interpretations and emphasize dif-
ferent aspects of CCI to involve other organizational
members. For example, movement activists could
emphasize the organizational or individual benefits that
CCI can bring to those who participate and portray
CCI as competency development or team building.
The effectiveness of these attempts in legitimating and
mobilizing action ‘‘stems from the social construction
of congruence between the activists’ interpretations
and goals and those of the target audience’’ (Creed
et al., 2002, p. 480).
The central thrust of the framing in social
movement literature is that framing processes can be
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 315
problematic and contested (Tarrow, 1998). Benford
and Snow (2000) refer in this respect to the notion
of audience effects. Individuals or groups may have
political or strategic considerations not to participate
in social movement activity or to engage in acts of
counter-framing or counter-mobilization instead. A
common example of framing and counter-framing
can be observed around the issue of abortion.
Proponents of abortion rights frame their movement
as ‘‘pro-choice,’’ thus invoking cognitive schemata
associated with individual freedoms and focusing the
audience on the notion of rights. On the other hand,
opponents of abortion rights frame their movement
as ‘‘pro-life,’’ thus shifting the frame away from
rights toward cognitive schemata of life and death.
Framing may also have unintended and/or unde-
sired consequences (Snow et al., 1986). In this respect,
Gerhards (1995) refers to a tendency among movement
actors to use multiple and broad frames to appeal to a
larger audience, thereby running a risk of overexten-
sion. Overextension is the tendency to overemphasize
the more general and commonly accepted cultural
frames (e.g., the bottom-line rationale for CCI) and
underemphasize the emotional aspects of the issue
(such as altruism). Gamson (2004) adds that such broad,
inclusive frames make social movements more inter-
nally differentiated and more prone to internal conflict.
Benford and Hunt (1992) therefore conclude that
movement actors must find the right balance between
heterogeneity and focus, while managing on ‘‘a razor’s
edge between institutionalization and isolation’’
(Tarrow, 1998, p. 138).
Applying these ideas to the management of CCI in
the business context, we argue that a similar ‘‘razor’s
edge’’ can be identified. Core activists extend their
framing of CCI from an individual, isolated and
grassroots activity to CCI as a corporate strategic
practice. Although this frame extension is intended to
increase the number of employee volunteers and to
institutionalize CCI among (top) management, it also
increases internal conflict. In other words, a shift to-
ward treating CCI as standard business practice and
emphasizing the strategic approach to CCI is closely
tied to problems associated with frame overextension
and mobilization more generally, as discussed in the
social movement literature.
In the remainder of the paper, we introduce our
case study to illustrate how the social movement
dynamics and associated leadership challenges play
out in the business context. One of the central
elements in social movement dynamics are decision
frames: the schemata on which individuals draw to
make sense of events (Weick, 1995). We therefore
begin by describing the development and change of
the CCI movement frames in the organization that
was studied. To supplement this broader picture and
clearly illustrate the management challenges that
CCI leaders face, we describe why and how the CCI
leaders extended the CCI frames and what problems
they encountered due to the different ways in
which their organization’s audience received the
frame extension.
Methodology
This paper draws on the results of a qualitative study
(August 2005–April 2008) on the micro-dynamics of
framing CCI in a Dutch financial conglomerate
(approximately 11,000 employees in the Nether-
lands).2 We chose this organization for three reasons.
First, the case represents a best practice in CCI and
employee volunteering in the Netherlands. Second,
this organization has explicit ambitions to lead the
broader CCI movement in the Netherlands. Third,
we had established access through our prior involve-
ment with the organization. Because the study was
conducted in several different divisions of a large
conglomerate, our data represents a sample of large
companies in the financial services sector that are
especially prone to engaging in community involve-
ment initiatives (Brammer and Millington, 2003).
We decided on a qualitative case study approach to
explore and explain the complexity of CCI as a social
phenomenon and to explain ‘‘the world of lived
experience from the point of view of those who live
it’’ (Locke, 2001, p. 8; Yin, 2003). Similar to Rynes
and Gephart Jr. (2004), we consider qualitative
research a highly descriptive effort that is grounded in
a social constructionist approach to organizational
phenomena and that can be used to show how existing
theory may operate in specific cases. The original aim
of the study was to uncover the legitimacy debate with
regard to CCI and the role of strategic considerations
therein. Semi-structured interviews were conducted,
in addition to many informal conversations and
observations of CCI staff meetings, employee-
volunteering activities, and several focus groups of
316 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
organizational members (organized and led by an
external consultant as part of a larger stakeholder
research). We triangulated data sources (Flick, 2002) by
interviewing over 60 organizational members, including
CCI staff, managers from diverse hierarchical positions,
staff members, and employees. Each interview lasted
between 45 and 120 min and was transcribed in full for
coding purposes. We also collected more than 2,000
pages of relevant documents, including minutes from
CCI staff meetings, annual reports, intranet postings, and
several drafts on a strategic communication plan. We
used qualitative data analysis software for coding pur-
poses (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For validation
purposes, we presented our emerging insights to key
informants (in 2007 and 2008).
