marx secular social development

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Karl Marx on Secular and Social Development: A Study in the Sociology of NineteenthCentury Social ScienceAuthor(s): Bert F. HoselitzSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jan., 1964), pp. 142-163Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/177904

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KARL MARX ON SECULAR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF NINETEENTH

CENTURY SOCIAL SCIENCE*

The purpose of this paper is to present briefly the theories of secular socialand economic development which can be found in the work of Karl Marxand to place them within the context of general thought and theorizing onthese matters during the nineteenth century. I shall not present in this paperany new interpretations of Marx's theories, but shall merely try to showthat Marx's views are related at many points to other theories on social andeconomic development proposed during his life and that in many ways hemust be regardedas a typical thinker of that period of European social thought.

Since, especially in his later work, Marx was interested primarily in theanalysis of the laws of capitalist dynamics, rather than in the secular develop-ment of human societies, considerable reliance has been placed on some ofhis earlier writings, particularly two manuscripts, both of which remainedunpublished until the 1930's.1 In these manuscripts many of the ideas, whichhave been very influential in an abbreviated published form, are spelled outin much more detail.

As I already have intimated, Marx was concerned, at different times of hislife, with two different problems of secular development. In his later work,of which Capital is by far the most important and representative contribution,* This paper was written while I was the holder of a John Simon Guggenheim Me-morial Fellowship. I wish to express my gratitudeto the officers of the Foundationforthe leisure for reading and reflection which enabled me to write it.1 These two manuscriptsare: (1) Karl Marx,Economic and PhilosophicManuscriptsof1844, Moscow, n.d. (ca. 1959); this is a translation of "Oekonomisch-philosophischeManuskripte",which was first published in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe:Werke,Schriften, Briefe, Abteilung I, Vol. III, Berlin, 1932,pp. 29-172. All referenceshereinafter will be made to both the German and the Englishedition of this work, the former will be cited as MEGA, III (since the customary ab-breviation of this edition of the works of Marx and Engels is MEGA), and the latterManuscriptof 1844. It should be noted that almost simultaneouslywith the publicationof this manuscript n MEGA, HI, another somewhatdifferentlyarrangedversion of thiswork appearedunder the title "Nationaloekonomieund Philosophie", n Karl Marx. Derhistorische Materialismus:Die Friihschriften,ed. by S. Landshut and J. P. Mayer,Vol. I(Leipzig, 1932), pp. 283-375. (2) The second manuscript appearedfirst in 1939-1941under the title Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (Rothent-wurf, Moscow), 2 vols. It was reprintedphotomechanically n 1953, and brought out ina single volume by the Dietz Verlag in Berlin. I have used the 1953 reprint. This workhereinafter will be cited as Grundrisse.


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MARX ON DEVELOPMENThe studiedprimarilyhe laws of economicdevelopment ndercapitalism,andapartfrom some very generalstatements,did not concern himselfwith theproblemof changeof a socio-economic ystem. It is differentwith some ofhis earlierwritings, specially hosecomposed n the 1840's andearly1850's.There Marxwas still very muchconcernedwith the ratherdetailedanalysisof differentsocio-economic ystems,and in the Grundrisse,or example,hedevoted an entire chapter (pp. 375-413) to what he called "ProgressiveEpochsof the EconomicFormationof Societies", .e., socio-economic truc-tures of pre-capitalist ocial systems.WhydidMarxregard histypeof analysisof suchfundamentalmportance?We may perhapsmosteasilygainan answer, f we consider hatinhis youngeryearshe cameto the viewthatthe "anatomy f civil society s to be sought npoliticaleconomy",and thathe took up the studyof the latterin Paris andagain in Brussels.2For a considerable ime after Marx'sdeath his earlieststudies n politicaleconomywereunknown,but a manuscriptwhichhad beencomposed in Paris probablybetween Februaryand August, 1844, waspublishedin the early 1930's almost simultaneouslyn two places. Thismanuscripts probably he first workof Marxdealingwitheconomics.It is awork in which economic relations are not yet crystallized nto a separatestudy, but are discussed n close interrelationwith philosophical,political,and socio-psychological uestions. Althoughhis other works on economicproblemsalso contain a wealth of non-economic,especiallyhistorical andsociological,material,this manuscriptcovers probablythe widest area inthe socialsciencesandpresentsa moreintegrated ersionof his thought hanany other workof Marx'swriting.Beforewe enter into a more detaileddiscussionof the contributionmadein the Economic and PhilosophicalManuscripta few words concerning tsgeneralpositionin the life work of Marx is necessary. AlthoughI believethatthe studyof this workis of importanceo a betterunderstandingf hislaterwriting, t would be wrongto overestimatets significance.Manyof thepropositionscontained n it are immatureas compared, or example,withCapital,andMarx's horough tudyof the classicaleconomistsoccurredonlya decade after he Parismanuscriptwascompleted.Moreover,hemanuscriptstillshowsthe strong nfluenceof Hegelianphilosophy, swell as theinfluenceof a shortessayby Engelson politicaleconomyin generaland a somewhatlongerone by MosesHess on money.3It is perhapsalso noteworthyor theplace occupiedby the manuscriptn the intellectualdevelopmentof Marx,that he designateshis philosophy n it not as materialism,but as realistic2 See, Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, Char-les H. Kerr Co., 1904), pp. 10-11.3 See Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx, I'homme et l'oeuvre (Paris, 1934), pp. 324-327. Thisindebtedness of Marx to the indicated writings is acknowledged by him; cf. MEGA, III,p. 34, and Manuscript of 1844, pp. 16-17.

