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FROM THE WAR ON TERROR TO THE WAR AGAINST DAESH

‘REPRODUCTION’ AND ‘TRANSFORMATION’

IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSES

Master Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree Masters of Laws (LL.M)

2015/2016 in Law and Politics of International Security

María Sofía Cossar Lambertini

Student number: 2573784

Advisor: Dr. Tanja E. Aalberts

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

2nd August 2016

Amsterdam, Netherlands

23. 710 Words

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INDEX

1. Introduction

1. A. Our case study and the aim of this analysis

1. B. A glance to the epistemological and theoretical framework

1. C. The relevance of our study and its contribution to the academy

1. D. Research question, hypothesis, methodology & data

1. E. The structure of the analysis

2. Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

2. A. PDA: language as an ontological and epistemological choice applied to

Terrorism Studies

2. B. Official foreign policy discourse: identity and policy

2. B. I. Foreign Policy as the discursive framework

2. B. II. Security foreign policy and the Copenhagen School

2. B. III. The particular case of “terrorism” after 2001 in security speeches

2. B. IV. Selves and Otherness and their interlink with Policies

2. C. The qualitative methodological model of Intertextuality

2. C. I. Methodological structure

2. C. II. Methodological procedure

3. The War on Terror basic discourse

3. A. Identity representation and policies proposed

3. A. I. The official foreign policy speech in the aftermath of 9/11

3. A. II. Introductions and transformations from 2002 on

3. B. Critics and support

4. The War against Daesh basic discourse

4. A. Identity representation and policies proposed

4. B. Critics and Support

5. From Bush to Hollande: “reproduction” or “transformation”?

6. Conclusions

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3

5

6

9

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10

10

12

12

13

13

14

18

18

20

21

21

22

39

45

48

48

63

66

68

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1. INTRODUCTION

“It is crucial to our understanding of the ‘war on terrorism’

to examine and explain how the discourse of counter-terrorism

constructs the practice of counter-terrorism”

(Jackson, 2005; 24)

1. A. OUR CASE STUDY AND THE AIM OF THIS ANALYSIS

A decade and a half after September 11 ‘terrorist attacks’ have been discursively identified in

diverse points of Western and Eastern Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa and North America.

Amongst Western capitals cities, New York, Madrid, London, Brussels and Paris have been

‘targeted’ since 2001 up to 2016. Within this particular group, State Administrations have reacted in

a multiplicity of ways; that is, constructing more or less radical speeches where different policies

are proposed against certain Otherness for the protection of certain Selves. Interestingly, it was after

Paris attacks on November 13th, 2015 that parallelisms began to be drawn -both by the media and

the academy- between two specific official reactions: the one of former United States (US)

President George W. Bush and the one of the current French President François G. G. Hollande1.

It has been pointed out that despite being constructed in a different time and space, Bush post-2001

and Hollande post-2015 official foreign policy speeches offer quite some similarities. To begin

with, both claimed the end of measures short of war –shall we recall George Bush’s phrase “war on

terror” (Bush, 2001b) and François Hollande’s statement “France is at war” (Hollande, 2015b)-.

Moreover, both anticipated a “new and different war” (Bush, 2011f), a “different kind of war”

(Hollande, 2015b) and tried to frame their respective Otherness –‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘Daesh’ terrorist

organisations- as threats to international peace and security through United Nations (UN) Security

Council Resolutions.

More importantly, what calls for attention is that such alleged ‘connection points’ between one and

another official rhetoric contrast with a historical background of French ‘opposition’ to certain

features of Bush’s War on Terror discourse. Particularly, France and Germany appeared as the

‘European bastion’ of disagreement to the Iraq War in 2003, which was explicitly mentioned by

former French President Jacques Chirac on multiple occasions. After a meeting with former Spanish

1 See, for example, Chossudovsky, M. (2015); Friedersdorf, C. (2015); Hemish, M. (2015) and Audureau, W. (2015)

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President Maria Aznar Jacques Chirac stated that, regarding the Iraq war, both governments had “a

common objective, that is to say, the need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq”,

despite not sharing “the same sentiment as regards the means to be adopted to achieve this goal”.

France, according to Chirac, considered the “possibility to achieve this goal through peaceful

means, that is to say through inspections” and war appeared no longer “inevitable” but rather “the

worst solution and a failure” (Chirac, 2003).

In such a context, it is interesting to reflect to what extent Bush’s and Hollande’s discursive

approaches to a ‘terrorist Other’ actually share –or not- a similar semantic structure from a post-

structuralist approach. If one aims at conducting a research project through a post-structuralist

outlook which assumes that language does not reflect but rather constitutes ‘reality’, the first

assumption to guide the rest of the analysis is that characterizations from one and another state

administration cannot be argued as objective or self-evident. There is no prior ‘natural’ reason for

labelling an event as “terrorist attack”, a “crime” or an “act of war” (Bartolucci & Gallo, 2013; 1).

That being said, distinguishing semantic constructions that are being ‘reproduced’ and/or

‘challenged’ from the War on Terror to the War against Daesh official speech is relevant for

understanding the dynamics and evolution of the international security agenda –also discursively

construed- where certain identities and policies are legitimised whilst other are discarded. The

discursive field is not an ‘even one’ and the US and France enjoy a privileged position as political

agencies shaping such agenda, which could facilitate their approaches assuming a ‘hegemonic’

position. Both appear as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and next to the US

argued ‘global extension of influence’2, it has been highlighted France’s current relative ‘regional

leadership position’ influencing the foreign policy rhetoric of European Union (EU) countries3.

Bearing this in mind, is the aim of this research project to provide a post-structuralist

comparative analysis between two official foreign policy discourses -the post-9/11 American War

on Terror and the post-11/13 French War against Daesh- specifically dwelling on the construction

of ‘identity’ and ‘policy’ within them.

2 See, for example, in Tsui, CK. (2014), pp. 52 3 See, for example, in Firat, G. (2010), pp. 20

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1. B. A GLANCE TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Post-structural Discourse Analysis (PDA) is an ontological and epistemological framework adopted

within Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) which focuses on the role of language as performative of

the social construct, therefore excluding the possibility of any extra-discursive reality. For the

purpose of this analysis and on the basis of such assumption, it is the paired construction of

‘identities’ –national/ international Selves and risky/ threatening Otherness- and ‘policies’ –

exceptional defensive and preventive measures- the conceptual guide for a comparative view of the

War on Terror and the War against Daesh. These concepts result from the combined provisions of

certain scholars: the Copenhagen School (1998), Lene Hansen (2006) and Rens Van Munster

(2004) jointly with Claudia Aradau (2009).

Lene Hansen (2006) theoretical and methodological proposal relies on its applicability to uncover

and deconstruct the interrelationship between identity, policies and foreign policy discourse.

According to Hansen, identity representations result in the construction of ‘Selves’ and ‘Otherness’

–e.g France/ Daesh- to which certain signs are attached –France = ‘civilized’/ Daesh =

‘uncivilized’-. They also enjoy a certain ‘spatial’ –as for their geographical boundaries- and

‘temporal’ –as for their capability to change- location, whilst the Self is also ‘ethically’ located –as

for its responsibility towards the Other- (2006; 38-46). In parallel, certain policies are discursively

proposed so as to deal with the specific ‘Otherness’ and shelter the specific ‘Selves’ –e.g. military

operations in Iraq and Syria, the revision of the French policy of asylum- . The final aim of a

foreign policy discourse –e.g. War against Daesh- is then to ‘discursively stabilize’ the identity

representations and the policies proposed (2006; 18), which despite being interlinked do not amount

to a causal relationship, so long one is not the precondition of the other (2006; 10).

Particularly for the case of security foreign policy discourses, Hansen relies on the work of the

Copenhagen School (1998) which argues that the “securitization of an issue” presents it an

“existential threat” –Hansen’s concept of ‘Other’- to a “referent object” whose survival is at stake –

Hansen’s concept of ‘Self’-, therefore allowing for “exceptional measures” – Hansen’s concept

‘policies’- (Buzan et al., 1998; 21-25). To these provisions, the author introduces some

particularities to the understanding of the referent object for the cases when ‘terrorism’ becomes the

securitized issue: securities foreign policy speeches tend to oppose a ‘terrorist Other’ not only to a

‘national Self’ as traditionally construed but also to the ‘International community Self’.

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In addition, further particularities have been introduced to the understanding of ‘exceptional

measures’ and ‘existential threat’ when analysing the rhetoric of War on Terror. Rens Van Munster

(2004) jointly with Claudia Aradau (2009) have argued that after 9/ 11, the US as a political agent

has systematically encompassed within its foreign policy speech concepts usually belonging to

distinctive semantic realms. Consequently, the War on Terror resulted not only a matter of

international security, deterrence/defence against a threat by military means but also an issue of

homeland security, prevention of a risk by law enforcement and intelligence means; thus putting

together two ‘conceptual chains’ with a distinctive temporal/ territorial character within the scope of

the same foreign policy discourse (Van Munster, 2004; 146) (Van Munster & Aradau, 2009; 698).

1. C. THE RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACADEMY

Deciding to carry out this research project within such epistemological and theoretical confines

responded to two main reasons. A circumstantial one, for partly due to the proximity in time to the

Paris attacks there are still no sound articles specifically addressing the War on Terror and the War

against Daesh comparatively. A substantial one, for those analyses dwelling either on America/

France foreign policy towards a ‘terrorist Other’ do not rely on the concepts highlighted above

within a comparative PDA.

Indeed, there is abundant literature within CTS about the American and European/ French official

foreign policy discourse towards a “global international threat” from 2001 on. However, scholars

have followed at least one of three ‘patterns’: focusing either on America or France instead of both

of them comparatively; focusing either on the ‘policies’ or the ‘identities’ proposed instead of a

paired understanding; and adopting a framework which is not PDA.

For instance, with a focus on the ‘policy element’ Jason Ralph (2009) (2013) sought to analyse the

American ‘policy of exception’ to both international and domestic bodies of law explaining it on the

basis of Carl Schmitt. Illustrating cases in which the Bush and Obama administration have

systematically ‘suspended’ provisions regarding jus ad bellum, jus in bello and international human

rights Ralph found them consistent with the Schmittean idea of the “friend/ enemy”

interrelationship and the “superficiality of the norm”. That is to say, the possibility of exception is

constitutive to the law itself, whose applicability in hands of the Sovereign State will be always

shaped by politics, war and the confrontation with the “enemy” (2009; 632), (2013; 6).

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Halit Mustafa Tagma (2009) also dwelled on American foreign policy when trying to combine

Giorgio Agamben propositions with a Foucaultian approach to the Guantanamo Bay Detention

Camp. Tagma argued that whereas the decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions of legal

treatment of prisoners might be seen as an “exceptional” measure decided by the state –as stated by

Agamben- ‘political violence’ is not solely conducted from top to button but it is also exercised at

the micro-level by subjects that decide on whom violence is going to be inflicted –as proposed by

Foucault- (2009; 423).

Richard Jackson (2005) resorted to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in combination with

international relations theory and communication and cultural studies to examined how the

“rhetoric and practice” of key social and political actors has normalized and institutionalized the

American reaction to September 11 based on a militaristic approach at odds with international legal

standards. By manipulating public anxiety so as to gain public support, Jackson argues that the War

on Terror is an example of a successful exercise of power which ultimately undermines instead of

providing with useful answers for political violence (2005; 2-5).

Looking to the other side of the globe, Karin von Hippel (2005) compiles the work of various

authors with two aims. Firstly, describing the role and contribution of the European Union (EU) and

particular states within it –including France- to the “counter-terrorism alliance” forged with the

NATO and the UN (2005; 19- 146). Secondly, explaining the “transatlantic tension” created by the

institutional, legislative and political strategies adopted in Europe on the basis of the perception

over US unilateralism, individual states as future targets and the process of integration at the

European level since the ‘70s on.

Dwelling on the understanding of ‘identities’ within foreign policy speeches, Christopher Baker-

Beall (2009) provided an interesting argument within CDA on how the EU counter-terrorism policy

is based on the construction of a “migrant Otherness” equated with a “threatening terrorist

Otherness” which ultimately leads to the securitization of immigration and asylum policies. In strict

correlation, Ali Bilgic (2006) also adopted a CDA framework focused on the EU securitization of

immigration and asylum but now incorporating some national cases, including the case of France.

According to the author, immigrants and asylum-seekers are depicted as “threats to social and

national identities, welfare states, social security systems” (2006; 1) ultimately connected a

potential terrorist threat (2006; 30).

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Looking back to the American continent, Chin-Kuei Tsui (2014) applied CDA to a genealogical

understanding of the US construction of identities behind the War on Terror, arguing that instead of

being a “revolutionary” turn in the American foreign policy speech the Bush Administration is

rather an expression of continuity built on foundations of previous administration -specially from

former President Reagan on (2014; 1)- maintaining certain identity narratives as “the good and

evil”, “civilisation and barbarism” or “heroes and cowards” (2014; 154-173).

Now resorting to PDA and applying Laclau and Mouffe (2001) academic work, Silje Solheim

(2006) put under the loop how the War on Terror was constructed as the “appropriate” response by

the US to September 11 whilst focusing on identity representations within it. The author argues the

resort to a “simplistic dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’”, a “zero-sum game” based on opposed

signs attached to each other -“civilisation vs. barbarism”; “evil vs. good”- (2006; 2).

Each one of the elements analysed by the cited scholars -exceptional measures defying international

legal bodies, the role of international organisations and differential signs attached to Selves and

Otherness in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism- can and will be also fully grasped through the

conceptual framework that this research project intends to apply to the case study. Its differential

and additional value to the existent literature on the topic is its ability to display how all these

elements become engaged and interconnected in one complex, partially-stabilized semantic

structure. Thus, it enables a more complete and precise identification of patterns of reproduction

and transformation between one and another official discourse.

In other words, especially when deepening into the analysis of the War on Terror, it might seem at

first that what is being presented is a “collection” of findings that other authors have also dwelled

on. However, not only it is shaped under a different theory and methodology but it is also put in

more comprehensive terms setting a sort of “blueprint” or “semantic map” instead of profoundly

enquiring into one specific discursive element or looking for certain power relations as an

explanatory tool. It is the structure of such “semantic map” that this analysis seeks to replicate and

fill with the specific content of the War on Daesh, hence allowing for a comparative analysis.

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1. D. RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESIS, METHODOLOGY, DATA & STRUCTURE OF

THE ANALYSIS

In order to achieve our above-mentioned aim, our research question will address how does

Hollande’s War against Daesh rhetoric reproduce and/ or challenge discursive constructions set

by Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric? For reaching an answer we will focus on three lines of enquiry:

I. How did the post-9/11 Bush administration discursively construct identity representations

and policies under the War on Terror rhetoric?

II. How did the post-11/13 Hollande administration discursively construct identity

representations and policies under the War against Daesh rhetoric?

III. How does Hollande’s War against Daesh rhetoric reproduce and/ or challenge discursive

constructions set by Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric?

The methodology selected hereby is a qualitative analysis in a comparative historical view founded

on selected elements from Lene Hansen’s proposal (2006). In terms of the data analysed, this

analysis resorts to various official speeches, drafted legislations, passed legislations and statements

and reports from governmental organs and agencies. For the American case, the temporal gap for

data collection has been the entire Bush administration from 9/11 on; whilst for the French case it

has been set from 13/11 up to June 2016. Academic writing and Approval Rating Polls carried by

recognized newspapers and agencies are analyzed as critics and support to the official rhetoric.

In the case of France, partially due to the short time lapse since Paris attacks, there are cases where

access to transcripts of official speeches –be it in French or in English- through governmental

official websites is possible. In other cases, there is access to only video recordings. For the purpose

of this analysis, data that was not offered in English or was only in an audiovisual format has been

interpreted and translated with the utmost caution to the fidelity of the discourse; that is, its own

semantic structure (Hansen, 2006; 83-84).

This research project will be structured as follows. The first section offers a deeper understanding of

the epistemological, theoretical and methodological framework on top of which this study is

construed. The second and third sections provide an analysis of the War on Terror and the War

against Daesh as basic discourses. Patterns of reproduction and transformation from one to another

are discussed in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section provides a synthesis of the various

issues raised in the discussion, the limitations of the study and advices for future research.

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2. POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

2. A. PDA: LANGUAGE AS AN ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHOICE APPLIED

TO TERRORISM STUDIES

Scholars of International Security (IS) have frequently pointed out to the end of the Cold War as a

turning point in our field of studies redefining who is to be protected, from what and by which

means. The traditional international security approach focused on the state nation as the object of

reference, armed conflicts as the main threat and the use and control of military force as the main

means to deal with it (Sotomayor Velásquez, 2007; 68). After the dissolution of the URSS, an

academic shift gave place to multidimensional international security approaches dwelling on

transnational threats -climate change, competition over resources, marginalisation of the majority

world, terrorism and global militarization (Abbot et. al, 2006; 4)- therefore requiring transnational

solutions, and human security approaches where not only the state but the individual became an

object of reference (Duffield, 2005; 1-2).