Our preliminary data collection efforts focused on
the experiences and understanding of CCI staff and
some CCI enthusiasts. We asked them about their
interpretation of CCI issues, as well as about their
motivations, aspirations, roles, and experiences.
Although we had prepared several open questions on
paper in advance, the interviews were primarily led
by the responses of our interviewees. Repeated
reviews of the transcripts were complemented
with the analysis of organizational documents and
observations in the field. Several interesting themes
emerged. We found variation in how the employees
understood and responded to the social issues.
Evolution was another important theme. In addition
to changes in the employees’ understanding of the
issues over time, we also observed changes in the
CCI practices and tactics that were used to recruit
organizational members and to legitimize CCI.
These changes resulted in internal tensions, which
highlighted the potential negative consequences of
top management involvement in CCI. We also
observed that the CCI leaders used a wide variety of
tactics to increase legitimacy and participation, as
well as to ‘‘sell’’ CCI. Existing literature on tactics
including literature on legitimation, issue selling,
championing, and upward influence (Andersson and
Bateman, 2000; Dutton and Ashford, 1993) proved
useful in explaining this observation by drawing our
attention to individual behavior and influence, to the
role of context in tactics choice, and most impor-
tantly, to the notion of issue framing as a selling
tactic. It was only by tracing the origins of this
concept that we were first introduced to the social
movement literature.
Informed by the insights of our preliminary
analysis and the above-mentioned literature, we
continued our research efforts by interviewing a
highly varied sample of organizational members,
including the insurance business line’s CEO and
several (senior) account managers and personnel
department staff. We asked them about their back-
grounds and their attitudes toward CCI. We were
also interested in their beliefs about the motives their
companies had for investing in CCI. Additional
questions focused on their views about CCI prac-
tices and recruitment tactics as well as the role of top
management in CCI leadership. We were surprised
by the highly varied and sometimes very critical
content of interviewee responses. Early coding of
these materials revealed a large set of diverse ‘‘ten-
sions’’ among audience responses and CCI staff.
These tensions suggested several double-edged effects
of CCI.
In the following sections, we combine the insights
and results from our analyses with more detailed
accounts of our data to report on the various facets of
the case study. Condensing the steps that are usually
reported separately in qualitative studies allows us to
present three different aspects of the research (i.e.,
the shift of frames, CCI leadership perspective, and
audience responses) in a single paper. We draw upon
all three perspectives to highlight the main contri-
bution of our paper – the double-edged effects and
dilemmas in CCI management. A more detailed
qualitative analysis is available from the authors.
The evolution of the internal movement:
from personal to business concern
The company that is the subject of this case study has
a rich history of CCI, going as far back as 1997. In
order to provide a structured, chronological account
of the development of CCI over the years (and as an
additional check to the retrospective accounts given
by CCI staff in their interviews), we examined a
large number of documents, including intranet
postings, annual reports, and CCI staff minutes of
foundation board meetings and staff meetings. The
analysis focused on identifying chronological phases
(as opposed to universalistic patterns or stages) in the
development of CCI over time. Based on our
analysis, we identified five distinct phases. The
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 317
issue’s distinct phasing is based on changes that we
identified in the documents regarding issue framing
and the tactics used to mobilize organizational
members, the goals of the CCI program, the
assumptions about the conditions of the internal and
external organizational environment,3 or any com-
bination of these aspects. Appendix Table I provides
an overview of the five phases, including represen-
tative quotations.
Phase 1: Thriving bottom-up enthusiasm (1997–
2000): In this phase, engagement in CCI is
framed as a private affair and an individual choice.
A communication manager utilizes a change of
corporate logo and a related change in corporate
values as an institutional opportunity to trigger
discussions on core values, corporate branding,
and employee behaviors. Supported by a vision-
ary CEO, she is able to develop a CCI project in
which employees may request a donation for the
causes for which they volunteer.
Phase 2: The emergence of a social movement organiza-
tion (2000–2001): This phase differs from the first,
in that explicit attention is paid to the develop-
ment of formal mobilizing structures with respect
to CCI. Documents on CCI report an emerging
need to establish a separate structure in the shape
of a foundation consisting of seven staff members
to preserve a sense of authenticity, autonomy, and
integrity. In addition, a basis is laid for a local em-
ployee-mobilizing structure in which active early
enthusiasts take seat.
