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TRANSCRIPT
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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Master of public administration program
PAD 5384 Civic groups & public policy
Summer 2014
Implementation Implementation gaffe of the week
Photo credit
American Red Cross
Post- 12 Sep 2001 fundraising *
Lecture goals: Discuss the role of civic groups in policy implementation.
As discussed earlier in the class: Brewer and deLeon (1983) introduce implementation as
"Implementation is an important but frequently overlooked step in the general policy process
model. Lacking proper implementation, policy innovation and selection may end up being
little more than intellectual exercises; indeed, faulty policy implementation can invalidate the
earlier, carefully considered steps in the policy process and thereby intensify the original
problem. The process, then, warrants our careful attention" (p. 249).
In this class on civic groups & public policy we are, of course, especially interested in thinking
about public policy in terms of how civic groups fit in. Implementation is hugely important
because of all the contracting out and/or downloading that 'we the people' are doing these days.
Nonprofits are often being contracted to implement public programs.
It is also important to remember that civic groups are also important autonomous actors in public
policy. Public policy is often seen (even defined) as that which government does; but a broader
definition would include action that is done in the public interest. Therefore, just as a
government initiative to educate children is public policy, so is a nonprofit program with the
same goal.
NPOs often serve a useful watchdog role in the implementation phase of public policy,
highlighting potential implementation failures.
Finally, while agenda setting and policy formulation are often the realm of policy advocacy
NPOs; policy implementation is often the realm of service provision NPOs.
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Gerston nicely introduces the problem with implementation: "most of the time we do not even
think about implementation, viewing it, instead, as an automatic extension of the policymaking
process. Naively, we tend to think that policies are preprogrammed into the implementation
mode" (2002, p. 109-10). He suggests smoking bans and fireworks bans as examples. Is it true
that an ordinance isn't enough, but legislation actually has to be implemented as well?
Early points from Gerston (here I draw on the book of his that I used in 2006)
Policy implementation requires change, which people often resist.
The implementation of public policy also involves a principal-agent problem: "it is enacted
by individuals or organizations who act on behalf of others” (p. 110).
Public policies are typically implemented by public servants!
o Yet government has increasingly 'devolved' implementation of public policies to NPOs (and
for profit contractors).
Requirements for implementation Translation ability: The policy must be understood by implementing agents. This applies in
terms of what the policy is, and how it is to be carried out.
Resources
o Self evident: you can't police a border if you don't have enough patrol agents on the
ground, enough court space to prosecute those caught, and enough jail space to
incarcerate them.
This can also apply not just in terms of the quantity of units deployed to implement a
policy, but also in terms of the quality of units deployed. Pay cuts, say for teachers, will
inevitably led to deterioration in the quality of implementing agents (see link and link).
o As succinctly put by that noted American social thinker and
philosopher, Pogo the Possum (right): we the People are often at
fault, too, as we want services but don't want to pay the taxes, or
even to borrow from China, enough money to support them.
Limited number of players
o Understood in terms of "relatively few agencies... involved in the
process" (p. 114). Think of the sixteen US intelligence agencies
implementing US security intelligence policy prior to 2002.
How likely was it all of these agencies would agree on anything?
o This is related to Gerston's next point: accountability. If there are too
many players involved, it is easy for one poorly performing player to
shift blame to another; the complexity of modern society makes these claims and counter-
claims hard to sort out.
America's intergovernmental system seems ideally built to lead to this plethora of
blame-shifting policy actors. There are some 90,106 ‘governments’ in the US alone.
Think of the flooding of New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina: was the fault
the US Federal Government, State of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, Orleans Parish,
or the Orleans Levee Board?
Well, maybe the latter, but
surely some of the other actors bear part of the blame; the Federal government,
for instance, apparently had cut its flood prevention (levee building) grants, and
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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what of the citizens, with their reluctance to pay taxes? There were no marches on
the streets prior to Katrina, demanding that the Levee Board raise the taxes to
build adequate levees. See, again, P. Possum, above.
o Accountability. Some entity (a public agency) needs to be responsible for implementation,
preferably accountable to someone else (an elected body or appointed official),
with a well-defined process for accounting,
including agreed on performance criteria.