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BERT F. HOSELITZhumanism, r developednaturalism,whichshows the influence fFeuerbach.4It would be impracticableo summarizehe entireParismanuscript ere;only a few crucialconcepts and relationswill be discussed. This will beenough to show that in spite of its fragmentary haracterand its heavyHegelianterminology,none of the majorpropositionsoutlined n it were, inessence,ever rejectedby Marx in his laterwork.Perhapsbetterthan any other of his earlywriting, t showswhy he took thepath he did, what other possible paths he might have taken and why herejected hem. It showsMarxat the cross-roads f his intellectual areerandhence aids in understandingmore fully the complexof variableswhich heconsidered n arrivingat his theoryof capitalism.Anotherdifficultypresentedby the manuscriptmustbe mentioned.Marxoperates throughouton three levels of abstractionand often interminglesthem. The purposeof the work is to solve the problemposed by Hegel offinding he mechanism y whichthe identityof subjectandobject,of thinkingand being, is established.Hegel had placedthis path in the realmof ideasand therefore,in Marx's opinion, offered only a pseudo-solution. Marxattempts o findthereal solution n manandnature,.e., inconcrete"practical"objects. But in order to integratehis solution withhis belief in the primacyof abstract heoryMarx analyzesthe path leadingto the identityof subjectandobjecton the level of consciousness, n the level of man as a creatureofnature,and on the level of man as a socializedbeing. The final solutionisachievedonly on the third evel and withit a solutionon the other two levelsis obtained. In the manuscripthesethreeavenuesof attackon the problemof the identityof subjectand objectare not strictlyseparated,but they willbe separatedhere. The avenuesare those of the three great branchesofscientific inquiry;philosophy(includingpsychology),natural science, andsocial science (includinghistory).On the philosophicalevel, the workconstitutesa criticismof the Hegelianviewthatthe dialecticprocess eading o the integration f realityandthoughtoccurspurely n the realmof the mind. Hegel'scontribution, mongothers,consisted n the demonstrationhat all developmental rocessesare subjectto a dialectic which operates throughan alienationand a return from thealienation o producea synthesis. Thus the Idea realizes tself by alienatingits content andby returningromthat alienationwith the resultof attainingtherebyconsciousnessof its essence. Hegel had acknowledgedhat in theprocessof humanevolution,man is the productof his labor,whichin turnconstitutesan alienationof man's rueexistence,and whichmanagainappro-priatesby conceiving t to be the expressionof his activity. Marxcriticizeshim for regarding his entireprocessas taking place in the developmentofthe self-consciousness f the Idea rather han as practical,realistic,concrete4 MEGA, III, pp. 114, and 167; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 102 and 164.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTactivity. But as Hegel himself had acknowledged,he processof alienation,labor,producedan object external o man which can be consideredas thenegationof man. Now if Hegelhadinterpretedmanas a living,naturalbeingequippedwithtangible, hatis, materialpowers,his alienationwouldproducea realobject,a tangibleproductof human abor. But sinceHegel conceivesof man merelyas his self-consciousness, s abstractman, it follows that a"self-consciousnessanproduceby its alienation nlythe conceptof thingness(Dingheit)and not a real object. Hence it is clearthat this thingness s notindependent f self-consciousness, ut merely ts creature, omethingposited(gesetzt)by it." Thus the Idea is isolated from the real world, is an emptyshell, and is devoid of all concreteproperties,and in consequence he aliena-tion as well as the self-realization f the Idea is a purely formalpseudo-process.5Marxthus arrivesat the conclusion hat the synthesisof thoughtandbeingcannotbe achievedon the level of speculative"idealistic" hilosophy.But inspite of its shortcomings e has derived an important nsightfrom Hegel'sanalysis:a method of investigation.And even more important, he conceptof alienation,especiallyif it is concretized,embodies the rudimentsof animportant spectof socialpsychology.Marxwas not the first whorecognizedthe impotenceof Hegelianphilosophy o solve the problemof the identityofsubjectandobject;as he himselfacknowledges, euerbachhad alreadydoneso. In his attemptto come closer to a solutionFeuerbachhad abandonedHegelian dealismby rejectingHegel'sbeginningwith an infinite,an abstractgeneralization religion- and choosing as his starting point the real,sensual,specific,finite: man as a creatureof nature.6 On the basis of thephilosophyof Feuerbach, herefore, he processof humanactivity, abor, isto be conceivednot as an actof the mind,but as reallivingactivity. Aliena-tion is represented y the objectthat mancreates hroughhis interactionwithnature. Man as an integralpartof natureexercisesa concreteactivity,andthe subject, instead of being conceived of as abstractactivity as in theHegelianscheme, s represented y a human ndividualwhose activityyieldsa concreteobjectin the form of the productof the "subject's"abor. Hence,the oppositionbetween subjectand object is resolvedin the mutualinter-dependence f man and nature:manis seen as a productof natureandnatureas a productof man. The dialecticprocessof alienationand realization sseen as the physical nteraction f man andthe sensualrealobjectsof nature.7But althoughhe identityof subjectandobjectcouldbe shownbythistrend5 MEGA, III, pp. 158-161. The passage quoted is on pp. 159-160. Manuscriptof 1844,p. 155. (The translation in this, as in other instances, is my own and not that of M.Milligan, the translator of the English edition of the Manuscriptof 1844.)6 See MEGA, III, pp. 151-152; Manuscriptof 1844, p. 145.7 See MEGA, III, pp. 155-156, 169-171, and 116-117. See also, on the Marxiananalysis of the interrelationbetween man and nature,Vernon Venable, Human Nature:The Marxian View (New York, 1946), pp. 66 ff.

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BERT F. HOSELITZof thought,it did not providea similarsolution to the dichotomybetweenthinkingandbeing. If man is thoughtof as acting only instinctively,ike ananimal, or example,the objectsof his activityexist outsideof him and areat the same time necessarily ied to his being since they are the means ofsupporting is life. Yet an animal,actingpurelyon the impulseof instinctivedrives,takes nature as given and does not try to understandor changeit.Hence, on the purelyorganiclevel, self-consciousness nd with it rationalthoughtare absent. The significantcharacteristic f man is his capacitytogainconsciousness f himselfand to interactwith nature n sucha way as toadaptit to his purposesand ends. This adaptation akesplace by meansoflabor,the practicalactivityof manthroughwhichhe acquiresknowledgeofthe naturewith which he interacts. This processis explainedby Engels inmore concretelanguage:"If we are able to prove the correctnessof ourconceptionof a naturalprocessby making t ourselves,bringing t intobeingout of its conditionsandusingit for our ownpurposes nto the bargain, henthere s an end of the Kantian ncomprehensiblething-in-itself'. he chemicalsubstancesproduced n the bodies of plantsand animalsremained ust such'things-in-themselves'ntil organic chemistrybegan to produce them oneafteranother,whereupon he 'thing-in-itself' ecame a thingfor us..."8This illustrationof Engels exhibits the nature of Marxianthought onachieving he identityof thinkingand being by means of knowledge. Thegrowthof humanknowledge s a consequenceof humanpracticalactivity,of human abor. Labor is spentin orderto obtainproductswhichrepresentthe alienation f man,buttheconsciousexamination f theproperties f theseproductsandthe processof understandingheirinneressence, n other wordsthe processof "knowing"hem represents he return of the alienation, henegationof negation. Knowledge s thus both the subjectand the object.On the one hand it is the object as that which is known,but although hisobjectwhich is knownis external o men it is penetratedby the subject, heknowing tself. In this processthe subject-knowing,hinking,reasoningmanis consciousof the fact that the objectis partof himself,that its propertiescan onlybe fully appropriatedy completelyknowing t and that in this waythe objectas an alienatedentityis abolishedandreintegratedn the subject.9On the purely abstract level of philosophyMarx has thus attainedamethod,on the naturalsciencelevel he has attainedan epistemology.Thefirstwas the Hegeliandialectic,the second a materialisticor Feuerbachiannaturalistic) ntology,whichtogetherconstitute he basis of Marxiandialec-tical materialism.Thus the problemof discovering he path to the identitybetweensubjectand objectwould appearto be solved,were it not for one furtherstep:the8 Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philos-ophy (New York, 1941), pp. 22-23.9 MEGA, III, pp. 163-164, and 166-167; Manuscriptof 1844, pp. 158-161.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTfact thatmanis a socializedbeing. On the level of naturalsciencepureandsimplethe solution of our problem, althoughcouched in naturalisticerms,is also basicallyabstractand not immediatelypractical. For the interactionbetweenman and nature s not a processaffectingan isolated ndividualbutis a social or culturalprocess. Alienation of human labor finds its mostconcrete expression n civil society. Here the productof human labor isalienatedaltogethern the form of privateproperty: he laborer'sproduct snot his own but that of the capitalistwho employshim. The institutionofprivatepropertys thus the resultof alienatedabor. Privatepropertyn turnforces man to alienatehis labor, notably in a social system of developedindustrialism,n the higherstagesof capitalism.In the wordsof Marx: "Allwealth has become industrialwealth, wealth of labor; and industry s theperfected abor,just as the factory systemis the perfected ype of industry,i.e., of labor;andjust as industrial apitalis the perfectedobjective orm ofprivateproperty. Onlynow do we see how privatepropertycan perfectitsdominationover man and can become,in the most general orm, the worldhistoricpower."10But althoughundera systemof privateproperty,and even more sharplyunder private enterprisecapitalism, he alienationof the laborer from hisproduct s obviouseven to a superficial bserver,other less obviousforms ofalienationare alsopresent. ThusMarxfindsthat the laborer s alienatednotonly from his productbut also from his very activity n labor, and that theprocessof alienationeven affects the capitalist. Hence under a systemofprivatepropertymanis alienatedromman. In otherwords,capitalist ocietyexhibits raitsof serious ocialdysfunction ndcleavage,whichmake mpossiblethe attainment f the true social natureof man. It is the elevationof com-modity productionand of the accumulation f capitalto apparentends inthemselves hat makes the true socialnatureof man disappear.Instead ofbeing the essenceof life the activityof laborer and capitalistalikebecomesmerely a means to existence. Man's consciousness of being a member of hisspecies s reduced,his life as a memberof a groupbecomingmerelya meansto his ends as a producerof objects. Free cooperationn the transformationof naturefor universalhuman ends is prevented. The social life of men isdestroyedbecausethe needspursuedarepurely ndividualistic.They are notthe endsof mankindas a whole;they arenot the ends of man as a memberof the genusof men,but the ends of man as alienated rom andopposedtoother men. Men confronteach other, separatedand estranged. Far frommaking possible the free unfoldingof man as a social creature,capitalistindividuationnegates the true social natureof man. It representshumanalienationn allforms:man'salienation romhis product, romhislife activity,from his genericsocialexistence, hat is, his alienation romman.My purpose in thus summarizinghe Paris manuscriptof 1844 is not10 MEGA, III, p. 110; Manuscriptof 1844, pp. 69-71.

