maritime security and safety

CONSTANTZA MARITIME UNIVERSITY

MARITIME SECURITY & SAFETY

Lecturer drd. Eugen BARSAN

Maritime Safety Master Course

2004

Tehnoredactare şi coperta: Eugen BÂRSAN Tiparul la Tipografia Nautica tel: 0241 664740 fax: 0241 617260

Copyright © 2004 Conţinutul acestei publicaţii a fost elaborate pe baza programei elaborate în cadrul proiectului Socrates pentru crearea Masteratului de Maritime Safety. Nici o parte a acestei lucrãri nu poate fi reprodusã fãrã acordul autorului.

CONSTANTZA MARITIME UNIVERSITY

Master Course

MARITIME SECURITY & SAFETY

Objectives and Topics for this Course in cooperation with:

• Southampthon Maritime Institute – UK • Szeczin Maritime University – Poland • Gdynia Maritime University – Poland • Facultad de Nautica de Barcelona - Spain

Documents and Case Studies selected and prepared by:

Lecturer drd. Eugen BARSAN

2004

CONTENS

Lectures & Case Studies

Lecture 1 ---- Introduction to maritime security

Lecture 2 - Development of maritime security policies

Lecture 3 - Maritime security threats

Lecture 4 - Terrorism

Lecture 5 - Amendments to SOLAS

Lecture 6 - International ship and port security code (ISPS) code - Part A

Lecture 7 - International ship and port security code (ISPS) code ---- Part B

Lecture 8 ---- Summary & conclusions

Lecture 9 - Workshop on the preparation of a port facility security assessment and/or, a ship security assessment together with appropriate recommendations

Case Study 1 – Maritime Terrorism: An Introduction

Case Study 2 – Direct Attacks on Ships

Case Study 3 – Ships as Vectors of Maritime Terrorism

Case Study 4 – The Ship as a Weapon

Case Study 5 – Attacking Vital Ports and Chokepoints

Annexes

Annex 1 - Ship Security Planning Guide - Royal Association of Nederlands Shipowners

Annex 2 - Facility Security Planning Guide - U.S. Coast Guard

Annex 3 - Guidance For Shipowners, Ship Operators & Masters On The Protection of Ships From Terrorism & Sabotage - International Chamber of Shipping

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LECTURE 1

INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Welcome to the Maritime Security Seminar/Workshop of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the world has achieved a heightened sense of security awareness. The maritime industry is no longer considered a safe, non-political, global transportation system that moves goods by sea harmlessly from one place to another, but rather, a liability that exposes all nations, maritime and non-maritime alike, to the threat of terrorist attack. There are hundreds of terrorist organizations around the world. They all have their own political agendas, their own complaints, and their own victims. For the first time in the history of the world, however, any such organization has the capability of wreaking mass destruction within or outside the nation in which it is located. Consequently, no nation, whatever its political affiliation or make-up, is safe from such activity. In the aftermath of the events of 11 September, the United Nations, through Security Council resolution 1373(2001), called on the international community to redouble its efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including full implementation of all anti-terrorist Conventions. Simultaneously, the Secretary-General of IMO proposed to the Member States that the Organization should review, as a matter of utmost urgency, all its Conventions and other instruments that have a bearing on the prevention and suppression of unlawful acts, including terrorism, that may affect the safety and security of shipping and port operations. The proposal was made because terrorist acts against shipping and ports – for example, the use of a gas tanker as an explosive device in a major port city, an attack on a large cruise ship, or the explosion or deliberate sinking of vessels in canals or heavily-trafficked shipping lanes – would be devastating to the thousands of persons immediately affected, with enormous commercial, environmental and public health consequences also. Moreover, such incidents could have a significantly adverse impact, for a considerable period of time, on the transportation of the world’s trade, over 90% of which is carried by merchant ships and passes through ports, and therefore on the global economy. The 22nd session of the IMO Assembly, held in November 2001, approved the Secretary-General’s proposal and adopted resolution A.924(22) calling for a review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism that threaten passengers and crews and the safety of ships. By the same resolution, the Secretary-General of IMO was requested to take appropriate measures, within the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme of the Organization, to assist governments in strengthening maritime and port security.

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In 2002 IMO therefore launched a global programme on maritime/port security in order to provide this assistance through the use of regional, sub-regional and national seminars/workshops. The seminars/workshops were intended for those in charge, or expected to be in charge, of maritime and port security, and for government officials with responsibility for maritime/port security-associated legislation or enforcement. The programme proved to be of great value to the participating organisations and is therefore to be continued in 2003. Given the conclusions of the Diplomatic Conference in December 2002, the programme for this current series of Seminars/Workshops is primarily based on SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code Part A and Part B. While the principal motivation for the development of this seminar/workshop was the terrorist attack in the USA, the event will also cover other illicit acts that may affect the safety and security of shipping and port operations. 1.2 Purpose The purpose of this seminar/workshop is to familiarize the participants with the concepts and principles of maritime and port security as given in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code and ensure their understanding of the methods of conducting a port facility security assessment and a ship security assessment. 1.4 Learning objectives By the conclusion of this seminar/workshop, you should:

• Understand the basic concepts of maritime security. • Demonstrate security awareness and the need for harmonizing the port facility and

ship security interface. • Demonstrate a knowledge of IMO SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code Part A

and Part B. • Demonstrate the ability to conduct a port facility security assessment and a ship

security assessment. • Understand how security assessments are used in developing port facility and ship

security plans. • Understand the conflicts between security and facilitation, including budgetary and

legal considerations.

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LECTURE 2

DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES The development and promulgation of explicit maritime security policies is a relatively new development in the history of international shipping. Certainly, ever since vessels have gone to sea, the security of the vessel, its cargo, passengers, and crew has been a primary concern of all those so engaged. However, this was more of an a priori tacit understanding than anything else. Ships and seafarers were expected to, and did, go to sea armed and prepared to defend themselves against all threats, known and unknown. Self-reliance was not only the order of the day, it was an occupational if not legal requirement. 2.1 Development of IMO Policies The international concern for the security of ships, cargoes, passengers, and crews has been steadily growing over the past forty years. Within the IMO, the first mention of “security” in any treaty, convention, or resolution appeared after the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985. On 20 November of that year, the IMO Assembly adopted resolution A.584(14), titled “Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts which Threaten the Safety of Ships and the Security of their Passengers and Crews”. This resolution authorized the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to “issue a circular containing information on the measures developed by the Committee to Governments, organizations concerned, and interested parties for their consideration and adoption.” On 26 September 1986 the MSC approved MSC/Circ.443, titled “Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crews on Board Ships”. The measures discussed in MSC/Circ.443 became known as the IMO “security recommendations” because nothing in MSC/Circ.443 was mandatory. The next action taken by the IMO regarding maritime security came in the form of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome 1988). This became known as the SUA Convention of 1988. No other action was taken by IMO on this matter until, on 5 July 1996, the Maritime Safety Committee adopted MSC/Circ.754, titled “Passenger Ferry Security”. The security measures recommended in MSC/Circ.754 related primarily to passenger ferries operating on international routes and the ports serving those routes. However, the Circular states that the measures might “also be applied to international freight ferry operations depending upon the requirements of individual Member Governments.” 2.2 Development of national maritime security policies Of the 161 Member States in IMO, only three have enacted national legislation incorporating the security recommendations contained in MSC/Circ.443 that were first promulgated in 1986. Those three nations are the United States, the United Kingdom, and


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Canada. While the United Kingdom and Canadian legislation address all forms of maritime and port security, the United States legislation only applies to cruise ships and cruise ship terminals. The present legislation is:

• United States: 33 Code of Federal Regulations §120 and §128; • United Kingdom: the Aviation & Maritime Security Act of 1999 and subsequent

“Directions”; and • Canada: Marine Transportation Security Regulations (Cruise Ships and Cruise

Ship Facilities) of 20 May 1997; Cruise Ship and Cruise Ship Facility Security Measures of 1 August 1997; Memorandum of Understanding on Cruise Ship Security of 30 March 1998.

2.3 Current developments in international maritime security policies On 20 November 2001, the IMO unanimously adopted resolution A.924(22), titled “Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping”, which had been proposed by the Secretary-General in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. D.C. on 11 September 2001. By this resolution, the Maritime Safety Committee – as well as other relevant IMO organs – was asked to undertake a review of all IMO instruments for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was a need to update those instruments in light of recent terrorist activities. The instruments specifically referred to in the resolution are:

• Resolution A.584(14) • MSC/Circ.443 • MSC/Circ.754 • SUA Convention 1988

The result was a series of meetings in 2002: • ISWG Meeting – February 2002 • MSC 75 Meeting – June 2002 • ISWG Meeting – September 2002 • MSC Meeting and Diplomatic Conference – December 2002 The results of these meetings, agreed at the Diplomatic Conference on 13 December 2002 and endorsed by a 107 Contracting Governments, were as follows:

• Amendments to SOLAS Chapter V dealing with the carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment.

• Amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI-1 dealing with ship identification numbers and the Continuous Synopsis Record.

• A new SOLAS Chapter XI-2 dealing with special measures to enhance maritime security.

In addition, to support the new Convention, the IMO also agreed an International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, Part A to be mandatory and Part B to be recommendatory. International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code:

• Part A - Mandatory

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• Part B – Recommendatory

SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (1) Regulations: 1 Definitions 2 Application 3 Obligations to contracting Governments with respect to maritime security 4 Requirements for companies and ships 5 Specific responsibility for Companies 6 Ship security alarm 7 Threats to ships 8 Master’s discretion for ship safety and security 9 Control and compliance measures 10 Requirements for port facilities 11 Alternative security arrangements 12 Equivalent security arrangements 13 Communication of information We will be covering the detail of all of these points later in the seminar and they are all included in your ‘hand out’ SOLAS/CONF. 5/32 dated 12 December 2002. ISPS Code Preamble Part A and Part B 1 General (introduction, objectives and functional requirements)/Introduction 2 Definitions 3 Application 4 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments 5 Declaration of security 6 Obligations of the Company 7 Ship security 8 Ship security assessment 9 Ship security plan 10 Records 11 Company security officer 12 Ship security officer 13 Training, drills and exercises on ship security 14 Port facility security 15 Port facility security assessment 16 Port facility security plan 17 Port facility security officer 18 Training, drills and exercises on port facility security 19 Verification and certification for ships We will discuss all these points later in the seminar and they are also included in your ISPS Code 2003 Edition. As well as the issues being dealt within the IMO, other security related issues are being discussed with other UN Agencies in particular the ILO and WCO.


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Co-operation with the International Labour Organization (ILO)

• Seafarer ID • Joint ILO/IMO WG on Port Security • Co-operation with the World Customs Organization (WCO) • Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

Integrity of the multi-modal transport chain Container examination Container sealing including EDI Ship/Port Interface Exchange of information

• Effective procedures for the exchange of data among customs authorities and other governmental agencies

• Establishing criteria to identify high risk movements • Pre-screening of high risk movements before shipment • Extending use of modern technology to screen and secure CTUs (Container

Transport Units) • Establishing or enhancing existing business/government co-operation on security

issues • Establishing control criteria for “empty” CTUs • Consider the value of “trusted agents and shippers” • Consider the balance between mandatory and voluntary measures • Consider the balance between ensuring the smooth flow of CTUs while recognizing

the need for increased security

Many of these issues are extremely sensitive. They impinge on national sovereignty, they can be accused of being discriminatory, they are costly, and they certainly do not facilitate trade. 2003 will be a year of intense debate. As well as co-operating with the ILO and WCO, other initiatives are in progress.

• Long range identification/tracking • Review of resolution A.890(21) – Safe manning principles • Review of security aspects of fixed and floating platforms • Review of facilitation aspects • FAL forms/EDI messages • Review of resolution A.872(20) – Illicit drugs • Guidance on uniform and consistent implementation of SOLAS XI-2 and ISPS • Model courses for CSO (Company SO), SSO (Ship SO) and PFSO (Port Facilities

SO) • Review of resolutions A.787(19) and A.882(21) – PSC • Guidance on control and compliance

2.4 Conclusion In 2002, the IMO, with the full co-operation of its Contracting Governments and other UN Agencies, achieved a remarkable success in agreeing procedures to improve the safety and security of the maritime and port industry.

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Given the comparatively short time in which this work was completed, it is inevitable that in 2003 changes and amendments will be necessary, but it can be confidentially predicted stated that the contents of this Seminar will form the base lien for all future maritime and port security legislation.

LECTURE 3

MARITIME SECURITY THREATS 3.1 Overview Maritime security can be defined as those measures employed by owners, operators and administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine organizations or establishments to protect against terrorism, sabotage, stowaways/illegal migrants/asylum seekers, piracy/armed robbery against ships, seizure, pilferage, annoyance, or surprise. It is an interdisciplinary concept that includes military science, police science, security management, psychology, sociology, domestic and international law, history, geopolitics, comparative religion, and trade facilitation. Proper maritime security creates a condition that establishes and maintains certain protective measures. These protective measures consist of certain responses to recognized maritime security threats, and include:

• Intelligence gathering and analysis • Security planning • Physical security measures and procedures • Operational security measures • Crisis management • Training

These security measures must be capable of performing two absolutely imperative tasks. They must provide timely warning of any impending threat, and they must be capable of removing that threat through an effective response. There are six maritime security threats that affect every port and every vessel in varying degrees, and we shall discuss each of them. They are:

• Pilferage and theft • Illicit drugs smuggling • Illegal migrants and stowaways • Piracy and armed robbery against ships • Sabotage • Terrorism


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Before we discuss these threats, however, it is necessary to understand that perfect security can never be fully realized. There exists no vessel, port facility, or offshore installation that is so well protected it cannot be seized, damaged, or destroyed.

Consequently, the goal of maritime security is to make access to the target so difficult as to discourage the attempt and, if the attempt is made, to minimize the damage. In order to do this, one should first understand the security threat, and then develop an appropriate response. This is what this seminar/workshop is all about – helping us to understand the various maritime security threats facing a port facility or vessel, and then showing how to take the necessary steps in developing appropriate responses to those threats. We shall do this by conducting a mock security assessment of a fictitious port facility.

Before the publication of SOLAS Chapter XI - 2 and the ISPS Code, security measures were taken on an “ad hoc” basis and varied considerably between port and port and ship and ship. There was no agreed international standard and in many ports and on many ships there were virtually no measures taken against Maritime Threats apart from theft and in some areas piracy. Now it is different. We have internationally agreed mandatory standards. Let us now look at these threats in turn, SOLAS XI- 2 and the ISPS Code are the direct result of an Act of Terrorism, protection against terrorism is the main aim of this new legislation. It is useful to note however, that the measures primarily intended to reduce Acts of Terrorism do have a positive effect in helping to protect against other illegal acts. 3.2 Cargo theft We will now examine five of the six maritime security threats that affect every port and every vessel in varying degrees. The sixth threat – that is, terrorism – will be the subject of a separate lecture. The most common security threat in the maritime transportation business is cargo theft. While the term “pilferage and theft” can include equipment and supplies stolen from work stations, money taken from petty cash boxes, and other types of thievery, the vast majority of theft that occurs in port facilities and onboard ships involves the theft of cargo. Cargo theft is the oldest, most costly, and most commonly committed land-based maritime crime, encompassing everything from petty theft and pilferage of relatively few items, to organized and sophisticated large-scale theft of entire containers. It has been estimated that theft, pilferage, and non-delivery account for somewhere around twenty percent of all cargo losses, and while there are no accurate records relating to worldwide cargo theft, the amounts have been estimated to be in the tens, and perhaps hundreds, of billions of dollars annually. In considering the security measures employed in combating cargo theft, the security planner must analyze both physical and operational security. Physical security relates to actual physical security measures employed in and around a port facility, ship, or offshore installation, such as fences, lights, alarms, locks, surveillance systems, intrusion detection devices, and so forth. Operational security encompasses such matters as: background investigations; document production, handling and control; access control measures such

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as badging and personnel identification systems; visitor monitoring and control procedures; container inspections; traffic control; guard force management and operations; and law enforcement and crime prevention activities. There are three causes of cargo theft that are commonly referred to as the three “Cs” of cargo theft. They are:

• Confusion • Conspiracy • Common Denominator

Confusion, by way of uncontrolled activity, is present at all transportation points, warehouses, and distribution areas. It is caused by:

• Personnel randomly and frequently entering and departing the specific facility, for example, regular employees, casual workers, passengers and crews, repair and service people, and truck drivers or other cargo handlers.

• Movements of equipment such as trucks, cargo and freight handling equipment, containers, rail cars, barges, etc.

• Voluminous and varied documents dealing with freight and cargo transactions such as bills of lading, cargo manifests, equipment exchange forms such as TIRs (Trailer Interchange Receipts), driver passes, letters of credit, and so forth.

Conspiracy is the combination of two or more persons for the purpose of committing a crime. A conspiracy occurs when truckmen, freight and cargo haulers, clerks and checkers, forklift operators, supervisors, security personnel, or any combination of these people agree or conspire to commit freight or cargo theft in the confused climate of a transportation facility. The Common Denominator that is present in virtually all cargo thefts and conspiracies is the dishonest truckman. This is because the stolen cargo must in one way or another be transported from the transportation or storage facility to someplace else in order to effect the theft. In most cases, this is performed in truck cabs or shipping containers with the complete knowledge and co-operation of the truck driver. The following security measures for the control of cargo theft include both physical and operational measures:

• Establish effective guard surveillance of all entrances and exits in cargo storage areas

• Establish an effective package and materiel control system • Locate parking areas for private vehicles outside the perimeter fencing of all cargo

work areas • Eliminate potential thieves during the hiring process by careful screening and

background investigations • Investigate all incidents of theft quickly and efficiently • Establish an effective key control system • Establish proper security patrols to check buildings, storage areas, access points,

streets and alleys, vehicles, etc. • Install intrusion detection and surveillance systems • Install appropriate perimeter fencing, lighting, and access controls


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• Establish accurate methods of taking physical inventories of, and accounting for, all cargo or shipping containers received, delivered, and salvaged

• Establish secure storage areas for highly pilferable cargo such as computer equipment, perfume, and other high-risk items

• Establish close liaison with local law enforcement and intelligence services From the foregoing, we can conclude this section on cargo theft by recommending that, in your facilities and vessels, you check everything that goes out! 3.3 Illicit drugs Drug smuggling has become one of the most serious threats to all civilized societies in modern history. One of the major methods of smuggling drugs is by ship, secreted in cargoes and shipping containers. A high proportion of drug trafficking is undertaken by sea because of the opportunities offered by the large volume of shipping movements from producing to consuming countries as drug traffickers attempt to enter the most profitable illicit markets. Especially vulnerable are ships on planned itineraries (e.g. passenger ships), which have fixed departure times and publicized destinations.

In 1997 the IMO Assembly agreed to contribute to the international effort aimed at combating illicit drug trafficking around the world, by adopting resolution A.872(20) – Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic. (IMO subsequently developed a course manual to promote implementation of the resolution, entitled Model Course on Prevention and Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking on Board Ships). These guidelines contain general advice that may provide guidance to shipowners, seafarers and others closely involved with the operation of ships. They are standards whose aim is to assist shipping companies, ships’ masters and officers in combating illicit drug trafficking and to recognize some of the symptoms of drug dependence among members of the crew. Three principle factors should be borne in mind when considering the implications of illicit drug trafficking by commercial means of transport: First, the very high value of drugs when smuggled in large quantities has attracted the major international criminal organizations and terrorist groups. The possibility of violent incidents, including armed assault, on discovering any sizeable quantity of drugs should not be overlooked and, consequently, due precautions should always be taken. Secondly, the professional trafficker rarely carries the drugs himself, and usually finds an accomplice, willing or unwilling, to do so. Merchant seamen are frequently targeted by drug traffickers anxious to get their products from producing to consuming countries. Often seafarers are not fully aware of the risks involved, which include long prison sentences and, in some countries, the death penalty. Finally, there are no “safe” shipping routes where operators can be quite certain there are no illicit substances on their ships. Direct sailings from countries of supply to countries of consumption are clearly considered as a risk and receive special attention from customs authorities. However, increasing quantities of drugs are being moved by roundabout and

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circuitous routes, using ports of countries that are not drug producers and which drug traffickers believe invite less risk of interception in countries of destination.

In this context, shipping is vulnerable to drug trafficking on three fronts. First, the threat of drugs being concealed on vessels means that law enforcement efforts by customs authorities may result in long delays to departing ships and the handling of cargo. Second, shipowners and operators face potentially devastating fines and penalties for importing illicit drugs, even when they have no knowledge of the contraband. And third, the possible involvement of crewmembers in drug abuse threatens the safety of their vessels. By way of example, it may be noted that since 1988, when the United States announced its zero-tolerance policy for the importation of illicit drugs, shipowners who wish to trade in the United States have been forced into the drug interdiction business. This is because U.S. law requires shipowners to “exercise the highest degree of diligence and care” in preventing the importation of illegal drugs in order to avoid the substantial fines levied by U.S. Customs. Some of these fines have been in excess of US$100 million, and are based upon statutory penalties. These penalties are:

• US$1,000 per ounce for cocaine and heroin • US$500 per ounce for marijuana

Nevertheless, there are steps the shipowner can take to limit his exposure to such draconian measures. The first involves what the U.S. Government calls the Carrier Initiative Programme. This programme is administered by U.S. Customs and basically consists of a written contract between the shipowner and Customs. By signing agreements with U.S. Customs, carriers agree to enhance their security at foreign terminals, aboard their vessels, and at facilities in the United States. In return, Customs agrees to provide training to carriers’ employees in the areas of baggage and cargo security, cargo profiling, personal security, and vessel searches. In addition, should illegal drugs be found aboard a vessel of a carrier that has signed an agreement, the degree of compliance with the terms of that agreement will be considered as a mitigating factor in any seizure or penalty decision or recommendation. In other words, Customs merely agrees to consider the steps taken under the contract as proof of having exercised the highest degree of diligence and care. It does not agree to refrain from levying the usual fines and penalties. The U.S. Customs programme, as well as other similar initiatives in the shipping industry, also provides maritime facilitation benefits inasmuch as, shipping companies that have joined such initiatives are normally presumed by national authorities to have taken steps to prevent illicit drug trafficking on their vessels and are therefore less likely to be the subject of extensive searches, all of which may cause delay to the efficiency of shipping and port operations, as well as increased costs. In this context, shipping companies should periodically carry out reviews of the control and security measures in their ports of call and take measures to remedy any defects identified or, when appropriate, report them to the port authority concerned. The review should focus specifically on those measures designed to restrict access of unauthorized persons to the vessel, services and cargoes. Shipping companies should notify the Customs when employees discover suspect packages or unjustified cargoes on the ship or outside it. Suspect packages should be kept under observation while Customs are notified.


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The shipping company should be ready to send warning signals to ships and loading services, with the description of internal sanctions applied to employees in confirmed cases of drug trafficking or abuse, with general reference to the severe penalties imposed by the competent authorities throughout the world for drug-related offences. The shipping company should provide Customs with information on stevedoring companies that provide services to its ships in the respective ports, and identify companies that provide ship-related services. The shipping company should, to the extent possible, take all the precautions necessary when recruiting new employees to work on their ships, to check that none of them has been convicted of drug trafficking or has a history of drug abuse. The shipping company should allow only authorized and duly identified employees to handle operational information about the cargo or the ship. Shipping companies should involve the proper customs authorities in educating its personnel in identifying areas where exceptions to normal commercial practice may suggest the possibility of a drug-related offence. The relevant personnel of shipping companies should be trained to recognize signs that an employee may be likely to commit drug-related offences and in the measures to be taken when suspicion is aroused. The shipping company should provide clearly identified and easily accessible local contact points for all matters shown to be of legal interest to Customs (cargo lists, passenger reservations, cargo routes, employee information, etc.). Shipping companies should notify all employees or agents involved in ship or cargo operations, ashore and on board, of the content of these matters and give them instructions to carry them out in line with company policy. Shipping companies should encourage constant and open exchange of information with the customs authorities. Shipping companies and Customs, together with other bodies involved in commercial transactions, should regularly discuss matters of mutual interest, both locally and nationally. Shipping companies should seek advice from Customs concerning the provision of suitable assistance and educational material, so that each company:

• can help them to assess its vulnerability to use as a means of illicit drug trafficking; • develop specific plans to reduce its vulnerability; and • implement those plans.

Shipping companies should endeavour to educate their personnel, both ashore and on board, in the dangers of drug abuse and ways of identifying illicit substances.

The level of security necessary to prevent illicit drugs being concealed on board vessels clearly depends on the level and nature of the risk. Carriers need to assess the threat and identify their vulnerability. Factors that should be taken into account include:

• Ports of call and routes taken by the vessel • The origin and routing of the cargo • The level of control exercised at shore facilities

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• The degree of control exercised regarding access to the ship • The vulnerability of the crew to pressure by drug traffickers

Today’s traffickers use a wide variety of routes, often transhipping the cargo several times until its country of origin is completely obscured. Few ports can now be considered safe from attempts to place drugs and other illicit substances on board, although ports in producing countries remain those in which the vessel is most at risk.

Ships are vulnerable to being used as a conduit for the movement of drugs: • By crews, visitors, contractors, stevedores and chandlers • In baggage, provisions, cargo and containers • In cars, trucks and trailers • Concealed on, in or attached to the infrastructure of the ship

Overall responsibility for the security of a ship, and the people on it, rests with the operating company and the company's representative, the master. It is difficult for any organization to provide absolute security in every circumstance since commercial considerations, such as the need to continue operating and the cost of such security, have to be borne in mind. Security measures inevitably become a compromise between what is desirable and what is practicable in the circumstances. Security measures, however, should relate directly to the level and nature of the risk of illicit drug trafficking in any particular location. The risk in the ports visited by ships needs to be reviewed regularly by both the company and the master, with the security measures being adjusted as appropriate. Good security involves a readiness to accept that risks exist, perhaps involving employees, and that arrangements might be necessary to counter them. Accordingly, operators should consider the following six factors. Education and training of the crew Although security is the responsibility of all crewmembers, they are likely to be more security conscious and vigilant if the principles of good security, and the risks of becoming involved in drug trafficking or abuse, are explained. A continuous and thorough training and education programme can support measures taken to safeguard ship security. Ships’ officers should have adequate knowledge of:

• Ship security plans and related emergency procedures • The assessment of the risk, threat and vulnerability • Port and ship operations • Training in: methods of conducting security inspections; techniques used to

circumvent security measures; operation of technical aids to security; recognition of characteristics and behaviour patterns of persons who may be likely to commit unlawful acts; the detection and recognition of illicit substances; and methods of physical searches of persons and their baggage.

Liaison between local authorities and the operating company Good liaison with local customs, police and port authorities in regular ports of call is essential since it will provide local "intelligence", contacts and guidance, and assistance in all aspects of threat assessment.


