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Newsletter ICOLD 2013 Preview Page 6 Oroville Spillway Incident: USSD Responds Page 4 March 2017 Issue No. 171 Published by the United States Society on Dams www.ussdams.org 8 Turbid DIscharge Incident at Cannonsville Dam 24 National Strategy to Address Public Safety Around Dams 30 Towards Seismic Fragility Analysis of Concrete Dams

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Page 1: March 2017 Published by the Newsletter - USSD · PDF fileNewsletter ICOLD 2013 Preview Page 6 Oroville Spillway Incident: USSD Responds Page 4 March 2017 Issue No. 171 Published by

Newsletter

ICOLD 2013 Preview

Page 6

Oroville Spillway Incident: USSD RespondsPage 4

March 2017 Issue No. 171

Published by the United States Society on Dams

www.ussdams.org

8 Turbid DIscharge Incident at

Cannonsville Dam

24 National Strategy to Address Public

Safety Around Dams

30 Towards Seismic Fragility Analysis of

Concrete Dams

Page 2: March 2017 Published by the Newsletter - USSD · PDF fileNewsletter ICOLD 2013 Preview Page 6 Oroville Spillway Incident: USSD Responds Page 4 March 2017 Issue No. 171 Published by

In this Issue4 Understanding Oroville: Apply a Common Sense Approach to U.S. Critical Infrastructure

5 2018 USSD Annual Meeting

8 Turbid Discharge Incident at Cannonsville Dam

19 ICOLD Update

24 National Strategy to Address Public Safety Around Dams

30 Towards Seismic Fragility Analysis of Concrete Dams

37 March 2017 Advertisers

38 New Members

41 Young Professionals Named as USSD Board Advisors

41 News of Members

Melinda Dirdal Brian C. Gettinger Christina Stanard

OfficersPresident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John S. WolfhopeVice President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dean B. DurkeeSecretary-Treasurer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Manoshree SundaramExecutive Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eugene A. Guilford, Jr.Executive Director Emeritus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Larry D. StephensPublic Affairs Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ronald A. Corso

Board of Directors Denise Bunte Bisnett Robert P. CannonDean B. Durkee B. Alex Grenoble Eric C. HalpinJames E. LindellGuy S. Lund John D. RiceManoshree SundaramDaniel L. Wade Christina WincklerJohn S. Wolfhope

Board AdvisorsPaul S. Meeks Bruce C. Muller, Jr.Kevin Schneider

Ex-OfficioRichard C. Armstrong William B. Bingham Harry L. Blohm Donald E. Bowes Douglas D. Boyer John J. Cassidy Robin G. Charlwood Woodrow W. Crouch Walter L. DavisLloyd A. Duscha Joseph L. Ehasz Keith A. FergusonJohn W. France

Daniel J. HertelDaniel L. JohnsonDavid E. Kleiner Eric B. KollgaardRichard W. KramerRonnie M. LemonsMichael F. RogersJohn D. SmartKenneth A. SteeleArthur G. StrassburgerGlenn S. TarboxConstantine G. TjoumasArthur H. Walz, Jr.

Committee ChairpersonsAwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christina StanardConcrete Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Michael F. RogersConstruction and Rehabilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Daniel L. JohnsonDam Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timothy J. RandleDam Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Brian BeckerEarthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lelio H. MejiaEmbankment Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rachael BisnettEnvironment and Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kelly SchaefferFoundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Douglas D. BoyerHydraulics of Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Martin J. TealICOLD Congress Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Richard L. WiltshireLevees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elena SossenkinaMembership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monitoring of Dams and Their Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christopher HillNewsletter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phoebe PercellPublic Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rebecca RagonPublic Safety and Security for Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . William F. FoosTailings Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tatyana AlexievaUSSD History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Richard L. WiltshireYoung Professionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amanda Sutter

Committee on NewsletterChairperson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phoebe Percell

Area RepresentativesEast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vann A. NewellSouth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Murphy ParksNorth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gillian M. GregoryWest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John W. France

Agency RepresentativesBureau of Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phoebe PercellCorps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Travis TutkaFederal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tennessee Valley Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Husein A. Hasan

The USSD Newsletter is published by the United States Society on Dams in March, July and November. The deadline for articles or news items is the 1st of the month preceding the month of publication.

USSD, 1616 Seventeenth Street, #483 Denver, CO 80202; Phone: 303-628-5430 E-mail: [email protected]

Advertising rates are available at www.ussdams.org/membership/media-kit-advertising/

Copyright ©2017. ISSN 1083-1282.

www.ussdams.org

On the Cover: An aerial view of the damaged Oroville Dam spillway as the California Department of Water Resources gradually reduced the outflow from the spillway from 50,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) to zero on February 27, 2017.

USSD, as the United States member of the International Commission on Large Dams, is dedicated to:

ADVOCATE: Champion the role of dam and levee systems in society

EDUCATE: Be the premier source for technical information about dam and levee systems

COLLABORATE: Build networks and relationships to strengthen the community of practice

CULTIVATE: Nurture the growth of the community of practice.

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President’s Message

A s I look at my calendar this morning, it strikes me that my term as USSD President is winding down to the three final weeks. Looking back on the past seven years since I joined the USSD Board, I smile thinking about my fantastic journey that started with a series of unusual circumstances and a simple

coin toss (long story, ask me about in person some time!).

Right from the start, I was provided amazing opportunities to help plan an ICOLD Annual Meeting, serve on the National Dam Safety Review Board, and be part of developing a new strategic plan that would provide our roadmap for the growth and transformation of USSD.

Our four Strategic Imperatives have become the guideposts that push USSD forward to be a relevant organization serving our global industry into the future. We have made significant accomplishments in all four imperatives: Advocate, Education, Collaborate and Cultivate. Through our renewed focus, we have grown our relationships, served as the voice of our industry, delivered State of the Practice specialty workshops and International Symposia, and participated in numerous collaborative events and initiatives. I have made many new friends and had the opportunity to work side-by-side with the most talented professionals from around the world. Yet, when I look back, it is the Cultivate Imperative that stands out as most dear to my heart.

At a meeting of committee chairs just four years ago, the USSD Executive Team presented our plan to add a Young Professional Vice-Chair to each USSD committee. When one of our committee chairs replied that there were no Young Professional members on the committee roster, we realized the magnitude of our challenge. The USSD YP Committee, under the leadership of Amanda Sutter, Brandan Vavrek and Emily Schwartz, established a focused committee charter with specific goals to advance all four strategic imperatives. Since we first rolled out plans to encourage Young Professional member participation, I have watched our young leaders work side by side with our most seasoned and experienced professionals.

Last year, I watched Brian Crookston step up to lead the planning and delivery of the 6th International Symposium on Hydraulic Structures. As further explained in the Membership Section on page 41, for the first time we have named Young Professional Board Advisors to serve in leadership roles as part of our board activities. They will begin their terms during the USSD Board meeting in Anaheim on April 2, prior to the 2017 Annual Conference and Exhibition. Please take the time if you're in Anaheim to congratulate Melinda Dirdal, Tina Stanard, and Brian Gettinger as they help the USSD Board on our path of continuous improvement.

So, what is next for me, you ask? In my role as Past-President, you will see me focus on expanding USSD’s collaborative relationships and our leadership role within ICOLD. I will continue to work with our colleagues throughout the western hemisphere to strengthen the ICOLD National Committees of the Americas (INCA). We are planning the second in a series of Dam Safety in the Americas Symposia, to be held in Paraguay in October 2018. I will continue to encourage my friends across USSD to step up to new challenges and opportunities to maintain USSD as the premier technical organization serving the global dam and levee engineering community. Thank you for the trust you have placed in me to lead our organization. Please join me in Anaheim for the Opening Session

on Monday, April 3, where I will have the privilege to present the President’s Award, introduce our incoming Board Members and Executive Team, and listen to their plans as we continue our fantastic journey together.

John S. Wolfhope President, USSD

USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 3

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W e live our daily lives surrounded by hazards, most of which we rarely think about. The hazard might exist in worn tires on the car we drive, a roof on our home

that is past its age of protecting us, the quality of the food that we eat, or the condition of a dam in our community.

Recent events in California have prompted some to call for the outright end to the use of dams in America. Why would some choose to simply end the use of all dams and forego the enormous benefits dams provide to our society? Perhaps they don’t understand the essential roles of these structures and the social, economic, and environmental benefits of dams. For the same reasons that you don’t stop driving because your car needs new tires, or demolish your home because the roof needs new shingles, you don’t tear down thousands of dams that every single day provide us with clean, renewable electricity, clean drinking water, water for agricultural irrigation for the food we eat, public access and recreational use of the reservoirs behind the dams, flood control, and for other environmental benefits.

We are, of course, very concerned about the cause and effects of the recent emergency at Oroville Dam. This facility provides drinking water to 23 million people in California. That amounts to 2 out of every 3 people living in the state. The water stored in Lake Oroville irrigates 750,000 acres of farmland that helps California farmers feed our families and keep farmers employed. The 2.2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity generated from Oroville’s hydroelectric plant can power 200,000 homes. Lastly, if Oroville Dam were not in place to provide floodwater retention, significant flooding and damage likely would occur throughout the communities below the dam. This dam is an incredibly important piece of the State Water Project in California. Along with thousands of other dams around the nation delivering similar benefits for us all, it deserves our attention, not our derision.

Independent investigators will review the events that occurred at Oroville, determine why they occurred, and recommend measures that can be implemented to prevent a similar event from occurring again. Though easy to focus on the negative aspects at Oroville, there are some positive actions to consider. The Oroville dam managers and the greater Butte, Yuma and Sutter counties region had an Emergency Action Plan in place and the public responded quickly when the dam managers identified a potential threat. These emergency action plans are updated annually and the DWR is required to conduct an annual drill to ensure that the plan is carried out correctly.