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merely"todescendto the origins".Anyonewho has studiedthe later worksof Marxwill find in it many valuableclues for the fullerunderstanding fobscure passages in these. If reorganized n a more logical sequence, itfurtherprovides the most general sociologicalanalysisof capitalismthatMarx ever wrote. It also revealswhy he concentrated n his later work onthe studyof politicaleconomyandwhyhe regardedhe economicanalysisofcapitalismas virtually denticalwith the studyof the physiologyof capitalistsociety. Startingwith the question of the identityof thinkingand being,which in the Hegeliansystemoccupiesa paramount osition,Marxdiscoversthat its real solution cannotbe found in the realm of abstractphilosophy,butonlyin the material ield,thatis, in theconcrete,practical, ocialrelationsof man. It is to be found in the studyof humanhistory. In the realm ofhumanhistory,the civil societyof the systemof capitalism s not the finalsynthesis,but only a passing stagein the dialecticprocesstowardthis. Thepresent s a state of necessity,whereasonly the resolutionof the dichotomybetween hinkingandbeingwill constitute he stateof freedom. The presentis a negationof the truenatureof free man, as may be seen in the fact thatthe verylife activityof man,the socialnexusof men to each other,and theobjects confrontingman, are alienatedfrom him. The concrete,practicalform of this alienation s seen in the relations n which men stand to oneanotherwithregard o the production f theirlivelihood. Historicalmaterial-ismis an outflowof the recognition f this state of alienation; nd the analysisof economic relationsprovidesthe most generaltheoreticaldescriptionofsocial relationsunder capitalism.In the social productionof their livelihoodmen enter into definite andnecessaryrelations hat areindependent f theirwill. Therefore,Marxsays,the socialexistenceof mandetermines is consciousness.He is sayinghereina perhapstoo abbreviatedorm that the fact of humanalienationsubjectsrelationsbetweenmen to the impersonalstricturesof an exchangesysteminwhichall humanvalues aremeasured n moneyand treatedas commodities;that it transcends ven the thinkingandreasoningprocessof man, and thatundera regimeof capitalism he apparently pontaneous, reativeactivityofman, even scientific or philosophicalspeculationor creative art, is alsoaffectedby the prevailing tate of alienation. For any man as a memberofsocietyis affectedby the alienationof manfromman,eventhoughhe spendshis life as a critic n anivorytower of his own. In otherwords,genuine, ree,spontaneoushuman activity, in the true sense of the word, is impossiblebecausethe social (i.e., generic)natureof manis thwarted. This impliesanessentiallyutopian,teleologicaloutlook. If man is not true to his genuinenatureundera systemof alienation, t mustbe possibleto stipulatea socialsystembeyond capitalism n which the true humanityof mankindbecomesrealized.1But sinceit is not the intrinsicnatural biologicalandpsychological)11 Marx's treatment of the concept and the circumstance of alienation has been dis-

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTmakeup of man which is responsible for alienation, - and here is a fun-damental contrast between Marx and later Freudian theory, according towhich any human society must exhibit noticeable symptoms of repression -it must be the pattern of social relations which may make possible the ultimatecomplete freedom of man. We now turn to this aspect of Marx's thought.Marx's position on this problem is summed up in a passage near the endof the third volume of Capital, which runs as follows:The actualwealth of a society, and the possibilityof a continualexpansionof itsprocessof reproduction,do not dependupon the durationof the surplus abor,butupon its productivityand upon the more or less fertile conditions of production,under which it is performed. In fact, the realm of freedom does not commenceuntil the point is passed where labor under the compulsionof necessity and ofexternalutility is required. In the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphereof materialproduction n the strictmeaningof the term. Just as the savagemustwrestle with nature,in order to satisfyhis wants, in orderto maintainhis life andreproduce t, so civilized man has to do it, andhe must do it in all formsof societyand under all possiblemodes of production. With his development he realm ofnaturalnecessity expands,because his wants increase;but at the same time theforces of production ncrease,by which these wants are satisfied. Thefreedominthisfield cannot consist of anythingelse but of the fact that socialized man, theassociated producers,regulate their interchangewith nature rationally, bring itunder the common control, insteadof being ruled by it as by some blind power;that they accomplishtheir task with the least expenditureof energy and underconditions most adequateto their human nature and most worthy of it. But italwaysremainsa realm of necessity. Beyondit beginsthatdevelopmentof humanpower, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, canflourishonly upon thatrealmof necessityas its basis.12There has been a good deal of uncertainty as to the meaning of the passage.Yet a full explanation is not difficult, and may be found by a careful readingof the Grundrisse. Scattered passages in this work relate to Marx's theoryof the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Bycomparing these we are able to penetrate into Marx's Utopia. We find herealso a more detailed description of the mechanism of the secular evolution ofhuman society which he thought he had discovered.Marx's interpretation of the process of secular evolution is best presentedin the form of his own dialectical method. As J. L. Gray points out, Marx'scussed in several places. Perhaps the two most satisfactory analyses are found in thefollowing works: Auguste Cornu. Karl Marx. Die okonimisch-philosophischenManus-kripte, Berlin, 1955; and Heinrich Popitz, Der entfremdeteMensch: Zeitkritikund Ge-schichtsphilosophiedes jungen Marx, Basel, 1953. See also Konrad Bekker, Marx'sphilosophische Entwicklung,sein Verhdltniszu Hegel, Zurich, 1940. The interpretationof Marx's eleology, xpressedn thisparagraphs sharedby Popitz,op. cit.,pp. 155 f.12 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. III (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr Co., 1906), pp. 954-955(Italicsadded).For the originalGerman ext of this passage, ee Das Kapital Volks-ausgabe,Vienna - Berlin, 1932), vol. III, pp. 873, 874. For a French text of the crucialpart of this passage see Karl Marx, Pages choisis pour une ethique socialiste, ed. byMaximilienRubel Paris,1948),pp. 313-314.

