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INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE 103 Tanah Merah Coast Road, #02-01
Singapore 498750
Tel: +65 9626 8965 (Hotline)
+65 6594 5728 (Office)
Fax: +65 6594 5734
www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg
05 Mar 18
UPDATE ON MARSEC SITUATION IN IFC’S AOI – January to December 2017
The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) recorded the Maritime Security (MARSEC)
Situation in the IFC’s Area of Interest (AOI) since Jan 16, with data corresponding from
Jan 13. This document contains briefs covering separate maritime security categories which
IFC monitors and reports on. All incidents were grouped into the following categories for
2017: Contraband Trafficking (CT); Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU);
Irregular Human Migration (IHM); Maritime Terrorism (MT); Maritime Incidents (MI);
Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea (TRAPS). These briefs have been produced with IFC data
collated from open sources and incorporates inputs from the International Liaison Officers
(ILOs) deployed at the IFC.
The aim of this document is to provide an update to the MARSEC situation in the IFC’s AOI
for each MARSEC threat category for Jan – Dec 2017 and highlight any observed changes in
patterns or modus operandi when compared with preceding years.
It should be duly noted that all data and information in this document was obtained from open
sources, and only constitute what was reported. It is not an exact representation of all
incidents that have occurred at sea as incidents may go un-reported to local or flag-state
authorities. Any reference to analysis made from this document should take into
consideration the above-mentioned limitation. We hope you find this update useful in shaping
and/or cueing your respective MARSEC operations accordingly.
Yours Sincerely,
<via email>
SLTC Raymond Ong
Head Information Fusion Centre
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Acknowledgements
This document is made possible with the active collaboration and effort of the following
officers:
CAPT Jean-Rene Degans, France ILO
CDR Eduardo Zevallos Roncagliolo, Peru ILO
CDR Jianpeng Zhu, China ILO
CDR Surachai Saiwongpanya, Thailand ILO
CDR Vuong Dinh Manh, Vietnam ILO
LCDR Andrew William Carey, United
Kingdom ILO
LCDR Andrew Wilson, New Zealand ILO
LCDR Aston Talbot, New Zealand ILO
LCDR Joseph T Dimayuga, Philippines ILO
LCDR Kyaw Thet Tin, Myanmar ILO
LCDR Mark Williams, Australia ILO
LCDR Mohd Nor Hadidi Ismail, Malaysia
ILO
LCDR Richard Elsom, Australia ILO
LCDR Tejinder Pal Singh, India ILO
LCDR Yohanes Berchmans Cahyono,
Indonesia ILO
MAJ Eric Ang, Head Shipping Engagement
LT David Copeland, United States ILO
LT Mao Sovanda, Cambodia ILO
LT Norlaila Binti Awang Harlip, Brunei ILO
LT Tomoya Kimura, Japan ILO
LTA Chong De Xian, IFC Staff Officer
LTA Nicholas Yong, IFC Staff Officer
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Contents
Maritime Terrorism (MT) & Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea (TRAPS)
4
Contraband Trafficking (CT)
18
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU)
34
Irregular Human Migration (IHM)
42
Maritime Incidents (MI)
45
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1. Maritime Terrorism (MT) & Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea
(TRAPS)
Figure 1: TRAPS-MT Incident Locations in 2017
Figure 1 indicates the IFC’s AOI TRAPS-MT incident locations from Jan to Dec, 2017. The
incidents were geographically recorded and color-coded for profiling purposes, reflecting a
total of eight sub-groups (ref. legend). Based on the incident locations, a total of seven
hotspots were identified:
1. Batangas and Manila Anchorage,
2. Chittagong Anchorage and Approaches,
3. Sulu and Celebes Sea,
4. Samarinda anchorage,
5. West Java,
6. Singapore Strait, and,
7. South China Sea.
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In addition, four other anchorages which share similar incident profiles were identified in
areas with fewer incidents and characterised by little to no violence1. The four areas share the
same pattern with all incidents occurring during periods of darkness and/or low visibility,
with most of the incidents occurring while the vessels were at anchor. These areas are:
1. Dumai anchorage,
2. Belawan anchorage,
3. Quangninh anchorage, and,
4. Tianjin anchorage.
Figure 2: Snapshots of the anchorages of Dumai, Quang-Nih, Belawan and Tianjin
Key events for 2017:
1. Theft of Oil Cargo
a. A foiled-piracy attempt occurred, involving a product tanker carrying diesel
oil, while underway at vicinity 54NM east off Kuala Dungun, Malaysia.
Civilian-stakeholder vigilance, cooperation and information-sharing between
the respective governmental authorities led to a timely and successful
1 Perpetrators were reportedly unarmed and typically escaping when spotted by crew members.
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operational response, which prevented oil siphoning and ensured the swift
arrest of 10 perpetrators and the detention of one pirate vessel.
b. A Thailand-Flagged Chemical/Products Tanker (C.P. 41) loaded with 3.8
million litres of diesel was attacked by six armed men near Kuantan, Malaysia
while heading from Singapore to the southern Thai province of Songkhla (Lat
03°55.27'N, Long 103° 52.8'E) on 232100H Jun 2017. Armed with guns and
knives, the perpetrators boarded the vessel, captured the captain and the crew
members and destroyed communications equipment, before pumping 1.5
million litres of fuel into their ship and subsequently fleeing the area.
c. A Thailand-Flagged product tanker “MGT 1”, was attacked by 10 perpetrators
while the vessel was underway at (Lat: 05°05.53N, Long: 104°14.45E) on
070103H Sep 2017. Another three perpetrators were waiting on a small fast
boat alongside the product tanker. Once in control, they forced the crew to
siphon 900 tons (of the 2000 tons on-board) of diesel oil onto a pirate’s
mother-ship. The MMEA Special Forces Team was deployed using an AW-
139 helicopter, boarding the MGT-1 approximately three hours later. 10
perpetrators were apprehended, while the other three perpetrators and the
mother-ship managed to escape. There was no further news on the stolen fuel
or the mother-ship. All of the crew members were safely rescued.
d. A Malaysian-Flagged tug and barge “EVER PROSPER” and “EVER
OMEGA” was boarded by an unknown number of perpetrators (Lat 2 12
40.08N, Long 107 06 18.66E) on 221716H Nov 2017. Perpetrators removed
fuel from the tug EVER PROSPER and stole the barge-in-tow, EVER
OMEGA, which contained 3700 tons of crude palm kernel oil. The company
reported that six of the 10 crew were also taken with the barge. The Malaysian
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and the Indonesia Marine Police
(IMP) were subsequently informed, and on 222140H Nov 2017, the
Indonesian ILO reported that the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) confirmed the
barge EVER OMEGA was recovered, with the six crew on-board unharmed.