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Awareness of the risk of illicit trafficking The threat of illicit drug trafficking in different ports of the world varies. The operating company therefore needs to consider the threat in relation to each port of call and make an assessment based on the best information available. The operating company's shore staff at each port should also be made aware of the risk and ways in which they can assist in combating it. Review of ship security In the light of a carrier’s assessment of the threat to its operations, a review of current security should be carried out, since this might reveal areas where additional measures are necessary. Such assessments should be discussed with customs and port authorities at both ends of the trade in which the vessel is engaged. Personnel available for ship security Company personnel, ashore and afloat, are vital to the operation of a good security system, whether or not they are directly employed in security functions. Drug traffickers generally carry out a reconnaissance of potential smuggling opportunities for whatever type of operation they are planning. An unsecured vessel or cargo compound is more likely to be targeted than an obviously protected one and traffickers are deterred by visible security arrangements. A ship whose crew is obviously vigilant is less likely to be selected as an innocent conduit for a drug run than one with a crew whose security procedures are neither extensive nor diligently enforced. It is therefore of great importance that security precautions are seen to be effective at all times. The greatest deterrent to a potential trafficker is the obvious awareness of the threat by shore-based and sea-going staff. Special care with cargo in containers Operating companies are encouraged to co-operate with customs authorities in sharing information that may be valuable in the establishment of a “container-risk profile”. A systematic analysis of criteria such as consignee companies, owners, source, market history, form of payment, ports of call, etc., may be valuable in establishing such profiles. In summary, we can say that, if drugs are prevented from getting on board, they cannot be unwittingly carried. The key issue, therefore, is access control to the ship and its cargo. Shipboard searches To help ensure maximum effectiveness, the search plan should be practised from time to time to build up confidence on the part of the crew and to remind them that good security is everyone's business. In areas of high risk or if specific information has been received, searches may be conducted after leaving each port. In these areas crews should be prepared to conduct a greater number of searches of people and goods. Ships are particularly vulnerable to the transport of illicit substances. In the case of drugs, precursors and chemicals used in their manufacture, two main factors should be borne in mind. The high value of the drugs, precursors and chemicals used in their manufacture and the involvement of international organized crime mean that large sums of money are at stake, with the consequent pressures including the risk of violence. The other possibility is

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that some crewmembers may be drug addicts with the potential of placing the ship, her cargo, and the rest of the crew in grave jeopardy. Shipboard search planning To ensure that a thorough and efficient search is completed in the shortest possible time, search plans should be prepared in advance. This should normally be done by management in conjunction with the master and can be reviewed and modified in the light of experience. The search plan should be comprehensive, and should detail the routes searchers should follow and all the places on the route where a package might be hidden. The plan should be developed in a systematic manner to cover all options and to ensure no overlap or omission. This allows those responsible to concentrate on the actual search without worrying about missing something. Before conducting the search, the configuration of the vessel should be taken into account to ensure that the ship is divided into manageable areas, all areas of the ship are included in the search, and all areas of the ship are accessible. One location on board needs to be designated as the control point where search team reports are sent, analysed and controlled. Preparations should be made to equip the search teams with flash lights and batteries; screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars; mirrors and probes; gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear; plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence; and forms on which to record activities and discoveries. When the master has decided to search the ship, he should first brief his department heads who, in turn, can brief their own search group leaders. It is the group leaders who then organize their teams and search allocated spaces, using search plans to ensure that no spaces are missed. Specially trained dogs can be very effective in searching cars, baggage and freight. Dogs can also be used for searching in ships but need to be familiar with the sea-going environment to achieve results. In this context, it is suggested that masters and ships’ officers consider the following checks:

• Know your crew’s usual habits and study any unease or departure from routine such as unusual places for routine jobs on board, or any uncharacteristic behaviour

• Maintain proper gangway watch at all times in port, and forbid unauthorized access • Conduct regular inspections of varied nature, place and duration, and log them • Question all strange persons in an unusual place on board while the ship is in port • Take into consideration the possible significance of finding things out of place, for

example, a supposedly full ballast tank found empty, or sacks of flour in the paint store

• Inspect all disturbed stowage, closed off spaces, and pipes going nowhere • Seek evidence of tampering with the ship’s fittings, for example, welded tank tops,

insecure boat covers, or equipment that does not work


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• Where possible, arrange supervision of shore gangs • Lock all spaces and access points to, for example, cargo spaces not regularly in use

and control access to keys Suspicious circumstances on shore Shipping companies should be aware of the drug trafficking threat. They should therefore take it into account, whether or not:

• The person making the cargo booking is familiar • The shipper/consignee is a regular customer or a first-time client • The article involved is consistent with the client's business • The shippers’/consignees’ addresses are incomplete, misspelled, vague or

inappropriate • The "notify party" is difficult to contact • It is a last minute booking • The charges are prepaid and in cash • Any attempt has been made to hide the name/address of the payer of freight • The shipment originates in a known drug source or transit country • The consignment appears to be normal bearing in mind the origin and routeing of

the cargo, commodity, country of origin and destination and the value of the goods • The cargo is properly described on the documentation • The size/weight ratio is commensurate with the commodity

All staff should be aware of the threat and alert to any unusual circumstances. Any such circumstances, together with details of the ship and cargo, should be reported to the local customs office. With respect to cargo handling staff, they should be asked to look for:

• Broken seals on containers • False floors in containers (i.e. not flush with the door frame) or false ceilings

(i.e. roof above the corner blocks or changes in height of internal ceiling) • Blocked cavities in the frame of containers or trailers • Evidence of drilling in the frame of a container or chassis • Evidence of fresh paint or new welding, or variations in wall, floor or ceiling

texture, which may indicate a structural alteration designed to conceal drugs or other contraband

Special attention should be paid to reefer boxes where insulation spaces and material, as well as the machinery, offer additional smuggling opportunities. General guidance In the absence of any specific standing company guidance, masters should seek directions on measures to be taken whenever drugs are discovered on vessels, in cargo or on premises. If drugs are found at sea, the authorities at the next port of call should be notified by radio before entering territorial waters. Customs authorities should be informed as soon as possible.

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Personal safety considerations The following points should be observed to ensure personal safety when a suspected package or substance is discovered:

• Do not pierce or open unrecognized suspicious packages wrapped in newspaper, foil, carbon paper, or polythene bags and sealed with masking tape.

• Do not feel, handle or touch the substance without skin protection and a facemask. • Do not inhale powders, fumes or vapours. • Do not rush your actions. • Do not smoke near the substance or expose it to heat or flame. • Do not UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES taste, eat or drink the suspect

substance. • Always wash hands and brush clothing free from any contamination as soon as

possible. • Ensure adequate ventilation and lighting in confined or enclosed spaces. • If moving the items to a secure place, wrap them in plastic film, sheet or bags and

take them to a secure place or safe as quickly as possible. • Take note of anyone taking an unusual interest in what you are doing.

Specific guidance Get another person to witness the position of a suspected package before taking any action. If possible, take photographs of the package as it was found, in other words, find a witness (avoiding the "minder"). Handle as little as possible and remember there may be fingerprint evidence on the package. Where necessary, taking handling precautions, remove the goods to a safe place under lock and key. Guard if necessary. If at sea, record any discovery in the ship’s log. Include as much detail as possible: date; time; location; approximate quantity; person detecting; names of witnesses, etc. In addition to the personal safety considerations, other guidance includes:

• Do not disclose the find, and limit information to persons who need to know. • Notify the authorities at the next port of call before entering territorial waters.

Failure to do so could result in charges of drug trafficking. • Do not allow crew members to disembark before being interviewed by the police or

customs officers. • Protect any wrapping and anything else found in the space. • Consider searching similar locations and spaces. • Write a report as soon after the event as possible. Include everything that occurred.

Making a sketch plan of the space and area often proves helpful. It is also very useful to note why the particular location or cargo was inspected or how the package(s) came to be found. Include any suspicious activity noticed. The report should be signed by any witnesses. At sea, the finder, the witnessing officer and the master or head of department should sign the report, showing the date and time. If the finding is in cargo, the relevant cargo documentation should be collected for subsequent examination by customs authorities.

• Ships’ masters should notify the appropriate customs official upon arrival. In addition to interdicting attempts at smuggling, customs authorities also have a duty to facilitate the movement of cargo into and out of their country. These two requirements are potentially in conflict.


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It must be recognized that, to customs officials, maritime transport offers the greatest potential for carrying large amounts of drugs. Due to the increased use of containers, it is more difficult for customs officials to examine cargo and, consequently, the possibilities of concealment have increased. No customs authority can conduct a physical search of all the cargo and the structure of even a small commercial vessel without a considerable allocation of resources and a delay to innocent cargoes. Since the vast majority of international trade is entirely legitimate and untainted by attempts at smuggling, customs authorities must be able to detect suspicious cargoes, vessels, persons and organizations more effectively. The IMO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the World Customs Organization. As a result of this commitment guidelines will be developed which will set out a framework to co-operate together to identify ways by which carriers and customs authorities can provide mutual assistance concerning the conflicting objectives of “facilitation” and “enforcement”. 3.4 Illegal migrants and stowaways The transportation of illegal migrants and stowaways on board ships is not a new phenomenon although, recently, such acts have been increasing and are now more frequently reported in the news. In 2000, for example, over 1,200 stowaways were reported to IMO. In June 2001, British customs officials in Dover, England, found the bodies of 58 illegal immigrant men and women wedged into the back of a cargo truck behind pallets of canned tomatoes. The discovery sent shock waves throughout the civilized world. In July of the same year, the U.S. Coast Guard was called upon to rescue the crew of a Miami-bound merchant vessel that had been overrun by twenty-three knife-wielding stowaways. They had held the ship hostage for more than thirty-six hours. In Hong Kong, China, twenty-six mainland Chinese were found hiding in a container scheduled to be shipped to Long Beach, California. That April, nine stowaways from the Dominican Republic were discovered aboard a vessel in Coatzacoalcos, Mexico, that had spent fourteen days loading cargo in Rio Haina. Other stowaways from Rio Haina boarded an Italian reefer ship bound for Valencia, Spain, and still others managed to successfully board a Cypriot general cargo vessel bound for Miami. In July, ten Haitian stowaways boarded a cruise ship in Nassau and had to be removed from the vessel in Miami. Over 1,800 stowaways have been apprehended by the operators of an English Channel ferry service operating out of Zeebrugge, in the Netherlands, either aboard their vessels or in the ferry terminal. There is a reason for all this stowaway activity. Stowing away is not considered a crime in many nations. Since stowaways are seldom, if ever, prosecuted, and are merely deported if caught, there is no effective deterrent to such activity. On the other hand, the financial and legal liabilities faced by the innocent shipowner can be substantial. First, and most obvious, are the fines levied against a ship for illegally landing a stowaway. In Canada, this fine is CD$5,000. In the United States, it is US$3,000. In Mexico, Australia, the United Kingdom, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and numerous other nations, the

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landing of a stowaway is a fineable offence. In the United States, a ship can be fined several times for landing the same stowaway. If, for instance, a stowaway jumps ship as she is docking and is later tracked down, caught, and returned to the vessel, the fine will be US$3,000. If the same stowaway then manages to escape and make it ashore a second time, the ship will be fined another US$3,000. If he is returned and escapes yet a third time, the ship will be fined another US$3,000. There have been instances where ships have been fined three and four times for landing the same stowaway. There is probably a limit to how many times one particular stowaway can escape and be returned to a vessel before she sails. Thus, even the most non-diligent vessel is likely not to incur more than a US$10,000 or US$12,000 fine for any given stowaway. The real problem arises when a ship lands twelve, fifteen, or more stowaways on each voyage. Liner service banana carriers have historically been placed in this predicament. On vessel runs from Turbo, Colombia, to Tampa, Florida, for instance, it is routine for a dozen to two dozen stowaways to be discovered for each Tampa port call. If a company has two ships in service, each making two runs per month, and each landing twelve stowaways per run, the fines alone could amount to US$144,000 per month. That amounts to almost US$2 million (US$1,728,000) per year. That type of liability, if realized, will put a carrier out of business very quickly, either because of the fines it pays or the increased insurance premiums. Of course, immigration fines are only the tip of the liability iceberg. The cost of guarding and repatriating stowaways can add substantially to the overall bill. This is particularly so when shipowners are forced to bear the entire cost of maintaining stowaways ashore until they can be repatriated or returned to the vessel, as they are in many countries. Several years ago, a major U.S.-flag carrier was forced to manage and pay for the incarceration of approximately twenty Romanian stowaways who were found on a vessel when she arrived in the Port of New York. The incarceration costs alone for round-the-clock guards, hotel space, food and other items exceeded US$70,000 per month for over a year. Fines and repatriation costs are the least of the ship owner’s stowaway concerns, however. In the 19th century, the primary purpose for stowing away was to secure passage one could otherwise not afford to a land of opportunity. It is still one of the main reasons for stowing away today, but it is not the only reason. Stowaways have consistently been utilized in recent times as “mules” for the importation of illicit drugs. Since a connection between stowaways and drug smuggling has been clearly established, shipowners are now faced with attempting to avoid both the fines for landing stowaways, as well as fines for the importation of illicit drugs. A single stowaway carrying a kilo (or 2.2. pounds) of cocaine or heroin can cause a ship to be fined US$35,273.60 (US$1000 per ounce). If he is carrying two kilos, less than five pounds, the fine can be over US$70,000. Consequently, many shipowners now require their masters to conduct stowaway searches. These may include searches made at the conclusion of each day’s loading operations, once loading is complete and the hatches are sealed, shortly after sailing, and before entering U.S. territorial waters. The problem is, however, that unless the shipowner has given considerable thought as to how such searches should be conducted, by whom, and under what circumstances, they can significantly increase his liability exposure rather than decrease it. A large number of


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stowaways today are armed and desperate. The shipowner must therefore ensure that the crewmembers conducting the searches are properly trained, equipped, and supervised. While at present there is no international legal requirement for cargo vessels to prepare and implement a comprehensive ship security plan, this is almost certainly going to change in the next two years, and the preparation of a security plan, or at least a stowaway procedures plan, will go a long way in protecting the shipowner from various forms of liability. In this context, the following procedures are recommended for ship operators:

• Conduct stowaway awareness training for all ships twice annually. • Review port security provided to their ships and insist that it be adequate. • Develop a stowaway-handling manual for use aboard each ship. • Prepare stock media responses and place them in each stowaway manual for use in

dealing with the media. • Place equipment and supplies onboard each ship to be deployed in the event of a

stowaway incident. • Conduct and document thorough ship searches following each port of call. • Maintain an effective gangway watch, 24 hours per day and 7 days a week. • Supervise longshoremen and ensure all stevedores disembark. • Be alert to problem ports and share information within the fleet.

Another aspect of stowaway liability, that may not be readily apparent, involves damage to the ship’s cargo through contamination of one form or another, including dead bodies or diseased individuals. Entire shiploads of coffee, flour, grain and other commodities have been condemned and destroyed as the result of diseased stowaways being found on board. Exposing crewmembers to the same contamination can also be a serious cause for liability, and may even render the vessel legally unseaworthy. The IMO has already addressed some of these matters in its Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of Stowaway Cases (resolution A.871(20)).

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF IMO GUIDELINES

• Asylum seekers to be treated in accordance with international protection

principles • Close co-operation between shipowners and port authorities • Stowaways may be prosecuted for any damage caused • Countries of nationality to permit the return of stowaways • Countries of embarkation to accept stowaways pending final resolution of their

cases • Stowaways not to be detained indefinitely on board • Individual responsibilities are identified

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The guidelines state that the resolution of stowaway cases is difficult because of different national legislation in the various countries involved. Nevertheless, some basic principles can be applied. First, stowaways entering a country without the required documents are, in general, illegal immigrants, and decisions as to how to deal with them are the prerogative of the countries concerned. However, stowaway asylum seekers should be treated in compliance with international protection principles set out in the relevant treaties. Second, the guidelines advocate close co-operation between shipowners and port authorities. Where national legislation permits, authorities should consider prosecuting stowaways for any damage they cause. (Notice the difference between prosecuting a stowaway for having committed a crime, something the IMO has not recommended, and merely prosecuting him for the damage he causes, if any.) Countries should permit the return of stowaways who are identified as being their citizens, and countries where the stowaways originally embarked should accept them, pending final settlement of their cases. Third, every effort should be made to avoid situations where a stowaway must be detained on board indefinitely. Finally, the guidelines suggest some of the responsibilities of the master, shipowner, country of embarkation, country of disembarkation, country of the stowaway’s apparent or claimed nationality, flag state of the vessel, and any countries of transit during repatriation. An international convention relating to stowaways was adopted in Brussels in 1957, but was never come into force. In fact, some of the original signatories later withdrew their support. In this context, therefore, in January 2002, IMO’s Facilitation Committee adopted amendments to the Annex to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL), 1965, which provide:

• definitions for “attempted stowaway”, “port” and “stowaway”; • a completely new Section 4, dealing exclusively with stowaways, to give legal

effect to, and thereby strengthen, elements of the earlier IMO guidelines; and • a new Appendix 3 containing the format to be used by shipmasters to notify the

existence of stowaways to all concerned parties. It should be noted that the amendments recently adopted – which contain obligatory measures (i.e. “Standards”) and recommendations (i.e. “Recommended Practices”) – are scheduled to come into force on 1 May 2003. It is believed that, with appropriate co-operation from all concerned parties the new measures introduced in the FAL Convention and the existing IMO guidelines (resolution A.871(20)), will go some way to resolving the stowaway problem so that lives can be saved, cargo can be secured, and crewmembers can be protected. It is simply a matter of having the awareness and willingness to do so.


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3.5 Piracy and armed robbery against ships During the 1990s, incidents of pirate attacks and armed robbery against ships, on a worldwide basis, rose by an estimated 300 percent.

DATA REPORTED TO IMO

2000 2001 471 incidents 370 incidents 72 crewmembers killed 17 crewmembers killed 129 crewmembers wounded 42 crewmembers wounded 5 crewmembers missing 5 crewmembers missing 2 ships hijacked 16 ships hijacked 3 ships missing 2 ships missing 1 ship destroyed 1 ship lost While the data received by IMO in respect of such incidents fluctuates from year to year, the fact remains that in just one year, from 1999 to 2000, such incidents increased by 52%, although they have since decreased. The slide we are now showing provides some comparative data for the years 2000 and 2001 in terms of:

• total number of incidents reported to IMO; • number of crewmembers killed, wounded or missing; and • number of ships hijacked, missing, destroyed or lost.

In accordance with Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of any of the following acts:

“(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

subparagraph (a) or (b).” This same definition is emphasized by the IMO in:

• resolution A.922(22), which provides a Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships; and

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• circular MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, which provides Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Thus, it can be said that the definition of piracy is well established, and true piracy, therefore, must occur on the high seas. Marine insurance policies traditionally make the distinction between “piracy” and “assailing thieves.” In many cases, both involve robbery, except that, on the one hand, the act occurs on the high seas while, on the other, it occurs in territorial waters. Since statistically most attacks occur within twelve miles of shore, whether the ship is underway or at anchor, according to the UNCLOS Convention such acts occur within the territorial sea of some nation, and not on the high seas, and therefore technically they are not pirate attacks. They are more properly considered “armed robbery against ships” as defined by IMO in its resolution A.922(22). In this respect, the IMO resolution, which was adopted by the Assembly of the Organization in November 2001, defines armed robbery as: “any unlawful act of violence or detention of any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.” No matter how “piracy” and “armed robbery” are defined, or where attacks may occur, the bottom line is that every ship is responsible for her own security. Security planning is an important aspect of vessel management, and should not be taken lightly. Neither should it be allowed to overshadow all other aspects of the vessel’s operation. The IMO has promulgated two circulars relating to the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. They are:

• Recommendations to Governments, which are contained in the circular MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, issued on 16 June 1999; and

• Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews, contained in

the circular MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, which was very recently revised and re-issued on 29 May 2002.

With regard to IMO’s recommendations to Governments, paragraph 3 of the corresponding circular states: “Ships can and should take measures to protect themselves from pirates and armed robbers. These measures are contained in MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1.” What does this mean? Does it mean that ships should take all necessary measures to protect themselves (including, perhaps, the carriage and use of firearms even though Paragraph 45 of MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 states: “The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged.”), or does it mean ships should only take such measures as are recommended by IMO? What happens if a recommended measure turns out to be a bad recommendation and the captain, ship owner,


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and ship operator are held in court to be negligent or criminally negligent for following the recommendation? (See Paragraphs 43 and 49 of MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, with regard to the use of fire hoses to repel an armed attack.) The same paragraph 3 goes on to state, however: “Ultimately it is the responsibility of owners, masters and ship operators to take seamanlike precautions when their ships navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists.” What are “seamanlike precautions”? Seamen have repulsed pirates with the use of force and arms (firearms, cannon, and cutlasses) for centuries. Through sheer historic precedent, is not the use of firearms a “seamanlike precaution”? Are paragraphs 45 and 46 of MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 in conflict with this paragraph? On the other hand, does the term “seamanlike precautions” refer only to the navigation and maneuvering of the ship? Few would disagree that a master’s and shipowner’s responsibility is to ensure the seaworthiness of their vessel. A “seaworthy” vessel is one that is “fit for its intended use.” Is a vessel that is inadequately protected by the absence of security training, effective operational procedures or protective equipment (including firearms) “fit for its intended use,” and if not, is it then unseaworthy? These, and similar observations notwithstanding, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 – which is addressed to shipowners and ship operators, masters and crew – outlines a number of “recommended practices,” which it divides roughly into three phases:

• Pre-piracy/armed robbery phase • Attempted or confirmed piracy/armed robbery • After action phase

The pre-piracy/armed robbery phase recommended practices cover the following topics:

• Ship security plan • Routeing and delaying anchoring • Practising the implementation of the ship security plan • Precautions at anchor or in port • Watchkeeping and vigilance • Communications procedures • Radio watchkeeping and responses • Standard ships’ message formats • Lighting • Secure areas • Alarms • Use of distress flares • Evasive manoeuvring and use of hoses • Firearms

Careful study of all recommended practices is strongly suggested. Common sense and experience should be applied to the recommendations before a particular policy or security measure is adopted. The recommended practices contained in MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and measures

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developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or master of ships operating in areas where attacks occur. Even so, of paramount importance is the development of a ship security plan. Ship security plans shall be discussed in detail later in this seminar/workshop. Suffice it to say, however, that all the subjects listed above should be addressed in the ship security plan. Once the ship security plan is completed, it must be implemented. It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and that those involved are as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore, those responsible for responding to acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the types of ships most likely to be affected. The subject of training will be addressed later in this seminar/workshop. Specifically, during the pre-piracy/armed robbery phase, the following measures should be observed. All ships expected to operate in waters where attacks occur should have a ship security plan, which pertains to piracy and armed robbery against ships. The ship security plan should be prepared having regard to the risks that may be faced, the crewmembers available, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board ship and the surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided. The plan should, inter alia, cover:

• the need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment;

• crew responses, if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway; • the radio alarm procedures to be followed; and • the reports to be made after an attack or an attempted attack.

Ship security plans should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board. In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled in affected areas and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore those responsible within the security forces for responding to acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the types of ships most likely to be encountered and shipowners should co-operate with the security forces in providing access to their ships to allow the necessary on board familiarization.


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If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottle-necks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Contact with port authorities should ensure that berthing priorities are not affected. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur either when no berth is available for the ship or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period. Prior to entering an area, where attacks have occurred, the ship's crew should have practised and perfected the procedures set down in the ship security plan. Alarm signals and procedures should have been thoroughly practised. If instructions are to be given over the ship's address systems or personal radios, they must be clearly understood by those who may not have fully mastered the language in which the instructions will be given. It cannot be emphasized enough that all possible access points to the ship and any key and secure areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when underway in affected areas. Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the ship. Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that with some luck it will not happen. Indications to attackers that the ship has an alert and trained crew implementing a ship security plan will help to deter them from attacking the ship. In areas where attacks occur it is important to limit, record and control those who are allowed access to a ship when in port or at anchor. Photographing those who board the ship can be a useful deterrent or assist the identification of attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Film need only be developed in the event of a subsequent attack. Given that attackers may use knowledge of cargo manifests to select their targets, every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents which give information on the cargoes on board or their location on the ship. Prior to leaving port the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge, engine room, steering space and other vulnerable areas. Doors and access points should be regularly checked thereafter. The means of controlling doors or access points which would need to be used in the event of an onboard emergency will need careful consideration. Ship or crew safety should not be compromised. Security guards employed in port or at anchorage on different ships should be in communication with each other and the port authorities during their watch. The responsibility for vetting such guards lies with the security personnel companies, which themselves should be vetted by the appropriate authorities. Maintaining vigilance is essential. All too often the first indication of an attack has been when the attackers appear on the bridge or in the master's cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms, alert other ships and the coastal authorities, illuminate the suspect craft, undertake evasive manoeuvring or initiate other

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response procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is being approached can deter attackers. When ships are in, or approaching areas where attacks take place, bridge watches and look-outs should be augmented. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar "blind spots" should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge staff and look-outs. Radar should be constantly manned but it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ship's radars. A yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the ship is underway. Use of an appropriately positioned yacht radar when the ship is at anchor may also provide warning of the close approach of small craft. It is particularly important to maintain a radar and visual watch for craft which may be trailing the ship when underway but which could close in quickly when mounting an attack. Small craft which appear to be matching the speed of the ship on a parallel or following course should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed, it is important that an effective all-round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a second craft while attention is focused on the first. Companies owning ships that frequently visit areas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of more sophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar and visual watch capability against attackers' craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early warning of a possible attack. In particular, the provision of night vision devices, small radars to cover the blind stern arcs, closed circuit television and physical devices, such as barbed wire, may be considered. In certain circumstances non-lethal weapons may also be appropriate. Infrared detection and alerting equipment may also be utilized. The master should ensure that an authorized person responsible for communications is on duty at all time when the ship is in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred and where the GMDSS installation on board does not have facility for automatically updating the “ship position” data from an associated electronic navigation aid, it is strongly recommended to enter the ship's position at regular intervals into the appropriate communications equipment manually. It is recommended that owners initiate the GMDSS INMARSAT "C" alarm programme before entering affected areas for use when appropriate (MSC/Circ.805). A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies, particularly VHF Channel 16 and 2,182 kHz, as well as in any other channels or frequencies which could have been determined by local authorities for certain areas. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT’s enhanced group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the SafetyNET service, owners should ensure a suitably configured EGC receiver is continuously available when in, or approaching areas where there is risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting a dedicated receiver for this purpose, i.e. one


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that is not incorporated into a Ship Earth Station used for commercial purposes to ensure no urgent broadcasts are missed. The IMO recommends in MSC/Circ.597, issued in August 1992, that reports concerning attacks by pirates or armed robbers should be made to the relevant Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) for the area. MSC/Circ.597 also recommends that Governments should arrange for the RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate security forces. If suspicious movements are identified which may result in an imminent attack, the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC or with the radio stations which could have been recommended by local authorities for certain areas. Where the master believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation, consideration should be given to broadcasting an “All stations (CQ)” “danger message” as a warning to other ships in the vicinity as well as advising the appropriate RCC. A danger message should be transmitted in plain language on a VHF working frequency following an announcement on VHF Channel 70 using the “safety” priority. All such measures shall be preceded by the safety signal (Sécurité). When, in his/her opinion, there is conclusive evidence that the safety of the ship is threatened, the master should immediately contact the relevant RCC or, in certain areas, with the radio stations which could have been recommended by local authorities, and if considered appropriate, authorize broadcast of an “All Stations” “Urgent Message” on VHF Channel 16, 2,182 kHz or any other radiocommunications service he/she considers appropriate or which could have been recommended by local authorities; e.g. INMARSAT, etc. All such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal (PAN PAN) and/or a DSC call on VHF Channel 70 and/or 2,187.5 kHz using the “all ships urgency” category. If the Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not, in fact, develop, the ship should cancel the message as soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to “all stations”. Should an attack occur and, in the opinion of the master, the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, he/she should immediately authorize the broadcasting of a distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress alerts (MAYDAY, DSC, etc.), using all available radiocommunications systems. To minimize delays, if using a ship earth station, ships should ensure the coast earth station associated with the RCC is used. The ship may be able to send a covert piracy/terrorist alert to an RCC. However, as pirates/terrorists may be on board the ship and within audible range of the communication equipment, when the RCC sends an acknowledgement of receipt and attempts to establish communication, they could be alerted to the fact that a piracy/terrorist alert has been transmitted. This knowledge may serve to further endanger the lives of the crew on board the ship. RCCs and others should, therefore, be aware of the danger of unwillingly alerting the pirates/terrorists that a distress alert or other communication has been transmitted by the ship. Masters should bear in mind that the distress signal is provided for use only in case of imminent danger and its use for less urgent purposes might result in insufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in need of immediate assistance. Care and discretion

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must be employed in its use, to prevent its devaluation in the future. Where the transmission of the Distress signal is not fully justified, use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over all communications other than distress. The standard ships’ message formats given in appendix 2 should be used for all piracy/armed robbery initial and follow-up alert reports. Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the 1972 Collision Regulations. Bow and overside lights should be left on if it can be done without endangering navigation. Ships must not keep on deck lights when underway, as it may lead other ships to assume the ship is at anchor. Wide beam floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used systematically to probe for suspect craft using the radar guidance if possible. So far as is practicable crew members on duty outside the ship's secure areas when in port or at anchor should avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers. It has been suggested that ships should travel blacked out except for mandatory navigation lights. This may prevent attackers establishing points of reference when approaching a ship. In addition, turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them and encourage them to desist. It is difficult, however, to maintain full blackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately depend in part on the level of moonlight, but primarily on the vigilance of the ship's crew. While suddenly turning on the ship's light may alarm or dazzle attackers, it could also place the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point through temporary loss of their night vision. On balance, this approach cannot be recommended. In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship's secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass, if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio room, engine room and master's cabin, should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms. Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled. Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage and recording of the main access points to the ship's secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge.


