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International Journal of Project Management 27 (2009) 123–130

Managing for innovation in large and complex recoveryprogrammes: Tsunami lessons from Sri Lanka

Mikko Koria

Helsinki School of Economics, Finland

Received 4 September 2008; accepted 9 September 2008

Abstract

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami reconstruction has been one of the best-funded recovery operations ever. However, wavering publicpolicy, weak coordination, management and competence of actors, perturbed markets, a civil war and the sheer size of the operationhave led to less than desirable outcomes in the Sri Lankan context. Within a major international non-governmental organisation, thispaper finds that recovery programmes and projects require distinct approaches, resources and competence. Programmes are seen to becritical in nature and should enable knowledge transfer, while projects need to strive for output efficiency.� 2008 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Knowledge management; Innovation management

1. Introduction

Large natural disasters, like the Indian Ocean tsunamiand hurricane Katrina, cause extensive human sufferingand physical damage. Recovery is usually, slow, expensiveand complex in terms of coordination and management.The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami caused an estimatedUSD 9.9bn worth of damages, and while Indonesia washardest hit, significant and extensive destruction of lives,houses, public infrastructure and services was felt rightacross the region, also including Sri Lanka. The interna-tional response was also extensive, with an estimatedUSD 13.5bn of funds pledged or donated in the initialaftermath of the disaster, seemingly driven by the proxim-ity of Christmas and the loss of tourist lives. Out of this41% is from private sources, while the remainder camefrom international financial institutions [1].

The initial relief operation was seen to be successful inits aims. However, despite the extensive resources, in thesubsequent recovery phase the international aid agencieswere observed to be lacking in an understanding of local

0263-7863/$34.00 � 2008 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.ijproman.2008.09.005

E-mail addresses: mikko.koria@hse.fi, mikko.koria@kolumbus.fi

conditions, were not able to field adequate field capabilityand capacity, entered into projects and programmes withweak planning and an insufficient coordination ofresources, and were not fully able to contribute to a senseof ownership and beneficiary participation in the pro-grammes and projects [1,2]. Significant volatility in scope,cost and time has been observed across the board.

This paper examines the post-disaster recovery processof the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka from theperspective of project and programme management(PPM) of a major international non-governmental organi-sation (INGO) involved in the recovery operation. Thiscase study is based on documentary evidence, longitudinalparticipatory observation over a 24-months period, and aseries of semi-structured interviews and more informal con-tacts with key managers and stakeholders in the case orga-nisation and its partners.

2. Literature review

A continuum exists between emergency relief operations(as the first post-occurrence step), recovery initiatives, anddevelopment activities. Relief humanitarian organisationsare set up for rapid entry and response, while development

124 M. Koria / International Journal of Project Management 27 (2009) 123–130

organisations are built on long-term response driven bylocals need. Recovery initiatives are situated in the middleground, looking at supporting local stakeholders to recoverlong-term capability, while often operating from a relief plat-form. There is a well-recognized paradigm gap between reliefand development activities [3,4]. Short-term oriented organ-isations are often ill-equipped to consider longer-term effec-tiveness, ownership, participation, sustainability and genderissues, in addition to the more immediate efficiency concerns.

Long-term recovery initiatives are often organised intoprojects and programmes. In looking at the projects, it is rec-ognized [5–9] that the present theoretical base may not fullyapplicable to post-disaster recovery or development cooper-ation. Cicmil and Hodgson [10] argue that the presentapproach to the knowledge of projects needs to be criticallyreviewed due to epistemological incompatibilities with non-positivist paradigms – a familiar issue in development coop-eration and recovery. That being said, Morris [11] arguesthat the present paradigm of project management is flexibleand can accommodate incremental development. Recoveryinitiatives incorporate both hard and soft PM approaches,and as Pollack [12] aptly demonstrates, there is a need to bal-ance between these two. Some research has been done onunexpected events [13] and the strategies to manage them,and Denning [14] notes the complexity of ‘‘unknownunknowns” in unexpected events like large terrorist attacks– applicable also to large and complex natural disasters.

