manin - on legitimacy and political deliberation

7/28/2019 Manin - On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation

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On Legitimacy and Political DeliberationAuthor(s): Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, Jane MansbridgeReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 338-368Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191208 .

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ON LEGITIMACY ANDPOLITICAL DELIBERATIONBERNARD MANINCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris)Institutefor Advanced Study (Princeton)Translatedfrom the French byELL YSTEIN and JANE MANSBRIDGE

A SKETCH OF A THEORY OFPOLITICAL DELIBERA TIONThe theoretical controversies that the notion of social justice

provokes today go far beyond the traditional framework of debatesabout the respectiveroles of the market and the state in the distributionof wealth.' The principal arguments that have been proposed seek, ineffect, to define social rules capable of bringing about the unanimousagreementof individuals.The most radical form of liberalismmaintainsthat protection against arbitrarycoercion is the sole common aim of allhuman beings living in society The liberty of individuals is identifiedwith their security protected from coercion by others, every individualmayfreelyseek happinessas he understandsit, determinehis own goals,and attempt to realize them, at least as long as this exercise of hisfreedom does not encroach upon the freedom of his fellows. Security isthus the only acceptable political principle;while all individuals havedifferentconcretegoals, they all wishto pursuetheirown goals in peace.If the rules promulgated by the political authorities limit themselves toguaranteeing liberty as defined in this manner, they can be universal,and apply to all in an identical fashion, because libertyis the sole aspectunder which all individuals are strictly identical. Indeed, whenever

EDITORS' NOTE: This is a translationwith minor modifications of an articlepublishedby thejournal Le Debat (Paris:Gallimard,Janvler 1985)under the title "Volonte Ge'neraleou Deliberation? Esquissed'une Theorie de la Deliberation Politique."POLITICAL HEORY,Vol. 15No. 3, August1987338-368? 1987SagePublications,nc.338


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Manin / ON LEGITIMACY AND DELIBERATION 339

political powers try, beyond concern for security, to make individualssubstantially better off or to affect, even to some small degree, thematerial situation of one or another group deemed to be particularlyunderprivileged, they will be led to enact rules that do not treat allindividuals in the same manner. By the very nature of their objective,such rules can never achieve the assent of all. The aim of the politicalordermust, therefore, be liberty(that is, security) and not well-being, asindividuals would not be able to agree on a single definition of well-being.2 The only type of state acceptable to all, and, therefore,legitimate, is one that limits its functions to the guaranteeof internalandexternal security within the society' such is the traditional "minimalstate."3This argument, however, runs into a major objection. Liberalismassumes that each individual is to have the rightto pursuehis objectivesfreely, protected from the interference of others. But for those indi-viduals whose income and situation place them below a certainthreshold, this rightjust loses its meaning.The minimalstate will thus beone in which certain people cannot seek to realize their objectives. Theuniversalism that was sought after is thus not attained; it can only beattained, or at least approached,if one acceptsthe promulgationof rulesthat are nonuniversal in their application, and that aim specifically atthe well-being of certain social categories, and, therefore, cannotcommand universal agreement.It is possible, however, to try to demonstrate the rational anduniversally acceptable character of a theory of justice that bases theactions of the state on broaderfunctions than those of the minimalstate.Rawls makes this attempt.4 He tries to prove that by assuming thatrational individuals,5who wish to form a society, are indifferentto oneanother and are unaware of their potential position in the society theyare about to establish, it is nevertheless possible to deduce that theseindividuals must accept two principles of justice, the second one ofwhichjustifies a certain redistributionof wealth.6 There is no need hereto examine in detail Rawls'sdemonstration. What matters is his aim. Ifhis process of deduction is correct, the two principles that he proposesfollow necessarily from the rationality of individuals placed in theoriginal position. These principles can thus, at least in the abstract, bethe basis of universal agreement.It has, however, been convincingly argued that the second principle(inequalities should be so arrangedthat they are to the greatestbenefitofthe least advantaged) cannot be rigorously deduced from the data of the


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340 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1987

original situation. Thereis, in effect, an implied asymmetrybetween themost andthe least privileged.The second group is favored over the first.If people neverthelesspreferit, it is because they tend to adopt the pointof view of the least advantaged implicitly and without compellingreason.7The universalism that was aimed at does not obtain becausethesecond principle rests on the particular point of view instead of theuniversalpoint of view of the rational individual. The second principlewould, however, not be undermined by such a criticism if Rawls wereable to recognizethat adopting the point of view of the leastadvantaged,while not absolutely rational, is nonetheless partially justifiable. But hecannot acknowledge such a possibility because his aim is to deduce astrictly universal conception of justice.Faced with these failures and inconsistencies, one may betempted todismissthe very premiseof a projectthat attemptsto define a conceptionofjustice that will produce, at least in principle,a unanimous agreementamong rational beings. The theses of radical liberalism, like those ofRawls, are in fact efforts to carryout a program, based on unanimousagreement. Rawls's work expresses this aim with particularclarity, butit is no different in the case of the radical liberals. Rawls states explicitlythat he wishes to give his theory a certain and unshakable base. It mustrest on an "Archimediean point,"8that is to say, on a unanimouslyagreed-upon position, considered necessary by all. "The originalposition is so characterizedthat unanimity is possible."9To justify hischoice of unanimity, he adds: "For the most part the philosophicaltradition including lntuitionism, has assumed that there exists someappropriateperspectivefrom which unanimityon moral questions maybehoped for, at least among rationalpersonswith relevantlysimilarandsufficient information."'0The project of basing political legitimacy on unanimity cannot bedismissed merelyon the groundthat it appearsat firstglanceunrealistic,for it also seems to derive inescapably from the fundamental principlesof modern individualism.Bynature,everyindividualis free andequaltoevery other individual. There is no essential difference or naturalhierarchy among individuals to justify the domination of some overothers. Political power and the rules it promulgates can have no otherlegitimate basis than the will of these equal individuals.This power andthese rules bear on all members of society and constrain them all. Therulescan, therefore, be legitimate only as long as they arisefrom the willof all and representthe will of all. In orderto be realisticand to relax theexorbitant demands of unanimity, one may add that this unanimity is


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not required for each individual decision, but rather for the largerprinciples and rules from which particular decisions flow. Rawls, forexample, does this. One could also distinguish unanimity in principlefrom the actual unanimous agreement of all parties, and argue thatphilosophical justification requiresonly the first. For example, if it canbe shown that a rule, opposed by some, actually supports what they, asfree and rational subjects, should have wished for, then one could arguethat their actual disagreement does not invalidate the rule, because therule reflects only what they should have wanted in principle. Thesedistinctions and nuances, however, in no way change the fundamentalprinciple:that unanimityalone is the basis of legitimacy It is in order tomeet this requirementthat universalist theories of justice seek to showthat principles do in fact exist that can form the basis for unanimousagreement.