In this context, the attack on the Twin Towers and its aftermath redirected IS studies attention to the

phenomenon of terrorism, where a hectic and enormous compilation of articles lead later on to a

general dissatisfaction with the scientific standards obtained by mostly orthodox/ positivist

publications (Stump & Dixit, 2013; 13). Challenging ahistorical approaches built on top of “why”

questions for the uncovering causal links between dependent and independent variables (Stump &

Dixit, 2013; 17), “Critical Terrorism Studies” (CTS) brought about an interest in “how” power

constructs identities, actors, and modes of conduct (Doty; 1996; 4).

Amongst the wide range of possible approaches within CTS, Discourse Analysis concentrates on

the role of language as a key element for the understanding of the social construct. Particularly,

Poststructural Discourse Analysis (PDA) is structured over fourth assumptions on top of which

our analysis has been constructed. Firstly, language is performative; that is to say, constitutive to

what is brought into “being”. Secondly, language is social and political; as it is a shared construct

that gives prominence to certain rhetoric in spite of others. Thirdly, language has a relative stability

for it can never be completely fixed or completely inconsistent. Fourth, language incorporates both

material and ideational factors. All these features together exclude the necessity and the possibility

to draw causation links in a rational-positivist way (Hansen, 2006; 17-28)

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To start with, language as performative is opposed to language as descriptive of social reality. That

means that for PDA there is no extra-discursive reality with a particular objective essence that

language ought to describe. It is only through a relationally structured discourse that “things”

acquire “entity” (Hansen, 2006; 18) –e.g., there is no natural, self-evident reason to present ‘Al

Qaeda’ or ‘Daesh’ as ‘terrorist organisations’-. Alternatively, this means that there is no ulterior true

that discourse representations should ultimately reflect to be considered more or less valid (Masugi

& Shapiro, 1984; 218).

Even more, language as a social practice means that it is a convention, a collective semantic

structure to which individuals resort in order to make themselves comprehensible (Hansen, 2006;

18). Language as a political practice means that it allows for the production and reproduction of

certain discursive representation(s) of the social construct whilst excluding others (Hansen, 2006;

19). Throughout a permanent struggle amongst different speeches, hegemony is provisionally

established every time one rhetoric exercises its dominance over the competing others (Laclau &

Mouffe, 2001; 137). For example, discursively portraying the ‘terrorists’ as a ‘fanatics’ opposed to

‘France’/ ‘The US’ as ‘moderate’ is one speech –the hegemonic one- over alternative ones.

On top of this, language is a web of juxtaposed paired dichotomies formed by a privileged sign –

‘France/ ‘The US’ in the example above- and a devalued/ supplementary sign –“terrorists”- where

despite being presented as diametrically opposed one cannot be fully comprehended without

referring to the other (Derrida, 1976; 142). Discourses will try to present themselves as stable and

structured, but there will always be certain points of unsteadiness and shakiness challenging its

paired dichotomies as perfectly opposed fixed entities –what happens when ‘fanatism’ is to be

found in ‘France’/ ‘The US’ as well?- (Hansen, 2006; 20-21).

Finally, PDA challenges the argument of reality being split into ideational and material spheres

with language representing an “ideational element” instead of a “material factor”. PDA contends

that discourses “encompass” both material and ideational elements so long neither of them has a

particular presence without the other. “Facts” –the American Twin Towers collapse or the shootings

at the French club Bataclan- are, therefore, not disregarded but rather considered as interdependent

and interlinked with the “semantic frame” that presents them (Hansen, 2006; 22).

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For all these reasons, PDA research designs like the one carried out here cannot and do not need to

establish any causal links. Causality designs require the identification of an “independent” and a

“dependent” variable; that is, a certain “fact” determining the probable occurrence of a certain

“result”. PDA designs applied to foreign policy speeches assume that there are neither “identities”

nor “policies” with an independent, objective existence constraining each other. Rather, speeches

produce –and reproduce- representations on top of previously construed “identities” and “policies”,

as no rhetoric appears on a completely undefined semantic field. Thus, instead of questioning why

does a certain speech propose a certain policy/identity we reflect on how one and another are

construed and interlinked by a certain discourse. PDA as a non-causal design is, therefore, not a

“flaw” but an ontological and epistemic choice (Hansen, 2006; 25).

2. B. OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE: IDENTITY AND POLICY

2. B. I. Foreign Policy as the discursive framework

The main feature of every official foreign policy speech is its intention to persuade its audience

about its legitimacy and enforceability by portraying a link between ‘policy(ies)’and ‘identity(ies)’

that appears consistent. Consistency might be achieved through stability. Internally, stability refers

to the relationship between Selves and Otherness and the link between such identity representation

and the policies proposed. Externally, stability refers to the relationship between the semantic

constructions of the foreign policy speech in question and critical/supportive discourses situated

within a wider social and political context. Neither type of stability can be ever completely

achieved, which leads to a constant process of (re)adjustment of the foreign policy speech so as to

maintain a –relative- appearance of legitimacy and enforceability (Hansen, 2006, 28-29).

In terms of adjustment, change and transformation of a foreign policy discourse, “key events” have

a relevant role. Key events refer to “facts” which discursively assume a protagonist role in the

political and/or media agenda and therefore force official foreign policy speeches to rethink their

policy/ identity construct and to react to opposition or criticism (Hansen, 2006; 32). When facing

critical or oppositional discourses after a key event, government administration as the political

agencies constructing foreign policy speeches might seek to react in three different ways. They

might either resort to major adjustments –e.g. the depiction of a more radical Otherness paired with

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a more confrontative policy- to an acknowledgement and reinterpretation of the facts under the

already established discursive frame or to a complete silence over the issue (Hansen, 2006; 33).

For the purpose of our analysis, what is commonly referred by the media and political actors as the

‘9/11 terrorist attack’ or the more recent ‘11/13 terrorist attack’ are to be referred as key events not

because of some extra-discursive essential feature but because of their undeniable impact on the

American and French official foreign policy speeches. From then on, the War on Terror and the

War against Daesh are to be seen as relatively stable discourses in a continuous dynamic of self-

readjustment towards internal and external points of instability.

2. B. II. Security foreign policy speeches and the Copenhagen School

Within the spectrum of foreign policy speeches, international security discourses like the ones

analysed in our case study offer some particularities according to scholars of the Copenhagen

School. They are based on the idea of an “existential threat” to a “referent object” whose survival is

at stake; traditionally articulated by States in security speeches confronting a “national self” to a

“threatening other” whose “nature” makes it as a high-priority issue on the political agenda (Buzan

et al., 1998; 21).

An issue is successfully securitized when the relevant audience to which the speech is directed

accepts it as such (Buzan et al., 1998; 21), which in turns is connected to the aim and achievement

of being presented as legitimate and enforceable. Once an issue is securitized, the sense of priority

provides those in charge of enacting security measures with the power and the responsibility to take

“exceptional measures”; in other words, suspending, annulling or modifying rules and procedures to

which they would be bound under “normal circumstances” in order to successfully respond to the

“threat” (Buzan et al., 1998; 25).

2. B. III. The particular case of “terrorism” after 2001 in security speeches

Alternatively, certain considerations are to be added according to Hansen (2006) and Van Munster

(20014) jointly with Ardau (2009) and in terms of how the existential threat, referent object and

exceptional measures –identity and policies for the purpose of our analysis- are discursively built in

official security speeches after 2001 when opposed to a ‘terrorist Other’.

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A. THE “REFERENT OBJECT”

The securitization of an issue in the military sector –that is to say, involving the potential use of

force as exceptional measure- has been traditionally framed as protecting the ‘state’ or ‘national

Self’ as the referent object from a certain existential threat (Buzan et. al, 1998; 21) (Hansen, 2006;

35). Nonetheless, after 2001 when ‘terrorism’ is constructed as the existential threat, the referent

object whose survival is a stake is usually not only portrayed as the ‘national Self’ but the

‘international community Self’. This, in turns, challenges the traditional construction where the

power and responsibility to take exceptional measures rest solely on the state actor by endowing the

international community with the responsibility to react to the threat (Hansen, 2006; 35-36).

B. THE “EXISTENTIAL THREAT” AND “EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES”

Particularly, the American rhetoric of the War on Terror has introduced further semantic changes to

official security discourses built in relation to ‘terrorism’. To start with, the assurance of survival of

the referent object is necessary not only when facing a concrete existential threat posed by

‘threatening Otherness’ –more or less precisely identifiable- but also in front of a ‘risky Otherness’,

that is, a potential threat. Such semantic shift in the identity characterization also influences the

construction of exceptional measures, which shall now incorporate not only ‘defensive’/ ‘re-active’

actions carried out by military forces out of the state’s borders, but also as ‘preventive’/ ‘pro-active’

ones carried out by ‘law enforcement and intelligence agents’ inside borders (Van Munster, 2004;

146), (Van Munster & Aradau, 2009; 698).

For the purpose of our analysis, we assume such conceptual distinctions are relevant and applicable

not only to Bush’s rhetoric but also to Hollande’s discursive construction. Consequently, identity

representations are to be interpreted as encompassing –at minimum- ‘national’ and ‘international’

Selves whose ‘survival is at risk’ because of a ‘risky’ and ‘threatening’ Otherness. Alternatively,

policies are regarded as including ‘defensive’ and ‘preventive’ exceptional measures.

2. B. IV. Selves and Otherness and their interlink with Policies

As introduced before, identity representations and policies are interlinked in foreign policy

speeches. Two important remarks ought to be highlighted with regards to the former. Recalling, for

example, Silje Solheim’s analysis (2006; 2) it has been argued the construction of a “simplistic

15

dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’”, a “zero-sum game” hindered in George W. Bush’s discourse.

However, -as we will see once engaged in our analysis of American and French speeches- this does

not have to be necessarily the case.

Firstly, foreign policy discourses can depict a variety of non-Selves enjoying different degrees of

radicalization gives place to “complementary identities, contending identities, negative identities,

non-identities” and not only “radically opposed identities” (Hansen, 2006; 39). Secondly,

discourses might not only construct a simple duality Self/ Other but rather a web of identities where

multiple Selves might be opposed to differently constructed Otherness (Hansen, 2006; 41).

Independently of the particular set of identity representations under the loop, uncovering the

semantic content of identities representations requires of involves two procedures. In the first place,

each official speech explicitly articulates different “signs” to the Self/Selves and Other/Otherness

which ought to be identified. Taking as an example Lene Hansen’s work (2006), the author

identified that during the Bosnian War, certain semantic constructions portrayed a European Self as

‘civilized’, ‘controlled’, ‘developed’ and ‘rational’ and a Balkan Other as ‘barbarian’, ‘violent’,

‘underdeveloped’ and ‘irrational’.

These explicit signs are to be put together and articulated in a larger web by a process of linking –

positive identity- and a process of differentiating –negative identity- (Hansen, 2006; 41). In other

words, whilst ‘barbarian’, ‘violent’, ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘irrational’ are positively linked signs

attached to one identity –the Balkan Other-, ‘barbarian’/ ‘civilized’, ‘violent’/ ‘controlled’

‘underdeveloped’/ ‘developed and ‘irrational’/ ‘rational’ are differentiated terms that oppose the

Other to the Self.

16

FIGURE PROVIDED IN (HANSEN, 2006; 42)

To these two processes offered by Lene Hansen we will add a third one: process of equating, that

is to say, the semantic construction where some or all of the explicitly attached signs of one identity

–e.g. ‘The US’ Self- are transferred and exported to another identity –e.g the ‘International

Community’ Self-. For example, this could be the case if the official speech states or indicates that

‘The US’ Self is representative of the ‘International Community’ Self.

In the second place, we ought to identify the spatial, temporal and ethical location of the identity

representations. Each one of the three analytical categories has the same theoretical and ontological

status –none determines nor is “more substantial” than the other- and need not be explicitly

mentioned in the discourse but rather inferred from it (Hansen, 2006; 46).

Spatiality is related to the delineation and construction of boundaries. In foreign policy discourses,

certain identities can be directly related to countries –the United States- or regions –Latin America-

whereas representations as ‘international community’; ‘humanity’ or ‘civilisation’ are a

combination of territorial bounded and abstract political subjectivities on their own (Hansen, 2006;

47). For instance, even when the ‘international community’ Self –over which we will dwell on-

might be territorially connected to the planet Earth, it is construed with a particular political content

17

–‘civilized’, ‘rational’- which sets aside non-abiding identity representations –e.g. ‘terrorist

organisations’- (Hansen, 2006; 48).

Temporality refers to the capacity of change attached to an identity and its temporal location with

respect to its counterpart. Some identities might have the ability to ‘progress’ –transform, develop-

whilst others might be portrayed as ‘intransient’ –condemned to repetition, stagnation- (Hansen,

2006; 48). Additionally, Selves and Otherness can be construed as part of a ‘same temporality’, or

as one being ahead or time than the other –e.g. the Self as ‘more developed’ in relation to the

Other- (Hansen, 2006; 49).

Finally, ethicality is to be found only in the discursive construction of the Self/ Selves and refers to

the responsibility and morality towards the Other/ Otherness. It can go in two ways: either there is a

sense of responsibility or a lack of it from the former towards the later. Lack of responsibility in

security speeches carries inaction, whilst the existence of it is accompanied by either a more

confrontative or a more accommodative reaction (Hansen, 2006; 50). We should keep in mind that

official security speeches towards a ‘terrorist’ Other –like our case study- ethically locate not only

the ‘state national’ Self but also the ‘International Community’ Self (Hansen, 2006; 34).

Policies or ‘directions for action’ will be proposed on the basis of the spatial, temporal and ethical

construction of Self/Selves and Other/Otherness related by processes of linking and differentiating.

Especially in relation to the ethical location of the Self/ Selves; a wide range of proposals –military

operations, surveillance measures, etc. – might be presented by the official speech which can be

classified by numerous criteria: their purpose, their geographical and temporal nature, etc.

Altogether, this conceptual structure allows us to specify in detail the way a basic discourse

constructs stability –internally and externally-; the points where it becomes unstable; and the

specific way in which it changes and evolves (Hansen, 2006; 45). When analyzed in a comparative

way, reproducing and challenging patterns can be described by pointing out to the way semantic

elements are construed –e.g., the amount of identity representations, the degrees of the Otherness,

the temporal location of Self- and interconnected in one and another rather than resorting to more

vague and general conclusions.

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2. C. THE QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGICAL MODEL OF INTERTEXTUALITY

2. C. I. Methodological structure

Carrying out a PDA research project based on Lene Hansen’s proposal (2006) requires selecting a

methodological structure and a methodological procedure adapted to the aims of the analysis in

question. Particularly, defining the structure of the methodology requires addressing six issues.

The first question is the number of Selves we want to examine. The analytical focus can be posed

over a “single Self”; “comparative Selves” - a study addressing the same foreign policy issue from

the perspective of different Selves - or a “discursive encounter” –comparing the construction of the

Self with the Other’s counter-construction- (Hansen, 2006; 76).

The second issue is the number of events we are going to focus on. We can put under the loop one

“single event”; “multiple events related by issue” –e.g., ‘terrorism’- in which case we will examine

reproducing and challenging patterns between the discourses being compared; or “multiple events

related by time” -the 90’s- providing an insight on discourses of the Self that appear politically

relevant for foreign policy speeches (Hansen, 2006; 80).

The third consideration is related to the temporal perspective; that is, whether we will consider

speeches at one particular moment or in a longer historical outlook. We can either chose to focus on

“one moment”; “comparative moments” by looking to ‘key events’ related to the same specific

foreign policy issue to find reproducing and/ or challenging patterns; or a “historical development”

by considering the evolution of the identity representation along time in relation to various foreign

policy issues (Hansen, 2006; 77-78).

In our research analysis, we will examine “comparative Selves” -the US as depicted by the Bush

Administration after 9/11, France as depicted by the Hollande Administration after 11/13-,

“multiple events related by issue” -Washington and Paris ‘terrorist attacks’- in a “comparative

temporal perspective” –post 9/11/2001 until January 2009 for the American case and post

11/13/2015 until the end of June 2016 for the French case-.

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The fourth element to consider is which ‘intertextual model’ we ought to select. There are four

‘intertextual methodological models’ for conducting a research project that can be summarized in

regards to their focus as “Model 1- Official Discourse”; “Model 2- Wider Political Debate”; “Model

3-A Cultural Representations” and “Model 3 B- Marginal Political Discourses” (Hansen 2006; 81).

The difference amongst each model is their distance to the official foreign policy discourse and the

incorporation of other political and social agencies which might reproduce or contest the official

discursive construction (Hansen 2006; 63).

In this case, the one selected is Model 1°. Although the analytical focus is the official discourse -the

discursive constructions of political leaders authorized to sanction foreign policy and those with a

key role in its enforcement-, the object of the analysis also includes ‘critical’ and ‘supportive’ texts

for the purposes of observing the external (in)stability of the official speech (Hansen, 2006; 60).

Because of the factual limitations in terms of length of the analysis and the time to prepare it, we

have restraint the scope of analysis that Hansen proposes.