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To prevent seizure of individual crew members by attackers - seizure and threatening a crew member is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a ship - all crew members not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the hours of darkness. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside such areas at night should remain in constant communication with the bridge and should have practised using alternative routes to return to a secure area in the event of an attack. Crewmembers who fear they may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack, should select places in advance in which they can take temporary refuge. There should be designated muster areas within the ship's secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and communicate their location and numbers to the bridge. Alarm signals, including the ship's whistle, should be sounded on the approach of attackers. Alarms and signs of response can discourage attackers. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an indication at the point at which the attacker may board, or have boarded, may help crew members in exposed locations select the most appropriate route to return to a secure area. The only flares authorized for carriage on board ship are intended for use if the ship is in distress and is in need of immediate assistance. As with the unwarranted use of the Distress signal on the radio (see paragraph 24 above), use of distress flares simply to alert shipping rather than to indicate that the ship is in grave and imminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded to. Radio transmissions should be used to alert shipping of the risk of attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be used when the master considers that the attackers' actions are putting his/her ship in imminent danger. Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should consider "riding off" attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Manoeuvres of this kind should not be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by ships constrained by their draught in the confined deep water routes found, for example, in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be difficult to train if evasive manoeuvring is also taking place. Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow may swamp his/her boat and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training hoses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of spare fire hoses could be rigged and tied down to be pressurized at short notice if a potential attack is detected. Employing evasive manoeuvres and hoses must rest on a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all crewmembers to gain the sanctuary of secure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with attackers on board may lessen their confidence that they will be able to return safely to their craft and may persuade them to disembark quickly. However, responses of this kind could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crew members and should not be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should not be used if the attackers have already seized crewmembers.

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The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged by the IMO. The Organization feels that the carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence. During the suspected or confirmed piracy/armed robbery phase recommended practices include the following:

• Early detection • Manoeuvring • Use of hoses • Secure crew positions • Maintaining control of the ship • Resistance, negotiation and compliance

Again, careful study of all recommended practices is strongly suggested. Common sense and experience should be applied to the recommendations before a particular policy or security measure is adopted. The recommendations contained in MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 are based upon reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations, and measures developed by shipping entities to enhanced ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the discretion of ship owners or masters. The use of fire hoses to repel armed boarders may or may not be wise, and in some courts might even be considered criminally negligent if the crewmember manning the hose is shot. Likewise, the amount of resistance, negotiation, or compliance in which the crew is instructed to engage should be carefully considered in light of potential legal liabilities, training, and capabilities. During the suspected or attempted piracy/armed robbery attack phase, the following measures should be observed. Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. If the vigilance and surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early. This is the stage at which the security forces of the nearest littoral or coastal State must be informed through the RCC, using the ships’ message format contained in appendix 2. The ship's crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive positions, they should move to them. Evasive manoeuvres and hoses should be vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase. If not already in touch with the security forces of the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals should be made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place. Vigorous manoeuvring should be continued and maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions permit.


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The IMO feels that vigorous use of hoses in the boarding area should be continued. It may be possible to cast off grappling hooks and poles, provided the ship's crew are not put to unnecessary danger. Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as it is appreciated that a boarding is inevitable all crew should be ordered to seek their secure positions. Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship. The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are aware they are on board and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ. When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:

• securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship; • seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and • securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.

The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by having gained access to the bridge or engine room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas, the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g. by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier. If the master is certain that all his/her crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas they do not place the entire ship at imminent risk, then he/she may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to return to their craft. The possibility of a sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew. For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie party can use water hoses, they stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in turn, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area, the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crewmember may be attractive but if it results in the crewmember being isolated and seized by the attackers, the advantage turns to the attackers. Crewmembers should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened. If the crew do apprehend an attacker, he/she should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him/her to the custody of officers

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of the security forces of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to this activity should also be handed over to the authorities who take him/her into custody. If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew's control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There will be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers' demands will be the only safe alternative and when resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crewmembers should, if it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running. As there have been occasions when entire crews have been locked up, consideration should be given to secreting equipment within areas in which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early escape. At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurance that nothing has been secreted may persuade the pirates/armed robbers to leave. If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to leave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates/armed robbers have left the ship. A pre-arranged signal on the ship's siren will alert the crew to the "all clear". The recommended procedures for the after action phase are as follows.

• Post attack reports. • Photographic records such as CCTV tapes. • Crime scene protection. • Individual written statements. • Inventories of personnel possessions. • Unlock secured spaces, unrig hoses, and revert to normal watchkeeping and

lighting. Immediately after securing the safety of the ship and crew a post attack report (Follow-up report, as shown in Ships’ message formats in appendix 2) should be made to the relevant RCC and, through them, to the security forces of the coastal State concerned. As well as information on the identity and location of the ship, any injuries to crew members or damage to the ship should be reported as should the direction in which the attackers departed together with brief details of their numbers and, if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker, that should also be reported in this report. If an attack has resulted in the death of, or serious injury to, any person on board the ship or serious damage to the ship itself, an immediate report should also be sent to the ship's


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maritime Administration. In any event a report of an attack is vital if follow-up action is to be taken by the ship's maritime Administration. Any CCTV or other recording of the incident should be secured. If practicable, areas that have been damaged or rifled should be secured and remain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic examination by the security forces of a coastal State. Crew members who came into contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting, in particular, any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attackers. A full inventory, including a description of any personal possessions or equipment taken, with serial numbers when known, should also be prepared. As soon as possible after the incident, a fuller report should be transmitted to the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred or, if on the high seas, to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allow officers of the security forces to board the ship, take statements from crew members and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of any CCTV recordings, photographs, etc. should be provided if they are available. Ships should take the necessary precautions, and implement the necessary procedures to ensure rapid reporting of any case of attack or attempted attack to the authorities in the relevant coastal States to enhance the possibility of security forces apprehending the attackers. Any report transmitted to a coastal State should also be transmitted to the ship's maritime Administration at the earliest opportunity. A complete report of the incident, including details of any follow-up action that was taken or difficulties that may have been experienced, should eventually be submitted to the ship's maritime Administration. The report received by maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO. The format required for reports to IMO through maritime Administrations or international organizations is provided as appendix 4 to MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3. Indeed, at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is directly affecting the ability to secure governmental and international action. Reports may also contribute to future refining and updating any advice that might be issued to ships. Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship's maritime Administration should also be made if an attack has been unsuccessful. Using RCCs, as recommended by IMO in MSC/Circ.597, will eliminate communication difficulties. On leaving piracy/armed robbery threat areas, shipmasters should make certain that those spaces that need to be unlocked for safety reasons are unlocked, unrig hoses and revert to normal watchkeeping/lighting.

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3.6 Sabotage Sabotage is the wilful damage to, or destruction of, a port, port facility, or ship property, equipment, or cargo. Of all the activities available to international terrorists, sabotage offers the widest range of targets and the best potential for success. The devastation that can be accomplished by the skilful employment of sabotage in the maritime arena, and the existence of certain terrorist groups willing to engage in such activity, place this hazard high on the list of serious risks confronting the maritime community. In terms of trained manpower, equipment, costs, and exposure, a sabotage operation involves only minimum expenditure by terrorists. The “profit” however can be enormous, particularly if the target has been carefully selected. Consider the economic and environmental devastation that could be caused by the well-placed sinking of a fully loaded supertanker. There are more than 500 VLCCs and ULCCs plying the world’s oceans. These ships are in excess of 1,000 feet long, over 150 feet wide, and carry more than 250,000 tons of petroleum products. The value of such ships and their cargoes alone exceeds US$50 million apiece. The damage a 250,000-ton oil spill can cause could easily be valued in the billions of dollars. France claimed damages in excess of US$2 billion in the Amoco Cadiz litigation over thirty years ago. Consider the catastrophic damage and loss of life that would be caused by blowing up an LNG tanker in a busy port. The detonation of 125,000 cubic meters of LNG has been estimated to be equivalent to a nuclear blast larger than the one that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. The most common sabotage objective is extortion. Sabotaging, or threatening to sabotage, a US$400 million offshore installation could lead to millions of dollars in extortion payoffs. Sabotage, however, may be committed for criminal as well as terrorist purposes, or simply for revenge. In an age when disgruntled employees feel compelled to murder dozens of co-workers simply because they feel the company for which they work has wronged them, extorting tens of millions of dollars from the company for the same reason is not unlikely. In fact, it is extremely likely. This is particularly so where extortion is the objective rather than destruction. The revenge motive may well cause an employee to manipulate computer databases, destroy data, or render software applications useless. As the shipping industry turns increasingly to paperless cargo movements, such sabotage could cause worldwide havoc, not to mention provide the opportunities for large-scale cargo theft. Operational requirements Terrorists who instigate sabotage attacks normally wish to publicize their motives. The relevant authorities need to have in place a communication system that enables whoever receives information about a threat to know exactly what to do. As with a bomb threat, beside each telephone there should be a proforma that enables the recipient to record all details such as male/female voice, exact text, background noises, etc.

3.7 Conclusion As we have discussed, many of the measures necessary to reduce the risk of theft, illegal drugs, stowaways, piracy and sabotage have now been codified by the new Maritime Security legislation. This is a great advantage and will certainly reduce the risk to property, profits and life.


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LECTURE 4

TERRORISM

4.1 Definition There are no internationally agreed definitions of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist,” even though modern terrorism has been around for almost 100 years. Nevertheless, the British author, Joseph Conrad, wrote about the philosophy of terrorism in his 1907 novel, The Secret Agent saying: “It is this country which is dangerous, with her idealistic conceptions of legality … To break up the superstition and worship of legality should be our aim. Nothing would please me more than to see [the police] take to shooting us down in broad daylight with the approval of the public. Half our battle would be won [by] the disintegration of the old morality.” Maritime terrorism, however, while not as old, is still not a new phenomenon, dating at least as far back as the seizure of the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria in 1961, and except for the fact that it occurs, by definition, in the maritime environment, differs little from terrorism ashore. Most, but by no means all, nations concede that terrorism generally consists of an illegal act committed with some connection to a political purpose. One definition of terrorism is: “politically motivated violence—including assassination, kidnapping, hostage-taking, theft, sabotage, extortion, and intimidation—conducted against governmental, civilian, or private sector targets by sub-national groups or state agents not constrained by the rules of law.” The United Kingdom’s Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1976 defined terrorism as the “use of violence for political ends [including] violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.” The United States Department of State has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents.” The difficulty with this definition is determining what act or acts are “for political ends” or are “politically motivated.” If one focuses on the nature of the act itself, and not the motivation, it is far easier to define maritime terrorism. The IMO’s Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988 (SUA Convention 1988) was formulated and adopted clearly with terrorism in mind, following the incident of the Achille Lauro. The Convention’s preamble states that the States Party agree to the conditions of the Convention, being “deeply concerned about the world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms;” recalling that resolution 40/61 of the UN General Assembly “unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed,” and also recalling that by resolution 40/61 IMO was invited to “study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships”. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Convention states: “1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:

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(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or

(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or

(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that s ship; or

(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigation facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or

(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or

(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraphs (a) to (f).

Interestingly, the one word that is conspicuously absent in this belaboured definition of “offence” is “terrorism,” even though the Convention’s preamble clearly uses it, and along with its absence is the notion of political purpose. The reason is obvious: without a clear definition of terrorism, the Party States could harmlessly agree to the Convention without being forced to agree that terrorism is committed for a political purpose. By so doing, any future act that is committed for a political purpose can be legitimized as not constituting terrorism and therefore not encompassed by the Convention. In other words, an act committed for a political purpose would not be an offence under Article 3. One of the world’s pre-eminent experts on maritime terrorism has suggested the following working definition: A maritime terrorist is one who, for political purposes or in order to affect the exercise of another state or political entity’s rights, attempts to do any one or combination of the following:

• Seize or exercise unlawful control over a ship or other maritime structure by threat or force

• Perform or threaten an act of violence against a person on board which is likely to endanger safe navigation

• Destroy or damage, or place a device likely to destroy or damage, a ship, maritime platform, cargo, or navigational facility

• Knowingly communicate false information which endangers safe navigation 4.2 Worldwide terrorism “Terrorism is sometimes effective in gaining specific concessions from target nations. It is used to attract worldwide publicity, support revolutions, create anarchy, and provide reprisal. It is capable of demoralizing whole societies; oppressive regimes employ it to enforce public obedience. Global terrorism promises to alter world politics in the future. Terrorist groups … will ally themselves in the international struggle; new weapons and new technologies will increase the vulnerability of their targets; radical governments will employ terrorists … to wage surrogate warfare. In any


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event, terrorism threatens to irreversibly alter traditional theories of national security, military strategy, and perhaps even the concept of government itself.”

Lloyd W. Garrison, Global Terrorism, 1986 Most forms of terrorism are founded in a national culture or subculture. Terrorist group motivations are derived from revolutionary political ideology, ethnicity, religion or some combination of these. As a general rule, the threat from terrorism increases in direct proportion to the amount of aid any particular group receives. Few terrorist groups remain completely autonomous, reject any form of external aid, and are self sustaining. Most are willing to accept support from a variety of international and national sources, and a worldwide financial, training, and supply network has developed over the last fifty years or so for the purposes of providing that support. Because this network is funded by both private organizations as well as individual nations, the line between State-sponsored and non State-sponsored terrorism is not always readily apparent. No matter where the terrorists operate, their targets remain essentially the same and can be grouped into five basic categories. They are:

• Engineering and energy systems (hydroelectric plants, offshore oil rigs, nuclear facilities, gas and oil pipelines, dams and electric power lines)

• Communications and supply systems (communications facilities, chemical storage sites, dock facilities, petroleum storage facilities, factories, equipment warehouses, computer facilities, weapons storage sites)

• Transportation systems (seaports, rail systems, bus depots, airports and aircraft, trucking facilities, shipyards)

• Human targets (embassy and government officials, corporate executives, police, judges, schools and school buses, any large congregations such as on passenger ships)

• Military targets (sensitive weapons and weapons systems, arms and ammunition, command and control facilities)

The seven most common acts of terrorism are:

• Bombings • Hijackings • Kidnappings • Arson • Assassinations • Hostage taking • Ambushes

4.3 Maritime case histories There have been forty-two hijacking/seizure incidents since the 1951 seizure of a Polish minesweeper by defecting crewmembers. Of these, at least eighteen were perpetrated by refugees or other defectors, while a few were simply the result of a terrorist or other group fleeing the scene of an earlier action. Rebel or guerrilla forces engaged in active hostilities against a government account for twenty-two of the incidents which may or may not be considered terrorist incidents depending on how one defines “terrorist” (see above).

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Following the seizure of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in 1985, there was much speculation that increased numbers of incidents would follow. However, it is significant that in the years since the Achille Lauro hijacking, no other cruise ship has been hijacked or even targeted for attack. Of course, international terrorism did not reached its pinnacle until September 11, 2001. Whether cruise ships are now as much of a target as some argued between 1985 and 2001 that they were, or whether other forms of international shipping are more likely targets, remains open for debate. Nevertheless, a few historic incidents do offer useful lessons. Santa Maria – 1961 This ship was selected by Henrique Galvao, a former general in the army of the Portuguese dictator Salazar, to be seized at sea for use in a larger anti-Salazar campaign. The decision to use the ship was based on its size and speed (20 knots at full speed). Galvao also realized that the large number of passengers ensured publicity and would provide some shield against counter action. The initial plan called for 100 armed men to be placed aboard as paying passengers. After the ship had been taken, it was to sail to the island of Fernando Po in the hope of staging a commando raid, seizing a gunboat, and proceeding to Angola to stage an uprising ashore. The transit was planned to take eight days, allowing three days’ head start before the Santa Maria was due for her next port call in Miami. Radio silence was to be maintained while confederates ashore cabled misleading location data and false reports of delays. The Santa Maria and her sister ship were kept under surveillance over a period of several months on each of their monthly calls at La Guaira, Venezuela. Careful note was made of security measures and boarding procedures, and brochures and photographs were acquired to familiarize the plotters with all aspects of the ship. Ultimately, only twenty-four hijackers were able to board at La Guaira and Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, some as paying passengers and some as stowaways. At 0145 hours on 22 January, the men moved against the bridge and officers’ quarters. Unexpected resistance resulted in the third mate being killed and three crewmen being injured, forcing the first alteration to the plan. The ship stopped at St. Lucia to put the injured men ashore, and then sped away as fast as possible. At this point, she reportedly had sufficient fuel and food on board for twenty days. The ship’s owners, controlled by the Portuguese Government, claimed an act of piracy and asked for international assistance. Several days passed before official opinion in the U.S. and U.K. accepted the seizure as a political act, meaning that under existing international convention neither government was obligated to intervene. U.S. Naval units were dispatched to search for, and later follow, the ship. Meanwhile, Galvao attempted to convert some of the ship’s crew to his cause. He also attempted to persuade the 600 passengers they would not be harmed in order to minimize his problems in controlling them. Only one of Galvao’s men, his navigator, had any real seagoing experience, and he was intentionally kept confused by the ship’s officers throughout the incident. In addition, Galvao had been forced to leave his only radio operator behind. His absence added to Galvao’s communication problems and allowed the ship’s radio operators to sabotage his communications. The most significant factor in the ship’s resistance, however, was the crew turning on the fresh water faucets throughout the ship, which depleted the ship’s water supply. By the eleventh day the lack of fresh water had caused serious problems for the ship’s captors and


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they sought asylum in Brazil. After negotiating with the Brazilian authorities, the hijackers turned the vessel over to them and the incident was concluded. Anzoategui – 1963 The Venezuelan freighter Anzoategui with a crew of thirty-six was seized at sea off the Venezuelan coast on 12 February 1963. The seizure was accomplished by eight members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces for National Liberation, who were smuggled aboard by the second mate. The hijacking was timed to coincide with gun and fire-bomb attacks in Caracas that were intended to disrupt President Betancourt’s visit to Washington. A spokeswoman ashore relayed messages, purportedly received from the ship, in which the rebels threatened to blow up the ship if they received any interference. In response to the incident, the U.S. dispatched destroyers to find and shadow the ship on behalf of the Venezuelan Government. While providing this support, the U.S. deflected Venezuelan claims that the action was piracy and therefore actionable by the international community. After seven days, the ship entered the Brazilian port of Belem and the hijackers were granted asylum by the Brazilian Government, citing as precedent the Santa Maria two years earlier. Columbia Eagle – 1970 The U.S-flag freighter Columbia Eagle was seized by two crewmembers while on a voyage to Thailand with a cargo of ordnance. The two spread a false alarm that a fused bomb had been set to explode, and twenty-four crewmembers abandoned ship. The remaining thirteen, including the captain and radio operator, were separated from the fleeing crewmembers and forced at gunpoint to divert the ship to Cambodia. The ship was later returned, but both mutineers were given asylum in Cambodia. One crewmember was eventually returned to the U.S. to stand trial for mutiny and assault, but the other was never heard from again. The seizure of the Columbia Eagle was not conducted for any private financial gain, and thus cannot accurately be termed piracy. The motivation was vaguely political, in this case opposing the U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam. In the final analysis, the incident was viewed as a “defection” of two crewmembers that committed mutiny to achieve their objective. The mutiny, however, was complicated by the “terrorist” element of armed hijacking and taking of hostages. Achille Lauro – 1985 The Achille Lauro is probably history’s most famous hijacking, despite its apparent accidental nature and subsequent failure as a maritime terrorist precedent. The ship was seized at sea off the Egyptian coast by four Palestinian passengers who were accidentally discovered in their cabin by a steward while they were cleaning their weapons. The four were reportedly using the ship to gain entry into the Israeli port of Ashdod, where they planned to attack a nebulously-defined variety of targets in the port area, and possibly take hostages back to the ship. Most of the 750 passengers had gone ashore to tour Egyptian sites, leaving about 150 on board along with the crew of over 300. The hijackers were forced to act as a result of their discovery, and mustered the remaining passengers in the ship’s dining room where they could be more easily watched. They were later moved to the forward lounge. The crew was left unsupervised. One hijacker each maintained control over the passengers, the bridge, radio room, and engine control room.

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As soon as the hijackers gained control of the ship, they ordered her to sail north toward Syria, where they hoped to pick up reinforcements. The Syrian Government, however, refused to allow the ship to enter Syrian waters, and the ship then sailed to the coast of Cyprus. Cyprus also refused the vessel entry, and by the third day it returned to Egypt where the hijackers surrendered to Egyptian authorities. At this point, it was learned that one of the passengers, an elderly American, had been murdered and his body dumped at sea. This was an attempt to influence Syria, which the hijackers still hoped would allow them into port. Subsequent investigation established that the hijackers had previously booked passage aboard the ship to test the security at Ashdod. They probably also used the opportunity to gain information about the ship’s layout and crew operations. They demonstrated knowledge of both, in the way the passengers and crew were handled. They also apparently realized from the time they were discovered by the steward that they could not effectively control the ship over a long period of time, and all their actions were aimed at using the ship for escape or to obtain reinforcements. Avrasya – 1996 he Panamanian-flag passenger ferry Avrasya was hijacked in the port of Trabzon, Turkey, by nine men supporting their embattled Chechen comrades in Pervomayskoye. The ferry was preparing to sail on its usual overnight run to Sochi with a predominantly Russian passenger list when the men, armed with guns and grenades, forced their way on board. They had missed their intended ferry earlier, which had sailed before they were in position. Initial reports indicated as many as fifty armed hijackers were on board and had rigged the vessel with explosives. Passengers were herded into the ferry’s cafeteria and the vessel was forced to put to sea. The ship proceeded slowly along the Turkish Black Sea coast toward Istanbul, where the gunmen threatened to destroy the ship with explosives if the Russians did not lift their siege of 250 Chechens trapped in the Dagestani village of Pervomayskoye. Turkish authorities established control over the situation almost immediately. They maintained constant surveillance of the ship and stayed in radio contact with the hijackers. Turkey continued to assert jurisdiction over the incident and refused to yield to Russian pressure to resolve the situation promptly and forcibly without regard for potential loss of life. This undoubtedly caused the hijackers to keep the ship in Turkish territorial waters and not on the high seas where Russian armed retaliation was likely. Ultimately, the ship ran short of food and water and the hijackers were forced to anchor near Istanbul where four of them surrendered. The remaining five were found hiding in the ship. USS Cole and SS Limburg In October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by a small boat which came along side and was detonated. Seventeen sailors were killed and thirty eight were wounded. On 6 October 2002, the French oil tanker the SS Limburg was rammed by a little boat carrying high explosive. One Bulgarian sailor died and there was extensive oil pollution. Both incidents occurred off the Yemen.


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Lessons learned From these incidents certain lessons can be gleaned:

• The greatest likelihood of terrorist success will be from those who have planned well.

• Once an attack is launched or the hijacking has occurred, the terrorists will probably have accomplished all or most of their goals, unless the seized ship is merely an instrument in a further terrorist act, such as the public murder of hundreds of innocent passengers and crew or the creation of a catastrophic environmental incident.

• Well-prepared terrorists will know they will probably not have enough people to take and hold a large cruise ship for any appreciable period of time. Sparsely manned cargo vessels, therefore, are more likely targets, particularly if the targeted vessel has the potential of creating some sort of disaster.

• Time is on the side of incident containment by locating the ship and controlling its further movement. Food and water will most likely become controlling issues. Since the terrorists know this, they can be expected to resolve the matter within a relatively short time period, either by surrendering, seeking asylum, or destroying the vessel.

• However, ships are not as vulnerable to destruction as aircraft. Despite the tactic of claiming that a large force is on board, or that the ship has been sabotaged by explosives, all current experience indicates hijackings will be attempted by small groups with no realistic probability of being able to sink a large, modern ship.