UNANIMITY AND MAJORITYLiberal theories of justice try to answer the question: How can weestablish a political and social order based on the will of individuals?From its inception, modern democratic thought has beenconfronted bythe same problem because, like literalism, it is based on the principlesofindividualism. This is so regardlessof the differences between the liberaland the democratic points of view Both arrive at an identicalconclusion: in the political sphere, it is unanimity that provides theprinciples of legitimacy Most democratic theories, however, areconcerned not only with legitimacy, but also with efficiency. Thus they

must bring into play a more realistic principle of decision making thanthat of unanimity, namely the majorityprinciple.Yet the meanstheyuseto reconcile the principle of decision making (by majority) with theprincipleof legitimacy (by unanimity)underlines even more stronglytherequirement for unanimity in any political thought that is based onindividualism.The thought of Sieyes presentsa remarkableexample of this process.Sieyes states that men areby nature free. When they form an associationor a society, "only relations based on the free act of will of eachindividual can be established among them."1'Only an individual's willcan give his agreement the character of a moral obligation. Con-sequently, "laws can only rest upon the will of individuals."'2 In orderfor a society to exist and to act, it must have a common will. "This will


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must of course be the sum of all individual wills, as was doubtless thecase when a group of menjoined in a political society, and the commonwill representedexactly the sum of allindividual wills."13This sumof allindividual wills is what is meant by unanimity. ElsewhereSieyes writes:"A political association representsthe achievement of the unanimouswill of its members."'4Yet he continues as follows:

Its public institution [that is its government] is the resultof the will of the plurality[that is of the majority]of its members.Unanimitybeinga verydifficultobjectivetoattain even among a rather small group of people, it becomes impossible in asociety of several million individuals. Since civil association has certain goals,reasonable means must be used to attain them. We must be satisfiedwithplurality.Thus, with good reason, plurality becomes legitimately a substitute forunanimity.15

To require that the common will always equals the exact sum of allindividual wills would lead to the "dissolution of the social union. Ittherefore becomes absolutely necessary to recognize all the character-istics of the common will in whatever plurality a community sets asdecisive. 6Sieyes's argument indicates how the requirement for unanimityfollows from the original postulate (that the individual will is the solesource of legitimateobligation);but it also stresses the extremedifficultyof reconcilingthis principleof legitimacywiththe practicalnecessitiesofpolitical life, which make it essential to settle for a majority Thissolution, in a way, transsubstantiatesmajorityinto unanimity majorityis not identical to unanimity, but we must resolve to find "all thecharacteristics"of the latter in the former. MaJoritymust be consideredas equivalent to unanimity.Unanimity thus remains the true source of legitimacy MaJoritywillbecomes legitimate when one has conferredupon it all the attributesofunanimous will. It is obviously possible to object that the differencebetween the will of the majorityand the will of all is an incontrovertibleempiricalfact. The ingeniousnessof Sieyes's argumentcannot maskthisfact. Sieyes simply presents the transfiguration of majority will intounanimous will as a practicalnecessity, whose uniquejustification is theneed for a realisticprincipleof decision making. Yet this move remainscompletely unrelatedto the rest of the argument;the majority principleis a simple necessity of fact with no reasonable link to the principleoflegitimacy It is merely a convenient convention.Rousseau, too, trustsunanimity as the only true source of legitimacyalthough the theory stated in Of Social Contract differs in several


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essential aspects from that of Sieyds. This is particularly true withrespect to the question of representation, which Rousseau rejects, andSieyes justifies. Furthermore,Rousseau offers a different solution to theproblem presented by the requirement of unanimity But the terms ofthe problem are the same. The only legitimate source of politicalobligation is the will of individuals. In obeying the common will, eachperson is in fact merely obeying himself.Therefore,the generalwill mustequal unanimous will as a matter of principle.As is well known, Rousseau distinguishes between the general willand the will of all. But the difference between the two is merely thedistinction between principle and practice. It is empirically possible forall individuals not to have agreed with what came to be the generalwill,but in principle, they arenecessarilyin agreement."The more agreementprevails in the assemblies, that is to say the more closely opinionsapproach unanimity, the more the general will prevails."17The generalwill is, in principle, the will of all the members of society; otherwise, itwould be impossible to understand how they could remain free, andobey only themselves, while still submittingto it. If disagreementsarise,andcertain people do not agreewith what has been decided, it is becausethose who disagree had in fact misunderstood the question put to them.

The firm will of all the members of the state equals the general will. By its exercisethey arecitizens, and free. When a law is proposed in the people's assembly, what isasked to them is not exactly whether they approve of or rejectthe proposition, butrather whether it conforms to the general will, which is also theirs. Each person invoting, gives his opinion in this matter, and the general will is then deduced bycounting the votes. Therefore, when an opinion contrary to my own prevails, itmerely proves that I was mistaken, and that what I had taken to be the generalwill,was not.18

A minority opinion is, therefore, nothing but a mistaken opinion aboutthe general will. But we must then also acknowledge that people werenot really asked what they wanted, but only what they believed to be thegeneral will. Unanimity is no longer required, but this result has beenobtained at the cost of an obvious contradiction with the principlespresented at the outset of the Social Contract.The ideas of both Rousseau and Sieyes demonstrate with exemplaryclarity the strength of the requirement for unanimity in democraticthinking, and the difficulties to which it leads when one triesto reconcileit with a principle of realistic decision making-with the majorityprinciple. The latter cannot be challenged, but neither can it bejustifiedby the assumption that the sole source of legitimacy is to be found in the


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will of individuals. Only one doctrine connected to modern in-dividualism manages to propose a coherent theory of the majorityprinciple. This is utilitarianism. For utilitarians, the goal of social lifecan be summarized in the formula "the greatest happiness for thegreatest number."19 t is admitted at the outset that all individuals havedifferentconcrete objectives,but all seek thegreatestpossible happinesswith these objectives in mind. A decision or a law is seen as just andlegitimate when its effect on the social entity is to raise the amount ofhappiness of the individuals concerned. As a result, the procedure ofmajority rule is by far the best because it results in the adoption of asolution that correspondsto the happinessof the greatestnumber.Sucha doctrine assumes that it might be legitimate to sacrificethe objectivesor the liberty of some, if such a sacrifice increases the sum total of socialhappiness; that is, the sacrifice must raise the satisfaction of a largernumberof individualsso that the total happinessthus createdoutweighsthe inconveniences experienced by those who opposed the solution.Utilitarianismpresupposesa homogeneity of individual utilities, whichmakes a comparison among these different utilities possible. Rawlsnotes that "utilitarianismdoes not takeseriouslythedistinctionbetweenpersons."20Ultimately, utilitarianism is not sufficiently individualistic.In fact, individual wills are absolute, and not to be compared to oneanother; there is no superior point of view from which they could belegitimatelyjudged and compared to one another. On this point, liberalcriticism of utilitarianismis entirelyconvincing, with the result that theonly doctrine capable of justifying the majority principlefalls short.

THE WILLOF INDIVIDUALSThe remarksof both Sieyes and Rousseau show that it is impossible

coherently to reconcile the majority principle with the requirementforunanimity that seems to derive from a rigorous form of individualism.But these theories make it possible to understand the particularinterpretationof individualism on whichthe requirementfor unanimityis based. These theories do not merely affirm that legitimate collectivedecision making must proceed from individuals; they also state moreprecisely that political obligation flows from individual wills, that is tosay, from choices arrived at by individuals. Thus it is not only the freeindividual who makes legitimacy possible, it is his already determinedwill.


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This appearswith greatclarityin Rousseau and becomes particularlyapparent in the meaning he gives to the term deliberation. Following ausage that goes back to Aristotle, philosophic tradition generallytakesdeliberation to mean the process of the formation of the will, theparticular moment that precedes choice, and in which the individualponders different solutions before settling for one of them. Rousseauuses the term deliberation in a different sense, one that is accepted incommon language, and uses it to mean "decision." We can see thedifference that separates these two definitions: in the vocabulary ofphilosophy, deliberation describes the process that precedesdecision; inRousseau's writings, it signifies decision itself.21He writes as follows:

It follows from the precedingthat the general will is always right, and always tendstoward the public good. But it does not follow that the people's deliberations havealways the same righteousness [rectitude]. One always wishes for one's own good,but one cannot always see it. The people cannot be corrupted, but they are oftendeceived, and it is only then that they seem to wish for what is bad.22In this passage, the "deliberationsof the people" obviously refers to thechoices the people make, and not to the process that leads to the choice.Therewould be no sense in saying that a process is morally rightor not.In the Discourse on Political Economy, the term is used in the samefashion. Rousseau shows how the existence of "partial associations"harms the general will. He says, "Such deliberation may be to theadvantage of a small community, but very harmful to the largerone."23Here again, deliberation clearly means decision: It is the decision madeby a group that can be both beneficial for the small group and harmfulfor society at large.The term deliberation taken in this particular sense comes upprecisely in those passages whereRousseau condemns those groupsthatnormally constitute the mainstay of public discussion: the groups orparties who face each other in an exchange of argument."Ifcitizens hadno communication between each other while a sufficiently well-informed public deliberated, the general will would always becomeapparent, in spite of a great number of small differences, and thedeliberation would always be good."24This formulation is remarkablebecause we can simultaneously see the reduction of deliberation todecision (in this context, only a decision can be either good or bad, butnot the process of the formation of the will) and the rigorous exclusionof communication between the citizens. The remainder of the chapterdevelops the famous critique of "partialassociations," and/or parties.The interests of groups or parties corrupt the general will:


