masinsin v albano1

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G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA, ROLDAN, petitioners,vs.THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X,DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity asPresiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

VITUG, J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition forcertiorari, prohibition, relief from judgment, aswell as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan TrialCourt ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private respondent VicenteCaeda ("Caeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court ofManila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and all personsclaiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment and surrenderpossession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month fromJanuary 1987 as the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the landis actually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August 1985, petitionersfiled a petition forcertioraribefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of theaforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due timedismissed. Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed bypetitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the nullification of the

judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground ofres judicata. This time, petitionersappealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC for theenforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of

Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987.

On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse tothis Court was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to remove their houseon the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of demolition was issued. Shortlythereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by theRegional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition forcertiorari, with preliminary injunction andrestraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTCdecision in a petition forcertiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case


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No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restrainingorder. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motion ofpetitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3On23 August 1990, 4the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision,dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for prioritydevelopment by the National Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446, entitled,"Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case is intimately related, where weruled:

. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court is theimplication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law," andits amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by ProclamationNo. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban Development CoordinatingCouncil, Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992,this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a Comment on the status of theprogram of acquisition by the Government of the land area which includes the disputed property, aspart of the Areas for Priority Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees andproclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro Manila

Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the following report on the status ofLot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the CarlosEstate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of the report read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St.,Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located within theCarlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.

The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the ZonalImprovement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor

(PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged negotiation forthe acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOTacquiring the said lot for its program.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of the respondentCourt of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in order to avoid eviction from thedisputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the same allegedly under the Community MortgageProgram of the National Housing Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same.Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5


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What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through differentcounsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of meritof the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitableexecution of a decision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision beforedifferent branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this practice be

countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to the pursuit ofjustice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable.Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I willsupport and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the dulyconstituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittinglyor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the

same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyeraccording to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as tomy clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or

purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court,which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumaciouscalling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and

WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely. Double costsagainst petitioners.This resolution is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.

Syjuco vs. Castro, G.R. No. 70403, July 7, 1989

A lawyer was held solidarily liable with his client for delaying the administration of justice for almost a quarter of a century.This is the origin of forum shopping.

Masinsin vs. Albano, G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994

For resorting to forum shopping, a lawyer was warned that a repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.

Forunda vs. Atty. Arnold Guerrero, 480 SCRA 201 [2006]

While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first andforemost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Inthis case, a lawyer was suspended due to forum shopping.

Bong Siong Yao vs. Atty. Leonardo Aurelio, 485 SCRA 553

Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigatinghostility against any person most especially against a client or former client.

Huibona vs. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 153785, August 31, 2006

The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of court processes which degrades the administration of justice, wreakshavoc upon orderly judicial procedure and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.


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A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993

EDUARDO R. SANTOS, petitioner,vs.JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.

Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action for unlawfuldetainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan while therespondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his verified complaint filed through the Office of theCourt Administrator on 18 March 1993, the complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of thelaw and gross incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer inthe said case was filed and "without notice and hearing," the latter rendered a decision on 28 June 1991, 1 thedecretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed thatjudgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-entitledcase.

SO ORDERED.

He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of 19 January 1993in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 2 a petition forcertiorarifiled by the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 had already opined that the said decision is void upon its face because it:

. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same cannotbe considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done, it merely praysthat judgment be rendered.

but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June 1991] in order tonullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 3promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive portion of this new decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff by:

1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate thepremises occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected theirrespective dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot ofplaintiff aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from saidsubject premises of plaintiff;

2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency,per month by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafteruntil they shall have vacated the premises of the plaintiff;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00,Philippine currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00,Philippine Currency, for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before thisHonorable Court; and

4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.


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On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum containing its evaluation,report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent facts, the said office submitted that the instantcomplaint is meritorious, and made the following findings:

It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing dispositiveportion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof. The onlyineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed the same. If only

he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion considered to be themost important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention. The alleged dispositiveportion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the case. Presumably, this musthave been simply copied from plaintiff's complaint.

True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since theRTC dismissed the petition forcertiorarialthough Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that what wasrendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took respondent Judge 1-1/2years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily been discovered at the time theMotion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But the writ was nonetheless issued onDecember 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would not mitigate his liability. There is no denyingthat the quality of a decision rendered by the judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the

integrity of the court in dispensing justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very leastcareless in failing to read carefully the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original andamended decisions still contained errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was noadequate editing of the decision that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would haveavoided such fractured phrases as:

1. Plaintiffon being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28, 1991);

2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);

3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid);

4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right becomesone of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid);

5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the property(Ibid).