Rather than demolish this critical facility, the incident in Oroville is a sign that the time is now for major investments

in our infrastructure to improve safety and reliability. Such an initiative would create thousands of good-paying jobs. A national debate has begun over the mechanism for investing in our infrastructure: finance v. funding. How do we find the state and federal resources to upgrade and construct stronger and more sustainable infrastructure; provide rehabilitation and repair, and increase public awareness, safety programs and inspections on our nation’s infrastructure? And for infrastructure, including dams and levees, that no longer serves the purpose for which it was built, how do we work with government agencies to decommission those facilities?

As the nation’s foremost dam and levee engineering professionals, the U.S. Society on Dams (USSD) works daily to deliver environmentally sustainable solutions to the nation and the world’s water resources challenges. Our country depends on the thousands of dams and over 100,000 miles of levees that provide such an important array of benefits and protection to our homes, communities, and to the nation. We need that critical infrastructure to serve us safely every day.

Applying common sense and the dedication of all levels of government and the American people, we can and should invest in this critically important part of our nation’s daily life as it touches each and every one of us.

Understanding Oroville: Apply a Common Sense Approach to U.S. Critical InfrastructureNote: The following editorial was sent to major U.S. newspapers in late February. USSD Members are encouraged to submit it to their local newspapers by going to the Advocacy page on the USSD website: www.ussdams.org/about/mission/advocate/current-issues/#/7/

Dam Experts to Serve on Advisory Boards The California Department of Water Resources has selected an independent Board of Consultants to help investigate the cause of the main spillway failure at Oroville Dam. All are USSD Members: Kerry Cato, John J. Cassidy, Eric Kollgaard, Faiz Makdisi and Larry Nuss.

At the request of DWR, USSD and ASDSO together compiled a list of engineers to serve on an independent forensic review team. Pending final approval by FERC, the team will comprise the following members:

Area of Expertise Name Geotechnical: John France, leader

Hydraulics: Hank Falvey

Hydraulic Structures: John Trojanowski

Operations/Human Factors: Irfan Alvi

Operations: Stephen Rigbey

Engineering Geology: David K. Rogers

Several additional individuals were recommended to provide support in specialized areas to the core team.

March 2017 USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte4

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2017 USSD Workshops Set for Texas, AlaskaSpecial Issues for Design and Construction of Dams in Cold Climates Focusing on Alaska, Canada and High Elevation DamsRobert Cannon, Schnabel Engineering, Leader September 18-20, Alyeska Hotel, Anchorage, Alaska

USSD is presenting this workshop in conjunction with the National Hydropower Association's fall regional meeting. The NHA meeting will be held on September 18, and the USSD workshop will follow on September 19-20.

This workshop brings together design and cold weather dam construction experts from the U.S. and Canada. Presentations will include experts from:

• Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Alaska Department of Fish & Game-Division of Habitat, and Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

• BC Hydro, Barnard Construction, Schnabel Engineering, ASI, Kodiak Electric, Ballard Marine, Juneau Hydro, WALO Construction and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Topics will range from dense asphaltic concrete construction in cold climates, frozen ground research, ice loading and jamming to engineering for long term performance. The second day will feature case studies of cold weather construction challenges from Alaska to Labrador.

The possibility of a field tour to the site of the Lower Eklutna Dam Removal Project is being investigated.

Lessons Learned from Recent Tailing Dam Failures and Path ForwardAmanda Adams, Stantec, Leader September 14-15, 2017, J.W. Marriott, San Antonio, Texas

The USSD Tailings Dam Committee is presenting this workshop in conjunction with the last two days of the ASDSO annual meeting, Dam Safety 2017. It will be a separate registration from the ASDSO conference.

This workshop brings together representatives from government and private industry, as well as tailings dams owners and regulators, from the U.S. and Canada, to look at historic tailings dams failures and regulatory responses and plan a path forward for the management of tailings dams challenges.

The first day will feature presentations on historic tailings dams failures, failure mechanism summaries, regulatory responses from the U.S. and Canada to failures, and the perspective of dam owners. On the second say, participants will break into working groups dealing with such diverse subjects as: practical design changes to implement as a result of lessons learned from recent failures, regulatory changes to implement as a result of the lessons learned from recent failures, alternative tailing disposal technologies, minimum slopes and other prescriptive regulations. The workshop will conclude with a plenary discussion of how dam owners, regulators and engineers can design a path forward to better manage the challenges of tailings dams.

Plan Now for USSD 2018 in Miami, May 1-5USSD is excited to announce that it will hold its 2018 Annual Conference and Exhibition in Miami, Florida. This 38th annual meeting will be held in Florida for the first time.

Conference participants will love the convenience and amenities of the beautiful Hyatt Regency in downtown Miami, the headquarters hotel. All events, including commiteee meetings, conference technical sessions, the exhibition, workshops and closing banquet, will take place at the Hyatt.

An invitation to join the Conference Planning Committee will be issued soon. You are encouraged to join the Planning Committee, whose first task will be to develop the Call for Papers, which will be issued in late spring or early summer.

Mark your calendars now to join your colleagues in Miami.

USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 5

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Innovative, Cost-Effective Engineering Solutions

Dean B. Durkee, PhD, PE • [email protected] Paul G. Schweiger, PE, CFM • [email protected]

602.553.8817 • www.gannettfleming.com • Offices Worldwide

The Tempe Town Lake Dam is one of the world’s largest hydraulically operated crest gate dams.

© Photos by James Doyle

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(800) 856-9440 | dappolonia.com

Engineers | Consultants | Managers

Civil, Environmental and Geotechnical Engineering

• Dam and Spillway Rehabilitation • Potential Failure Modes and Risk Analyses • Seepage and Geotechnical Analyses • Hydrologic and Hydraulic Evaluations • Instrumentation and Data Collection Systems • Dam Breach Analyses and Flood Routing Studies• Construction Inspections and Management• Permitting Services

TRADITION OF UNDERSTANDING.QUALITY SOLUTIONS.

Innovative, Cost-Effective Engineering Solutions

Dean B. Durkee, PhD, PE • [email protected] Paul G. Schweiger, PE, CFM • [email protected]

602.553.8817 • www.gannettfleming.com • Offices Worldwide

The Tempe Town Lake Dam is one of the world’s largest hydraulically operated crest gate dams.

© Photos by James Doyle

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Turbid Discharge Incident at Cannonsville Dam

Introduction

O n July 8, 2015, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) discovered turbid discharge at the toe of Cannonsville Dam,

a 2,800-foot-long, 175-foot-high earth dam with 97 billion gallons storage capacity. This dam is an important component of the water supply system which supplies 1.1 billion gallons daily to nine million people (Figures 1 and 2). The subsurface profile at the maximum section (Figure 3) illustrates the primary components of the dam. Turbid discharge developed during test borings for design of a 14.1 MW hydro-electric plant licensed to NYC by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and located at the toe next to the release chamber (Figure 4).

Incident A hydropower consultant developed a plan to collect subsurface information and install piezometers in the powerhouse foundation (Figure 5). Three of eight proposed borings were partially completed. On July 8, 2015, turbid

discharge was emanating from the toe into tailwater during the 3rd of 8 boreholes (FID-0) (Figures 5 and 6).

FID-8 began on July 1, resuming on July 5 and was drilled through the rock toe via hollow stem augers (HSA) to 52 feet and uncased to about 62 feet by mud rotary methods. The driller had difficulty backfilling FID-8 on July 6 by pouring 9 bags (450 pounds) of bentonite chips, 1 cubic

Figure 1. New York City Water Supply System.

John H. Vickers, P.E., Chief, Water Operations Division, NYC Environmental Protection, Grahamsville, New York ([email protected]); and and William H. Hover, P.E., Senior Principal, GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc., Norwood, Massachusetts ([email protected])

Figure 2. Aerial view of dam — focus area lower right.

FEATURE

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yard of 1 inch stone, 3 cubic yards of sand and 2 bags of bentonite chips into the borehole after auger removal. FID-1 was drilled on July 6 and 7 with HSA to 29 feet and uncased to 61 feet by mud rotary methods. FID-1 was backfilled using bentonite mud and cuttings. After HSA removal, the hole collapsed to six feet below grade and was backfilled with bentonite chips. FID-0 was drilled on July 7 and 8 in the same manner as FID-1. The borehole was filled with 60 gallons of cement grout bentonite grout prior to HSA removal, followed by borehole collapse to 6 feet and backfill with bentonite chips. The belief on July 8 was that drill cuttings,”recirculated mud” and backfill from previous holes mixed with drainage and seepage, causing turbid discharge. DEP stopped the borings to evaluate. Turbidity continued for two more days, with significant drops in piezometer levels beneath the dam, so DEP notified FERC and NY State DEC Dam Safety and mobilized staff to the normally unoccupied site for 24-7 monitoring. DEP notified state, county and town officials and emergency managers. DEP contacted William Hover, P.E., of GZA GeoEnvironmental, who performed a comprehensive dam safety assessment in the past, to respond. In consult with FERC, DEP initiated reservoir drawdown on July 13 at 1,000 MGD (maximum sustainable release); and increased maximum supply diversion to 450 MGD.

ResponseDEP took quick steps to mitigate risk and enable resolution. DEP mobilized staff, equipment and materials and, using the Emergency Action Plan as a guide, notified emergency managers, elected officials, regulating agencies and other stakeholders. DEP brought in tents, potable water, lighting, communications trailers and means to provide 24-7 monitoring at the remote location. DEP surveyors ensured the dam profile had not changed and erected staff gages in tailwater and on the toe area to monitor changes in discharge water surface and tailwater elevations with automated pressure transducers. DEP began daily inspections and photo documentation. The Automated Data Acquisition System reading interval of the piezometer array installed in 2000 was changed from daily to hourly, with twice daily analyses. DEP established deviation alarms and standard operating proceedures to notify engineers of rapid change of any piezometer. DEP built sediment collection boxes to examine grain size distribution of sediment. DEP

Figure 3. Inferred maximum dam section.