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When special interests begin to make themselves felt, and when smaller societiesinfluence the larger one, the common interest changes, and finds opponents.Unanimity no longer reigns, the general will is no longer the will of all,contradictions and debates arise, and the best point of view is no longer acceptedwithout disputes.25The existence of parties is not the only cause for alarm; the merecommunication betweencitizens is considered dangerous. Whatdangerdoes Rousseau wish to ward off? The answer is to be found in thepassage of the Discourse on Political Economy, which I have quotedabove. Rousseau wants to show that the public will is always right,except if the people are

seduced by special interests, which certain shrewd people, by means of influenceand eloquence manage to substitute for the general will. Then public deliberationwill differ from the general will. Athenian democracy ought not to be brought upagainst me, because Athens was not in fact a democracy, but rather a verytyrannical aristocracy, governed by scholars and orators.26

What we must exclude from a democracy are the effects of rhetoricandthe powers of persuasion that some individuals might exercise overothers.A careful examination of Rousseau's texts shows the real reason forhis desire to exclude parties, a desire often noted by commentators.Contraryto what is wrongly supposed, this desiredoes not resultfrom asort of pretotalitaran point of view but rather in a much deeper wayfrom the fact that Rousseau's individualsarealready supposed to knowwhat they want when they come to a public assembly to decide incommon. They have already determined their will, so that any act ofpersuasionattemptedby otherscould only taint theirwill andoppressit.One could object that instead of deliberating collectively, Rousseau'scitizens have only deliberated within themselves, in the secret of theirhearts. Certain texts might lead one to such an interpretation. Thatinterpretation would nevertheless be false because, strictly speaking,when all decide for all, the choice becomes absolutely simple, and thereis nothing uncertain.

Whenever men who have gathered together, consider themselves as one singlebody, they will have only one will, dedicatedto the preservationof thecommunity,and the general well-being. Then all the actions of the state would be vigorous andsimple, its maxims clear and luminous. There will be no tangled, contradictory


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that of the individualsin the original position that we find in the work ofRawls. Rawls, as Rousseau, uses the term deliberation: individualsbehind the veil of ignorancearesupposed to deliberate in order to knowwhat principlesof justice they are to adopt. But what does deliberationmean in this situation?

To begin with, it is clear that since differences among the parties [i.e., theindividuals] are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarlysituated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore we can view thechoice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected atrandom.29

Therefore, there can be no arguments among individuals because, bydefinition, they all have the same point of view It is true that Rawlsimagines individuals communicating between each other through areferee, "and that he is to announce which alternatives have beensuggested and the reasons offered in their support," but he addsimmediately,"but such a referee is actually superfluous, assuming thatthe deliberationsof the partiesmust be similar."30Public deliberationis,therefore, excluded, and Rawls adds a precise point that cannot butrecall Rousseau:the formation of coalitions is forbidden.Thispoint is infact also superfluousbecausethe hypothesisstates that only one point ofview exists, which is the same for all. Must one, however, add that therepresentative ndividual deliberateswithin himself?It does not seem so.This is how Rawls defines the rational individual: he is exclusivelyconcerned with finding the solution, that is, those principlesof justice,that most clearly advance his own interests. He is the classic "homooeconomicus."

A rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between theoptions open to him. He ranks these options accordingto how well they furtherhispurposes;he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires ratherthan less,and which have the greaterchance of being successfully executed.31

This means that what Rawls calls deliberation is nothing but thecalculation of the classic economic agent:he is provided with a coherentset of preferences (that is, A may not be preferredover B, while B issimultaneously preferred to A), certain given constraints restrict hisactions, and he chooses the optimal solution, taking these constraintsinto account. He is assumed to have criteriafor evaluation that permittaking all possible solutions into account, and rankingthem so that he


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can select the best one. One might be tempted to say that the individualdoes not know a priori which solution he will prefer,and will discover itwhile applying his criteria of evaluation to the propositions put to him.Such an implication is in fact incorrect: the criterion for evaluation isgiven, as is the set of solutions, so that the procedureof forming the willloses its importance. The result is alreadycontained in the premisesandis only separated from them, one might say, by the time needed forcalculation. Reflection and the calculations necessary for obtaining asolution teach the individual nothing new; in particular, he learnsnothing about his own preferences.32 There is, therefore, no de-liberation, in the full sense of the term, to be found here. The process offorming a decision is reduced to calculation. As with Rousseau, theindividual is alreadysupposed to know exactly what he wants, or moreprecisely,he already possesses the criteriafor evaluation that will permithim to appraise all possible alternatives.But this assumption cannot be accepted. As the work of HerbertSimon shows, it is not even justified in all economic situations, and iseven lessjustified in politics. In the realworld, when individuals make adecision concerning society, they can never avail themselves of allnecessary information. They certainly have some information, but it isfragmentary and incomplete. Yet they must reach a decision within alimited time, there is generally an urgency pertaining to action ("life'sactions brook no delay," as Descartes put it) that acts against the searchfor complete information. During both collective and individualdeliberation, information, which at the beginning was incomplete,becomes firmer without however becoming complete. In any case, dueto the complexity of social life, individuals could neveravail themselvesof all necessary information. Political decision making is by its nature achoice under uncertainty In the process of exchanging evidence relatedto proposed solutions, individuals discover information they did notpreviously have. They learn that a given choice will have a givenconsequence, and if these consequences contradict the original objectivethey may be led to alter that objective. Real political life offers manyexamples of this. It is not reasonable to suppose as Rousseau does thatindividuals deliberate when they are already sufficiently well-informed("If when sufficiently well-informed people deliberate"). In reality,deliberation is in itself a procedure for becoming informed.There is also no reason to suppose that individuals have from the firsta complete set of preferences. When they enter a political debate, theyarelikely to have certain wishes, but these do not applyto all thesubjects


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raisedin the debate, nor to all aspects of the decision to be made. Theydo not a priori have a set of preferences relating to a multitude ofproblems and solutions (here again empirical analyses of electoralprocesses offer much evidence), and even when they reach a decision atthe close of the debate, their preferences are still not complete, theirchoices do not cover the entire ground of the debate, but they havebecome more focused. Let ussuppose, for example, that a citizenwishesa priori a reduction in taxes, and that otherwise he has no particularpreferenceas to the level of social benefits. He has given no thought tothis problem. In the course of the debate, he discovers that if the level oftaxation is to be reduced, it will also be necessary to lower socialallowances. He can either accept this consequence, and thus discover apreferencehedid not have at the start,or he cannot acceptit, and he maythen choose to revise his original choice. In the course of collectivedeliberation,the individualmayalso discoverthat the opinion heheldatthe outset was nothingmore than prejudiceand he maydecideto changeit.