It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions haveno place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done.

and recommends that:

. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the sameor similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the service. He is

also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.

We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently supported by the pleadingssubmitted by the parties in this case.

After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its body to be flawed withgrammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of, resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot evenbe called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such asthe Memorandum or the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after thedefendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected by the Court

Administrator. How it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the


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mystery may only complicate the matter against the respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance orincompetence.

There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally infirmed "dispositiveportion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of the respondent betraying the absence ofdue care, diligence, conscientiousness and thoroughness qualities which Judges must, among others, possess.Respondent could have easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least

read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot expect every Judge tobe an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he must, however, do everything he can, throughconstant study, extraordinary diligence, and passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect forand encourages obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court.

As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed by the Canons ofJudicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the dutiesimposed upon him" 10 and that he should be conscientious, studious and thorough. 11

Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even granted the motion for itsexecution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge that there was nothing to execute. He could nothave feigned ignorance of such nothingness for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its

execution, exhibiting once more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his incompetence.

We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such unmitigated faux pas.The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known the fatal defect of the dispositive portionand the obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution, yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution,while the counsel for the defendants the complainant herein merely filed a motion for reconsiderationbased solely on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-trialorder. Obviously, the complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision. As a matter of fact,when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was amended was a " finaldecision," aposition totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. Asofficers of the court who owe to it candor, fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called thecourt's attention to the glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991 Decision.

We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency, neglect of duty and theviolation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could not, however, be liable for ignorance oflaw and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he handed down a newdecision on 25 January 1993. The 28June 1991 Decision was "incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could notattain finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and

justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the order of the RTC of Bulacanin Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28 June 1991 is "void upon its face"forever bars the respondent from rendering a new or amended decision in the ejectment case.

We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred task and all thoseinvolved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the

Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times beaccountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act withpatriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget that he is the visiblerepresentation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. 15 Therefore, he must constantly be the embodimentof competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and integrity so as to preserve,promote and enhance the people's confidence in the Judiciary.

A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his complaint in this case healleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the respondent "without any hearing, or at least thiscounsel was never notified of any such hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate,if not outright false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in the


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Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was admitted by the court, thecase was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties were required to submit their position papers andthe affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and consideredunder the Rule on Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of thesubmitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further suppressed the fact that heentered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after the court had conducted the preliminary conferenceand issued the order for the submission of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled

to any notice before then.

The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give his complaint astrong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, heforgot that he owes to this Court absolute candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nortolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial actionComplainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons ofJudicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of Five ThousandPesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with moreseverely.

Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always keeping in mind hisduty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.

AC No. 2837 | October 7, 1994 | LIBIT VS. OLIVA

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court tobe misled by any artifice.Facts:Judge Domingo Panis inPedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to conduct an investigation to

determine the author of the falsified Sheriffs return in said case. As a result of which, the NBI charged respondents Attys.Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for obstruction of justice.The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.

In view of NBIs report that Umalis signature in the complaint in the civil case was not his, the case was dismissed withrespect to him.

Issue:W/N respondent violated Code of Ethics

Held:Yes. After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds thatrespondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its

disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondents failureto live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath, the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of hisclient does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he shall not doany falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he mislead or allow the court tobe misled by any artifice.

Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty ofDISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant isordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/oct1994/ac_2837_1994.htmlhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/oct1994/ac_2837_1994.html


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CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995SALLY D. BONGALONTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA,Respondents.Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline, NationalGrievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M.Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representingconflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant

might obtain.The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps.Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminaryattachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of theSps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money based on apromissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin wasrepresented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file thenecessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by defaultrendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previouslyattached by complainant was levied upon.It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo andAtty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number.Thus, complainant concluded that the civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps.Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in the civil case he filed.

After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and recommendations:Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the records is axerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to be a faithfulreproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aidTCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated insaid title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needlessto state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the saidregistered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting interests andabetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and herhusband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances and in theirpleadings the same IBP No., respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.

The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in heraffidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt numberpertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing topay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is thebounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues ontime, especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be SUSPENDED from thepractice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondentAtty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Held: The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the practiceof law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue topossess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is theobservance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyersappearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that

expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any incourt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oathand of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for aperiod of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in theimposition of a more severe penalty.


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NAKPIL v VALDES

Facts:

Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement withAtty.Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil.

Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred to his name.

When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and lawfirmsfor the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.

What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (heactuallytransferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans hecontracted.

What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filedanadministrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes.

The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.