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2. Kidnap for Ransom
a. The Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA) led to positive
developments/outcomes pertaining to the successful pursuit operations
launched against elements of the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Coordinated
police, ground, air and naval operations conducted simultaneously by the
respective government agencies in the tri-boundary area effectively curtailed
the ASG’s ability to conduct sea-based kidnapping.
b. A Malaysian-Flagged fishing boat (registration number BN 838/4F) with its
engine still running was found abandoned in waters off Langawan island (Lat:
06°04.00N, Long:118°20.00E) in southern Philippines on 191405L Jan 2017.
The suspected abduction (which was later confirmed) involved three
Indonesian crew members, who were identified as Hamdan Salim (29),
Subandi Sattu (47), and Sudaling Samandung (26).
c. A Philippines-Flagged fishing trawler, while sailing near Pangutaran town off
Sulu (Lat: 6° 34'N Long: 120° 26'E), was attacked by a group of perpetrators
on-board a speedboat on 142015L Oct 2017. Five crew members were
subsequently abducted by the perpetrators once the trawler was boarded.
d. A Vietnam-Flagged motor vessel “GIANG HAI” was attacked at 17NM North
of Pearl Bank, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines (Lat: 6° 9'4.00"N, Long:
119°39'4.00"E) on 192015L Oct 2017. After destroying the vessel navigation
systems, the perpetrators killed one crew member and abducted a further six.
(There were 17 Crew Members in total).
e. A Philippines-Flagged tug boat “SUPER SHUTTLE TUG 1” was attacked
1.7NM off Sibago Island, Philippines, while towing the cargo vessel “SUPER
SHUTTLE RORO 9” (Lat: 6° 42’ 33.26”N, Long: 122° 24’ 51.84”E) on
231215L Mar 2017. At least three armed perpetrators boarded the vessels, and
two of the crew members on-board were abducted. There were no further
reports.
f. A Philippine-Flagged fishing boat was attacked by at least five suspects who
boarded the boat in the southern waters of the Philippines (Lat: 06°52'0.00"N,
Long. 122° 1'60.00"E) on 092000L Jan 2017, killing eight of the 15 crew
members on the spot. Two crew members were found nearby and the other
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five crew members earlier reported as missing were later found hiding on a
nearby island after they were able to escape from the boat.
3. Attacks at Sea
a. A Taiwan-Flagged fishing boat “JIN JIN HE FA 2” was attacked by an
unidentified iron shell boat, 113NM (22 37N 117 45E) southwest of Penghu,
Taiwan. Three robbers came on-board and took away $200,000 in Taiwanese
currency (US$6578). After being informed by the Taiwan Coast Guard,
China’s Shantou Coast Guard arrested the iron boat and 14 suspects offshore
of the city of Shantou on 14 Jul 2017.
b. A Singapore-flagged tug boat “JAYA CRYSTAL” and her barge, were
attacked while underway off Cox Bazar, Bangladesh (Lat: 21°11'0.00"N,
Long: 91°43'0.00"E) on 231000H Jan 2017. The perpetrators approached the
vessel on several skiffs and succeeded in boarding the vessel. A fire
subsequently broke out on the barge. The perpetrators subsequently left the
vessel when a Bangladeshi naval asset arrived on-scene. The crew members
were unharmed and nothing was stolen.
General Observation(s):
Figure 3: Yearly recorded number of incidents per month for 2015, 2016 and 2017
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Yearly recorded Number of Incidents per
Month
2015 2016 2017
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There is a decrease in the total number of TRAPS-MT incidents recorded for 2017, as
compared to 2015 and 2016. A total of 119 incidents were recorded for the period in review,
which corresponds to a decrease from 149 incidents in 2016 and 258 incidents in 2015,
respectively. The downward trend of incidents reflects the stakeholders’ increased security
awareness, and increased collaboration and responses from navies and maritime security
agencies, together with the shipping community. According to the yearly profile covering
monthly incident occurrences for the past three years (2015-2017), there is an upward trend
of incidents from Aug to Dec 2017 as compared to the previous years’ data.
Figure 4: Profiling of the type of incidents (left) and the type of vessels targeted (right)
In addition, majority of the 119 incidents recorded involved sea theft (41%), followed by
attempted actions (31%) and sea robbery (16%). Tankers accounted for the majority of
incidents (34%), followed by bulk carriers (26%), container ships (12%), and tug & barges
(10%). The type of vessels affected also corresponds to the volume of traffic undertaken by
these particular vessel types.
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Hotspots Profile(s) and Key Observation(s):
Figure 5: Overview of hotspot in relation to volume and level of violence in 2017
The illustration above provides an overview of each hotspot in relation to the level of
violence, and the volume of incidents in each area. The majority of the hotspot areas involve
low levels of physical violence, characterized by the perpetrators’ non-confrontational
behaviour. However, the South China Sea and the Sulu and Celebes Sea were notable for
their medium to high level of violence, which is defined by armed perpetrators threatening,
injuring and/or taking the crew for kidnap for ransom (KFR) purposes.
Singapore Straits and Approaches
Compared to the overall AOI’s hotspots which constitutes an average of 10-20 incidents per
hotspot, the Singapore Strait and its nearby approaches registered a higher range of incidents
at 26 incidents (out of the 119 recorded incidents in the AOI).
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Figure 6: Incidents within the Singapore Straits and its approaches in 2017
Key Observation(s) (refer to IFC spot commentary 1-18 for details):
1. Vessels which are anchored or stationary outside of designated anchorage areas
covering the eastern approaches to the Singapore Strait were more susceptible to
attacks, as compared to those in designated anchorage areas adjacent to the Singapore
Strait;
2. There is a developing trend of vessels being targeted in both the eastbound and
westbound lanes, within the eastern part of the Singapore Strait. The number of
westbound vessels being attacked has increased as compared to the previous year’s
trends of targeting eastbound vessels;
3. Majority of the attacks against vessels anchored and underway occurred during night
time or in periods of low visibility;
4. Vessel types which constitute a larger percentage of the overall traffic volume (i.e.
numerically more in absolute numbers); and vessels which operate at slower speed
and with lower freeboards are more likely to be targeted in this area;
5. More than half (14) of the reported incidents (26) were foiled due to crew alertness
and diligent observation of best practises, e.g. regular patrols and locking down access
points; and timely reporting to coastal authorities; and,
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6. Level of violence is low, as characterised by the perpetrators’ non-confrontational
behaviour.
Sulu-Celebes Sea
Figure 7: Incidence in the Sulu-Celebes Sea in 2017
Key Observation(s):
1. Incident timings and day of occurrences are not indicative of any trends or patterns;
2. The type of vessels targeted were tankers, container ships, cargo ships and fishing
vessels, which is consistent with data collected by the IFC since 2015, that vessels
characterized by low freeboard, low speed and limited manoeuvrability (fishing
vessels, tugs and barges) while in transit near island have the highest number of
reported incidents that is related to kidnapping and maritime terrorism.