Figure 4. Conceptual rendering of proposed powerhouse.

Figure 5. Locations of three borings for proposed hydroelectric plant.

Figure 6. Turbid discharge at downstream toe tailwater on July 13, 2015.

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installed a constant monitoring turbidimeter and provided data to the Bureau of Water Supply (BWS) control room. BWS requested communication assets from NY State as there is no cellular service at the dam. Verizon and AT&T established satellite voice and data communications until the local telephone company upgraded to allow data and voice over internet phones. DEP erected generator powered lights and closed circuit television with camera feed to BWS and deployed satellite telephones. The division chief assimilated daily inspection and meter reading data and issued written situation reports to the project team to document site conditions and any changes.

Following is a timeline of selected events (all dates 2015).

July 8 Turbid discharge observed

July 10 DEP began 24-7 monitoring on-site

July 13 Initiated reservoir drawdown; notified public officials

July 18 Selected specialty contractor; first public notification meeting

July 20 Submitted relief well design; DEP began 24/7 remote CCTV monitoring

NYSOEM communication trailer arrived – satellite phone, internet service

July 22 Verizon communication trailer - 6 phones, internet, improved cell service

July 24 Begin drilling Relief Well No. 4; Board of Consultants meeting 1

July 28 Second larger rig begins drilling Relief Well No. 1

August 2 Confirmed visually that relief well pumping eliminated turbidity

August 4-5 Board of Consultants meeting 2

August 25 Compaction grouting of FID Boreholes completed

August 28 Termination of relief well pumping

Public OutreachThe dam is key to the safety of 80,000 people in the breach inundation area. DEP timely disseminated information to the public, with daily opportunities for questions and answers on public safety, emergency preparedness, state of the dam and repair progress, preventing rumors and building credibility. DEP hosted 12 public meetings and compiled an email list of officials, business owners, and residents in 130 communities along the Delaware River. Updates were sent daily during the height of the incident. Updates and weekly photographs were posted to DEP’s Facebook page. To increase the audience for Facebook posts, DEP “tagged” key media outlets and other groups. Updates were designated for community news. Facebook post sharing allowed access by tens of thousands of people. DEP compiled a list of newspapers, radio and TV stations and news websites that covered riverside communities in New

York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Many outlets and towns did not usually receive information from DEP. DEP asked the Associated Press to ensure its story was posted on the wire for all three states. DEP created a central page on its water supply website to post updates, including information on downstream releases, reservoir storage, inundation maps for downstream areas, and other useful information. A cell phone number of DEP’s information officer was shared in all updates and public meetings. Site tours for elected leaders and emergency response officials bolstered confidence.

Analyzing the ProblemWhile DEP mobilized, agency senior leaders hired GZA, which had performed a thorough engineering assessment of the dam and was very familiar with it, to assist with the problem. DEP hired three additional expert consultants with the advice and approval of FERC, to form the independent Board of Consultants (BOC), to help analyze the situation and provide feedback on DEP mitigation plans.

DEP found that deep piezometer levels in the dam foundation dropped 13-14 feet during drilling boreholes FID#1 and FID#0 and remained steady thereafter (Figure 7). An artesian well located 1,000 feet downstream that historically discharged freely through an orifice and 30 inches upward, dropped to a few inches upward. This artesian well and the new boreholes were hydraulically connected.

DEP, its consultants, FERC and DEC performed an abbreviated Potential Failure Mode Analysis on site on July 14. Of concern was the potential for a piping condition to form and if not halted, leading to dam failure. Larger soil particles could be transported into the rock fill toe undetected. Construction of a measuring weir, filter blanket or other surficial measures was impractical. DEP believed that the 3 boreholes pierced a confining layer under the rock toe into an artesian zone, causing water to flow upward and erode soil from within the boring, creating turbid discharge through the rock toe. The consultant agreed that this was the most plausible theory, while BOC and FERC agreed that this was a plausible theory. DEP collected samples from the borings and the turbid discharge and sent them to a laboratory for analysis. Microscopy studies suggested that soil particles in the turbid discharge was from the confining layer of silts and clays located below the rock toe and above the artesian zone. Microscopy confirmed that the boring backfill was not the source of turbidity. DEP’s archival search yielded historical photographs which helped the team to better understand where the relic riverbed was located and provided other useful information.

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Mitigation The team brainstormed alternatives and agreed on installation of pressure relief wells followed by plugging the boreholes. The relief wells would depressurize the aquifer to halt the turbid discharge and permit the boreholes to be plugged. DEP also tapped the knowledge of four reputable specialty geotechnical contractors. On July 17, DEP and project team members met with four contractors individually and listened to their approach to relief well installation and borehole plugging. Potential remediation measures were discussed to provide a basis for rational selection of a highly qualified contractor with the resources to respond rapidly. Potential solutions discussed included large diameter over-boring the original boreholes, high mobility pressure grouting and low mobility compaction grouting. Three of the four contractors independently felt compaction grouting to be the best solution to plugging the boreholes. DEP entered into an emergency contract with Moretrench to construct repairs.

Using the experience of the GZA consultant, DEP archives, contractor’s recommendations, and a collaborative effort with regulators and the BOC, the team settled on 10 temporary wells configured in an arc up gradient from the boreholes and powerhouse and along the right abutment at 40-foot spacing for the 1st stage and 20-foot spacing for a

2nd stage (Figure 8). Pumps would increase pressure relief, and the wells could be maintained for future use.

Figure 7. Decreased piezometer levels concurrent with FID borings.

Figure 8. Relief well location plan.

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Relief well holes were drilled through permanent steel casings to control artesian pressure, using sonic drilling methods to rapidly advance the casing through the rock toe with little or no water or air flushing. The wells were constructed with slotted PVC screen and solid PVC riser. The slotted section was backfilled with filter sand on top of which a bentonite plug was installed. The annular space above the screened zone was backfilled with cement grout. Well screens were set below the silt-clay confining layer to relieve the artesian stratum (Figure 9). Each well housed a submersible pump with a PVC discharge pipe fitted with a sampling port and flow meter and then connected to a header pipe discharging into a sedimentation tank and then an existing catch basin. Diameter of readily available sonic drill tooling and casing allowed relief wells with 3-inch and 4-inch diameter screens. Ten (10) inch sonic drill casing allowed a permanent 8-inch steel casing to be grouted into the confining soil strata below the rockfill before advancing the hole into soils under artesian head. A careful evaluation was essential to provide a casing with adequate seal into the confining layer, before encountering the artesian stratum of unknown extent and depth.

Sonic drilling allowed continuous soil sampling and custom design of screened zones for each well. RW-1 was screened in clean sands and gravels associated with an ancient buried river bed under artesian pressure, encountered beneath the dam crest and upper downstream berm, deep within

the glacial till foundation during 2001 explorations. The old artesian water supply well located downstream of the dam, RW-2 and RW-3 were screened in the same stratum. RW-4 through RW-7 did not encounter the sand-gravel and were screened in the till or till-like material above bedrock. The first well drilled was RW-4, completed on July 28 and selected based on the proximity of a piezometer and availability of the first, smaller sonic drilling rig. RW-1, closest to FID-01 (borehole showing 1st piezometer reaction), was designed to intercept the ancient riverbed. RW-1, 2 and 3 awaited the larger sonic rig to allow larger well screens and pumps. RW-1 showed 14 gpm artesian flow. When RW-4 started pumping at 4 gpm, turbid discharge slightly declined. RW-7 initially yielded 12 gpm but quickly ran dry. On August 1, RW-1, 2 and 3 were pumping 50, 25 and 30 gpm. The toe was depressurized and turbidity was no longer observed. The relief wells were declared a success the next morning (Figure 10). Pumping from the deep artesian stratum using RW-1, 2 and 3 revealed that it was the source of water causing turbid discharge. Further confirmation of the source of the erosive flow was provided when pumping was briefly stopped for electrical rewiring and turbid seepage re-emerged.

Authorization to resume normal reservoir operations was granted by FERC. DEP stopped deliberate reservoir drawdown (15 feet/18 days) by returning the release and water supply diversion to normal seasonal rates of flow.

RemediationThe borehole remediation plan developed concurrent with relief well installation employed compaction grouting to restore pre-breach hydraulic conditions by sealing the boreholes through the confining layer, replacing eroded ground washed out by artesian flow. The verticality of the boreholes was unknown, so the team decided that grouting should modify the ground within a target area around the Figure 9. Relief well detail.

Figure 10. Tailwater – no turbid discharge, August 2.

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borehole location. Evaluation of the success of grouting required indicators such as piezometric levels and tailwater turbidity. Low mobility grouting (LMG) using low slump mortar-like grout injected under pressure through an open-ended steel casing displaced and densified the surrounding soil. Strategically placed grout bulb “columns” within the target zone displaced and densified the surrounding soil, and filled larger voids.

The Phase 1 LMG grouting plan re-traced each FID hole and included three holes surrounding each borehole in a triangular pattern (Figure 11). The re-traced holes were to clean out and backfill the FID boreholes and the surrounding three holes were to squeeze the FID boreholes closed if they could not be found and re-traced. The grouting plan included stand by time for dissipation of pore-pressures. The LMG casing was advanced by internal flush duplex drilling to the target depth. The casing was then retracted in 2-foot (0.6-m) lifts as the grout was injected. For each lift, injection continued until pressure refusal, a pre-determined target grout volume was reached, or surface heave was observed. The team agreed that borehole re-tracing, cleaning out and grouting would be the most reliable closure expected. Relatively flexible, specially selected 2.5-inch drill casing with a lost point tri-cone 3.5-inch diameter bit was advanced first with positive water flush so as to follow the existing FID borehole as closely as possible. Minimal resistance to the advancement of the drill string and an abrupt increase

in density at termination depth of each FID hole was a conclusive indicator that the boreholes were re-traced to full depth.