Causes of faulty implementation 'Post-decision bargaining'
o Imprecision -- part of what Gerston seems to be getting at is lack of precision in the
legislation (or instruction) creating the program, so that the various parties haggle after
the fact to change things. This becomes especially critical when contracts are agreed to.
o Bureaucratic discretion -- Here, the implementing agents may just interpret the policy
differently, or intentionally disregard instructions. Often this is good, occasionally it isn't.
Poor oversight
o This was certainly alleged in terms of US military action under the previous US federal
administration. The argument goes that the President was too loyal to his senior
appointees (junior official Brown was out as a result of the fiasco in New Orleans; while
senior officials Rumsfeld, Rice et al remained despite the poor performance of their
implementation plan in Iraq), and the pre-2006 Congress was reluctant to challenge an
administration that demanded loyalty from its party. As a result, too few questions were
asked about priorities (more resources devoted to nation-building in Iraq, rather than the
'war on terror' in Afghanistan) and methods (number of troops deployed, availability of
body armour and armour for humvees, etc.).
o Lack of stakeholder buy-in: The idea here is that a policy is more likely to enjoy successful
implementation if no one is trying to prevent this. Intuitive enough, yes?
Some policies are inherently conflictual, as contrary to policies of others:
China's desire to export conflicts with America's desire to reduce imports! Not to
mention that American desires for jobs conflict with American desires for
inexpensive Chinese-made goods.
The Bush administration's desire for peace and democracy in Iraq conflicted with the
nationalist insurgency's desire to continue fighting until (at least) American troops are
out of the country. Or: the Bush administration's assertion that "we can't lose" in
defeating the insurgents in Iraq conflicted with the views of the insurgents that they
can't lose in kicking the Americans out.
Society's desire for no drugs conflicts with the desire for drugs of sellers and users.
Some policies simply require buy-in.
An anti-smoking policy would be more likely to be smoothly implemented if the
private establishments where smoking still takes place agreed with the policy. This
might require some give on the part of the city, with some exemptions, provisions for
smoking-only areas, and such.
An anti-crime program in a high-crime area will be more likely to succeed if the
community sees the police as law enforcers, rather than as intruders. This may
simply require talking to community leaders!
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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A decision to consolidate a couple of schools is more likely to avoid resistance if
community members are part of the decision-making process, so they understand why
the consolidation is being proposed, and at least feel like they've been shown the
courtesy of consultation.
Some policies are (or appear to be) unethical, and implementing officials will balk.
Implementation models
In terms of our discussion so far, the table below indicates different perspectives on the role of
civil society in three different stages of public policy:
Table 1
Models of public policy
in three governance paradigms and three stages of the policy process
Traditional public
administration New public management New public service
Key
characteristics
Bureaucracy and
democracy
Market-mediated
decisions
Civic dialogue-mediated
decisions
PAD 5384
sources
Woodrow Wilson and
Larry Lynn Goldsmith and Shughart
Denhardt & Denhardt,
Thomas
Agenda setting
Legislators (in
consultation with
public) put issues on
the policy agenda.
Bureaucrats may also
do this, within the
realm of their
technical expertise.
Irrelevant: market
choice decides what gets
done.
Legislators (in
consultation with public)
put issues on the policy
agenda.
Bureaucrats may also do
this, again interacting
directly with the public.
Formulation
Largely a function of
bureaucrats, drawing
on their technical
expertise.
Again, market-mediated
choice decides how
goods & services will be
provided, to whom.
Public dialogue is
emphasized.
Implementation Bureaucrats do this, in
public agencies.
Markets do this, either
directly through private
markets, or through
business and nonprofit
organizations contracted
to provide public
services.
Interaction between
government and civic
groups still featured, but
formal contracting de-
emphasized. Instead
government works with
civic groups.
The ‘traditional bureaucratic’ approach
The logic is simple: form an agency → hire personnel → implement policy. What could go
wrong?
The justification is simple: market failures! As discussed in week two. Many types:
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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Justice
National defence
Major infrastructure
Public goods, with education specifically mentioned
Monopoly or oligopoly
Asymmetric information -- if one party in an exchange (usually the seller) knows more than
the purchaser.
Externalities -- when A sells to B, but in the process of the production or use of the product,
C is affected.
Equity concerns -- when the benefits of the increase in societal wealth accrue to a narrow
few. In the US, especially, with its reverence both of the Constitution and of the Bible, this is
doubly disturbing, as undercutting the Constitutional charge to promote the general welfare;
and as contrary to the fundamental Christian charge to 'do unto' 'the least among us'.