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great world-historical triad starts from a thesis that corresponds to the periodof simple property when no exploitation and no social classes exist, i.e., thestage of primitive communism. The antithesis then is the introduction ofprivate property in the means of production, made possible by the greaterproductivity of human labor. In the most developed stage of this antitheticalphase we encounter capitalism. Here the working class, as the exploitedsocial group, forms the negation of the negation. Through its action it bringsabout the synthesis, in which the element of communism in the thesis (theabsence of private property in the means of production) is combined withhigh productivity of labor, i.e., the principal element of the antithesis. In thesynthesis, wealth is a product of society as a whole and "labor" as freecreative human activity has become a rule.13 This triad differs only slightlyfrom that presented by Marx himself, when he says:"Thefirst social forms are based on (at first quite naturally)evolved personalre-lations of dependence,in which human productivity s developed only in smallmeasure and in isolated spots. Personal independence,associatedwith materialmutual dependence s the second stage, upon which is based a system of generalsocial intercourse, generalized relationships,many-sided needs, and universalwealth. The thirdstageis a stystemof free individuality,basedupon the all-sideddevelopmentof the individuals,and the subordination f theircommon socializedwealth. The secondphase createsthe conditionsfor the third. But patriarchal,aswell as ancient(andfeudal)relationshipsdecline at the same rate at which modernsociety grows with the developmentof commerce, luxury, money and exchangevalue."14Both statements come to the same result. Human history is characterizedbythe social nexus existing between individuals which, in turn, is based on thedevelopment of human productivity. In the most primitive forms of humanexistence productivity is so little developed that dependence of one personupon another is either impossible (and unprofitable), or based purely uponpersonal subjugation in a quarrel, a struggle, or battle. The subordinatedperson is dependent in his status, he is a slave or serf, or in some other waynot enjoying full personal freedom. This phase of social organisation tendsagain to become replaced by a phase (capitalism) in which individuals arepersonally free, but in which the condition creating the nexus of dependenceis material, i.e., based upon material objects, in this case, capital. Finally,with the development of productivity to an even higher level, man's depend-ence on materially conditioned social relations ceases, and human beings can- in conformity with their true nature - form associations in which theysubjugate material objects instead of being dominated by them. We see inthis triadic schema of human evolution a more highly developed form of the13 See J. L. Gray, "KarlMarx and Social Philosophy",in F. J. C. Hearnshaw,ed., TheSocial and Political Ideas of Some RepresentativeThinkersof the VictorianAge (Lon-don, 1933), p. 126.14 Grundrisse,pp. 75-76. (Italics in original).

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTschema implied already in the Paris Manuscript of 1844. All that can be saidin further analysis of this model may be found in the Grundrisse and laterwritings, and consists primarily in a more detailed description of the variousphases and their conditions of becoming and passing away. Unfortunately,Marx has not seen fit to discuss these matters in extenso in any one place.The only exception is a discussion of pre-capitalist forms of social-economicorganization in a long chapter in the Grundrisse,entitled "ProgressiveEpochsof the Economic Formation of Societies".15 I shall not discuss this part ofMarx's thought in detail, since we are interested ratherin the further evolutionof these forms into a new form of socio-economic organization, i.e., in thetransformation of the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.

Since we are concerned with this transition, it is important to show inwhat form Marx considers the present socio-economic system to be one ofnecessity, even though he admits that individuals are personally free, i.e.,non-dependent, and that whatever dependence exists is on things and onlythrough them upon men. But this makes it necessary also to explain why hethinks, in contrast to Adam Smith, that a system based upon exchange valuesas they come to be established in a capitalist system, is not instituted by aninvisible hand, but is rather the outcome of man's subordination to materialobjects created by him. In one form Marx shows this by contrasting thesystem of personal independence coupled with material dependence, withthe system of "natural"personal dependence. In another form, he shows itby a discussion of money as the generalized object of wealth.The first point is best dealt with by a citation from Marx himself. Indescribing the impersonal "world-wide"market he says:"It has been said... that its beauty and grandeurconsists just in its naturallydevelopedmaterialand intellectual ntercourse,which is independentof the wishesand knowledgeof individuals,and which presupposesa relationshipbetweenthembased upon mutual independenceand indifference. And this personalnexus iscertainlypreferable o an absence of socal relationsaltogetheror to socialrelationsconfined to a narrow local context founded on natural blood-lines and on domi-nationand submission... But it is absurd o regard his merelymaterialnexus asthe naturalone, as a relationship nseparable rom the natureof individualityandimmanent n it. This nexus is a historicalproductwhich pertainsto a particularphase of development...If we considersocial relationswhich areproducedby an underdeveloped ystemof exchange .. it is clearfromthe beginning hat thevarious ndividuals thoughtheir intercourseappears o takeplace on a morepersonal evel - only are relatedin their individualroles, e.g., as feudal lord and vassal, manorial lord and serf,etc.... or as membersof given castes, or estates,etc.... In a developedsystemof exchange,all ties of personaldependencebased on kinship,educationaldiffer-ences, etc. are, indeed, broken;... andthe individualsappear o be independentofone another, o meet each otherfreely and to enterinto exchangeswithin this con-dition of freedom... But the specificityof a role which in the first case appears15 Ibid., pp. 375-413.

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BERT F. HOSELITZas a personalrestrictionof one individualby another,appears n the second caseas a material limitation of the individual mposedby independentexternal condi-tions positedby themselves... These externalconditionsrepresentby no meansa removal of the "relationsof dependence",but merely their dissolutioninto amore generalform... The materialrelationsof dependence in contrast o thepersonalones, make it appearthat individualsare now dominatedby abstractions,whereas earlierthey were dependentupon one another."'1The contrast between pre-capitalist socio-economic systems and capitalism isclear, and so is the fact that Marx considers the objective, material depend-ence upon things or ideas to be less desirable than the very specific dependenceupon other individuals. This becomes even plainer in his discussion of freecompetition. He argues that under such a system it is not the individualswho have been freed, but only capital, because competition is that system ofsocio-economic organization in which the productive method based uponcapital is best served. He sums up his view by arguing that the developmentunder a system of free competition is "merely the free development on alimited basis - the basis of the domination of capital. This kind of individualfreedom is therefore at the same time the most complete abolition of allindividual freedom, and the full subjection of individuality under socialconditions, which take on the form of material powers, in fact, overpoweringthings - that is things which are independent of the individuals related toone another." 7