4.4 Bomb incidents and threats Bombs are the weapons of choice for terrorists. They are easy to construct, easy to transport, easy to conceal, and easy to place. They require little time at the target, thus reducing the likelihood of discovery. They are cost effective and hard to trace. A bombing attracts the attention of the news media — one of the primary motives for the use of a bomb — and thus, the hallmark of a terrorist bombing is not any advance threat, but rather the attribution or claim of responsibility after the detonation has caused as much death and destruction as possible. Terrorists rarely divulge their intentions. On the other hand, a person who seeks revenge, or one who plans to use a bomb to extort money or action, is more likely to warn of the threat. Whether a bomb threat is a hoax or a warning about an actual device, or whether a detonation occurs without a warning, good bomb threat planning is the best defence and the minimum requirement for reasonable or effective security. Bomb threats are inconvenient, and most are hoaxes. However, three percent are not. As a result, all bomb threats must be taken seriously. Explosives are classified as either “low” or “high” according to their burn rate or speed, expressed in feet per second. Low explosives are composed of materials that burn at a slow rate, such as black powder and smokeless powder. These materials are commonly used by individuals constructing homemade bombs because they are easily obtained. Pipe bombs containing low explosives have long been favoured by terrorists. High explosives, such as TNT, dynamite, Tovex, C-4 and Semtex change from a solid to a gaseous state almost instantaneously. The detonation velocity of some high explosives can exceed

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30,000 feet per second. Unlike in the movies, not even Bruce Willis or Arnold Schwartzenegger can outrun a bomb blast travelling at six miles a second! Bomb-making materials are readily available and easily obtained. A truck-load of ammonia fertilizer and some diesel fuel can level buildings and kill hundreds of people. Military explosives can be obtained from countries that support terrorism, from other terrorist groups, and from military organizations around the world through thievery or bribery. All the ingredients needed to make explosives, when manufactured explosives are not available, can be purchased at hardware stores, drug stores, and grocery stores. The list of materials and compounds that can be used to construct a bomb is virtually endless. Starch, flour, sugar, fertilizer, gasoline, cleaning solvents, and weed killer can all be used. Of course, powder from shotgun shells, rifle and pistol ammunition, and even fireworks can also be used. Information about how to manufacture explosives is easily obtained at public libraries, local bookstores, and through the Internet by anyone interested in constructing bombs. Explosives can also simply be purchased using counterfeit identification. Dynamite is readily available for commercial use. It can be stolen from construction sites, quarries and mines, manufacturers, suppliers, and transporters. Furthermore, the bomb-maker need not buy or steal the explosives himself. He can pay or bribe someone else to do it for him. The initial moments of a bomb threat are crucial to the evaluation of the incident and the determination whether the threat is real or a hoax. To help assure a successful determination, the bomb threat contingency plan must emphasize the need for planning and training. There are three primary means of receiving a bomb threat:

• Telephone • Mail • Discovery of a suspicious item

Each method requires special procedures to effectively obtain the maximum amount of information from the threat source. All bomb threats no matter how brief are comprised of a series of facts that contain both basic and special elements. Basic elements are those statements involving (a) the caller, (b) the location, and (c) the recipient. Special elements are more specific, and are the most important factors. Special elements include (a) the specific location or victim, (b) the specific time, (c) the specific caller, (d) the specific reason for the threat, and (e) the specific description of the bomb. A simple bomb checklist should be developed that will assist the recipient of the threat in ascertaining and recording as much information as possible in the short period of time that is available. Once a bomb threat is received, the decision to evacuate or not evacuate the affected area must be made. This is not as simple as it might at first appear. Any evacuation must be accomplished in a planned and orderly fashion, with all consequences carefully weighed. For instance, a sophisticated terrorist, knowing that an evacuation is the likely result of a bomb threat, might employ a telephoned bomb threat to concentrate as many people as possible in a small area — such as a parking lot — before detonating a car bomb without


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warning and killing or maiming far more people than he would otherwise. Furthermore, there are facilities that simply cannot be evacuated, such as ships at sea, and therefore alternative procedures must be developed to render the crew as safe as possible. This primarily involves searching the ship and this important matter will be discussed later during this workshop. 4.5 Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are commonly lumped together when discussing attacks that can lead to a mass casualty event. Each type of weapon, however, and hence attack, has its own properties and capabilities. All have the same purpose: to create mass destruction in one form or another; hence the term “weapons of mass destruction.” In the post-Cold War international environment, the threat posed by “rogue States” in possession of such weapons has become a major concern. The fear of attack using chemical or biological weapons was considerably increased in March 1995 when a secret cult known as “Aum Shinrikyo” (Aum Supreme Truth) launched an attack on the Tokyo subway system using Sarin, a nerve agent first developed in Germany in the 1930s. Although the attack was considered a failure — causing only twelve fatalities and several thousand casualties — it appeared that a terrorist threshold had been crossed. For the first time in history a non-State actor had independently developed, produced and deployed a potential weapon of mass destruction in an attempt to cause a mass casualty event. Further investigations revealed that Aum had also developed a significant biological weapons program and had attempted attacks on several occasions. It was only because these biological attacks failed that Aum turned to a chemical attack employing Sarin gas. To some extent, biological weapons have become known as the “poor man’s nuke.” The Aum example illustrates that (a) the ability to develop weapons of mass destruction is no longer restricted to nation States, and (b) some non-State actors such as terrorists, guerrillas, narco-terrorists and drug cartels, may develop both a desire and capability to cause mass casualty events. Nuclear weapons, which can be more than a million times more powerful than the same weight of conventional explosives, create shock waves, high pressures, flying debris, and extreme heat — the same mechanisms by which conventional explosives injure, kill and destroy. They simply do it on a vastly greater scale. Unlike conventional explosives, however, nuclear explosions also create neutron and gamma radiation that can kill or injure those exposed at the instant of detonation. In addition, they generate long-term radioactivity in the form of fallout, which can spread over an area much greater than that affected by the explosion’s immediate effects. In addition to producing acute illness and death, fallout can lead to delayed medical problems such as cancer or genetic abnormalities. Of the three types of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological and chemical – the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists seems the most unlikely. First, while considerable information related to nuclear weapon design has become public knowledge and the fodder for novelists, the fabrication of a nuclear device requires substantial financial and technical resources that most terrorist organizations simply do not have.

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This does not mean, however, that a threat does not exist. Virtually anything can be purchased with enough money, including technology, material, and scientific knowledge. Furthermore, a nuclear device need not necessarily be manufactured from scratch in some terrorist camp or basement. Some estimate that over 30,000 nuclear weapons and 650 metric tons of weapons-usable materials were stockpiled in the Soviet Union at the time of its demise. There is no question that some of these weapons or weapons-making materials remain unaccounted for, and could potentially be in the hands of terrorist organizations throughout the world. A genuine threat by a terrorist group to use a nuclear device reasonably believed to have been stolen or fabricated would present significant difficulties for, and perhaps even panic throughout, most civilized countries. Biological weapons are those weapons that utilize various living organisms (rickettsae, viruses and fungi) as well as bacteria. Such weapons work by disseminating diseases caused by micro-organisms or biologically produced toxins (i.e. “biological agents”) to cause illness or death in human, animal or plant populations. Generally, dissemination is by means of an aerosolized cloud of infectious organisms released over a target population or area. A biological agent is any micro-organism, virus, or infectious substance capable of:

• Causing detrimental changes in the environment • Harming or damaging supplies of food, water or equipment • Causing disease in humans, animals or plants or other living organisms

Using disease against one’s enemies is not a novel idea. One of the earliest recorded uses of poison in warfare occurred in 600 B.C. when the Athenians tossed poisonous roots into the stream their opponents were using for drinking water. The enemy soldiers became violently ill and were defeated as a result. Greek and Roman armies were also known to use rotting animal corpses to poison drinking wells. In 1346, Mongol forces besieging the city of Kaffa in the Ukraine hurled plague-ridden bodies over the walls of the city that caused an outbreak of Bubonic Plague amongst the city’s defenders. Some historians believe the retreating European troops carried the disease home with them, which was the major cause of the outbreak of the “Black Death” that killed roughly one quarter of Europe’s population. A biological agent may not necessarily be a viable biological weapon. It must first be “weaponized.” There are a limited number of biological agents that are suitable for weaponization. While there is no such thing as a “perfect” biological agent, all have their unique strengths and weaknesses. And although the most notable are anthrax and smallpox, they include also:

• Anthrax • Botulinal toxins • Brucellosis • Cholera • Clostridium perfringens • Encephalomyelitis viruses • Glanders • Hemorrhagic fever viruses • Mycotoxins


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• Neurtoxins • Plague • Q-fever • Ricin • Shigella • Smallpox • Tularemia • Typhus

Just as biological weapons utilize biological agents to inflict death and injury, chemical weapons use chemical agents to do the same. The difference is that chemical agents usually work faster than do biological agents. Chemical agents are poisons that incapacitate, injure, or kill through toxic effects on the skin, eyes, lungs, nerves, or other organs. Some chemical agents can be lethal when vaporized and inhaled in amounts as small as a few milligrams. Two chemical agents used extensively in World War I were mustard gas and chlorine gas, which accounted for thousands of casualties on both sides. A number of modern, extremely lethal, nerve gases, such as Sarin, have been developed since then. Law enforcement agencies throughout the world routinely employ non-lethal chemical weapons such as tear-gas (CS) and MACE (liquid CS). 4.6 Controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the anthrax exposures that followed closely on their heels, have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The international community now recognizes, if it didn’t before, the need to maintain strong controls over such weapons and their technologies. Terrorists or rogue States can acquire weapons of mass destruction by buying materials and equipment from countries that produce and export them or by stealing them. With the increasing globalization of the world economy, dual-use items and technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction cannot be effectively controlled without cooperation among exporting and transit countries. Otherwise, foreign purchasers denied a critical item by one country can simply obtain the same item from another country that does not control its exports as stringently. There are four primary economic and diplomatic instruments that are used internationally to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They are:

• International treaties • Multilateral export control arrangements • Individual national export controls • Security assistance to less developed countries

International treaties obligate members to restrict transfers of WMD technologies. The international community has established three such treaties to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, non-binding agreements under which countries that produce technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of such technologies. These arrangements include lists of

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sensitive materials and technologies that are to be controlled by national legislation. One weakness in such arrangements is that member countries do not always agree on their application, and the effectiveness of such multilateral controls has been increasingly questioned in recent years. Individual nations’ export controls set the legal and regulatory conditions under which goods and technologies can be exported. While the goal of export controls is to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies, a number of factors hinder their implementation. These include a failure to assess the security risk associated with the transfer of sensitive goods and technologies, the difficulties in screening and eliminating would-be end users, and monitoring the use of the items after export. Security assistance to other countries helps control or eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is achieved by helping countries to destroy launch capabilities and to secure and protect materials that may be used as weapons. 4.7 Stockholm Syndrome In 1973, four Swedes held in a bank vault for six days during a robbery became emotionally attached to their captors. This phenomenon was later dubbed the Stockholm Syndrome. According to psychologists, abused individuals may bond to their abusers as a means of enduring violence. The most notorious instance came when heiress Patty Hearst was kidnapped by the Symbionese Liberation Army. After several months in captivity, she re-christened herself "Tanya" and joined their ranks. The Stockholm Syndrome is an emotional attachment, a bond of interdependence between captive and captor, that develops “when someone threatens your life, deliberates, and doesn't kill you.” The relief resulting from the removal of the threat of death generates intense feelings of gratitude and fear that combine to make the captive reluctant to display negative feelings toward the captor or terrorist. In fact, former hostages have visited their captors in jail, recommended defence counsel, and even started a defence fund. It is this dynamic, which causes former hostages and abuse survivors to minimize the damage done to them and refuse to cooperate in prosecuting their tormentors. “The victims’ need to survive is stronger than his/her impulse to hate the person who has created the dilemma”. The victim comes to see the captor as a “good guy,” even a saviour. This condition occurs in response to the four specific conditions:

• A person threatens to kill another and is perceived as having the capability to do so. • The other cannot escape, so his or her life depends on the threatening person. • The threatened person is isolated from outsiders so that the only other perspective

available to her or him is that of the threatening person. • The threatening person is perceived as showing some degree of kindness to the one

being threatened. It takes only three to four days for the characteristic bond of the Stockholm Syndrome to emerge when captor and captive are strangers. Many airlines now include as part of their crew training, a briefing regarding the Stockholm Syndrome, and ship owners might well consider doing the same. To understand


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the Stockholm Syndrome, one must understand the effects of sensory deprivation. Imagine being forcibly removed from your daily life (with all its familiar environments, routines and social interactions) and put in a strange place from which you cannot escape. Your only interactions are with your captors, whose behaviour can be capricious—that is, beyond your ability to understand why or when they may choose to do something for you, with you or to you. They may withhold food and/or water, in order to raise its value to you in order to receive your compliance with their demands. You may be left in complete silence or darkness with nothing to do and nowhere to go. You may not be allowed to talk or interact with other prisoners. This is important knowledge to have if one ever becomes a hostage. Being able to understand, and anticipate, the possible emotions will reduce the chances of succumbing to the Stockholm Syndrome. However, some experts argue that because of the extreme emotional roller coaster caused by fluctuations between fear and relief, no amount of preparation can prevent the Stockholm Syndrome from occurring. 4.8 Conclusion Terrorism has proved to be a successful military tactic for those people who are prepared to use extreme violence in support of their fanatical nationalist, cultural, religious or environmental beliefs. There is every reason to believe that this illegal use of violence will continue in the future. For the maritime industry, and in particular the passenger and tanker sector, security against terrorism will become a routine part of commercial life.

LECTURE 5

AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS 5.1 Aim First a reminder of the aim. It is to establish an international framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

5.2 Introduction This lecture will concentrate on the details of the amendments to SOLAS Chapter V and Chapter XI – 1, and the requirements as set out in the new Chapter XI - 2. The lecture will be based on Powerpoint presentations highlighting the salient points of these documents. As we will make constant reference to the new provisions, students should have available, in front of them, a copy of the ISPS Code (2003 Edition).

5.3 Threats against ships We start with a reminder of the threat.

Ships as a target

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- sinking ships, killing people, causing oil pollution.

Ships as a weapon - damage to ports, channels, industrial centres or carrying weapons of mass destruction.

Ships used to smuggle

- terrorists, weapons, drugs, illegal immigrants.

5.4 What is the fundamental “bottom line” of all these security measures? Key measures – ships and ports • To prevent unauthorised persons entering a port facility or boarding a ship, this includes

from the seaside of the ship or when it is at sea • To prevent unauthorised weapons and goods entering a port facility or being taken

onboard a ship, either hidden in cargo, in stores or in baggage • To alert the appropriate authorities if a security incident arises, for instance when being

illegally boarded or when suspect items are discovered

5.5 How has the IMO tackled this problem?

New SOLAS regulations • All new security related requirements have been addressed in a new SOLAS

Chapter XI-2 “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security” • Other provisions, mainly safety related, have been covered by amendments to

SOLAS Chapter V “Carriage Requirements for AIS” and in a new SOLAS Chapter XI-1 “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety”.

5.6 What is in SOLAS Chapter V?

SOLAS Chapter V, Reg. 19 - Automatic Identification System (AIS) This requirement had been adopted previously with implementation dates ranging from 1 July 2002 to 1 July 2007 for ships on international voyages. The final date has now been moved forward to not later than the first safety equipment survey after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier.

5.7 What is in SOLAS Chapter XI-1? SOLAS Chapter XI-1 • Reg. 3 - Ship identification number Ships are already required to have an IMO identification number. The new requirement is that the number has to be permanently marked inside on a bulkhead and outside, on the stern, the side or on top. The requirement being that the number is plainly visible and cannot be expunged.


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• Reg. 5 - Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)

All vessels shall be issued with a CSR to be continuously updated containing 13 pieces of information relating to the IMO number ownership, flag, class, name etc. 5.8 Who is affected by the new SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2?

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 2 - Application All cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards and all passenger ships on international voyages as well as port facilities serving such ships. Mobile offshore drilling units, only when transiting international waters (not when on location). Application date is 1 July 2004 for most of the requirements with some transition period for existing ships. 5.9 What are the obligations of Contracting Governments?

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 3 - Obligations of Contracting Governments Contracting Governments shall set Security Levels and provide security level information to its own ships and the ports in their own territory.

• Level 1 – Normal • Level 2 – Heightened probability of a security incident • Level 3 – When a security incident is probable or imminent.

5.10 What are the requirements for companies and ships?

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 4 - Requirements for companies and ships Companies and ships shall comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and Part A of the Code using Part B as a guidance

5.11 What are the specific responsibilities of companies? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 5 - Specific Responsibilities of Companies Supplementing the CSR requirement under SOLAS XI-1, Reg. 5 and to establish the ownership and control of the ship, the Company shall ensure that the master has available on board at all times information through which Flag and Port States officers can establish who has appointed the crew, decided the employment of the ship and, if relevant, who are the party(ies) to the charter party(ies).

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5.12 How can a ship warn the appropriate authorities that they are under threat? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 6 - Ship security alert system All ships shall be fitted with a security alert system. This may be combined with an existing radio installation. (A performance standard has been adopted by IMO by resolution MSC 136(76).) For passenger ships, tankers and bulk carriers constructed before 1 July 2004, the system is to be installed not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2004. For other cargo vessels, not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1 July 2006. How can ships be warned of a heightened threat?

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 7 - Threats to ships In areas where there is a heightened risk against ships, coastal states are obliged to provide relevant information and points of contacts to ships in the area (The Limburg regulation) 5.14 The Master retains command SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 8 - Master’s discretion for ship safety and Security. This is to make it absolutely clear that the master has the overriding responsibility for all safety and security matters on his ship. He has the right to make a professional judgement on what to do in case of a conflict between safety and security requirements. 5.15 What are the powers of a Port? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 9 - Control and compliance measures Initially, there will be the ‘normal’ Port State control check of the ISSC. If there are clear grounds to believe that the ship is not in compliance, the control may go further. Non-compliance may include invalid ISSC, not properly implemented SSP or no SSP, interface with Port Facilities or other ships in violation with the provisions. This regulation describes how port states shall carry out the control of their own security requirements. Ships that have reported their intention to call on a port may be required to send certain information to the port state, and also may be inspected prior to entering the port. If the port state has reason to believe that the ship is in non-compliance with its security requirements, it can be denied entry. (Such denial may result in claims for compensation). 5.16 What are the requirements for a Port Facility? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 10 - Requirements for port facilities


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Port facilities used by ships for which the Code applies, are required to comply with the Code, including carrying out a Port Facility Security Assessment and establishing a Port Facility Security Plan. 5.17 Can Contracting Governments agree alternative security agreements? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 11 - Alternative security agreements Contracting Governments may enter into agreements covering alternative security arrangements for ships on fixed routes between port facilities within their own territory. (The main intention is to simplify security requirements for internal ferries.) Ships covered by such agreements cannot conduct ship to ship operations with other ships not covered by the alternative security agreement. 5.18 Can an Administration implement other security arrangements?

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 12 - Equivalent security arrangements This regulation allows Contracting Governments to apply equivalent security arrangements provided that they are at least as effective as those prescribed in Part A of the Code. Equivalent security arrangements have to be communicated to the IMO. 5.19 What are the obligations for Contracting Governments as regard of the

communication of information? SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 13 - Communication of information This regulation summarizes the obligations of Contracting Governments to provide information to ships, to the IMO and other Contracting Governments.

It is a most important regulation and covers: 1 the names and contact details of their national authority or authorities responsible for

ship and port facility security; 2 the locations within their territory covered by the approved port facility security

plans. 3 the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all

times to receive and act upon the ship-to-shore security alerts. 4 the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all

times to receive and act upon any communications from Contracting Governments exercising control and compliance measures.

5 the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be available at all times to provide advice or assistance to ships and to whom ships can report any security concerns

6 Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the IMO the names and contact details of any Recognized Security Organizations authorized to act on their behalf together with details of the specific responsibility and conditions of authority delegated to such organizations.

7 Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the IMO a list showing the approved port facility security plans for the port facilities located

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within their territory together with the location or locations covered by each approved port facility security plan and the corresponding date of approval and updates if amended or at least every 5 years. 8 alternative security arrangements under SOLAS Chapter XI-2, reg.11

5.20 Conclusion The aim of this new Convention is to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector. For all Contracting Governments it will involve the publication of new legislation, a considerable reorganization of administrative staff, the allocation of money and a significant amount of training. This all has to be completed by 1 July 2004 – so work should begin now.

LECTURE 6

INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT SECURITY CODE (ISPS) CODE - PART A

The ISPS Code Part A contains the mandatory provisions for the implementation of SOLAS Chapter –XI-2. It has 19 sections.

ISPS Code Part A - 19 Sections 1 General 2 Definitions 3 Application 4 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments 5 Declaration of Security (DOS) 6 Obligations of the Company 7 Ship security 8 Ship security Assessment (SSA) 9 Ship Security Plan (SSP) 10 Records 11 Company Security Officer (CSO) 12 Ship Security Officer (SSO) 13 Training, drills and exercises on ship security 14 Port facility security 15 Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) 16 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 17 Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) 18 Training, drills and exercises on port facility security 19 Verification and certification of ships


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ISPS Code - Part A 6.1 Sect. 1 - General This deals with the fundamental requirements of the Convention to detect and deter acts which threaten ships, ports and maritime trade. 6.2 Sect. 2 - Definitions This deals with definitions. Of particular relevance are the definitions of a Ship Security Plan (SSP), the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP), the Ship Security Officer (SSO), the Company Security Officer(CSO), the Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), and the three security levels. 6.3 Sect. 3 - Application Describes who and what is covered by the Convention (see also SOLAS Chapter XI-2, reg. 1) 6.4 Sect. 4 - Responsibilities of Contracting Governments This section covers the responsibilities of the Contracting governments particularly specifying those responsibilities which CANNOT be delegated.

• setting of the applicable security level; • approving a PFSA and subsequent amendments to an approved assessment; • determining the port facilities which will be required to designate a PFSO; • approving a PFSP and subsequent amendments to an approved plan; • exercising control and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9; and • establishing the requirements for a Declaration of Security.

6.5 Sect. 5 - Declaration of security This section explains the reasons for the Declaration of Security and the procedures for its use. (See Part B, appendix 1). 6.6 Sect. 6 - Obligations of the Company This section explains that the Company shall ensure that the SSP contains a clear statement emphasising the master’s authority and shall provide the necessary support to the CSO, the Master and the SSO to fulfil their duties.

6.7 Sect. 7 - Ship security This section explains the procedures to be carried out a security level 1

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1 Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties 2 Controlling access to the ship 3 Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects 4 Monitoring restricted areas 5 Monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the ship 6 Supervising the handling of cargo and ship’s store 7 Ensuring that security communication is readily available.

At security level 2 and security level 3, measures should take into account the guidance given in Part B of the Code. 6.8 Sect. 8 - Ship Security Assessment (SSA) This section explains that the CSO shall ensure that an initial SSA, including an on-scene security survey, is carried out by persons with appropriate skills. The SSA shall be documented, reviewed, accepted and retained by the Company and constitute the basis upon which the SSP is developed. The SSA shall at least include the following elements: 1 identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations 2 identification and evaluation of key ship board operations 3 identification of possible threats and the likelihood of their occurrence 4 identification of weaknesses, including human factors, policies and procedures

6.9 Sect. 9 - Ship Security Plan (SSP) This section explains that on the basis of the SSA, a SSP shall be established using the guidance in Part B of the Code. The plan must be periodically reviewed. The plan may be kept in electronic format and must be protected from unauthorised access. Some parts may only be disclosed to a Port State Control (PSC) with the explicit of the approval of the Flag State, ie non-sensitive issues and sensitive issues. The plan shall address the following 18 points: 1 measures designed to prevent unauthorised weapons from being taken on board the

ship. 2 identification of restricted areas and measures for the prevention of unauthorised

access to them. 3 measures for the prevention of unauthorised access to the ship. 4 procedures for responding to security threats or breaches 5 procedures for responding to any security intersections 6 procedures for evacuation in case of security threats 7 duties of shipboard personnel with security responsibilities 8 procedures for auditing the security activities 9 procedures for training, drills and exercises 10 procedures for interfacing with port facility security activities 11 procedures for the periodic review of the plan & updating 12 procedures for reporting security incidents


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13 identification of the SSO 14 identification of the CSO 15 procedures for checking security equipment on board (if any) 16 frequency for testing or calibration of any security equipment 17 identification of locations where the ship security alert system activiation points are

provided 18 procedures for the use of the Ship Security Alert System including testing.

6.10 Sect. 10 - Records

This section describes what records are to be included in the SSP. It states that records can be kept in the working language or languages of the ship but if the language or languages used are not English, French or Spanish, a translation into one of these languages shall be included. Details to be included in this operational security record shall include: 1 training, drills and exercises 2 reports of security threats and incidents 3 reports of breaches of security 4 changes in security level 5 communications relating to the security of the ship 6 internal audits and reviews of security activities 7 periodic review of the security assessment 8 periodic review of ship security plan 9 implementation of any amendments to the plan 10 maintenance, calibration and testing of any security equipment

6.11 Sect. 11 - Company Security Officer (CSO) This section explains how each Company shall designate a CSO or CSOs with duties and responsibilities including the following 13 requirements: 1 advising the level of the threat 2 ensuring that SSAs are carried out 3 ensuring the development of the SSP 4 ensuring the SSP is modified to correct deficiencies 5 arranging for internal audits 6 arranging for verifications by the Administration or RSO 7 ensuring that deficiencies identified are dealt with 8 enhancing security awareness and vigilance 9 ensuring adequate training of relevant personnel 10 ensuring effective communication with the PFSO 11 ensuring consistency between security and safety 12 ensuring SSPs are ship-specific and accurate 13 ensuring the implementation of any alternative or equivalent arrangements

6.12 Sect. 12 - Ship Security Officer (SSO) This section explains that a SSO shall be designated on each ship with duties and responsibilities including the following 10 items. (The position of SSO may be combined with other duties.):

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1 undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security

measures are maintained; 2 maintaining and supervising the implementation of the SSP, including any

amendments to the plan; 3 co-ordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with

other shipboard personnel and with the relevant PFSO; 4 proposing modifications to the ship security plan; 5 reporting to the CSO any deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal

audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance and then implementing corrective actions;

6 enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board; 7 ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as

appropriate; 8 reporting all security incidents; 9 co-ordinating the implementation of the SSP with the CSO and the relevant PFSO;

and 10 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and

maintained. 6.13 Sect. 13 - Trainings, drills and exercises on ship security

This section explains how the CSO, appropriate shore based personnel and the SSO shall have knowledge and have received training taking into account guidance in Part B of the Code . Shipboard personnel having specific security duties and responsibilities shall understand their responsibilities as described in the SSP and have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties. Drills and exercises shall be conducted at appropriate intervals in conformity with Part B of the Code. 6.14 Sect. 14 - Port facility security

This section explains the security requirements to be implemented by the port facility at changes in the security level. Activities to be carried out at security level 1: 1 ensuring the performance of all Port Facility security duties 2 controlling access to the Port Facility 3 monitoring of the Port Facility, including anchoring and berthing areas 4 monitoring restricted areas 5 supervising the handling of cargo 6 supervising the handling of ship’s stores 7 ensuring that security communication is readily available. At security levels 2 and 3 guidance is given for extra precautions in Part B of the Code.


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6.15 Sect. 15 - Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA)

The PFSA is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and updating the port facility security plan. The PFSA shall be carried out by the Contracting Government within whose territory the Port Facility is located. A Contracting Government may authorise a recognised security organisation to carry out the port facility security assessment of a specific port facility located within its territory. When a PFSA has been carried out by a recognised security organisation, the security assessment shall be reviewed and approved for compliance by the Contracting Government within whose territory the port facility is located. The persons carrying out the assessment shall have appropriate skills to evaluate the security of the Port Facility in accordance with this section, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the Code. The PFSA shall periodically be reviewed and updated, taking account of changing threats and/or minor changes in the Port Facility and shall always be reviewed and updated when major changes to the port facility take place. The PFSA shall include, at least, the following elements: 1 identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructure it is important to

protect; 2 identification of possible threats to the assets and infrastructure and the likelihood of

their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures; 3 identification, selection and prioritization of counter measures and procedural

changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing vulnerability; and 4 identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies

and procedures.

The Contracting Government may allow a PFSA to cover more than one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design of these port facilities are similar. Any Contracting Government, which allows such an arrangement shall communicate to IMO particulars thereof. Upon completion of the PFSA, a report shall be prepared, consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a description of each vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of counter measures that could be used to address each vulnerability. This report shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.

6.16 Sect. 16 - Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP)

Subject to certain provisions, a recognized security organization may prepare the PFSP for a specific port facility.