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3. Over 77% of the incidents in the area happened while the vessels were underway,
60% of which were successful. Of the incidents that were not successful, the
perpetrators were either foiled by Philippines’s law enforcement agencies, or by
detection and evasive manoeuvres resulting from the ship’s vigilance and early
warning practices;
4. High level of violence has been recorded in this area with perpetrators taking crew
members for kidnap and for ransom (KFR) activities;
5. KFR incidents perpetrated by ASG involving transiting vessels have significantly
reduced due to increased coordination and combined military and law enforcement
operations conducted by Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia under Trilateral
Cooperative Agreement (TCA) (refer to IFC Spot Commentary 5/17 for details);
Manila and Batangas Anchorage
Figure 8: Incidents in the Manila and Batangas Anchorage in 2017
Key Observation(s):
1. Sea theft is prevalent in both anchorage areas, constituting most of the recorded
incidents. Level of violence is low with perpetrators indicating non-confrontational
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behaviour. However, perpetrators were reported to have carried knives and tools for
forcible entry and self-protection when necessary;
2. Tankers constitute the larger percentage of the overall volume in Batangas, while
container ships were the main targets in Manila;
3. Over 78% of all incidents were at anchor and over 89% of all incidents were
successful;
4. All incidents transpired during the period of darkness;
5. Common items lost/taken in Batangas anchorage are brass-made items such as
signal/forecastle bells, fire nozzles, hydrant covers/caps, airline valve caps:
6. Common items lost/taken in Manila anchorage are Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
equipment, breathing apparatus, fireman’s outfits, life rafts and immersion suits.
Chittagong Anchorage and Approaches
Figure 9: Incidents in the Chittagong Anchorage and its Approaches in 2017
Key Observation(s):
1. The time and day of incidents occurring are not indicative of any trends or patterns,
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2. 72.7% of incidents were observed to have occurred in Jan, Feb and Dec, 2017;
3. Majority of the incidents recorded are sea thefts, characterized by low level of
violence with perpetrators indicating non-confrontational behaviour. However,
perpetrators were reported to carry knives and tools for forcible entry;
4. The types of vessels targeted in this area are tugs, barges and container vessels, most
of which were anchored at the time of the incidents. Of all the incidents that occurred,
over 82% were successful;
5. Over 66.6% of the incidents in which the perpetrators were reportedly spotted were
successful.
South China Sea
Figure 10: Incidents in the South China Sea in 2017
Key Observation(s):
1. All incidents transpired during periods of darkness, and when all involved vessels
were underway;
2. All incidents in the area were successful attacks;
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3. The types of vessels targeted were tugs & barges, as well as tankers. Within this area,
there were three cases of oil cargo theft, involving perpetrators that employed similar
modus operandi (MO);
4. Incidents occurring near the Anambas islands have also been consistently noted since
2016, with three sea robbery incidents occurring in 2016 and 2017;
5. Medium level of violence was employed by the perpetrators, with crew being held-up
and harmed into submission.
West Java and Samarinda
Figure 11: Incidents in the West Java and Samarindain 2017
Key Observation(s):
1. All of the incidents occurred during periods of darkness;
2. The types of vessels targeted include tankers and bulk carriers at anchor, consisting of
seven in West Java and six in Samarinda;
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3. The items stolen by perpetrators tend to be small items such as crew member’s
personal belongings, ropes and paint. There were no reports of ship’s spares being
stolen;
4. Four of the recorded incidents were not reported to local authorities.
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2. Contraband Trafficking (CT)
Introduction:
Contraband Trafficking (CT) is a lucrative business that commands significant revenue
through the transfer of illegal goods, involving both organised syndicates at the transnational
level and individuals at the domestic level. The aim of this update is to correlate the
MARSEC situation in IFC’s AOI for 2017 on CT, to identify trends on specific hot spots and
potential maritime routes previously reported.
Definitions:
Contraband Trafficking is defined as the act of conducting trade or business, especially of
an illicit kind, of goods that are prohibited by law from being exported or imported; illegally
imported or exported goods.
To provide clarity and alignment in this report, the following terms are as defined:
1. Drugs Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are substances with a physiological
effect on the body E.g. Methamphetamine, Cocaine, Cannabis;
2. Natural Resources Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are resources that are
harvested from nature E.g. Gold, Sandalwood, Wood, Gas, Sand;
3. Domestic Products Smuggling When the smuggled goods are either common
household products or manufactured items E.g. rice, flour, salt, gas cylinders, plastic,
cars;
4. Cigarettes Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are a product of the tobacco plant
E.g. cigarettes, cigars;
5. Wildlife Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are live animals or animal parts listed
under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES); E.g. elephant tusk, pangolin scales, tortoises, sloths;
6. Fuel Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are any kind of fuel E.g. diesel, petrol,
Marine Gas Oil (MGO);
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7. Weapons Smuggling: When the goods smuggled are designed for inflicting bodily
harm or any form of damage E.g. guns, explosives etc.;
General Overview
Figure 1: Contraband Trafficking Incidents in IFC’S AOI for 2017
Figure 1 gives a general overview of various CT incidents that occurred in the IFC’s AOI in
2017. The IFC has classified the incidents recorded nto eight categories (as shown in the
legend). Each of the sub-categories has been analysed in detail in the subsequent part of the
report. There were a total of 353 reported CT incidents in 2017, which reflects a reduction in
comparison to 2016 (390 incidents reported) and an increase in 2015 (316 incidents reported).
The comparison has to be assessed with two important aspects in mind; 1) stringent
preventive measures undertaken by various law enforcement agencies, and 2) the activeness
and frequency of such incidents being reported by the resident media. Figure 2 depicts the
data shown above.
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Figure 2: Number of CT Incidents in the months of Jan-Dec in 2015, 2016, and 2017
The graph below reflects the categorical percentage of various goods smuggled in the IFC’s
AOI in 2017. Drugs remained the most smuggled category with 134 reported incidents,
followed by domestic products (88 reported incidents) and wildlife smuggling (48 reported
incidents). Cigarettes (35 reported incidents), natural resources (21 reported incidents) and
fuel (18 reported incidents) make up the remaining contraband smuggled within the maritime
domain of the IFC’s AOI. It should be noted that the numbers signify the smuggling that was
undertaken through maritime routes and, that weapons smuggling was the least reported
contraband (only four reported incidents).
Figure 3: Percentage of incidents in accordance to category
39%
25%
14%
10%
6% 5% 1%
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY
DRUGS
DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
WILDLIFE
CIGARETTES
NATURAL RESOURCES
FUEL
WEAPONS
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Key Observations:
A total of 134 cases of drugs smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the year, there
was little seasonal variation with an average of 10 to 11 incidents per month, with the lowest
in Aug 2017 (five) and the highest in Feb 2017 (12).