The wide literature on crises management is partiallyapplicable to recovery. As an example, Bertrand and Lajtha[15] argue for the needs for flexible learning processes insteadof tight and detailed procedures as a key to manage complexcrises, while Sellnow et al. [16] note the inbuilt inefficienciesof predetermined courses of action. Lalonde [17] exploresthe links between crises management and organisationaldevelopment as a way of developing lasting competence.Kruke and Olsen [18] note the challenges of having theauthority to coordinate in large and complex emergencies,and the problematic proliferation of actors, phenomenapresent also in the tsunami context. Gundel’s [19] highly rel-evant crises matrix relates predictability to ability to influ-ence – a tsunami is both unpredictable and hard toinfluence, locating it in the most disfavoured quadrant of‘‘fundamental crises”, where responses are unknown andthus large-scale destruction is not only possible butprobable.

A parallel also exists between the extreme situation of apost-disaster recovery and the mega-projects literature[20,21]. Inbuilt agendas effectively by-pass public benefit,resulting in poor socio-economic and environmental per-formance. There have been attempts to manage complexityin large projects through decomposition; one such attemptis the framework by Shenhar and Dvir [22], which, how-ever, tends to have a technological perspective, without awider socio-economic context. Large and complex recoveryoperations can also be seen as temporary organisations[23,24] and thus a whole range of literature becomes avail-able from the organisational studies.

Projects and programmes are problematic within thecontext of (international) development cooperation, muchakin to large-scale recovery operations in terms ofapproaches and methodological concerns. The advantagesof project approaches are evident for donors, as contribu-tions are finite and involve set objectives, aims and perfor-mance measurement. Unexpected benefits are usually noteither recognized or encouraged [25]. The beneficiariesare in many cases not in the ‘‘driver’s seat” of project iden-tification, planning and monitoring. Clearly asymmetriccapabilities contribute to this state of affairs, and initiativesdo not always address local issues and ownership [26].

Projects and programmes also present challenges toinnovation management. As Bessant and Caffyn [27] andBoer and Gertsen [28] argue, innovation is a continuousprocess, but projects and programmes in the recovery con-text tend to be discontinuous by definition. It is noted thatorganisational learning and knowledge creation [27–30] iscritical to the continuous improvement of the best practicealso in the recovery operations. Underpinning this is theability to sense, assimilate and apply new knowledge[31,32], observing that interaction in the process is essential[33] and knowledge has a key role in enabling administra-tive innovation, which is often linked to new technology[34,35].

What emerges from the literature is an observation thatresponse strategies in recovery initiatives could also signif-icantly benefit from flexibility, learning processes, and con-tinuous improvement, leading to administrativeinnovation, taken here to mean ‘‘the creation or adoptionof an idea or behaviour new to the organisation” [36, p.115]. From Schumpeter onwards, most many definitionsof innovation include the idea of novelty linked to utilityand diffusion [37–39]. As Afuah [35] has noted, administra-tive innovation is distinct from technical innovation, beingconcerned with organisational structure of managementand administrative processes.

3. The case

The Asian tsunami of December 2004 resulted in theloss of over 35,000 lives in Sri Lanka, as well as the totalor partial destruction of nearly 100,000 homes, displacingover half a million people. While the fielded resources wereextensive, the long-term recovery has not progressed in linewith the expectations [1,40,41].

3.1. A complex operational environment

The highest political leadership indicated that recoverywould be extremely swift and completed in a year at thevery most, contrary to the expert view of three to five years.This led to false expectations and a hostile media environ-ment looking for scapegoats for the delay among interna-tional organisations. As INGOs were also concerned withequity of aid support to minority groups, public opinionbecame a major consideration between the implementation

M. Koria / International Journal of Project Management 27 (2009) 123–130 125

partners, leading to delayed decisions out of fear of amedia backlash. This is also related to a general rise inauthoritarian rule and the negative impact of the armedconflict between the Tamil minority and the Sinhala major-ity, ongoing since the 1980s, essentially stopping all recov-ery work in the north of the country due to lack of access[41].