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1 measures designed to prevent weapons or any other dangerous substances and devices intended for use against people, ships or ports and the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced into the port facility or on board a ship;

2 measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to the port facility, to ships moored at the facility, and to restricted areas of the facility;

3 procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security, including provisions for maintaining critical operations of the port facility or ship/port interface;

5 procedures for evacuation in case of security threats or breaches of security; 6 duties of port facility personnel assigned security responsibilities and of other facility

personnel on security aspects; 7 procedures for interfacing with ship security activities; 8 procedures for the periodic review of the plan and updating; 9 procedures for reporting security incidents; 11 measures to ensure the security of the information contained in the plan; 12 measures designed to ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo handling

equipment at the port facility; 13 procedures for auditing the port facility security plan; 14 procedures for responding in case the ship security alert system of a ship at the port

facility has been activated; and 15 procedures for facilitating shore leave for ship’s personnel or personnel changes, as

well as access of visitors to the ship including representatives of seafarers’ welfare and labour organizations.

Personnel conducting internal audits of the security activities specified in the plan or evaluating its implementation shall be independent of the activities being audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the port facility.

The Contracting Government in whose territory the port facility is located shall determine which changes to the port facility security plan shall not be implemented unless the relevant amendments to the plan are approved by them.

The plan may be kept in an electronic format. In such a case, it shall be protected by procedures aimed at preventing its unauthorised deletion, destruction or amendment.

The plan shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Contracting Governments may allow a PFSP to cover more than one port facility if the operator, location, operation, equipment, and design of these port facilities are similar. Any Contracting Government, which allows such an alternative arrangement, shall communicate to IMO particulars thereof.

6.17 Sect. 17 - Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)

A PFSO shall be designated for each port facility. A person may be designated as the port facility security officer for one or more port facilities. In addition to those specified elsewhere in Part A of the Code, the duties and responsibilities of the port facility security officer shall include, but are not limited to:


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1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey of the port facility taking into account the relevant port facility security assessment; 2 ensuring the development and maintenance of the port facility security plan; 3 implementing and exercising the port facility security plan; 4 undertaking regular security inspections of the port facility to ensure the

continuation of appropriate security measures; 5 recommending and incorporating, as appropriate, modifications to the port facility

security plan in order to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to take into account of relevant changes to the port facility;

6 enhancing security awareness and vigilance of the port facility personnel; 7 ensuring adequate training has been provided to personnel responsible for the

security of the port facility; 8 reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining records of occurrences which

threaten the security of the port facility; 9 co-ordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the appropriate

company and ship security officer(s); 10 co-ordinating with security services, as appropriate; 11 ensuring that standards for personnel responsible for security of the port facility are

met; 12 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and

maintained, if any; and 13 assisting ship security officers in confirming the identity of those seeking to board

the ship when requested. The PFSP shall be given the necessary support to fulfil the duties and responsibilities imposed by chapter XI-2 and Part A of the Code.

6.18 Sect. 18 - Training, drills and exercises

The PFSO and appropriate port facility security personnel shall have knowledge and have received training taking into account guidance in Part B of the Code. Port facility personnel having specific security duties shall understand their duties and responsibilities as described in the PFSP and have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties. Drills and exercises shall be conducted at appropriate intervals. 6.19 Sect. 19 - Verification and certification Ships shall be subjected to verifications as a basis for the issuance of an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). (See Part A, appendix 1). The validity shall not exceed 5 years. There shall be at least one intermediate verification. The Flag State is responsible for this, but can delegate it to a recognized security organization. First ISSC may be issued prior to 1 July 2004.

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LECTURE 7

INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT SECURITY CODE (ISPS) CODE – PART B

The ISPS Code Part B contains guidance for the provisions of Chapter XI-2 and Part A of the Code. It sets down essential considerations which should be taken into account when considering the application of the guidance relating to ships and port facilities. Nothing in Part B of the Code should be read or interpreted in conflict with any of the provisions of Chapter XI-2 or Part A of the Code. Part B gives further guidance on the responsibilities of the Contracting Governments, mandatory security documentation, ship security assessments and plans, port facility security assessments and port facility assessment plans, additional measures to be taken in changes in the threat levels and the duties of those who have specific security responsibilities eg CSOs and SSOs. Certain paragraphs are particularly relevant. 7.1 Recognized security organizations (RSOs) When authorizing an RSO, Contracting Governments should give consideration to the competency of such an organization. An RSO should be able to demonstrate: 1 expertise in relevant aspects of security; 2 appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations, including knowledge of ship

design and construction if providing services in respect of ships and port design and construction if providing services in respect of port facilities;

3 their capability to assess the likely security risks that could occur during ship and port facility operations including the ship/port interface and how to minimise such risks;

4 their ability to maintain and improve the expertise of their personnel; 5 their ability to monitor the continuing trustworthiness of their personnel; 6 their ability to maintain appropriate measures to avoid unauthorised disclosure of,

or access to, security sensitive material; 7 their knowledge of the requirements chapter XI-2 and Part A of this Code and

relevant national and international legislation and security requirements; and 8 their knowledge of current security threats and patterns; 9 their knowledge on recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances

and devices; 10 their knowledge on recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics

and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; 11 their knowledge on techniques used to circumvent security measures; and 12 their knowledge of security and surveillance equipment and systems and their

operational limitations.

When delegating specific duties to an RSO, Contracting Governments, including Administrations, should ensure that the RSO has the competencies needed to undertake the task.


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A port or harbour authority or port facility operator may be appointed as an RSO provided it has the appropriate security related expertise listed in paragraph 4.5. 7.2 Manning level Establishing the minimum safe manning of a ship the Administration should take into account that the minimum safe manning provisions only address the safe navigation of the ship. The Administration should also take into account any additional workload which may result from the implementation of the ship’s security plan and ensure that the ship is sufficiently and effectively manned. In doing so the Administration should verify that ships are able to implement the hours of rest and other measures to address fatigue which have been promulgated by national law, in the context of all shipboard duties assigned to the various shipboard personnel 7.3 Training The Company Security Officer (CSO) and appropriate shore based company personnel, and the Ship Security Officer (SSO), should have knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate: 1 security administration; 2 relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations; 3 relevant Government legislation and regulations; 4 responsibilities and functions of other security organisations; 5 methodology of ship security assessment; 6 methods of ship security surveys and inspections; 7 ship and port operations and conditions; 8 ship and port facility security measures; 9 emergency preparedness and response and contingency planning; 10 instruction techniques for security training and education, including security

measures and procedures; 11 handling sensitive security related information and security related

communications; 12 knowledge of current security threats and patterns; 13 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; 14 recognition, on a non discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural

patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; 15 techniques used to circumvent security measures; 16 security equipment and systems and their operational limitations; 17 methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring; 18 methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections; 19 security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; and 20 assessment of security drills and exercises. 7.4 Ship Security Officer (SSO) In addition the SSO should have adequate knowledge of, and receive training, in some or all of the following, as appropriate: 1 the layout of the ship;

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2 the ship security plan and related procedures (including scenario-based training on how to respond);

3 crowd management and control techniques; 4 operations of security equipment and systems; and 5 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of security equipment and

systems. 7.5 Shipboard personnel having specific security duties Shipboard personnel having specific security duties should have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties, including, as appropriate: 1 knowledge of current security threats and patterns; 2 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; 3 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to

threaten security; 4 techniques used to circumvent security measures; 5 crowd management and control techniques; 6 security related communications; 7 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; 8 operations of security equipment and systems; 9 testing, calibration and whilst at sea maintenance of security equipment and

systems, 10 inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; and 11 methods of physical searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and

ship’s stores. 7.6 All other shipboard personnel All other shipboard personnel should have sufficient knowledge of and be familiar with relevant provisions of the SSP, including: 1 the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels; 2 knowledge of the emergency procedures and contingency plans; 3 recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices; 4 recognition, on a non discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioural

patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; and 5 techniques used to circumvent security measures. The objective of drills and exercises is to ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security levels and the identification of any security related deficiencies, which need to be addressed. To ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security plan, drills should be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases where more than 25 percent of the ship’s personnel has been changed, at any one time, with personnel that has not previously participated in any drill on that ship, within the last 3 months, a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test individual elements of the plan such as those security threats listed in paragraph 8.9 of Part B of the Code.


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Various types of exercises which may include participation of company security officers, port facility security officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments as well as ship security officers, if available, should be carried out at least once each calendar year with no more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises should test communications, coordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be: 1 full scale or live; 2 tabletop simulation or seminar; or 3 combined with other exercises held such as search and rescue or emergency

response exercises.

Company participation in an exercise with another Contracting Government should be recognised by the Administration. 7.7 Port Facility Assessment (PFSA) Once the Contracting Government has determined that a port contains a Port Facility a PFSA has to be prepared. This PFSA may be conducted by an RSO, but as with a SSA, if an RSO is used to prepare a PFSA they should not be associated with the verification and compliance procedures. It is essential that all relevant expertise is co-opted to help in the preparation of a PFSP which should contain the following elements: .1 physical security; .2 structural integrity; .3 personnel protection systems; .4 procedural policies; .5 radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks; .6 relevant transportation infrastructure; .7 utilities; and .8 other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to persons,

property, or operations within the port facility. The identification of assets within the Port Facility is required so that a decision can be made as to the priority of their importance for protection. Assets which should be considered important may include: .1 accesses, entrances, approaches, and anchorages, manoeuvring and berthing areas; .2 cargo facilities, terminals, storage areas, and cargo handling equipment; .3 systems such as electrical distribution systems, radio and telecommunication systems

and computer systems and networks; .4 port vessel traffic management systems and aids to navigation; .5 power plants, cargo transfer piping, and water supplies; .6 bridges, railways, roads; .7 port service vessels, including pilot boats, tugs, lighters etc; .8 security and surveillance equipment and systems; and .9 the waters adjacent to the port facility. The PFSA should also consider possible threats against which security measures have to be deployed e.g. hijacking, use of the ship as a weapon, smuggling of weapons of mass

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destruction. This process should involve consultations with all those authorities who have knowledge about a structures adjacent to the Port Facility which might constitute a threat. The PFSA should analyse vulnerabilities in a port such as water supplies, bridges etc. that could be resolved through physical measures e.g. permanent barriers, alarms, surveillance equipment etc. 7.8 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) Based on the PFSA the PFSP will be prepared which is to be specifically designed to minimize the security threat to the Port Facility. It should include .1 detail the security organization of the port facility, .2 the organization’s links with other relevant authorities and the necessary

communication systems to allow the effective continuous operation of the organization and its links with others, including ships in port;

.3 detail the basic security level 1 measures, both operational and physical, that will be in place;

.4 detail the additional security measures that will allow the port facility to progress without delay to security level 2 and, when necessary, to security level 3;

.5 provide for regular review, or audit, of the PFSP and for its amendments in response to experience or changing circumstances; and

.6 reporting procedures to the appropriate Contracting Governments contact points.

The PFSP should also consider the use of armed personnel, the organisation and performance of port facility security duties and, most importantly procedures for access to the Port Facility and Searching. 7.9 Conclusion Part B of the ISPS Code contains very useful advice on how to implement Part A. Although it is stated to be for “guidance” only, for all those who have the responsibility for the implementation of security policy, it must be prudent to implement Part B recommendations as far as possible.

LECTURE 8

SUMMARY

A summary of the provisions contained in the new SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code are as follows: 8.1 Contracting Governments/Designated Authorities Each Contracting Government has to have a focal point responsible for the implementation of the new legislation. This focal point could be a Designated Authority eg. a Government department.


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The Contracting Government/Designated Authority is responsible for: • Determination of the port facilities within a port • Review/approval of PFSAs and PFSPs • Issue of statements of compliance. (See Part B, appendix 2) • Periodic testing • Issuing of security levels

Contracting Governments can authorize Recognized Security Organizations to act on their behalf for certain duties. These are

• SSA • SSP approval • On-board verification • Certification • PFSAs • PFSPs

But an RSO cannot validate or certificate its own plan. 8.2 International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) All ships must carry an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). The steps to obtain these certificates are as follows:

• appoint a company security officer • train the company security officer • carry out a ship security assessment • produce a ship security plan • get the ship security plan approved • get the plan to the ship • designate a ship security officer on each ship • train the ship security officer • train those crew who have specific security responsibilities • train the remainder of the crew • implement the SSP on the ship • obtain verification and an ISSC • exercise the SSP • ensure adequate security resources

8.3 Statement of compliance All port facilities must obtain a statement of compliance from their Contracting Government/Designated Authority. The steps to obtain the approval of a Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) are as follows:

• the Contracting Government decides whether the port needs to comply with the new maritime security legislation. If so,

• the Contracting Governments selects the port facilities within the port • a PFSO is appointed • the PFSO is trained • the port authorities or an RSO carries out the PFSA • based on the PFSA a PFSP is compiled

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• all port employees with specific security responsibilities are trained • the remainder of the employees are trained • the PFSP is implemented • the assessment and plan is sent to the Contracting Government to obtain a

statement of compliance • the plan is periodically tested

8.4 Documents to be carried on board Documents to be carried on board:

• Ship Security Plan • ISSC • Continuous synopsis record • Additional security related information • Security activities at last ten port calls

8.5 Other maritime security related matters Finally, there are other maritime security related matters which are being carried forward:

• Outstanding issues • Ship Identification Numbering • Ship Security Alert System • Long-range Tracking System

There are also other maritime security related matters which are being carried forward by other UN agencies:

• Crew Identification System (ILO) • Transmodal Container Security System (WCO)

8.6 Human element related aspects It is very appropriate to recall that Conference resolution 11 adopted on 12 December 2002 also took into account the welfare of seamen. It recognized that the shipping industry and the smooth transportation of goods are essential to world trade, and it recalled that the provisions of the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965, had established a general right for foreign crew members to be entitled to shore leave while the ship on which they arrived is in port, provided that the formalities on arrival of the ship have been fulfilled and the public authorities have no reason to refuse permission to come ashore for reasons of public health, public safety or public order. It also recognized that given the global nature of the shipping industry, seafarers need special protection, and was aware that seafarers work and live on ships involved in international trade and that access to shore facilities and shore leave are vital elements of seafarers’ general well-being. The Conference therefore urged Contracting Governments to take the human element, the need to afford special protection to seafarers and the critical importance of shore leave into account when implementing the provisions of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.


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8.7 Conclusion The increased threat of terrorism has required additional, international agreed, maritime security legislation. The IMO has achieved this improvement in security using amendments to SOLAS and the publication of the ISPS Code. Maritime security will undoubtedly significantly improve. It is essential however, that while implementing the new Convention and Code, the right balance is maintained between security, trade facilitation and the seafarers general well-being.

LECTURE 9

WORKSHOP ON THE PREPARATION OF A PORT FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND/OR,

A SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Introduction to the workshop and establishment of Working Groups The purpose of conducting this PFSA and SSA workshop, and the reason you are here, is to help you understand the implications complexities of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. It is not intended to make you an expert in all the security procedures, nor give you the surveying and planning skills necessary to develop effective security in your ports, on board your ships, or on your offshore installations. Creating effective maritime security is a job for an expert with many years of experience. This workshop will, however, help you become better port facility managers, PFSOs and security managers. We have covered a tremendous amount of material in the last few days, and you are not expected to have assimilated all of it. However, where you may remember one aspect of the training, your colleague, or the person sitting beside you, may remember another aspect of it. On that basis, by dividing into working groups, sharing what you have each learned, and applying it to a common project, you will be able to cement some lasting impressions regarding maritime security and all that it entails. Therefore, the first thing we will do after the conclusion of this lecture is to divide you up into working groups. This is to achieve as much variety as possible in terms of your home countries, ports, backgrounds and employers. If you haven’t yet had a chance to meet, introduce yourselves. Once in your working groups, please write down a list of your members by name, country, and position/occupation and hand it into the one of the instructors. As a working group, you will be allowed to approach the problem in any way you desire. If you want to begin by having each member of the group talk a little about his or her

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background, feel free to do so. If you want to elect or appoint one of your group to act as chairperson, or secretary, or coordinator, you can do that. If you would like to assign particular sections of the project to different individuals in the group, you may do that as well. Your goal, as a working group, will be to produce a final written product and present it to the rest of the groups in an oral presentation on the last morning. Again, how you choose to make your presentation, and what charts or handouts or other visual aids you choose to use, if any, is up to you. You will have the remainder of today, tonight and half of tomorrow to work on the project. Whether you use all that time is up to you. However, you will be required to remain in or around the classroom during the rest of today and also tomorrow morning.

WORKING GROUP PROJECT

PREPARE A PORT FACILITY SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND/OR, A SHIP

SECURITY ASSESSMENT TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS

Your working group project is, based on SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, to prepare a PFSA with recommendations. If it is appropriate, the working group may also produce a SSA, with recommendations. The port you are required to report on is a fictitious one, which we have called “Port IMO” in the “Republic of Atlantis”, and the ship is the “M/V Technical Assistance”. You will all have the same project and the same amount of initial information on Port IMO and the M/V Technical Assistance. On the morning of Day 5, each group will present their assessment reports. After all the presentations are made, we will engage in a discussion period in which you will attempt to combine what you feel are the valuable points from all the presentations.

CONTENTS OF INFORMATION PACK

• Details of Port IMO from the Port Handbook • Survey notes prepared by your colleague, Mr. P. Brian, following his initial visit

to Port IMO • Map 1 – aerial photograph of Port IMO • Map 2 – showing the limits of Port IMO’s jurisdiction • Map 3 – details of Port IMO and its Basin F • Details of the M/V Technical Assistance • General Arrangement Plan of the M/V Technical Assistance


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9.2 Presentation of workshop information pack In the information packs we will distribute to you, you will find the following documents:

• details of Port IMO from the Port Handbook; • survey notes prepared by your colleague, Mr. P. Brian, following his initial visit to

Port IMO; • Map 1 – aerial photograph of Port IMO; • Map 2 – showing the limits of Port IMO’s jurisdiction; • Map 3 – details of Port IMO and its Basin F; • Details of the M/V Technical Assistance; and • General Arrangement Plan of the M/V Technical Assistance.

You will be required to use the data and plans to write up your assessment reports and recommendations. In so doing, you should bear in mind that just as a surveyor might, after spending several days if not weeks at a particular port, obtain information that he may or may not be able to utilize in his assessment report, some of the information you receive may not be useful. It will be your job to sort out the important information from the unimportant information, if there is any, and organize it into useful data. If there is a significant point of detail you wish to clarify, please ask the instructors. If you draw an inference, or assume a fact not included in the information we give you, simply note what it is, why you have assumed it, and why you feel it is important.

PROJECT STEPS

• Read the information on Port IMO • Analyze the information and the port maps • Make an assessment of the risk to the port facilities • Identify the most relevant facilities (i.e. those that you will report on) • Read the information on the M/V Technical Assistance • Analyze the information and the ship’s General Arrangement Plan • Make an assessment of the risk to the M/V Technical Assistance • Write up your assessment report and recommendations Finally, it is up to each group to identify the most relevant aspects of both Port IMO and the M/V Technical Assistance that are to the subject of the group’s report. To do this you should:

• read the information on Port IMO; • analyze the information and the port maps; • make an assessment of the risk to the port facilities; • identify the most relevant facilities (i.e. those that you will report on); • read the information on the M/V Technical Assistance; • analyze the information and the ship’s General Arrangement Plan; • make an assessment of the risk to the M/V Technical Assistance; and • write up your assessment report and recommendations.

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References Alling, Philip, Edward M. Wolfe, and Scott D. Brown, Compliance Deadlines Loom: Supply-Chain Giants Drive Early Adoption of RFID, New York: Bear-Stearns Equity Research, 2004.

Amaral, L. A. N., A. Scala, M. Barthelemy, and H. E. Stanley, “Classes of Small-World Networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 97, No. 21, 2000, pp. 11149–11152.

CIA World Factbook 2001, http:/www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (20 November 2001).

Cohen, Stephen S., Economic Impact of a West Coast Dock Shutdown, Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 2002.

Feder, Barnaby J., “Wal-Mart Hits More Snags in its Push to Use Radio Tags to Track Goods,” The New York Times, March 29, 2004, p. C4.

For a comprehensive review see Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Maritime Cooperation Between India and Pakistan: Building Confidence at Sea (Albuquerque, NM: Cooperative Monitoring Center, 2000).

Ford, L. R., Jr., and D. R. Fulkerson, Flows in Networks, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

General Accounting Office, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, Washington, D.C., GAO-03-770, 2003.

Gerencser, Mark, Jim Weinberg, and Don Vincent, Port Security War Game: Implications for U.S. Supply Chains, McLean, Va.: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2003.

Ginn, Michael, and Tamara Lacy, “An Overview of CSI and C-TPAT,” paper presented at Maritime Homeland Security 2004, March, Miami Beach, Fla., March 29–31, 2004.

Goedvolk, Ernst-Jan, Bob Hulsebosch, Wil Janssen, and Piet Maclaine, Risk Analysis of Container Import Processes: Security Risks Associated With Flows of Goods and Information in the Port of Rotterdam, Version 1.2, Enschede, The Netherlands: Virtuele Haven, Telematica Institut, 2001.

Guare, John, Six Degrees of Separation, play, New York: Vintage, 1990.

Holmes, Bruce J., Transportation Network Topologies, Network Theory: A Primer and Questions for Air Transportation System Applications, Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2004.

Hugh R. Williamson. “Legal Issues: Stowaways, Piracy and Other Criminal Activities”, in Griffiths et al. (eds), The Changing Strategic Importance of International Shipping, pp.71-99.

IMO—See International Maritime Organization. International Maritime Organization, Web site, 2004. Online at http://www.imo.org/ (as of October 15, 2004).

Iritany, Evelyn, and Marla Dickerson, “Calculating Cost of West Coast Dock Strike is a Tough Act,” Los Angeles Times, November 26, 2002.

Jacksta, Robert, “An Overview of U.S. CBP’s Role in Maritime Homeland Security,” paper presented at Maritime Homeland Security 2004, Miami Beach, Fla., 29–31 March, 2004.

John H. Noer, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 3.

Julian Schofield. “We Can’t Let This Happen Again”, Proceedings, US Naval Institute, June 2001, pp. 58-61.

M.V. Ramana and A.H. Nayyar, “India, Pakistan and the Bomb”, Scientific American, Vol. 285, No 6 (December 2001), p. 74.

Machalaba, Daniel and Bruce Stanley, “In California, Santa’s Goods Face Port Delays,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2004, pp. B1–B2.

Martonosi, Susan E., and Arnold I. Barnett, “Security Profiling of Airline Passengers: How Effective Would It Be? Some Surprising Conclusions,” working paper, Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004.


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Nishiguchi, Toshihiro, and Alexandre Beaudet, “Fractal Design: Self-organizing Links in Supply Chain Management,” in G. Von Krogh, I. Nonaka and T. Nishiguchi, eds., Knowledge Creation: A Source of Value, London: Macmillan, 2000.

Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact,” Maritime Transport Committee report, 2003. Online at http:// www.oecd.org/home/ (as of November 5, 2003).

Pelosi, Nancy, and Tom Daschle, “Pelosi and Daschle Deliver Pre-Buttal to State of the Union Address,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate, Office of the Democratic Leader, January 16, 2004.

Pollack, Richard, The Colombo Bay, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Robert H. Thomas, “Is Shipping Still a Strategic Issue”, in Ann L. Griffiths et al. (eds), The Changing Strategic Importance of International Shipping (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997), pp. 3-4.

Salvador de Madariaga. The Blowing Up of the Parthenon: or How to Loose the Cold War (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960), p. 71.

Sam Bateman. “Prospects for Indian Ocean Cooperation”, Ocean Yearbook 12 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 308.

Simchi-Levi, David, Philip Kaminsky, and Edith Simchi-Levi, Designing and Managing the Supply Chain, 2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2002.

Smart and Secure Tradelanes, “Phase One Review, Network Visibility: Leveraging Security and Efficiency in Today’s Global Supply Chains,” November 2003.

Stana, Richard M., “Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-04-557T, 2004.

The Mineral and Gemstone Kingdom website. http://www.minerals.net/glossary/terms/p/placer.htm (20 November 2001).

UN Press Release SG/SM/6291 DEV/2166 28 July 1997, “Good Governance Essential to Development, Prosperity, Peace Secretary-General Tells International Conference”.

United Nations, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC Third Assessment Report: Climate Change 2001 (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001). Available on line at http://www.ipcc.ch. Data from http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/041.htm (19 November 2001).

Wasem, Ellen, Jennifer Lake, Lisa Seghetti, James Monke, and Stephen Viña, Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004.

Watts, Duncan J., “Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness,” in P. W. Anderson, J. M. Epstein, D. K. Foley, S. A. Levin, and G. Meayer-Kress, eds., Princeton Studies in Complexity, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Wolfe, Edward M., Philip Alling, Harry D. Schwefel, and Scott D. Brown, Track(ing) to the Future: The Impending RFID-Based Inventory Revolution, New York: Bear-Stearns Equity Research, 2003.

World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/ungass/sar.htm (21 November 2001).

World Shipping Council, In-Transit Container Security Enhancement, Washington, D.C.: World Shipping Council, 2003.

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CASE STUDIES

Prepared in cooperation between California Maritime Academy and Constantza Maritime University as part of the joint IAMU Project 2004

Maritime Terrorism: Developing Case Studies for Teaching and Analysis

Dr. Donna J. Nincic Associate Professor, Department of Global and Maritime Studies California

Maritime Academy Capt. Eugen BARSAN

Lecturer, Nautical Department, Constantza Maritime University

Maritime Terrorism: An Introduction

While ten or even five years ago, “terrorism” referred to a fairly traditionally defined category, in recent years our thinking has encompassed new threats and scenarios. The fear that terrorists could launch attacks using chemical, biological or nuclear materials has been added to our concerns about the seeming rise of terrorism in general. At the

same time, due largely to al-Qaeda, we have encountered examples of “iconic” and “spectacular” terrorism that includes far more than car bombs. The ease with which

mundane objects such as airplanes and subway cars have been used against us has forced us to imagine and anticipate other forms of attacks – as yet unrealized – which could be

far more devastating than those already experienced.

For example, since 9/11, the maritime community has become very aware of how ships and the shipping industry present a unique opportunity for the kind of “iconic” devastation that groups such as al-Qaeda seek in their terrorist attacks. Merchant ships can no longer be viewed solely as a means of vital transportation in a globalized world; they must also be viewed as targets, weapons and delivery systems, which, even if conventionally “armed,” are capable of causing destruction on a “spectacular” scale. Terrorist risks to merchant shipping are growing. Suicide bombers from al-Qaeda and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have regularly attacked ships in recent years, and there are concerns other groups may be adopting their tactics. Analysts and security experts routinely discuss “nightmare scenarios” such as a WMD placed in a container on a vessel, or the hijacking of a ship carrying dangerous cargo – either of which could be primed to detonate in a crowded port or city. These risks to maritime security stem from the sheer size of the maritime environment: Between 80% and 95% (depending on measure) of global trade is carried by ship [1], with more than 1.2 million seafarers [2] on 120,000 vessels in the global maritime fleet, [3] calling at over 2,800 ports in the world. Securing the maritime environment a) from attack, b) from being used in an attack, or c) in support of an attack, is a truly global challenge.

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Value of Case Studies to Maritime Institutions

Maritime security in general, and maritime terrorism specifically are, therefore, issues of current vital importance, and all students interested in maritime careers (regardless of major field of study) should have at least a basic understanding of the political and security contexts in which they will pursue these careers. Scholars and analysts typically divide maritime terrorist “events” – either real or hypothetical – into different “types” for ease of analysis. This serves a number of purposes. It allows for a detailed in-depth focus on one aspect of maritime terrorism, allowing students to note similarities between events which have occurred, or which may occur. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, working with a typology of maritime terrorism highlights similarities and differences in means of reducing the threats that terrorism poses to the maritime domain. The case studies presented in this project reflect the typology analysts and scholars typically use. The objective of the case studies is to provide students with an understanding of maritime terrorism, the likely forms maritime terrorism may take in the future, and how the international community is responding to this global maritime challenge.