Phase 3: Framing CCI as a HR tool (2002–2003):
In this phase, several early steps are taken to bring
CCI closer to the business by emphasizing the
‘‘qualitative dimension of CCI.’’ Rather than focus-
ing on personal growth, CCI documents report
on competency development and other human
resource management (HRM) concepts to stress
the ‘‘win–win’’ character of CCI ‘‘investments.’’ In
addition to collaboration with HRM staff, the
foundation staff also engage in a ‘‘pull strategy’’ by
giving advice and providing custom-made solu-
tions to staff units and business lines.
Phase 4: Toward a management focus in mobilization
(2004–2006): The fourth phase represents a clear
break in practices, as CCI staff choose to include a
top-down approach to mobilization. The goal
of this approach is to stimulate a sense of issue
ownership among the various layers of manage-
ment and to make up for what they believe are the
lagging results of the original framing of the issue.
Phase 5: Toward CCI as standard business practice
(from 2007 to present): In the final phase, founda-
tion staff members aim to implement a strategic
plan to ensure that members of the organization
will perceive participation in CCI as standard busi-
ness practice. Externally, they aspire to assume a
leadership role in professionalizing the broader
movement. Internally, they aim to frame CCI as a
‘‘strategic instrument’’ and ‘‘collective responsibility.’’
Taken together, these phases reflect a rigorous frame
extension over time. In the original framing (grassroots
approach), engagement in CCI is a personal choice, and
mobilization depends on bottom-up employee efforts.
Grounded in the assumption that community impact
stems from a multitude of small-scale, individual acts of
community involvement, program design is steered by
individual preferences. CCI is a non-standard business
practice in that it is separate from the business and is
driven by a willingness to assume responsibility for
expanding the broader CCI movement.
The new strategic management framing that has
emerged over the years emphasizes the business
context instead. Because CCI is a business concern,
participation is a management responsibility, and
mobilization is subject to the working of the hierar-
chy. This framing is driven by a sense of competition
with other companies with regard to CCI policies and
the impact they have in the community. Strategic
framing implies a preference for focusing CCI pro-
grams over a multitude of initiatives, assuming that
more community and business impact can be realized
by tying a company’s core competencies to specific
causes. In the next section, we describe how the core
activists in the CCI movement have managed this shift
from a grassroots to a strategic frame, as well as the
challenges that they have encountered in the process.
The core activists’ view
Drawing upon information from interviews and
informal conversations with CCI staff and from the
observation of their practices, we were able to
reconstruct the core activists’ view of the evolution
of CCI. The CCI leaders who were interviewed
318 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
identified several tensions they face when making
decisions about how to manage the development of
CCI within their organization. Because CCI leaders
attempt to extend the CCI frames and mobilize
employees, they have to consider the effects that
their efforts have on their audiences. They must
navigate and build organizational support structures
while simultaneously considering the ongoing influ-
ences and limitations from the external environment.
The types of tensions CCI leaders experience are listed
and illustrated with quotations in Appendix Table II
and described further below.
At the beginning of the CCI movement, the CCI
leaders had high ambitions, but mobilization proved
more strenuous than expected. The desired beneficial
effects on corporate image and employee development
did not materialize. Foundation staff members attrib-
uted these disappointing results to the original framing
of CCI as a personal choice and a bottom-up employee
initiative with an implicit emphasis on community
impact. Because of the highly diversified and broad set
of low-barrier and ad hoc volunteer activities resulting
from this framing, mobilization remained a labor-
intensive process. It did not trigger issue commitment
beyond the core group of enthusiasts nor did it generate
a shared sense of issue ownership among management.
The staff realized that they needed to change their
practices, especially if they wanted to retain their
leadership role among other companies also actively
engaged in CCI.
The members of the CCI staff believed that in
order to improve mobilization, it would be neces-
sary to centralize CCI activities and draw more
explicitly from the business organization’s unique
characteristics (i.e., its membership, hierarchy, and
business logics). Active support from senior man-
agement as issue ambassadors was assumed crucial
for portraying CCI as expected, in-role behavior
and for triggering issue commitment, especially
among middle management. The foundation staff
also expected to be able to convince the organiza-
tion’s employees of the added value of participation
in CCI by staying close to their daily operations and
business objectives rather than emphasizing personal
or private benefits. To turn participation in CCI
activities into standard business practice, members
of the foundation staff framed CCI as a strate-
gic instrument. In this frame, CCI emphasized
competency development, customer relationship
management, and reputation management instead of
such private goals as fun. The benefit of CCI
activities to the communities was considered only
after the benefit to the business had been considered.