At the same time, the extensive resources meant thatthere were a significant number of organisational actorscompeting for (good) projects. This proliferation of donorsand actors made coordination efforts evidently more diffi-cult, and much of the aid effort was initially driven by aneed to spend, replacing other needs based approaches.There have been also problems with implementation per-formance, linked to the government’s inability to fully deli-ver the technical and coordination support (mainly landand services), which has had significant knock-on effectsin the programming of the hundreds of participatingnational and international organisations. Beneficiary iden-tification processes have not been robust in all cases, andsome vulnerable groups like squatters have been entirelyexcluded. In many ways, enabling the voice of the benefi-ciary has not been high on the agenda, perhaps somethingto be expected in a society that does not embrace stake-holder participation in governance [1,40,41].

On another level, the public policy on relocation andreconstruction has been inconsistent. A 200 m coastal buf-fer zone was created early on, without geomorphologicconsideration or wide consultation, ignoring a previousapproved Coastal Conservation Plan of 1997, thus in prac-tice eliminating the possibility of rebuilding houses in theiroriginal location. This was later revised to a significantlyless wide zone, enabling again (in mid-flight of the opera-tion) extensive reconstruction on original sites. This createda double knee jerk action: first came an expensive and cum-bersome top–down relocation policy, which means extre-mely heavy infrastructure investment and an overtreliance on the client–consultant–contractor approach(under the circumstances highly prone to cost escalationand susceptible to graft and unwanted collusion betweenparties), which was later replaced by a support programmefor self-help construction. The sudden increase in demandon consulting and construction services in a fairly small,closed and protected construction sector market created aseries of scarcities, which translated into increased costand decreased attendance. It is interesting to note in theinterviews how oblivious organisations were to these tobe expected market disturbances.

Lastly, there has been a lack of appropriate technicaland managerial expertise and knowledge within the partic-ipating organisations that have undertaken to implementreconstruction projects. In many cases organisations didnot have inbuilt competence to manage extensive portfoliosof reconstruction programmes and projects, but attemptedto build up this competence from scratch while runningwith the activities. Some organisation have been successfulin this, others less so [1,2,40,41].

3.2. A complex INGO

The case organisation, an International Non-Govern-mental Organisation (INGO) operating globally has beenable to support to the tune of USD 300 m the rebuildingof homes, hospitals, schools and water and sanitationinfrastructure in Sri Lanka. Over 200 projects have beenor are being undertaken, with individual project valuesranging from a few hundred thousand to close to 10 milliondollars. Shelter (taken here to mean homes) programmesuse half of the available financial resources while represent-ing less than a fifth of the total number of projects, and theorganisation aimed at contributing to the housing of over30,000 families affected by the calamity. At the other endof the spectrum, the livelihood development projects,intended to enable affected populations to return to activeand sustainable economic activity, utilize <5% of the totalavailable funding, but constitute, in numbers, nonetheless,a fifth of the total project portfolio. The INGO is one ofthe largest donors in the Sri Lankan context, representingto the tune of a seventh of all of funds in the post-tsunamirecovery (based on Government indicated total commit-ments of USD 2.1bn).

The INGO is structured as an umbrella membershiporganisation, a form of a matrix, in which locally managed,funded, and governed national organisations form thebackbone of the system. For international humanitarianaid assistance after natural disasters, the umbrella INGOacts in a central coordination role, while mostly thenational member organisations implement projects.

The core organisational structures are based on func-tional line management practices and long-term, repetitive,constant involvement between the national and interna-tional actors. Each one of the national member organisationis somewhat different in terms of its management practices,decision-making processes, and the ‘‘style” of management.At the same time, the INGO, together with the nationalmembership organisations has a very strong brand and anorganisational ethos that, according to a senior manager,is the glue that keeps the thing ‘‘ticking against all odds”

(interview 6/2007). A common code of ethics and conduct,together with an extensive volunteer base make the organisa-tion robust and able to deliver in very demanding conditions.The INGO has been involved in many post-disaster recoveryoperations in a lead role, and acts as a knowledge intensiveservice provider for the membership organisations world-wide. Projects are used on many levels of the organisationto deliver support to members in organisational develop-ment and humanitarian aid delivery capability developmentand readiness. The overall organisation has extensive knowl-edge of delivering relief aid in many parts of the world. Thereappears to be a variance in the ability to perform, however,and as one country representative put it, the organisation isat its best when there is an emergency, noting that ‘‘we arenot good in recoveries, as we always forget how we did itthe last time around” (interview with an European countryrepresentative, 4/2007).