Principal/agent problems -- when employees act in their own, rather than the organization's
interest.
Irrationality -- Markets assume rational decision-making on the part of consumers and
suppliers. Yet as especially the spate of recent bubbles has shown (not to mention personal
bankruptcies), this is an at least questionable assumption.
The criticisms of the bureaucratic approach to implementation are myriad: government failure!
Advocates of privatization/marketization present these failures, ad nauseum. Goldsmith and
Bridgeland provide a good example of this, with two passing slaps:
“The legislation puts its faith in civil society, not distant government bureaucracies…”
“The bill will require that any new funding be offset from other programs, – and there are
more than enough failed government programs that could be converted…”
Etzioni, on the other hand, provides a more balanced perspective:
“Ideologues have pretended for more than 200 years that there is a choice between free
markets – and all the alleged blessings thereof – and big government, which ‘interferes’ in
the markets, curtails efficiency, and kills jobs. Actually, an honest argument would …be
limited to questions of whether specific areas need more or less regulation, what kinds of
regulation are most suitable, and how tightly they ought to be drawn” (2009, p. 41).
Still…as noted below, public accountability requires a contract management process, and so an
“irony that the regulations which accompany government contracts with nonprofit service
providers tend to reduce the flexibility, autonomy, and discretion of the contracting agency –
that is, the regulations weaken those features which make the nongovernment agency an
attractive alternative in the first place” (Johnston and Romzek, p. 389).
Other models
Smith and Larimer identify 'three generations' of studies of implementation, as people who think
about this sort of thing have tried to make sense of it. The first generation (pp. 158-62) was just
the observation that implementation matters. Think, again, of the post-invasion plan in the US
invasion of Iraq. However brilliant the plan might be, you have to "go to war with the Army you
have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time" (Ricks 2004, p.
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A1). And so if the implementing agency isn't up to the task of carrying out the brilliant plan...
maybe a plan should have been written up that was implementable by the army you have?
Top down approaches to policy implementation. Smith and Larimer's second generation of
implementation studies focus especially on the distinction between top down and bottom up
approaches. By 'top down' approaches to implementation Smith and Larimer essentially refer to
those characterized by planning from the top, so the emphasis is on managers directing the
process, leadership, and all that (crikey, I can hardly type that 'leadership' codswallop' without
wanting to barf me guts up...). They open with Bardach's notion of 'implementation games':
The games metaphor focuses "analysts attention on the actors involved in implementation;
the stakes they played for; they rules they played by; and the tactics, strategies, and resources
each brought to the table" (Smith & Larimer 2009, pp. 162).
Smith and Larimer (pp. 164-6) then refer to Sabatier and Mazmanian's model of the
implementation process. I happen to have it reproduced electronically, so by way of example,
I'll reproduce it in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Sabatier and Mazmanian's model of the implementation process
Tractability of the Problem 1. Availability of valid technical theory and technology
2. Diversity of target-group behavior
3. Target group as a percentage of the population
4. Extent of behavioral change required
↓ ↓
Ability of stature to structure
implementation 1. Clear and consistent objectives
2. Incorporation of adequate causal
theory
3. Financial resources
4. Hierarchical integration with and
among implementing institutions
5. Decision-rules of implementing
agencies
6. Recruitment of implementing officials
7. Formal access by outsiders
Nonstatutory variables affecting
implementation 1. Socioeconomic conditions and
technology
2. Media attention to the problem
3. Public support
4. Attitudes and resources of
constituency groups
5. Support from sovereigns
6. Commitment and leadership skill
of implementing officials
↓ ↓
Stages (dependent variables) in the implementation process)
Policy
outputs of
implementing
agencies
→
Compliance
with policy
outputs by
target groups
→
Actual
impacts
of policy
outputs
→
Perceived
impacts of
policy
outputs
→
Major
revision in
statute
Source: Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, p. 154
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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For what it's worth, I find these sorts of frameworks to be useful if only as checklists that the
public or nonprofit manager might consult to ensure that s/he has considered everything before
implementation (or when formulating policy proposals!).
