marital property reletions and succession_judge_singh

HON. MARIA FILOMENA D. SINGH Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City Professor, Ateneo de Manila School of Law

Professor, Philippine Judicial Academy

MARITAL PROPERTY RELATIONS AND

SUCCESSION (CLE FOR COURT ATTORNEYS)

Antonio Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City et al., GR No. 122749, July 31, 1996

FACTS: Antonio and Consuelo wed on January 5, 1971 and had five children. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 and ordered the parties “to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 within 30 days from notice of the decision.” On clarification by Consuelo, the RTC issued an order stating “Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and


respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Petitioner argues that Articles 50, 51 and 52 should apply.


In a void marriage, regardless of the cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 provides: “When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.


“In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. “Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts


inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. “When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of cohabitation.”


This applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other as husband and wife, only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.


Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner alreay expressed. (Article 148) In the liquidation and partition of property owned in common by Antonio and Consuelo, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,


not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code, should prevail.

Neng Malang v. Hon. Corocoy Moson, et al., GR No. 119064, August 22, 2000

FACTS: Hadji, a Muslim, married Aida. After Hadji and Aida had their 2nd child, Hadji married Jubaida, but the latter bore him no child. When Aida was pregnant with Hadji's 4th child, Hadji divorced her. Then Hadji Married Nayo, but she also did not have a child. Hadji then married Mabai who bore him a daughter, Fatima. Hadji also married Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai, but he eventually divorced all 3 of them. Hadji then married Neng but they were childless until Hadji's death on December 18, 1993. Neng filed a petition with the Shari'a District Court for the settlement of the estate of Hadji and letters of administration.


Hadji's eldest son by Aida opposed the petition, later joined by the other children and wives of Hadji. The Shari'a court ruled that Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji, apportioning it proportionately among the 4 wives and 5 children. Hadji married 8 times all celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code. He divorced 4 times, all also before the Muslim Code. He died in 1993 when both the Family Code and the Muslim Code were already in effect.


Q.1:Law governing validity of Muslim Marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code of 1977

Since all 8 marriages of Hadji were celebrated before the Muslim Code, the Civil Code applies. Article 78 provides: “Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.” This recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance with their customs and rites.


Q.2: Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated before Muslim Code

Prior to PD 1083, the Muslim Code, there was no law in our country which sanctioned multiple marriages. The Muslim Code provides in respect of acts that transpired prior to its passage: “Article 186. (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution.” This is consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively.

Seeming conflict: the Civil Code nurtures


monogamous marriages. Thus, in People v. Subano (73 Phil. 692 [1942]) and People v. Dumpo (62 Phil. 246 [1935]), the SC applied the Civil Code perspective to Muslim plural marriages: in Subano, since the accused had 3 wives and he was accused of parricide for killing the 3rd wife, the deceased was deemed not the accused’s lawful wife and it prevented his conviction for parricide. “Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Laws which merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals.”


In Dumpo, the ruling implied that “had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered.”

Q.3: Laws governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code

The Civil Code determines the property relations of the marriages between Hadji and his wives for the reason that at the time of their celebration, the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations


between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

Q.4: Laws on Succession and Dissolution of Marital Property Regimes

Hadji died intestate in 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine his heirs and the order of intestate succession, as well as their respective shares. Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the parties to the marriages depends upon the law in force at the time of the marriage rite. The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception


or birth. Only upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing will the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code apply.

Q.5: Muslim Divorces before the Muslim Code

Under RA No. 394, absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces in accordance with Muslim custom was authorized for 20 years, from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.

Which of the several marriages was validly and


legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji in 1993? It would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because the Civil Code governs all the 8 marriages and under it, only one marriage can exist at any given time. Now whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and applicable law. If it took place between June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, it is valid under RA 394.


There being a dispute as regards the heirship of the 5 children from different marriages, who are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a validly existing marriage, as determined based on which marriage was valid, are legitimate.

What properties constitute the estate of Hadji at the time of his death on December 18, 1993? (a) Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, which was the


law in force at the time of Hadji’s death; (b) properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code between August 30, 1950 and August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code. However the wives other than the lawful wife may submit evidence to prove that any such property is hers/theirs exclusively; (c) properties acquired under the conditions in Article 147 and 148 of the Family Code from ad after August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership; and (d) properties acquired


Under conditions not covered and obtained exclusively from the efforts or assets of Hadji are his exclusive properties.

Who are the legal heirs of Hadji and what are their shares? The legal heirs of Hadji are: his lawful wife; and, his children. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji’s death, will determine their shares.

The case was remanded for reception of additional evidence.