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In order to achieve the common aims in the tsunamioperation, a joint management platform structure wasdeveloped, based on decision-making by consensus, toattend to the overall strategic level management of thecommitments made early on. The structure proved to bedifficult to manage, as conflicting agendas, differing compe-tencies and variance in inter-organisational trust madedecision-making processes extremely complex and time-consuming. One informant from the INGO has noted ‘‘ifthere are no complexities, the organisation is good at creat-ing them on its own” (interview 4/2007).

3.3. Projects and programmes

The recovery operation in the case is a one-off, temporalset-up that has the main aim of delivering rebuilt shelterand services to the affected population. Reconstructionprojects are located inside programme frameworks, in linewith functional line management systems and areas ofexpertise. Altogether seven programme areas were set up,out of which three deal with construction (shelter, health,and water and sanitation systems), using in total well overeighty percent of the total available funding.

In the case of the Sri Lanka there is not a single pro-gramme/project management office (PMO), but effectivelya series of offices – practically each national membershiporganisation that participated in construction activity hadtheir own project management staff. There are clear advan-tages to be obtained from sharing resources across all ofthe projects within the scope of the PMO(s) – the synergiesthat can be obtained are significant, and there are variousdegrees in the centralization. In the case of the tsunamirecovery, however, the various parties have been unableor unwilling to pool construction project managementresources to common advantage. Essentially the structurehas been splintered and divided. Lack of trust betweenthe partners has been identified (by several informants) asa key driver in the splintered project management struc-ture. The coordination between the projects is in the man-date of the INGO, and is centralised in a programmemanagement office. This programme management alsoincorporates a support centre for technical matters, theoverall contract management, and the relationship man-agement between the central authorities and the overalloperation of the INGO.

4. Findings

With apparently sound experience, ample funding and aclear mandate, the recovery operation of the INGO startedoff and ran into great difficulties from the beginning. Exten-sive delays have been observed in getting projects (and con-sequently whole programmes) off the ground, in executingthem and in closure. Programmes have not enabled cleardefinitions for project scope, cost and time, and in manycases the political agendas have detrimental on the projectlevel.

4.1. Re-inventing the wheel

At the inset, planning and coordination tasks wereunderestimated and overshadowed by the imperative ofsetting up the system itself, as effectively the operationwas re-inventing the wheel in many ways. The stakeholdermap was volatile, and conflicting internal and externalpolitical agendas contributed to additional delays. As oneinformant noted, the internal political agenda supersededthe technical one, and on one key occasion, the principaltechnical officer was given only five minutes to elaborateon the strategies of dealing with multimillion dollar con-struction programming. Many interviewes noted that theorganisation has not been able to capture, retain and/orre-use the learning from previous similar operations (exceptthrough the tacit knowledge of individuals that haveworked in various operations), and the various parties haveessentially had to re-invent the wheel in this operation, interms of the setting up and managing the construction pro-grammes and projects within the tsunami operation. This isno mean feat, and there is currently a functional system inplace. The downside of re-inventing everything again isthat it requires a great amount of work to set things up,and makes strategic drift not only possible but probable.That being said, the lack of incremental learning resultedin a lack of wide knowledge of available choices, leadingto strategic indecision. The interviews showed there hasbeen an observable lack of foresight in the organisation,which is risky in finance and time dimensions.

4.2. Programmes vs. projects

In terms of programme and project management issues,informants noted that management roles have beenunclear, as when generalist line managers have managedconstruction programmes and projects, or as when insuffi-cient or not fully competent resources are put in play.Common protocols and basic industry standard projectmanagement and planning tools have not been widely used.In some cases programmes and/or projects have been‘‘done on the side”, leading to lack of needed inputs andfailure, and weak planning competence and practice hasbeen widely observed. In many cases, parties have not sub-scribed to common guidelines, and in others, the guidelinesthemselves have not been to best benefit. Time has not beenconsidered as a cost, and shifting objectives have madeobjectives unattainable. Monitoring at all levels has notbeen systematic and attached to clear and concise goals,and a shifting resource base has made goal setting difficult.Foresight, financial follow-up and projections have beenlacking or not of useful quality. The expertise of projectstaff has not necessarily corresponded to the needs at hand,and according to a senior project manager, attempts to ver-ify the competence of incoming candidates was seen asmeddling in the affairs of the membership organisationsand was soon dropped. It should be noted that the wholeUSD 300m initiative did not have a single formally autho-