Finally, it is unrealisticand unreasonableto suppose that individualshavefrom the firsta "coherent"set of preferences.Experienceshows, onthe contrary, that their initial desires are most frequently in conflict.This is so not only becausedifferentindividualswish for differentthings,but because each one has wishes that conflict with one another. Forexample, everyone simultaneously wishes for a reduction in taxes andan increase in social services. In the course of deliberation and theexchange of points of view, individuals become aware of the conflictsinherent in their own desires. This leads them to modify the objectivesthey held at the start, to give up some of them and to tone some of themdown in order to make them compatible with others, thus bringingabout a conciliation or compromise. As Webernoted, politics remainsaconflict of values, a "conflict among the gods," not only between oneindividual and another but within each person. It is unreasonable toassume that this conflict is already settled at the outset, given thatpolitics is by nature the arena where opposing demands must beweighed, wherean attemptis madeto reconcilethesedemandswhereverpossible, and wherea decision is taken in favor of those whose positionseems most justified. All this must also be done in a timely fashion. Wecan, therefore, state that during political deliberation, individualsacquirenew perspectivesnot only with respectto possible solutions, butalso with respect to their own preferences.Rawls is currently reproached for what is taken to be an excessiveindividualism. He has been criticized for reducing the citizen to an


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economic man who calculates his own advantage in a solitary andegoistical manner. Some critics contend that the Rawlsian theory doesnot give sufficientweightto the fact that man is also a social and politicalbeing, belonging to a community and attached to it. Such criticismmisses the point. Neither Rawls nor Rousseau denies the collectivedimension of human existence. The real problem for a society thatclaims to be based on the liberty of individuals is to find a way toreconcile each individual's free pursuit of his own objectives with thecommon good. As Rousseau understood, it is a matterof reconcilingtheinterests of each individual (the good as he sees it) with justice.Reproaching Rawls with neglecting the "collective" dimension of lifeand the importance of the sense of community does not advance thephilosophical debate at all, because the problem consists precisely infinding out how it is possible to constitute a collective entity that doesnot violate the freedom of individuals. When one confines oneself tocommending the virtues of collective existence and of community, oneassumes that the crucial problem is alreadysolved, or ratherone throwsit into the darkness of incomprehensibility Critics such as theseinvariably find their conclusion in the pathos of "community"and itsunfathomable mystery.

THE WILL OF ALL-DELIBERA TION BY ALLIn fact, what must be criticized in Rawls's and Rousseau's theories isnot their neglect of the collective dimension, but the assumption thatindividuals in society, in particular, those having to make a politicaldecision, possess an already formed will, already know exactly whatthey want, and at most only need to apply their criteriaof evaluation tothe proposed solutions. This criticism can be conducted in accordancewith the principlesof individualism. We need not arguethat individuals,when they begin to deliberate political matters, know nothing of whatthey want. They know what they want in part: they have certainpreferences and some information, but these are unsure, incomplete,

often confused and opposed to one another. The processof deliberation,the confrontation of various points of view, helps to clarify informationand to sharpentheir own preferences.They may even modify theirinitialobjectlves, should that prove necessaryIt is, therefore,necessaryto alterradicallythe perspectivecommon toboth liberal theories and democratic thought: the source of legitimacy is


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not the predeterminedwill of individuals, but rather the process of itsformation, that is, deliberation itself. An individual's liberty consistsfirst of all in being able to arrive at a decision by a process of researchand comparison among various solutions. As political decisions arecharacteristically imposed on all, it seems reasonable to seek, as anessential condition for legitimacy, the deliberation of all or, moreprecisely, the right of all to participate in deliberation. We must,therefore, challenge the fundamental conclusion of Rousseau, Sieyes,and Rawls: a legitimate decision does not representthe will of all, but isone that results from the deliberation of all. It is the process by whicheveryone's will is formed that confers its legitimacy on the outcome,rather than the sum of alreadyformed wills. Thedeliberativeprincipleisboth individualistic anddemocratic. It implies that all participatein thedeliberation, and in this sense the decision made can reasonably beconsidered as emanating from the people (democratic principle). Thedecision also proceedsfrom the libertyof individuals:those individualsdeliberatetogether, form theiropinions throughdeliberation,and at theclose of the process each opts freely for one solution or another(individualistic and liberal principle). We must affirm, at the risk ofcontradictinga long tradition, that legitimate law is the resultofgeneraldeliberation, and not the expression of the general will.There is a double dimension to the process of deliberation; it issimultaneouslycollective and individual. It is individualinthe sense thateveryone reasons for himself, finding arguments, and weighing them.Becausetheaimof the deliberativeprocessis to broadenthe participants'information and enable them to discover their own preferences, thatprocess requiresa multiplicity of points of view and/or arguments. Asthe individual listens to arguments formulated by others, he broadenshis own point of view and becomes awareof things he had not perceivedat the outset. Deliberation requires not only multiple but conflictingpoints of view becauseconflict of some sort is the essenceof politics. Thepartiesin deliberation will not be content to defend their own positions,but will try to refute the arguments of the positions of which theydisapprove. New information emerges as each uncovers the potentiallyharmfulconsequences of the other parties'proposals.Thus deliberation tends to increase information and to pinpointindividuals' preferences. It helps them to discover aspects both ofproposed solutions and of their own objectives that they had notperceived earlier.33But deliberation is not only a process of discoverythe parties are not satisfied with presenting various and conflicting


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theses; they also try to persuadeeach other. They argue. Argumentationis a sequence of propositions aiming to produce or reinforceagreementin the listener. In this sense, it is a discursive andrationalprocess. Yet, incontrast to logical proof, argumentation does not result in a necessaryconclusion that the listenercannot reject.A conclusion developed fromargumentation is not a necessary proposition. The listener remainsfreeto give his agreement or to withhold it. The listener is free becauseargumentation does not start from evident premises or from con-ventional ones. Rather, one starts by taking propositions one assumesare generally accepted by the audience being addressed. In politics, onewould argueby assumingcertain common values as held bythe public ata given moment. Argumentation is, therefore, always relative to itsaudience. Someone who does not share these values will not beconvinced by the arguments presented. Nor are the procedures oflinking the propositions logically binding. One may use, for example,arguments by analogy and afortiori arguments.These do not make thepassage from one proposition to another strictly necessary. It is,therefore, not said of a conclusion developed from argumentsthat it iseither true or false, but that it simply generates more or less supportdepending on whether the argumentwas more or less convincing. Nor isan argument either true or false; it is stronger or weaker. Whatever theforce of an argumentation, its conclusion is neverstrictly necessary.Thelistener may withhold his approval, and it must even be acknowledgedthat his refusal to approve a conclusion may have reasons as well. Theforce of an argumentation is always relative.34One argues in order to try to persuade others. But one tries only topersuade, that is, to produce or reinforceagreementto a proposition, incases where no proposition imposes itself with unimpeachable anduniversally recognized force. People need not be persuadedof the truth.In this sense, argumentation differs from a logical demonstration. Onthe negative side, it differs also from refutation. One piles up severalarguments against a thesis, one tries to weaken it because one lacks therefutation that would incontestably destroy it.Thus argumentation is particularly suited to the nature of politicaldebate, which most frequently consists of a confrontation betweenopposing norms or values. We must admit, with Weber, that no sciencecan resolve this conflict in a rigorous and necessary manner. However,contrary to Weber'sthesis, it does not follow that the choice of valuesremains ineluctably arbitrary Some values are more likely than othersto win the approval of an audience of reasonable people. It is impossible


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to demonstratetheirsoundness;they can only bejustified. A decision ora norm is not eithertrue or false. But we areneverthelessnot reducedtopure arbitrarinessbecause a norm can be more or less justified. Therelativeforce of itsjustification can only be measuredby the amplitudeand the intensityof the approval it arouses in an audience of reasonablepeople.Political deliberation and argumentation certainly presuppose arelatively reasonable audience. They also require a certain degree ofinstruction and culture on the part of the public. But they constituteprocesses of education and of trainingin themselves. They broaden theviewpoints of citizens beyond the limitedoutlook of theirprivateaffairs.They spread light. Such a concept of deliberation implies that themajority of citizens should be educated, but it is not the kind ofpedagogic model in which an enlightened elite is intended to bring thelight of science down from its pulpit to a backwardpeople. Rather, thepeople educate themselves. Certainly, knowledge is not distributedequally, and all speeches will not have the same weight, but becausethose who are more knowledgeable tend not to be in agreementamongthemselves, theirexchange of opinions, refereedby thepublic, offers aneducation without a uniqueand eminentteacher.J. S. Mill has analyzedthis educational function of argumentsremarkablywell.In the political sphere, deliberation does not permit us to arrive atnecessary and universallyadmitted truths,35but it also does not permitthe absolute and incontestable refutation of a norm or a value. It isdoubtless possible to show that a policy that was based on givennormative principles failed, but most of the time, this failure is notsufficient to refute either the policy in question, or the normativeprinclple from which it was derived. This is so because first of all it isextremelydifficult, if not impossible, to discover exactly what in a givenpolicy caused the failure. In order to find that out, it would be necessaryto isolate exactly what derived from the initial conditions in which thepolicy was adopted and what derived from the normative princlplesthemselves. Evensupposing that one succeeds in isolating the normativeprinciples that caused the failure, the unhappy outcome does notnecessarilyprove that this principleshould be rejected.One can alwaysargue that it should have been put into practice in anotherform or to alesserdegree. The plannedeconomy is surelya failurewith respectto itsown objectives, but for all that, economic planning as a normativeprinciple is not absolutely refuted. A limited nonbinding form ofplanning may be defended. Ascertaining a failure does not refute a