The core activists’ interpretation of the added value
of the business context rests on the assumption that it is
possible to expand the support base for CCI beyond
early sympathizers by making explicit use of the
employees’ organizational membership and by drawing
on a completely different (instrumental) motivation
that better suits a business context. We argue, however,
that explicitly framing (or re-framing) CCI as a business
concern may actually complicate rather than facilitate
the projected interaction between the internal social
movement (i.e., the development of CCI in the
organization) and the external social movement (i.e.,
the increased demand for corporate responsibility by
the larger social environment). We believe that this
reframing implies a shift from a situation in which the
internal and external social movement are aligned (i.e.,
both address the community involvement of individ-
uals and are aimed at community relief) to a situation in
which they are also in conflict, due to the interference
of the business context. In the next section, we draw on
data gathered from other members of the organization
(i.e., the ‘‘audience’’) to show specifically how this
framing generated several double-edged effects and
which management challenges arose as a result.
Reframing from the audience’s perspective:
dilemmas and double-edged effects
Although they expressed strong belief in the added
value of a strategic management approach to CCI,
members of the foundation staff indicated several
practical impediments in the process of realizing
the frame extension. According to CCI staff, real-
izing such a rigorous frame extension required more
time and effort than expected. More generally, they
referred to the additional capacity needed to invest
in connecting their activities to the business, espe-
cially since they hoped to also retain their grassroots
origins. In addition to these practical issues, they
acknowledged a potential risk in stretching the
commercial orientation of CCI: ‘‘If you go too far in
the direction of the business, you start to forget that
your original aim was to do something for the
community; you miss something there as well.’’
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 319
Based on the observations above, we argue that
there are practical boundaries to the framing or
reframing of CCI as a business concern. Workplace
activists might go too far in assuming a strategic
management approach. This could create a leader-
ship paradox involving the need to manage the
interests of the company while keeping an eye on
the interests of both their own movement and those
of the broader, external CCI movement.
Our interview study into the attitudes and
behaviors of the organizational audience regarding
CCI and the foundation reflects this conclusion as
well. It points to a second, ideological, set of
boundaries to the process of framing or reframing
CCI as a business concern. The data indicate that a
shift toward a strategic approach (and away from a
grassroots approach) can be controversial and that it
can trigger an ideological debate among CCI
participants. A central point in this debate is what we
refer to as the ownership dilemma in CCI, which
consists of two related but ideologically separate
disputes. The two types of ownership dilemmas are
listed and illustrated with quotations in Appendix
Table III.
First, the private–professional connection in relation to
CCI is controversial. A distinction can be made
between employees who explicitly separate their
private from their professional lives and those who
are not ideologically opposed to combining the two.
For those who view volunteering solely as a private
activity, the growth of CCI within the organization is
problematic by definition, as it implies that corporate
membership can be used to stimulate activities that
they consider private. To these employees, partici-
pation in CCI activities is relevant to neither their
jobs nor their environments.
Employees (including management) who do not
necessarily consider an overlap between their private
and professional lives as problematic might never-
theless differ in the extent to which they consider
company intervention acceptable with respect to
CCI. Although some organizational members con-
sidered CCI separate from their job functions, they
nonetheless considered the organizational context an
attractive venue for mobilizing support for their pet
projects, as well as for acting upon their desire to do
good. Other employees recognized the value of
CCI to their work (e.g., they can refer to CCI
in conversations with clients) and/or perceived
participation in CCI as in-role behavior (e.g., it is
what a manager is supposed to do).
While the primary focus of the first dispute involves
the ways in which organizational members under-
stand CCI and their role identities, the second dispute
centers on goals, means, and mobilization tactics. This
dispute contrasts a local (bottom-up) approach to the
management of CCI with a central (top-down)
approach. The two approaches differ with respect to
the organization of CCI within the business domain,
the strategies and tactics that may be used to mobilize
participation, and the prioritization of goals.
With regard to CCI organization, some employees
criticize the current situation for being too local,
small-scale, and internally focused, while others
consider it too central, large-scale, and externally
oriented. In terms of acceptable mobilization strate-
gies, some find it appropriate to draw on tactics that
narrow individual choice and restrict the voluntary
and private character of CCI for the benefit of the
company. Others find such restrictions highly objec-
tionable. Our data show that a central, top-down
approach to CCI is generally more problematic for
some organizational members. Those who are already
active at the local level tend to perceive this approach
as a threat to their autonomy. For others, a central
approach to CCI is problematic by definition, as
organizational identification among some (new)
business units is low.
The two disputes represent the ideological
boundaries that organizational members may perceive.
One boundary emerges in relation to the reframing
of CCI from a grassroots approach to a strategic
approach. A second boundary emerges in relation to
the organization of CCI, a central, top-down man-
agement responsibility rather than a local, bottom-up
initiative. Different organizational members value or
criticize different combinations of framing and orga-
nization. The combinations to which they are most
responsive depend upon their interpretations of the
social issues, the relationship between their profes-
sional and private roles, their perceptions of the
foundation’s ambitions and practices, their views of the
tactics used for mobilizing CCI, and their interpreta-
tions of the organization and environment.