Bottom up approaches to policy implementation. 'Top down' approaches to implementation
might best be understood in contrast to their implied opposite: 'bottom up' approaches. As
Birkland indicates, 'bottom up' approaches focus on what Lipsky famously termed 'street level
bureaucrats'. Implementation here is critically dependent not on what the manager wants done,
but on what the official on the street actually does. For Smith and Larimer:
"For the 'bottom-uppers,' it is down at the street level where implementation really happens,
and to favor a center over a periphery perspective is to ignore the practical realities of
delivering public services. A number of scholars pitched the argument that because
implementation was ultimately dependent on street-level bureaucrats, they had to take center
stage in any theory of the implementation process. Actually, the bottom-uppers' argument
went even further. Given that street level bureaucrats were clearly making policy. and given
that compliance issues with the center were virtually inevitable. it made sense to start
thinking of implementation as an important stage of the policy formulation process. From
the bottom-up perspective, it made sense to make the periphery's implementation perspective
(and the target population's) a key issue in the process of resolving questions of 'what should
we do?'" (pp. 167-8)
To belabor the Iraq invasion example: Rumsfeld was probably wrong that 'the army he had', his
implementing agency, was where his plan to invade Iraq went awry. The invasion went well,
with the Ba'athists collapsing quickly, and a relatively small level of civilian 'collateral
damage'. Instead, it was the consolidation -- the nation-building phase -- where things went
awry. It is hard to blame this on the implementing agency, for as the administration well knew:
"The President must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and it is
meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most
certainly not designed to build a civilian society. Military force is best used to support clear
political goals, whether limited, such as expelling Saddam from Kuwait, or comprehensive,
such as demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany during World War
II. It is one thing to have a limited political goal and to fight for it; it is quite another to apply
military force incrementally, hoping to find a political solution somewhere along the way"
(Rice, 2000, p. 53).
Instead, a major flaw in the plan was in not taking into consideration the views of what the
'bottom uppers' refer to as the 'target population': the Iraqi people. US troops were not 'greeted
as liberators', at least not both in a sustained fashion, and in a fashion that would lead a
substantial portion of Iraqis to ‘dob-in’ insurgents. In short, divisions within Iraq were making
political reconciliation impossible (see link), and for the US to police this society would require
too many resources potentially needed elsewhere.
Load shedding. Another type of relationship between government and civic groups is what has
been referred to as ‘load shedding’. Metaphorically, government throws momma off of the train,
and hopes (or not!) someone will care enough to catch her. Rather than contracting out, where
government funds but private actors implement (Johnston and Romzek, p. 385); here private
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actors implement without funding assistance. Incremental load shedding. We have also seen
what might be termed incremental load shedding: government shifts implementation to a
nonprofit group, then slowly cuts funding.
Contract management. As
Johnston and Romzek note (p.
384), legislators seeking to cut
costs by contracting out often
overlook costs of contract
management. This is despite
“The logic of accountability
under contracting is that of
specifying the mutual
expectations, responsibilities,
and obligations of the
contracting parties. Some
government actor, as principal,
monitors the agent for
compliance with the terms
specified in the contract for
performance outcomes” (p.
387).
This is reflected in their Figure 1
(from page 386) at the right.
Compare, for instance, the
contracting out of the construction
of a new school, with Medicaid
case management services.
Ignoring this can have disastrous consequences, as the experience of contracting in Iraq
illustrated. By 2004 warnings were already being sounded (source), and a 2006 report stated:
“Instability—such as when wants, needs, and contract requirements are in a state of flux—
requires greater attention to oversight, which in turn relies on a capable government
workforce. Managing the attendant risks in unstable situations grows in both importance and
difficulty. Unfortunately, attention to oversight and a capable government workforce has not
always been evident during the reconstruction effort. Such workforce challenges are not
unique to Iraq. DOD’s civilian workforce shrank by about 38 percent between fiscal years
1989 and 2002, but DOD performed this downsizing without ensuring that remaining staff
had the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish future DOD missions. In other
cases, contractors have taken over support positions that were traditionally filled by
government personnel” (source).
By 2011, a DoD report stated that:
“At least one in every six dollars of U.S. spending for contracts and grants in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the past decade, or more than $30 billion, has been wasted…
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“Tens of billions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted through poor planning, vague and
shifting requirements, inadequate competition, substandard contract management and
oversight, lax accountability, weak interagency coordination, and subpar performance or
outright misconduct by some contractors and federal employees…
“the United States embarked on operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003
without adequate planning or contract-management personnel to handle the enormous scale
and numbers of contracts” (source).
