MANAGING RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN A NEW

STRATEGIC AGE

Richard Mies29 January 2009

UNPREDICTABLE, DIVERSE, GROWING THREATS

• Changing character of war: irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and asymmetric

• No longer confined to the battlefield• Proliferation of nuclear weapons, biological agents,

and cyber technology• Proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile

technology• Proliferation of hard and deeply buried targets• Non-state actors• Emergence of potential peer, near-peer competitors

USA

JapanNATO

Russia China

France

Germany

CaspianStates

Taiwan

Pakistan

India

North Korea

South Korea

Egypt SyriaPalestine

IsraelIraq Iran

England

South East Asia

EastEurope

DETERRENCE RELATIONSHIPS IN A MULTI-POLAR WORLD

East Asia

Middle East

Afghanistan

South Asia

North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

South Pacific

CanadaCentral AmericaSouth America

Cuba

TerroristsExtremists

Ukraine

2002 Near Term Mid Term Far Term (2012)

• Peacekeeper Inactivation• 4 SSBN conversion to SSGN• B-1B rerole requirement elimination

2005

NewTriad

Missile Defenses

Command, Control, Intelligence and Planning

Improved Non-nuclear Strike

Periodic Assessment Point

THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE 2001 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

1,700 - 2,200

Responsive ForcesSTART I

Triad

Infrastructure

THE RISKS OF FURTHER STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS

Credibility of our extended deterrent commitments may fall into serious question

Potential adversaries may be emboldened to challenge us

Comparative stockpile asymmetries become more pronounced

Loss of inherent robustness and flexibility in options available to the President

Shift from counter-force to counter-population strategy

Stockpile asymmetries more pronounced at lower strategic force levels

Tactical Warhead UncertaintyTactical Warheads

Strategic Warhead UncertaintyStrategic Warheads Production Capacity

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

RUSSIAN STOCKPILE+ UNCERTAIN CHEMICAL CAPABILITY+ UNCERTAIN BIOLOGICAL CAPABILITY

1995 1990 1985 1980

U.S. STOCKPILE

US / RUSSIAN STOCKPILE COMPARISON

2005 2009 20002005

THE STRATEGIC TARGETING DOCTRINE DILEMMA

NUMBER OF AVAILABLE WEAPONS

MEASURE OF DAMAGE

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

COUNTER-POPULATIONNOMINAL MAX DETERRENT

REQUIREMENT

STRATEGIC FORCE ATROPHY

Weaknesses highlighted in numerous reports. Erosion of: Senior leadership interest People and expertise Research and development Technology Infrastructure Congressional support

“Our lack of nuclear weapons production capability – and our stricture against not only development but design – holds our future hostage.”Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study

THE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Arms control frameworks need to be more comprehensive

Addressed in armscontrol indirectly

via launcher accounting rules

Tactical NuclearWeapons

Inactive Nuclear StockpileNuclear Warhead Components

Fissile MaterialNuclear Infrastructure

Scientific/Technical Expertise

StrategicNuclear

Weapons

25

20

15

10

5

0

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Number of Warhead Types in Production

Aver

age

Wea

pon

Age

(Yea

rs)

Num

ber o

f War

head

Typ

es in

Pro

duct

ion

Stockpile Age

End of Fiscal Year

AN AGING STOCKPILE OF UNCERTAIN AND LIKELY DECLINING RELIABILITY

1

10

100

1000

2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044

Year

Forc

e Le

vel

THE APPROACHING DELIVERY PLATFORM CLIFFS

ALCM/ACM

MINUTEMAN III

SSBN/SSGNTRIDENT D-5

BOMBER

STRATEGIC COSTS(1990 - 2008)

DECREASE=55%

STRATEGIC FORCES(CY$B)

6.5% of FY90DOD TOA

2.1% of FY08DOD TOA

1990 2008

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

FISCAL YEARS

COST

DOD TOA(CY$B)

INCREASE=34%

NON-STRATEGIC FORCES

STRATEGIC FORCES

1990 2008

CY$: FY07

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

STRATEGIC FORCE HEDGING OPTIONS

FORCE STRUCTURE Diversity of operationally deployed and stockpiled warheads Diversity of delivery platforms and tactics Reconstitution capabilities Integration of strategic offense and defense Integration of kinetic and non-kinetic

FORCE POSTURE Initiatives to improve survivability Flexibility in force generation Strategic communication/signaling

INTELLIGENCE/TACTICAL WARNING/ATTACK ASSESSMENT Diversity of land/sea/air/space-based sensors Reliance on dual phenomenology Potential establishment of joint/international data exchange

centers and verification means

NEEDED STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES Senior leadership commitment, advocacy, and involvement Improved strategic intelligence Comprehensive strategic research and development Replacement warhead designs with enhanced safety,

security, and use control as well as new designs to address existing mission shortfalls

Enhanced strategic communications/declaratory policy Understand/engage/influence

More robust adaptive planning Stronger commitment to non-proliferation initiatives

Prevention Mitigation/consequence management Attribution Response

Better integration of all instruments of national power

THE ILLOGIC OF ZERO

Is it feasible? Is it verifiable and enforceable? Is it inherently stabilizing and hence

sustainable? Is it desirable?

“The means for creating a world without actual nuclear weapons would have to be of a basic political kind, not a matter of technical arms control. Secure nuclear abolition would be consequence, not cause; and in the journey it has to be cart, not horse.”

Sir Michael Quinlan

A PARADIGM SHIFT?

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

2.5

War

time

Fata

litie

s(%

of w

orld

pop

ulat

ion)

1

2

01700 19001600

1.5

.5

WW

I

“Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war, than onewith major war but no nuclear weapons.” Sir Michael Quinlan

THE ABOLITION CART BEFORE THE GEOPOLITICAL HORSE?

“The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end. Upside down first; for nations do not arm willingly. Indeed, they are sometimes only too willing to disarm, as the British did to their sorrow in the Baldwin days. Nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily and without committees to tell them how they are to undress.”

Salvador de Madariaga

STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTION GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The journey is more important than the destination Focus on stability and capabilities rather than just

numbers View reductions as a means to an end – national

security- and not as an end in itself Strategy must drive numbers rather than numbers

driving strategy Preserve strategic adaptability as a hedge against

uncertainty Place burden of proof on reduction advocates Eliminate artificial distinctions between strategic and

non-strategic nuclear forces Utilize deliberate planning as the foundation of

adaptive planning Exercise capabilities regularly

A WISE STRATEGIC ARCHITECT