1. Product analysis: The most common smuggled drugs in the region were
Methamphetamine (including its precursors), Cannabis, Heroin, Cocaine, and small
amounts of other drugs like Ganja, Hashish, and Hash etc. Although by the number
of incidents, Cannabis remained the most commonly smuggled drug (49%), followed
by Methamphetamine (22%), Heroin (13%) and Cocaine (2%), the pattern was
different in terms of quantities. When considering the quantity of drugs that was
smuggled, Methamphetamine (48%) was the highest, followed by Heroin (24%),
Cannabis (21%) and Cocaine (7%). This means that although there were more
incidents in which drugs are seized, the quantities in which it was seized were
smaller. Thus, although there were lesser seizures pertaining to Methamphetamine in
the AOI, the quantities seized continue to be significantly higher.
Figure 4: Percentage of incidents as per quantity
48%
24%
21% 7% METH
HEROIN
CANNABIS
COCAINE
PERCENTAGE AS PER QUANTITY
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Figure 5: Percentage of incidents as per number of seizures
Drugs Smuggling
A brief summary on major prevalent drugs in the area is given below.
1. Cannabis: This was the most smuggled drug reported in the AOI in terms of number
of seizures, and the third most smuggled drug in terms of quantity. On an average, 4-5
incidents pertaining to Cannabis smuggling were reported each month, predominantly
in Sri Lanka and areas adjoining Palk Strait. There were also occasional marijuana
seizures reported in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong.
2. Methamphetamine: This was the most smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI in
terms of quantity, and the second most smuggled drug in terms of number of seizures.
On average, two to three incidents pertaining to Methamphetamine smuggling were
reported each month. The drug was smuggled in various forms across the AOI i.e.
between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s border as Yaba tablets, Shabu in Philippines and
sometimes in the form of precursors for the drugs in Taiwan and China. While
Indonesia reported the highest number of seizures, other countries had relatively high
number of seizures as well, such as Bangladesh, China, Philippines, Taiwan and
Thailand. Some of the more notable seizures involved one ton of methamphetamine in
Indonesia in the month of Jul 2017, and in Taiwan in Sep 2017.
3. Heroin: This was the third highest smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI, in terms
of the number of seizures, and the second most smuggled drug in terms of quantity.
49%
22%
13%
2% 14% CANNABIS
METH
HEROIN
COCAINE
OTHERS
PERCENTAGE AS PER NUMBER OF SEIZURES
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The highest number of seizures occurred in Sri Lanka, although in small quantities (a
few kilograms). However, Indian authorities made a major seizure of 1.5 tonnes in the
month of Jul 2017. There were occasional seizures of Heroin in Japan, Malaysia and
Taiwan.
4. Cocaine: This was the fourth most smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI in terms
of both quantity as well as the number of seizures. Major seizures happened in
Myanmar in Feb 2017.
5. Others: There were other drugs which were seized in the IFC’s AOI in small
quantities. The various drugs in circulation in lesser quantities continue to be Ganja,
Hashish, Hash, tramadol tablets, Pregablin, tobacco products and other illegal
medicinal products. There was no particular pattern established pertaining to these
drugs.
Sri Lanka and areas adjoining the Palk Strait remains a drug-smuggling hot spot, although
the majority of the seizures undertaken by Sri Lanka’s maritime enforcement agencies
(mainly the Sri Lankan Navy) occurred inland, rather than at sea. These inland areas in
Sri Lanka reported the highest number of Cannabis seizures, although there were
occasional seizures which were also related to Heroin and Cocaine. This year saw a major
increase in successful seizures by Indonesian enforcement agencies pertaining to
Methamphetamine, with almost 52% of seizures of the drug within the AOI undertaken
by Indonesian authorities. This possibly means that greater volumes of the drug are being
smuggled in this area, but it may also reflect the stronger bilateral/multilateral counter-
drug cooperation at the operational level.
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Figure 6: Number of drug seizures as per country
Domestic Products Smuggling
A total of 88 cases of domestic products smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the
year there was little seasonal variation with an average of 7 incidents per month. The month
with the lowest incidents was Oct 2017 (five) and the highest being Mar and Apr 2017 (nine
each).
0 50 100
Sri Lanka
Malaysia
China
Philippines
Myanmar
Bangladesh
Cannabis
Meth
Heroin
Cocaine
Others
NUMBER OF DRUG SEIZURES AS
PER COUNTRY
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=
Figure 7: Number of Domestic products smuggling incidents as per category
The patterns observed are similar to previous years, with food items being smuggled between
Indonesia, Malaysia and within the Philippines, and goods (especially electronics) being
smuggled from Hong Kong to China. Of all countries, Indonesia had incidents in all
categories of goods, ranging from alcohol, electronics and rice. Although it was not as wide-
ranging as the incidents in Malaysia and the Philippines, the diversity is broader in
comparison, from bulk food smuggling to luxury cars. In other areas, smuggling appeared to
be more specific: electronics and luxury items (cars, jade etc.) tended to occur in China/Hong
Kong. Most incidents were reported from Malaysia (24), Indonesia (22) and the Philippines
(20) with the main trend being goods that are traditionally necessities, of low value per item
and in large quantities. For example 75% of incidents in Hong Kong are luxury items
compared to incidents in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, where 65% of incidents
were necessities. Alcohol smuggling was most prevalent in Indonesia and Malaysia. It has
been observed that the general motivation behind domestic products smuggling is to evade
local taxes and customs duties.
35%
21%
16%
14%
14%
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY- DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
Food/Cooking items
Necessities
Luxury Items
Alchohal
Electronics
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Figure 8: Number of domestic products seizures as per country
Wildlife Smuggling
A total of 48 cases of wildlife smuggling were reported in 2017. The frequency of incidents
was higher between Jul and Sep, 2017 with the most number of incidents reported in Sep
2017 (Nine) and the least in Apr 2017 (One).
0 10 20 30
Malaysia
Philippines
Indonesia
China
Sri Lanka
Hong Kong
India
Cambodia
Food/Cooking Items
Necessities
Luxury Items
Alchohal
Electronics
NUMBER OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTS
SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY
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Figure 9: Number of Wildlife smuggling incidents as per category
Whilst a variety of contrabands pertaining to wildlife were smuggled through the IFC’s AOI,
the major categories that were observed to be smuggled are shown in Figure 9. Sea cucumber
smuggling was the most prevalent, with the majority of seizures occurring between India and
the Sri Lankan coast. Smuggling of endangered turtle species and tortoises was observed in
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of the pangolin scales seizures happened in
Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong. Major ivory and elephant tusks seizures were
undertaken in Vietnam, Cambodia and Hong Kong. Crocodile and shark fin seizures were
also observed in Hong Kong and China, indicating an increased demand for these items,
which are used in manufacturing traditional medicines and consumed as food. Attempts were
also made to smuggle ornamental fishes into Vietnam.