Paula T. Llorente v. Court of Appeals, et al., GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000

FACTS: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and Paula married. Lorenzo left for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal abode in Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo became a US citizen. In 1945, Lorenzo visited Paula only to discover she was pregnant and living in with his own brother. Lorenzo could not forgive Paula and refused to live with her. They executed an agreement that they will terminate their marriage with judicial proceedings, all allowances for Paula will be suspended, Lorenzo will not prosecute Paula since she admitted fault and agreed to separate


peacefully. Lorenzo returned to the US and in 1951 obtained a divorce which became final in 1952. Lorenzo then returned to the Philippines. In 1958, he married Alicia and they remained married until 1985 when he died. They begot 3 children. In 1981, Lorenzo made a will wherein he left all his properties to Alicia and their 3 children and he named Alicia as his sole executor, and in her default, any of their 3 children. The will was probated during Lorenzo’s lifetime but before an administrator could be appointed, he passed away. Paula sought letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.


The trial court found the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo in the US to be invalid and hence his marriage to Alicia also void. The will of Lorenzo was also declared invalid as it deprived Paula, the legal wife, of her legitime. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC decision only to declare Alicia a co-owner of properties she and Lorenzo acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

Q: Who are entitled to inherit from Lorenzo?


Lorenzo was a US citizen at the time of his divorce from Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and death. Thus, all issues arising from these incidents are governed by foreign law, not Philippine law. Article 15 of the Civil Code: “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Article 16: “Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of


succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” True foreign laws do not prove themselves and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. They must be alleged and proved. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the


formalities of Philippine law, is fatal.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA 139 [1985]), we held that owing to the nationality principle in Article 15, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to public policy and morality. The Sc rued there that aliens may obtain a divorce abroad provided they are valid according to their national law. In Quita v. Court of Appeals (300 SCRA 406 [1998]), it was held that once a party is proven to be no longer a Filipino citizen when


the divorce is obtained, Van Dorn will apply. Thus the divorce obtained by Lorenzo from Paula was valid and recognized here as a matter of comity.

Q: Was Lorenzo’s will valid?

Article 17: “The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.”

The clear intent of Lorenzo’s will is to bequeath his property to his second wife Alicia and their 3 children. We should not frustrate his wishes as


he was a foreigner not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.

Whether the will was intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. But as to whether the will was executed with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law and in fact, the will was duly probated.

Case remanded for reception of proof of foreign law.

Purificacion Balilo-Montero et al. v. Eugenia Septimo, et al., GR No. 149751, March 11, 2005

FACTS: Jose Balilo owned a 7.7 hectare parcel of land. In 1943 he died intestate. Niniana, the sister of Jose, filed for guardianship of the person and property of Jovencio, the son of Jose, asking for authority to execute a deed of sale over the property in favor of Septimo. The court granted the authotity and the sale was executed. Septimo, however, failed to register the sale and to have title transferred to him. Jovencio sued to compel Septimo to resell the land to him. The complaint was dismissed. Purificacion, sister of Jovencio, filed a suit for recovery of possession against Septimo and the


the Robles’ who purchased a portion of the land from Septimo. The RTC granted the prayer for the recovery of the land and ordered Septimo to return to Purificacion ½ of the subject land. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by finding that Purificacion was entitled to only 1/3 under the old Civil Code.

There is no evidence that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama (the mother of Jovencio) were married or that they cohabited as husband and wife. The provisions of the old Civil Code on intestate succession should be applied considering that


Jose died intestate in 1943 before the new Civil Code. Article 931 of the old Civil Code provides that when a person dies intestate, his legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of sex, age, even though they spring from different marriages. Article 932 provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

When Jose died intestate on August 12, 1943, he was survived by his daughter Purificacion, his son Jovencio, and their respective mothers,


neither of whom was legally married to Jose. Besides under the old Civil Code, the surviving spouse shall inherit only in default of children.

When Jovencio through his legal guardian Niniana executed the deed of sale in favor of Septimo, the latter did not acquire title over the entire property but only to the undivided ½ portion which Jovencio inherited from Jose. Septimo could not have acquired the other half from Jovencio because the latter was not the owner thereof.

CA reversed. RTC upheld.

Metrobank v. Nicholson Pascual, GR No. 163744, February 29, 2008

FACTS: Nicholson and Florencia were married in 1985. During the marriage, Florencia bought a lot in Makati City, and title was issued in the name of Florencia “married to” Nicholson. In 1994, Florencia filed for nullity of her marriage to Nicholson and in 1995, her petition was granted on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC ordered the dissolution ad liquidation of the conjugal property. No liquidation was effected. In 1997, Florencia obtained loans from Metrobank and offered the property as collateral covered by a mortgage. Upon Florencia’s default, Metrobank foreclosed. Nicholson sued


to annul the mortgage. The RTC nullified the real estate mortgage, ruling that the lot was conjugal property and should not have been encumbered without Nicholson’s consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC but deleted the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees.