Regarding critical texts, the selection of the discursive examples will be reduced to those portraying

the ‘most radically opposed’ versions to the official rhetoric in their ‘most fundamental version’4. A

whole “shades of grey” where more confrontative/ accommodative voices might refer in a deeper,

more complex way to the same semantic constructions will be set aside. Regarding supportive texts,

they are harder to include in an analysis without resulting redundant. That is why we will focus on

the evolution of Presidential Approval Rating Polls for getting a sense of the level of acquiescence

of the audience to the official foreign policy speech.

Particularly, we will not make use of “intertextuality” as an analytical tool; that is, identifying

further texts to which the original speech makes direct or indirect reference (Hansen, 2006; 56-57).

Although it has an important additional value, it is not indispensable for the goals of the analysis set

by Model 1, that is, unveiling the way each official discourse seeks for internal stabilisation and its

reaction to critical speeches (2006; 64).

4 ‘More radically opposed versions’ refers to critical voices claiming for a more accommodative approach whilst the official speech

appears as rather confrontative . In our case, this would exclude the most right-wing conservative political parties’ views on the topic.

Their ‘most basic fundamental version’ refers to critical voices that challenge a semantic construction from its foundations. This would exclude, for example, criticism over the application of a law if arguments are raised challenging the legal character of the provision in

itself.

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In the fifth place, there is the genre selection. Different genres -literary non-fiction, journalism,

academic writing and policy documents- are constructed with a different sense of authority to speak

about an issue, and knowledge has a particular place in it for each case (Hansen, 2006; 65). Our

analysis will be based on policy documents for the official speech and academic and journalist

writings for critic and supportive texts. In this case, whilst journalist and academics writing’s

authority ought to be erected solely through knowledge, politicians build authority in their foreign

policy speeches not only through knowledge but also through their ability to deploy power and take

responsibility (Hansen, 2006; 67).

Finally, there is the textual selection. In terms of the type of material, we will resort to and general

material from which we can identify the dominant discourses, which should a) establish a clear

articulation of ‘identity’ and ‘policies’ b) be widely attended to, that is to say, play a key role in

defining the semantic content of the central discourse and c) display status and power as the

political agency behind the discourse enjoys the formal authority to portray a political position

(Hansen, 2006; 83). “Key texts” or recurrently quoted ones which are usually included for the

purpose of intertextuality are not to be considered. In terms of the temporal location, we will make

use of primary sources or texts that are taken from the time of the study (Hansen, 2006; 83).

“Historical material” which might be useful for genealogical explanations of certain concepts will

be also excluded (Hansen, 2006; 83)

We should take into account that for analysing the War on Terror –temporally covering

approximately eight years- there is a fairly greater amount of relevant texts than for analysing the

War against Daesh –temporally covering less than a year-. For this reason, from the bulk of relevant

general material on Bush’s rhetoric, we will mainly focus on the annual State of Union Address and

the annual Presidential Speech to the United Nations, whereas for Hollande’s rhetoric we will make

use of every text complying with the three criteria of selection of general material.

2. C. II. Methodological procedure

Based on the structure set aside, carrying out our research project will require following certain

steps. Firstly, we ought to identify our basic discourses or main points of contestation within a

comparative analysis. That is, discursive frames that although related by “issue” –in our case- they

comparatively construct a) different Otherness with different degrees of difference b) diverging

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forms of spatial, temporal and ethical identity and b) competing links between identity and policy

(Hansen, 2006; 52). For the purpose of this analysis, the War on Terror and the War against Daesh

will be our basic discourses.

Secondly, from the basic discourses selected we will a) identify the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ signs

adjudicated to Otherness and Selves; b) integrate them into a larger system of process of ‘linking’,

‘differentiating’ and equating; c) read the ‘spatial’, ‘temporal’ and ‘ethical’ constructions of the

political identity; and d) unveil the characteristics of the defensive and/or preventive counter

policies proposed. Thirdly, we will focus on the reaction of the basic discourses to supportive

and/or critical texts so as to devise the possible adjustments, changes and transformations within

them accordingly with the aim of maintaining an internal and external stability. Finally, we will

compare each basic discourse so as to find reproducing and/ or challenging patterns from one to

another in the construction of ‘identity’ and ‘policy’.

3. “THE WAR ON TERROR” BASIC DISCOURSE

3. A. IDENTITY REPRESENTATION AND POLICIES PROPOSED

If one is to analyze the basic discourse of the War on Terror in its entirety -that is, as construed by

the Bush administration from the key events in 2001 to January 2009- one will unequivocally

encounter a high level of complexity in the identities construed, the richness of the signs attached to

each one of them and the density of policies proposed. Moreover, the level of complexity increases

over time.

For this reason, this section is sub-divided. First, we will present the identity representations and

policies proposed ‘right after’ 9/11. Second, we will we highlight the introductions –e.g new

policies, new identities, if any- and transformations –e.g. different ethical location of the Self, if so-

to that semantic structure from 2002 on. Why not just presenting Bush’s rhetoric in its final and

more complex version? As argued before, every discourse is construed over an already ‘semi-

defined semantic field’ and this case is no exception. Introductions and transformations from 2002

on are made on top of the ‘blueprints’ initially set by the official discourse.

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3. A. I. The official speech in the aftermath of 9/11

Far from being a simplified dichotomy Self/ Other as argued, for example, by Solheim (2006), the

official foreign policy speech right after September 11 presented a five-folded identity

representation: ‘The US’ and the ‘International Community’ as Selves and the ‘Al Qaeda terrorist

organisation ’, the ‘Taliban Afghan Regime’ and the ‘Afghan People’ as Otherness.

‘AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION ’ OTHER

In the aftermath of September 11 ‘key events’, former American President George W. Bush began

by condemning what he portrayed, alternatively, as “terrorist attacks” (Bush, 2001a), “acts of mass

murder” (Bush, 2001a) and “act of war against our country” (Bush, 2001b). Speaking to a nation

and the world, former Head of State remarked: “Americans are asking: Who attacked our

country?” (Bush, 2001b). Well, the ‘attackers’ were to be pinpointed by the official speech as a

“loosely affiliated terrorist organisation known as ‘Al Qaeda’” (Bush, 2001b). Its ‘vaguely

connected character’, however, was almost automatically confronted with a parallel contradicting

description of a ‘pretty solid entity’. ‘Al Qaeda’ was a “network”, had identifiable “assets” and

coordinated “operatives” throughout its “cell around the world” (Bush, 2001b).

According to Bush, ‘Al Qaeda terrorist organisation’ enjoyed of a particular position within

‘terrorism’. By stating: "the suffering of September 11 was inflicted on people (...) [who] were killed

(...) by the terrorist leaders” (Bush, 2001e); ‘Al Qaeda’ was understood as embodying a

‘leadership’. But, what were they actually leading?: one of the ‘ideological sides’ in the struggle,

given according to Bush “at the start of the 21st century, it [was] clear that the world [was]

engaged in a great ideological struggle between extremists who use terror as a weapon to create

fear and moderate people who work for peace” (Bush, 2006b).

What Al Qaeda’s ideology represented was very precise in the official speech. The world was

joining in “the fight against extremism” (Bush, 2007a) and it had to be cautious as “in the shadows

of hopelessness, radicalism thrives” (Bush, 2001b). The terrorist had chosen “the weapon of fear”

(Bush, 2002d), they embodied a “dark vision of hatred and fear” (Bush, 2006a). If they were behind

the incitement of “violence and terror” (Bush, 2001e), it was a particular type: “lawless violence”

(Bush, 2001e). On top of this, Al Qaeda’s ideology of extremism, radicalism, fear and lawless

violence did not appear to the Bush Administration as something new. It resonated to the “heirs of

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all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical

visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow[ed] in the path of fascism,

Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush, 2001b).

The importance of the ‘semantic linkage’ between ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’,

‘terror’, ‘fear’, ‘lawless violence’, ‘totalitarianism’ lies in the fact that, from that point on, the

official American speech will proceed to treat the ‘extremists’, the ‘radicals’, ‘terror’, ‘terrorists’

and ‘Al Qaeda’ as equivalent labels.

There is another element, perhaps one of those with the ‘highest resonance’ in scholarly work5: the

idea of ‘evil’, repeatedly remarked by former President Bush. ‘Evil’ had being inflicted upon ‘them’

-America was “angry at the evil that was done” (Bush, 2001e)-. But was also ‘personified’ by

Osama Bin Laden -America had seen “the evil one threatening” (Bush, 2001d)-; Al Qaeda –

America had learnt “a good lesson on September 11th, that there is evil in this world” (Bush,

2001d)-; and terrorism itself -America ought to “confront and defeat the evil of terrorism” (Bush,

2008b), “the man-made evil of international terrorism” (Bush, 2003a)-.

Interlinked with the construed features highlighted above, the official rhetoric addressed Al Qaeda’s

relationship with ‘religion’ in a particular way. For the former Head of State, “those who commit

evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. Terrorists are traitors to their own faith,

trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself” (Bush, 2001b). ‘Terrorism’ resulted in a “disease for Islam”

(Bush, 2001b), a “fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Bush, 2001b).

More generally, ‘Al Qaeda’ resulted in a ‘blasphemy’, ‘treason’, ‘perversion’ and ‘disease’ not

only to ‘Islam’ but to ‘every religion’, having “no place in any religious faith” (Bush, 2003b).

Nevertheless, this point could be argued as a source of internal instability. If ‘terrorism’ had no

connexion to ‘Islam’ or any other religion; making explicit references to the Islamic faith for

describing the Otherness would not be necessary. However, the official speech also claimed, for

instance, that “the Shia and Sunni extremists [were] different faces of the same totalitarian threat”

(Bush, 2007a)

5

Not only the scholarly work of Tsui, C.K (2014) and Solheim, S. (2006) –remarked here because of their approach of unveiling the

‘general panorama’ of identity construction– dwell on this semantic feature. There is plenty of literature in CTS focused solely or mostly

on the construction of evil and the rationale behind it, see for example: Sarfo, E. & Krampa, E. A. (2013); Daghrir, W. (2013).

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Finally, ‘Al Qaeda’ was not only ‘uncivilised’ -quite a passive expression of “lacking” certain

features- but rather ‘against civilisation’. Consequently, what is depicted is a much more

‘threatening’ Other towards which there is only room for forceful confrontation. In other words, the

‘terrorist’ were actively plotting “against America and the civilised world” (Bush, 2004a) and

opposed to “almost any principle of civilisation” (Bush, 2007a). As “the civilised world face[d]

unprecedented dangers” (Bush, 2002a) and “civilisation itself (...) [was] threatened” (Bush, 2001e)

this was nothing else than “civilisation's fight” (Bush, 2001b).

Leaving the explicitly articulated signs aside, the spatial location of ‘Al Qaeda’ as presented in

Bush’s rhetoric might appear at first glance quite tough to unveil because of both the characteristics

of “terrorism” as an abstract political entity (Hansen, 2006; 48) and the particularities of the identity

representation in the War on Terror as a basic discourse. For starters, Bush’s official speech makes

a differentiation of Al Qaeda’s spatial circumvention as for its origins, on the one hand, and the

extension of its influence –or territories from which they gain ‘supporters’-, on the other hand.

In tracking ‘Al Qaeda’s origins’, former American President stated that the responsible for

September 11 were “some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania

and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole” (Bush, 2001b). The 9/11 Commission

Report also made reference to the same events whilst connecting them to Osama Bin Laden. The

Saudi Arabian was the “inspirer and organiser of the new terrorism”6, recruiting and training what

later on became known as Al Qaida began in Sudan and Afghanistan7.

George W. Bush continued locating Al Qaeda’s extension of influence, encompassing “many other

organisations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan” (Bush, 2001b). According to the Republican President, “there [were]

thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They [were] recruited from their own

nations and neighbourhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they [were]

trained in the tactics of terror” (Bush, 2001b).

Although former Head of State did not go any further outlining which the countries subject to Al

Qaeda’s ‘influence’ were, he considered that the “free people” were not to be drawn to “violent

and malignant ideology” (Bush, 2007a). Additionally, the majorities of tyrannies and dictatorships,

6 Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. (2011), pp. 108 7 Ibid. pp. 109

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according to the official discourse, were to be found in the Middle East. That was the reason why it

was mainly the Middle East the one to be “transformed” so as to “benefit the entire world by

undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands” (Bush, 2003b).

As for the temporal location of ‘Al Qaeda’, there are two constructions that come together. Firstly,

Al Qaeda’ as ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, ‘violent’, and ‘evil’ ‘uncivilized’ depicts an identity temporally

located as ‘backwards, primitive, or less developed’ than the Selves. This is reinforced by the

reference to ‘terrorism’ as a renewed version of “murderous ideologies of the 20th century” which

are understood to have been “eliminated after Second World War” in the light of “freedom”,

“peace” and “justice” (Bush, 2001b). Secondly, there is a sense of intransience attached to ‘Al

Qaeda’ when understood as ‘against civilisation’, incapable of change and permanently subject to

its state of ‘evilness’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘primitiveness’. As former American President remarked, the

terrorist had to be seen “for what they [were]” understanding that “no concession could ever satisfy

their ambitions” (Bush, 2008b).

‘TALIBAN REGIME’ OTHER

Simultaneously to references of ‘Al Qaeda’, the Bush Administration pointed out to the Taliban

Regime’s role in September 11 attacks. They were “servants of terrorism” (Bush, 2003b),

“sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists” (Bush, 2001b). Particularly, they had

“harboured terrorists” (Bush, 2006b) whilst making “Afghanistan the primary training base of ‘Al

Qaeda’ killers” (Bush, 2004a).

As ‘sponsoring’, ‘sheltering’, ‘supplying’, ‘serving’ and ‘harbouring’ members of the ‘Al Qaeda’

was not seeing in the official rhetoric as pure ‘negligence’ but rather as an ‘active support’ to the

organisation ’s goals they were discursively treated as ‘equals’. The US President articulated it

explicitly: “the Taliban are now learning this lesson: that regime and the terrorists who support it

are now virtually indistinguishable” (Bush, 2001e). In this way, by a process of equating, signs

explicitly attached to the ‘Al Qaeda’ Other were semantically transferred to the ‘Taliban Regime’

Other, which therefore also became ‘evil’, ‘radical’, ‘uncivilized’, etc.

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The Taliban Regime’s inside-borders behaviour was also ‘repelled’ by the official speech, portrayed

as an ‘outlaw’, ‘tyrannical’, ‘brutal’ and ‘oppressive regime’. The “tyranny of the Taliban” (Bush,

2008a), the “outlaw regime in Kabul” (Bush, 2004b), the “brutal Taliban Regime” (Bush, 2006b)

was responsible for “brutalizing women” (Bush, 2001e) and submitting “millions of Afghans” to

“oppression” (Bush, 2001e).

Although the spatial location seems quite clear and leaves no grounds for doubts –the geographical

borders of the State of Afghanistan as defined in the 21st century-, temporally there is an

interesting construction to highlight. It is understood that by attaching to the ‘Taliban Regime’

features linked to ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘condemning’ the rapport with its own population, Bush’s official

speech presents once again an Otherness located in a temporally previous state of development in

relation to ‘The US’ Self and ‘International Community’ Self. However, the framing of the

Taliban’s capacity to ‘change’ and ‘progress’ did not correspond to the one attached to the ‘Al

Qaeda’ Other.

Initially, the American administration resorted to a list of demands for the ‘Taliban Regime’ as

‘provisional measures’ before resorting to war, being amongst others “delivering (...) all the leaders

of ‘Al Qaeda’ who hide in [their] land (...), clos[ing] immediately and permanently every terrorist

training camp in Afghanistan, and hand[ing] over every terrorist, and every person in their support

structure, to appropriate authorities” (Bush, 2001b). Even after the first incursion into Afghan

territory, the Press questioned whether the bombing would stop if the Taliban turned over Bin

Laden, to what President Bush responded: “we still have the same objective. And that is, for the

Taliban to hand over Al Qaeda” (Bush, 2001d).

Giving the ‘Taliban Regime’ such possibility of ‘redeeming itself’ by making the ‘right choice’

speaks for a temporal location where the ‘possibility of change’ is still there. This is maintained

even after Osama Bin Laden was not handed over to the US, moment when President Bush stated:

“we must defeat the evil doers where they hide (...) I gave them ample opportunity to turn over ‘Al

Qaeda’ (...) they obviously refused to do so, and now they're paying a price (Bush, 2001d). For the

official discourse, The Taliban ended up suffering the ‘consequences of making the incorrect

decision’, but had always the opportunity to do otherwise –and change, progress-.

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‘AFGHAN PEOPLE’ OTHER

The ‘Afghan People’ identity representation is recited in Bush’s discourse as the ‘other side of the

coin’ of the State of Afghanistan whilst maintaining its character of Otherness. The ‘Afghan

People’ “practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c). The “United States respects the people of

Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001b), as they are “themselves the victims of a repressive regime” (Bush,

2001d), “have been brutalised; many are starving and many have fled” (Bush, 2001a). They are an

“oppressed people” (Bush, 2001c); the “suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan”

(Bush, 2001c).