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political principle; it merelycreates apresumption against it. Despite acertain closeness, political deliberation and scientific argumentationremain separated by an irreducible difference. One does not really saythat the scientific community deliberates when it exchanges conjecturesand refutations.

POLITICAL PLURALISM ANDTHE MARKETThe process of the formation of the collective will is the essentialmoment of political decision making. It does not consist in totaling uppreviously formed intentions or wills. Individual intentions, individualwills aredecided progressivelyin its course. A diversityof points of viewand of arguments is an essential condition both for individual liberty(for individuals must have a choice among several parties)36 nd for therationality of the process (for the exchange of argumentsand criticismscreates information and permits comparing the reasons presented to

justify each position). However, this perspective differs from that oftraditional pluralism.37The latterviews the pluralismof social groups inlight of the model of marketcompetition. Various groups or elites enterinto competition to win over the voters just as they would build up aclientele. The competition among partieswith respectto the voters is, inthis model, analogous to the competition of producersfacingconsumers.The public chooses in each case.However, the analogy is misleading. In the marketplace,competitionamong producers is justified because it favors producers who producegoods at the lowest cost. From the collective point of view, this isrational because these producers use the smallest amount of scarceresources, thus leaving a largeramount available for the production ofother goods. This outcome is assured because it is in each consumer'sself-interest to select the most competitive producer. Buying goods fromthat producer will permit him to devote larger resources to otherpurchases. If the consumer makes a poor choice (i.e., if he does notchoose the most efficient producer), he himself is penalized and he (inthe purestmodel) experiencesthisdisadvantage both directlyand withina short time.The same is not true in politics: both the negative and the positiveeffects of political decisions often make themselves felt only in the long


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run. The effects are often diffuse and scattered. If a voter choosespoorly, that is, if he opts for the least effective policy for society, theeffect on his own position will usuallybecome apparentonly after a longtime. At that time, the voter would presumably change his originalposition, but the change would come too late to correct the initialdecision in an effective manner. Such a system is bound to engender asuccession of chaotic measures ratherthan realself-regulation.Further-more, if the voters behavejust like consumers in the marketplace,theyare apt to choose from among proposed policies those whose con-sequences they perceive as affecting their particular situation mostdeeply and clearly But the consequences that affect them onlymarginally will tend to be neglected, regardlessof their importance forsociety as a whole. These two reasons (the remoteness in time of theeffects and their dispersion) make it impossible to attribute the self-regulatingvirtues of the economic market to the political one. They alsoexplain the need for political persuasion. Citizens must be persuadedtoadopt a policy because they cannot simply choose according to theimmediate effects that they perceive themselves. In the marketplace,individualsfeel theeffects of their choice immediatelyanddirectly.Thiscannot be the case in theforum wherethey deliberatepolitical decisions.Furthermore,individualsenteringthe marketplaceknow theirneeds.They may discover new products they had not looked for a priori, butthey choose those that correspond to some sort of previously felt need.On the other hand, when citizens enter the political forum, they do notknow exactly what they want or need. The aim of political competitionis, therefore, to offer voters not only a rangeof solutions, among whichthey may choose according to predetermined needs, but also toenlighten them about their needs, and have them weigh the optionspresentedby the parties.Pluralism, therefore, has adifferentfunction inthe forum. The marketrequiresnot simplysome diversityas in politicalpluralism, but rather a great multiplicity of agents. In order to be asefficient as possible, competition in the marketplace requires themaximal dispersion of forces. In the model of the perfect competitivemarket proposed by neoclassic economics, the formation of coalitionsamong producers or consumers is not permitted. But if the object of theconflict among varying points of view is the forming of the will, thensome degree of diversity and not an extreme multiplicity is necessary.In fact, political pluralismimplies a drastic reduction in the numberof proposed solutions. But this is preciselywhat is requiredbythe natureof deliberation. It is not possible to deliberate everything, or all the


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possibilities permitted by a given situation. In highly complex systems,the cost of exploring all possibilities, even if that were theoreticallypossible, would be enormous. Chess players, for example, cannotexamine all possible moves with all their consequences; they examineonly certain types of moves, and explore only those moves that seemmost promising. This situation characterizes deliberation. It is notpossible to deliberate all possible outcomes; the range of proposedsolutions must by necessity be limited. In the political arena,the limitedpluralism of parties is requiredfor effective deliberation. The people, assuch, before the intervention of any mediating process, do not have adetermined will,38but rather offer a multiplicity of incomplete prefer-ences, which are often incoherent. It is only when more well-definedissues are proposed for its deliberation that the influence of the peopleon the government of their society can become real and effective.39If the parties that specify which issues would come up for collectivedeliberation had no connection to the bulk of citizens, some kind ofdeliberative opinion formation would still unfold, but the originaldefinition of these matters would completely escape the control of theordinary citizens. (This would occur, for example, in the case of closedoligarchies competing between one another to win the support of themass public.) That is why it is important, in a democratic society, thatthe parties themselves be set up by the mass of citizens. Under suchconditions, the proposed solutions originate in part from the peoplethemselves. But this goal can only be partially attained. It has beenknown since Michels that political parties are, at least in part,oligarchical. Yet one should not conclude that for that reason they areharmful to democracy Theiressentialcontribution to democracycomesfrom the fact that they allow the deliberation by all of matters alreadyrelatively determined. The existence of political parties is essential fordeliberation. The parties face each other, and the process of argu-mentation is submitted to the arbitration of all.

THE DELIBERA TIVE PROCESSDeliberation is freely conducted because each person, who may ormay not be convinced by a given argument, does have ultimately achoice between several alternatives. That is why it is necessary thatindividuals have a genuine choice among different alternatives, all ofwhich should seem realistically possible. If only one solution were


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proposed, and the citizens were free to choose it or not, their eventualchoice would be both unbalanced and misleading as a guide to theirpreference. There would not even be a real choice because the optionwould be between the unique solution proposed and the the absence ofany solution at all. The first term of the choice would have anexaggerated advantage, for it would be too easy to convince people toselect it. Yet they would still remain free either to give or to withholdtheir assent.In many cases, the different points of view that arepresentedfirst tothe public's scrutiny and then to its choice are defended by parties orindividuals who wish to accede to positions of power. Admittedly,individualswho support a particularpoint of view areelected, not onlythe programs themselves. Schumpeter is correct in stressing thatdemocracy is a processthat alms to select those who govern. Candidatesfor positions of power compete with one another and try to collect thegreatest number of votes for themselves. Because they wish to exercisepolitical power, in a sense, they act in their own self-interest; and, inaccordance with Schumpeter's formula, they may be compared to"entrepreneurs"dealing in votes. Yet we need not deem the programsthese entrepreneursrepresent and the points of view they advocate asbeing without Importance, as Schumpeter does.40 Politicians offersimultaneously both their services in governmental functions and aparticularpoint of view concerning the public good. The two elementsare indissolubly linked. Experience shows that voters do not make uptheir minds solely on the basis of writtenprogramsor projectsexplicitlyannounced by the candidates, but they do take these programs andprojectsinto account. Evenwhen voters decide primarilyon the basis ofa global, though often confused image they have of the candidates, thisimage is still relatedto voters'idea of his or hercommunity good. It mayowe more to the personality of the candidate as the voters perceive itthan to the expressed declarations about programs,but the"image"stillrepresents some idea of what is admirable, successful, and fit in thatcountryCompetition among the different points of view of the candidatesalso encourages each protagonist to make use of those principles andarguments likely to win the largest possible agreement.The process ofargumentationtakes place before a universalaudience, thecomplete setof citizens.41 n orderto increaseits support,each partyhasan interestinshowing that its point of view is moregeneralthan the others.Therefore,universalism also plays a part here, but it is not assumed at the start. It