The lost-point bit was dropped at the bottom of each of the three boreholes and the hole flushed with water and pressure grouted. The high pressure grouting began 3-5 feet below the bottom of FID boreholes. This assisted in densifying soils which may have been loosened as a result of upflow. Higher grout pressures, up to 500 psi, were utilized beneath the confining stratum of hard silt-clay and underlying glacial till to replace eroded ground and compact loosened soils. Lower pressure grouting, at 50 to 300 psi, was performed with an LMG grout of greater slump [4 to 6 inches] in the “erodible zone” of soils comprised of the stratified sands, silts, gravels, and clays above the silt-clay confining layer and below the rockfill and the foundation interface at the bottom of the rockfill. Pressures were lowered to reduce the potential for damaging the erodible and confining layers due to the high forces that accompany LMG grouting. Potential hydro-fracturing of the confining layer required careful selection of the grout mix and the grouting pressure. The grout mix was relatively dry to keep the grout from acting too “liquid.” The grouting pressure needed to be high enough to close the borehole, but not cause hydraulic fracturing, nor lift the strata grouted, potentially causing new groundwater flow paths. A value of 500 psi was several times lower than the undrained shear strength of the silt-clay confining layer, and lower than the shear strength of the underlying soils and was selected for trial use based on these considerations and engineering judgment. Based on successful trial use, including vertical surveys which demonstrated that lifting was not occurring, a 500 psi value was adopted.

Following grouting of the 3 FID boreholes, grouting

Figure 11. LMG borehole closure pattern.

Figure 12. Grout volumes vs. depth at each fid borehole repair location.

SSSGC = Stratified Sand, Silt, Gravel, and Clay; S-C = Silt-Clay; GT = Glacial Till; S-G = Sand and Gravel.

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was performed on a triangular pattern around each FID borehole, based on the volumes of grout injected and concern about radial voids or loosened zones beneath the confining layer. Figure 12 shows the grout volumes injected vs depth at each FID borehole. The highest grout volume was observed at FID-1, which was suspected by the project team to be the most problematic based on its hydraulic connection to the artesian layer.

Observations during drilling of the FID boreholes provided confidence that the boreholes had been retraced. Observations during grouting indicated that the ground had been tightened. After 24-hour grout cure, the relief wells were deactivated one at a time. Immediate piezometer response (Figure 7) suggested that pre-breach conditions had been restored. On August 30, 2015, after all relief wells were turned off, the project team determined that the grouting was successful, but long-term verification of recharge of the piezometer levels as the pool returned to historic levels would be more conclusive.

RecoveryDEP developed a phased monitoring program to check the success of the borehole remediation. The first phase continued the same level of 24/7 on site monitoring for two weeks after the borehole repairs were completed, ending on September 11, 2015, at which time DEP partially demobilized. The second phase lasted approximately 10 weeks and included daily inspections, remote visual monitoring, turbidimeter and enhanced piezometer reading frequency and analysis (which had been changed to 5 minute intervals to support relief well installation and LMG processes). DEP continued weekly Situation Reports, without issues. Following submission of the Forensic Report on November 25, 2015, monitoring entered the third phase. DEP decreased inspections to twice weekly and issued reports monthly. Throughout the third phase, piezometer readings rose towards pre-incident levels as the reservoir level returned to full pool. On May 16, 2016, the project team met on site to reassess the incident and plan for disposition of the relief wells. The team agreed that DEP could return to pre-incident levels of monitoring and to maintain relief wells in a stand-by status pending decisions on the future hydro-electric project.

Lessons LearnedThe root cause of the incident was the improper preparation for and execution of the FID boreholes, using uncased drilling techniques which led to unsuccessful borehole closure. Contributing factors included lack of understanding of subsurface conditions at the dam toe, selection of an inexperienced lead field geotechnical engineer for the boring operation, and lack of contingency planning and

preparation for artesian conditions. Successes included prior engineering assessments and installation of piezometers, periodic data collection and the ADAS which enabled quick determination of areas of the dam reacting to the turbid discharge. Routinely conducted dam safety training programs prepared DEP to quickly react with confidence. A well laid out Emergency Action Plan helped to guide public notifications and contingency planning. The multi-point public information and awareness push informed local elected leaders, businesses and residents, while preventing anxiety and instilling confidence with downstream stakeholders. The collaborative process with regulators, consultants and the contractor led to good decisions and resulted in mutual trust and confidence that supported timely field changes.

This turbid discharge incident was a hard fought skirmish which required quick, informed and collaborative decision making. The success of the project team prevented the risk from developing into something much worse. DEP was quick to respond and, with the help and support of FERC and NYS Dam Safety and other local and state officials, gathered a team of experts that used their diverse knowledge, skills and abilities to respond, analyze the problem, mitigate and remediate the problem, and develop and implement plans for long term success. It is our hope that the lessons learned will assist other dam owners and dam safety professionals

The hydro-electric project is on hold pending further feasibility analysis. DEP has taken steps to prevent recurrence of a similar incident. DEP has updated its Drilling and Boring checklist to ensure open hole methods are not used in areas subject to artesian conditions. This includes the base of all dams, dikes and aqueducts.

Contributing AuthorsNYCDEP –Thomas DeJohn, P.E., BWS, Adam Bosch, BWS, Sean McAndrew, P.E., BEDC, Jeffrey Helmuth, P.E., BWS, Paul Costa, P.E., BEDC, Eric Robert, BWS, Anthony Garagliano BWS

Board of Consultants – Joseph Ehasz, P.E., Frederick Rhyner, P.E., Stephen Whiteside, P.E.

Moretrench – Paul Schmall, PhD, P.E., Michael McHugh, Matthew DeGregoris

GZANY – Chad Cox, P.E., Laurie Gibeau, P.E., James Guarente, P.E., Ronald Kubiak, P.E., Todd Bown, P.G., Chris Navien, EIT

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ICOLD UPDATE

2018 Congress Call for PapersThe historic and beautiful city of Vienna, Austria, will be the venue for the 26th ICOLD Congress and 86th Annual Meeting. The triennial gathering of dam experts from around the world will focus on the four Questions (below). All U.S. papers must be submitted through USSD. A Call for Papers, including deadlines and author instructions, will be available soon. For more information, contact Dick Wiltshire, Chair of the USSD Committee on ICOLD Congress Papers ([email protected]).

Q100: Reservoir sedimentation and sustainable development

• Best practice of storage design including sediment release structures, reservoir operation and sedimentation management techniques, including dredging, sediment removal and debris removal.

• Sediment replenishment techniques downstream of dams for river regime and morphology restoration.

• Experiences with turbidity current discharge by bottom outlets and the performance of sediment bypass tunnels.

• Effect of climate change on reservoir sedimentation and consequences on sustainable storage use.

Q101: Safety and risk analysis

• Seismic Risk. Lessons from past earthquakes. Cost efficiency of relevant design improvements for dams.

• Risk from floods on embankment dams, including climate change. Data of accidents. Risk analysis. Efficiency and cost of solutions.

• Various risks for concrete and masonry dams including climate change. Data on accidents. Risk Analysis. Specific remedies.

• Non-structural drivers that increase or reduce risk management. Alert systems. Public safety. Data on accidents.

Q102: Geology and dams

• Geology of foundation (investigation, interpretation and characterization) in relation to dam type selection and dam design.

• Foundation treatment: sealing the foundation (grouting, jet-grouting, cut-off walls, deep cut-off, etc.), strengthening the foundation (consolidation grouting, anchoring, concreted galleries, etc.).

• Instrumentation and monitoring; behavior of foundations including long term performance.

• Problems and solutions related to soft rock foundations and foundations on deep overburden.

Q103: Small dams and levees

• Failure modes of levees: lessons learned, risk analysis, safety levels.

• Design, construction and reinforcement of levees, problems with the original design.

• Governance, inspection and monitoring of levees.

• Specific problems experienced and solutions for operating, maintaining and rehabilitation of thousands of large dams (lower than 15 m).

• Specific problems experienced and solutions for operating, maintaining and rehabilitation of millions of small dams (lower than 15 m and storing less than 1 million m3).

ICOLD to Meet in Prague, July 2017For the first time in its history, the ICOLD Annual Meeting will be held in Prague. The 85th Annual Meeting will take place July 3-7, 2017, in the capital of the Czech Republic.

A key event will be a one-day symposium, Knowledge Based Dam Engineering. Other important activities on the agenda will be meetings of the ICOLD technical committees and working groups and committee workshops. Highlights of the Annual Meeting will also include an exhibition, a special cultural event, local technical tours, and several post-meeting study tours. A large delegation of USSD members and others from the U.S. are expected to attend the Annual Meeting, including USSD representatives to ICOLD technical committees. Please advise USSD Executive Director Gene Guilford ([email protected]) if you plan to attend. For more information, visit www.icold2017.ez.

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COMMITTEE CORNER

EarthquakesLelio Mejia, Committee ChairThe Committee had a busy year in 2016 as it continued to actively work on its objectives of: a) promoting the seismic safety of dams by contributing to the development of knowledge on seismic analysis and design of dams and to the advancement of seismic dam engineering practice, and b) supporting the ICOLD Committee on Seismic Design of Dams. The Committee met in person twice during 2016, first during the USSD Annual Meeting in April, and in October. The committee added five new young professional members and its roster now stands at 34. The membership includes representatives of private, federal, state and academic entities from the United States and Canada.