One of the key aspects of the ‘Afghan People’ Other is that, whilst being temporally situated in a

previous, underdeveloped state than ‘The US’ and ‘International Community Selves’, this is

framed as an imposed condition by the ‘Taliban Regime’, not an intrinsic and unchangeable

characteristic. For instance, after the Taliban were out of power, former American Head of State

described “the men and women of Afghanistan are building a nation that is free and proud” (Bush,

2004a) which lead to a new “Afghanistan (...) now [ruled] by the freely elected Government of

Afghanistan” (Bush, 2006b), leaving ‘oppression’ and ‘brutality’ behind.

‘THE US’SELF

‘The US’ Self is construed with great richness and complexity; being presented as one entity which

is discursively split into different spheres to stabilise each paired identity representation. As for ‘Al

Qaeda’, ‘The US’ enjoys a parallel role of ‘victim’ and ‘target’ of the ‘terrorist attacks’ and key

events of 9/11. That day, it “fellow citizens, way of life, and very freedom came under attack in a

series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts (...) America was targeted” (Bush, 2001a).

‘The US’ Self is also portrayed as assuming a role of ‘leadership’ and it was “because of American

leadership and resolve, [that] the world [was] changing for the better” (Bush, 2004a). A leading

role was presented almost as an ‘inevitable’ and ‘natural’ position, since American leadership was

“the only way to secure the peace” (Bush, 2006a) and “the only alternative to American leadership

[was] a dramatically more dangerous and anxious world” (Bush, 2006a).

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As one might predict, ‘The US’ leading role is construed around the diametrically opposed side of

the ‘ideological spectrum’ that ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘terrorism’ itself were thought to represent.

According to President Bush, ‘The US’ represented “moderate people who work for peace” (Bush,

2006b), “free people” (Bush, 2003a), “a compassionate nation” (Bush, 2001d). Contrary to the

‘lawless violence’ resorted to by the ‘Al Qaeda’ Other, America made use of “every lawful and

proper tool of (...) military action” (Bush, 2007a). Contrary to ‘totalitarianism’, America stands for

a “democratically elected government” (Bush, 2001a).

Comparatively, ‘The US’ is ‘tolerant’ and ‘respectful’ not only of ‘Islam’ but to ‘every religion’.

In the official discourse, ‘The US’ did not “fight a war against Islam or Muslims” and did not

“hold any religion accountable”. By defending “freedom of religion” (Bush, 2001b) what made the

“nation so strong” and what would “ultimately defeat terrorist activity” was ‘The US’ “willingness

to tolerate people of different faiths” (Bush, 2001d).

Naturally, in the battle against ‘evil’ America had “good intentions” and would achieve “good

outcomes” (Bush, 2003b). Former Head of State celebrated “how good” America was and how

they would “overcome evil with greater good” (Bush, 2002a). Accordingly, in the struggle against

the ‘uncivilized’ and those ‘against civilisation’, it is implicit that America is presented as

‘civilised’ and the ‘defender of civilisation’, in connection with the leading role it had assumed.

Additionally, ‘The US’ assumed the contrary mission than the ‘Taliban Regime’ towards

‘terrorism’. It was determined to “prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological

or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world” (Bush, 2002a); “track

terrorist threats” (Bush, 2008a), “fight radicalism” (Bush, 2004b), “defeat the terrorists on the

battlefield”- (Bush, 2005b) and “destroy terror networks wherever they operate” (Bush, 2004b).

Inside borders, ‘The US’ government was not only ‘legitimate’ –being the very aim of ‘terror’ to

“threaten the stability of legitimate governments” like America (Bush, 2001d)- but it also embodied

precise values: the ‘rule of law’, the defence of ‘human dignity’ and ‘human freedom’. As framed

to the UN General Assembly, ‘The US’ appeared committed to “the equal value and dignity of

every human life”, which was “honoured by the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect

for women, protection of private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance”

(Bush, 2004b).

29

Regarding the ‘Afghan People’, ‘American’ people were ‘multi-religious and multi-ethnical’ –or

in Bush’s terms, there were “Americans of all races and backgrounds” (Bush, 2005a)-. American’

people’s ‘great force’ lied on “freedom and prosperity” (Bush, 2006a) which made them a

“compassionate, decent, hopeful society” (Bush, 2006a). Their ‘great strength’ was “the heroic

kindness, courage, and self-sacrifice of the American people” (Bush, 2007a).

Spatially located within the geographical bounds of the United States of America as defined in the

21st century and temporally construed as a ‘capable of change’ and ‘more developed, advanced,

ahead in time’ in relation to each Otherness, it is the ethical sphere of ‘The US’ Self the one

diverging according to each case of paired identity representation.

Because of the characteristics attached to both the ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ Other,

there is a sense of ethical responsibility channelled in a way that ‘The US’ Self faces the need of

defeating, fighting and/or destroying them. We shall notice that such confrontative response is

not aimed to a mere ‘neutralization’, but to a rather ‘destruction’ of what is perceived as ‘evil’,

‘radical’ and ‘against civilisation’ either because of making the wrong decisions –the Taliban- or

because of being unable to change –Al Qaeda-.

Conversely, the sense of ethical responsibility towards the ‘Afghan People’ Other is envisaged as a

more accommodative response; with ‘The US’ Self facing the need of liberating, setting them

free. Setting the ‘Afghan People’ free from an oppressive regime is seen as a requirement to set the

conditions which bring about change, “because free people embrace hope over resentment and

choose peace over violence” (Bush, 2003b).

There is more to it. Not only ‘The US’ Self embraces such ethical responsibility for granting self-

protection, but also because it ‘leads’ a ‘mission’ on behalf of the entire ‘international community’.

In words of George W. Bush, this is an uncalled yet praiseworthy mission –America had “not ask

for this mission”, but it was an “honour in history's call” (Bush, 2001e)-. The mission, whilst

setting an example of “how to fight the new wars of the 21st century” (Bush, 2001d), aimed at

pursuing the “advance of human freedom” (Bush, 2001b) not only for American people but for

“people everywhere” (Bush, 2001c)

30

‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’SELF

The key characteristic of the ‘International Community’ Self in the official speech is its explicit

equation with what ‘The US’ Self stands for, importing its attached signs from the later to the

former in a process of equating. To begin with, it represents ‘civilisation’ and the ‘civilised world’,

for this was not “just America's fight” and what was a stake was not just “America's freedom”

(Bush, 2001b). This was “the world's fight (...) civilisation's fight” (Bush, 2001b).

Moreover, it embodied the same ideology which ‘The US’ defended since “this [was] the fight of all

who believe[d] in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush, 2001b) as well as “hope

and order, law and life”, commitments which “unite people across cultures and continents” and

upon which “depend all peace and progress” (Bush, 2001e).

The temporal location –‘advanced’, ‘developed’, and ‘ahead’ of time- and ethical responsibility of

the ‘International Community’ Self -‘defeating’ Al Qaeda and the Taliban whilst ‘liberating’ the

Afghan People- are shared with ‘The US’ Self. As for its spatial location, one might assume that a

priori it is construed to assume a global extension. However, in Bush’s official rhetoric it is

confined to the geographical boundaries of the political entities complying with its discursively

construed features –e.g civilized entities, representing pluralism, tolerance and freedom- whilst

discarding those unable and unwilling to abide them. Accordingly, each identity representation

portrayed as Otherness would not be part of this discursively constructed Self.

THE PARTICULAR CASE OF “FRIEND”/“ENEMY” SIGNS AND THE DEGREES OF OTHERNESS

One key feature of Bush’s rhetoric that we have not remarked so far is the largely studied reference

to a ‘friend/ enemy’ duality. As a matter of fact, there are plenty of CTS scholars dwelling on it,

mostly –but not only- from a Schmittean perspective8. There is, however, an additional feature to

point out to if we decide to understand such binary construction in the light of the different degrees

of Otherness in the identity representation of the former American President discourse.

8 See, for example, the above-mentioned Ralph, J. (2009) (2013); Tagma, H. M. (2009); Van Munster (2004) for the specific case of Carl

Schmitt’s categories applied to the War on Terror. See, for example, Odysseos & Petito (Eds.) (2007) for a broader overview of

contemporary International Politics under a ‘Schmittean outlook’. Jackson (2005), Tsui (2014), Solheim (2006) also highlight the „friend/

enemy“ construction without necessarily rooting it into Schmitt’s formulation.

31

In effect, an speech that resorts to the idea of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ in the way George Bush does

might appear to portray an image of enclosed dichotomy, and ‘Us’/’Them’ zero-sum game with no

place for ambiguities. After all, Head of State had warned: “either you are with us, or you are with

the terrorists” (Bush, 2001), and “between these alternatives, there is no neutral ground” (Bush,

2003a). Nonetheless, the five-folded identity structure of the American official discourse contains

more than one degree of Otherness, whilst not every Other is in effect an ‘enemy’.

Both ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ fit an expected outcome. For starters, the “enemy is a

radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them” (Bush, 2001b); both of

them conceived as ‘radical threatening/ risky Otherness’ against the ‘The US’ Self and the

‘International Community Self’ –seen, for example, in UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 of

September 12th 2001 or Resolution 1378 of November 14h 2001, adopted under Chapter VII of the

Charter-. Additionally, America’s “staunch friends [and] allies” (Bush, 2001b) are located in the

‘International Community’ Self since “the civilised world is rallying to America's side” (Bush,

2001b).

However, what it is interesting to see is the role of the ‘Afghan People’. Framed as a rather

‘different and underdeveloped Other’ -some sort of ambiguous identity still not part of

‘International Community’ Self but different from the ‘radical Otherness’- it is America’s ‘friend’.

President Bush said: “The United States of America is a friend to the Afghan people, and [] almost

a billion worldwide who practice the Islamic faith” (Bush, 2001c), therefore hinting the possibility

of finding an ‘ally’ not only in ‘Us’, but also ‘Them’. This will have a clear interlink with the

policies formulated.

OTHERNESS SPATIAL LOCATION TEMPORAL LOCATION

US/ INT. COM

ETHICAL

RESPONSIBILITY

DEGREE OF OTHERNESS

AL QAEDA TERRORIST

ORGANISATION

SUDAN/AFGHANISTAN MIDDLE EAST

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE

INTRANSCIENT

DEFEATING, FIGHTING,

DESTROYING THEM

RADICAL, THREATENING/ RISKY OTHER,

ENEMY

TALIBAN REGIME

STATE OF AFGHANISTAN

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE

INTRANSCIENT

DEFEATING, FIGHTING,

DESTROYING THEM

RADICAL, THREATENING/ RISKY OTHER,

ENEMY

AFGHAN PEOPLE

STATE OF AFGHANISTAN

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE

CAPABLE OF CHANGE

LIBERATING, SETTING

THEM FREE

DIFFERENT, UNDERDEVELOPED OTHER, FRIEND

32

AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION

ATTACKERS

LEADERS

IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM, RADICALISM, FEAR, LAWLESS VIOLENCE, TOTALITARISM

EVIL

BLASPHEMY, TREASON, DISSEASE, TO ISLAM AND EVERY RELIGION

UNCIVILISED, AGAINST CIVILISATION

VICTIMS

GOOD

IDEOLOGY OF MODERATION, FREEDOM/ LIBERTY, COMPASSION, LAWFUL MILITARY ACTION, DEMOCRACY

RESPECFUL, TOLERANT TO ISLAM AND EVERY

RELIGION

CIVILISED, DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION

LEADERS

UNITED STATES

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

PROCESS OF LINKING PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATING PROCESS OF EQUATING

33

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

TALIBAN REGIME

UNITED STATES

SPONSORING, SHELTERING, SUPPLYING, SERVING AND HARBOURING TERRORISTS

IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM, RADICALISM, FEAR, LAWLESS VIOLENCE, TOTALITARISM

OUTLAW, TYRANNICAL, BRUTAL, OPPRESSIVE REGIME

BLASPHEMY, TREASON, DISSEASE, TO ISLAM AND EVERY RELIGION

UNCIVILISED, AGAINST CIVILISATION

LEGITIMATE REGIME, RULE OF LAW, HUMAN DIGNITY,

HUMAN FREEDOM

IDEOLOGY OF MODERATION, FREEDOM/ LIBERTY, COMPASSION, LAWFUL MILITARY ACTION, DEMOCRACY

RESPECFUL, TOLERANT TO ISLAM AND EVERY

RELIGION

CIVILISED, DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION

PREVENTS, TRACKS, FIGHTS, DEFEATS, DESTROYS, TERRORISM

AL QAEDA TERRORIST ORGANISATION

34

POLICIES PROPOSED

Much can and has been said about the policies planned by the post-9/11 American Administration.

What matters in our analysis is to remember that it is in connection to the Selves and Otherness that

George W. Bush proposed to the audience a set of measures that, first and foremost, can be unveiled

as a single multi-faceted, semi-stable structure founded on interlinked concepts, ‘construing’ the

nature and justification for the course of action.

“It is war...” When first facing the expectant audience in and out America’s borders, George W.

Bush did not hesitate in labelling September 11 key events as an “act of war” (Bush, 2001b), hence

gathering “America, [] friends and allies (...) together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush,

2001a).

AFGHAN PEOPLE

RESPECTED ISLAMIC PEOPLE VICTIMS, BRUTALIZED, OPPRESSED, STARVING, SUFFERING, HOPELESS

UNITED STATES

MULTI-RELIGIOUS AND MULTI-ETHNICAL PEOPLE

FREE, PROSPER, COMPASSIONATE, HOPEFUL

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

35

Legal ‘shelter’ was sought under Article 51 of the UN Charter9; the provision recognizing the

“inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member

of the United Nations” which sets an exception to the prohibition on the threat and use of force

under Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

The resort to collective self-defence was channelled through the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation, a ‘political and military alliance’ for cooperation in the ‘field of security and defence’

originally established on April 4th, 1949 between North American and European countries

10. This

intergovernmental organisation –that is, in which each state member maintains its sovereign

competences (Klabbers, 2015; 27)- appeared to George Bush as “reflect[ing] best the attitude of the

world” as “an attack on one is an attack on all” (Bush, 2001b). Indeed, Article 5 of the North

Atlantic Treaty encourages each member state to assist “the Party or Parties so attacked” by taking

“such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. 9/11 brought nothing else

than its first invocation.

“A different type of war” If the jus ad bellum –or the “right to war”- in the immediate aftermath

of 9/11 sought to be justified in relatively ‘conservative terms’ as for its compliance with

international legal standards, the official American speech carefully ‘warned’ that this type of war

would be a different ‘kind’ than the ones waged before.

What had changed according to the Bush administration? First, the ‘nature of the attack’; which was

‘indiscriminate’ –“on thousands of civilians”- (Bush, 2001b), ‘unexpected’ and ‘on American soil’

–“at the centre of a great city on a peaceful morning”- (Bush, 2001b). Second, the ‘nature of the

adversary’; a partly known -America had “seen their kind before” (Bush, 2001b)- two-folded

enemy: Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime.

Thus, what was to be expected was a true “unconventional war” (Bush, 2001d), a “new and

different war” (Bush, 2001d), a “guerrilla war” (Bush, 2001d), an “asymmetric war” (Bush, 2001d)

calling for “a different type of approach and a different type of mentality” (Bush, 2001d); one that

will use “conventional forces” but will also require “to fight on all fronts” (Bush, 2001d).

9 See in: United States House of Representatives, Joint Resolution 23, 107th Congress, (2001-2002) 10 See in: What is NATO?, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Website, (n.d)

36

“A multi-purpose war” To begin with, the War on Terror aimed at achieving multiple purposes

in consonance with the ethical responsibility of the Selves, that is; the need of fighting, defeating

and destroying ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Taliban Regime’ whilst liberating and setting free the ‘Afghan

population’.

“A defensive and preventive war” Moreover, there was the intention of carrying out in parallel

‘defensive’/‘re-active’ measures and ‘preventive’/ ‘pro-active’ exceptional measures not only in

front of an ‘established and actual threat’ but also in relation to a ‘potential risk’; in and out

domestic borders and resorting to a broader spectrum of means than solely military strikes.

On October 7th, 2001 former President Bush informed the American people that ‘The US’ had

begun “strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan” in a joint operation with allies such as “Canada, Australia, Germany and

France” (Bush, 2001c). The reference was being made to the well-known ‘Operation Enduring

Freedom’, carried by a multinational coalition forged for deploying land, sea, and air military forces

and sharing intelligence assets11

.

Operation Enduring Freedom was actually preceded by the ‘Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team’ -

deployed on September 26th, 2001 integrated by over CIA’s Special Activities Division agents

12-

and the ‘Task Force Dagger’ -deployed in earlier October 2001, integrated by members of the 5th

Special Forces Group13

-. Ultimately, it ‘dismantled’ the ‘Taliban Regime’ in early December when

retrieving from the city of Kandahar and defeated and dispersed members of the ‘Al Qaeda terrorist

organisation’ who mainly flew to the neighbour country of Pakistan.

Claiming that “the Islamic ‘street’ greeted the fall of tyranny with song and celebration” (Bush,

2002a), the official speech transmitted a sense of double success in accomplishing the

‘responsibilities’ towards the ‘Taliban Regime’ and the ‘Afghan People’. Nonetheless, ‘Al Qaeda’

as a radical Other was an “existential threat” (Buzan et al., 1998) and “risk” (Van Munster, 2004)

(Van Munster & Ardau, 2009) which required of ‘parallel via’ to be applied domestically.