Problems: lack of competition
(Johnston and Romzek, p. 384), among
others.
Implementation failure
Johnston and Romzek’s analysis of the
Kansas Medicaid reform shows a
complex accountability relationship
between the nonprofit contractors, and
the state government. They reflect this
in their Figure 3, which I copy in at the
right. Their key observation is that
there are hierarchical, legal,
professional and political types of
accountability relationships with, in
this case, all four functioning at once.
Keep in mind, too, that this is a
relatively complex example of
contracting, as we discussed above.
Birkland notes that:
"both journalists and policy
scientists like bad news: Journalists
will report when government has
lost a lot of money, but will ignore
evidence of those instances when
the government has saved money
through some sort of
innovation. At the same time, most
of our books on policy
implementation describe policy
failures." (p. 189-90)
Birkland presents a useful table with 'explanations for policy failure.' I'll reproduce it below,
with suggested examples of each in a third column:
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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Table 3
Examples of Birkland's 'explanations for policy failure' Type Explanation Example
Alternatives to
policies tried
Failure needs to be assessed
in terms of the 'do nothing'
option, and in terms of the
likelihood that other options
would have been more or
less successful.
Critics note that despite $billions in anti-
poverty programs, poverty in the US has
stayed stubbornly at 12-15%, creeping up a bit
since 2000. But poverty was 10% higher in the
1950s, so how bad would it be if there were no
anti-poverty programs (see link)?
The impact of
changing
circumstances
Changing circumstances can
render policies less
successful
Low 1980s energy prices lead to less
conservation, and so more foreign dependency
in the 2000s (see link)!
Relationships of
one policy to
another
Policies are interrelated. Tax cuts will hurt the federal budget,
increasing the national debt (see link).
The boundary
question
Political boundaries will
influence policy success. The Northwest Atlantic cod collapse.
Excessive
policy demand/
realizable
expectations
We may expect too much.
Building a democracy at the point of a gun, in
a region with little experience with democracy,
a cultural world with little success with
democracy, and a multi-ethnic state (see link).
Accurate theory
of causation
Policy will fail if it is not
based on sound casual
theory.
What impact will the current immigration
reform proposals have on illegal immigration:
will prospective immigrants queue in orderly
fashion; continue to enter illegally, induced by
the 'amnesty', or will current immigrants 'self
deport' (see link)?
Choice of
effective policy
tools
The choice of ineffective
tools will likely yield
failure.
"The President must remember that the
military is a special instrument. It is lethal, and
it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police
force. It is not a political referee. And it is
most certainly not designed to build a civilian
society." -- Condoleezza Rice Foreign Affairs
79/1 (2000). See link for full article.
The vagaries of
implementation
The problems inherent in
policy implementation can
contribute to policy failure.
Hmmm...
Failure of
political
institutions
"Policy failure is simply a
symptom of more profound
ailments within our political
institutions..."
Perhaps disengaged voters, coupled with a
Congress (Democrats included from 11 Sep
2001 to about November 2006) that lacked the
courage to assume its Constitutional role as an
equal branch of government, explains much of
the policy failure in Afghanistan and Iraq (see
link). Source: adapted from Birkland, p. 191
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Weak research! It may well be that policy research has focused overmuch on failure, and this
reflects a faulty research design, with no variance on the dependent variable. You'd need to
incorporate both success and failure into an analysis, so that the unique characteristics of the
failures can be identified through contrast with the successes (or at least non-failures!).
Similarly, some criticisms of 'atheoretical', practitioner-based research on public policy argue
that these present 'best case' examples of success. In other words, you find a program that
appears to have succeeded and try to figure out why. Look at almost anything Goldsmith has
published. This sort of backward-induction, though, is prone to biased analysis. If you're a
Marxist, you're going to find a class-based explanation for success. If you’re Goldsmith, you’re
going to find a market-based explanation for success.
But as for the news, it is certainly true that good news is no news!
*
Termination! Our model of the policy process has been as follows:
Agenda setting – an issue gets the attention of the public, and/or policy makers.
Estimation – these actors try to figure out the parameters of the issue, as well as policy
response options.
Selection – a choice is made (or not made) from these options (hopefully).
Implementation – actually carry out the program resulting from the policy analysis.
Evaluation – try to figure out if it has worked as a response to the initial issue.