The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held thatValdesonly held the lots in trust for Nakpil.

Issue : W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:

Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;

Including his loans as claims on the estate; and

Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors

Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his lawfirm.

Held:

The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.

The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by ImeldaNakpilwhen the latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear thatJoseNakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. Byhis act of excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his ownbenefit) asclaims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a closerelationship since the50s), which was the basis for Imeldas decision to use his services.

As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribedbyCanon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of itscreditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities oftheestate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly aconflictbetween the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who arecreditors of the estate.


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Maglasang vs. People [G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990]

Facts: Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano,filed for a petition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the court dismissedthe petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the President wherehe accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust

judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos appointees, and robbing the

Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who wasimpleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be reached byordinary men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. When asked to show cause why he shouldnot be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the complaint was constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith theerroneous and very strict practices of the justices concerned. He also said that the justices have no jurisdiction over hisact and that they should just answer the complaint. The SC found him guilty of contempt and improper conduct andordered to pay P1, 000 or imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the Atty. Castellanos acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Held: Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and contumacious. He went beyond the bounds of constructivecriticism. What he said are not relevant to the cause of his client. They cast aspersion on the Courts integrity as a neutraland final arbiter of all justiciable controversies before it.

The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing of the petition for certiorari did not render his negligenceexcusable. It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the membersof the Court, but his inexcusable negligence and incompetence.

As an officer of the court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep theconfidence of his client.

Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of the system of government separation of power - has been lost.He should know that not even the President of the Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Courts acts.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN ORMONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OFRIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUTMERIT. The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of thisfact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that wasconsistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts forthe purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the

lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as hebelieves to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money ormalice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trustreposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as awarning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED forONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant tomembership of the Philippine bar.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM, p:
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In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment ofAtty. Crisanto L. Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa andMagdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1,1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease.Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over theproperty.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced varioussuits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings weredecided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issuesand parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as wereauthorized by law.

The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:

1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors forspecific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This wasdocketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on thegrounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by JudgeFelimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.

2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in theMetropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Leefiled an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolutionrejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.

3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors.This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have knownthat it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus orprohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.

Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denialof his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a specialcivil action and not an appeal.

On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with

the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set asideand Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.

4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer forpreliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the otherlessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Veradismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.

5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the otherlessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition againstJudge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and


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damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.

In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawfuldetainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990,Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garciaattacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed asCA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the groundthat the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.

6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of themotion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.

7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminaryinjunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other

lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.

8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against JudgeSingzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare thewrits of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco,filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion waspending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when hewilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as

he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted theirvaluable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged todefend herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedlyrebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him tobe just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delayany man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthyof trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practiceof the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of thecomplainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to otherlawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rightsand privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the IntegratedBar of the Philippines.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971


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THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUPWORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,vs.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.

Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Appeal, by certiorarito review a decision and a resolution en bancof the Court of Industrial Relations dated August17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & EmployeesAssociation-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions),while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargainingagreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as theCompanies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees

Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuadethe members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions(NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department ofJustice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legalassistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receivingfrom the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and waslikewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modifiedrenewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957.The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1,1957.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals,but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held underthe auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions'proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security inexchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insistedthat the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon,and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particulardemand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent InsularLife Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the

joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise theCompanies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to


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October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped theirdemand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.

From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to astalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies finalcounter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals,the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable

formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith theUnions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.

Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor inresponsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served onthe Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim asfollows:

We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

2. Take your meals within the office.

3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office wherecomfortable cots have been prepared.

4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.

5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in thefairness of the Management.

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by theaforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some managementmen tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, andVicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picketlines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of apicketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companiesorganized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeededin penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also tothe strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filedcriminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in


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the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instanceof Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions,issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping,impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the freemovement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.

On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter

(exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long.We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are nocriminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at thehome office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3),were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" againstone striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of theCompanies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decidedto call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the CityFiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which wereEnage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, allnon-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediatelyby the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, whenpractically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some butadamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on theground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specificacts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president ofthe Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance GroupWorkers & Employees Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance

Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later thatthey were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep.Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formaldismissal notices given to them.

On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies underRepublic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of theUnions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them toabandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paidovertime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, theymight be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work afterthe strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.


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On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the complaint, statingspecial defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.

After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered onAugust 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unionsseasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum onSeptember 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en bancin a resolution promulgated on

October 20, 1965.

Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:

1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to thestrikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;

2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the strikingmembers of the Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;

3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members ofthe Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in

regard to activities undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and

4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages,from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.