33%
16% 15%
10%
8%
8% 5% 5%
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY -
WILDLIFE SMUGGLING Sea Cucumbers
Turtles
Pangolin scales
Ivory
Crocodile meat
Shark fins
Ornamental fish
Birds
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54%
11%
11%
9%
6% 6% 3%
NUMBER OF CIGARETTES SEIZURES AS
PER COUNTRY MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
SINGAPORE
SRI LANKA
HONG KONG
TAIWAN
THAILAND
Figure 10: Number of Wildlife smuggling incidents as per category
Cigarettes Smuggling
A total of 35 cases of cigarettes products smuggling were reported in 2017. There was little
seasonal variation throughout the year, with an average of two to three incidents per month.
The highest number of incidents were reported in Dec 2017 (five), and none in May 2017.
Figure 11: Number of cigarettes seizures as per country
Cigarettes are a common commodity for smuggling, as they can be used for both black
market goods and a barter currency. The majority of cigarette smuggling incidents in the
maritime domain were reported from Malaysia (19) and when combined with Thailand,
0 5 10
India
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Vietnam
Hong Kong
China
Malaysia
Brunei
Cambodia
Sea Cucumbers
Turtles
Pangloin scales
Ivory
Crocodile meat
NUMBER OF WILDLIFE SEIZURES AS
PER COUNTRY
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Indonesia and the waters around Singapore, it accounted for 80% of the total reported
cigarette smuggling incidents within the IFC’s AOI. Some taxes in the region are now as high
as 90%. The pattern seen in South East Asia can be attributed to the supply and demand
issue, considering the price differences across the region caused by varied taxes. Even though
regional countries continue to increase tax laws to deter smoking, and step up efforts in
educating their people about the personal harm caused by nicotine, the demand for cigarettes
continues. This is because nicotine is not an illegal drug that warrants severe punishments,
unlike several other types of illegal drugs. Cigarette smuggling is a low risk, high profit
business with many willing to pay for cheaper cigarettes. Key considerations for cigarette
smugglers are as follows:
1. Lower price smuggled cigarettes can be sold for less compared to legitimate
cigarettes;
2. Higher rate of return that can be made when smuggling and avoiding taxes and duties,
and
3. High local demand for cigarettes
The bi-product of cigarette smuggling methods and routes may be associated as test routes for
other counterfeit goods, or be used to test narcotics, weapons or other human trafficking
routes at a transnational criminal level, as proposed by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) this year.
Natural Resources Smuggling
A total of 21 cases of natural resources smuggling were reported in 2017. A greater number
of incidents were reported in the second half of the year with an average of zero to one
incident in the first half of the year and two to three incidents in second part of the year. The
highest numbers of incidents were reported in Jul 2017 (five), with none in the month of May
2017.
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Figure 12: Number of Natural resources smuggling incidents as per category
The only natural resources reported being smuggled in the IFC’s AOI were gold (eight
reported incidents), wood (11 reported incidents), and sand (two reported incidents), with
smuggling of wood involving mainly sandalwood (seven), and in one case of charcoal
smuggling in Indonesia, in which the origin of the charcoal was believed to be illegal
mangrove wood. There were 8 smuggling incidents involving gold: In India (seven), these
related to the smuggling of gold (in relatively small quantities) from Sri Lanka in small boats.
Sri Lankan gold smuggled to India attracts only a small rate of return but is more likely
considered less risky that smuggling other good like narcotics. The Indian domestic market
for gold is also large; hence it is easy for smugglers to find a buyer in India. The total
reported weight of smuggled Gold was 68.7kg, with the highest single quantity being 16.3kg.
The single case in Japan was reported as 206kg and was the largest single seizure in Japan's
history. Other local news sources have reported on prolific gold smuggling in Japan
associated with organised criminal activities. The prevalence of gold in smuggling is because
it is a good commodity for laundering money, as it has global value and can be re-formed
relatively easily.
The incidents of wood smuggling (11), relates mostly to sandalwood (seven), accounting for
63% of wood related smuggling. Sandalwood is the second most valuable wood in the world
after African Blackwood, and Sandalwood oil is highly regarded for its fragrance in many
52% 38%
10%
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY-
NATURAL RESOURCES
WOOD
GOLD
SAND
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religions and is widely used as base oil in perfume manufacturing. It grows slowly and illegal
felling is leading to the species being logged unsustainably. Other wood incidents, and those
related, are more likely related to reclamation and construction demands.
Figure 13: Number of natural resources seizures as per country
Fuel Smuggling
A total of 18 cases of natural resources smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the
year, there was little seasonal variation with an average of one to two incidents per month.
The highest number of incidents was reported in Aug 2017 (four) with none in the month of
Jun 2017.
0 5 10 15
India
Indonesia
Hong Kong
Philippines
Malaysia
Japan
Sri lanka
Gold
Wood
Sand
NUMBER OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY
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Figure 14: Number of fuel smuggling incidents as per category
Figure 15: Number of fuel seizures as per country
Trends for fuel smuggling remain similar as seen in previous years. Malaysia remains a
cheaper source of diesel in ASEAN and as such, a large number of fuels related incidents
(12) have occurred there. With the areas around Singapore and Indonesia included, it
accounts for 89% of the incidents recorded by the IFC. These incidents are categorised by
barrels or drums on vessels with no documentation to account for its purchase, and fuel
47%
40%
13%
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY-
FUEL
DIESAL
PETROL
MARINE GAS OIL
0 5 10 15
Malaysia
Indonesia
Singapore
Vietnam
Sri LankaDiesalPetrolMGO
NUMBER OF FUEL SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY
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cargos delivered from bunker vessels not matching exactly to the volumes supplied. Incidents
tend to be occurring either at sea or near coastal borders, indicating that smugglers are taking
advantage of the gains made by selling cheaper fuel and avoiding taxes and duty with
commodities that are in demand.
Weapon Smuggling
There were only four incidents reported in 2017 pertaining to weapon smuggling. Two
incidents occurred in Jun 2017, both involving the smuggling of martial arts weapons in
Hong Kong, and another two incidents reported in Nov 2017, involved 21 illegal fire arms in
the Philippines and 41 pressure mines in Sri Lanka.