The Committee worked on four initiatives intended to develop and disseminate knowledge on dam seismic design. One of them was a workshop, held during the 2016 USSD Annual Meeting, on a blind prediction analysis of the recorded seismic response of Monticello Dam, California. The other three are in progress, as follows: 1) update

of guidelines for the selection of earthquake ground motion parameters of dams (which were last updated by the Committee in 1999), 2) development of guidelines for the seismic design and evaluation of structures appurtenant to dams, and 3) development of guidelines for the seismic deformation analysis of embankment dams. In addition, the Chair attended the 2016 meeting of the ICOLD Committee on Seismic Aspects of Dam Design in South Africa, and reported on the Committee’s initiatives and other USSD activities.

2017 Plans and GoalsThe Committee is continuing work on its three standing initiatives, and plans to complete the first two in 2017. In addition, it is co-sponsoring with the Bureau of Reclamation a second workshop on the Seismic Analysis of Concrete Dams, to be held during the 2017 USSD Annual Meeting. The Committee will be holding an in-person meeting also during the Annual Meeting, and a second meeting later in the year. In addition, the Committee will continue to support the ICOLD Seismic Committee, and hopefully participate in the ICOLD meeting in Prague.

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Issue PaPer

National Strategy to Address Public Safety Around Dams Note: The following was presented to the Homeland Security Joint Meeting of the Dam Sector Coordinating Councils on January 11, 2017, and to the FEMA National Dam Safety Review Board meeting on February 15, 2017

Purpose

T his paper is intended to bring awareness to and obtain the support from the Dams Sector

and U.S. governing bodies to assist in the development of a national strategy that includes supporting technical guidance tools to reduce the number of fatal public safety accidents occurring at and around dams in the U.S.

BackgroundDams and their impounded reservoirs are public destinations for a wide range of recreation activities. Many of these activities make use of dam features for extreme sports that include unauthorized and unsafe actions, resulting in accidents and fatalities. Oftentimes, first responders succumb to hazards while attempting to rescue victims. A troubling statistic uncovered by Dr. Bruce A. Tschantz, professor emeritus of the University of Tennessee, is that during the past 36 years there have been nearly nine times as many fatalities from accidents at dams than there have been deaths resulting from dam failures; 347 reported drownings at dams versus 40 deaths from dam failures [Tschantz, 2016]. This same trend has been observed in other countries.

Over the entire history of Canada, more people have died in accidents around dam sites than from structural failure of dams [CDA, 2011]. Of significant concern are the growing populations near these structures and the increasing online postings of extreme sports activities by youth in and around restricted industrial sites at water control structures.

While accidents at dams are reported regularly in the local and national media, little statistical data is available to assess the full national extent of the problem. There is no national strategy addressing public safety or database to collect information on dam-related accidents. The state of Iowa reports an estimated 97 drowning deaths at dams, of which 18 occurred since 1998 [Des Moines Register, May 1, 2012, citing Iowa Department of Natural Resources records]. Minnesota reports 52 deaths, and 50 injured or rescued people, at dams in that state between 1974 and 2002 [Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, Boat and Water Safety Section, 1974-2002 Dam-Related Accidents, 2003]. In Illinois, the Fox River has a notoriously dangerous segment of 15 dams in the 115-mile reach. At the Yorkville Dam, on Fox River, at least 12 people are reported to have

drowned since it was rebuilt in 1960. Drayton Dam on the Red River in Minnesota claimed 12 lives between 1965 and 1995.

A study by Tschantz from a database of accidents he collected from 1960 through 2016, reveals at least 304 injuries and/or death-related incidents at low-head dams in 39 states. In these incidents, there have been over 100 injuries and over 377 drowning deaths. These figures only include accidents obtained by Dr. Tschantz from documented news articles and local officials primarily at low-head dams, the focus of his research. The actual number of accidents are unknown and are likely much higher, but collective statistical data is lacking. Dr. Tschantz’s research shows a disturbing trend that the number of documented accidents at low-head dams in the U.S. has been increasing in recent years, as

William F. Foos, CPP, PSP, Chair, USSD Committee on Public Safety and Security for Dams ([email protected]); and Paul G. Schweiger, PE, CFM, Chair, ASDSO Committee on Public Safety Around Dams ([email protected])

During the past 36 years

there have been nearly

nine times as many

fatalities from accidents

at dams than there have

been deaths resulting

from dam failures.

FEATURE

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shown in Figure 1. These statistics demonstrate the need for the dam industry to focus attention on identifying and correcting the hazards created by the dams.

Although the most significant hazard and cause of fatalities is the transient submerged hydraulic jump or hydraulic roller that is often attributed to flow over low-head run-of-the-river dams, there are many other hazards that exist at dams that have contributed to accidents and fatalities. Dozens of fatalities, resulting predominantly from boating accidents, occur immediately downstream from larger conventional dam spillways, and turbine releases. [Dr. Roland Hotchkiss, BYU Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering, who maintains a broad BYU database website of fatalities at dams, reports nearly 500 deaths related to low head dams (note: the BYU database includes contributions from Dr. Tschantz).]

Other hazardous conditions produced by and around dams include: strainers, sudden releases with rapidly increasing flow conditions, confined spaces, unpredictable currents,

submerged structures, hidden dam crests, watercraft over spillways, entrapment, stranding, bridge and box culvert apron drop-offs, and steep slopes and slippery surfaces.

In response to the increasing number of accidents and fatalities at and around dams, several countries and organizations have recently formed work groups with the aim of learning, fostering cooperation, and developing solutions. Countries in the forefront include Canada, France and Norway. In 2010, ICOLD formed Technical Committee I - Public Safety around Dams, with representatives from 21 ICOLD Member Countries, including the United States. The ICOLD Committee has been tasked with producing a State of Practice document that includes providing information on hazards and risks, current practice, legal frameworks, and mitigation measures. Amongst the National Committee contributions to the ICOLD publication has been the Canadian Dam Association (CDA) Guidelines on Public Safety around Dams. The CDA guidelines include an approach for evaluating public safety at dams and developing and implementing a site-specific public safety plan using a risk assessment methodology.

Within the United States there exist several guideline type documents addressing public safety controls, most notably those produced by the FERC (1992), USBR (1996) and the USACE. In each case the documents are written at a high level, and do not include a robust methodology to assess the hazards in order to select appropriate control measures. However, most states and dam owners do not have any formal policies or guidelines for addressing public safety. Public safety at and around dams tends to fall through the cracks between state dam safety, and boating or water safety. Most of the Federal Agencies that produced these documents have each identified the need to update. This presents an opportunity to align the practice in the United States around a common set of objectives and methodologies for assessing hazards and treating risk. What is missing is a national, coordinated effort for protecting the public at and around dams, including smaller dams that are exempt because they fall below the state or federal jurisdictional size categories.

Security ConcernsThe increased number of extreme youth activities at dams have created a security risk in and around these structures. Many of these activities are captured by cell phones or GoPro video recording devices, and later uploaded on video website platforms. Some of the videos capture images of critical assets, and record access routes into and /or around security features that restrict access to critical areas in and around water retention structures. This information has the potential to be used by threat actors in pre-attack

Figure 1. Cumulative U.S. low head dam drownings from 1960 to 2016 [Tschantz, 2016].

Figure 2. U.S.-based incidences in and around dams (T. Bennett, Personal Communication, OPG External Public Safety Incident Database, January 2, 2016)

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surveillance, preparation, and planning. For this reason alone, the security community should be involved in supporting a National Public Safety program for dams, and developing training material to educate dam owns to the potential risks to security when unauthorized activities are ignored and discounted.

USSD and ASDSO CommitteesIn response to the growing need to address public safety issues at dams, both ASDSO and USSD have formed committees over the past two years to address the growing concerns around public safety.

Public safety is inherently defined as the safety consequences on the public (including visitors, boaters, first responders, workers and trespassers) that are potentially exposed to hazards at dams, other than dam failures, resulting from the existence and operation of dams.

The goal of each of these two committees is to promote a future where all dams are safe to the public.

Public Safety for Dams Work The efforts of the two committees have identified that the U.S. needs a national approach towards identifying hazards created by dams that put the public at risk, while tracking public safety accidents, and evaluating the success safety measures have on minimizing the risks to the public. The following is a list of areas that would be worthwhile pursuits that could be used as good guidance, but would require significant attention and resources to address and potentially stem the growing number of public safety accidents that dam owners are facing:

1. Develop and maintain a database of accidents, fatalities, and hazardous activities at dams

2. Monitor trends and relevant issues (examples: dam dropping, right to fish laws)

3. Assemble and make available information and resources on a public web page dedicated to public safety around dams. Consider a database that includes the following subject categories:

• Research and other information on hydraulic hazards (emphasis on understanding physics of hazardous submerged hydraulic jump)

• Educational Resources (warning signs and buoys, pamphlets, videos, websites, PowerPoint presentations, papers)

4. Post mortem incident investigation case studies

• Crisis Incident Investigation Team• After action reports

• Case studies of specific incidents (videos of news reports, news articles, blogs,etc.)

5. Development of technical information on controlling exposure and mitigation strategies

• How to evaluate for and create exclusion zones• Design of portage facilities around dams• Patrolling• Information on emergency response/rescue (rescue

procedures, rescue equipment)• Site Enhancements• Information on Eliminating Hydraulic Hazard

6. Research on how to design dam structures that can minimize if not eliminate hydraulic hazards

• Structural Modifications to Dam• Dam Removal• Other

National Strategy on Public Safety at DamsThe efforts of both ASDSO and USSD have drawn significant attention from the dam community throughout the US, highlighting the growing demand for education on issues related to Public Safety. Today, both organizations are encouraging the scheduling of guest lecturers and workshops on Public Safety topics (during their April 2017 annual conference, USSD featured a concurrent session on safety and security, and hosted a workshop on the Canadian Dam Association’s Technical Guidelines on Public Safety for Dams). Similarly, ASDSO is including a concurrent technical session on public safety around dams during the March 2017 Southeast Regional Conference in Nashville. However, more is needed. Today the demand for a unified message on matters of Public Safety requires:

1. National Dam Incident Tracking Database

2. Educational Products

• Publications• Papers• Workshops• Seminars• Presentations• Public meetings• Webinars• Media briefings and consultation

3. Message(s) that are targeted for the audience

• Designers — Avoid creating hazards & eliminate or mitigate existing hazards.