This view of the limitations and restrictions imposed by man's subjugationto objects is set out both by Marx and by Engels, in several contexts. Itappears in Capital, it had appeared in The German Ideology, and Engelstook it up in the Anti-Diihring.18It may be considered one of the fundamentalideas in Marx's system.Should we regard the socialist countries as being still within the realm ofnecessity or as having already attained the realm of freedom? This is not theplace to discuss the precise nature of the socio-economic structure of thesecountries. Yet, by general admission, they have not reached a level ofproductivity, nor a form of free human association, which could allow us toargue that the realm of genuine human freedom as contemplated by Marxhas been effectively established. In these countries economic activity is cen-trally planned, and capital is not "owned" by society, but by the stateapparatus. For "ownership"must be interpreted not as a legal category, butas a relationship between persons and objects, and this means that regardlessof formal legal and constitutional rules, a person "owns" an object - inparticular a piece of capital - if he has effective control over it, i.e., if he16 Ibid.,pp. 79-82.17 Ibid., pp. 543-545. The passage quoted is on p. 545.18 See Capital, Vol. I, pp. 81 ff; Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Die deutscheIdeologie,in MEGA, Vol. V., pp. 351-355; and Friedrich Engels, Herrn Eugen Diihring's Um-walzung der Wissenschaft,11th ed. (Berlin, 1928), pp. 112ff. and passim.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTcan effectivelyexclude others from disposingof it or interferingwith hisdisposalof it. Hence, all the basic social and socio-psychologicalategorieswhich Marx appliedto the later stages of capitalistsocieties also apply tothese societies. They still presentmanifoldpatternsof alienation,humanactivity s stilldominatedby wagelabor,theystillhave humansocialrelationssubjected o dominationby objects,productions commodityproduction,andtheir economiesarebasedon exchangevalue andon moneyas a generalizedmeansof wealthand income.Let us now turnto the second crucialtopic in Marx'sanalysisof socio-economicsystemssubject o necessity: he discussionof moneyas a general-ized meansof exchangeand a generalized, bstractrepresentative f wealthandproperty,and, therefore,also the generalizedorm of capital.The connectionbetween the acquisitionof wealthas a generalized bjectof social actionand the availability f a generalizedmeansof exchangeandacquisition,s easyto see. Its universalmpact s emphasizedby Marxwhenhe compares he way in which wealth was regardedn antiquitywith viewson wealth n modern ndustrializedocieties. He saysthat among he writersof the ancientworldwe never find an investigation f whichformof landedpropertycreatesthe mostwealth,but alwayswhichformof propertycreatesthe best citizens. Of course,greedandthe personalwill for acquisitionwasnot foreignto the ancients. Therewere misers n ancientGreeceandRome,as there are miserstoday. But, just as Max Webermaintained ater thatpersonalgreedwas easily reconcilablewith the otherworldly eligiousethicof India,19 o Marx could show that under a systemof capitalism,moneybecomesa generalequivalent, he general"powerof purchasing", nd henceall can be converted nto money. As a consequence,"thereare no absolutevalues, since for money all values are only relative. Thereremainsnothingthat is higheror holier, etc., since all can be acquiredby meansof money.The 'res sacrae et religiosae'... which are exempted from the 'commerciohominum'do not exist in the face of money, just as all are equal beforeGod."20Private property representsthe full negation of man's true individuality.Appropriation,nsteadof being a spontaneous elationbetween man andhisenvironment,s an act of attaining ossession fobjects,and hepurposeof thispossession s for man to appear o be the oppositeof what he is. The desireto acquireproperty s thusnot a naturalor instinctualhumandrive,it is notan elementof the basic natureof man, but is the outcome of a state ofalienation,of the negationof man'srelation o objectsexternal o him.Marx'sreasoningon the subjectof acquisitivenesswas not developedbyhim independently ut owes much to the views of Moses Hess. Marxhad19 See Max Weber, The Religion of India (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), p. 337.20 See Grundrisse,pp. 387 and 722-723. The passage cited is on p. 723.

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BERTF. HOSELITZbecome acquainted with some of Hess's published writings and had alsoseen some of his manuscripts which were submitted for publication in theDeutsch-franz6sische Jahrbiicher, of which Marx was co-editor. Althoughthere developed later profound differences between Marx and Hess, theinfluence of Hess's ideas on the young Marx is unmistakable. A notableessay by Hess on money which had been written in 1843 or early 1844 andwhich Marx saw soon after its composition contains many of the ideas onthe impact of the institution of private property upon man's acquisitivenessin a somewhat loose form. Marx tightened the argument and brought out thecontrasts more clearly, but his indebtedness to Hess on the level of socio-psychological analysis must be acknowledged.21

Even more clearly than in his discussion of acquisitiveness Marx appearsto be influenced by Hess in his views on the psychological aspects of man'salienation from his productive activity. Thus, before we return to Marx'sown elaboration of this problem, Hess's statement of it may serve as aconvenient starting point. Stripped to its barest outline, Hess's argumentruns as follows:The curse of all past human history lies in the fact that man does not

regard his activity as an end in itself, but contrasts labor with enjoyment.Labor and enjoyment are opposed under the rule of private property becauseunder it labor is alienated from the workers. The rule of private propertyconstitutes on the one hand the practical realization of egotism, which negatesfree activity and debases it to the labor of a slave. On the other hand itmakes animal enjoyment the paramount end of this dehumanized labor.Only the achievement of communism can bring about the abolition of thisdehumanized form of activity."Onlythroughthe attainmentof absolutefreedom,not only of 'labor' n the nar-row, limited sense of the term,but of any human inclinationand activitywhatever,absolute equality and communityof all conceivable 'goods' is possible. And atthe same time only in this absolutecommunity s that absolute freedom thinkable.Labor,society in general,cannot be organizedbut it organizes tself in that every-one does what he cannot help but do, and fails to do what he cannot do. Everyman is inclined to engagein some activity,even in manifold activities. This multi-plicity of free human inclinations and activitiesmakes up not the dead artificial,but the free, living, eternally youthful organismof a free human society, of freehumanactivities,which now cease to be 'labor'andare,on thecontrary, horoughlyidentical with 'happiness'."22In this view of Moses Hess, communism, i.e., the future society, involves the21 See Moses Hess, "Ueberdas Geldwesen",reprinted n SozialistischeAufsitze, ed. byTh. Zlocisti (Berlin, 1921), pp. 158-187, especially pp. 179-180. In a later work, firstpublished in 1845, Hess discusses the same theme with greater clarity and precision.See, ibid, pp. 140-141.22 Moses Hess, "Sozialismusund Kommunismus" first publishes in G. Herwegh, ed.,Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, 1843), reprintedin SozialistischeAufsdtze, op.cit., pp. 51, 70-74. The words cited are on page 74, and italics have been added.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTabolition of alienation and with it the abolition of labor. Labor is replacedby free and spontaneous human activity, which is an end in itself, or as Marxputs it, the function of human life. The prime purpose of society is not theproduction of material objects, but the unfolding human personality, theattainment of happiness. This view is fully shared by Marx. Labor in thestrict sense, therefore, is not identical with all forms of creative humanactivity, but is a phenomenon which exists only within the realm of necessityand under conditions of alienation and the estrangement of man from hisactivity.23 Although the Manuscript of 1844 provides only implicit evidencefor this view, it is more clearly expressed later, for example, in The GermanIdeology and Grundrisse. In a well-known passage in the former work Marxand Engels wrote:"The modernstate, the rule of the bourgeoisie, s basedon the freedomof labor.Freedom of labor is the free competitionamongworkers. Saint Max is very un-lucky; as in all othersubjects,so also in economics. Labor is free in all civilizedcountries. The task is not to free laborbut to abolishit."24In other words, Marx quite explicitly expressed himself as early as 1846 thatonly the abolition of labor (in the sense in which it is common in a societyfraught with alienation) can lead to genuine freedom. And in the Grundrissewhich were written after several more years of reading and reflection andconfrontation with related ideas in the works of Ricardo and post-RicardianBritish economic writers, Marx gives a more detailed explanation of his viewof the abolition of labor. Whereas in the earlier writings Marx derived theeventual abolition of labor chiefly from the generic nature of man, he nowshows carefully in what form rising productivity of labor plays the major rolein this process. Yet he holds to his earlier view in that the rise of productivityis mainly due to the growth of human knowledge. If it is possible that in asmaller amount of actual labor time the same output can be produced on ahigher level of technology, as with a larger amount of labor time on a more23 Manystudents f Marx'sworkshaveoverlooked r even misinterpretedhis trendof thought.VernonVenable,whose otherwise xcellentbookon Marx'sviewson hu-mannature,was citedabove n. 7), neithermentionshe alienation orthe abolitionoflabor. The reasonwhy this pointcouldbe so easilymisunderstoods, in my opinion,principallyemantic, .e., it turnsaround he doublemeaningof the word,"labor". nsomecontexts hismeans heexpendituref physicalor mentalenergyunderconditionsof alienation.In others, t means hemanifestationf a humanneed, .e., the needforcreativeactivity.Hence,we canonlygivequalified ssent o AbramL. Harriswhenhesaysin his paper,"UtopianElements n Marx'sThought", thics,LX, (January, 950),p. 90, that in Marx'sdefinition abor is an abstractuniversalwhich,in the historicalprocess,symbolizesman's creativepowers,and that "man'snature as a human orsocial animal s expressedn labor".A moreextendeddiscussion f whatappearso beMarx'scompleteresolutionof labor in a state of necessityand "labor"n a stateoffreedom s presentedn the text above.24 KarlMarxand FriedrichEngels,Die deutsche deologie, n MEGA,Vol. V, pp.184-185.