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3. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU)
Introduction:
The continual population growth in Asia and local fishing communities has placed increasing
pressure on marine resources and fisheries. As a result of overfishing in Southeast Asia, the
inherent lack of fish, or the severe depletion of fish stocks in certain territories, has propelled
fishing fleets to venture into neighbouring waters. This is compounded by the fact that across
the region, there are territories with a longstanding culture and history of fishing. Driven by
poor economic and social conditions among coastal communities, the locals are more
inclined to turn to illegal fishing due to the potential profits it can bring. The heavy maritime
traffic and huge area of interest makes it easy for IUU vessels to operate, and conversely
difficult for maritime agencies to monitor these activities. The possibility of a lack of proper
navigating equipment and suitable charts, on the part of the fishermen also makes it difficult
for them to identify maritime borders or to keep track of their positions where they are
allowed to fish. Other limitations include limited resources available for regional countries’
monitoring and enforcement resources, and a lack of cooperative frameworks on combating
IUU.
Definitions:
Many references to IUU fishing fail to differentiate clearly between the three forms of
fishing, and illegal fishing is often used incorrectly as shorthand, even if the term may not
accurately describe the form of fishing in question. Hence, for purposes of this report, IFC
has adopted the definitions provided by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) International Plans of Action.
1. Illegal fishing refers to activities conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters
under the jurisdiction of a state, in contravention of national laws, international
obligations or those relevant to a regional fisheries management organization;
2. Unreported fishing refers to activities that have either been unreported or misreported
to the relevant national authority or fisheries management organization whose laws
have been contravened;
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3. Unregulated fishing refers to activities conducted by vessels without nationality, or
by those flying the flag of a state not party to the regional fisheries management
organization, in a manner that is inconsistent with state responsibilities for the
conservation of living marine resources under international law or conservation and
management measures of that organization.
Area of Interest (AOI) and Regional Hot Spots:
Based on the open-source information it has gathered, the IFC has identified five hotspots in
the region (see figure 1). These include the Philippines archipelagic waters, the Gulf of
Thailand, the South China Sea, the Yellow sea and the waters of India and Sri Lanka.
Figure 1: Regional Hotspots
General Trends involving Modus Operandi:
As IUU fishing takes place all-year round and throughout the IFC’s AOI, many types of
fishing tactics and techniques can be observed. Aside from using nets and trawls, the most
common form of IUU fishing, other types include the Danish seine, blast fishing or the use of
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sodium cyanide. The size of vessels used for IUU fishing may vary, depending on the width
and depth of the waters. Small vessels tend to operate in coastal waters while larger vessels
operate outside of territorial waters. Similarities are evident across hotspots in terms of the
mode and timings of operation. The operators usually operate at night under the cover of
darkness using wooden fishing trawlers. These operators also attempt to blend in with the
local fishermen by changing their hull registration numbers, carrying fake licenses or bearing
a fake flag. The illegally caught marine products are then brought either to local markets,
shipped to neighbouring states or sold directly to foreign vessels, usually via illegal transfer
at sea.
Regional Distribution:
Philippines Archipelago
Figure 2: Philippines Archipelago
The most prominent IUU areas are in Central Visayas and Moro Gulf, Western Mindanao.
The local Filipino fishermen engage in IUU fishing by using methods such as Danish seine
fishing, blast fishing, cyanide fishing and unload their catch to fish ports nearby. While some
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of these products are brought to local markets, others are shipped to neighbouring states or
sold directly to foreign vessels in the surrounding waters. The Philippines Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) crafted a national plan of action against IUU fishing and
froze the distribution of fishing licenses for three years. It conducted recruitment of additional
maritime law enforcement personnel and implemented the VMS for Monitoring, Control and
Surveillance. BFAR also actively exchanges information with neighbouring coastal states.
Gulf of Thailand
Figure 3: Gulf of Thailand
The IUU fishing vessels in the Gulf of Thailand comprise of both locals and foreigners.
However, the number of IUU fishing activities by local vessels dramatically decreased since
Thailand has mustered its strength in combating IUU fishing. Therefore, poaching by foreign
vessel becomes a major concern in this area. The Gulf of Thailand has become a hotspot of
the IUU fishing, due to the overlapping of the maritime boundaries between Thailand and its
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neighbouring countries. Local fishing vessels as well as foreign fishing vessels poach at
night in national or neighbouring waters, shifting swiftly from one place to another to avoid
detection and arrest by local authorities.
South China Sea
Figure 4: South China Sea
Data collected by the IFC indicates that IUU fishing is a serious problem in the South China
Sea. IUU fishing activities by foreign fishing vessels occur mostly in the waters of South and
Southwest of Vietnam. Some local fishermen are venturing far into the high seas to fish for
high-value marine resources such as sea turtles, tuna and sea cucumbers. This has led to some
cases of arrests in neighbouring countries’ waters. However, there are challenges in
monitoring and enforcement by the coastal states, as foreign IUU vessels have a tendency to
disguise themselves amongst local vessels to avoid detection.
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India and Sri Lanka
Figure 5: India and Sri Lanka waters
In 2017, the IFC s identified the waters between Sri Lanka and India as IUU hotspots. In
these areas, illegal fishing activities are either domestic issues or in most cases, an inability to
respect maritime boundaries by fishermen, who mostly do not have any equipment allowing
them to precisely determine their positions at sea. There were a high number of reported local
illegal fishing practice incidents in Sri Lanka. This reflects the pro-activeness of the Sri
Lankan Navy in eradicating and reporting local illegal fishing practices in their area. In
addition, from a historical perspective, these fishermen were used to fishing without such
boundary-constraints and it will require time and effort to resolve these legacy issues.
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Yellow Sea
Figure 6: Yellow Sea
There were reports of violent confrontations between foreign poachers and the South Korea
Coast Guard, which have led to a series of near-misses, collisions, injuries and fatalities on
both sides. Enforcement of the limits of each country’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and
the negotiation regarding to maritime territorial boundaries are ongoing.
Observations of the Way Ahead:
According to the data collated and the compiled situational picture, it is evident that some
efforts has been made towards achievable solutions when dealing with the IUU Fishing
threat, and more can still be done:
1. Monitoring, Control and Surveillance: Countries can adopt more effective and
efficient monitoring systems to keep track of their own fishing vessels and ensure
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that they do not fish illegally in foreign waters, which also comprises of a more
thorough system of registration of local fishing vessels.
2. Information dissemination on fishery laws: Local governments and fishery
organizations can conduct continuous information, education and communication
programmes for local fishermen, fishing communities and commercial fishing
companies with regards to foreign fishery laws;
3. Information-sharing networks: Better information with regards to restricted
territorial waters, and demarcated boundaries can be shared actively between
countries to raise awareness among fishermen;
4. Coordinated Patrols: Neighbouring countries and enforcement agencies can step up
coordinated patrols in adjacent areas and initiate more collaboration to combat illegal
fishing;
5. Resolve the tension of maritime boundaries dispute: Claimant states must seek to
resolve tensions between pursuing maritime sustainability and retaining unlimited
access. Sovereignty and sustainability needs to be separated in the South China Sea.