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• Inspectors — Identify hazards, recommend or enforce appropriate action.

• Maintenance staff —Understand hazards, follow best practices for working around dams, and maintain public safety features at dams.

• Dam Owners — Understand legal responsibilities, exposure, and risk reduction options.

• State Regulators — Understand scope of hazards, available resources, and state regulatory practices.

• First Responders — Understand hazards, follow best practices for emergency response, learn about latest response equipment and techniques.

• Contractors/Divers — Understand hazards, follow best practices for working around dams, avoid creating hazards at dams when constructing temporary diversion and care of water facilities.

• Recreating Public — Understand and avoid hazards. • Media — Accurate reporting, promote public education.

4. Cooperation with other groups focused on promoting public safety around dams

• Other Professional Associations, CDA, ICOLD • Boater Safety Organizations • Fishing Organizations

• Parks and Recreational Agencies • First Responders

Recommendation It is the opinion of ASDSO and USSD that the Dam Safety and Security governing bodies (National Dam Safety Review Board and DHS Dams Sector Coordinating Council) are in a position to provide support and technical assistance in the development of national guidelines and best practices for the U.S. Dams Sector on public safety around dams. The initial intent is to develop public safety guidelines similar to what has been done for Canada and currently under development through ICOLD for participating international members. The focus of the initial technical guidelines would be to identify and illustrate best practices and risk reduction strategies that could address:

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Towards Seismic Fragility Analysis of Concrete Dams

Introduction

D ams, a most critical component of our energy generating infrastructure are aging and their deterioration levels are reaching critical values. Indeed the American Society of Civil Engineers report card for America’s

infrastructure categorized the US dam hazards as 1) high (potentially causing loss of life), 2) significant (economic losses), 3) low, and 4) undetermined [1]. About 14700, 12400, 59000, and 1300 dams fall in each one of those four categories. The geographical distribution of the hazardous dams is shown in Figure 1 and the number of high-hazard dam is reported to have increased by nearly 40% over the past decade [2]. The Association of State Dam Safety Officials reports that by 2020, 70% of the U.S. dams will be over 50 years old [3] and most of them are unlikely to safely withstand current design guidelines for potential maximum floods and maximum credible earthquakes.

A premise of this paper is that the current approach based on “potential failure mode analysis” (PFMA) of dams may not be sufficient and needs to be broadened. Thus, the concept of “performance based earthquake engineering” (PBEE) is adopted and merged with PFMA to proposed a hybrid method in which a critical measure of the resulting probabilistic safety assessment is the fragility curve.

Concept of Fragility AnalysisThe concept of fragility was first introduced in the context of probabilistic analysis of nuclear power plants, in order to distinguish the task of the structural engineers from the one of the seismologist. In the general form, the seismic fragility is defined as the probability of exceedance of a certain limit state (LS) for specific level of ground motion intensity measure (IM). Examples of LSs include minor damage, moderate and collapse. Those in turn are assessed from either engineering demand parameters (EDP) such as stresses, drifts, or from damage index (DI) such crack length ratio or plastic deformations. IMs in turn are not limited to the usual peak ground acceleration (PGA), as they may include first-mode spectral acceleration (Sa(T1)), specific energy density (SED) or Arias intensity (IA). Hence, fragility is defined as [5]:

[ ]Fragility P LS | IM im= = (1)

where P [A|B] is the conditional probability that A is true given that B is true, and im refers to a specific value of IM. Fragility curves can be derived based on one of following four approaches:

• Empiricalmethods are based on post-earthquake surveys which are usually the most reliable source.

M.A. Hariri-Ardebili, Ph.D., University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of hazardous dams in the U.S.[4].

AbstractGiven the recent impetus for probabilistic based analyses of dams, and the limited previous attempts to address this timely question, there is a need for a comprehensive assessment of the previous work. Hence, this paper provides a review on seismic fragility analyses of concrete dams. A contextual framework within which fragility curves are used is presented within the scope of the performance based earthquake engineering.

FEATURE

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•Heuristic methods are based on expert elicitation and are useful where the empirical information about damage data is very limited.

• Analyticalmethods are based on structural analyses (usually finite element simulations).

• Hybridmethodsare based on combination of the above sources to reduce the computational efforts.

In practice most of the fragility curves are obtained by fitting a log-normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) to the data points (obtained using one of the four previous methods):

where X is the uncertain excitation. It is usually represented

as an IM; however, it may have another form such as safety factor. η is standard normal CDF, η and β are the median of the fragility function (the X level with 50% probability of exceedance) and the logarithmic standard deviation (also referred to as the dispersion of X). From the method of moments, the estimated η and β are:

where Nobs is number of observations (simulations).[ ] ( )ln /

P LS | Xx

β

= = Φ

( )1

1ˆ exp ln XobsN

iiobsN

η=

=

( ) ( )( )2

1

ˆln X lnˆ

1

obsN

ii

obsN

ηβ =

−=

(3)

(2)

(4)

Contextual FrameworkThe steps towards generating seismic fragility curves for concrete dams are conceptually showed in Figure 2. The following section describes each of these steps more in detail.

Figure 2. Outline of the concrete dams fragility analysis [6].

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I. Site Characteristics: Determine dam site seismicity map which can be obtained from US geological Survey (USGS) web-site.

II. Experimental Tests: Examine the dam physical model using appropriate instrumentation, record the long term field monitoring data, and possibly perform forced vibration test to obtain the most reliable initial material properties.

III. Finite Element (FE) Model: Develop the initial finite element model based on the previous data and material characteristics. Decide on required features (e.g., fluid-soil-structure interaction, thermal loads, nonlinearity) for the numerical analyses and determine the constitutive models. Finally, select an appropriate FE Package.

IV. Initial Deterministic Analysis: Perform the initial FE deterministic analysis to ensure on the accuracy of model, to be followed by a set of parametric analyses with initially N1 identifiable unknown parameters, which may be reduced to N2 through calibration with forced vibration testing and long term field monitoring.

V. Analysis Re-check: Double check the finite element analysis in terms of numerical methods used for time integration, number and size of increments, explicit/implicit solution scheme, convergence criteria, etc.

VI. Sensitivity Analysis: Assuming that each of the remaining N2 variables has a minimum and maximum value, then 2×N2+1 sensitivity analyses are performed. The first has all variables set to their mean value, and then each variable is assigned the minimum or maximum, one at a time. Results are then displayed though so-called “Tornado Diagram” from which the most sensitive N3 random variables are selected and kept in further studies.

VII. Epistemic Uncertainties: These types of uncertainties are those associated with quantities that should be known, but practically impossible to quantify, such as material property spatial distribution or temporal uncertainties (e.g., time-dependent material degradation). Either one of those two may have two or more random variables (such as tensile strength and fracture energy) and a possible cross-correlation matrix (which is used to define the dependency between multiple variables at the same time).

VIII. Aleatory Uncertainties: These types of uncertainties are those due to insurmountable lack of knowledge such as seismicity at a given site and at a given time. First, a “probabilistic seismic hazard analysis” is performed to determine the hazard curves. Then, corresponding ground motion records are selected (PEER Berkeley web-site), and finally the optimal IM parameter is determined (such as PGA or Sa(T1)).

IX. Combined Uncertainties: Outcome of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties are combined by performing Monte Carlo simulations (MCS). Advance methods such as Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS), Halton or Sobel can be replaced to reduce the number of analyses. One of the following three approaches can be used when both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties are presence (See Figure 3):

• Method I: This is a simultaneous method, where the number of ground motion records in each seismic intensity level (SIL), n should be equal to the number of models (already sampled and prepared based on LHS). Then, each of the ground motions are randomly paired with one of the models and n nonlinear transient analyses are performed for a specific SIL. Thus, a total of n×k analyses are required, where k is the number of SILs. In the resulted fragility curves, the median and the logarithmic standard deviation have the combined nature ηcom and βcom, respectively.

• Method (II): This is a simultaneous method, where the number of ground motion records, n, is independent from the number of model, m. Thus, for each SIL, n×m analyses are required which results a total of n×m×k analyses.

• Method (III): This is a non-simultaneous method, where uncertainties are treated separately and then combined. Ground motion record-to-record (RTR) variability is computed assuming m=1 in “Method (II)” (it means a deterministic model with all RVs at the mean values). Performing the nonlinear analyses lead to ηRTR and βRTR. On the other hand, the logarithmic standard deviation due to material/modeling (MM) uncertainty, βMM, can be obtained from a set of nonlinear analyses, literature survey, or engineering judgment. Finally, the combined dispersion can be obtained as:

X. Fragility Analysis: Limit States and Potential Failure Modes are then extracted through data mining. Examples of LSs include crest displacements and joint opening/sliding. In the last step, fragility curves/surface are derived from the previous through a statistical interpretation and a cumulative distribution function.

Review of Current ApplicationsThis section aims to address some of the current applications of the seismic fragility analysis of concrete dams. Table 1 summarizes the major features of each case, followed by Figure 4 which shows a sample plot.