Using the Case Studies

This project is divided into five case studies representing different “types” of maritime terrorism. These cases may be used alone or together:

• Hijacking and Hostage-Taking: The Case of the Achille Lauro • Direct Attacks on Ships • Ships as Vectors of Maritime Terrorism • The Ship as a Weapon • Attacking Vital Ports and Chokepoints

Each case write-up contains:

• A detailed description of the “type” of maritime terrorism, • Examples of where and how that type of maritime terrorism has occurred (or where

and how it may occur), • An historical overview (where appropriate), • Discussion Questions, and • PowerPoint slides for supplemental classroom use.

Note: “Answers” are not provided to the questions, as they do not seek to elicit “facts” but the students’ opinions on how to address different kinds of maritime terrorism, and how successful (or not) current plans, agreements and procedures are in dealing with the maritime terrorist threat. Opinions may differ; the purpose of the cases is to challenge the students – as future mariners and policy makers – to think about the problems. As such, students should be allowed and encouraged to bring their own opinions and experiences to the conversation. To this end, I have made as much of an effort as possible to present only an outline of the “details” of the cases, and have tried to avoid drawing analytical conclusions. Maritime security in general, and maritime terrorism specifically, are issues of current vital importance, and all students interested in maritime careers (regardless of major field of

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study) should have at least a basic understanding of the political and security contexts in which they will pursue these careers. My lectures in my own classes at the California Maritime Academy have shown that students and faculty are generally very eager for information on this topic – they see how clearly relevant it is to their future careers. This has been reinforced by my recent talks (see below) at Shanghai Maritime University and Dalian Maritime University in Fall 2003 and Spring 2005. The audiences at each institution quickly grasped the unfortunate but very real possibility of future maritime terrorist attacks. Post-lecture discussions were lively in each case, and the students’ questions centered on the common theme of “What can I, as a future mariner, do to protect my ship and my crew?” Case studies are a known useful pedagogical tool, and have the advantage of being relevant both to classroom curricula, and to workshop use. Courses at maritime universities having a security component would be able to use any or all of the case studies to stimulate classroom discussion (for example, case studies are already used with great success in the California Maritime Academy’s Ocean Politics course). At universities where it may not be feasible to introduce the topic or the case analysis into the curriculum, the case studies could be used at daylong or weekend workshops and seminars. Additionally, they could be used in the context of continuing education programs for mariners on most campuses.

Using a Single Case: An Example In Spring 2005, the Hijacking and Hostage-Taking case was used in my course on Ocean Politics at the California Maritime Academy, required for students in the Global Studies and Maritime Affairs degree, but containing students from all majors. The course is an introductory-level class to maritime policy issues, and typically has approximately forty students. The class contains a segment on maritime terrorism, and the case study was used as the assigned reading for two of the class sessions. The students were assigned the case and told to read it in advance of the lecture. During the class, I presented the case outline, using the PowerPoint attached PowerPoint slides, to make sure the students understood the basic details of the class. At the end of the class, the students were assigned “roles” – hijackers, captain and crew, international negotiators, passengers, and told to do additional research as they felt appropriate to address the discussion questions. At the beginning of the following class, the students met in groups for approximately fifteen minutes to discuss how they viewed the situation, given their assigned role. Each group then made a presentation to the class, from their point of view. The class ended with general conclusions and lessons learned.

Using Multiple Cases: An Example In Fall 2005, four of the five cases were used in my upper-division course in Maritime Security. The class is small – only thirteen students from the Global Studies and Maritime Affairs and Marine Transportation programs – and there is an expectation of a very high level of student participation. Students were assigned the cases to read and told to do additional research as they felt appropriate. Class discussions focused on addressing the discussion questions for each case, and doing a compare-and-contrast between the cases. Students were particularly asked to discuss which of the cases they felt presented the most realistic threat and how, as future policy-makers and mariners, they believed they should meet these threats in the face of limited economic resources.

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There was less emphasis in these discussions on “getting the facts right” (this was assumed), and more on getting the students to think of the challenges these cases present from the point of view of maritime professionals. This differed from the emphasis in the lower-division classes where students were being introduced to the concept of maritime terrorism for the first time. Upper-division students are already conversant with the concept and many of the details; and were encouraged to take their thinking to a “problem-solving” level, toward the goal of achieving a level of expertise in these issues.

References

[1] For further information and detail, see Nincic, Donna J. (2005). The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD, and Regime Response. Forthcoming, Journal of Strategic Studies.

[2] Daly, John C.k. (24 October 2003). Al-Qaeda and maritime terrorism, part I. The Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation.

[3] Michael Richardson, “A time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in an age of weapons of mass destruction,” Viewpoints, Institute of South East Asian Studies (25 February 2004).

Direct Attacks on Ships

Introduction

Suicide terrorism – “the readiness to sacrifice one’s life in the process of destroying or attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal” [1] – is often acknowledged as a “growing threat” and a “dangerous trend.” [2] Despite the fact that some 271 attacks occurred between 1980 and 2000, [3] suicide tactics are not new:

The bomber willing and indeed eager to blow himself up has appeared in all eras and cultural traditions, espousing politics ranging from the leftism of the Baader-Meinhof Gang in 1970s Germany to rightist extremism. When the Japanese military wanted kamikaze pilots at the end of World War II, thousands of volunteers rushed to offer themselves. [4]

Many terrorist groups engage in suicide attacks, but only a handful of organizations account for the vast majority of maritime suicide attacks on merchant vessels: Al Qaeda, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Tactics and rationale differ, but the end result is to create a maritime industry that is less – rather than more – secure.

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Al Qaeda Attacks

To date, the suicide attack has has been al-Qaeda’s preferred method of maritime terror attacks. The failed suicide boat attack on the USS Sullivans (Yemen, January 1999), the attack on the USS Cole (Yemen, October 2000), and the attack on the Limburg oil tanker off the Yemeni coast (October 2002) were all linked to al-Qaeda. [5] Al-Qaeda also claimed responsibility for the April 2004 suicide attack against oil terminals in Basra, Iraq, which killed two US sailors (a third later died of his wounds). [6] Abd al-Rahim al-Nasheri, [7] al-Qaeda’s chief maritime strategist and mastermind behind the Cole and Sullivans attacks, is also suspected of planning to bomb the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain, [8] and planning to attack US and British warships as they passed through the Strait of Gibraltar. [9] Al-Nasheri’s maritime terrorism plans, detailed in an 180-page dossier, explicitly included attacks on “Western merchant shipping and cruise liners” [10] which al Qaeda considers to be “both iconic and economic.” [11] The October 2002 capture of Abd al Rahman al Nashiri led to the discovery that Al Qaeda had developed a four-part strategy to attack Western shipping interests: 1) Ramming, 2) blowing up medium-sized ships near other vessels or at ports, 3) attacking large vessels such as supertankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft, and 4) attacking vessels with underwater demolition teams using limpet mines or with suicide bombers. [12] The Al Qaeda attacks on the USS Sullivans and USS Cole provide useful information on Al Qaeda’s maritime operations, even though the Sullivans and Cole are US naval vessels and technically beyond the scope of this study. The Limburg attack, on the other hand, bears closer examination for the light it may shed on the security of global merchant shipping.

The USS Sullivans

Al Qaeda planned to attack the US naval vessel USS The Sullivans while it was in port refuelling in Yemen in 2000. However, the attack failed when the suicide dinghy, over-laden with explosives, sank on its way to its target. Many of the operatives associated with the aborted attack on The Sullivans would later be implicated and charged in the Cole attack.

The USS Cole

Two suicide bombers pulled alongside the USS Cole in a dinghy during a port call in Aden, Yemen, and detonated explosives that blew a 40-foot hole in the left side of the $1 billion warship. The attack left 17 dead or missing and 39 wounded. At the time of the blast, the Cole was in what is known as "Threat Condition Bravo," the second highest of four alert levels that requires guards on deck to keep small boats away and mount a close watch for possible attacks. However, sources familiar with a Pentagon report said officials found that almost half the measures required for that level of alert had not been carried out. Al Qaeda, although never claiming official responsibility, was immediately connected with the attack. Additional individuals responsible for the attack (who did not die in the bombing) were arrested in Yemen, and charged in the United States.

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The Limburg Attack

The attack on the Limburg, a French-flagged oil tanker, occurred on 6 October 2002. The vessel was carrying crude oil from Iran to Malaysia, when an explosion occurred while it prepared to enter the port of Ash-Shir in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Yemen. The ship caught fire, which was eventually put out, but not before leaking 90,000 barrels of oil into the sea, and polluting forty-five miles of coastline. [13] One crewmember, Atanas Atanasov, a native of Bulgaria, was killed and seventeen of the ship’s twenty-five French and Bulgarian crew members were wounded. Although the captain of the Limburg reported a small fishing boat approaching the tanker just before the explosion, the explosion was initially reported as an accident. Within days, however, a French investigative team of experts found traces of TNT and parts of a small boat at the blast site inside the tanker, and was able to confirm that the blast was intentional, [14] caused by “an explosives-laden boat.” [15] Debris consisting of plastic and of a “mixed glass-resin material used … in Yemen [for constructing] fishing boats.” [16] The experts also concluded that the explosion bore a strong resemblance to that on the USS Cole in 2000. The militant Muslim group Aden-Abyan Islamic Army initially took responsibility for the attack, [17] although Yemeni and US officials believed it did not have the means to carry out such a sophisticated operation. While Al Qaeda never took direct responsibility for the Limburg attack, it is widely believed to have been responsible. Fifteen Yemenis were ultimately arrested and convicted for the attack, with two receiving death sentences. [18]

The USS Firebolt

Two U.S. Navy sailors from the USS Firebolt and a member of the Coast Guard died in April 2004 when they attempted to board an explosive-laden boat off Basra, near the Khawr Al Amaya oil terminal. Two other suicide-boats exploded harmlessly near the Basra oil terminal, which handles most of Iraq's oil exports. [19]

USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge

Katyusha rockets were fired at two U.S. warships in Jordan's Red Sea Aqaba port, narrowly missing the ships and hitting a warehouse where one Jordanian guard was killed. While there was no immediate claim of responsibility on the attempted strikes against the USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge, Jordanian security officials said they believed al Qaeda was involved in the attack. [20]

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (also known as the “Tamil Tigers”) was founded in 1976 with the goal of forming an independent Ceylon Tamil state in northeastern Sri Lanka. Armed conflict with the government of Sri Lanka began in 1983 and has continued since then with intermittent cease-fires. A highly sophisticated and organized guerilla

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force, the LTTE contains its own intelligence service, women’s political and military wings, and the tactically advanced naval component known as the Sea Tigers.

Maritime Suicide Attacks by the LTTE

The LTTE is responsible for a number of suicide attacks on merchant vessels. Unlike Al Qaeda, however, the LTTE, with few exceptions, aims mainly at political and military targets within the greater coastal areas of Sri Lanka. For example, in 1996, the Sea Tigers sank five vessels of the Sri Lankan navy in Trincomalee. They have also sunk government vessels in Jaffna, and have been able to carry out periodic blockades. Nonetheless, a discussion of LTTE attacks is useful, as many of the tactics of the Sea Tigers are considered to be quite advanced in nature, and as such, emulated by other terrorist organizations. A partial list of recent LTTE maritime attacks occurs below.

MV Silk Pride (October 2001) The Silk Pride was an oil tanker hired by the Sri Lankan government to carry oil and other commodities to civilians in the northern part of the country. It was carrying 650 tons of diesel and kerosene to the port of Point Pedro off the Jaffna peninsula when it was attacked by the Tamil Tigers. At least five rebel boats took part in the attack, with one finally ramming and detonating an explosive. Seven people were killed: Three crewmembers of the Silk Pride, and four of the suicide-attackers (two of them women). The Sri Lankan navy rescued the remaining twenty-five members of the crew. The ship caught fire, which was eventually put out, and the vessel was salvaged from sinking.

MV Pride of South (September 2001) The Pride of South was a military-chartered ferry carrying 1,200 military personnel, when it was attacked by twenty LTTE boats off Northern Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan navy successfully thwarted the suicide attack, although twenty-nine naval personnel and Tamil rebels were killed in the ensuing battle, and three LTTE craft laden with explosives were destroyed. [21]

MV Mercs Uhana (June 2000) The Mercs Uhana was a civilian transport ship carrying food and supplies from Tincomalee to Point Pedro when it was rammed by an LTTE suicide boat. The vessel caught fire and the ship eventually sank. Seven crewmembers were killed.

Neuuco Endurance (July 1999) The Neuuco Endurance, a passenger ferry registered in Colombo, was bombed while docked in the Trincomalee harbor, only hours before it was scheduled to take on passengers. The captain of the vessel, apparently the only person on board at the time of attack, was missing and presumed dead. The ferry was badly damaged. The LTTE was blamed for the attack, as the Tamil Tigers are known for targeting Tamil refugees – most of the passengers who use the ferry are refugees returning to homes they had fled during fighting between the LTTE and government forces. The Tamil Tigers have said they

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believe refugees should “stay in rebel-held areas and help fight against the government”. [22]

Pabbatna (February 1998) A suicide bomb attack at Point Pedro destroyed the Sri Lankan naval vessel Pabbatna, killing forty-seven naval personnel. The ship was carrying food and supplies to the Sri Lankan Army in Jaffna. The attack was carried out by two LTTE suicide craft laden with explosives. [23]

Additional Attacks Additional attacks by the LTTE include those on the tug Sea Dancer (June 1995), the M.V. Cordiality, which was loading mineral sand from the Mineral Sands Corporation off Pulmuddai, and on the Japanese owned, Philippine flagged M.V. Princess Wave which was damaged by an underwater device allegedly set by Sea Tiger frogmen, wounding 9 port workers. [24] The M.V. Cordiality, owned by China Ocean Shipping Company was attacked with small arms and RPGs, and set on fire off Pulmudai. Military personnel retaliated, and in the ensuing battle two soldiers and five civilians engaged in loading the vessel were killed. Four LTTE boats were sunk, and twenty-five Tamil Tigers were killed. [25]

Attacks in the Philippines: Abu Sayaaf

The Islamic separatist group Abu Sayaaf has been implicated in a number of maritime terrorist attacks in the Philippines. While linked to al-Qaeda, the group’s targets to date have been entirely within the Philippines, and directed largely (although not exclusively) against local interests. Terrorism experts consider Abu Sayaaf to be the only terrorist group in Southeast Asia with a maritime terror capability; [26] it has been implicated in at least three major maritime attacks in recent years. In 2000 at least thirty four were killed and a number of others injured when bombs exploded on the ferry M/V Our Lady of Mediatrix, traveling from Kalambungan in Lanao del Sur, to the port of Ozamis in Misamis Occidental. The bombs, placed on two buses traveling on the ferry, detonated minutes before the ferry was to dock in Ozamis. [27] In February 2004, an explosion occurred onboard the Superferry 14, killing 125 people in the Philippines’ worst maritime incident. Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility, saying that one of its members posed as a passenger and planted a bomb that caused the blaze. Initially, Philippine Coast Guard and maritime investigators found no evidence to support the claim, but the results of a lengthy investigation concluded an “explosive device” caused the explosion. [28] Six members of Aby Sayaaf were arrested for the attack. It is believed the ferry was targeted after its owners refused to pay US $1 million in protection money. [29] Most recently, in August 2005, thirty people were injured in a blast onboard the Dona Ramona [30], that has also been blamed on Abu Sayaaf. The ferry was about to set sail from Lamitan, Basilan to Zamboanga City when the bomb which had been left under piles of LPG tanks exploded. [31] Basilan is the base for the insurgents, and the area has a history of political violence.

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Other Attacks on Vessels: Indonesia and Malaysia

Suicide operations against merchant shipping are not limited to the above organizations. The London-based Lloyd's List shipping registry reported that a group of Indonesians who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan and call themselves Group 272 are believed to be plotting to destroy an oil tanker in the Strait of Malacca. [32] Group 272 has links to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which, in addition to bearing responsibility for the 2002 Bali bombings, is believed to have been plotting to attack a US Naval facility in Singapore. [33] Jemaah Islamiyah is also suspected of having plans for additional maritime operations. According to Indonesia's head of intelligence, A.M. Hendropriyono, "senior Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists now in detention have admitted that attacks on Malacca shipping traffic have been contemplated in the recent past" [34]. Analysts believe JI has “well-developed” plans to attack US military vessels in and near Indonesian waters; two plots to attack US ships in Malaysian waters in 2000 and 2002 were thwarted by Malaysian intelligence. [35]

Protecting Against Direct Attack

After the attack on the Limburg, the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization advised:

… [g]overnments and the industry to take any sensible measures justified by the degree of risk in areas of operation of their ships, to increase awareness of the potential dangers so that their ships become extremely vigilant and alert to any security threat they may encounter or be suspicious of, be they in port or at offshore terminals or while underway. [36]

An emerging trend may be military escorts and protection for increasing numbers of merchant vessels, and not just those carrying dangerous cargoes such as uranium and plutonium. British military vessels have begun to patrol the port of Gibraltar, heeding UN and international maritime groups’ calls to provide protection to high-risk maritime areas. The Royal Navy vessels are considered to be “ideal” for countering suicide attacks, as they are highly mobile, capable of speeds of up to more than thirty knots, and are armed with machine guns. [37] And in the Strait of Gibraltar, NATO vessels have been escorting civilian ships through the narrow passage. [38] This said, it is extremely difficult for even armed naval vessels to protect themselves from suicide attack, let alone unarmed merchant vessels. It is more likely that ships will – where possible and when necessary – begin to take increasingly serious note of warnings such as those recently posted by the Somali government about increased piracy in Somali waters: Shipping companies "should try and avoid the waters of Somalia," said Abdirahman Yusuf Meygag, an aide to Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. [39]

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Discussion Questions

1. Why, of all the forms of maritime terrorist attack, is the suicide bombing one of the most difficult for merchant and commercial vessels to guard against?

2. Would allowing merchant and commercial vessels to be armed decrease the likelihood

of a successful suicide attack? What problems might arise from allowing the arming of non-military ships?

3. Short of arming them, what steps can be taken to make merchant and commercial ships

more secure from terrorist suicide attacks? 4. What role does international cooperation play in reducing the threat of suicide terrorist

attacks on innocent vessels?

References

[4] (20 October 2000). Suicide terrorism: a global threat. Jane’s Intelligence Review. <janes.com>. [5] Suicide terrorism, (Note 1). [6] Suicide terrorism, (Note 1). [7] Laqueur, Walter. (September/October 1996). Postmodern Terrorism. Foreign Affairs. [8] The Cole attack killed 17 and injured 40. The Sullivans attack failed when the suicide dinghy, too

heavily-laden with explosives, sank on the way to its target. The Limburg attack killed one, and caused a widespread oil spill.

[9] (26 April 2004). Al Qaeda statement claims Iraq boat attack. Reuters. An explosives-laden dhow detonated as a zodiac carrying sailors from the USS Firebolt was sent to investigate.

[10] Also known as the “Prince of the Sea”, al-Nasheri was arrested in 2002 cooperated with Western authorities.

[11] Daly, John C.k. (24 October 2003). Al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism, Part I. The Terrorism Monitor. Jamestown Foundation. The Cole attack killed 17 and injured 40. The Sullivans attack failed when the suicide dinghy, too heavily-laden with explosives, sank on the way to its target.

[12] Becker, Maki. (21 September 2003). Terror lurks on high seas. New York Daily News. [13] Coultan, Mark. (30 March 2004). Al-Qaeda Attack at Sea On Cards: Expert. Sydney Morning Herald. [14] (19 February 2004). Maritime terrorist act imminent, experts warn. FreeRepublic.com. [15] (20 January 2003). Al Qaeda has multi faceted marine strategy. Agence France Press. [16] Mukalla, Al. (11 October 2002). Evidence Points to Yemen Terror Attack. CBS News. <cbsnews.com>. [17] (10 October 2002). French Tanker Explosion Confirmed as Terror Attack. Institute for Counter-

Terrorism. <ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=837>. [18] (5 February 2005). Two Yemenis sentenced to death over Limburg and other attacks.

<turkishpress.com>. [19] Mukalla, (Note 13). [20] Mukalla, (Note 13). [21] Two Yemenis, (Note 15). [22] (26 April 2004). Web site lists al-Zarqawi to Iraq oil attacks. CNN.com.

<cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/26/iraq.zarqawi/index.html>. [23] (19 August 2005). Rockets narrowly miss U.S. warships in Jordan. Reuters.

<alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19654873.htm>. [24] (16 September 2001). 29 killed as LTTE boats attack Lankan ferry. Indiainfo.com.

<newsarchives.indiainfo.com/2001/09/16/16ltte.html>. [25] Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Attacks from 1988-the present. Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

<www.ict.org.il/organizations/orgattack.cfm?orgid =22> [26] (September 2004). IPCS Program on Suicidal Terrorism. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

<ipcs.org>.

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[27] (1997). Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM). <fas.org/irp/world /para/docs/ASAM-1997.htm>. [28] (9 September 1997). Sri Lanka News Update. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka.

http://www.lanka.net/lankaupdate/09_sep_97.htm. [29] (30 August 2005). Thirty injured as terror blast fireball hits Philippines ferry. Lloyds List News.

<marineafric.com/english/news/liner-conf-news/liner_0386.htm>. [30] (28 February 2000). Toll Rises to 45 in Philippines Bus Bombings. Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

<ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=402>. [31] (11 October 2004). Bomb caused Philippine ferry fire. BBC News. <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-

pacific/3732356.stm>. [32] Bomb caused, (Note 28). [33] The name of the ferry is also reported as Dona Ramonaon. [34] (1 September 2005). 2nd terrorist attack on Filipino ferry. Maritime Union of Australia News.

<mua.org.au/news/general/ferryattack.html>. Note: The title of the article is misleading as there have been at least three attacks on ferries in the Philippines.

[35] Becker, (note 9). [36] Doran, D’Arcy. (17 March 2004). Analyst says al-Qaeda may attack by sea. The Guardian. [37] Huus, Kari. (26 July 2005). Southeast Asia struggles to protect vulnerable waterway. MSNBC.com.

<msnbc.msn.com/id/8487337>. [38] Richardson, Michael. (2002). Terrorism: The Maritime Dimension. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. [39] (2002). IMO concern over Limburg incident, experts sent. <imo.org>. [40] Rayment, Sean. (3 November 2002). Navy Switches IRA Patrol Boats to Guard Gibraltar. The Free

Republic. <freerepublic.com/focus/news/ 781564/posts>. [41] Morris, Chris. (17 March 2003). Terror fear sparks ship escorts. BBC News.

<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Europe/2855769.stm>. [42] (28 September 2005). Alarming rate of piracy in Somalia. USA Today.

<usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09-28-somalia-piracy_x.htm>.

Ships as Vectors of Maritime Terrorism

Introduction

Merchant vessels – including innocent merchant vessels – may be used to transport weapons, materiel, and even people on behalf of terrorist groups, thereby becoming “vectors” for international terrorist operations. There are a number of ways the global maritime fleet has been used in support of terrorist operations. Some terrorist groups are known to operate their own “fleets” of merchant vessels, many of which are believed to be engaged in both the weapons trade and the trade of such common items as cement and sesame seeds. Terrorist organizations are also believed to charter vessels for the transportation of their goods. The abuse of the flags of convenience regime can often make it difficult to detect their operations. Innocent and completely legitimate merchant vessels can also find that they have unknowingly transported merchandise or weapons for terrorist groups (especially within shipping containers). At the same time, there have been cases of ships that have

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transported the terrorists themselves – either because they carried fake merchant mariner documents, or because they managed to stow away on the vessel. Some known examples of how the global shipping industry has acted as such “vectors” of terrorist operations appear below.

Terrorist merchant fleets

Many terrorist groups have varying degrees of maritime capability, but only a few are believed to have the expertise to operate a fleet of ocean-going vessels in support of their operations. The two organizations with the largest “merchant fleets” are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and allegedly al-Qaeda.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

The Tamil Tiger’s military and naval capabilities, supported by the Sea Tigers, are known to be extensive. At the same time, the LTTE also has a well-supported merchant operation. The Tigers are believed to own and operate at least ten ocean-going freighters flying Panamanian, Honduran and Liberian flags. [1] In 1994, the LTTE shipped 50 metric tons of TNT and ten metric tons of RDX explosives on board one of their own freighters, operated by a Bangladeshi front company called Carlton Trading, from a Ukrainian Black Sea port via the Turkish Straits to Sri Lanka. [2] On 23 May 1997, the Greek-registered freighter Stillus Limassul left Mozambique for Sri Lanka carrying 32,400 81mm mortar bombs intended for that country’s army. The shipment never arrived. On 11 July 1997, a fax was sent to the US embassy in Colombo stating:

“We, the Tamil Tigers, inform you by the present that on 11 July 1997 we have hijacked a vessel carrying arms destined for Colombo. … The cargo (has been) confiscated. We make known and warn that we will take action against all persons participating in the supply of military equipment used against the legitimate rights of Tamil people and we will severely punish those concerned.” [3]

Subsequent investigations revealed, however, that the Stillus Limassul was not included in Lloyds’ international shipping registry but was actually owned by the LTTE. [4]

Al Qaeda

Al-Qaeda’s maritime capabilities and intentions are, of course, the greatest concern. Although not conclusively proven, the organization is believed to have a large maritime fleet in support of its stated commitment to commit maritime acts of terror to disrupt the global economy. [5] Its alleged fleet of merchant vessels has been estimated from a low of fifteen to a high of 300; [6] others estimate its “terrorist naval force” at between fifteen and thirty vessels. [7] Some of these ships, supposedly up to 400ft long, are used to generate profits for al-Qaeda’s operations, and in direct support of its terrorist activities. For example, al-Qaeda ships have been believed to have carried cargoes of sesame seeds and cement as part of fund raising efforts. [8]

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US and Norwegian intelligence have identified between fifteen to twenty-three freighters in the Mediterranean and Pacific, flagged in Yemen, Somalia, and Tonga, as owned or controlled by al Qaeda. [9] More generally, NATO has monitored the Mediterranean since the September 11 attacks, and has tracked up to fifty ships suspected of terrorist ties. [10]

Tracking terrorist shipping: Flags of convenience

Flags of convenience play a very important role in global maritime commerce. At the same time, is possible for terrorist organizations to reregister ships “using invented corporate owners” or to flag, and re-flag, vessels in countries that do not fully cooperate with global anti-terrorism efforts. [11] For example, a list of countries in which al-Qaeda’s vessels have allegedly been flagged illustrates this point: Yemen, Somalia, Senegal, St. Vincent, and Liberia [12] have all been tied to the “al-Qaeda navy.” [13] Until recently, known al-Qaeda vessels had been flagged in the Kingdom of Tonga (the Kingdom closed its registry in 2002 after Tongan-flagged ships were caught smuggling terrorist operatives into Italy). [14] Potentially troubling to security experts has been the Comoros Islands, which advertises itself as the “first Islamic flag of convenience.” [15] The flag has had at least one connection with a suspicious incident: The Baltic Sky (more below), which was found to be carrying an illegal cargo of ammonium nitrate, was flagged in the Comoros [16] (ammonium nitrate when mixed with fuel can be a powerful explosive). Additionally, the Comoros Islands were allegedly used as a staging area and exfiltration route for those responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. [17] This said, the United States praised the government of the Comoros Islands for its assistance with the investigation into the bombings, which resulted in the indictments of Osama bin Laden and Muhammad Atef in US Federal court. [18]

Ships used to transport materials in support of alleged terrorist activities

Approximately 50% of the world’s trade by value, and 90% of its general cargo, is now transported in containers. [19] There are approximately fifteen million containers in circulation worldwide, making over 230 million journeys each year. [20] Less than 1% of containers are manually inspected worldwide. [21] While some containers now carry tamper-proof security seals (to ensure that nothing has been added to the container after it has been loaded, inspected, and closed), they are not always reliably inspected. [22] With so many containers in circulation, making so many voyages throughout the worlds’ ports, with so few of them physically inspected, the container presents a terrorist with a unique opportunity − weapons, people, and possibly even materials and components for weapons of mass destruction can be smuggled in sealed shipping containers. Terrorist organizations have recognized the value of the maritime industry in general, and shipping containers in particular, as the following examples illustrate. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks, offered to invest $200,000 in an export firm in exchange for access to the firm’s containers, which were used to ship garments to Port Newark, NJ. [23] And, documents seized from al-

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Qaeda operatives allege that the group planned to use containers “packed with sesame seeds to smuggle highly radioactive material” into the United States. [24] In April 2004, Turkish Customs found 500 undeclared Bulgarian AK47s inside a shipping container that had just been taken off a vessel from Bulgaria. According to the manifest, the cargo was destined for Paraguay. Turkish authorities seized the weapons, which they believed were being smuggled into Turkey for terrorist organizations. [25] In June 2003, the Greek Coast Guard impounded the Baltic Sky, which was carrying an undeclared cargo of 750 tons of industrial-grade explosives and 8,000 detonators from Tunisia to Sudan. Authorities became suspicious when, instead of heading for the Suez Canal, the ship had sailed to Turkey and then back into the Mediterranean. [26] The explosives used in al-Qaeda’s 1998 attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were transported to their destinations in what were believed to be al-Qaeda’s own vessels. [27] Similarly, the explosives used in the 2002 Bali nightclub attacks were transported by ship to Indonesia as well. [28] All of these incidents are considered problematic. But the event that brought the “cargoes of concern” transport issue to the fore was the interception of the So San in 2002. The So San was a Cambodian registered vessel carrying Scud missiles (concealed beneath sacks of cement) [29] from North Korea to Yemen. Believed it might be destined for Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen, the United States passed on information to the Spanish government, who had one of its naval vessels intercept the ship in the Indian Ocean, 600 miles from Yemen. The interception and search of the vessel in international waters was considered legal – the So San was not flying any flag; as such, it appeared to be a “stateless vessel” and therefore potentially engaged in piracy. [30] However, there was no legal authority for the missiles to be seized under international law, and the ship and its cargo was released. Concerns over the release of the ship led to the US-backed Proliferation Security Initiative, discussed in a later section.