Claimants might explore multilateral options under UNCLOS, which mandates that
regions shall cooperate as required to formulate and elaborate international rules,
standards, and recommended practices and procedures for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.
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4. Irregular Human Migration (IHM)
Figure 1: Location of IHM incidents from Jan to Dec, 2017 in IFC's AOI. Three
hotspots were identified: I-Coastal Area of Pengerang, II- Sulu and Celebes Sea, III-
Coastal Area of Sri Lanka
Key Observation(s):
1. Law enforcement: A total of 66 IHM incidents have been recorded in the AOI in
2017, a decrease from the figures of 2015 and 2016 respectively, and the majority of
these incidents occurred in West Malaysia, Sabah and Indonesia. The decrease in
IHM incidents from 2016 to 2017 is likely due to Malaysia’s implementation of two
sea bases in the waters of East Sabah to strengthen security control, and combat cross-
border crimes under the control of the Police and the National Security Council.
Mechanism introduced, such as the new communications systems with applications
I
II
III
ILLEGAL WORKERS FILIAL MIGRATION /
RELIGIOUS AND TRADE ATTEMPTED EMIGRATION
VIA SEA
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for mobile devices has enabled the local maritime community to report any suspicious
activities and emergencies promptly.
2. Established Multilateral Cooperation: A set of practical co-operative measures
were undertaken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to form a joint
patrol known as the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) has helped to ensure the countries
around the Strait of Malacca and Singapore achieve effective operational responses to
MARSEC challenges. While the MSP has been set up primarily to counter piracy and
sea robbery threats, it has also enabled enforcement in areas such as IHM.
3. Hot-spot Highlighting
a. (Malaysia, Johor) Pengerang's coastal area: The highest number of illegal
immigrants detained - hotspot for illegal immigrants seeking employment.
b. (Malaysia, Sabah) Sulu and Celebes Sea: Immigrants attempted
to illegally travel for filial, religious and trade reasons.
c. Sri Lanka: More than 50 illegal immigrants were
apprehended for attempting to migrate illegally abroad via the sea.
Figure 2: Number of IHM incidents for each month from Jan 2015 to Jun 2017. There
were fewer recorded cases across the months from 2015 to 2017.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS PER MONTH
2015 2016 2017
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Figure 3: Number of IHM incidents for 2017, based on locality of occurrence.
The numbers of IHM incidents in the last 12 months has greatly reduced, however, the
Malacca Straits and Sabah remain the main areas of illegal migration. The relatively high
illegal migrant activity is likely to be based on economic reasons, due to better employment
opportunities in Malaysia and Singapore. Southern Indonesian ports are historically used as a
'stepping stone' to other countries, such as Australia by human trafficking networks.
18
14 10
4
3
3 2
2 2 1 1
AREA OF INCIDENTS West Malaysia
Sabah
Indonesia
Sri Lanka
Hong Kong
Bangladesh
Australia
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Japan
Taiwan
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5. Maritime Incidents (MI)
Introduction:
This report, compiled using open-source data recorded in 2017, aims to provide readers with
a better understanding of the location and types of maritime incidents occurring in the
Information Fusion Centre’s (IFC) Area of Interest (AOI). For the year of 2017, 711 maritime
incidents were reported in the IFC’s AOI. This is a 6.4% increase compared to the same
timeframe in 2016. This observed increase in the number of recorded incidents since 2015
may be attributed to improved processes of data collection and incident reporting in the
region. The following analysis will look at the data recorded in 2017, and identify possible
trends within the IFC’s AOI. The following six categories will be examined: (1) Grounding,
(2) Sunk/Capsized, (3) Collision, (4) Unauthorised Activity, (5) Violent Confrontation, and
(6) the “Ghost Vessel” Phenomenon.
Definitions:
To provide clarity and alignment in this report, the following terms are as defined as follows:
a. Maritime Incident: Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not
pertain to TRAPS & MT, IHM, IUU and Contraband smuggling. Incidents due to
weather may appear in this category;
b. Grounding: An incident involving an impact between the bottom of a vessel’s hull
and the seabed or coastline, resulting in the vessel being unable to carry on or proceed
with her journey without assistance;
c. Sunk/Capsized: An incident which involves or results in a vessel being overturned or
submerged in the water completely (less submarines);
d. Collision: Any incident involving physical impact between two or more vessels, or a
vessel and any other floating or still object;
e. Unauthorised Activity: An incident arising from vessels engaging in activities that
are not compliant to the rules and regulations which apply in a specific area, or
activities which are carried out without official permission from the authorities over
the area.
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f. Violent Confrontation: Any hostile situation that involves any form of firearms or
violence;
g. Incident: Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not pertain to
other previously defined incident categories i.e. fire, gas leak, man overboard (MOB),
MEDEVAC, missing vessel etc.;
h. “Ghost Vessel”: Vessels with no living crew on-board. A ghost vessel can either be
abandoned, or may contain the cadavers of crew members;
i. Registered Vessel: A vessel registered with an IMO number.
General Observation(s):
Figure 1: Monthly breakdown of maritime incidents in IFC’s AOI over three years
A total of 711 maritime incidents were recorded by IFC in 2017, which is an increase from
668 in 2016, as well as from 578 in 2015. The increase of the number in recorded incidents
may be attributed to an improved data collection process and reporting of incidents in this
region. Another plausible factor is that of more extreme weather conditions at sea resulting in
the increase of incidents.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of types of maritime incidents in 2017
From data recorded in 2017, vessels sinking or capsizing, collisions, and other causes such as
fire, explosion, missing vessels and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) incidents account for
a majority of all maritime incidents in IFC’s AOI.
Figure 3: Breakdown of types of vessels involved in maritime incidents in 2017
13%
10%
26% 37%
10%
2% 2%
TYPES OF INCIDENTS
Collision
Vessel Groundings
Vessel Sinkings and Capsizings
Incidents (Fire, Explosion, Vessel Missing,
MEDEVAC,...)
Recreationnal Incidents
Violent Confrontation
Unauthorized Activities
5% 8%
7%
4% 4%
2%
11%
3%
38%
4%
3% 4%
4% 3%
TYPES OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS Container Vessel
Bulk Carrier
Tanker
Ferry / Passenger Vessel
Navy, CG, Police Vessels
Tug & Barge
General Cargo Vessel
Other Registred Vessel
Fishing Vessel
Unregistred Ferry
Tourist Boat
Unregistred Cargo Vessel
Speed Boat
Other Unregistred Vessel
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The main types of vessels involved in maritime incidents are fishing vessels (38%), general
cargo vessels (11%), bulk carriers (8%) and tankers (7%). The following sections will
provide a more detailed breakdown of maritime incidents and analysis of potential trends and
patterns IFC has identified.