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BERT F. HOSELITZprimitive technological level, it is because the productivity of labor has risendue to the advance of human knowledge."Naturedoes not build machines,locomotives, railways,electric telegraphs,self-acting mules, etc.... They are organs of the human brain created by humanhands; they are reified power of knowledge. The developmentof fixed capitalshows to what degree the generallevel of social knowledgeand informationhasbecome an immediateproductivepower, and hence to what extent the conditionsof the process of social life have come to be subjectto the generalintellect andbecome transformed n accordancewith it."25The main result of the application of science to production processes is theachievement of more leisure. But under capitalism, this added leisure doesnot accrue to everyone, but only to a few; not to the capitalists themselves,for these - as we shall see - are also engaged in feverish activity in theprocess of accumulation, but to some aristocrats, rentiers, and others withinherited wealth. However, since capital is created out of the surplus whichis left over after the subsistence and other current needs of the society tomaintain its stock of goods have been filled, the process of capital formationin itself is instrumental in creating the means of disposable time. Marx hasdescribed this process in a very enlightening passage in these words:"Thegreathistoricalaspectof capitalis to have created this surplus abor, a sur-plus from the standpointof mere use value, mere subsistence. The historicaldes-tiny of capital is fulfilled when, on the one hand, needs have become so highlydevelopedthat surplus abor abovewhat is essentialhas become a generalrequire-ment, and on the other, general industriousness... has become developed as ageneralcharacteristic f the new generation. Finally, the productivityof labor -which, in turn is spurredon by capital in its unlimitedstrivingfor riches - hasadvancedto such a level that the maintenanceand preservationof all wealth re-quires an increasinglysmaller amountof labor for the whole society, and, at thesametime, society entertainsa scientificrelationship o its processof reproductionon an ever fuller scale. This is a species of labor where man has ceased to dowhathe can have thingsdo for him ... But the ceaselessstriving or a generalizedform of wealth makes capital drive labor beyond the limits of naturalnecessityand, in this way, createsthe materialelements for the developmentof a rich in-dividuality,which is equally all-embracingn productionandconsumption.Hence,in such a situation abordoes not appearany more as labor,but as full unfoldingof pure humanactivity, in which the naturalnecessityof its immediateform hasdisappeared,because in the place of natural needs have steppedthose createdbyhistory."26Marx here makes explicit what he had expressed on a more intuitive levelin The German Ideology: with Hess and others, he saw the replacement oflabor by free human activity as the major characteristic of the communistUtopia. Marx clearly recognizes the psychological need for men to be active,and to create things and ideas, works of art and works of industry. This is25 Grundrisse, p. 594.26 Ibid., p. 231 (italics added).

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTwhy he counters the view of Adam Smith, who regarded labor invariably aspain and who, therefore, saw rest as identical with freedom and happiness.Though Marx admits that labor under specific conditions, i.e., in a systemof slavery, serfdom, or under a wage contract may be considered in thismanner, he points out that man "in his normal state... also has the needfor a normal amount of labor, for elimination of rest". He points out, more-over, that in the most ideal situation, labor is self-realization - and this,of course, is closely related to, if not identical with, what we called earlierfree human activity. More sophisticated than Smith was Fourier who con-ceived of "travailattractif", but who regarded it essentially as fun or amuse-ment. On the contrary, Marx maintains that"really ree labor,e.g., composingmusic, is damnedserious,requiringmost intenseeffort. Laborin the field of materialproductioncan attain this characteronly if(1) its social character s realized,and (2) its scientific charactercomes forth, ...i.e., when it is not humaneffort consisting n speciallytrainedexertion of physicalforce, ... but activitywhich appearsrulingsupremelyoverthe forces of nature."27Thus, here again, though he actually uses the term "labor",Marx distinguishesbetween "labor"in the realm of necessity and "activity"in a state of freedom.This spontaneous, creative activity is, however, an aspect of human naturewhich was regarded by Marx as a universal; that is, true, generic humanexistence requires that individuals should have the opportunity - becausethey have the intrinsic need - to engage in some creative activity. Labor inthe narrow sense is not the same thing as free creative activity, but is thetypical characteristic of alienated man. And when he tries to show thefrustration of the laborer with his "life activity" Marx writes perhaps moreeloquently than on any other topic.It is not necessary to present here a detailed description of Marx's viewsof alienation under capitalism subject to more heavily growing industrialdevelopment, since this matter has been discussed extensively in a series ofrather recent books and essays.28Alienation, partly based on Marx's extensiveexposition of it in his Paris manuscript of 1844, has in fact become a wide-spread problem of discussion in currentsocio-psychological theories. Similarly,Marx's own views on alienation may be considered to express, in a somewhatfumbling manner, his interpretation of the psychological needs and attitudesof the industrial workers of his day.It should be noted that Marx has primarily in mind laborers in Englishand French industrial centers of the 1840's. While a student at Germanuniversities, he had little contact with members of the working class. But asan exile in Paris, living in financial stringency and thrown together with27 Ibid., p. 505.28 See on this problem, above all, Bekker, op. cit.; Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology(Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960), pp. 335 ff; Erich Fromm, Marx Concept of Man(New York: Frederick Ungar PublishingCo., 1961), pp. 43 ff; and Georg Lukacz, Ge-schichte und Klassenbewusstsein Berlin:Malik-Verlag, 1923), esp. pp. 57 ff.