I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of theirfreedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually byregistered special delivery mail at that without being coursed through the Unions which were representing theemployees in the collective bargaining.

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike followingunproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that

their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair laborpractice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with theemployees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur.563, citingNLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)

Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiateor to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And thebasis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, theemployer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo PhotoSupply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).

Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of

a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with theirunion membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right tocollective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for theemployer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwisenew employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting theirhomes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend toundermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from theemployer's molestation.1

Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them toreturn to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co.,


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Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the strikingemployees in the event they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under theConstitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise ofbenefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. GoigyCo., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots,"

"free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and"arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break astrike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by aunion, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returningto work would be.

Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of aChristmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union tobargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused tobargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer'spromises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the

employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to theeffect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization,accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2

Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officersand members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reasonof the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main causewhy the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. Thecircumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued bythe Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or whichtended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike.Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being

thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, andshould not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning ofsubsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be saidtends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is notnecessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced bystatements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of theemployer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco,Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citingNLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).

Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the lightof the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to

the "totality of conduct doctrine,"

... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis oftheir implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction withcollateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, thoughinnocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances underwhich they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias orbecause of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference.(Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)


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It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of theirrespective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia,former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, withattractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progressin the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary orin responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in theDepartment of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop

their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondentsadamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiatingpanel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners wentto strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducingthem to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president andmanager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men,who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru onlyone gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premisesof the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. lwph1.t Then therespondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and thesethree only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain aninjunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the freeand peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehiclesto and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter,Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by registered special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening themwith dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported forwork, the respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member refused to admit 63members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared ofcriminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and unionmembers. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from thebreakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikerswith pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon,

Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's officefound no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them onthe pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the

inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the samecriminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yieldthe clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism withinthem.

To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect andcontinue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Noticeof Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposedtestimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted thatexhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:

TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONSDEPARTMENT OF LABORMANILA

Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strikeagainst

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.Plaza Moraga, Manila


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THE FGU INSURANCE GROUPPlaza Moraga, Manila

INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATIONPlaza Moraga, Manila .

for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...

However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. Thissimply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economicconcessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the causeof the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:

3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice ofstrike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing `deadlock in collectivebargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated

April 15, 1958.)

The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main

reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate ingood faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime beingcommitted by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisorswithout increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare thestrike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) ittook the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they couldnot go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents' letterdated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have acounter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to thepetitioners' demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "wellreasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8,1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)

II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested incontinuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he mustreport for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employeesreported back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having compliedwith the first and third conditions.

Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is notdenied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refusedreadmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to securetheir respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground thatthey committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also hadcriminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal

charges against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is aclear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec.4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from theless active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the firstcategory were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authoritieswith respect to the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for oneunion official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing throughthe picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where therecord shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers whowere denied reinstatement.


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So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court ofIndustrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only theleaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed andconstituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation ofthe fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citingPhil.

Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)

It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination inthe readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. Butthe respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia,assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that thesetwo employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike were hostileto the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the powerof reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.

Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery ofreinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official whoformerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized.(Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted

Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)

Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted thediscrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for thediscrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returningemployees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp.15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting thediscrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But themanagement, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for thediscrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of thatcommittee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)

Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such discrimination bytestifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in naturewere readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). Buteven this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondentscontend was the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination ofthe evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers citedthe alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given theopportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the strikingemployees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they firstsecured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present therequired clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters

from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:

This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group asof 2 June 1958.

The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct whilepicketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law toterminate your employment without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 correspondingto one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.


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Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBESPresident, Insurance Life

Acting President, FGU.

The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were

the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and the courts. But all thesecharges except three were dropped or dismissed.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basisfor dismissal.

Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, hadabandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut,negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others,Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed

them when Olbes refused them an audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. Helikewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondrawere not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions to rebut his testimony. Therespondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention tohis non-admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondentsdismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed forcause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."

At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constituteabandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of elevenmen constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in theunion and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there wereno openings. Said the Court:

... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six unionmen, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activitiesand that the excuse given that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthoughtand not the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & TelegraphCo., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725,728)

The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2,1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the timeagreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further.

Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent morethan P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust asan auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphaticallydenied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of theofficials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on acombined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized

Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to thedollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It wasonly on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank liftedthe exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And hiscompetence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified


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public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip which the respondents never denied or tried todisprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise the factsinvolved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which guarantees the untramelledexercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labordispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it isnot only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a disput

masinsin v albano1

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