While Metrobank is correct in saying that Article 160 of the civil Code, not Article 116 of the Family Code, is applicable since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, contrary to its submission, only proof of acquisition during the marriage is


needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the presumption arises, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v. Miat (397 SCRA 271 [2003]), “Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that ‘all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.’ This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with


funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.”

When there is no showing when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. The title in this case was in the name of Florencia “married to” Nicholson.

While the declared nullity of marriage of Florencia and Nicholson severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnerhsip, the


character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership, regardless if Article 129 of the Family Code or Articles 179 et seq of the Civil Code is applied as both require first the liquidation of the conjugal properties. In Dael v. IAC (171 SCRA 524 [1989]), we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased. Article 493 of the Civil Code applies.


“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”

Florencia constituted the mortgage in 1997, 2 years after the dissolution of the conjugal


partnership but before its liquidation. Under Article 493, Florencia had the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interest even without Nicholson’s consent. However, Metrobank, as mortgagee, is limited only to the ½ undivided share of Florencia. The mortgage in so far as it also covered the ½ undivided portion of Nicholson is null and void, the latter not having consented to it. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot.

Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, GR No. 183053, June 16, 2010

FACTS: Cristina was married to Federico. Their only son Emilio predeceased them. Emilio was married to Isabel and they begot 3 children, Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. The marriage between Emilio and Isabel was annulled. Emilio had 2 children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, with different mothers. Both Emilio III and Nenita were acknowledged natural children of Emilio and they were reared by and lived from infancy with their grandparents, Cristina and Federico. The 3 children of Emilio lived with their mother, apart from Cristina and Federico. On June 4, 1990, Cristina died. In 1993,


Federico adopted Emilio III and Nenita as his own. Isabel, daughter of Emilio and Isabel, filed for letters of administration over her grandmother’s estate, which Federico opposed. Emilio III also opposed the petition. In November 2000, Federico died. The RTC appointed Emilio III as the administrator of Cristina’s estate. The CA reversed the RTC and instead appointed Isabel as the administratrix of Cristina’s estate.

The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a


valid and effective will.

Rule 78, Section 6 established the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in


only one direction, i.e., joint administration.

Article 992, the successional bar between legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent. The basis for intestate succession, i.e., that love first descends, then ascends before spreading sideways. Cristina did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband Federico who even raised the status of Emilio III and Nenita as his own children by adoption. These overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 that there exists


animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

CA reversed and letters of administration issued jointly to Emilio III and Isabel. Case remanded to RTC for determination of who are Cristina’s heirs and their shares in the estate.

Alain M. Diño v. Ma. Caridad L. Diño, GR No. 178044, January 19, 2011

FACTS: Alain and Caridad started living together in 1984 until they separated in 1994 but in 1996 they reunited and lived together again until they were married in 1998. In 2001, Alain filed for nullity and a decree was issued to him in 2006. In the meantime, Caridad secured a divorce in the US in 2001 and in the same year, married again. The RTC granted the nullity but the decree “shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and dissolution under Article 147 of the Family Code.”

Q: Whether Article 147 applies?


In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void. The elements for Article 147 to apply: (1) The man and woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) they live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.


All these elements are present here. Article 147 applies. The trial court relied on Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: “Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.” It is clear from Article 50 that Section 19 (1) applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under articles 40 and


45 of the Family Code. Article 50 does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed by either absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains. There is thus a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree could be issued. This is not the case for nullity under Article 36 because the marriage is governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola v. Ester Servacio, et al., GR No. 157537, September 7, 2011

FACTS: In 1976, Gaviola sold 2 parcels of land to Protacio, Jr. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver stating it was his father, Protacio, Sr., not him, who executed the sale. In 1987, Marta Barola, Protacio, Sr.’s wife, died. In 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito sold a portion of the property to Servacio. In 2001, the heirs of Protacio, Sr. and Marta demanded from Sevacio the return of the property sold in 1999. A suit was filed to annul such sale. The RTC held that the lot was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr.


and Marta but upheld the validity of the sale as long as the portion alienated will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final partition.

Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the Family Code. Their property relation is properly characterized as conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved and an implied voluntary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation.


Article 493 applies. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share without an actual partition of property being done by agreement or judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless a co-owner could well sell his undivided share. Hence Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale without the consent of the co-owners was not necessarily void for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively


transferred, making the buyer Servacio a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

The RTC decision was affirmed.

Thank You!

marital property reletions and succession_judge_singh

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