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BERT F. HOSELITZradical eadersandwriters,he learnedto know firsthandwhatthe life of thepoorestclasseswas like.29Thisexperiencewas a shock. The low standard fliving of many proletarianswas, of course, too obvious to be overlooked.ParliamentaryCommittees, haritableorganizations, ocial workers,church-men, and journalistswere fully aware of the deplorablematerialconditionsunderwhich manyworkers ived. But Marx was concernednot only withtheir physical miseryand poverty;he asked, in addition,what were theconsequencesof this type of existencefor the psyche of these men? Heregardedactivity,whichwas felt to be creative,as an indispensableacet ofhuman life. If one cannotwork creatively, hen life has lost its purpose.80Now among ndustrialaborersMarxfound that although hey worked,theyreallyhad lost all sense of being active creatively. He saw that they con-sideredworkingonly as a dull, hateddrudgerywhich one had to submittoin order to keep one's belly filled; and even this was not guaranteed, inceaccidents,sickness,and old age were perennialthreats to a worker'sveryexistence. Here thenweremen,human ndividualswhose life had no humanmeaningand content. Here was the epitome of frustrationof true humanexistence. This is what Marx, in his eloquentdiscussionof alienation,wastrying o explain.38The passage s at the sametimea criticismof mostof thepoliticaleconomyof Marx'sday. By regardinghe laborermerelyas a supplierof a productive29 On Marx's life experiences n Paris in 1843 to 1844, see Marx-Engels-Leninnstitute,Karl Marx: Chronikseines Lebens (Moscow, 1934), pp. 19-25 and the additionalsourcescited there.30 Marx is reported to have said late in his life: "To be incapable of work is to anyhuman being who does not wish to be simply an animal the equivalentof a death sen-tence." See D. Riazanov,Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels (New York, 1927), p. 206.31 Adam Smith also expressed serious concern over the highly unsatisfactoryhumanconditions of workers under capitalism. Though he regarded the development of amodern "commercial society" as a necessary and desirable end product of historicalevolution, he maintained, nevertheless,that under this system "the employment of thefar greater part of those who live by labour... comes to be confined to a few verysimple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandingsof the greaterpartof men are necessarily formed by their employments. The man whose whole life isspent in performing a few simple operations... becomes as stupid and ignorant as ispossible for a human creature to become. The torporof his mind rendershim, not onlyincapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation,but of conceivingany generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judg-ment concerning many of even the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great andextensive interestsof his country he is altogether incapable of judging;and unless veryparticularpains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable ofdefending his country in war... His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, inthis manner,to be acquiredat the expenseof his intellectual,social, and martialvirtues."See Adam Smith,An Inquiryinto the Nature and Causes of the Wealthof Nations (NewYork, The Modern Library, 1937), pp. 734-735. We note that the distress, low livinglevels, and intellectual limitations of the proletariatin the early phases of the industrialrevolution gave rise to very similar evaluations on the part of different studentsof theeconomy. In fact, it was this degradationof a large part of human beings which gaveeconomics the title of a dismal science.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTservice rather than as a human being, political economy surrendersany claimit may have to be reckoned among the human sciences. Classical, especiallypost-Ricardian, economics reduces human life and existence to propositionsby which the most paltry standard of subsistence becomes the yardstick fordetermining the typical needs of the mass of men. Political economy makesworkers virtually into senseless and needless beings. Any luxury on the partof a laborer appears reprehensible and any activity going beyond the meresatisfaction of animal needs is regarded as luxury."Thisscience of the wonderfulindustry s thereforeat the same time the scienceof asceticism; ts true ideal is the ascetic, yet usuriousmiser and the ascetic yetproductiveslave... Self-renunciation, enunciationof life and all human needsis its chief theorem. The less you eat, drink,buy books, go to the theater,to dan-ces, to the tavern;the less you think, love, argue,sing, do feel, etc., the moreyousave, the largerbecomesyour treasure,your capital,which neithermothsnor rob-bery can take away. The less you are, the less you live, the more you have, thelargeris your alienatedlife, the more you store up of your alienatedessence...All passion and all activity thus must perish in avarice. The laborer must havejust enough to make him wish to live, and he may only live in orderto have."32Here the circle is closed. The alienation of the laborer from his productivework, and contrasted with it the alienation of the wealthy capitalist from hisactivity, is seen as an outflow of the category of private property, of theparamount place assigned to the accumulation of wealth under capitalism.But at the same time the role of political economy as the branch of scientificinquiry best capable of laying bare the physiology of modern society isestablished. For political economy, although disregardingthe totality of manas an individual, is concerned with that aspect of his activity which appearsmost clearly in an alienated form. The modern laborer, though personallyfree, surrendersmost of life activity to the control of another, the capitalist,but in truth to an impersonal force beyond this latter, capital. The analysisof the relations of capital, which constitutes what Marx called a "critique ofpolitical economy", is a procedure by means of which the key to the abolitionof alienated labor and to the abolition of labor (in the narrow sense of theterm) is to be found.The main character in the drama of socio-economic progress, at a certainhistorical stage, is thus an objective material category: capital. It dominatesnot only the workers but the capitalists, even though the latter control themeans of production. But the capitalist mode of production - herein liesits intrinsic "necessity" - imposes certain behavior patterns upon all, at thepenalty of proletarianization for the capitalist and starvation for the prole-tarian. Capitalism as a social system has a compulsive character: thoughpeople make decisions on the basis of their free will and in full consciousnessof their implications, the socio-economic framework sets limits within which32 MEGA, III, pp. 129-130; Manuscript of 1844, pp. 118-119.

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BERTF. HOSELITZthese decisionscan be maderationally,.e., in pursuitof the impliedor openlyexpressedobjectivesof each decision-makingndividual. As Marx puts it,thecapitalist hareswiththe misera passionfor wealth andits accumulation,but that "which n the miseris a mere idiosyncrasys, in the capitalist, heeffect of the social mechanism, f which he is but one of the wheels." Thecapitalist s undercompulsion:"Accumulate, ccumulate!That is Moses andthe prophets! ... Save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion ofsurplus-value r surplus-productnto capital!"33We find hereagainthe emphasison asceticism, he refrainingromenjoy-ment and luxuryconsumptionby the capitalistwhichis imposed upon himby the system,and which he disregardsat his peril. In spite of the greatdifferences n their social philosophyand in their methodologicalapproachto the study of capitalism, here is a great deal of similaritybetween thisexplanationof capitalistprogressand its substratumand the explanationgiven by MaxWeber. Both the Marxianand the Weberian ystemsstipulatecompulsivemechanisms.In the Marxiansystemthe dominationof thingsover men results in alienation. In the systemof Weber,the domination sthat of an anxiety-inducingdeology,i.e., the doctrineof predestination ndthe concern on the part of each individualto insure his salvation. Thebehavioralconsequencesare the same for workers and capitalistsalike:emphasison savingand the curtailment f consumption, n the one side, and,on the other,frugalityand glorificationof labor as an end in itself. Thedifference between the theories lies not so much in the identificationofmechanisms esponsible or the dynamismof a capitalistsystem,but in theprincipalsourcesetting n motion the mechanism tself: in one case it is thegrowth of productive orces, in the other a new ethic based on religiousinnovation. There are even closer similaritiesn the predictionof the out-come of the capitalistsystemin the two theoretical treams. Marx, as wehave seen, regarded apitalismas an indispensable tagein the comingof thecommunistsociety. The Weberian view led also to the predictionthatsocialismwouldfollow,thoughthis predictionwas not madeby Weberhim-self,butby WernerSombartandJosephSchumpeter,who werebothindebtedto the theoriesof Max Weberfor their own hypotheseson the originsanddevelopment f capitalism.34 oth SombartandSchumpeterawthe principaldynamismn capitalist ocietyin the "irrational"nnovatingactivityof entre-preneurs, estingon a broad-basedystem n whichrational,ascetic ndividualsworkedwithina highlydevelopedexchangeeconomy,reproducing gainandagain he conditionsorprogressbeyondthe level of theself-containedircularflow. WernerSombartablycharacterizedhisviewpoint n a lecturedelivered33 Capital, Vol. I, pp. 649 and 652.34 Schumpeter'sviews are expressed at length in his work, Capitalism,Socialism andDemocracy (New York, 1942), especially chapters 12-14. On the views of Sombart seebelow.