Regardless of their readiness to engage in CCI or
their attitudes toward this form of involvement, the
majority of employees in our research suggested that
the foundation staff might have gone too far in
320 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
assuming a strategic management approach to CCI.
Our interviews point to several potential or existing
negative consequences (i.e., double-edged effects)
associated with the adoption of a central, top-down,
approach to CCI. These double-edged effects are
categorized and illustrated with quotations in
Appendix Table IV.
First, employees feared the negative consequences
of professionalizing CCI activities and framing CCI as
a standard business practice. One of these fears was that
the foundation staff would lose sight of the unique
characteristics of CCI. Although a structural approach
may lead to more community and business impact,
some employees expressed a fear that efforts to
professionalize CCI could cause it to become too
pragmatic and casual. In addition, all interviewed
employees considered the explicit introduction of the
business context as an additional constraint rather than
a stimulus for CCI-related action. Such constraints
can trigger a sense of loose coupling. Some members
of the organization hinted in this respect at the pos-
sibility of free-riding behavior, as participation in the
internal movement was not necessary to benefit from
it. Another downside of CCI professionalization
emerges in the area of external communication about
CCI practices. The most enthusiastic participants
perceived external communication about CCI activ-
ities as essential to their company pride. For those
explicitly targeted with the new framing, however,
such external orientation only feeds their skepticism
about CCI and the interest of top management in such
efforts. For these employees, such an explicit need for
external validation comes at the cost of community
impact and is therefore questionable.
Second, organizational members referred to the
de-motivating and de-mobilizing effects of what they
experienced as the obligation to participate (rather
than perceiving the desired participation as in-role
behavior). Most of these respondents questioned the
added value of obliging participation to increase issue
commitment. Rather than increasing commitment,
this group felt that such ‘‘quasi-volunteer work’’ could
actually undermine intrinsic motivation. In this
regard, a number of organizational members referred
to the emergence of a hidden countermovement.
Third, employees referred to what they perceived
as the negative consequences of top management
assuming an ambassador role with respect to CCI.
Their comments suggest that such elite co-optation
reduces rather than increases their issue commit-
ment. Although elite support is considered essential,
many organizational members question the credi-
bility of top management as CCI ambassadors,
thereby calling the overall credibility of CCI into
question as well. The use of top management as
ambassadors shifts the evaluation of CCI from the
context of CCI policy into the overall strategy of the
organization, which further strengthens skeptical
attitudes. In addition, as more people become frus-
trated with their organization, they become more
likely to dispute the elite leadership and call for the
prioritization of internal problems over external
ones. In general, our data on audience responses
indicate that reframing has made CCI more political
and contested rather than more legitimate over time.
Discussion
Our analysis indicates that the fundamental conflict
inherent in CCI suggested in the literature (Buchholtz
et al., 1999) cannot be resolved by assuming a strategic
stance towards CCI. The results suggest that tactics to
legitimate and expand the CCI movement may
actually trigger a legitimacy crisis rather than a solution.
Our analysis reveals real boundaries to such a strategic
management approach to CCI. These boundaries can
be traced back to several aspects of social movements.
For this reason, this case provides a good example of
how core activists tend to frame their issues broadly to
appeal to a larger audience (Gerhards, 1995), thereby
risking overextension.
Our explicit consideration of the core activists’
perspective allows us to demonstrate how the
ambition to claim leadership of the external CCI
movement and to achieve further growth in the
internal movement may create a sense of necessity
among core activists to assume a more strategic,
external-oriented, top-down approach to CCI.
Over time, these core activists, who use their
workplace for mobilization purposes, may move
away from their grassroots origins to appeal to an
audience for whom such a framing of CCI would
not suffice to motivate and sustain their active
involvement. Although the business context does
provide such an opportunity, this paper shows that
the efficacy of such a shift is limited in at least two
ways.
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 321
At the practical level, our case study indicates that
framing CCI as a central business concern compli-
cates rather than facilitates the anticipated mutual
beneficial relationship between the internal and
external CCI movement. Core activists experience a
leadership paradox, due to the necessity of managing
an additional and potentially conflicting set of
objectives and criteria in selecting CCI practices and
mobilization tactics. While a specific focus in CCI
practices (e.g., a focus on underprivileged young
people) may facilitate external communication and
the ability to claim a leadership position with regard
to the broader CCI movement, the choice of this
focus might appeal only to a small portion of the
organization audience. Moreover, such a reframing
might also trigger ideological disputes over issue
ownership, if members of the organization’s audi-
ence believe that the core activists have gone too far
in ‘‘giving in’’ to business interests and the elite (top/
senior management).