11 See in: Gerleman, D. J. et al. (2001), pp. 1

12 See in: Schroen, G. (2005), pp. 30 13 See in: Operation Enduring Freedom, at Special Forces Association Official Website, (n.d)

37

There was, however, some inner instability in George Bush’s construction. At times, he would still

label as “defensive measures” responses towards “any attacks that may come” (Bush, 2001b) –

which a priori are to be understood as a ‘risk’ of ‘potential attack’-. In other examples, the official

rhetoric would make a more clear transition from a re-active to a pro-active approach when stating:

“we will come together to (...) prevent hijacking [and] know the plans of terrorists before they act,

and to find them before they strike” (Bush, 2001b), or warning: “the government is taking strong

precautions” (Bush, 2001c).

Particularly, and given that ‘Al Qaeda’ required the coordinated action of the entire national body,

President Bush advocated for the creation of national organs as the ‘Department of Homeland

Security’ which integrated 22 different agencies and federal departments14

and the ‘Terrorist Threat

Integration Center’15

which was later on replaced by the ‘National Counterterrorism Center’16

, with

the aim of “merg[ing] and analyz[ing] all threat information in a single location” (Bush, 2003a).

Preventive measures within borders were to be focused on “four key areas: bioterrorism;

emergency response; airport and border security; and improved intelligence” (Bush, 2002). The

last two areas offer an interesting inside. Airport and border security was federalized by creating the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)17

in charge of supervising transit via highways,

railways, ports, and domestic airports.

Moreover, the US Border Patrol whose priority mission is “preventing terrorists and terrorists

weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States”18 went under

control of the Department of Homeland Security whilst the government promised “doubling [its]

size (...) and funding new infrastructure and technology” (Bush, 2007a). Indeed, border control

appeared as a matter of higher priority for ‘preventing’ the ‘entrance’ of the radical Other, spatially

understood as a ‘foreign element’ ought to be kept outside national borders.

With regards to improvement of intelligence, there are two main official introductions: the USA

PATRIOT Act and the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp. Firstly, the official version was that the

USA PATRIOT Act was conceived as an “essential tool (...) which allows federal law enforcement

to better share information, to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets”

14 Homeland Security Act, Pub. Law 107–296, 116 STAT. 2135 (2002) 15 Exec. Order n° 13354, 69 Fed. Reg. 169 (27th August 2004) 16 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. Law 108-458, 118 STAT. 3638 (2004) 17 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. Law 107-71, 115 STAT. 597 (2001)

18 See in: Border Patrol History, US Customs and Border Protection Official Website

38

(Bush, 2004a). However, a point of instability is to be found as ‘suspects’ rather than ‘terrorists’

were the target of the legal reform; designed for, inter alia, ‘seizing funds of foreign persons,

organisations and countries suspected of being involved in terrorist attacks’ (Title I); ‘incorporating

and/or increasing the use of surveillance mechanisms as warrantless searches, trapping and

intercepting communications’ (Title II); and ‘increasing the power of federal migration authorities

to ban people suspected of being involved with terrorist organisation from entering the country’.19

Secondly, the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp, in words of former Secretary of Defence Donald

H. Rumsfeld, had been installed as a “temporal facility” detention of “extremely dangerous men”

for the purposes of “interrogation”, “gathering intelligence information”, and “law enforcement

information” (Rumsfeld, 2002). It is here where the construction of a risky, dangerous, potentiality

threatening but still unidentified Other can be clearly devised.

“A global and perpetual war” Additionally, former American Administration’s approach

deliberately set a ‘temporally and spatially unenclosed battlefield’ calling for a ‘global’ and

‘perpetual war’; once again connected to the ‘expansionist’ nature of ‘Al Qaeda’ Other. “We are

looking for Al Qaeda cells around the world” had stated former American President (Bush, 2001d),

for “these enemies view the entire world as a battlefield and we must pursue them wherever they

are” (Bush, 2002a). The Selves had become engaged in a “long war against terrorist activity”, a

“lengthy campaign, unlike any other [America] had ever seen” (Bush, 2001d).

“A lawful and just war” Finally, there is a particular hoisting of the idea of a ‘lawful’ and ‘just’

war, which the official speech treated as coexistent and differential features. We shall remember

that ‘The US’ Self had been described as resorting to “lawful military action” and had sought for

legal shelter regarding the ‘right to war’ –jus ad bellum-. With regards to the ‘right in war’ –jus in

bello-, the official speech pronounced itself over two issues.

As for the qualification of ‘the armed conflict’, George W. Bush initially stated to comply with “the

legal conclusion of the Department of Justice” which determined that “none of the provisions of

Geneva appl[ied] to [America’s] conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the

world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda [was] not a High Contracting Party to Geneva”

(Bush, 2002b).

19 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. Law 107-

56, 115 STAT. 272 (2001)

39

As for the ‘means and methods at war’, it was sustained that despite the legal debate around the

applicability of the Geneva Conventions, ‘The US’ was still resorting to “every lawful and effective

measure to protect [the] country” (Bush, 2008a). It was highlighted, for instance, that the treatment

of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay -although considered “unlawful combatants”- was “humane” in

compliance with international bodies of law (Rumsfeld & Pace, 2002).

In addition, the War on Terror was not only a matter of what was ‘lawful’, but more importantly a

matter of what was ‘just’ and ‘right’; surpassing the traditional framing of exceptional measures as

‘needed’ for assuring the State’s ‘survival’ (Buzan et al., 1998) Repeatedly, American Head of State

transmitted to the audience: “I assure you and all who have lost a loved one that our cause is just”

(Bush, 2002a); “I am assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come”

(Bush, 2001b). This ‘just cause’ was ‘ancient’ and ‘well-known’, since “freedom and fear, justice

and cruelty, [had] always been at war” (Bush, 2001b). It represented “the cause of all mankind”

(Bush, 2004a); bringing the ‘good’ Selves and ‘evil’ Otherness against each other without ground

for neutrality as “God [was] not neutral between them” (Bush, 2001b).

3. A. II. Introductions and transformations from 2002 on

It is on top of the semantic structure defined in the right aftermath of 9/11 that a series of discursive

introductions and transformations were set both in terms of identities and policies increasing the

level of complexity. A five-folded identity representation was maintained, now gathering together

‘Al Qaeda’, the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ –in replacement of the ‘Taliban Regime’, and the ‘Oppressed

Peoples’ –in replacement of the ‘Afghanistan People’- as Otherness; and ‘The US’ and the

‘International Community’ –whose ethical locations are expanded- as Selves. As for the policies

proposed, additions and modifications occur in terms of the understanding of a “multipurpose”,

“defensive/ preventive”, “lawful/ just” war.

‘OUTLAW REGIMES OTHER’ AND ‘OPPRESSED PEOPLE OTHER’

In replacement of the ‘Taliban Regime’, George W. Bush resorts to a much broader, heterogeneous

‘radical, threatening/ risky Other’ and ‘enemy’. In official words: “the gravest danger in the war on

terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is [now] outlaw regimes” (Bush, 2003a).

40

The differential characteristic of ‘Outlaw Regimes’ was that they “seek[ed] and possess[ed]

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons” (Bush, 2003a); which was understood as illegitimate

and dangerous. Firstly, it came at odds with international provisions of nuclear non-proliferation –

e.g. ‘Outlaw Regimes’ were not part of the Five Nuclear States as defined in the Non-Proliferation

Treaty of 1968- and prohibitions on the acquisition, possession and use of chemical and biological

weapons –e.g. Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 and Biological Weapons Convention of

1975-. Secondly, the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ could “use such weapons for blackmail, terror and mass

murder” or “give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies” (Bush, 2003a).

Certain signs initially attached to the ‘Taliban Regime’ were exported to this new identity, for they

were also considered potential ‘sponsors’, ‘shelters’, ‘suppliers’, and ‘harbours’ of terrorists. They

stand next to the ‘uncivilised’/ ‘against civilisation’ ideological side of the struggle based on

‘extremism’, ‘fear’ and ‘radicalism’, for terrorist –as it reads above- were their ‘allies’. They

represented the ‘evil’ side –recalling the famous reference to the “Axis of Evil” (Bush, 2002a)-.

Inside borders, they were also condemned as ‘dictatorial’, ‘repressive’ regimes (Bush, 2002a)

Whilst maintaining a ‘backward intransient’ temporal profile, ‘Outlaw Regimes’ were no longer

spatially conscripted to a certain geographical area but appeared as an open category applying to

any ‘Regime’ fitting the semantic description. There are, however, specific examples as the famous

North Korea, Iran and Iraq triad (Bush, 2002a). This is coupled with a general reference to the

‘East’ as more prone to host ‘Outlaw Regimes’ seen, for example, when American Head of State

transmitted: “we also hear doubts that democracy is a realistic goal for the greater Middle East,

where freedom is rare (...) as long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny, and despair, and

anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the safety of America and our

friends” (Bush, 2004a).

Comparatively, there was a similar discursive abstraction when the ‘Afghan People’ was replaced

by a broader identity category exporting some of its signs to the ‘Oppressed Peoples’ Other. This

‘different and underdeveloped Other’, ‘friend’ of America, encompassed the ‘victims’, ‘brutalized’,

‘oppressed’, ‘starving’, ‘suffering’, and ‘hopeless’ peoples.

Temporally still backwards in relation to the Selves but capable of overcoming such state; it is

spatially open to every location where the official speech discursively identify the lack of

‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’. As posed by George W. Bush: there is a “call of history to deliver

41

the oppressed” (Bush, 2006a) because “when it comes to the desire for liberty and justice, there is

no clash of civilisations. People everywhere are capable of freedom, and worthy of freedom” (Bush,

2004b).

‘THE US’ SELF AND ‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’ SELF: ETHICAL EXPANSION

In the face of newly construed Otherness, ‘The US’ Self also suffered transformations as for its

ethical location vis a vis the ‘Oppressed Peoples’. Whilst there were no major changes from the

‘Taliban Regime’ to the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ –they needed to be ‘defeated’, since “this threat is new;

[but] America's duty is familiar” (Bush, 2003a)-, the ‘Oppressed People’ needed not only to be ‘set

free’ but also a more comprehensive ‘national building and reconstructing process’.

For instance, right in the beginning, President Bush had stated that “it would be a useful function

for the United Nations to take over the so-called nation- building (...) after [America’s] military

mission [was] complete” (Bush, 2001d). Paradoxically, only one year later the Bush Administration

informed without hesitation: “America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We will be

partners in rebuilding that country” (Bush, 2002).

It was clear that such ‘ethical location’ and sense of responsibility grasped the whole ‘Oppressed

People’ identity representation when the Head of State promised that, with America’s help,

“millions will see that freedom, equality, and material progress are possible at the heart of the

Middle East. Leaders in the region will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open

societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity” (Bush, 2003b).

Despite the fact that ‘The US’ was supposed to “lead toward this vision where all are created equal

and free to pursue their dreams” (Bush, 2007b), it was a shared responsibility with the

‘International Community’. After all, “The U.N.'s founding members laid out great and honourable

goals in the charter they drafted six decades ago”, goals to which the ‘International Community’

had to “remain committed to” whilst “continu[ing] to work to ease suffering and to spread

freedom” (Bush, 2005a).

42

OTHERNESS SPATIAL LOCATION TEMPORAL LOCATION US/ INT. COM ETHICAL

RESPONSIBILITY

DEGREE OF

OTHERNESS

AL QAEDA TERRORIST

ORGANISATION

SUDAN/AFGHANISTAN MIDDLE EAST

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE INTRANSCIENT

DEFEATING, FIGHTING, DESTROYING THEM

RADICAL, THREATENING/ RISKY OTHER, ENEMY

OUTLAW REGIMES

AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, IRAQ, NORTH KOREA; ECC.

OPEN IDENTITY

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE INTRANSCIENT

DEFEATING, FIGHTING, DESTROYING THEM

RADICAL, THREATENING/ RISKY OTHER, ENEMY

OPPRESSED PEOPLE

AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, IRAQ, NORTH KOREA, ECC.

OPEN IDENTITY

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE CAPABLE OF CHANGE

LIBERATING THEM, SECURING AND REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY

DIFFERENT, UNDERDEVELOPED OTHER, FRIEND

VICTIMS, BRUTALIZED, OPPRESSED, STARVING, SUFFERING, HOPELESS

FREE, PROSPER, COMPASSIONATE, HOPEFUL

UNITED STATES

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

OPPRESSED PEOPLES

AFGHAN PEOPLE

43

OUTLAW REGIMES

UNITED STATES

SPONSORING, SHELTERING, SUPPLYING, SERVING AND HARBOURING TERRORISTS

IDEOLOGY OF EXTREMISM, RADICALISM, FEAR, LAWLESS VIOLENCE,

TOTALITARISM

OUTLAW, TYRANNICAL, BRUTAL, OPPRESSIVE REGIME

ILLEGITIMATE SEEKERS AND POSSESORS OF WEAPONS OF

MASS DESTRUCTION

UNCIVILIZED, AGIANST CIVILISATION

LEGITIMATE REGIME, RULE OF LAW, HUMAN DIGNITY,

HUMAN FREEDOM

IDEOLOGY OF MODERATION, FREEDOM/ LIBERTY, COMPASSION,

LAWFUL MILITARY ACTION, DEMOCRACY

ONE OF THE “FIVE NUCLEAR STATES”

CIVILIZED, DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION

PREVENTS, TRACKS, FIGHTS, DEFEATS,

DESTROYS, TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

TALIBAN REGIMES

44

POLICIES PROPOSED

“A defensive and preventive war: preventive self-defence” Again, one of the most

controversial and discussed topics of the Bush administration, ‘prevention’ as an exceptional

measure offered a new variant from 2002: the possibility to resort to ‘military force’ against the

‘risk’ posed by ‘Outlaw Regimes’. From then on, ‘The US’ is meant to “no longer solely rely[ing]

on a reactive posture” given the “inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of [the]

threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be unleashed by [the] adversaries’ choice of

weapons” (Bush, 2002c). There was a need to “deter and defend against the threat before it is

unleashed” (Bush, 2002c). Ultimately, this lead to Operation Iraq Freedom on March 20th, 2003

aimed at “disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, (...) end[ing] Saddam Hussein's support

for terrorism, and (...) free[ing] the Iraqi people” (Bush, 2003b).

“A lawful and just war: the applicability of the Geneva Conventions” The first official

version for the applicability of the Geneva Conventions was forced to revision after the US

Supreme Court ruling in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case; for it determined that Common Article 3 to

the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applied as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda20

. Arguing

the applicability of Common Article 3 to the War on Terror supposed the understanding of “an

armed conflict not of an international character” as endorsing ‘extraterritorial conflicts’ or

potentially ‘global battlefields’, and not merely those occurring within the borders of a certain state.

“A multi-purposes war: the democratic mission” Confronted with an expanded ethical

responsibility towards the ‘Oppressed Peoples’, the War on Terror as a basic discourse channelled a

new aim to pursuit next to ‘defeating’ ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘Outlaw Regimes’. The official US

premise for ‘securing and rebuilding’ countries subject to oppression was “not impose [their] own

style of government on the unwilling” but to “help others find their own voice, attain their own

freedom, and make their own way” (Bush, 2005a). There was, however, some level of internal

instability in this construction as the ‘nation-building and reconstruction’ was crystallised in a quite

clear ‘style of government’. It was “democracy”, based on “fair elections”, “the rule of law” and

even “private property” (Bush, 2005b) the model ought to be followed by the “free people” and

which America committed itself to ‘expand’.

20 United States Supreme Court, Salim Ahmed Hamdan v. Donald H. Rumsfeld et al., 548 U.S. 557 (2006), No. 05.184, 29 June 2006,

section D. iii.

45

3. B. CRITICS AND SUPPORT

The wide spectrum of criticism and counter-speeches to the War on Terror can be clustered and

categorised according to the semantic elements of external instability highlighted; which in turns

can refer to the construction of identity representations, the construction of policies, or their

interlinked relationship. The examples selected try to illustrate the semantic dynamic of certain

counter-discourses which have been raised by several agencies and several genders –journalists,

scholars, etc.-

Firstly, one element to be challenged was the relationship between the radical, threatening and

risky Otherness and ‘Islam’. If we recall the semantic deconstruction carried out before, one of the

most important elements of the official speech is depicting ‘Al Qaeda’, the ‘Taliban Regime’ and

‘Outlaw Regimes’ by analogy as intrinsically irreconcilable with the ‘Islamic faith’.

William Ramsey Clark, a liberal American lawyer and former senior federal official at the

Department of Justice, was probably one of the key figures in bringing up the matter. Advocating

for the impeachment of members of the Bush administration including former President himself21

,

Ramsey Clark argued that not only the War on Terror was based on a clear link between the

‘radical, threatening and risky Otherness’ and ‘Islam’, but that actually ‘Islam’ was to be considered

the real and only ‘enemy’ to Selves.