2 2com RTR MMβ β β= + (5)

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ConclusionSeismic fragility analysis is, in fact, a probabilistic metric for seismic performance assessment of concrete dams. Due to its probabilistic nature, it requires the use of random methods to quantify both the demand and capacity. On the other hand, there exist extra challenges in seismic fragility analysis of concrete dams such as the idealization of structure, fluid-structure interaction, foundation-dam interaction, spatial variability of seismic ground motions, selection of the ground motion intensity parameters, structural analysis techniques, definition of the limit states, and quantification of the uncertainties. Therefore, many models have been developed to address these issues. However, the final goal is identical: prediction of the structural performance with a quantified level of confidence under different seismic intensity levels.

Figure 3. Comparison of two simultaneous approaches in combination of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties [6].

Table 1. Summary of the fragility analysis of concrete dams.

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Figure 4. Samples of seismic fragility curves and surfaces for concrete dams [6].

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References[1] ASCE, 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure; Dams,

American Society of Civil Engineers.

[2] US Army Corps of Engineers, 2015, CorpsMap; National Inventory of Dams.

[3] ASDSO, State and federal oversight of dam safety must be improved, Magazine of Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO).

[4] FEMA-956, 2013, Living with dams: Know your risks, FEMA P-956, Tech. report, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC.

[5] Hariri-Ardebili, M.A., Concrete Dams: From Failure Modes to Seismic Fragility, in Encyclopedia of Earthquake Engineering, Edts: Beer, M., Kougioumtzoglou, I.A., Patelli, E., Au, I.S.-K., Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.1-26, 2016, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36197-5 409-1.

[6] Hariri-Ardebili, M.A., and Saouma. V.E. 2016, Seismic fragility analysis of concrete dams: A state-of-the-art review, Engineering Structures 128, 374-399.

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Tetra Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Vertical Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

WEST Consultants, Inc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Worthington Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 37

PREVENT DOWNTIMEPREVENT DOWNTIME

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Membership

New Organizational Members

ArcadisAttn: Carol C. Tinsley

Chattanooga, TN

[email protected]

www.arcadis.com/en/global

SAGE Engineers, Inc .Attn: Darren Mack

Roseville, CA

[email protected]

www.sagengineers.com

New Individual Members

Steve ArtmanGeo-Solutions Inc.

Lakewood, CO

[email protected]

Sarwenaj AshrafCorps of Engineers

Fort Worth, TX

[email protected]

Krishnan Athipotta VariamUC Davis

Davis, CA

[email protected]

Jeff BeanBencor

Frisco, TX

[email protected]

Morley BeckmannKleinfelder

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Jeremy BestPhillips & Jordan, Inc.

Knoxville. TN

G . BirdAECOM

Wildwood, MO

[email protected]

Carolyne BocovichColorado School of Mines

Golden, CO

[email protected]

Daniel BoleHayward Baker Inc.

Tampa, FL

[email protected]

Nate BollesBlack & Veatch

Kingsport, TN

[email protected]

Josh BrownCampbell Scientific

Logan, UT

[email protected]

Kyle BuchananPhillips & Jordan, Inc.

Knoxville, TN

Britt-Anya BursellGeocomp

Acton, MA

[email protected]

Pedro CeolhoBencor

Frisco, TX

[email protected]

Mark ConnellyKleinfelder

Stockton, CA

[email protected]

Nathan CoxMcMillen Jacobs Associates

Boise, ID

[email protected]

Nigel CrookhydroGEOPHYSICS

Irvine, CA

[email protected]

Colleen CrystalGeo-Logic Associates

Costa Mesa, CA

[email protected]

Vojislav CvijanovicCalifornia Department of Water Resources

Sacramento, CA

[email protected]

Dirk DeGrootGlobal Diving & Salvage, Inc.

Seattle, WA

[email protected]

Kevin DennWEST Consultants, Inc.

Salem, OR

[email protected]

Andrew DinsickGeoPentech

Irvine, CA

[email protected]

Melinda DirdalSchnabel Engineering, Inc.

West Chester, PA

[email protected]

Jennifer DoddTennessee Valley Authority

Knoxville, TN

[email protected]

Joseph DonnellyNorthern Water

Berthoud, CO

[email protected]

Zee DuronHarvey Mudd College

Claremont, CA

[email protected]

Michael EdwardsPaul C. Rizzo Associates, Inc.

[email protected]

Tom EdwardsRIZZO Associates

Pittsburgh, PA

[email protected]

Jacob EsterhuizenCH2M

Corvallis, OR

[email protected]

Faber EthanKleinfelder

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Kristi EvansBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

James FaughtBureau of Land Management

[email protected]

Jose Feliciano CesteroBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Chrissy FerrazzanoSchnabel Engineering

West Chester, PA

[email protected]

Manoel Freitas JuniorHydrogeo Engenharia

São Paulo, Brazil

[email protected]

Dorian FrenchBGE, Inc.

Dallas, TX

[email protected]

Hermann FritzGeorgia Institute of Technology

Atlanta, GA

[email protected]

Benjamin GallagherSouthern Company

Birmingham. AL

[email protected]

Seth GentzlerAECOM

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Hande GerkusFreese and Nichols, Inc.

Austin. TX

[email protected]

Kevin GerstHDR

Roseville, CA

[email protected]

Joachim GloschatGannett Fleming

Mesa, Arizona

[email protected]

Brian GomezAECOM

Greenwood Village, CO

[email protected]

David GoodrichSouthern California Edison

Redlands, CA

[email protected]

Craig HallGEI Consultants, Inc.

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Robert HallCorps of Engineers

Vicksburg, MS

[email protected]

Garrett HarrisHDR Engineering

Folsom, CA

[email protected]

Julie HeitlandAECOM

Seattle, WA

[email protected]

For complete Member contact information, refer to the Members Only section, www .ussdams .org .

March 2017 USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte38

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Membership

Jeffrey HillHayward Baker Inc.

St. Louis, MO

[email protected]

Jian HuArcadis

[email protected]

Anthony ItrichBrookfield Renewable

Milton, MA

[email protected]

Kevin JensenMcMillen Jacobs Associates

Boise, ID

[email protected]

Brad KirkseyFreese and Nichols, Inc.

Fort Worth, TX

Mark KitkoGeo-Solutions Inc.

New Kensington, PA

[email protected]

Joseph KulaARCADIS

Frederick, MD

[email protected]

Matt KuzmickShimmick Construction Company, Inc.

Thousand Oaks, CA

[email protected]

Jesse LangPhillips & Jordan, Inc.

Knoxville, TN

Michael LikavecPuget Sound Energy

Seattle, WA

[email protected]

Nikolaos MachairasNew York University

Brooklyn, NY

[email protected]

Joseph MachalaKleinfelder

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Ashley MacMillanGeocomp Corporation

Salt Lake City. UT

[email protected]

Ian MakiCalifornia Department of Water Resources

Sacramento, CA

[email protected]

Matt MarchiselloOBG

East Norriton, PA

[email protected]

Gabriel MartinezStantec

Wheaton, IL

[email protected]

Sam MillerPhillips & Jordan. Inc.

Knoxville, TN

Michaele MonaghanMcMillen Jacobs Associates

Boise, ID

[email protected]

Greg MonleyKumar & Associates, Inc.

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Mathew MosesFreese and Nichols, Inc.

Austin, TX

[email protected]

Timothy MyersBencor

Frisco, TX

[email protected]

Chris NardiKleinfelder

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Aaron NottisTennessee Valley Authority

Chattanooga, TN

[email protected]

Rosemarie O’ConnellOneRain

[email protected]

Jennifer OstrowskyUtah State University

Logan, UT

[email protected]

Raj PadmanabhanCorps of Engineers

Tulsa, OK

[email protected]

David M . PalumboBureau of Reclamation

Washington, DC

[email protected]

Dara ParkerTennessee Valley Authority

Knoxville, TN

[email protected]

Juan PestanaGeosyntec

Milton, MA

[email protected]

Justin PhalenSAGE Engineers, Inc.

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Kalie PostonTennessee Technological University

Livingston, TN

[email protected]

Om PrakashWEST Consultants, Inc.

Folsom, CA

[email protected]

Bradley RastallKleinfelder

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Jill ReedRIZZO Associates

Pittsburgh, PA

[email protected]

Jordan ReimerFederal Energy Regulatory Commission

Portland, OR

[email protected]

Paul RidlenKnight Piesold and Co.

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Diego RiveraRIZZO Associates

Tarrytown, NY

[email protected]

Michael RosenmeierRIZZO Associates

Pittsburgh, PA

[email protected]

Joe RoyerCalifornia Department of Water Resources

Sacramento, CA

[email protected]

Caleb RudkinBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Bahram SafaviSCE

Los Angeles, CA

[email protected]

Sean SalazarUniversity of Arkansas

Fayetteville, AR

[email protected]

Ara SanjidehSAGE Engineers, Inc.

Roseville, CA

[email protected]

Kevin SchaefferBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Eric SchlosserCARPI USA, Inc.

Englewood, CO

[email protected]

Jason SchneiderBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Kristine SmithBureau of Reclamation

Washington, DC

[email protected]

Kayla SmithSUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry

Syracuse, NY

[email protected]

James StiadyKleinfelder, Inc.

[email protected]

Justin StoeberBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

For complete Member contact information, refer to the Members Only section, www .ussdams .org .

USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 39

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Membership

Heath StonePhillips & Jordan, Inc. Knoxville, TN

Eric SturtzBlack & Veatch

San Diego, CA

[email protected]

Sean SundermannBrierley Associates

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Sharon TapiaCalifornia Department of Water Resources

Sacramento, CA

[email protected]

John TatyosianCalifornia Department of Water Resources

Sacramento, CA

[email protected]

Christopher ThorsonNevada Division of Water Resources

Carson City, Nevada

[email protected]

Carol TinsleyArcadis

Chattanooga, TN

[email protected]

Edward TomsAECOM

Englewood, CO

[email protected]

Carlos TorricoSacramento State University

Rancho Cordova, CA

[email protected]

Jason VazquezARCADIS

[email protected]

Hillery VenturiniBureau of Reclamation

Denver, CO

[email protected]

Jon ViducichWEST Consultants, Inc.