While the CCI literature frames the ideological
debate inherent in CCI as a debate between moral and
agency-cost interpretations (both of which are, in fact,
representations of a corporate approach to CCI), our
research indicates that the actual ideological debate is
between two different perspectives on issue owner-
ship: an individual-oriented grassroots approach and a
company-oriented strategic management approach.
Our study shows that core activists may be confronted
with undesired double-edged audience effects with
regard to the internal movement. These audience
effects are more likely to occur when CCI is
approached in a corporate and top-down manner.
Double-edged effects are also more likely when core
activists essentially obligate participation in CCI by
appealing to the professional roles of organizational
members. Excessive movement in one direction of the
continuum (e.g., the strategic management approach)
might increase the salience of the other direction (e.g.,
the grassroots approach) in the perceptions of audience
members.
By depicting the mobilization challenge as an
exercise in reframing and by adding audience
responses to the analysis, we have provided a more
nuanced view of workplace activism. We conclude
that the mobilization of active support within a
business context is more complicated than what the
current literature on workplace activism suggests
(Scully and Segal, 2002). Complications can arise
from the excessive use of the business context for
mobilization purposes and the elite co-optation that
may result from it. Another source of complications
is formed by the unexpected audience effects that
may emerge when social issues are reframed into
business issues. Practices that are generally consid-
ered legitimate or standard business practice within a
business context may not be perceived as legitimate
within the context of CCI.
We propose that the complexity of managing CCI
and of leading the internal and external CCI move-
ment stems from the combined challenge of issues of
action and consensus mobilization and the influence
of the case-specific factors of the business context.
Although the commonality of the business context is
likely to tempt core activists to assume consensus
among their audience with respect to the desirability
of a strategic management approach to CCI, our
results suggest that the potential of such a frame to
mobilize action and sustained involvement in CCI
may be limited. While core activists may feel pres-
sured to change their issue framing according to their
ambitions and interpretations of the framing pro-
cesses, their audience may not respond as anticipated.
Our study thus underscores the added value of dis-
tinguishing between action and consensus mobiliza-
tion (Klandermans, 1988). As our research shows,
action mobilization does not necessarily lead to
consensus. On the contrary, an emphasis on action
mobilization may actually uncover and reinforce a
lack of consensus. Successful CCI management
should therefore pay attention to both action and
consensus. Unfortunately, the divergence of opin-
ions regarding the legitimate place and ownership of
CCI within the workplace context (as indicated by
the debates described in the previous section) may
make consensus much more difficult to attain than
expected.
Avenues for future research
In showing the added value of a social movement
approach to CCI, this paper underscores the need
for CCI practitioners and scholars alike to be
conscious of the social movement origins of CCI.
From this perspective, the management of CCI
requires maintaining a balance between a grassroots
approach and a strategic management approach, with
322 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
repercussions in the form of double-edged audience
effects if the core activists should go too far in either
direction.
The primary substance of CCI management
involves the management of audience perceptions
that will never be under the complete control of core
activists, not even in a business context. The diffi-
culty to control audience perceptions stems from
personal issue affiliations and differences in inter-
pretations of the organizational context and the
broader environment. The risk is always present that
core activists will aim at ambitions that are not shared
– or even recognized – by part or all of their audi-
ence. Another possibility is that core activists may
hold certain assumptions about their audience that do
not correspond to their actual attitudes and behav-
iors. We therefore believe that more research is
needed to explain and categorize audience responses.
Why would some people choose to be active in a
workplace movement although they are also very
critical of that movement while others may be very
positive but inactive? What distinguishes these
groups from each other?
The exploration of the above questions would be
particularly enhanced by the development of a survey
tool. While surveys loose some of the richness that
qualitative data can provide, they allow for a wider
sampling of organizational members. Larger sample
sizes and standardization of the collected data can
make additional quantitative analysis methods possi-
ble. For example, discriminant analysis can provide
insight into the key differences between active and
inactive groups. The increased anonymity for the
study participants is an additional benefit of survey
research. Since volunteering can be perceived as a
sensitive subject, employees might not be open in
discussing the reasons for their attitudes about vol-
unteering in face-to-face interviews. The anonymity
of the survey setting could also encourage employees
to be more candid about negative overall perceptions
of CCI.
Another important avenue for future research
involves the relationship between the type of social
issues embraced by CCI and the efficacy of tactics
used to stimulate employee involvement. Our
research has focused on a single company, and we
could examine only the interaction between a single
set of tactics and single set of social issues. Although
our theoretical framework suggests that social
movement organizing in a workplace context
presents inherent management challenges, those
challenges might be easier to overcome for some
issues or with the use of specific tactics. For example,
social movement organizing in favor of corporate
involvement in private issues (e.g., domestic partner
benefits; see Raeburn, 2004) might be more
challenging than organizing in favor of corporate
involvement in less private issues (e.g., environ-
mental sustainability).