In his interview to The Hindu Newspaper, Ramsey Clark stressed that “as for Islam, it is a faith that

has served [American] people well at a time when there seemed to be no values, no principles,

when economic power, greed and force prevail. In the U.S. it has touched the lives of African-

Americans” (Clark, 2007). Later on, he claimed: “the war on terrorism is really a war on Islam.

Most of the politicians are putting it as Islamic terrorists but what they really mean is the threat of

Islam” (Clark, 2007).

Secondly, what was brought into discussion is the ‘lawful’ charter of the policy; that is to say, its

accordance to ‘the law’ principally regarding three specific international legal bodies. With respects

to jus ad bellum, there is the question on the possibility of enacting Article 51 towards a non-state

actor as ‘Al Qaeda’. According to Marjorie Cohn, American professor of law and former president

21 We shall recall, for example, his public advocacy for impeachment at the A.N.S.W.E.R inauguration protest of January 20th, 2005 and

his role as founder of the “Vote to Impeach” Organisation in 2003

46

of the National Lawyers Guild, “The invasion of Afghanistan [was] not legitimate self-defence

under article 51 of the Charter because (...) the attacks in New York and Washington D.C were

criminal attacks, not "armed attacks" by another state” (Cohn, 2001; 54).

Jointly, there is the question on the possibility of enacting Article 51 towards a non-imminent

threat. Following Marjorie Cohn’s line of thought, “the necessity for self-defence must be ‘instant,

overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’. This classic principle

of self-defence in international law has been affirmed by the Nuremberg Tribunal and the UN

General Assembly” (Cohn, 2001; 54).

According to Marjorie Cohn, it not only implies that the Doctrine on Preventive Self-Defence

enacted in the Iraq War was to qualify as ‘unlawful’, but also the Afghanistan incursion, as “there

was not an imminent threat of an armed attack on the United States after September 11, or Bush

would not have waited three weeks before initiating his October 2001 bombing campaign” (Cohn,

2001; 54).

Regarding jus in bello, counter-arguments have claimed the inadequacy of qualifying the War on

Terror as a non-international armed conflict under Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions

because of the impossibility of applying an ‘intensity’ and ‘organisation ’ test22 to what it is

considered to be a rather “multifaceted” spectrum of actions between “hardly identifiable parties”.

On the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in, the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presented a Report regretting the “unfortunate confusion (...)

created by the use of the term ‘war’ to qualify the totality of activities that would be better

described as a ‘fight against terrorism’”, given that it was “evident that most of the activities (...)

undertaken to prevent or suppress terrorist acts do not amount to, or involve, armed conflict” and

that “the anti-terrorism campaign [was] being waged by a multitude of means (...) which [did] not

involve the use of armed force” (ICRC, 2003; 18).

From the cases indeed involving armed force, except for the Afghanistan incursion, the ICRC

deemed it doubtful “whether the totality of the violence taking place between states and

transnational networks [could] be deemed to be armed conflict in the legal sense” (ICRC, 2003;

22 Common Article 3 has been interpreted in the ICTY Boskoski case as requiring a certain level of intensity which ought to be measured,

inter alia, by the ‘spread of clashes over territory and period of time’, the ‘types of weapons used’, the ‘extent of the destruction and the number of casualties’ (paras. 117); and a certain level of organisation , which requires the non-state group involved in the clash of arms

to have a ‘hierarchical structure’ where the ‘high command’ is able to impart orders over its members (paras. 199-203)

47

18). One of the reasons was that an armed conflict of any type required, “the existence of opposing

parties” whilst, in the case at hand, “it [was] difficult to see how a loosely connected, clandestine

network of cells” –referring to Al Qaeda- “could qualify as a "party" to the conflict” (ICRC, 2003;

19).

Regarding human rights law, there has been criticism regarding the treatment of the detainees in

Guantanamo Bay and the measures envisaged in the USA PATRIOT Act. With regards to the

assertion that prisoners were “treated humanely” (Rumsey & Gate, 2002) and after the Department

of Defence approved new interrogation techniques setting aside ‘harsher’ methods applied in 2002

(Rumsfeld, 2003) a Report of the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate was released

in 2008. It pointed out how authorized practices as “sleep deprivation” and “other mistreatments”

were connected and contributed to “homicides” within the facilities (CASUSS, 2008; 152) whilst

paving the way for unauthorized practices as “nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical

training (exercise) carried over into sexual and physical assaults” (CASUSS, 2008; 210).

As for the USA PATRIOT Act, various local and state American governments coordinated through

the Bill of Rights Defense Committee passed resolutions condemning its content and warning about

its ‘clash’ with civil liberties. That was the case, for example, of the New York city Council which

stated that “certain federal policies adopted since September 11, 2001, including certain provisions

in the USA PATRIOT Act (...) unduly infringe upon fundamental rights and liberties", posing a

particular threat to residents of New York City “who are or who appear to be Arab, Muslim or of

South Asian descent".23

Thirdly, controversy is brought up towards ‘purpose’ of the policy; bi-folded in ‘deterring and

defeating Al Qaeda and Outlaw Regimes’ whilst leading a ‘democratization mission’ for the

Oppressed Peoples. Once again, Clark stressed that behind constructing ‘Islam’ as the true ‘radical,

threatening and risky Otherness’ was “The U.S. government’s need for an enemy” given that “its

search for new enemies [was] really a way of uniting the country, covering its real motives and

appealing for patriotism”. However, “the real motive [was] domination and exploitation” (Clark,

2007).

23 The New York City Council, Res. 0909- 2003 version A (2003)

48

The official reaction to the critical voices in order to ‘regain’ an appearance of stability

encompassed both ‘ignoring’ and ‘acknowledging’ certain conflictive semantic nodes. When

acknowledged, Bush’s speech would try either to ‘reinterpret’ the remarks within the same

discursive frame or just to ‘deny’ them.

For instance, even if the concept of preventive self-defence could shake the foundations of the idea

of the War on Terror as both ‘just’ and ‘lawful’; according to Bush, the nature of the Otherness

made it a ‘fair’, ‘necessary’, and even ‘expected’ reaction. As posed by former Head of State:

“some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants

announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?” (Bush, 2003b). As for

the War on Terror being a mechanism for extending America’s domination –for example, by

imposing its own governmental model- or ‘Islam’ being the ‘real target’, former American

President continued denying all of such links. However, as seen before, certain constructions would

end up indirectly reaffirming the critical voices whilst setting nodes of internal instability.

Arguments and counterarguments chained together had a clear impact on the acquiescence of the

domestic audience to the War on Terror as a ‘legitimate’ foreign policy discourse. A progressively

decreasing compliance from 2003 on -right when the rhetoric increases in complexity and scope and

so criticism- can be recognised, for instance, Presidential Approval Ratings. Although September

2001 brought the highest peak of support with approximately 90% of approval, it is from April

2003 on -the second highest peak with 71% of approval - that an almost inexorable decline can be

found up to the very end of the administration, with 20% / 25%24

approval by October 2008.

4. “THE WAR AGAINST DAESH” BASIC DISCOURSE

4. A. IDENTITY REPRESENTATION AND POLICIES PROPOSED

The discursive scenario officially depicted by the French government after November 13 was

founded on top of a five-folded identity representation. ‘France’ and the ‘International Community’

were constructed as Selves contrary to ‘Daesh terrorist organisation ’, the ‘Affected States’ and the

‘Suffering Peoples’ as Otherness.

24 See: Presidential Approval Ratings – George W. Bush, Gallup, (n.d.)

49

‘DAESH TERRORIST ORGANISATION’ OTHER

To begin with, when addressing the nation after Paris events, President Hollande claimed to “know”

who were ‘responsible’ for what he labelled as the “crimes” (Hollande, 2015a), the “terrorist

attacks” (Hollande, 2015a), the “acts of war” (Hollande, 2015b), the “act of aggression” (Hollande,

2015b) and the “vile attack” of November 13 (Hollande, 2015b): “an organisation , Daesh, which

[had] a territorial base, financial resources, and military capabilities” (Hollande, 2015b). This

was the same organisation behind the “cowardly attacks against Charlie Hebdo and Hypercacher”

and the “assault in Montrouge, at Villejuif, Saint-Quentin Fallavier and the Thalys”; all happening

throughout the same “terrible year” of 2015 (Hollande, 2015c).

The first feature of Daesh to be highlighted by the Head of State was that it represented “the root of

evil” (Hollande, 2015c); but, more generally, the ‘root’ of an “ideology” (Hollande, 2015b) of

‘horror’, ‘fanatism’, ‘extremism’ and ‘criminality’. According to Hollande, the casualties of 11/13

were “victims of fanaticism” (Hollande, 2015c), since what “the extremists” and the “terrorists

believe[d] that free people will allow themselves to be intimidated by horror” (Hollande, 2015b).

But ‘France’ knew “who these criminals” were (Hollande, 2015a), for “so many other crimes were

committed in recent years in the name of this same (...) ideology” (Hollande, 2015b).

‘Daesh’ appeared clearly connected to a ‘religious’ background. They were presented as an

‘extreme expression’ of the Islamic faith by being labelled as “the jihadists” (Hollande, 2015c), the

“jihadist army” (Hollande, 2015b) and “jihadist terrorism” (Hollande, 2015b); but also as

“fundamentalist Islamic terrorism” (Hollande, 2016c) and “Islamist terrorism” (Hollande,

2016e). Finally, they were also located in a dual construction of being ‘outcasts of civilisation’;

‘uncivilized’ and ‘against civilisation’ because of their active role in ‘fighting’ what civilisation

stand for. Such duality can be appreciated in the words of François Hollande: “It cannot be said

that we are engaged in a war of civilisations, for these assassins do not represent one. We are in a

war against jihadist terrorism that threatens the entire world, not just France” (Hollande, 2015b).

Temporally framed as a ‘backward’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘barbarian’ identity –it was the “the

barbarians” the ones “attacking France” (Hollande, 2015b)-; after an individual becomes

“radicalised” and joins ‘Daesh’ there is no mention of any ‘capacity of change’, being that the

moment when he or she needs to be “destroyed” (Hollande, 2015b).

50

The “radicalization” of individuals is also connected to the spatial location of ‘Daesh’, unfolded in

terms of its ‘origin’ and the ‘extension of its influence’ –or the territories from which ‘Daesh’ gains

followers-. The ‘origin’ and primary ‘extension of influence’ of ‘Daesh’ is set out pretty clearly by

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development: “Daesh is a terrorist organisation

that is currently occupying areas of Syria and Iraq and seeks to export its terror system outside of

the Levant (Libya, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc.). It emerged from the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaida,

developing in the country in 2006 and later spreading to Syria in 2011, taking advantage of the

chaos caused by the Syrian regime’s sustained repression”25

.

There is, however, one particular additional element of immense importance. When recalling

November 13 events in front of the Joint Parliamentarian Session, French Head of State Hollande

stated “Friday’s acts of war were decided upon, planned and prepared in Syria. They were

organised in Belgium and carried out on our soil with French complicity” (Hollande, 2015b). The

colossal semantic importance of such key statement is nothing else than spatially locating the

extension of influence of the ‘Daesh’ Other ... in the ‘France’ Self.

Hesitating and unveiling some level of internal instability, President Hollande tried to ‘take one step

backwards’ and understand ‘Daesh’ as a purely foreign element when stating, in the same speech,

the need “to protect ourselves, to keep foreign fighters from coming to our country, as was the case

on Friday, to commit terrorist acts” (Hollande, 2015b). At last, he resorted again to his original

construction by claiming: “It hurts to say it, but we know that these were French people who killed

other French people on Friday. Living here in our land are individuals who start out by committing

crimes, become radicalised, and go on to become terrorists” (Hollande, 2015b).

The idea of a “radical, threatening/ risky Other” –which will be further explained below- growing

inside the Self borders would be understood to occupy the European territory by other voices of

Hollande’s administration. For instance, when asked about Salah Abdeslam’s arrest –a Belgian-

born French national accused of being involved in the Paris attacks-, Minister of the Interior

Bernard Cazeneuve responded succinctly: “it is a major blow to the terrorist organisation Daesh in

Europe” (Caseneuve, 2016).

25 See in: What is Daesh?, France Diplomatie – Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement International Official Website,

(n.d)

51

The explicit spatial relocation of a ‘terrorist’ Other within the circumvents of the Self appears, one

could argue, as a true semantic novelty in Western official foreign policy speeches related to the

‘terrorist threat’ since 9/11. Apart from the example of Hollande’s dual construction of a “purely

foreigner” whilst also “national” supporters of ‘Daesh’ as an internal instability; the idea in itself

ought not to be regarded as such. To some extent, a French-born citizen raised up under the values

of the ‘Republic’ who becomes ‘radicalized’ is understood as the “turning point” where element of

the Self is automatically transformed into an element of the Other, so as to maintain such identity

paired dichotomy and reaffirm the legitimacy of the official rhetoric.

‘AFFECTED STATES’ OTHER

At first sight, one could presuppose that the ‘Affected States’ Other would involve every single

state actor ‘victim’ of Daesh ‘attacks’. After all, President Hollande stated: “Daesh terrorist army

has struck in Paris, Denmark, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Libya”

(Hollande, 2015). Nonetheless, the ‘Affected States’ Other is limited to those state actors whose

‘very survival is under threat’, for they are ‘victims’ of ‘massacres, kidnappings, rapes and

murders’ carried by ‘Daesh’ and ‘affiliated terrorist organisations’ whilst being in urgent need to

‘restore their sovereignty’.

In the words of the Head of State: “we are fighting terrorism wherever the very survival of States is

under threat. That was the reason for my decision to intervene in Mali, and it still justifies the

presence of our troops in the Sahel where Boko Haram carries out massacres, kidnappings, rapes,

and murders. We are fighting terrorism in Iraq to allow the authorities of that country to restore

their sovereignty throughout the entire country, and in Syria, where we are resolutely and tirelessly

seeking a political solution” (Hollande, 2015b).

The ‘Affected States’ speaks for an ‘underdeveloped’ identity in a temporal continuum with the

potential to be ‘transformed’ and where its ‘weak and fragile’ political and social fabric turns them

more vulnerable to ‘Daesh’ strikes. Moreover, at the time of being an open category to those fitting

the description, it is understood that currently “all those [countries] affected” are spatially located

in “the Maghreb, Tunisia, (...) Africa, (...) the Middle East” (Hollande, 2016c).

52

‘SUFFERING PEOPLES’ OTHER

The ‘Suffering Peoples’ Other –the “inhabitants of those countries [the ‘Affected States’],

particularly those living in territories controlled by Daesh” (Hollande, 2015b)- are portrayed as

“victims of this same terrorist system”; “suffering hideously and fleeing” as “the refugee issue is

directly linked to the wars in Syria and Iraq” (Hollande, 2015b). Naturally, the ‘Suffering Peoples’

Other matches spatially with its counterpart -the ‘Affected States’- and also temporally, as for its

‘modifiable’, ‘more primitive’ nature when confronted with the Selves.

‘FRANCE’ SELF

The ‘France’ Self as officially construed results in one identity with different ‘signs’ attached to it

when confronted to each Otherness, in the pursuit of discursive stabilisation. With regards to ‘Daesh

terrorist organisation’; ‘France’ is the ‘target’ of the ‘attacks’ carried throughout 2015, since “the

terrorists’ target was France as a whole” (Hollande, 2015b). ‘France’ appears, moreover, as the

“beacon for humankind” for “when it is attacked, the whole world is thrown for a while into

shadow” (Hollande, 2015b), and the ‘model of Europe’, given that “it is in his name that [it was]

built Europe” (Hollande, 2015c). It assumes a ‘role model’; planning to “eradicate terrorism so

that France can continue to lead the way” (Hollande, 2015b).

Such ‘role’ of ‘origin and leader’ of ‘humankind’ is built around ideals of ‘freedom’, ‘republic’,

‘human rights, and the ‘rule of law’. According to Hollande, “the Republic” (Hollande, 2015b),

the “country of freedom” (Hollande, 2015c), the “birthplace of human rights” (Hollande, 2015b), a

“state governed by the rule of law” (Hollande, 2015b), “must equip itself with the means to

eradicate terrorism” (Hollande, 2015b), those who “want to make war against [France’s] liberties,

democracy, and what [it] represents” (Hollande, 2016c).

If ‘Daesh’ is ‘evil’, ‘France’ stands for ‘good’. If ‘Daesh’ represents ‘jihadism’, ‘France’ is a

“secular Republic” (Hollande, 2015c) characterized for being ‘diverse’ -for it “makes no

distinction as to colour, origin, background, religion”- and “open to the world” (Hollande, 2015b).

‘France’ not only stands next to civilisation, it is its ‘defender’. In Hollande’s words, ‘France’

would “eradicate terrorism so the movement of people and the mixing of cultures can continue and

so that human civilisation is enriched” (Hollande, 2015b).

53

When compared to the ‘Affected States’ Other; ‘France’, despite having been ‘target’ of ‘Daesh’

“must be strong, it must be great and the state authorities must be firm” (Hollande, 2015a).