SAR Operations & MI Human Cost:
This section summarises the number of Search and Rescue (SAR) and Medical Evacuation
operations carried out in 2017, as well as statistics on people rescued, dead and missing.
The IFC recorded a total of 403 SAR and 30 MEDEVAC operations in 2017, with a total of
5,421 people rescued and 1,835 people dead or missing. Of the 1,835 dead or missing people,
194 (10.6%) people were seafarers, including ship crew and sailors, 1,113 (60.6%) were
fishermen and the remaining 528 (28.8%) comprised of people that do not earn their
livelihood out at sea, such as tourists, migrants and ship passengers.
It is worth noting that the majority of deaths and missing person cases have been largely due
to natural disasters or capsized vessels. One such key event was Cyclone Ockhi (which will
be elaborated on later in the document), which accounted for 685 (more than half) of the dead
or missing fishermen.
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Vessel Grounding:
Figure 4: Location of Vessel Groundings Incidents in IFC’s AOI in 2017
The IFC recorded a total of 57 registered vessel grounding incidents in 2017, within the AOI.
Of these, general cargo vessels (25%), bulk carriers (21%), tankers (16%) and ferries (12%)
accounted for a majority of grounding incidents recorded. It is worth noting that there were
three grounding incidents in the Kalimantan Strait (which separates the islands of Borneo and
Java): one bulk carrier on 24 Mar 2017, one tanker on 12 Apr 2017 and one bulk carrier on
20 Nov, 2017.
It is also worth noting that around 35% of grounding incidents occurred in and around
Indonesian waters. This could be attributed to the geography of Indonesia as an archipelagic
nation with large bodies of water surrounded by many islands, thus increasing the risk of
grounding as vessels potentially sail too close to these islands. Other factors may include
vessels in poor conditions, bad weather, or a lack of proper navigation aids.
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Vessel Sinking & Capsizing
Figure 5: Location of Vessel Sinking and Capsizing Incidents in IFC’s AOI in 2017
A total of 27 registered vessels which were sunk and capsized were recorded in 2017.
General cargo vessels (63%) were the most common type of vessels involved, accounting for
more than half of the 27 incidents. Of note in 2017 was Typhoon Damrey in Nov 2017,
which caused eight Vietnamese cargo ships to sink, with 25 crew members missing and four
or ten reported dead. It was regarded as the biggest maritime disaster in Vietnam’s maritime
history, with about 18 Search and Rescue (SAR) assets from the Vietnamese Navy and Coast
Guard being deployed for SAR operations. Typhoon Damrey also caused the sinking of over
1,000 fishing vessels.
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Collisions
Figure 6: Location of Collisions in IFC’s AOI in 2017
There were 75 collisions, involving a total of 323 registered vessels that were recorded in the
IFC’s AOI in 2017. General cargo vessels (25%), bulk carriers (59), tankers (18%) and
container vessels (11%) accounted for a majority of registered vessels involved in collisions.
It is worth noting that of the 75 collisions, 27 (36%) involved collisions between fishing
vessels and merchant vessels, and a majority of these incidents occurred primarily in the
waters between South Korea and Japan, off the coast of India in front of Cochin, and off the
coast of Vietnam. Eleven (41%) of these 27 collisions were hit-and-run incidents in which the
merchant vessel which collided with the fishing vessel left the scene immediately, without
attempting to stop and assist the other vessel. Of these 11 collisions, six (55%) remains
unsolved. Lastly, despite collisions with fishing vessels accounting for less than 40% of all
collisions in 2017, the number of dead or missing people in collisions involving fishing
vessels accounts for almost 50% (57 dead/missing out of 119 overall) of all dead or missing
people arising from collisions overall.
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Unauthorised Activity
There were 11 maritime incidents involving unauthorised activities recorded by the IFC in
2017. Almost all the incidents were illegal anchoring activities (73%), with dredgers (36%)
and tankers (27%) accounting for a majority of unauthorised activities. Other unauthorised
activities recorded included underwater exploration (9%), illegal dumping (9%) and sand
mining (9%). It should be noted that due to the illegal nature of unauthorised activities, the
data we present may not provide a complete picture of the extent of unauthorised activities in
the AOI.
Violent Confrontation
There were 15 cases of violent confrontation in the IFC’s AOI in 2017. All violent
confrontations involved fishing vessels, with confrontations generally occurring between
fishing vessels and constabulary forces such as the coast guard, police and naval forces, or
between other fishing vessels. The highest concentration of confrontations occurred in the
Philippines (27%) and Sri Lanka (27%), followed closely by Indonesia, India, Vietnam and
South Korea.
“Ghost Vessel” Phenomenon
Lastly, this section will highlight the few incidents involving “ghost vessels”, which are
vessels which are abandoned with no crew or people on-board, or may contain cadavers
instead. These vessels are generally found to be of North Korean origin, and have been found
primarily in the coastal areas of Japan. The IFC recorded a total of four incidents of “ghost
vessels”, all of which occurred in Nov and Dec 2017. In contrast, the Japanese Coast Guard
has stated that a total of 104 North Korean fishing boats had been caught drifting into
Japanese coastal waters in 2017, the biggest number recorded so far.
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Figure 7: Incidents of fishing boats that had drifted into Japanese coastal areas in Nov
2017 (Images courtesy of Japan ILO)
The image above shows the incidents of fishing boats that had drifted into Japanese coastal
areas in Nov 2017. Here, the Japanese Coast Guard reported a total of nine incidents,
compared to the two incidents recorded by the IFC. The key reasons for the appearance of
these vessels could be due to the fact that these vessels are either very old or unfit for sea due
to various reasons. As a result, many of these vessels ended up either sinking, or are unable to
complete their journey due to rough seas.
Key Event: Cyclone Ockhi
Cyclone Ockhi occurred in Dec 2017, hitting the coastlines of Southern India which left 685
fishermen either dead or missing, accounting for about 37% of all dead or missing people
recorded in 2017. This saw the Indian Navy undertake its biggest humanitarian aid and
disaster relief operation since the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, carrying out SAR operations for
more than four weeks which covered approximately 450,000 square miles in adverse weather
conditions for missing fishermen, vessels in distress and stranded fishermen requiring
assistance. A total of 16 ships, two helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft (including the long
range maritime reconnaissance aircraft P8I from the Indian Navy), 10 ships, one helicopter
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and two fixed-wing aircrafts from the Indian Coast Guard, and two helicopters and one fixed
wing aircraft from the Indian Air Force were deployed for the SAR and HADR operations.
845 people were successfully rescued by the Indian Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, as
well as by other agencies, including merchant vessels.