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seems rather to be the ideal term of the process. In truth, no party willever become an actually universal party; there will always remainopponents; this is the core of political pluralism. Nevertheless thestructure of the deliberative system usually makes the protagonistsstrive to enlargetheirpoints of view andpropose more and moregeneralpositions. There is a sort of competition for generality The deliberativeprocess never resultsin strictlyuniversalproposals;universalityremainsthe unattainable end, but the system provides an incentive to general-ization.The deliberative process is brought to a close by a choice-the vote.In the vote, the process of the formation of the wills is finished. The finaltabulation lets the people know which solution prevailed, that is, whichhas won the approvalof the largestnumber.The approvalof the greatestnumber reflects, in that context, the greater strength of one set ofarguments compared to others. The process nevertheless insti-tutionalizes the admission that there were also reasons not to desire thesolution finally adopted. The minority (or minorities) also had reasons,but these reasons were less convincing. We can now see thejustificationfor the majority principle (it is not a simple necessity of fact). Because itcomes at the close of a deliberativeprocessin whicheveryone was abletotake part, choose among several solutions, and remain free to approveor refuse the conclusions developed from the argument, the resultcarries legitimacy The decision results from a process in which theminority point of view was also taken into consideration. Although thedecision does not conform to all points of view, it is the result of theconfrontation between them.The decisions that will bemade bytheelected officials will come fromthe candidates and the points of view that have won a majority Thesedecisions are legitimate because they are, in the last analysis, theoutcome of the deliberative process taking place before the universalaudience of all the citizens. These political decisions do not necessarilyhave to apply to all the citizens; nor do they requirethe agreementof allthe citizens. In the last analysis, and taking into account the mediationthat the elected representatives introduce, a political decision islegitimate because it has been able to win the approval of the majorityatthe conclusion of a process of free confrontation among various pointsof view. Political decisions dealing with particular objectives (selectedsocial groups, for example) may be legitimate if they satisfy thiscondition. With respectto the law, the deliberativeperspectiveallows usto drop the requirements of either strict universality of application orunanimity of approval.


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We must note, however, that the mere fact of being the will of thegreatest number does not by itselfconfer any special privilege upon it.The majority will is legitimate because it is ascertained at the close of adeliberative process in which all the citizens (or at least those whowished to do so) have participated. The procedure preceding thedecision is a condition for legitimacy, which is just as necessary as themajority principle. It is the conjunction of these elements that createslegitimacy As aresult,there is no needto haverecourse to theuntenablefiction that the majoritywill is in essence the will of all, or that it must beconsidered as the equivalent of unanimous will. The decision of themajority is only the decision of the greatest number,nothing more. Wemust, therefore, recognize that in the period between two elections, theminority or minorities are forced to abide by decisions that do notcorrespond with their will.Yet paradoxically, the lucid recognition of this fact makes it possibleto take the minority, its opinions, and its interests into serious account.As long as one considers the will of the majority the expression of thegeneral will, the minority has no status at all. It is supposed that bysubmitting to the decision that was finally made, the minority merelyobeys itself, or achieves what it reallywanted or should have wanted. If,on the contrary, and in accordance with empirical evidence, oneacknowledges that minority will is in no way included in the will of themajority, it becomes necessary to find the means that will allow theminority to express its opinions and interests between two elections.Institutions must be set up that will compel the majority to take theminority point of view into account, at least to a certainextent. This isthe essential justification of social pluralism, of associations andinterest-groups. Their power must force the majority to take intoaccount in its actions the interest of those it does not represent.Thesecounterforces, checks, and balancesarenecessarybecausemajoritywillis not the equivalent of the will of all.On this point, the thesis of traditional pluralism is inadequate. It istrue that, contrary to Rousseauist tradition, pluralism has alwaysstressed the need for a variety of interests, groups, and forces inopposition to each other. But the pluralist view has also assumed thatthe spontaneousinterplayof these forces would generatean equilibrium,and would in the end almost dispense with higher levels of politicaldecision, being able to enforce obedience by all and to settle theconflicts.42Classical pluralismhas most frequentlyseen the interplayofsocial forces as a form of equilibrium,conceived either as a mechanical


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equilibrium or along the lines of the economic equilibrium of themarket. It is unrealistic to suppose that a plurality of forces can aloneproduce an equilibrium,andit iseven more unrealisticto think that suchan equilibrium will automatically be an optimal one. Rather, theexistence of counterforces is justified because it is necessary to givesocial forces that are in a political minoritythe means to have theirpointof view considered. It is a guarantee against the omnipotence of themajority. The fact remains, however, that the decision of the majoritymust be able to impose itself in cases where no compromises acceptableto it could be worked out. The superiorstrength of the majority shouldbe checked, not eliminated. Therefore, the process is not balanced, butrathernecessarilyunbalanced, in favor of the majority The pluralismofsocial forces, of groups and associations, offers only limited protectionfor minority views, but when it works well, it would encourage themajority to take these views into account, because the majority knowsthat if it did not do this it would meet with resistancethat would hamperits actions. If, in the last analysis, and despite these obstacles, themajority were to choose simply to impose its decision on a minority, wemay assume that such a choice would be a more deliberate one than ifthe majority had believed at the outset that the decision underconsideration would meet with no opposition. The government iscompelled to justify itself before the public while its opponents argueaswell. A power that faces no obstacle will have both less cause todeliberate on its decisions and less need tojustify them. The truegoal ofthe pluralism of counterforces is not equilibrium;it is deliberation itself.This is a second form of deliberation, not the kind that results in amajority decision, but one that the majority, after the choice of policy,must itself carry out.In the last analysis, the majority principle remains a principle ofdecision making. The majority is capable of deciding and resolvingconflicts that do not have a solution within the simple process ofconfrontation and negotiation among differentsocial forces. Wecannotcontent ourselves with the idea that pluralism and the irreconcilableconflict of social forces are a necessity. If pushed to its extreme, suchconflict and pluralism would mean the dissolution of society On thispoint, Hobbes's argument has lost none of its force. There must be somelocus of decision endowed with a will that can carrythe day in a case oflast resort. It does not follow that this institution must be all-powerful,or that it should settle everything. The pluralism of forces, and theconflict among them, form the very conditions for social liberty, while


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the unity of the ultimate decision guarantees political and socialcohesiveness, andtherebyliberty.Germanyduringthe WeimarRepublicwas doubtless free, but it did not remain so for long.The conception of political deliberation that I have advocated heredoes notjustify the sovereigntyof the majority.Therearecertain actionsthat the majority must be forbidden to take: it ought not, for example,exclude anyone from the rightsto vote and to participate ndeliberation.Nor ought it to suppress the fundamental liberties necessary for theeffective exercise of this right: freedom of conscience, of opinion, ofspeech, and of association.Complete universal suffrage, of course, cannot exist. There arealways some individuals who are excluded (children, those who havebeen deprived of their civil rights,and so on). It is, however, possible torely on the currently accepted definition of universalsuffrageto set thelimits of the deliberative body. Above all, the majority must beforbidden to exclude any group from the deliberative body on thepretext that it disagrees with the majority, however overwhelmingthismajoritymay be. The majorityshould also not be permittedto eliminatethe diversity of proposed solutions. The same is true for the variety ofsocial forces, interestgroups, and associations. Finally, the deliberativeprocess and its conclusion by a vote that can result in the dismissal ofthose who govern must take place at regular intervals. The majorityshould not tamper with this principle.