Human Cargo: Ships used to transport terrorists

There are two ways ships could be used to transport terrorists unknowingly: 1) terrorist agents with fake seafarer credentials could be could be disguised as merchant mariners; and 2) terrorists could be smuggled onboard vessels as stowaways on the ship, or hidden in shipping containers.

Ships carrying terrorists disguised as merchant seamen

Terrorist groups could disguise their operatives as merchant seamen, or “sleeper agents,” embedding them in target vessels for suicide operations, or to transport them to other countries while avoiding more stringent airport security. Fake seafarer credentials are widely available, often with insufficient checks. For example, in 2001, the International Transport Workers’ Federation applied for and received a First Officer’s certificate for $4,500 for its General Secretary – a man with no seafaring experience whatsoever. The certificate authorized him to “navigate a vessel and deputize for its captain.” [31] This has led to the concern that terrorists could use legitimate documents to disguise themselves as merchant mariners. As one senior US government official has commented, “You can’t swing a dead cat in the shipping business without hitting somebody with phony

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papers.” [32] Of the “tens of thousands” of merchant seamen around the world, a “sizable percentage” is believed to carry fake documents. [33] Also worrisome is that terrorists could be legitimately trained mariners, with valid documentation. In March 2004, nine seamen with legal credentials issued by the United States were identified as possible associates of terrorist groups. [34]

The Twillinger and the Sara The concern is not purely hypothetical. In February 2002, eight Pakistani “seamen” jumped ship off the freighter Twillinger in Italy; they were subsequently found with forged merchant mariner credentials, large sums of money, and evidence linking them to al Qaeda. [35] And in August of the same year, the captain of the Sara, at sea in the Mediterranean, radioed to Italian authorities that fifteen Pakistani “seamen” he had taken onboard in Morocco were menacing his crew. They, too, were discovered with large sums of money, false documents, and alleged links to al-Qaeda. [36]

Terrorists as stowaways

Stowaways present additional problems. It is currently estimated that some 800,000 people are smuggled across borders every year, [37] with many of these of arriving by ship. There are concerns that some stowaways who manage to evade detection and enter countries illegally may actually have links to known terrorist organizations. At the same time, terrorist groups have used shipping containers not only to transport themselves across borders, but also to gain access to ports and facilities they would not otherwise have been able to enter. While there are not a large number of examples of terrorists being transported by such methods, there are enough to show that it is possible for them to do so.

Egyptian stowaway found in Italy In October 2001, a stowaway was found in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro inside a shipping container loaded in Egypt and destined for Canada. The container had been comfortably outfitted with bed, water, supplies and toilet facilities. [38] The stowaway was later released and absolved of all terrorist connections. [39]

The Ashdod attack In 2004 a Palestinian double suicide attack left ten dead in the port city of Ashdod in Israel. The attacks occurred inside the heavily protected port perimeter; those responsible for the attack gained access to the port facility by securing themselves inside a shipping container delivered by truck into the port complex. [40]

LNG carrier stowaways: United States And in the United States, in May 2002, the US Coast Guard announced that “twenty-five Islamic extremists” had entered the United States from cargo ships into the ports of Savannah, Long Beach and Miami. [41] In April 2004, the Department of Homeland Security confirmed that stowaways found on an Algerian-registered LNG tanker coming into Boston might have had ties to terrorists. [42] At least one of the stowaways is under federal indictment for allegedly planning to blow up Los Angeles airport as part of al-Qaeda's "Millennium Bombing Plot." [43]

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Limiting maritime vectors of terrorist activity

Most efforts to limit the ability of merchant vessels to be used in support of terrorist activities have focused on making it easier to inspect shipping containers and the ships themselves. Two agreements have been urged by the United States in this regard. Not without controversy, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are meant to increase the ability to detect the transport mainly of materials and components for weapons of mass destruction.

The Container Security Initiative (2002) [44]

The CSI arises from the fact that approximately only one percent of containers worldwide are inspected to ensure the integrity of their contents; this number increases to only just over five percent for the United States. [45] The objective of the CSI is to increase confidence container trade, by increasing the number of containers that are inspected. Containers can now be inspected and verified at the “point of origin,” that is, where they are initially packed and loaded, rather than at the port of arrival (leaving the arrival port to inspect other non-CSI containers). A US initiative, the CSI currently involves ports in countries comprising the majority of US trade. The world’s twenty largest ports, all of which are CSI members, account for two-thirds of all containers shipped to the United States. [46] The initiative allows US Customs inspectors, working with their counterparts in foreign ports to open, inspect, and verify the contents of suspicious cargoes, before they are placed onto ships bound for the United States. Verified containers are then fitted with tamper-proof seals. The CSI is a reciprocal agreement: foreign nations may place their customs agents in US ports for inspection purposes. Currently, for example, Canada has agents at the ports of Seattle, Washington and Newark, NJ, and Japanese customs agents are in the Los Angeles/Long Beach ports in California.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (2003)

PSI nations agreed to work cooperatively to deter the proliferation by sea, land, and air of WMD and associated materials. The PSI allows countries varying degrees of participation. At one end of the spectrum, states have attended meetings and offered “public support” for the intent of the agreement. Others, such as Japan, have hosted PSI interdiction training exercises. At the other end of the spectrum, the PSI contains a set of “interdiction principles” that allow countries to conclude bilateral, reciprocal boarding arrangements for their vessels. Permission to board in international waters would be expedited in cases of suspicious activity. Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, whose flags account for over 15% of the world’s 50,000 largest cargo ships, have signed bilateral agreements with the United States, as have Belize, Croatia and Cyprus. These agreements allow US forces to board any of their flagged vessels suspected of illegal WMD proliferation on the high seas once the nationality of the ship had been verified. At the same time, because the agreements are bilateral, signatories may board US-flagged vessels suspected of proliferation activity. In either case, the vessel and its cargo can be detained if necessary. [47]

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The PSI has not been without controversy. It has been criticized for undermining international law, treaties, and norms by having a “coalition of the willing” assume the authority to interdict suspected WMD-related shipments on the high seas, particularly as there is no international treaty banning the shipment of missiles – even if they are capable of carrying WMD. [48] More generally, the PSI is seen by some as a direct contravention of the freedom of navigation on the high seas. [49] Many states have also been reluctant to participate extensively in the PSI, for concerns that it could “endanger international commerce” and allow the US Navy to act as a “global police force”. [50]

Biometric IDs and reducing forged documentation

Other initiatives exist to deter the use of maritime shipping as a vector for international terrorism. To reduce the risk that terrorists could pose as legitimate sailors, mariners are now required to have valid US visas to enter US ports (the mariner’s ID card is no longer sufficient); other nations have responded in kind. Also, plans are underway to introduce biometric identification cards to reduce the trade in forged documentation. Crackdowns on forged documentation have been increased; in 2004 the United States sentenced the leaders of a group creating and trading in false mariner documents and identification. [51] Reducing the risk that terrorists could train to become legitimate mariners has also involved screening students seeking merchant officer training at domestic and international maritime academies.

Conclusion

Significantly reducing the risk that the global maritime industry will continue to be used as a vector for international terrorism will be a difficult task as it involves ensuring not only the integrity of the global fleet of oceangoing vessels, but the cargoes these vessels carry, and the crews that sail them. The initiatives and proposals discussed in this study are only the first (often imperfect) steps, and they unfortunately leave many vulnerabilities for terrorists still to exploit.


• Are there any current procedures in place that help protect against the use of a ship as a terrorist vector (particularly in dealing with stowaways)? Why are they not considered completely effective?

• Some doubt the existence of an al Qaeda “navy” or “fleet” of merchant vessels. Do

you believe it is be possible for al Qaeda to operate a fleet that has remained undetected for so long? Do flags of convenience make terrorist “fleets” possible?

• Is it possible to make shipping containers completely secure? Why or why not? • Some argue that the Container Security Initiative might actually make container

trade less secure, rather than more secure. Do you share these concerns?

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• What concerns do many nations have about the Proliferation Security Initiative? Do you share these concerns?

References

[43] Davis, A. (1996). Tamil Tiger International, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.8, No.10, pp.472-473. [44] Davis, (note 1). [45] Chalk, Peter. (Winter 1999). Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and

Operations: A Preliminary Analysis. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). <lankalibrary.com/pol/LTTE.htm>. Chalk’s personal correspondence with US Embassy officials, Colombo, July 1997.

[46] Chalk, (Note 3). [47] Threats to oil transport. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (iags.org). [48] Daly, John C.k.. ((24 October 2003). Al-Qaeda and maritime terrorism, part I. The Terrorism Monitor.

Jamestown Foundation. [49] Coultan, Mark. (30 March 2004). Al–Qaeda attack at sea on cards: expert. Syndey Morning Herald. [50] Mintz, John. (31 December 2002). 15 freighters believed to be linked to al-Qaeda. Washington Post.

<washingtonpost.com>. [51] (20 October 2003). What Al Qaeda could do with a terror navy. World Net Daily. [52] Daly, (Note 6). [53] Mintz, (Note 8). [54] Liberia is generally regarded as a “problem free” open registry. See also Eckert, Toby. (9 February

2003). ‘Flags of convenience’ raise shipping security concerns. Copley News Service. [55] Jones, Gary. (12 February 2004). Osama’s Navy. Mirror.co.uk. [56] Robinson, Colin. (20 August 2003). Al Qaeda’s ‘Navy’ – How Much of a Threat? Center for Defense

Information. [57] Schoen, John W. (21 June 2004). Ships and ports are terrorism’s new frontier. MSNBC.com. [58] Schoen, (note 15). [59] (September 9, 2004). U.S.-Based Branch of Al Haramain Foundation Linked to Terror. US Department of the

Treasury. <treasury.gov/press/releases/js1895.htm>. [60] (4 November 1998). Bin Laden, Atef Indicted in U.S. Federal Court for African Bombings. US State

Department. <usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_ Index/Bin_Laden_Atef_ Indicted_in_U.S._Federal_Court_for_ African_Bombings.html>.

[61] Richardson, Michael. (16 June 2004). Fighting maritime terrorism. Asia Times Online. [62] Richardson, Fighting maritime terrorism, (Note 19). [63] Richardson, Fighting maritime terrorism, (Note 19). [64] Broder, John M. (27 July 2004). At ports, cargo backlog raises security questions. New York Times;

Richardson, Fighting maritime terrorism, (Note 19). [65] Richardson, Fighting maritime terrorism, (note 19). [66] Richardson, Michael. (19 May 2004). Counter-terrorism: The mysterious al-Qaeda navy.

FreeRepublic.com. [67] (24 Jan 2005). Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO. IAGS Energy Security.

<iags.org/n0124051.htm>. [68] (23 June 2003). Greeks seize ship packed with explosives. The Star. [69] Richardson, Counter-terrorism, (note 24). [70] Jones, (note, 13). [71] (12 December 2002). US lets SCUD ship sail to Yemen. CNN.com. <archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/

asiapcf/east/12/11/us.missile.ship>. [72] The Spanish government explicitly stated they believed the ship to be a “pirate ship.” (note above).

According to Article 100 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all states shall cooperate “to the fullest extent possible” in the suppression of acts of piracy on the high seas.

[73] See Richardson, Michael. (25 February 2004). A time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in an age of weapons of mass destruction. Viewpoints. Institute of South East Asian Studies.

[74] Mintz, (note 8). [75] Mintz, (note 8). [76] Johnson, Kevin Johnson. (4 March 2004). Coast Guard, FBI probe of merchant mariners finds terrorist

ties. USA Today. [77] Mintz, (note 8).

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[78] Mintz, (note 8). [79] Bhabha, Jacqueline. (1 March 2005). Trafficking, Smuggling, and Human Rights. Migration Information

Source. <cc.msnscache.com/cache.aspx?q= 2271337325816& lang=en-US&FORM=CVRE>. [80] Richardson, “Counter-terrorism,” (note 24). [81] Bayles, Fred. (27 February 2002). Shipping containers could hide threat to U.S.” USA Today. [82] Schoen, (note 15). The attack killed ten and wounded eighteen. [83] Howland, Jonathan. (1 April 2004). Hazardous Seas: Maritime Sector Vulnerable to Devastating

Terrorist Attacks. The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. [84] (28 May 2004). Homeland security threat cited from lack of U.S. flag shipping, crew presence in U.S.

ports. MaritimeTV.com. [85] Raines, Ben. (29 April 2004). Letter confirms suspicions of smuggling on LNG ships. Mobile Register.

<exxonmobil-solidarity.org/Press%20Releases /letter_confirms_ suspicions_of_smuggling.htm>. [86] The Container Security Initiatve and Proliferation Security Initiative are also discussed in the “Ship as a

Weapon” case. [87] Richardson, “A time bomb for global trade,” (note 31). [88] (29 July 2003). China formally joins U.S. Container Security Initiative. Department of Homeland

Security press release. [89] “U.S. applauds ship-boarding agreement with Panama,” US Department of State, (12 May 2004). [90] Joseph, Robert. (15 August 2005). IDSS seminar on “Transforming counterproliferation efforts in the

Asia region.” <ntu.edu.sg/idss/short%20 reports/Robert_Joseph_full.pdf>. [91] Wei, Su. (July 2004). China’s views on PSI. Issues and Insights. Vol. 4, No. 5.

<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v04n05_ch2.cfm>. [92] Prosser, Andrew. (16 June 2004). The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective. Center for

Defense Information. <www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf>. [93] (22 January 2004). Defendant sentenced for conspiring to crease false mariner documents. U.S.

Department of Justice, Southern District of Florida.

The Ship as a Weapon

Introduction

Maritime security experts discuss many ways ships could be used in support of terrorist operations. One of the most frightening scenarios is the use of a ship as a weapon or, more commonly, a “floating bomb”. This involves causing – in one manner or another – an explosion on the ship in the vicinity of a port, harbor, or crowded urban area. In this scenario, the ship is an agent used to achieve maximum human casualties and damage to vital economic infrastructure. There are three general ways a ship could be used as a weapon: 1) A bomb hidden in a shipping container, 2) the hijacking and explosion of a ship carrying nuclear materials, and 3) the hijacking and detonation of a ship carrying “dangerous maritime cargoes” (DMCs).

A bomb hidden in a shipping container

Approximately 50% of the world’s trade by value, and 90% of its general cargo, is now transported in containers. [1] There are approximately fifteen million containers in circulation worldwide, making over 230 million journeys each year. [2] Less than 1% worldwide is manually inspected. [3] While some containers now carry tamper-proof security seals (to ensure that nothing has been added to the container after it has been loaded, inspected, and closed), the seals themselves are not always reliably inspected. [4]

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With so many containers in circulation, making so many voyages throughout the world, with so few of them physically inspected, the container presents a terrorist with a unique opportunity − weapons can be smuggled in sealed shipping containers, timed to detonate when the vessel arrives in port. Of particular concern is the “nightmare scenario:” a radiological device, [5] or “dirty bomb,” hidden in a shipping container, primed to detonate when the ship reaches a selected target. [6] While al-Qaeda does not currently have the ability to build a nuclear or radiological device, it is known to be planning to do so. [7] While there is no credible evidence that al-Qaeda possesses either nuclear weapons or sufficient material to produce them, documents describing the basics of nuclear bomb-making have been found in its possession. At the same time, al-Qaeda has been trying to acquire nuclear materials since the early 1990s. Terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda recognize the value of shipping containers. In the unlikely event that a terrorist group was successful in developing a nuclear device, it would be very heavy and cumbersome in nature, and could only be transported by ship or truck. [8] Were such a device to be developed and placed in a container, there are concerns it would slip through the various security measures in place. For example, In September 2003 ABC News revealed that one of its investigative reporters had “smuggled,” undetected, a container of nuclear material by ship from Europe to New York. [9] (The actual contents were depleted uranium enrichment residue, which though harmless, gives off essentially the same radioactive signature as weapons-grade highly enriched uranium.) Congress had appropriated $35 million to develop radiation detectors for U.S. ports, but nearly a year later the New York Times noted that most of the funds still had not been spent. [10] Thus, ships emerge as a possible delivery vehicle for a terrorist nuclear device, and in particular container ships; placing the weapon in a sealed container would allow the device to remain hidden until it arrived at its target. Recognizing the importance of shipping containers for this and other purposes, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks, offered to invest $200,000 in an export firm in exchange for access to the firm’s containers. [11]

Ships carrying nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium, MOX)

About twenty million packages of all sizes containing all levels of radioactive materials are routinely transported worldwide each year on public roads, railways and ships. This raises concern that they could be hijacked for blackmail purposes, or attacked to release their radiation into the atmosphere. [12] Since 1971 there have been more than 20,000 shipments of spent fuel and high-level wastes (over 50,000 tons) over more than 30 million kilometers, with three hundred of these transports occurring by ship, transiting over eight million kilometers. [13] A common form of transporting plutonium, much of which is the by-product of nuclear power plants, is to convert it to a far more stable mixed plutonium and uranium mixed oxide (MOX). To release a ship’s MOX cargo into a crowded port or urban area, terrorists need only send a missile or boat like the one al-Qaeda used to attack the USS Cole, equipped with the right

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explosives, into the side of the freighter. While MOX fuel is stored in shipping containers that can resist temperatures of 800C for 30 minutes, fires on ships can burn for up to 24 hours at 1,000C. [14] Were this to occur, a plutonium release would become almost certain, turning the vessel into a radiological device.

Ships Carrying Dangerous Maritime Cargoes

Many ships routinely carry potentially lethal cargoes in such significant quantities that, if attacked in a certain manner, could prove catastrophically deadly. These include dangerous maritime cargoes (DMCs) such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and ammonium nitrate, which, if used by terrorists, could “inflict damage in the (lower) range of the WMD scale at minimal expense.” [15] It is believed that militant groups, particularly in South East Asia, are practicing hijacking ships for their possible use as weapons – particularly oil and chemical tankers. These vessels are manned by smaller crews and loaded with volatile substances that could cause significant damage were they seized by terrorists and rammed into crowded port or harbor facilities. Lloyd's List has reported that terrorists might be training pilots in the Straits of Malacca in order to capture a ship, pilot it into a port or chokepoint, and detonate it. [16]

LNG

LNG tankers can hold 33 million gallons of liquefied natural gas (the equivalent of 20 billion gallons of natural gas), and can be as long as three football fields. [17] This is enough to supply the daily energy needs of over 10 million homes. [18] There are currently 142 LNG tankers in service around the world, with an additional 55 on order. [19] In its liquefied (LNG) state, natural gas can neither burn nor explode. However, if a tanker spill were to occur, the liquid could begin to return to its gaseous form, creating the possibility for two kinds of hazards: “pool fires” and “vapor clouds.” Spilled LNG creates a “pool” (if the spill is from a tanker, a gas pool is formed on the water); as the gas evaporates from the pool, it can ignite and burn with an intense heat, hotter than oil or gas fires. If the LNG is released, but does not immediately ignite, the resulting evaporating gas could form a vapor cloud that may drift some distance before igniting. [20] A recent report by Sandia National Laboratories gauging the impact of an intentional LNG release concluded that an attack on an LNG carrier could cause "major injuries and significant damage to structures" a third of a mile away [21] and second-degree burns on people more than a mile away. [22]

Chemical tankers

The number of hazardous chemicals transported by ship is far too numerous to list, but the quantities in routine transit raise concerns about their potential to be used in a maritime terrorist attack. Adding to the concern has been the rise in pirate attacks on chemical tankers in the Straits of Malacca in recent years. For example, an unusually high number of chemical tankers were boarded in March 2003.

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Of particular concern was the March 2003 attack on the chemical tanker M/T Dewi Madrim. The pirates robbed the crew, but then spent the next hour practicing sailing the vessel through the crowded straits. The captain and first officer were kidnapped, and experts at the time commented that “[t]here’s a very strong possibility that we’re looking at the equivalent of a flight training school for terrorists.” [23] The concern was that this could have been a “practice run” for an attack on Singapore’s port facilities. Additionally, in 2005, the Tri Samudra carrying methane gas was boarded by more than thirty armed pirates, who briefly took control of the ship before taking two members of the crew for ransom. The vessel’s owners believed the pirates were rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). [24]

Ammonium nitrate

Ammonium nitrate, a common agricultural fertilizer, can be used to create powerful explosives when mixed with fuel oil. Ammonium nitrate is a favorite component of terrorist bombs; it was used both in the Bali nightclub bombing, in a 2002 attack on the US embassy in Pakistan, [25] and in the Oklahoma City bombing in the United States. As such, it can be considered a “dangerous maritime cargo” that could be used in a terrorist attack. In 1947, two ships containing about 3,300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate caught fire and exploded, killing 568 and wounding 3,500 in the port of Texas City on the US Gulf coast. [26] In 2003, Greek authorities seized the suspicious Baltic Sky, which turned out to be carrying 750 tons of “industrial-grade” ammonium nitrate-based explosives and 140,000 detonators. [27] And, in April 2004, port authorities in Auckland, New Zealand refused permission for a ship carrying ammonium nitrate to dock on short notice. [28]

Oil Tankers

A January 2004 report by the International Maritime Bureau noted that attacks on tankers in 2003 increased some twenty-two percent. "That these ships carrying dangerous cargoes may fall temporarily under the control of unauthorized and unqualified individuals is a matter of concern, for both environmental and safety reasons." [29] In 2004 it was reported that Jemaah Islamiyah was planning to seize an oil tanker in the Straits of Malacca for use in a terror attack. The group planned to seize a vessel with the assistance of local pirates. The hijacked ship would then be wired with explosives and directed at other vessels, sailed towards a port, or used to threaten the narrow and congested Straits. [30] A near miss occurred in 1999, when pirates seized the oil tanker Chaumont near Singapore. With the crew tied up, the pirates let the ship sail for over an hour with no one at the helm in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. [31]

Pyrophoric metals

Many metals are considered to be pyrophoric – able to ignite spontaneously upon exposure to air under certain conditions. These include aluminium, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead, magnesium, nickel, sodium, and platinum. These metals, handled incorrectly, are

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considered to be very dangerous. In the wrong hands, ships transporting them could provide weapons-grade fuel for terrorist attacks. Sodium, for example, is a soft metal that explodes when exposed to water or moist air. A half-pound – 228 grams – could explode with the force of “an average car bomb.” [32]

Preventing the use of a ship as a weapon

Preventing the use of a ship as a weapon involves addressing the vulnerabilities of each of the three concerns described above: • For bombs hidden inside shipping containers, this involves ensuring the integrity of the

containers. The Container Security Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiative [33] address this vulnerability;

• Preventing the hijacking of, or attack on, a vessel carrying either nuclear materials or

dangerous maritime cargoes involves the protection of the vessel itself, at all stages of its voyage.

The Container Security Initiative

The CSI arises from the fact that approximately only one percent of containers worldwide are inspected to ensure the integrity of their contents; this number increases to only just over five percent for the United States. [34] The objective of the CSI is to increase confidence container trade, by increasing the number of containers that are inspected. Containers can now be inspected and verified at the “point of origin,” that is, where they are initially packed and loaded, rather than at the port of arrival (leaving the arrival port to inspect other non-CSI containers). A US initiative, the CSI currently involves ports in countries comprising the majority of US trade. The world’s twenty largest ports, all of which are CSI members, account for two-thirds of all containers shipped to the United States. [35] The initiative allows US Customs inspectors, working with their counterparts in foreign ports to open, inspect, and verify the contents of suspicious cargoes, before they are placed onto ships bound for the United States. Verified containers are then fitted with tamper-proof seals. The CSI is a reciprocal agreement: foreign nations may place their customs agents in US ports for inspection purposes. Currently, for example, Canada has agents at the ports of Seattle, Washington and Newark, NJ, and Japanese customs agents are in the Los Angeles/Long Beach ports in California.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (2003)

PSI nations agreed to work cooperatively to deter the proliferation by sea, land, and air of WMD and associated materials. The PSI allows countries varying degrees of participation. At one end of the spectrum, states have attended meetings and offered “public support” for the intent of the agreement. Others, such as Japan, have hosted PSI interdiction training exercises. At the other end of the spectrum, the PSI contains a set of “interdiction principles” that allow countries to conclude bilateral, reciprocal boarding arrangements for

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their vessels. Permission to board in international waters would be expedited in cases of suspicious activity. Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, whose flags account for over 15% of the world’s 50,000 largest cargo ships, have signed bilateral agreements with the United States, as have Belize, Croatia and Cyprus. These agreements allow US forces to board any of their flagged vessels suspected of illegal WMD proliferation on the high seas once the nationality of the ship had been verified. At the same time, because the agreements are bilateral, signatories may board US-flagged vessels suspected of proliferation activity. In either case, the vessel and its cargo can be detained if necessary. [36] The PSI has not been without controversy. It has been criticized for undermining international law, treaties, and norms by having a “coalition of the willing” assume the authority to interdict suspected WMD-related shipments on the high seas, particularly as there is no international treaty banning the shipment of missiles – even if they are capable of carrying WMD. [37] More generally, the PSI is seen by some as a direct contravention of the freedom of navigation on the high seas. [38] Many states have also been reluctant to participate extensively in the PSI, for concerns that it could “endanger international commerce” and allow the US Navy to act as a “global police force”. [39]

Preventing Hijackings or Attacks on Vessels Carrying Dangerous Cargoes

Several plans are in place globally to ensure the safety of vessels carrying dangerous cargoes. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) covers the security and integrity of shipping in the international arena. More specifically, ships transporting nuclear materials, for example, may often have armed escorts – at least when they transit near strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, or near urban areas. The United States requires escorts and separate berthing areas for LNG carriers. Boston Harbor was closed to LNG imports immediately following the September 11 attacks; currently Boston-bound LNG tankers are required to have a US Coast Guard escort to/from 200 miles at sea. [40] LNG tankers entering the Ports of Seattle/Tacoma also have mandatory Coast Guard escorts, and are berthed in a separate area, near Coast Guard facilities.