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rized/certified project manager at inset. In some cases taskdefinitions have not been seen to match with the reality athand. In addition to all of these, mostly internal manage-ment issues, shifting external conditions have played havocwith best plans and shaky government policymaking hasheld the operation at ransom.

It is also evident from the interviews that there is not avery clear understanding of the differences between pro-gramme and project management. The projects were seenas visible efforts to do something, while programme man-agement was ‘‘invisible” as it was not seen to be achievinganything except perhaps attempting to control and limitthe activity of the membership organisations. That beingsaid, all informants stressed the importance of coordination.

Yet, despite all the challenges, the various parties havemanaged to configure the programmes and projects intoa manageable system, and have addressed, among otherissues, risk management (albeit in a passive way, lackingproactive risk projection skills and methods that couldinform the development of the projects). In the shelter con-text, extensive development of standard operational levelprocesses and protocols has taken place during the tsunamioperation. Contract management documents are embeddedin local technical guidelines for construction activities.

4.3. Living (with) delays

The combination of fielding inadequate or inexperiencedstaff to manage very demanding and difficult projects in ashifting policy and resource environment has led to signif-icant failure in term of delivery timing, in addition to sig-nificant scope and cost drift. The evident lack of foresightto counter market disturbances (scarcity of service provid-ers and escalating costs) caused by the tsunami reconstruc-tion is also somewhat incredible – experienced managersshould have perceived that this was bound to happen.Many reasons have been given for the delays (observedin the internal reports and noted in the interviews), amongthem the credible and real public policy environmentchanges and the daunting size of the operation that hasadded onto the level of complexity. The less credible expla-nations include the voiced needs for extensive mobilizationtime requirements and the difficulty of recruiting and man-aging competent service providers. In terms of responsibleprogramme and project management the least comfortableexplanations are linked to the difficulty of the variousimplementers to field competent construction project man-agement staff.

4.4. And drifting costs

Cost overruns have been reported due to late starts,extended performance periods, and getting caught up inknock-on effects of inflationary markets, where the costof materials, labour and services has escalated over andabove normal limits. Delays have caused cost overrunsand in some cases cost overruns have caused delays and

abortive projects, when the funds have not been sufficient.As one finance officer noted, over the operation’s life theextensive financial resources have been whittled down toa situation of scarcity, where overtly ambitious pro-grammes have had to be cut to make ends meet. Recoveryoperations have pre-determined funding ceilings due toone-off funding (i.e. funding tends to be collected in theimmediate aftermath of the disaster, and the window isnot open for extended periods of time) and delivery scopeis stripped when funding problems emerge e.g. [20]. Typi-cally, internal management costs have escalated, and theexpense of extensive (but not always relevant) humanresources brought in from the outside has further had anegative impact on the available budget.

4.5. The major issues

In distilling the findings from the case, it is noted thatthere are major issues with: (i) the structure or set-up thatused to manage programmes and projects; (ii) the manage-rial practices linked to the management of programmesand projects; and (iii) the competence and ability that isfielded to manage the programmes and projects.

It would appear the matrix organisation is somewhatdysfunctional due to the fact that the members do notshare a vision of how the matrix should operate – thereare n views with n members. The matrix is also an ad hocconstruct and one that has not evolved through incremen-tal growth and development. This implies that there is aninbuilt asymmetry of expertise, knowledge, and experiencebetween the parties (as one informant noted, ‘‘there aresome parts of the organisation that have seen it all before,some which have done it once, some that never have, andthen some which will never understand what they aredoing, making coordination and harmonisation onerousand difficult”). When the political externalities are addedto the mix, the organisation becomes unwieldy, and fraughtwith internal tensions. The programmes and projects bothhad significant political dimensions, and project managersreported that they had to deal not only with internal butalso external politically oriented issues (with authorities,partner organisations, headquarters, and others), using asignificant amount of time and effort to keep projects oper-ational. At the same time they noted the weak coordinationand the unclear role of programme management in theoperation.

