Can we come up with proposals to increase fisher

compliance?

BehavFish WorkshopICES, CopenhagenOctober 22, 2014

Fisheries Management is People Management Diverse Actors

Diverse Motivations

Diverse Methods

Diverse Fishery Structures

Compliance

“the degree to which the actions of an individual, or group of individuals, accord with the rights and rules to which they are bound”

Common Rule Types Access

Area

Gear

Capacity

Time

Catch

Effort

Reporting

Prevalence

Illegal and unreported fishing accounts for between 11 and 26 million tonnes annually.

The total value estimated to be between $10 bn and $23.5bn annually

Agnew, D.J., J. Pearce, G. Pramod, T. Peatman, R. Watson, J.R. Beddington, and T.J. Pitcher. 2009. Estimating the worldwide extent of illegal fishing. PLOS ONE, 4 (2):e4570

Compliance Theory

Rational Choice

E.g. Gary Becker (1968)

Right Realism E.g., Situational Crime Prevention

Behavioral Economics

E.g. Dan Ariely (2013)

Irrational Realism?

“Everybody Cheats”

Self-Concept Maintenance Theory

It would suggest that:

Most illegal fishing is conducted not by specialized, economically rational criminals, but by ordinary fishers that cheat by just a little.

Fisheries managers should begin to consider the “irrational” or non-economic factors affecting illegal fishing to better preserve their resources.

Fishers Cheat More?

Non-monetary Assets

Organization

Revenge

Mental Depletion

Opportunities

Revenge

Mental Depletion

In-Group Contagion/Desistance

Out-Group Desistance

Snowballing/Slippery Slope

Measuring Effectiveness

Direct

Observer program/EMS – costly

At-sea Inspections – Nonrandom, costly

Dockside Inspections – Limited detection, nonrandom

AIS/VMS – Limited detection of offenses

Indirect

Logbooks & Catch Reports – Potentially Biased

Supply Chain Audits – institutionally limited

Noncompliance Risk Perception? Contagion

False Consensus Effect

Case Study

Australian Fisheries Management Agency’s “show cause” model for closed areas

“Since its commencement, in June 2010, the program has resulted in a reduction in the number of suspected closure breaches of 87% over the first three months and an overall reduction of over 94%”

Arguably no new costs/risks were imposed on fishing operations

The Supervision Effect?