• How easy do you believe it would be to place a working bomb in a shipping container, and have it detonate in a destination port?

• What sort of bomb do you think terrorists would most easily be able to place into a

shipping container?

• Are current procedures adequate for detecting a bomb in a shipping container? Is the technology being developed to make bomb detection easier? Is this something developing countries are likely to be able to afford?

• Are current procedures for transporting uranium and plutonium by ship adequate?

How can shipping these materials be made safer and more secure?

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• How easy would it be to hijack a vessel carrying dangerous maritime cargoes and

actually use it to attack a port facility or urban area?

• How do you prevent vessels carrying dangerous maritime cargoes from being used to attack port facilities or urban areas?

• How successful do you believe the Proliferation Security Initiative is likely to be?

Is it worth the political controversy?

References

[94] Michael Richardson, “Fighting maritime terrorism,” Asia Time Online, (16 June 2004). [95] Richardson, (note 1). [96] Richardson, Michael. (25 February 2004). A time bomb for global trade: Maritime-related terrorism in

an age of weapons of mass destruction. Viewpoints. Institute of South East Asian Studies. [97] Broder, John M. (27 July 2004). At ports, cargo backlog raises security questions,” New York Times;

Richardson, Fighting maritime terrorism, (note 1). [98] A radiological device is simply a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, combined with radioactive

material. When detonated, the conventional blast disperses the radiation. Also referred to as a “radiological dispersal device (RDD)” or “dirty bomb.”

[99] According to David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), "if al-Qaeda were to build nuclear weapons, it would likely build relatively crude, massive nuclear explosives, deliverable by ships, trucks, or private planes." See Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey. (October 2003). Al-Qaeda and mass casualty terrorism: Assessing the threat. Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict.

[100] Ensor, David. (4 December 2001). Al Qaeda interested in ‘dirty bomb. CNN.com. [101] Boureston and Mahaffey, (note 6). [102] Ross, Brian, Rhonda Schwartz, and David Scott. (11 September 2002). Customs Fails to Detect

Depleted Uranium. ABCNews.com. <abcnews.go. com/WNT/ story?id=129321&page=1>. [103] Quinlan, Guy. (2004). Nuclear Terrorism. Unitarian Universalist Association.

<uuworld.org/2005/01/forum.html>. [104] Richardson, “Fighting maritime terrorism,” (note 1). [105] (September 2005). Transport of Radioactive Materials. Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper #51.

Uranium Information Centre, Ltd. <uic.com. au/nip51.htm>. [106] Transport of Radioactive Materials, (note 12). [107] Monbiot, George. (13 June 2002). Shipping Plutonium Around the World. The Guardian.

<alternet.org/story/13376>. [108] Gorka, Sebestyén L.v. (September 2002). Al Qaeda and the WMD threat. Institute for Transitional

Democracy and International Security <itdis.org>. [109] (15 October 2003). Asia Pirates Training for Terrorist Attack. Lloyd's List International. [110] LNG danger to our communities. Law Office of Tim Riley. Timriley law.com/lng/htm. [111] Behr, Peter. (5 July 2003). Higher gas price sets stage for LNG. Washington Post.

<washingtonpost.com>. [112] Parfomak, Paul W. (9 September 2003). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure security:

Background and issues for Congress, Congressional Research Report. [113] The cloud will ignite if the concentration of natural gas is between five and 15 percent in air and it

encounters an ignition source. See “LNG safety,” California Energy Commission (energy.ca.gov/lng/ safety.html).

[114] Hightower, Mike, Louis Gritzo, Anay Luketa-Hanlin, John Covan, Sheldon Tieszen, Gerry Wellman, Mike Irwin, Mike Kaneshige, Brian Melof, Charles Morrow, Don Ragland. (December 2004). Guidance on risk analysis and safety implications of a large liquefied natural gas (LNG) spill over water, Sandia National Laboratories.

[115] Savage, Charlie. (21 December 2004). Study spells out high toll on city in LNG attack. Boston Globe.

[116] Glass, Charles. (10 September 2003). “Terror on the high seas?” ABCNews.com.

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[117] (14 March 2005). Pirates storm Indonesian tanker. BBC News. <news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/asia-pacific/4347167.stm>.

[118] Berger, J.M. (3 August 2004). Nearly 3,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate stolen in N.C. Intelwire.com.

[119] Richardson, Michael. (19 May 2004). Counter-terrorism: The mysterious al-Qaeda navy. FreeRepublic.com.

[120] Schoen, John W. (21 June 2004). Ships and ports are terrorism’s new frontier. MSNBC.com. [121] Richardson, “Counter-terrorism,” (note 26). [122] Mihailescu, Andrea R. (16 July 2004). Feature: Piracy still lurks the high seas. The Washington

Times. <washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040716-043422-2867r.htm>. [123] Sherwell, Philip, Massoud Ansari and Marianne Kearney. (12 September 2004). Al Qa'eda terrorists

'plan to turn tanker into a floating bomb'. The Telegraph. <telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/12/ wterr12.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/12/ixportal.html>.

[124] Mihailescu, (note 29). [125] Munoz, Hilda. (4 September 2004). Hazardous material shipment leads to arrest. Hartford Courant.

P. B5. [126] The Container Security Initiative and Proliferation Security Initiatives are also discussed in the

“Ship as a Vector” case. [127] Richardson, “A time bomb for global trade,” (note 3). [128] (29 July 2003). China formally joins U.S. Container Security Initiative. Department of Homeland

Security press release. [129] (12 May 2004). U.S. applauds ship-boarding agreement with Panama. US Department of State.

<state.gov>. [130] Joseph, Robert. (15 August 2005). IDSS seminar on “Transforming counterproliferation efforts in

the Asia region.” <ntu.edu.sg/idss/short%20 reports/Robert_Joseph_full.pdf>. [131] Wei, Su. (July 2004). China’s views on PSI. Issues and Insights. Vol. 4, No. 5.

<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v04n05_ch2.cfm>. [132] Prosser, Andrew. (16 June 2004). The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective. Center for

Defense Information. <www.cdi.org/pdfs/psi.pdf>. [133] (7 November 2003). Al-Qaeda and maritime terrorism, part II. The Terrorism Monitor. Jamestown

Foundation.

Attacking Vital Ports and Chokepoints

Introduction

Globalization of the world economy and the dependence of an ever-increasing number of nations on foreign trade have made the security of global maritime trade routes more important than they have ever been before. Maritime transport still remains the most inexpensive means of transporting bulk goods; consequently, over 80-90 percent (depending on measure) of the world’s trade involves ocean transit. [1] And international trade is projected to reach two billion tons within the next twenty years—twice today’s levels. Therefore, the world’s sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) and chokepoints are vital to the world economy, especially to an increasingly globalized economy.

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With the increased importance of global maritime trade comes the concern that terrorist groups could threaten global trade by attacking not only ships, but the world’s vital chokepoints and major trading ports – especially hub ports. And, in the case of Al Qaeda, one of its stated objectives is to disrupt global trade and inflict massive economic losses on the United States and its allies.

The World’s Major Chokepoints and Hub Ports

While ships can, in theory, travel anywhere on the world’s oceans, the most efficient means of getting from one point to another by sea have remained fairly constant for more than 100 years. In spite of technological advances in transportation systems, prevailing winds, as well as ocean currents and predominant weather patterns determine the safest and most efficient maritime trade routes, or sea-lanes of communication/commerce (SLOCs). [2] A chokepoint is a narrow strait or passage on a SLOC through an isthmus (the Panama Canal), a group of islands (the Straits of Malacca), or between two continental shores (the Bosporus and Dardanelles). Chokepoints can be vulnerable due to natural hazards (shallow depth or dangerous shoals, for example), or the danger of collision can increase due to “bottlenecking” and increased congestion. Furthermore, because they are, by definition, proximate to land and to land-based means of military power, they are at risk of being closed or threatened by terrorist groups. Vital chokepoints lie on maritime trading routes in every ocean of the world. Many have been in constant use for hundreds of years. Others, due to changes in technology, or deterioration of existing chokepoints, may become more important in the future. For example, the Strait of Magellan may see increasing trade as global fleet of post-Panamax vessels increase. Similarly, the thinning of Arctic ice and advances in icebreaker technology may lead to increased transit through the Northwest Passage. While there are hundreds of chokepoints of regional and local economic importance, fewer than two-dozen lie on the world’s international maritime trade routes giving them global economic significance. Some of the world’s most vital global maritime trade chokepoints appear in Table 1 below:

Geographic Region Key Chokepoints Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf

Bosporus, Dardanelles, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb

Eastern Pacific Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, Luzon Strait, Singapore Strait, Makassar Strait

Europe Great Belt, Kiel Canal, Dover Strait, Strait of Gibraltar

Africa Mozambique Channel The Americas Panama Canal, Cabot Strait, Florida

Straits, Yucatan Channel, Windward Passage, Mona Passage

Table 1: The World’s Major Chokepoints

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Hub and vital ports

With the global trend toward increasingly larger container ships, fewer ports are becoming capable of handling them. The world’s largest ports, such as Singapore and Rotterdam, “collect” numerous trades at a single concentrated point; hence, the name “hub port.” [3] Chokepoints and hub ports, therefore, have similar characteristics that render them susceptible to terrorist attack – most importantly they are both places where a significant amount of global trade concentrates. Nonetheless, there are important differences in the event of terrorist attack:

“In the case of chokepoints, ships may deviate around an obstacle, and the business inventory cycles can adjust accordingly, since the amount of extra transit times can be calculated with a high degree of certainty. With hub ports, the effect is both cascading and chaotic, since ships in a hub-and-spoke network adhere to a stringent and fixed sailing schedule. This, in turn, makes the necessary adjustments in inventory cycles more difficult to formulate quickly and effectively.” [4]

While no definitive “hub port” list exists, a partial list of some of the world’s largest ports and hub ports appears in Table 2:

Geographic Region Major Ports

Eastern Pacific Singapore, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Pusan, Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Port Klang, Tanjung Pelepas

Europe Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, Genoa, La Spezia, Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Gothenburg

Africa Durban The Americas Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax, New

York/New Jersey, Houston, South Louisiana, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Santos, Buenos Aires

Table 2: Ports and Hub Ports

Some of these – due to their geographic location, in addition to their importance to global trade – may be vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Terrorist Threats to the World’s Chokepoints and Hub Ports

No terrorist attack has yet occurred directly against a chokepoint or hub port. This said, there is enough intelligence to make us aware that this is being contemplated by terrorist groups, and that the danger exists. A few examples illustrate global concerns about chokepoint/port vulnerabilities.

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Singapore and the Straits of Malacca

A terrorist attack on the Port of Singapore is one of the “nightmare” scenarios of global shipping. The Port of Singapore is the world’s busiest in terms of shipping tonnage handled, with 1.04 billion gross tons in 2004, and 393 million tons of cargo in 2004, surpassing Rotterdam for the first time. Singapore is ranked second globally in terms of containerized traffic, and is the world's busiest hub for transhipment traffic, and the world’s largest bunkering hub. [5] The terrorist threat to Singapore is real. In 2001, Singapore authorities arrested 12 alleged al Qaeda members suspected of planning an attack on the island nation's deep-water Navy port. The suspected target was the US aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, which was scheduled for a port call. [6] Two tons of explosives intended for use in the attack were not immediately located. [7] Of similar concern, in March 2003, the chemical tanker M/T Dewi Madrim was boarded in the Straits of Malacca. The pirates robbed the crew, but then spent the next hour practicing sailing the vessel through the crowded straits. The captain and first officer were kidnapped, and experts at the time commented that “[t]here’s a very strong possibility that we’re looking at the equivalent of a flight training school for terrorists.” [8] The concern was that this could have been a “practice run” for an attack on Singapore’s port facilities. Also, in 2004 it was reported that Jemaah Islamiyah was planning to seize an oil tanker in the Straits of Malacca for use in a terror attack. The group planned to seize a vessel with the assistance of local pirates. The hijacked ship would then be wired with explosives and directed at other vessels, sailed towards a port, or used to threaten the narrow and congested Straits. [9] A near miss occurred in 1999, when pirates seized the oil tanker Chaumont near Singapore. With the crew tied up, the pirates let the ship sail for over an hour with no one at the helm in one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. [10] Additionally, in 2005, the Tri Samudra carrying methane gas was boarded by more than thirty armed pirates, who briefly took control of the ship before taking two members of the crew for ransom. The vessel’s owners believed the pirates were rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). [11] Concerns have also been voiced that Al Qaeda could detonate a “dirty bomb” in the Straits of Malacca to disrupt world shipping – more than 600 ships a day, and 25% of world trade moves through the straits. [12] This includes half of all sea shipments of oil bound for East Asia, and two-thirds of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments. [13] These straits are so narrow (only 2.8 kilometers wide at the narrowest point) that a single burning supertanker and its spreading oil slick could block the route for other tankers, possibly for up to several weeks. [14]

Gibraltar

Linking the Mediterranean with the Atlantic Ocean, the Strait of Gibraltar is a vital link between Southern European and Eastern Mediterranean ports and the rest of the world. The Strait is approximately fourteen kilometres wide at its narrowest point. While it would be very difficult to close the strait entirely as a result of a terrorist attack (it is over 300 meters deep), the psychological impact of such an attack cannot be overestimated.

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In 2002, three Saudi men were arrested in Morocco on suspicion of plotting to attack US and British warships in the Strait. [15] A Moroccan official stated that the men planned to sail small dinghies carrying explosives into the Straits of Gibraltar to attack the vessels, similar to how the attack on the USS Cole had been executed while it was refuelling off Yemen in 2000. When Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, one of the highest-ranking Al Qaeda officials, was captured in 2002 he confirmed he had masterminded the Gibraltar plot. Despite the arrests, concerns about Al Qaeda’s intentions continued, and in 2003, US military vessels, along with their Spanish counterparts, provided escort for US flagged-vessels transiting the Strait. [16]

Turkish Straits

The Turkish Straits – seventeen miles long, and only half a mile wide at their narrowest point – are the only shipping route for the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Some 50,000 vessels per year transit the Bosporus and Dardanelles – the same as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. An attack on the Straits could block traffic for a significant amount of time, as past accidents in the region have shown. For example, in 1994 the Greek Cypriot tanker Nassia collided with another ship in the Straits. Thirty seamen were killed, and 20,000 tons of oil were spilled into the Straits, creating a slick that burned for 5 days, seriously impeding the flow of shipping. Of additional concern is a suicide attack on a vessel carrying dangerous materials. In this case the impact would be not only to block the strategic waterway, but also to inflict significant human costs. For example, if a ship carrying liquid petroleum gas were attacked in the Turkish Straits, scientists estimate the impact could be the same as an 11.0 earthquake on the Richter scale: [17] “it will threaten the whole of Istanbul like an atomic bomb” and could “reach 50 kilometers in diameter.” [18] Of the 50,000 ships transiting the Straits each year, up to 8,000 carry some form of hazardous cargo. [19] While there has been on direct attack on the Straits, terrorists affiliated with the Kurdish Hizbullah are known to have targeted the Turkish port of Antalya where they had expected an Israeli cruise ship to dock. The ship, however, failed to appear due to inclement weather. [20]

Strait of Hormuz

Two-fifths of the world’s oil trade, and over 80% of Persian Gulf oil transits the Strait of Hormuz by ship. In 2004, British police arrested one of its citizens suspected of terrorist activities – a search of him home found plans to attack US military vessels in the Persian Gulf. The documents described naval vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack and provided specific examples of how the ships might be attacked. [21] In President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address, he referred to a number of “terrorist plots” that had been “foiled” by US intelligence. Later information provided by the White House referred to a plan disrupted in 2002 to attack ships in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf. [22]

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Bab al-Mandeb/Horn of Africa

The Bab al-Mandeb strait linking the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea is one of the most strategic shipping lanes in the world, with an estimated 3 million barrels per day (bbl/d) oil flow. [23] Disruption to shipping in the strait could prevent tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden from reaching the Suez Canal, instead requiring them at great cost to transit the southern tip of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. While it is not possible for a terrorist attack to block this strategic chokepoint, attacks that have occurred have placed an economic burden on shipping in the area. Maritime insurers, for example, have raised the premiums charged to cover tankers in risky waters – premiums charged for tankers passing through Yemeni waters have tripled since the Limburg attack. For a typical supertanker carrying about two million barrels of oil, this “terror premium” has meant an increase of $300,000 per trip (from $150,000 to $450,000), adding about 15 cents a barrel to the cost of the oil. [24] As noted in a previous case study (Direct Attacks on Ships), the Somali government has posted warnings of warnings such about increased piracy in Somali waters: Shipping companies "should try and avoid the waters of Somalia," said Abdirahman Yusuf Meygag, an aide to Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. [25] While maritime piracy is not maritime terrorism, the warning does go to show that concerns over criminal activities in general can have a negative impact on the use of key strategic chokepoints in some parts of the world. The attack on the Limburg prompted a warning by the U.S. Navy's Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, stating that shipping interests should use “extreme caution” when transiting chokepoints such as Bab el-Mandeb. Following the attack, al-Qaeda warned that the Limburg attack "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but...on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word." [26] In response, the United States has deployed a joint task force to Djibouti, along with Italian, Spanish and German frigates, to counter possible terrorist threats to shipping in this area. [27]

Costs of Terrorist Attacks on Chokepoints and Ports: Some Estimates

While the above discussion does not represent an exhaustive list of chokepoint and hub port vulnerabilities, it does provide a sense of how susceptible the world’s shipping routes and infrastructure could be to terrorist attacks, and that terrorist groups around the world realize this and are planning for it. It is also clear that, were an attack to occur in a key port or chokepoint, not only could the loss of life be significant (due to frequent proximity to population centers), but so could the economic costs. There are examples where accidents in strategic chokepoints, resulting in a partial or complete blockage, imposed delays and, therefore, increased costs to affected shipping. For example, in November 2004, the fuel tanker Tropic Brilliance broke down in the Suez Canal, blocking immediate passage for forty ships while the canal remained closed. [28] Over 100 ships were ultimately affected for the five days the Canal remained closed, with the lost revenue to the Egyptian Government estimated at $7 million/day. [29]

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Shutdowns of ports due to terrorist attack could lead to substantial economic costs. For example, the eleven-day lockout at 29 major US west coast ports in 2002 (although clearly not due to a terrorist incident) delayed the unloading of more than 200 ships carrying 300,000 containers. The estimated cost to the US economy due to the lockout was approximately $466.9 million. [30] Extrapolating for a four-week shutdown, the reduction in US income is estimated at $4.7 billion (0.56% of 2002 US GDP), of which US losses would be: [31] • $84 million to US workers • $2.9 billion to US industry • $48 million to US maritime industry producers • $1.6 billion to US exporters • $58 million to US consumers In addition: • 0.4 percent of Asian nominal GDP • 1.1 percent of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysian nominal GDP A terrorist incident does not have to result in a port shutdown or the complete closing of a chokepoint to have an economic impact. For example, a study of over 200 countries from 1968 to 1979 estimated a doubling of the number of terrorist incidents decreased bilateral trade between the affected economies by about six per cent. [32] There are economic costs in addition to those that might be incurred were a terrorist attack to occur; that is, the economic costs associated with preventing such an attack. Compliance with the 2002 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), the first and “front line” against terrorist attacks, has been estimated at $1.3 billion to global ship operators, and $730 million per year after that. [33] This is significant for all countries, but places a very heavy burden on smaller countries. Estimates for the Caribbean nations run at over $100 million per year, a sum many of these nations may be hard-pressed to afford. [34]

Preventing Attacks on Chokepoints and Hub Ports

Preventing an attack on a vital chokepoint or a hub port requires the careful monitoring and inspection of all ships in a given area. Generally this falls under two domains: • State and regional patrols of key ports and waterways, and • The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) – implemented by the

IMO to ensure the integrity of all ships, their cargoes, and their crews.

The ISPS Code

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) was established after the 9/11 attacks in the United States highlighted the vulnerability not only of aviation, but of all forms of transportation. The ISPS consists of a comprehensive set of measure to “enhance the security of ships and port facilities” through the establishment of “a standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk” which will allow states to establish

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“appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures” in response to existing and identified threats. [35] The ISPS Code is based on the need to reduce vulnerability as threat increases. The code establishes a number of minimum functional security requirements for ships and port facilities. For ships, these requirements include [36]: · ship security plans · ship security officers · company security officers · certain onboard equipment For port facilities: · port facility security plans · port facility security officers · certain security equipment In addition the requirements for ships and for port facilities include: · monitoring and controlling access · monitoring the activities of people and cargo · ensuring security communications are readily available

Domestic and Regional Patrols

All states, to a greater or lesser degree, attempt to ensure the integrity of their territorial waters through routine naval patrols meant to detect and deter illegal activity. This said, some states have stronger enforcement regimes than others, in many cases due differences in the ability of the state to afford policing actions. In those cases where financial constraints are an issue, other states have offered assistance (though this has not always been accepted). The United States, for example, has proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to facilitate the sharing of relevant security information and coordination of potential responses. In those areas of the world considered to be particularly vulnerable, additional programs have been proposed. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have begun the joint Eyes in the Sky air patrols, meant to detect and deter suspicious activity in the Straits of Malacca, specifically related to piracy, but also highly relevant to suspected terrorist activities.


• Which chokepoints and/or hub ports do you believe are most vulnerable to terrorist attack?

• Attacks on which chokepoints and/or hub ports would cause the greatest economic

harm to the global economy?

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• How easy is it to prevent an attack on a chokepoint or a hub port? • Will programs such as the Eyes in the Sky make attacks on chokepoints or hub ports

less likely?

References

[134] (1998). The Ocean, our Future....The Report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans. Independent World Commission on the Oceans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 186.

[135] SLOC and chokepoint definitions are drawn from Nincic, Donna. 2002. Sea-Lane Security and US Maritime Trade. Sam J. Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime Power. Washington DC: NDU Press. <ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_ 2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/09_ch08.htm>.

[136] Coulter, Daniel Y. (2002). Globalization of Maritime Commerce: The Rise of Hub Ports. Sam J. Tangredi, ed. Globalization and Maritime Power. Washington DC: NDU Press. <ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/ Globalization_ and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/08 _ch07.htm>.

[137] Coulter. (Note 3). [138] (2005). Singapore. Wikipedia. <wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore#Transport>. [139] Hess. Pamela. (28 December 2001). Terror Plot on US Carrier Foiled. Singapore Window.

<singapore-window.org/sw01/011228up.htm>. [140] Kolesnikov, Sonia. (2 Januray 2002). Singapore denies getting US terror intel. Singapore Window.

<singapore-window.org/sw02/020102u1.htm>. [141] Glass, Charles. (10 September 2003). “Terror on the high seas?” ABCNews.com. [142] Sherwell, Philip, Massoud Ansari and Marianne Kearney. (12 September 2004). Al Qa'eda terrorists

'plan to turn tanker into a floating bomb'. The Telegraph. <telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/12/wterr 12.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/12/ixportal.html>.

[143] Mihailescu, Andrea R. (16 July 2004). Feature: Piracy still lurks the high seas. The Washington Times. <washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040716-043422-2867r.htm>.

[144] (14 March 2005). Pirates storm Indonesian tanker. BBC News. <news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/asia-pacific/4347167.stm>.

[145] (2002). U.S. warns of terrorist threat in Asian waters. American Maritime Officer. <amo-union.org/Newspaper/Morgue/5-2004/Sections/News/ warning.htm>.

[146] Threats to Oil Transport. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. <iags.org/oiltransport.html>. [147] Threats to Oil Transport (note 13). [148] (11 June 2002). Gibraltar plotters 'funded by Bin Laden'. The Guardian. <guardian.co.uk/print/

0,3858,4431506-107226,00.html>. [149] (28 March 2003). USCGC Dallas Homepage. <uscg.mil/lantarea/ cutter/dallas/ updates01.htm>. [150] Inan, Yüksel. (March-May 2001). The Current Regime of the Turkish Straits. Perceptions: Journal

of International Affairs 6, 1. <mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-1/default.htm> [151] Naegele, Jolyon (23 June 1998). Turkey: Caspian Oil Presents Challenge to the Straits. Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty. <www.rferl.org>. [152] Richardson, Michael. (25 February 2004). A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related

Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Viewpoints, Institute of South East Asian Studies. <iseas.edu.sg/ viewpoint/mricfeb04.pdf>.

[153] (24 January 2005). Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. <iags.org/n0124051.htm>.

[154] (7 August 2004). UK Terror Suspect had Plans to Attack Gulf Ships. Sify News. <sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=13538971>.

[155] (7 October 2005). White House Lists 10 Foiled Attacks. CNN.com. <edition.cnn.com/2005/ US/10/06/whitehouse.plots/>.

[156] (October 2005). Country Analysis Briefs: Yemen. Energy Information Agency, US Department of Energy. <eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Yemen /Background.html>.

[157] Threats to Oil Transport (note 13). [158] (28 September 2005). Alarming rate of piracy in Somalia. USA Today.

<usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09-28-somalia-piracy_x.htm>.

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[159] (November 2002). World Oil Transit Chokepoints. US Energy Information Agency. <eia.doe.gov/emeu/ security/choke.html>.

[160] (6 May 2003). Operations in Iraq. International Institute for Strategic Studies. <iiss.org/iraqCrisis-more.php?itemID=137>.

[161] (8 November 2004). Daily Shipping Newsletter 2004. Vlierodam Wire Ropes Ltd. No. 229. [162] (9 November 2004). Daily Shipping Newsletter 2004. Vlierodam Wire Ropes Ltd. No. 230. [163] (September 2003). Costs of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy and the Benefits of Working Together.

Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. <dfat.gov.au/publications/catalogue/costs_of_ maritime_security.pdf>.

[164] Costs of Maritime Terrorism, (note 25). [165] Costs of Maritime Terrorism, (note 25). [166] (July 2003). Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact. Maritime

Transport Committee, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

[167] (12 August 2004). Anti-Terrorism Costs Could Bring Caribbean to its Knees. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. <coha.org/NEW_PRESS_ RELEASES/New_Press_Releases_2. 004/04.51_ISPS1.htm>.

[168] FAQ on ISPS Code and Maritime Security. International Maritime Organization. <imo.org>. [169] (December 2002). IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures. International

Maritime Organization. <imo.org>.