The failure of unanimlstic theories of justice or legitimacy leads ustonote, once more, that the definition of what sjust remainsthe subjectofconstant debate, and, on the theoretical level, an attitude of constantquestioning is surely the only warranted one. But a society cannot liveand maintain itself solely on the basis of principlesand institutions thatreflect only an ultimately indeterminate justice. For a society tocontinue to exist, decisions must be made and conflicts resolved;poweralso must be exercised and in the last resortmust be sufficient to restoresome unity to the multiplicity of actions and desires that make up sociallife. To make room simultaneously for the indeterminacyofjustice andthe necessity for decision, those in power and their idea of the commongood must be questioned, if not constantly, then at regular intervals.Between those intervals, societies need to keep in place some power ofultimate decision making, even if it does not constantly interfere


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everywhere. Therefore, unless we believe that this power of decisionmaking may be constituted simply in anymanner,as long as it somehowexercises the function of making a decision, we must try to uncover theprocedures most likely to make those decisions reasonable. If suchprocedures cannot be found, the indeterminacy of justice and thepractical necessity of decision making will in reality simply result inarbitrariness. But between the rational object of universal agreementand the arbitrarylies the domain of the reasonable and the justifiable,that is, the domain of propositions that are likely to convince, by meansof arguments whose conclusion is not incontestable, the greaterpart ofan audience made up of all the citizens.The theory of deliberation offers only an imperfect method formaking the decision process as reasonable as possible. We cannotguaranteethat adeliberationconsonant with the stated ruleswill alwaysbe rational, or even as rational as possible. But this process makes therealization of reasonable results more likely, especially if one takes intoaccount the dimension of time and the educative effect of repeateddeliberation. The weakness of universalist theories of justice lies not intheir lack of realism (indeed, they often explicitly concede theirnonrealistic character). Rather, those who propose these universalisttheories present them as models that simultaneously permit theevaluation of actual societies (making it possible to determine whethersociety approaches the model more or less closely) and at the same timeset a standard: a goal that must be pursued with the knowledge that itcan never be attained. This is where the inadequacy lies. We want notonly to know whether a society is more or less just, and what the idealsociety should be like, but we also want concrete means to make realsocieties as reasonable aspossible. The idea of setting standards that areexplicitly unrealistic is unsatisfactory because it leaves totally open thequestion of the means necessary to approach this state.As long as we accept the predetermined will of individuals as theunique basis for legitimacy, we must inevitably conclude that only theobject of unanimous agreement is legitimate. The requirement forunanimity is justified in a pure theory of justice because a pure theorydoes not encompass the practical conditions for its realization nor themeans necessary for attaining it. Yet unanimity is an inadequaterequisite for a theory of political decision making; a theory of decisionmaking cannot, without falling into pure empiricism and relativism,avoid concerning itself with legitimacy. It is unrealistic, and, moreimportant, unjustified, to assume that individuals faced with the


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necessity of having to make a political decision already know exactlywhat they want. The free individual is not one who already knowsabsolutely what he wants, but one who has incomplete preferencesandis trying by means of interior deliberation and dialogue with others todetermine precisely what he does want. When individuals approachpolitical decision making, they only partiallyknow what they want. Wearejustified in taking as a basis for legitimacy not their predeterminedwill but the process by which they determine their will. This is theprocess of deliberation. This perspective is strictlycompatible with theprinciples of individualism. It in no way implies that someone whopossesses knowledge should teach other individuals what their wishesare, but rather that they find them out for themselves. Withoutrenouncing a concern for legitimacy, which in the modern world canonly be based on the individual, deliberation makes it possible to avoidthe exorbitant requirementsof universalityand unanimity.

NOTES1. This article does not purport to deliver a full-blown theory of politicaldeliberation; it intends only to show why deliberation, instead of unanimity, ought to bethe basis of any modern theory of legitimacy. Therefore, some questions that a theory of

political deliberation might raise will not be addressed here (for example, the deter-minatlon of why a question has been sufficientlydeliberated),and others will be answeredonly in broad terms (for example, the definition of a "universalaudience").2. Radical liberalism is derived from Kant with good reason. Kant already claimedthat happiness (Gluckseligkeit) or welfare (Wohlfahrt) could not form the basis forpolitical right and legitimacy. Freedom alone can constitute the basis for right because itcan be defined in purely universal and a priori terms, whereas happiness or welfare areempiricalends, and as such are not amenable to universalprinciples. According to Kant,the "wholeconcept" of right

is derivedentirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relations ofhuman beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature(i.e., the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognizedmeans of attainingthisend.Men have different views on the empiricalend of happinessand what it consists of,so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will cannot be brought undercommon principle nor thus under any external law harmonizingwith the freedomof every one.

Kant, "Onthe Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply inPractice,' "Kant's Political Writings,ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970),73-74. "The principleof happiness (which is not in fact a definite


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principle at all has ill effects in political right just as in morality, however good theintentions of those who teach it"(Kant, "On the Common Saying," 83). Kant applies thesame reasoning to rejectwelfare as a basis for right:"But welfaredoes not have any rulingprinciple, either for the recipient or for the one who provides It, for each individual willdefine it differently. It depends, in fact, upon the will's material aspect which is empiicaland thus incapableof becoming a universal rule"Kant,"TheContest of Faculties,"Kant'sPolitical Writings,ed. by Hans Relss (Cambridge University Press, 1970), 183-184.3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 149.Hayek, who can be viewed as another advocate of the extreme version of liberalism,accepts that the state should take upon itself the distribution of a minimum of revenuetothose who, without it, would fall below a certain threshold of poverty. However, thiscomes in direct conflict with his general argument. In order to assure such a minimum, itwould be impossible not to use procedures and rules that establish distinctions amongindividuals and are applied in a way that distinguishes among men. There is no reason tosuppose that the setting of a threshold for assistance, as well as of its level and itsbeneficiaries, could be based on a universal agreement, even in principle. It would be partof a policy of well-being and, as such, vulnerable to the Kantian objection (namely,well-being or welfare is not amenable to universal rules). Hayek's position is moremoderate than that of Nozick, but at the price of some incoherence.4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of HarvardUniversity Press, 1971).5. The rationality assumed here in no sense implies the substantial rationalityof thealms. On the contrary, Rawls assumes that all individuals have different objectivesamongwhich it is impossible to determine any objective hierarchy. Rawls's idea of rationalitysimply implies that subjects have coherent objectives (or, more precisely, coherentpreferences) and are able to calculate the means necessary for the realization of theseobjectives. This is the definition of rationalitycommon in the social sciences (see Rawls, ATheory of Justice, 143).6. The two pnnciples are the following:(a) "Eachperson is to have an equal rightto the most extensive basic libertycompatiblewith a similar liberty for others"(Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 60).(b) "Social and economic inequalities are to be arrangedso that they areboth 1)to thegreatest benefit of the least advantaged and 2) attached to offices and positions open to allunder conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 83).7. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 189-197.8. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263.9. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263.10. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 263.11. Emmanuel Sieyes, Vues sur les Moyens d'Execution dont les Representants de laFrance Pourront Disposer en 1789 (Pans, 1789), 15. Sieyes is mostly known as the authorof the pamphlet Qu'est-ceque le TiersEtat? and as a leader of the French Revolution; hisimportance as a political thinker is often underestimated. In fact, he is probably one of thefirst and most important theoreticians of representative government; his influence onFrench and German constitutional thought has been considerable. Because most of hiswritings have not been published since the French Revolution, they must be consulted intheir original editions.12. Siey6s, Vuessur les Moyens d'Execution.13. Sieyes, Vuessur les Moyens d'Execution.