Accordingly, the “Republic is under no threat from these despicable killers” (Hollande, 2015b) for

“the French Republic has surmounted many other trial [and] it is still here, still alive and well”

(Hollande, 2015b). As for the ‘Suffering Peoples’; the ‘French People’, although having being

“victim of fanatism” (Hollande, 2015c) are “a free people, an invincible people, when it is united

and comes together” (Hollande, 2015b); “a staunch, tough, courageous people” (Hollande, 2015b)

that “show[s] compassion and solidarity” (Hollande, 2015b).

Spatially, the ‘France’ Self refers to Republic of France as currently geographically located and

circumvented; but, more importantly, to the Republic of France as part of the European Union (EU).

The role of the EU for this identity representation is one to dwell on, as instead of being a separate

semantic construction like the ‘International Community’ is treated by the official rhetoric as a

constitutive part of the ‘France’ Self. This, in part, responds to its understanding as a supranational

nature as an international organisation –an “above-members organisation ”- which works based on

sovereign competences transferred from the state members resulting, for instance, in binding

decisions adopted by majority and supremacy of the EU law over domestic law (Klabbers, 2015;

27). Temporally, it is framed as an identity ‘capable of change’ whilst in a ‘more advanced’,

‘higher’, ‘superior’ state of development.

The ‘France’ Self offers different ethical locations according to each specific Otherness. On the one

hand, ‘Daesh terrorist organisation’ entails a confrontative ethical responsibility where ‘France’

“must be merciless” and “will fight” and “defeat terrorism” (Hollande, 2015b); where “terrorism

will not destroy France because France will destroy it” (Hollande, 2015b). On the other hand, both

the ‘Affected States’ and the ‘Suffering Peoples’ bring up a rather accommodative ethical

responsibility: states whose ‘survival is threatened’ need to be ‘intervened’ to contribute to

“restore their sovereignty throughout the entire country” (Hollande, 2015b) “bring a considerable

support (...) in the field of security and defence” (Hollande, 2016b). Finally, the peoples ‘fleeing

their territories’ need to be “welcomed in asylum” (Hollande, 2015c).

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‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’ SELF

The ‘International Community’ Self which the official speech refers to, is understood to had

resulted from the French ‘seeds of inspiration’. In a semantic process of ‘equating’, the

‘International Community’ is also to be seen as, for example, ‘good’, ‘civilized’, defender of

‘human rights, freedom’, ‘diverse’, etc. However, in contrast to the ‘France’ Self that remains

‘united’; the “international community (...) is divided and incohesive. [That is why] France has

called for this unity, which is so necessary in order to act” (Hollande, 2015b).

The French President referred throughout his official speech to an ‘International Community’

temporally ‘ahead of time’ when contrasted with the Otherness. An ‘International Community’ that,

despite invoking a spatial sense of ‘totality’, sets aside those being against –‘Daesh’- or being

unable –‘Affected States’ and ‘Suffering Peoples’- to leave up to the ‘values’ it represents. The

ethical responsibility of the ‘International Community’ is shared with the ‘French mission’

especially in relation to ‘Daesh’. In words of the Head of State: “the need to destroy Daesh

concerns the whole international community” (Hollade, 2015b); “we are in a war against jihadist

terrorism that threatens the entire world, not just France” (Hollande, 2015b); “the whole world also

needs to mobilize its efforts in order to combat terrorism” (Hollande, 2015b).

THE DEGREES OF OTHERNESS

Hollande’s rhetoric resorts to different degrees of Otherness. On the one hand, ‘Daesh terrorist

organisation’ “is not just France’s enemy” (Hollande, 2015b) but also an enemy to the

‘International Community’ –seen, for example, in UN Security Council Resolutions 2249 of

November 20th 2015 adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter under ‘France’ initiative-. Combined

with the signs attached by processes of linking and differentiating and the spatial and temporal

location, ‘Daesh’ appears as the clear ‘radical and threatening/ risky Other’ of ‘global’ dimensions

–or in official terms, “the global terror threat, it is a threat for all countries” (Hollande, 2016e)-.

On the other hand, the ‘Suffering Peoples’ and ‘Affected States’ are framed as a rather ‘different

and underdeveloped Other’, neither part of the Selves nor asymmetrically opposed to them.

55

DAESH TERRORIST ORGANISATION

RESPONSIBLE

ROOT

IDEOLOGY OF HORROR, FANATISM, EXTREMISM, CRIMINALITY

EVIL

JIHADISTS, FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC, ISLAMIST

UNCIVILIZED, AGAINST CIVILISATION

TARGET

GOOD

IDEOLOGY OF REPUBLIC, FREEDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW

DIVERSE, OPEN, SECULAR

CIVILIZED, DEFENDERS OF CIVILISATION

BEACON, LEADER

FRANCE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

PROCESS OF LINKING PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATING PROCESS OF EQUATING

DIVIDED, INCOHESIVE

56

AFFECTED STATES

‘VICTIMS’ OF ‘DAESH’ SURVIVAL UNDER THREAT, NEED TO RESTORE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY

FRANCE

‘TARGET’ OF DAESH ‘SOUL’ NOT UNDER REAL THREAT, STRONG, GREAT, FIRM, ALIVE, WELL

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DIVIDED, INCOHESIVE

SUFFERING PEOPLES

‘VICTIMS’ OF THE ‘TERRORIST SYSTEM’

SUFFERING, FORCED TO FLEE

FRANCE

‘VICTIMS’ OF FANATISM FREE, INVINCIBLE, UNITED, STAUCH,

TOUGH, CORAGEOUS, COMPASSIONATE AND SOLIDARY

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DIVIDED, INCOHESIVE

57

OTHERNESS SPATIAL LOCATION TEMPORAL LOCATION US/ INT. COM ETHICAL

RESPONSIBILITY

DEGREE OF

OTHERNESS

DAESH TERRORIST ORGANISATION

SYRIA, IRAQ/ LIBYA, EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, FRANCE

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE INTRANSCIENT

DEFEATING, FIGHTING, DESTROYING THEM

RADICAL, THREATENING/ RISKY OTHER, ENEMY

AFFECTED STATES

SYRIA, IRAQ, STATES OF MIDDLE EAST AND MAGREB OPEN IDENTITY

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE CAPABLE OF CHANGE

INTERVENE, ALLOW FOR POLITICAL RESTORATION, SUPPORT IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE

DIFFERENT, UNDERDEVELOPED OTHER

SUFFERING PEOPLE

SYRIA, IRAQ, STATES OF MIDDLE EAST AND MAGREB OPEN IDENTITY

UNDERDEVELOPED, PRIMITIVE CAPABLE OF CHANGE

WELCOME THEM IN ASYLUM

DIFFERENT, UNDERDEVELOPED OTHER

POLICIES PROPOSED

It is in connection to the set of identity representations presented in the official foreign policy

speech that the French rhetoric offers to the audience a certain course of action to be distinguished

by different semantic criteria.

“It is war...” The night of the Paris attacks, President Hollande’s speech to the ‘French’ nation was

echoed by the international and national press under the same headline: “France is at war”

(Hollande, 2015a). Additionally, the French Head of State informed the audience that this was not a

‘new’ situation, as ‘war’ against ‘Daesh’ had “began some years ago” (Hollande, 2015b) and

included ‘attacks’ on French soil of “Charlie Hebdo and Hypercacher” (Hollande, 2015c).

Waging war was justified as an exception to the prohibition on the threat and use of force as set in

Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter by virtue of the State’s ‘inherent right’ to self-defence. As stated by

Permanent Representative of France to the UN, “on November 13, Daesh committed an act of war

against France (...) Our military action, as we informed the Security Council, was justified by the

collective self-defense. It can now also rely on individual self-defense in accordance with Article 51

of the UN Charter” (Delattre, 2015).

58

Collective self-defence was channelled through Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union or

the “mutual defense clause”, which was invoked for the first time and states that if a member of the

EU is victim of “armed aggression on its territory” the other member states have an “obligation of

aid and assistance by all the means in their power.” However, the Lisbon Treaty on European

Union (EU) contains not one but two different provisions for mutual assistance amongst its Member

States which might include military aid. Apart from Article 42 (7); Article 222 –commonly referred

as the “solidarity clause”- is to be triggered “if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or

the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. Opting for the former but not for the latter tells us

about France’s preference for an ‘intergovernmental approach’ and an ‘extended territorial scope’.

Firstly, whilst Article 222 actually provides for a specific process of decision and application of the

course of action to be carried out through the EU institutions26

, Article 42 (7) lies on a

‘intergovernmental approach’ as the role of the EU institutions is limited to coordinate or facilitate

what the requesting Member State and the “aid-supplier” Member State have decided (European

Parliament, 2015; 5). Bilateral agreements were celebrated on this basis with, for example, the

United Kingdom on ‘Security and Defence’ (Hollande, 2016a) and particularly in the ‘fight against

terrorism’ (Hollande, 2016b). Secondly, whilst Article 222 limits the EU’s mobilisation of

assistance to the territory of the Member States Article 42 (7) encompasses the lawful use of force

outside the territorial borders of the EU Member States against the initial aggressor (European

Parliament, 2015; 6).

Interesting, contrasted with the territorial location and of ‘Daesh terrorist organisation ’ and the

‘France’ Self, the activation of Article 42 (7) gives the impression of ‘France’ trying to disengage

from the EU –a constitutive part of the Self; sharing its same ethical responsibilities- whilst

focusing on a coordinated interstate action focused on neutralizing the ‘radical Other’ as a foreign

element.

“A different type of war” If resorting to arms was justified through ‘conventional’ means; almost

automatically the French Head of State ‘presaged’ necessary transformations and changes in the

traditional way of conducting war. In clear connection to the semantic nature of the ‘radical,

threatening risky Other’, on 16th of November 2015 Hollande argued the nation to be facing “a new

26 For instance, the coordination between the Member State requesting and those providing assistance is to be made through the Council –

Article 222 (2)-, whilst the implementation of the course of action is to be defined by the Council acting on a proposal presented by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Parliament of the EU is to be kept

informed –Article 222 (3)-.

59

kind of adversary” and consequently “a different kind of war” (Hollande, 2015b) which would then

justify a different type of response based on the following characteristics.

“A multipurpose war” Firstly, in consonance with the ethical location of the Selves as explained

above, the particularity of the War against Daesh can be seen in its multipurpose nature, based on

the need of fighting, defeating and destroying ‘Daesh terrorist organisation ’; intervening, allowing

for political restoration and supporting in security and defence the ‘Affected States’ and welcoming

in asylum the ‘Suffering Peoples’.

“A defensive, preventive and punitive war” Secondly, the course of action presented by

Hollande was founded on ‘defensive’/ ‘re-active’ and ‘preventive’/’pro-active’ exceptional

measures directed towards ‘Daesh terrorist organisation ’ and the ‘Affected States’.

Firstly, President Hollande communicated to the Joint Parliamentary Session that in reaction to

Paris attacks “France [would] step up its operations in Syria” including the addition of “10 French

fighter jets to launch airstrikes on the Daesh stronghold of Raqqa” and “the Charles de Gaulle

aircraft carrier (...) which [would] triple [their] capacity to act” (Hollande, 2015b). He was

referring to the strengthening of ‘Operation Chammal’, conducted by French armed forces in the

fight against ‘Daesh’ which began on September 19th, 2014 in Iraq that was later on extended to

Syria27

. Without deploying troops on the ground and mainly conducted through airstrikes, after

November 13 ‘Operation Chammal’ redouble its military missions and ended up launching more

than 3642 sorties and striking more than 1028 ‘objectives’ in total28

.

Moreover, Hollande remarked November 13 “justified the presence of our troops in the Sahel where

Boko Haram [affiliated to ‘Daesh’] carries out massacres, kidnappings, rapes, and murders”

(Hollande, 2015b). He was referring to the continuance and strengthening of ‘Operation Barkhane’

launched on August 1, 2014, led by the French armies and based on a partnership approach with the

main countries of the Sahel –the ‘Affected States’ of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina

Faso- aimed at coordinating efforts in ‘fight’ against ‘terrorist armed groups’29

.

27 Ministère de la Défense, Dossier de Presse – Opération Chammmal, pp. 4, July 2016 28 Ibid., pp. 6 29 Ministère de la Défense, Dossier de Presse – Opération Barkhane, pp. 3, July 2016

60

Secondly, Head of State announced a wide range of measures to be applied domestically with the

aim of dissuading any ‘risks’ of future ‘terrorist attacks’. To start with, President Hollande proposed

a revision of the Constitutional scheme provided for the state of emergency (Hollande, 2015b).

According to the Constitutional Bill for the Protection of the Nation, French constitution offers two

“special schemes for times of crisis”: Article 16, which “implies that the regular functioning of the

constitutionals authorities is interrupted” giving the President of the Republic “exceptional

powers”; and Article 36, applied for a state of siege when facing “imminent danger resulting from

foreign war or armed insurrection” which implies that “different competences are transferred from

civil authorities to military authorities”30

.

Following the text of the Constitutional Bill, neither of them was appropriate for “combating

terrorism effectively”. What ought to be done was giving Article 1 of Law n° 55-385 of April 3rd

1955 a constitutional basis through the adoption of a new Article 36 (1), according to which a state

of emergency was to be determined by the Council of Ministers when facing “imminent danger” or

“events having, for their nature and gravity, the character of public calamity” and approved by the

Parliament if extended more than 12 days.

Under this scheme of state of emergency, administrative measures could be taken by civil

authorities to “prevent the risk” or “deal with these events”. These shall include, inter alia, “identity

control without justifying the particular circumstances establishing a risk to public order”;

“administrative detention, without prior permission of the person in the place subject to an

administrative search”; “administrative seizure of objects and computers for administrative

searches”31

.

A second measure included strengthening surveillance and intelligence techniques (Hollande,

2015b). In this respect, on December 1st, 2015 President Hollande passed the law on surveillance

measures of international electronic communications amending the code of Homeland Security. By

virtue of this set of new provisions, the Prime Minister could authorise, for instance, the

“interception of information sent or received abroad” of “people using subscription numbers or

30 Assemblée Nationale, Project de Loi n° 3381, 14th Législature (2015)

31 Ibid. Supra. It is worth to remark that, meanwhile the Constitutional Bill was under discussion, the state of emergency was temporarily

adopted in November 2015 under: LOI Prorogeant l'application de la loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence et renforçant

l'efficacité de ses dispositions, n° 1501, 0271 JORF (2015); extended in February 19th 2016 until May 2016 under: LOI Prorogeant

l'application de la loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence, n° 2016-162, 0043 JFOR (2016)

61

identifiers which are traceable to the national territory” for “the protection and promotion of the

fundamental interests of the nation”32

.

A third policy proposed aimed at reforming the criminal proceedings in the fight against organized

crime and terrorism (Hollande, 2015b). Prime Minister Manuel Valls presented a Bill which sought

to “enhance the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime, including terrorism” by giving

“new investigative means to the prosecution as the investigating judge, [reinforcing] the existing

means” and “making simplifications, at all stages of the proceedings”. This aimed at

“facilitate[ing] the work of investigators and judges” whilst “strengthening the guarantees in

criminal proceedings, especially during the investigation and instruction” to make the process

“fully compliant with constitutional and European requirements”33

.

In the fourth place, Hollande’s administration considered necessary to reorganise and increase the

staff and resources of law enforcement, intelligence agents and armed forces (Hollande, 2015b). In

bigger detail, the proposal aimed at creating “5,000 additional jobs for police officers and

gendarmes”, “2,500 additional jobs in the prison service and the judiciary service”, “additional

1,000 employees in order ensure border control” whilst assuring that “there [would] be no cutbacks

in defence personnel until 2019” and that “operational, cyber defense intelligence units” would be

the first ones benefited (Hollande, 2015b).

Particularly, the idea of a more ‘efficient’ border control as a preventive measure aimed at ‘Daesh’

as a foreign element added further tension to the idea of a ‘European France’. President Hollande

warned to the Joint Parliamentarian session. “if Europe does not control its external borders – we

are seeing this before our very eyes – that means a return to national borders, when it’s not walls

and barbed wire. That will mean the dismantling of the European Union” (Hollande, 2015b). That

is, when confronted with the threatening and risky radical Other ‘Daesh’, exceptional measures

could require a new version of the ‘France’ Self, detached from the very supranational construct it

‘help building’: the European Union.

In the compound of ‘defensive’ and ‘preventive’ measures, there is a third and final alternative

introduced by the French rhetoric that it is worth to pay close attention to. If the previous proposals

were linked to the understanding of an Otherness originated and expanded out of the ‘France’ Self –

32 LOI Relative aux Mesures de Surveillance des Communications Électroniques Internationales, n° 2015-1556, 0278 JORF (2015) 33 LOI Renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et améliorant l'efficacité et les garanties de la

procédure pénale, n° 2016-731, NOR: JUSD1532276L (2016)

62

as a ‘foreign and external element’-, the forfeiture of citizenship of French-born dual nationals

appeared as an attempt to ‘deal’ with the very Self becoming the Other.