Another key issue was the structure of the project andprogramme management offices. The splintered structurecreated overlap, duplication, and made communication dif-ficult between the parties. It also effectively disabled thetransfer of tacit knowledge between the parties, as the var-ious PMOs were located in different parts of the capital cityof Colombo. The significance of the opportunity lost isexacerbated by the fact that knowledge in projects tendstowards the practice-based paradigm, where explicitknowledge is not seen to exist without the tacit. It wasnoted by many of the informants that in the Sri Lankan

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context, information and knowledge needed to be transmit-ted orally and personally for action to result.

4.5. Management

With as many approaches to planning, executing andcontrolling projects and programmes, as there are member-ship organisations in the operation, the issue of assuming acommon management protocol becomes quite significant.In the area of construction management, a decision wasmade early on to use the Sri Lanka construction industrystandard for conventional client-consultant-contractorworks. While this is a logical move, it excluded effectivelythe whole set of procedures and protocols needed forself-help housing programmes. Also, as one project man-ager noted, these procedures were only written up after asignificant number of projects had already been put intothe pipeline. In other words, the opted standard was bothincomplete in coverage and late in timing. Another issuewas that internal processes and protocols were notaddressed holistically, and as one informant noted, ‘‘onenever knew how things were going to be done before doingit”.

One of the key lessons from Sri Lanka has been that acomplex and splintered operational environment needs tobe negotiated into a common agenda, before hitting theground with projects. The fuzzy front end of programmes(which are composed of individual projects) tends to beambiguous and riddled with uncertainty of objectives andmethods. In development, which recovery and reconstruc-tion is arguably a part of, the role of the dialogue emergesas a key issue to address, and the process is inherently polit-ical and complex due to international actors. In the after-math of natural disasters, the circumstances almostinvariably have an effect of changing existing socialarrangements, redistributing wealth and opportunitieswithin the social fabric. The markets and normal procure-ment systems tend also to be disrupted, and the assumptionthat services and goods can be procured as usual may notbe valid. This makes planning very difficult, as the aimsmay be socially constructed over time, and again the polit-ical nature of the solutions is evident.

4.6. Competence issues

In the Sri Lanka operation, the various partneringorganisations have on occasion (more in the beginningand fortunately less later on) fielded staff that have nothad the relevant experience or training to manage largeand complex projects. Even less expertise has been avail-able on the programme management level. Also, great var-iation in the expertise has been observed in the professionalstaff, leading to a culture of ‘‘doubling up just to be on thesure side”, which effectively means that work has been donetwice over. Still yet, the senior management of the partner-ing organisations have not often had experience in large-scale programme and project management. The combined

negative impact has lead to a culture of managing by theleast common denominator.

5. Discussion

Cicmil and Hodgson [10] argue that failure in projects isless due to technical issues than political processes that arenot considered deeply enough in the conceptualization,planning, implementation, and closure of projects. Fur-thermore, stakeholder participation, ownership of projectsare important, and as Flyvbjerg et al. [20] note, there is aneed to consider the social construction of projects. Inthe context of large and complex operations, like theIndian Ocean tsunami, it would appear that this essentiallyholds true for both projects and programmes.

5.1. Towards critical programmes

The Sri Lanka experience shows that having overlap-ping staff, responsibilities and tasks between programmeand project management creates easily a vacuum in theprogramme management side. The project managementside is a concrete activity that produces visible evidence,while programme management is invisible and linked toabstract outputs. The case organisation understood theneed to staff project sections, while understaffing pro-gramme management. In order to achieve a balance it issuggested that programme and project management needto exist side by side, but with very clear boundaries anddedicated staffing. The management structure must be ableto create a division of labour between exploration (seenmostly as programme level activity) and execution (as inprojects) oriented parts of the management structure. Theclear boundaries translate into clear roles that enable effi-ciency in project delivery on one hand, and reflection andsignificance creation on the other. To use project staff toman programme tasks effectively constrains innovationby limiting unanticipated benefits, programmatic changesand dynamic adaptation to novel circumstance.