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14. Emmanuel Siey'es,Preliminairede la Constitution Francaise (Pans, 1791), 38.15. Sieyes, Prdliminaire,38.16. Sieyes, Vuessur les Moyens d'Execution17. Jean-JacquesRousseau, Du ContratSocial, Book IV,chap.2, OeuvresCompletes,ed. by B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Pans: Gallimard,),vol. III, 439.18. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 2, 441.19. Jeremy Bentham,"Constitutional Code," The WorksofJeremy Bentham,vol. IX(Edinburgh:J. Bowring, 1838-1843),5.20. Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 27 See also, on the same point, Nozick, Anarchy, Stateand Utopia, 33: "No moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral

outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good.There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others"(emphasis in the original).21. The term has in fact two meanings in French. This ambiguity surely justifiesRousseau's usage, but in no way lessens the importance of his choice in favor of one andonly one of the two meanings.22. Rousseau, Du ContratSocial, Book II, chap. 3,371. The termrectitudein Frenchhas the meaning of both "rightness"and "righteousness";however, the context makes itclear that Rousseau wants to stress here the moral characterof the decision.23. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur I'Economie Politique, OeuvresCompletes,vol. III, 246.24. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 3, 371.25. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 1, 438.

26. Rousseau, Discours sur l'Economie Politique, 246, emphasis added.27. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Book IV, chap. 1, 437, emphasis added.28. Aristotle, Rhetorica, I, 2, 1357a, 3-6, vol. XI, The Worksof Aristotle Translatedinto English, ed. by W D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910-1952).29. Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 139.30. Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 139.31. Rawls, A Theoryof Justice, 14332. The nondeliberative aspect of the classic conception of economic rationality isespecially highlighted in the work of H. Simon. He has constructed a model of"procedural"or "limitedrationality"to take into account a certain number of empiricalsituations with which the classic model of optimization (or maximization)did not seem tobe able to deal. In this conception, "theconditions for choice, for the ends as well as for themeans, are not given to the decider, but are the object of the search,"whereas the classicconception "regardsthe conditions for choice as fixed, and therefore identifies decision-makingwith the mereapplicationof criteria of evaluation givento a set of possibleactions,as equally given" Philippe Mongin, "Modele Rationnel ou Modele Economique de laRationalite?" Revue Economique, 35, no. 1 (January 1984), 26, 27. The most recentformulation of Simon's theses can be found in Herbert A. Simon's Models of BoundedRationality (2 vols.) (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1983)and H. A. Simon's Reason in HumanAffairs(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983).For a sociological application of thismodel of limited rationality, see Michel Crozier and E. Friedberg.L'Acteur et le Systeme(Pans: Seuil, 1977).33. Individuals deliberate because at the start they are relatively uncertain as to thesolution they should adopt. The concept of deliberation used hereis, therefore, in a sense,close to that of Aristotle, for whom deliberation bearson that which is neitherabsolutely


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certain (that is, the domain of "science") nor completely contingent (in this case,deliberation could serve no purpose). See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, III, e, 1112a18-1112b31, The WorksofAristotle, 1910-1952,vol. IX. However, in Aristotle's thought, thisrelative indeterminacy results from the nature of things and the order of the world. It is acosmological and ontological indeterminacy. In the theory of deliberation outlined here, Imake no assumptions about the order of the world. Individuals are assumed to berelativelyuncertain, not because of the intrinsicnature of the subjectsthey deliberate, butbecause they lack complete information, and theirpreferencesarenot entirelydetermined.This relative uncertainty is related to the deliberating subjects themselves, and not to thenature of the objects of their deliberation. Aristotle furthermore assumes that peopledeliberate only the means and never the ends. The ends aregive by nature. Such a vision istoo closely linked to the teleological conception of the world for the theory presentedhere.34. With reference to the conception of argumentation sketched here, see ChaimPerelman and Lucle Olbrechts-Tyteca, TheNew Rhetoric: A Treatiseon Argumentation,trans. by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN.. University of NotreDame Press, 1969); and also Chaim Perelman, L'Empire Rh6tonque: Rhetonque etArgumentation (Paris: J. Vrnn,1977).35. The conception defended herediffers, therefore, from that of Habermas. For him,deliberation plays the central role in "practicalquestions," that is, questions about thevalidity of norms, whetherthey are moral or political; furthermore,the validity of a normis neither, in Habermas's conception, susceptible of proof (reducible to deductiveargument) nor is it decided only by an arbitrary act of will, as is affirmedby decisionisttheories; as a result, for Habermas, the recognition of the validity claim of a norm can berationally motivated. On all these accounts, I find myself in agreement with Habermas'sconception. However, when Habermas deals with this rationally motivated agreementabout norms, he apparently means the consensus of all, at least in pnnciple. "Since,"hewrites, "all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in thepractical deliberation, the 'rationality' of the discursively formed will consists in the factthat the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to acommon interest. The interest is common because the constraint free consensuspermits only what all can want;" Juirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. by T.McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 108, emphasis in the original. Thus Habermasmaintains, in my view, the requirementfor unanimous consensus, at least in principle. Hefails to recognize that there are various degrees of agreement, which if the appropriaterules for deliberation are respected, reflect in turn the respective strengths of thearguments put forward in the defense of the conflicting norms. Given the appropriateprocedural rules for deliberation, the better argument is simply the one that generatesmore support and not the one that is able to convince all participants.36. Here I use the termparty in two senses, as a matter both of taking sides (deciding)and of choosing the platform of a political party.37 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1956); Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Detroit:Wayne State University Press, 1962), and, especially, Anthony Downs, An EconomicTheory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).38. On this point, see the short but remarkably suggestive and profound article ofErich Kaufmann,"ZurProblematik des Volkswillens,"GesammelteSchriften(Gottingen:Otto Schwarz, 1960),vol. III. Kaufmann, whose perspectiveis very different from what Ihave sketched here, nevertheless comes to a similarconclusion: "Themore the people as a


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multitudewant to express themselvesdirectly,the morethey lose influenceover the detailsof what really happens"(p. 278). According to him, thisjustifies the mediation of parties,whichpermitsthe will of the people to takeshape;beforethismediation, thepeople'swill issimply a chaotic set of inchoate and confused desires.39. It is striking to note that the theoreticlans who stress the role of deliberation (incontrast to the will) in politics are also those whojustify the existence of parties(which, aswe have seen, Rousseau opposes). See Burke ("Speech to the Electors of Bristol") inBurke'sPolitics, Selected Writingsand Speeches, ed. by R.J.S. Hoffmann and P Levack(New York: Knopf, 1969).The same connection appears in J. S. Mill's thought; see JohnStuart Mill, Utilitarianism,On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Govern-ment, ed. by H. B. Acton (London: Dent, 1972),in particular,78-114, and the remarkablepassage on the "function of antagonism," 267-270.40. For the definition of democracy in the work of Schumpeter, see Joseph A.Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942),250-283;and especially concerning parties'programs, p. 283.41. The citizens constitute a universal audience in comparson with the differentparties that compete for their support. These parties are defined by some point of view,some values that are specific to a particular group, whereas the universal audience ischaracterizedby the views and values commonly sharedby all the citizens. The universalaudience, as it is intended here, is not a set of abstractbeings without any commitment toparticularvalues or weaned from all traditions;it is the set of all the citizens of a concretepolitical community at a particularpoint in time.

42. Onthis point, see the remarkablecriticismof traditionalAmericanpluralism(onlythe pluralismof special interestgroups is dealt with here)presentedby Theodore J. Lowl,TheEnd of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (2nd ed.) (New York:Norton, 1979). See particularlythe criticism of the idea of "automaticsociety."

BernardManin is with the Centre National de la Recherche Sclentifique in Pariswhere he also teaches at the Ecole Normale Superleure. He has written on socialdemocracy and on the thoughts of Montesquieu.

manin - on legitimacy and political deliberation

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