One useful way to study the issue above would be
to replicate the present study in other contexts.
Replication would not only remedy the limited
generalizability of the case study conducted in this
research, but also provide an opportunity to compare
and contrast various approaches to managing CCI.
The instruments and measures developed for purposes
of studying audience responses could significantly
facilitate the collection of data in numerous sites. A
standardized measure for audience ‘‘resistance’’ could
be combined with more qualitative data to develop
hypotheses about the relationship between the type of
CCI issue and the efficacy of different movement
organizing tactics. Such hypotheses could then be
tested with experimental methods in either a labora-
tory or a corporate setting.
Notes
1 Professionalization implies the building of a formal
organizational infrastructure, introduction of hierarchy,
and clear delineation of areas of responsibility to ensure
organizational survival.2 This case study is part of a larger empirical research effort
that also includes a similar case study of what Yin (2003)
would call a ‘‘polar-type’’ case: a non-profit organization.
All data collection was conducted by the lead author.3 Cited quotes in this section originate from docu-
ments only.
Appendix
See Tables I, II, III and IV.
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 323
TABLE I
Description of phases in the development of a CCI program
Phase Issue framing Views on
mobilization
Representative quotes
Thriving, bottom-up
enthusiasm
(1997–2000)
CCI as private
affair and individual
choice
Bottom-up
mobilization
Assumption: ‘‘The message will circulate auto-
matically when people see what we do and how
well we do it.’’
Goal: ‘‘The initiative to become involved and
apply for support should rest with employees.’’
The emergence
of a SMO
(2000–2001)
CCI as private
affair and
individual choice
Formalization
of (bottom-up)
mobilizing
structures
Assumption: ‘‘The establishment of the foun-
dation is the crowning glory of our work. What
was initiated as a bottom-up initiative four years
ago has now become officially embedded in the
organization. We have seven permanent
employees, a stable budget and a foundation
board.’’
Goal: ‘‘A new foundation, but with the same
people and the same idealistic objective: calling
employees to account for their community
involvement and to stimulate them to contribute
actively to the community.’’
Framing CCI
as a HR Tool
(2002–2003)
CCI as competency
development
Mobilization by
collaboration
and a pull strategy
to engage business
units
Assumption: [Foundation staff still have diffi-
culty with] ‘‘connecting to the business lines’’
[and struggle with a] ‘‘gap between the com-
mercial business and community investment; a
labor-intensive year program; and a perception
of the foundation as a central organizing club.’’
Goal: [the aim is to] ‘‘Engage in more structural
alliances and to mobilize existing networks more
consciously’’ [as] ‘‘stimulation for growth.’’
Toward a manage-
ment focus in mobi-
lization (2004–2006)
CCI as manage-
ment responsibility
Addition of
top-down approach
to mobilization
Assumption: ‘‘The foundation has been a
‘bottom-up organization’ for years. Originating
from an employee initiative, the employees have
always been the ones who thought about and
shaped the activities [.] Nonetheless, we realize
that a bottom-up process cannot subsist without
the commitment of top management.’’
Goal: ‘‘We aim to deepen and professionalize
our practices, but we also want to maintain a
broad basis.’’
Toward CCI as
standard business
practice
(from 2007)
CCI as strategic
instrument and
collective
responsibility
Balancing bottom-
up and top-down
mobilization
approaches
Assumption: ‘‘After playing the missionary role
for many years, we have finally arrived at a sit-
uation in which most managers – at least in
words – commit to our approach.’’
Goal: ‘‘As part of the normal operations we
would like to realize a participation rate of 45%
of [company name] – employees in 2011.
Obviously, on a voluntary basis.’’
324 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
TABLE II
Core activists’ perception of tensions experienced in managing CCI
Experienced tensions
in managing CCI
Illustrations of core activist views
Individual choice versus
Central programming
‘‘We believe that CCI should originate from the enthusiasm of the organizational members
themselves’’ [and that] ‘‘we therefore should follow organizational members in their volunteer
initiatives and preferences.’’
‘‘There is a tendency here to leave all options open with regard to our internal clients. [.]
Nonetheless, keeping it broad adds nothing.’’
Community benefits
versus Business benefits
‘‘CCI should not exist if it does not benefit the community,’’ [but it] ‘‘simultaneously [should]
produce value for the firm.’’
‘‘Speaking for myself, what I would like to contribute is to realize as great a business impact as
possible, because, in the end, you just want to be a healthy company.’’
Private/personal
motivation versus
Instrumental
motivation
‘‘Manual labor activities, doing chores, fun day outings, social teambuilding activities; people
do not necessarily see the added value of these activities, but they do see the fun of it.’’