In this case, the INGO programmes form the essentiallink between organisational strategy and project implemen-tation, and the interface between the levels has an impor-tant role in ensuring that projects are aligned with theoverall aims of the organisation. Individual projects onlylook at a specific area of a whole programme – having aportfolio of projects drifting in varying directions willundermine the organisational strategy as a whole. It isargued that in the context of large and complex operations,and adopting the vocabulary of Cicmil and Hodgson [10],programmes need to be critical, while projects need to be task

oriented and efficient. This joins the perspectives of hardand soft PPM [12] into one framework.

5.2. Transferring knowledge

The programmes also have a second, important func-tion. They must be able to capture, retain, and diffuse the

M. Koria / International Journal of Project Management 27 (2009) 123–130 129

learning from the operation to be used in the next one,implying a drive towards continuous improvement[27,31]. This demands that some of the competence mustreside in-house, to be (re)applied as needed in a timely fash-ion; starting programmes from scratch every time a disasterhits is simply inefficient. While programme know-how isargued to be a key competence, projects are more flexible,and scan be set up with a varying set of circumstances, pre-mises, models and protocols. It is argued that it would betremendously useful to have a single organisation-wideproject management protocol, but it is also recognized thatthis may be a long-term goal.

5.3. Competence issues

It is suggested that the key factor in terms of effective-ness in recovery and reconstruction operations is linkedto field adequate human resource. To make sure that com-petent staffs are fielded, it is possible to develop an autho-rization/certification scheme that parallels the programmeand project management structure. While no certificationscheme is watertight, the fact that professionals are regis-tered and have gone through certified training is normallyan acceptable indication of expertise (this is not a newobservation and e.g. Telford et al. [1] propose accreditationschemes). It should be noted that the accreditation schemeand the training must be developed for the context on therecovery work; it is evident that any accreditation schememust accommodate for the particularities at hand, and itmay be that various different types of certifications areneeded to cater for varying needs, noting especially therequirements for self-help or self-build schemes. As profes-sional programme and project managers are not usuallyreadily available at short notice, it is suggested that part-nering arrangements should be built up with professionalprogramme and project management practices, to enablegetting best practice out to identify issues very early on ina post-disaster situation. There is also an observed needto train existing staff members in contextually relevant pro-gramme management practice.

In large and complex recovery operations, the availabil-ity of planning skills is bound to be limited, most probablyseverely so. This implies that planning exercises must beprioritized and that over-extensive and complex planningshould be avoided, supporting the view of progressive elab-oration in manageable steps. Clarity, flexibility and opera-tional simplicity need to be developed for the programmes;complex, inflexible gate-keeping through ‘‘must do beforeproceeding” is often counterproductive and leads to grid-locked situations. The successful management of largeand complex operations requires innovative HR policiesand incentives to attract qualified professionals.

6. Conclusions

This paper has examined the lessons from the tsunamirecovery operation in Sri Lanka.

It notes the differences in the roles and competenciesneeded to manage programmes and projects in large andcomplex operations. The inherent political nature of pro-grammes makes them critical in nature, and it is suggestedthat a clear structural and managerial divide be set to dis-tinguish programmes from projects. This is done with aview of enabling efficiency in the implementation of pro-jects, as the programme level is seen to absorb the ambigu-ities, clearing them before project execution commences.Programmes also a key role in transferring the learningfrom one operation to another one and it is thus arguedthat competence in programme level management mustreside with the organisation. The knowledge intensiveactivities of the organisation in question require high cali-bre human resources, both to explore new possibilitiesand to execute efficiently defined solutions. It is suggestedthat networking with international partners is a way toachieve the necessary competence, in addition to imple-menting professional authorization schemes. Scarcityseems especially acute in programme managementcompetence.

Finally, it is suggested that significant administrativeinnovations are available in the recovery context frommaking programmes critical, transferring learning throughorganisational embeddedness, and through enhancedhuman resource management.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this study was reviewed, acceptedand presented at the European Academy of ManagementEURAM 2008 conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 14–17of May 2008. The author would like to thank the reviewersand the conference participants for their valuable insights.

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