San Diego, CA

[email protected]

Nancy WalkerKleinfelder

Rancho Cordova, CA

[email protected]

Grant WaringEmagineered Solutions

Redmond, OR

[email protected]

April WelshansStantec Consulting Services Inc.

Lexington, KY

[email protected]

Andy WestbrookPhillips & Jordan, Inc.

Knoxville,TN

Mark WiesnerKleinfelder

Stockton, CA

[email protected]

Nicholas WilligBencor

Frisco, TX

[email protected]

Thomas WilsonPhillips & Jordan, Inc.

Knoxville, TN

Anthony WohletzKleinfelder

Stockton, CA

[email protected]

Noel WongAECOM

Oakland, CA

[email protected]

Jeffrey WykoffCalifornia Nevada Cement Association

Irvine, CA

[email protected]

Gregory YankeyBrierley Associates

Lexington, KY

[email protected]

For complete Member contact information, refer to the Members Only section, www .ussdams .org .

For more than 50 years, GZA has been involved in the inspection, investigation, engineering analysis, design, permitting and construction of more than 1,000 dams throughout the United States.

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USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 40

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Membership

Young Professionals Named as USSD Board AdvisorsThe USSD Board of Directors has appointed three Young Professional members to serve as advisors to the Board of Directors. "The USSD Board of Directors is committed to expanding young professional initiatives," said President John Wolfhope in announcing the appointments. "We believe that these advisory board positions will help USSD continue to grow and prosper," adding that he looked forward to working with them to help shape the future of the organization.

Melinda Dirdal, PE, is a dam engineer with Schnabel Engineering. She has worked for the firm for 11 years, engaged in a variety of practice areas, including structural, hydrologic, hydraulic and geotechnical engineering, as well as

reservoir operation modeling and yield analysis. She is active in the Pennsylvania Society of Professional Engineers and was recently selected to serve on the Board of Directors for the Delaware County Chapter of PSPE. She is also a member of the steering committee for Schnabel's Women's Initiative Network. She has authored technical papers for USSD and ASCE conferences and will present a paper at the upcoming ICOLD 85th Annual Meeting in Prague.

Brian C. Gettinger, Black & Veatch, is a Program Manager in the firm's Project Management Consultant team, supporting the Santa Clara Valley Water District's dam safety program in San Jose, California. He holds a BS in Civil Engineering and an Master's in Business Administration - Finance, both from the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is responsible for managing the financial reporting and internal budgeting for Black & Veatch's Heavy Civil business line. He has a wide variety of experience in design, cost estimating, inspection and construction management of large infrastructure projects.

Christina "Tina" Stanard, PE, Freese and Nichols, Inc., is a water resources engineer specializing in the design, rehabilitation and inspection of dams and hydraulic structures. Associated with Freese and Nichols for more than eight years, her experience includes design of a

labyrinth weir auxiliary spillway, design of a new RCC flood control dam on a karst foundation, evaluation of existing embankment dams to improve stability and/or repair slide failures; and comprehensive evaluation of large concrete dams. She is Chair of the USSD Committee on Awards and has prepared papers for presentation at various conferences, including ICOLD and USSD.

News of MembersWilliam (Bill) Allerton, P.E. has retired from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. He was the Director, Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy Projects. David Capka has been appointed to the position of Director.

D'Appolonia has opened the doors to a second location in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, in an effort to better serve central and eastern Pennsylvania clients.

Shaun Dustin is now a senior engineer with GeoComp.

David Gutierrez is now a senior water resources and geotechnical engineer with GEI Consultants, Inc., Rancho Cordova, California.

Dina Hunt is now a geotechnical earthquake hazard engineer with Gannett Fleming, Inc.

Lelio Mejia is now associated with Geosyntec. He will work in geotechnical, earthquake, and dam engineering as a senior principal in the firm's Oakland, California office.

Emily Schwartz is now affiliated with Black & Veatch in Austin, Texas.

In MemoriumRobert Polvi, age 81, of Salem, Oregon, passed away on September 19, 2016. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Agricultural Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering from Oregon State University in 1958. He rose through the ranks to the position of member of the Board of Directors of Bechtel Group, Inc. (1984-92), one of the world's largest civil engineering design and construction firms, and President for Bechtel Civil Inc. (1986-91). He served as President of the the U.S. Committee on Large Dams (now USSD) and was active in ICOLD. After retiring from Bechtel in 1991, he served as a consultant for a number of years.

USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte March 2017 41

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Membership

George L. Barber

Steven L. Barfuss

Zoren Batchko

Ralph R. W. Beene

Wilson V. Binger, Jr.

John A. Bishoff

Donald E. Bowes

David S. Bowles

Tobia L. Brewer

Rodney Bridle

Edwin H. Campbell

John J. Cassidy

Catalino B. Cecilio

Sanjay S. Chauhan

Ying-Kit Choi

Anil K. Chopra

John P. Christensen

Ashok K. Chugh

William B. Connell

Stephen D. Cross

Woodrow W. Crouch

Kim de Rubertis

Franklin G. DeFazio

Jerry S. Dodd

Karl J. Dreher

William H. Duke

Lance Duncan

Blaine Dwyer

Donald R. East

Joseph L. Ehasz

E. Harvey Elwin

R. Craig Findlay

Steven A. Fry

Duane L. Georgeson

Yusof Ghanaat

James R. Graham

Christopher C. Grieb

Patrick M. Griffin

Sammie D. Guy

James V. Hamel

Gregory G. Hammer

Michael Jonathan Harris

Mark R. Haynes

Alfred J. Hendron, Jr.

Daniel J. Hertel

H. John Hovland

Carlos Alberto Jaramillo

Palmi Johannesson

Michael C. Johnson

Robert W. Johnson

Pierre Julien

Charles E. Karpowicz, Jr.

Byron C. Karzas

Woogu Kim

Terence M. King

David E. Kleiner

Richard W. Kramer

Frank C. Kresse

Paul Krumm

Haibo Liang

Frederick Lux III

Arthur C. Martin

B. Philip Martin

Errol L. McAlexander

Francis G. McLean

Christopher L. Meehan

Andrew H. Merritt

Donald L. Millikan

Mahmoudreza Mivehchi

Paulo J. M. Monteiro

Neil F. Parrett

Warren J. Paul

Michael J. Pauletto

Howard C. Pettibone

J. Bruce Pickens

Robert Pyke

Jin Tien Quin

Vikram V. Rajadhyaksha

Alan T. Richardson

Bennie N. Rinehart

J. David Rogers

Kelly R. Schaeffer

Ernest K. Schrader

E. Douglas Schwantes, Jr.

Paul H. Schwartz

Joseph Sciandrone

Chander K. Sehgal

Suprabhat Sengupta

Francisco Silva

John D. Smart

Jay N. Stateler

Kenneth Aaron Steele

Larry D. Stephens

Gilbert R. Tallard

Glenn S. Tarbox

Robert E. Tepel

Lloyd O. Timblin, Jr.

Daniel A. Vellone

J. Lawrence Von Thun

Michael Wainaina

Arthur H. Walz, Jr.

John E. Welton

Roman P. Wengler

John W. Williams

Richard Lyman Wiltshire

Robert S. Wright

C. H. Yeh

Darell Dean Zimbelman

John A. Zygaj

Life MembersAECOM

ASI Constructors, Inc.

Barnard Construction Company, Inc.

Black & Veatch Corporation

Bureau of Reclamation, USDI *

Campbell Scientific

Corps of Engineers *

Emagineered Solutions, Inc.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Freese and Nichols, Inc. *

Gannett Fleming, Inc. *

GEI Consultants, Inc. *

Geocomp

Golder Associates Inc.

GZA GeoEnvironmental, Inc. *

Hatch Associates Consultants, Inc. *

HDR

Keller Foundations, LLC

Kleinfelder, Inc.

O’Brien & Gere

Phillips and Jordan, Incorporated

RIZZO Associates

RJH Consultants, Inc.

Schnabel Engineering, Inc.

Stantec

Tetra Tech, Inc.

Worthington Products, Inc.

WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff

*designates Charter Sustaining Member

Sustaining Members

Advanced Construction Techniques Inc.

Alabama Power Company

Alaska Department of Natural Resources

Amec Foster Wheeler Environment & Infrastructure, Inc.

Arcadis

ASI Marine, L.P.

Ballard Marine Construction

Bechtel Global Corporation

Brayman Construction Corporation

Bureau of Reclamation, Office of Dam Safety

California Department of Water Resources

Cascade Drilling, L.P.

CDM Smith

CEI Enterprises, Inc.

Colorado River Water Conservation District

Condon-Johnson & Associates Inc.

D’Appolonia Engineering

Durham Geo Slope Indicator

East Bay Municipal Utility District

FirstLight Power Resources, Inc.

GENTERRA Consultants, Inc.

Geokon, Inc.

Geo-Solutions Inc.

Geosyntec Consultants

Givler Engineering, Inc.

Global Diving & Salvage, Inc.

Griffin Dewatering Southwest, LLC

JAFEC USA, Inc.

Kleinschmidt Associates

Knight Piesold and Co.

Mead & Hunt, Inc.

Measurand, Inc.

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

Nicholson Construction Company

OneRain Incorporated

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

RST Instruments Ltd.

SAGE Engineers, Inc.

Santee Cooper

Shannon & Wilson, Inc.

Tennessee Valley Authority

WEST Consultants, Inc.

Xcel Energy Corporation �

Organizational Members

March 2017 USSD: AdvocAte • educAte • collAborAte • cultivAte42

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