‘‘People like to do something with us out of a desire to make a difference, and we want to
make sure that it has value as well. It is easier to bind people to an initiative if it offers benefits
for their jobs; if you can combine the two.’’
TABLE III
Audience responses to CCI management and the resulting ownership dilemmas
Ownership dilemmas Illustrations of audience views
Private roles versus
Professional roles
‘‘For me, there is the private and the business. Should I also do something for the company in my
private life? Okay, but I already do that quite often. An additional project would not suit me.
I have a young family; demanding sports; I am already active in the football association – there are
1001 reasons for not getting involved.’’
‘‘Do you want to change these employees in their private behaviors? That is what you do when
you ask them to become involved in the local community.’’
Private motivations
versus Professional
motivations
‘‘It is nice to be part of a company that wants to invest in community involvement, but I do it out
of my own self-interested viewpoint.’’
‘‘That would be really for myself, for my own consciousness.’’
‘‘I use this in conversations with my clients.’’
‘‘I do believe CCI is part of my responsibilities. As a manager, you have to consider this
important.’’
Local (bottom-up)
organization versus
Central (top-down)
organization
‘‘It is too big, too colossal, too much of an ‘in-class’ approach; I believe in a regional approach.’’
‘‘The smaller the better; the closer to the local community, the better.’’
‘‘There is a risk that, once you institutionalize it on a higher (central) level, you demote the well-
intended local initiatives.’’
‘‘My view of the current situation is that there is a list of activities for which you can enroll
yourself if you want to [.] It is not by us, with us, for us.’’
‘‘I could imagine that we would invest a larger share of our capacity in thinking about how to
mobilize that big X for the foundation, not for the sake of the foundation, but for profiling our
company.’’
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 325
TABLE III
continued
Ownership dilemmas Illustrations of audience views
Local (bottom-up)
tactics versus Central
(top-down) tactics
‘‘You have to let it grow intrinsically from the bottom-up.’’
‘‘If the foundation does not have a huge attraction to organizational members and if it fails to
mobilize energy, is that due to all the people surrounding it?’’ and ‘‘in that case, should they take
all kinds of measures to realize it anyway?’’
‘‘You can not provide additional motivation by obliging people to participate [.] Of course they
will come and paint with us one time, but they will still not have it in them; that’s the crux.’’
‘‘This is how X would like to do business in the world, and participation is therefore not without
obligations.’’
‘‘What efficiency underlies such a collective CCI policy? None, and that’s why this is a sensitive
issue around here.’’
TABLE IV
Double-edged effects of CCI management
Double-edged effects Illustrations of audience views
Professionalization ‘‘It is not about emotions anymore; they are viewed more critically.’’
‘‘What do you need to account for anyways? That people had a day off? Much of it occurs in
private time anyway.’’
‘‘Our contribution could be larger. But larger often means more money and that we need to
embed CCI in our practices. That’s the downside as well. A certain casualness will creep into our
CCI activities and make CCI much more pragmatic.’’
‘‘I believe we are forcing ourselves on those nonprofit organizations just for the sake of showing
our involvement.’’
‘‘Then you are used in your private time as a source of free advertising.’’
Obliging
participation
‘‘I feel obliged, because that is how I am, but also because of my function, but I will think about it
long and hard before I consider participating the next time.’’
‘‘I do not want to be tested to see whether I am sufficiently CCI oriented, and that’s a broadly
shared but unexpressed sentiment among many management layers [.] Saying so would imme-
diately suggest that you do not want to be involved. But of course you want to, only the current
setting needs to change.’’
‘‘Nobody will say no, but they won’t say yes either.’’
‘‘The problem with obliging CCI involvement is that participation turns into an exercise in
checking off boxes, like it is with diversity. The number of participants is just not the issue.’’
Elite co-optation
and support
‘‘One of the foundation’s smartest moves has always been that they pretend to be separate from
our business. Any effort to use the foundation as a strategic instrument will be fatal, as you will
lose that unique sincere element driving it.’’
‘‘It is fine to do good. As a board of directors, however, if you continue to flatten your orga-
nization, I could not care less about your whereabouts within the foundation.’’
‘‘They need a patron, but if this patronage is commercially motivated rather than sincere […] It
will become a vehicle and lose its credibility.’’
‘‘If you require a ‘7 days a week, 24 h a day’ commitment from your managers, you can’t talk
with tears in your eyes about how important sustainability and CCI are to the organization.’’
326 Judith M. van der Voort et al.
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Judith M. van der Voort
and Lucas C.P.M. Meijs
Department of Business-Society Management,
Rotterdam School of Management,
Erasmus University,
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
E-mail: [email protected];
Katherina Glac
1000 LaSalle Avenue,
Minneapolis, MN 55403, U.S.A.
E-mail: [email protected]
‘‘Managing’’ Corporate Community Involvement 329