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MARX ON DEVELOPMENTin 1932, in which he also outlined the factors within the capitalist systemwhich tended to bring about its destruction. The crucial passage in that lectureis as follows:"The economic ethic peculiarto capitalism s customarilydesignatedas 'spiritofcapitalism'. During the last decades this spirit has undergonequite substantialchangeswhich are apt to alterits essence. This essencelay in the tensionbetweenrationalism and irrationalism,between calculation and speculation,between thebourgeoisspiritand the robberspirit,betweenprudenceandventuresomeness.Butthis tension has decreased. The rational factor has been given a strongimpetusand even a rationalizationof entrepreneurship as taken place, so to speak. Wecan pursuethis change in detail. We see how the 'sixth sense' diminishes. Thenumberof knowable,predictablecircumstancesconstantlyincreasesand the in-clination of business leaders grows to base their enterpriseson a foundation ofinformation and scientific knowledge. Enterprisesthus attain the characterofadministrations,heir leadersthe characterof bureaucrats, ndthe giganticsize ofthe apparatus ontributes o this development."35The growth of rationality, of the application of science to economic processes(both on the production and the organizational level), and the predictabilityof their outcome, tend to change the nature of capitalist socio-economicstructure and to bring about the gradual or abrupt development of socialismor at least of a quasi-socialist structure. Contemporary capitalism, composedprimarily of these vast business bureaucracies, endowed with large numbersof automatic or almost automatic machines, characterized by the routiniza-tion of innovation and scientific methods in production, administration andfinancial control, is a very different kind of animal from that described byKarl Marx. In many of its features it resembles the socialist society of eitherthe stage of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or even the next step, thestage of incipient socialism. Hence in many essentials the socio-economicstructures of modern capitalist societies and contemporary socialist societiesboth resemble each other and differ from the primitive capitalism of the late18th and early 19th centuries. As we have already seen, they still exist underthe principle of alienation, they are based on exchange value and money,they have accepted science and technical progress as values applicable toproductive activity, and they have instituted routinized procedures for eco-nomic growth and technological advance. Because of its technical superiority,capitalism has even outstripped the socialist countries in some features whichMarx considered important:the working day and the working week have beenshortened, the standard of living of the workers has risen substantially, in factso much that in some capitalist countries they live much better than theaverage bourgeois of Marx's days. Moreover, the social distance betweenclasses has narrowed and individuals have become freer, since the stricturesof necessity have been mitigated and the scope of equality has been widened.Capitalist development has taken a turn which Marx apparently did not35 Werner Sombart, Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus, Berlin, 1932, pp. 8-9.

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BERT F. HOSELITZforesee and althoughwe have not yet reached the somewhatutopian stageof perfecthumanfreedom,it appearsthat the transition o it would be nomore difficult romthe ruleof moderncapitalismhanfromthatof socialism.But we shall not engagein prophecyor even long-rangeprediction. Thepurposeof thischapters notto elevate hepresentandfutureof capitalism ndsocialism,butrather o examine he contribution f KarlMarxto thetheoryofsecular, ocial andeconomicprogressandtheextent o which hiscontributioncanbe explainedntermsof thegeneral ntellectual rends n social scienceandphilosophyduring he nineteenthcentury. In orderto do so, we have exam-ined, in some detail, that part of Marx'swork whichhas specialrelevanceto the study of long-rangesocio-economicchange. Though, as we haveshown, quite extensive hints of his views on these problems appeared nwidelyread works, two extensivemanuscriptswhich remainedunpublisheduntilthe 1930'scontainmaterialwhich dealsmuchmoreexplicitlywith thesematters han the earlierpublishedworks,hence we are now ableto delineatewith greater certaintythan before what his thoughts were on long-termeconomicandsocialdevelopment.It cannot be deniedthat in this field, as in manyothers,Marxhas madeimportant ontributions.But it wouldbe wrongto regard hese as unrelatedto similar attemptsat theory-building efore him, or to believe that thegeneraltrend of reasoningwhich we can follow in his work has not beenpursuedoutside socialistcircles. For this reasonmodern social theoriesonlong-rangesocio-economicgrowth can easily incorporatecertain elementsof Marxian houghtwithoutabandoning heir non-Marxian oots. We alsohave seen that in discussingthe trendsof probablefuture developments,Marx places principalemphasison the growthof science and knowledge,expecting hatultimatelyall processesof productionandsocial organizationwill become subjectto scientificprinciples. In fact, the growthof humanknowledgeandthe increase n productivity reatedby it, plays a many-sidedrole. It enables us to have more goods for the same expenditureof labortime, it adds to the amount of each individual'sdisposabletime, and iteliminatesall labor which is eitherdrudgeryor hard physicalexertion,re-placing t withregulatory ndsupervisoryi.e., intellectually atisfying)aborcombinedwith automaticor quasi-automaticmachines.In all these aspectsof Marxianreasoninghererepeatedly ropup severalviewsthatweregenerallyheld in Europeansocialscienceandsocialphiloso-phy of the late eighteenthand the nineteenthcenturies. They appearin asharply disguised form sometimes,since they are clad in the somewhatabstruse anguageof Germanpost-Hegelianphilosophy. But it is, in fact,the combinationof post-Hegelianphilosophy, he materialism f the Frenchenlightenment, nd the economictheoryof Ricardo and his successors hatfinds a syntheticexpression n Marx. A dash of socialistthoughtderivedfrom the French"utopian" ocialists s also mixedin, thoughit almostdis-

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MARXON DEVELOPMENTappearsin the much thicker gravy of Germanphilosophyand the sharpsauce of Britisheconomics. But all this is a truism. That Marx learnedmuchfromthesepredecessors as neverbeendenied. Whathas beenassertedis thatthis criticalmindachieveda completeemancipationromthe teachingsof these "ideologues" nd that there is a sharpgap betweentheir biasedorutopianthoughtandMarx'sstrictlyscientific heories.Hence the most important esultof our enquiry,as concerns he sociologyof Marxian heory,is thatMarxstill keeps essentiallywithin the verybroadstream of the theoryof progress,which was so characteristic f Europeanthoughtduringthe eighteenthand up to the end of the nineteenthcentury.Thoughmoreemphasis s placedon empiricaldata by Marxthanby almostany of his predecessorswho wroteon the grand,secular evolutionof man-kind, and thoughMarx'sviews were intended o stand the test of searchingcriticalanalysisfrom the standpointof acid post-Hegelianphilosophy, heunderlying rend of ideas is virtuallyidentical with that of many of hispredecessors.Progressconsists n the gradualemancipation f man throughknowledgeand science. The end of this evolutionis the realm of perfecthuman freedomand the full realization of virtue, since all petty, selfishantagonismswill disappear.Therewill be full equality,thoughin a systemof abundanceof goods, disposable time, and scientific information,theconceptof equalitywill have littlemeaning. All thesethoughtscan be foundin utopianwritings romThomasMoreto Fourierand in worksexpoundingthe theoryof progressand humanperfectibilityromSaintPierreto WilliamGodwinand AugusteComte.36There is muchin Marxwhich is new and Ihave pointedto the profound nsightswhich he developedon the theoryofseculardevelopmentof human socio-economicsystems. But underlyingallthis innovation s a core of thoughtwhich has deep roots in the traditionsofEuropean ocialscience of the last 200 years.

BERTF. HOSELITZUniversity of Chicago36 It should be scarcelynecessaryto mentionthat the gradualdevelopmentof the theoryof progress from its early beginnings to the period contemporarywith Marx has beenadmirablyanalysedin the work by J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, London, 1920. Asan example of the profound belief in the all-powerfuleffects of science, one may citea prophetic statementof William Godwin, which he regardedas the clinching argumentin his controversy with T. R. Malthus. In his final reply to Malthus's demographic-economic theory, Godwin writes in On Population,London, 1820: "Of all the sciences,natural or mechanical, which within the last half century have proceded with suchgigantic strides, chemistry is that which has advanced most rapidly. All the substancesthat nature presents, all that proceeds from earth or air, is analysed by us into itsoriginal elements... And it is surely no great stretch of the faculty of anticipationtosay that whatever man can decompose, man will be able to compound. The food thatnourishes us, is composed of certain elements; and wherever these elements can befound, there human art may hereafterproduce nourishment;and thus we are presentedwith a real infinite series of increasein the means of subsistence to match Mr. Malthus'sgeometricalratio for the multiplicationof mankind."(pp. 499-501).

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