The Constitutional Bill for the Protection of the Nation included a second proposal, modifying

Article 34 of the French Constitution and incorporating a provision stating that “a French-born

person holding another nationality can be stripped of French nationality when convicted of a crime

constituting a serious attack on the life of the Nation", including “crimes on terrorism” 34

. It is the

character of the proposal to be applied to ‘convicted terrorists’ that leads us to believe that it is

neither ‘defence’ nor ‘prevention’ but a ‘punitive’ measure. And so states the very text of the

Constitutional bill: “it is for the national community to decide to punish those who by their actions

aimed at destroying the social fabric. As noted by the State Council in its opinion of 11 December

2015, this ‘reflects a legitimate aim of punishing serious offenders, for they deserve no more

belonging to the national community’”. 35

“A global and perpetual war” Thirdly, the War against Daesh as set by the official French

rhetoric sought to frame an ‘open’ battlefield in terms of time and space to face the “global terror

threat” (Hollande, 2016c). President Hollande admitted ‘France’ to be “fighting terrorism wherever

the very survival of States is under threat” (Hollande, 2015b) whilst enquiring for “time” and

“patience” since “the threat is going to continue and we will be involved in the fight against Daesh

for a long time abroad and at home”(Hollande, 2015b).

“A lawful and necessary war” Finally, President Hollande put special emphasis on the idea that

the policies proposed in the War against Daesh as a basic discourse were ‘lawful’ and ‘necessary’.

‘Lawfulness’ is to be understood as a policy adopted, in the face of “different type of war”, “without

compromising the rule of law” nor France’s “international commitments” (Hollande, 2015b).

Having previously mentioned how the official rhetoric enacted Article 51 as ‘legal shelter’ for jus

ad bellum; it is to note that so far no mentions have been made as for jus in bello provisions. What

has been highlighted is the conformity of policies with international human right standards.

In this context, President Hollande claimed that “strengthen[ing] the resources available to the

justice system and the security forces”, “strengthen[ing] the surveillance of certain individuals,

especially those who are on file” and “develop[ing] [France’s] Constitution to allow the

34 Ibid. supra 30 35Ibid. supra 30

63

government authorities to take action against terrorism that incites war” (Hollande, 2015b) were

taken in accordance with Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen which

states that “security” and “resistance against oppression” are imprescriptible rights of man.

Particularly, regarding the forfeiture of French nationality, the Constitutional Bill specified that it

could not “be imposed if it has the effect of making the person stateless”36

therefore complying with

the ‘right to a nationality’ recognized in multiple international legal instruments like the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) or

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).

Simultaneously, French President inferred that a “different type of war” would also lead to

exceptional measures that, if found to be colliding with certain rights and freedoms, were still

‘necessary’ to cope with the ‘threatening/ risky adversary’. For instance, the Constitutional Bill

stated that introducing Article 36 (1) regarding the state of emergency –which by its very nature

means the suspension of certain rights and freedoms- was not only “lawful” but “necessary” so as

to set a clear “constitutional basis” of a “modernized the system” under which the Parliament can

pass “further legislation including renewed tools that can be implemented during a state of

emergency” and the police and gendarmerie forces “can implement, with judicial control, the means

to fight against violent radicalization and terrorist threats”.37

4. B. CRITICS AND SUPPORT

The ‘lines of criticism’ of the War against Daesh basic discourse so far appear quite condensed in

few defined counterarguments. To begin with, the identity construction of the ‘France’ Self as a

‘diverse, open, secular Republic’ was defied. Gordon Adams, American Professor of International

Relations and former senior White House official for the budget of national security, considered

that it is actually “the legacy of France’s ancient confrontation with Islam and of more recent

French colonial history” (Adams, 2015) that influences the position of the Muslim population in

France and the “violence and the response” (Adams, 2015) to Paris attacks.

According to Adams, France had been “a central arena for the confrontation between Islam and

political-religious Christian Europe for 1,300 years”, which combined with a “200-year-old pattern

of French colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East” generates a sense of “cultural, military,

36 Ibid. supra. 30 37 Ibid. supra 30

64

and political conflict with Islam and a fear of Islamization” (Adams, 2015) in the ‘French

consciousness’. Consequently, the 4.7 million French Muslim citizens coexist in a context of

“tension, violence, and radicalization” visible “from the economic isolation of Muslim families; to

the episodic upsurge of street confrontations between authorities and young men in Muslim

neighbourhoods (...) to the legal battles over the veil” (Adams, 2015). This results in two colliding

communities: the “France secular and Christian, and France Muslim” (Adams, 2015).

Secondly, it was the official construction of the ‘lawfulness’ of the policy to be questioned. More

specifically, the Constitutional Bill and legislation passed on surveillance measures were under the

loop by national and international politicians and experts. The National Consultative Commission

on Human Rights (CNCDH, by its French acronym) is a governmental organisation created with the

purpose of controlling the respect of human rights, expressed its concern regarding the adoption of

Article 36 (1) -the state of emergency- and the modification of Article 34 -forfeiture of nationality-

in the Constitutional text.

The CNCDH rejected any attempt to qualify Article 36 (1) as ‘lawful’ on three bases. Firstly,

affirming that the “state of emergency, and more generally all the legal provisions intended to

perpetuate it, intrinsically threaten fundamental rights and freedoms” (CNCDH, 2016; 2).

Secondly, stating that insomuch the Constitution aimed “not only to define the powers by putting

them in framework but also to guarantee fundamental rights”, ‘constitutionalising’ the state of

emergency would place it on the “same level in the hierarchy of legal norms as fundamental rights

and freedoms” (CNCDH, 2016; 4). Thirdly, claiming that even if the official rhetoric intended to

merely uphold to a ‘higher legal hierarchy’ provisions of an already existing law, whilst “the law of

the state of emergency of 3 April 1955 was above all conceived for territorial control (Article 1) for

a limited duration (Article 3)” the proposed Article 36 (1) was to be “effective and adapted for

facing the jihadist threat which is circumscribed neither in space nor in time” (CNCDH, 2016; 2).

With respects to the modification of Article 34, the CNCDH manifested that, contrary to Article 1

of the French Constitution which states that France “ensures the equality of all citizens” the

forfeiture of nationality provided for clear “differential treatments”. Firstly, between citizens

holding single nationality and those holding dual nationality. Secondly, between those enabled to

give up a nationality –and become nationals of one State- one and those not able to do so -e.g.

because of being nationals to a State other than France with a system of perpetual allegiance-

(CNCDH, 2016; 12).

65

Further concern has been expressed by UN Human Rights experts with regards to the strengthening

of surveillance measures proposed and adopted by the French government. Specially because of the

“the lack of clarity and precision of several provisions” and the “expan[sion] of the power of the

executive over the collection, analysis and storage of communications content or metadata, without

requiring prior authorization or judicial review”, they argued that such measures posed a severe

threat to the legitimate exercise of the right of association, the right to privacy, the freedom of

expression and the freedom of peaceful assembly (UNHRE, 2016).

From the whole spectrum of criticism, President Hollande’s reacted and acknowledged mainly

counter speeches focused on accusations of the ‘lack of lawfulness’ of the policies proposed.

Interesting, in looking for legitimacy, the official foreign policy rhetoric reframed the understanding

of the ‘necessary’ policies to adopt and the nature of ‘Self’.

Facing the resignation of the Justice Minister Christiane Taubira and a fierce opposition within his

own political party, on March 2016 French Head of State informed about the end of the

constitutional debate. The National Assembly and the Senate had failed in reaching an agreement

because “some of the opposition [was] opposed to any constitutional amendment concerning the

state of emergency” and “a compromise seem[ed] unattainable even on the forfeiture of nationality

for terrorists” (Hollande, 2016d).

However, if Hollande’s first reaction abstained from denying the ‘lawful and necessary’ character

of the Constitutional Bill, on an interview conceded to the German newspaper Bild one month later

President Hollande argued: “it is not by removing the nationality that we can fight terrorism. It is

fighting against the very roots of radicalization and hatred. And it is conducting wide coordinated

policies of Europe to apprehend individuals who want to hit us. (...) Terrorists do not respect

borders. So the war against this scourge can be fought and won in a single country” (Hollande,

2016f).

Indeed, Hollande channelled criticisms without giving up on the identity representation of a ‘Daesh’

Other partially comprehended in the territorial location ‘France’ Self whilst acknowledging that the

‘need’ for a ‘punitive action’ as stirring French nationality from dual nationals convicted of

terrorism should be replaced by a ‘preventive’ outlook aimed at the ‘roots of radicalization’.

Additionally, the ‘France’ Self conflictive but not totally disengaged relationship with the EU is

66

maintained as the call for concerted policies refers to European countries acting together without

necessarily resorting to the supranational institutional structure.

Support from the French national audience to the official rhetoric on the War against Daesh evolved

accordingly to progressive exposure of nodes of instability within it. Right after the key events in

Paris, President Hollande obtained 50% of approval for his performance as Head of State38

–one of

the highest peaks so far- with an overwhelming 85% of support to the stirring of French

nationality39

. Nevertheless, according to the emergence of ‘critical voices’ coupled with a rather

unsuccessful official effort to overcome them, polls showed a sharp decline in the domestic support

to Hollande’s performance with 16% and 18% of approval by June and July 201640

.

5. FROM BUSH TO HOLLANDE: “REPRODUCTION” OR

“TRANSFORMATION”?

So far, we have been able to deepen into the semantic ‘picture’ or ‘blueprint’ construed by each

administration, in accordance to the first and second sub-research questions presented in the

introduction to this research project. Now, it is time to reflect on how the War against Daesh

rhetoric reproduces and/ or challenges discursive constructions present in the War on Terror.

Indeed, certain elements appear to support international headlines warning about ‘Bush’s speech

resurrection’ in the mouth of the French Head of State. For starters, both basic discourses guide us

through a complex identity structure where five main players assume a protagonist role. The

international community, the national self, a non-state terrorist organisation, political regimes and

national populations; which are displayed on a “discursive board” that does not simply radically

oppose Otherness to Selves but offers different degrees of differentiation between one and another.

Of course, ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘Daesh’ terrorist organisations are conceived as the ‘archenemy’ of

both national Selves and the International Community; symbolised in the American and French

government drafted Resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. To these examples of

‘barbaric, evil, corrupted, radical and violent ideology’, ‘incapable of change’ and originated in the

‘East’, both national Selves oppose by upholding and defending the ‘values of civilisation’. There is

38 See in: Le Tableau de Bord Politique, L’approbation de l’action de François Hollande comme Président de la République, Ifop/

Fiducial & Paris Match/ Sud Radio, n° 113606, pp. 9, July 2016 39 See in: Les français et la Déchéance de Nationalité, Sondage Opinionway pour Le Figaro, pp. 5, December 2015 40 Ibid supra. 38

67

an indubitable resemblance between the ‘France of Hollande’ and ‘The US of Bush’ as leaders and

role models of the ‘civilized world’; which does not entail a ‘global extension’ and is being

threatened and attacked by these ‘new adversaries’.

After 9/11 and 11/13, the need to fight, defeat and destroy ‘Al Qaeda’ and ‘Daesh’ calls for the end

of measures short of war and the commencement of a conflict of new dimensions and

characteristics. ‘War’ is pursued with multiple purposes and coping with such unpredictable

enemies in potential expansion leads to a global and perpetual battlefield, in which military

(re)action is needed for an outside-borders threat whilst law enforcement, intelligence and

surveillance (pro)action is required for inside-borders risks. In both cases, behind this sense of

unconventionality, there is still an effort to make the policies fit with certain established legal

provisions. Jus ad bellum is channelled through the right to collective self-defence; which France

manages to operationalize, as in the US case, under an intergovernmental approach evading the

supranational EU structure.

There are, however, important constructions in François Hollande’s discourse which challenge

identity representations and policies proposed by George W. Bush, especially in the American

official rhetoric after 2002. To begin with, there are modifications in the projection of the

Otherness. The idea of ‘outlaw’, ‘oppressive’ regimes as active accomplices of Al Qaeda and

holders of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is replaced by much more ‘passive’ and ‘less threatening’

state actors unable to effectively confronting Daesh. Meanwhile, direct links are drawn between

‘Daesh’ and ‘Islam’–strongly denied by the Bush’ administration when describing ‘Al Qaeda’- and

its expansion of influence is understood to include the radicalization of nothing else than French-

born citizens -an absent premise in the American rhetoric-. The ‘France’ Self adopts a much more

moderate and less ambitious ethical responsibility towards the ‘Suffering People’ and the

‘Affected States’ than ‘The US’ Self regarding the ‘Outlaw Regimes’ and the ‘Oppressed Peoples’;

whilst the famous friend/enemy American dichotomy is abandoned.

Additionally, polices proposed by the French official speech also offer a distinctive character. A

more conservative tone is adopted since, in the absence of the threat posed by ‘rogue states’ the

duality of a defensive and preventive war does not include allusions to pre-emptive self-defence.

Conversely, pragmatism makes its way when asserting that extraordinary measures are adopted

because it is ‘needed’ instead of asserting that it is the ‘right’, ‘just’ thing to do. An element of

novelty comes with the resort to punitive measures as the forfeiture of nationality, envisaged as a

68

mechanism to deal with an Otherness that is not merely a ‘foreign element’ but also located and

originated from the ‘seeds’ of the Self. It is also in connection to such territorial location that the

need to reinterpret the law encompasses for Hollande mostly France’s own Constitution with no

reference to international legal provisions, as it was the case of George W. Bush.

As seen before, both the War on Terror and the War against Daesh evolved in the light of internal

and external instabilities pursuing a sense of legitimacy to persuade the domestic audience. The

progressively decreasing percentage of public support can be considered as a sign of a relative

failure from both administrations in this regard. Nonetheless, François Hollande redirected his

rhetoric from a rather ambitious plan to more prudent proposals whilst the Bush administration

seems to have gone in the opposite direction expanding the scope and character of the policies

proposed.

The War on Terror appears as a ‘two-sides crusade’ which ‘The US’ –a ‘monolithic’, ‘solid’ entity-

is supposed to lead; a ‘just cause’ and ‘historical mission’ of actively fighting ‘evil’ with ‘good’,

‘fear’ with ‘freedom’ wherever it appears. Conversely, the War against Daesh speaks of a rather

pragmatic ‘France’, more interested in doing what is ‘necessary’ to cut off the ‘deviated branches’

of the ‘Republic tree’ for protecting the state’s own identity than globally expanding the values of

civilisation. Altogether, whilst Hollande’s basic discourse seems to inherit semantic patterns from

its American counterpart, it challenges its scope and nature as semantically construed.

6. CONCLUSION

This research project intended to show the importance and advantages of PDA when analysing

official reactions to the ‘terrorist global threat’. Hand in hand with the contributions of the

Copenhagen School (1998), Lene Hansen (2006) and Rens Van Munster (2004) jointly with

Claudia Aradau (2009), we have unveiled identity representations and policies construed in George

W. Bush’s War on Terror basic discourse. It is on top of such ‘semantic map’ that we contrasted

François Hollande’s War against Daesh rhetoric to finally find that, despite claims from the media

and certain scholars, it not only reproduces but also challenges some semantic patterns from the

War on Terror official foreign speech.

69

In carrying out this comparative case study certain obstacles and limitations have been encountered.

To begin with, every PDA applied to security official speeches faces the difficulty of accessing data

because of the confidential nature of certain foreign policy documents. Moreover, PDA applied to a

case where data is available in more than one language requires a huge effort for translations to

remain ‘faithful’ to the meaning of the original speech. For instance, there is a whole debate on how

is one to translate to English the French reference “Islamistes”, either as “Islamic fundamentalists”

or merely “Islamists” (Krammer, 2003). Finally, the War against Daesh as a basic discourse is an

ongoing case study. Since the end of June –once the period of data collection and analysis was

finalised- two other 'key events' took place: the Niza and Normandy attacks, whose official

reactions could not be included due to the lack of time for analysing new primary sources.

Bearing this in mind, new PDA research applied to the War against Daesh as a basic discourse may

be stirred into three directions. First, it could be of use to continuing applying the theoretical and

methodological tools hereby presented to new developments on François Hollande official foreign

policy speech. Second, it may be interested to expand the analytical focus, the object of analysis and

the goal of analysis by applying broader intertextual research models offered by Lene Hansen

(2006) which include, for example, constructions by the political opposition, cultural

representations and marginal political discourses. Finally, a contemporary comparative discourse

analysis might result in a great contribution, where the War against Daesh is contrasted with, for

example, the official foreign policy speech of the new American administration to be elected on

November 8th, 2016.

In a context where the ‘terrorist threat’ appears to dominate the international security agenda and

academy, the value of PDA lies in denaturalizing heavily rooted assumptions of identities and

courses of action by distancing itself from ‘problem solving’ theories, positivist outlooks based on

‘why’ questions. Understanding terrorism and counterterrorism as discourses, allows us to question

the intrinsic links where a certain set of identities are paired up with certain policies in a relatively

stable structure; reminding us that there is not ulterior ‘natural essence’ to determine what is to be

regarded as a ‘terrorist attack’ or as a ‘terrorist group’. It is in the exercise of such a continuous

critical questioning that the academy will bridge the gap between ‘theory’ and ‘praxis’, by

contributing to a better understanding and subversion of the international construct. That has been

the ulterior aim of this research project.

70

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