Termination – the subject of this lecture.
Brewer and deLeon describe termination as follows:
“Termination generally refers to the adjustment of policies and programs that have become
dysfunctional, redundant, outmoded, unnecessary, or even counterproductive. As termination
is the finish of one set of expectations, rules and practices, a sense of finality is easily seen in
the concept; however, less evident but perhaps more important is the idea that termination is
frequently only the replacement of one set of practices with another. Termination signals the
beginning of the policy process as much as it does its end” (p. 385).
Adjustment. Note that, especially with reference to the week six criticism of the stages model by
Guy Peters, the model is not simplistic in its assumption that a policy starts at agenda setting,
progresses through the different stages, and then is terminated at some point. Brewer and
deLeon, at any rate (see also Geva-May, p. 310), note that issues often cycle through the policy
process, with evaluation often setting the stage for ‘adjustment’, which may include considering
termination (or modifying elements of) one approach and setting the agenda to try to determine a
better policy response.
Unintended consequences. Brewer and deLeon provide the example of the termination of state
mental institutions in California:
“…a strong presumption was that those released would somehow be cared for, probably in
community-based facilities. It was an erroneous presumption, particularly for the seriously
disabled. While the closure of the state facilities struck a certain note of finality in one
sector, it merely initiated a whole series of new problems for several others – cities, counties,
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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the community mental health systems, the criminal justice system, the welfare system, and
various private mental health providers. The problem did not go away, it got shifted
elsewhere” (p. 386).
Equally important: the net cost to society very likely exceeded the savings in the state budget
with the closure of the state institutions.
Practical questions.
“Who will suffer from the termination and in what ways?
“What obligations do authorities have to those disadvantaged, such as due process, severance
and other compensation, or ethical and moral responsibilities?
“What costs -- not limited to simple monetary ones – accrue to individuals affected by
termination? “Can these be accounted and compensated for” (p. 386). Related to all of
these, think of defense downsizing:
Defense contractors are an obvious example, given the number of US weapons systems
that we build that DoD doesn’t want (source).
Members of the armed forces who are being, or going to be downsized (source).
But then, given the need for recruitment bonuses during the tougher days of the Iraqi
occupation (source), hasn’t this always been a market deal, anyhow?
The Iraqi people (source)? The people of Afghanistan (source)? Do we owe them
anything
Morality. Brewer and deLeon go on to discuss the ‘ethical, moral and legal dimensions’ of
termination, with these implied in some of the questions above.
Conceptual challenges. A number of conceptual challenges exist for understanding termination:
Strong negative connotations. We don’t like to think about death (?!).
Too little data. “…only 27 federal agencies out of a sample of 421 had gone out of business
since 1923” (p. 390)!
Fuzziness. It is hard to differentiate between termination; and policy fine-tuning,
reorganization, and such.
Geva-May similarly notes that “termination can be applied to functions, organizations,
policies, and programs. Sometimes these are so tightly connected that it is hard to identify
them as separate entities…” (p. 312).
Few incentives….
…to study termination. Times were good (Brewer & deLeon published in 1983, don’t
forget), termination wasn’t a hot topic.
…to terminate. Elsewhere Brewer & deLeon point out that there are generally supporters
for any program (otherwise it wouldn’t be there!). These generally have strong feelings in
favour of the program, and often benefit directly and handsomely from it. Opponents,
though, hardly know the program exists.
Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. This phenomenon goes a long way to explain
why a handful of goat herders have been able to game 100,000,000s of Americans for
so long. For a Cato discussion, see Boaz 2001).
An example of staying power. See Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1789.
This identifies a number of powers of the US Congress.
PAD 5384 lecture eight
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How many of these have since been terminated, 223 years later?
Does this mean that we are reluctant to change, and that powerful forces are preventing this?
Termination strategies
How to terminate those relentless, indestructible cyborgs: Angora
goats (see right)? Geva-May suggests the logic of Kingdon’s
policy windows. As she puts it:
“My” (see instructions: ‘Do not use first person -- e.g. my…’)
“underlying assumption is that termination, possibly more
than any other optional avenue can occur in decision windows
that open and close as political, policy, and problem streams
converge… or in opportunity windows that may be induced or
enlarged by agendas and related dimensions” (p. 310) .
Impediments to termination.
‘Nonchoice’. For Geva-May, the difficulties involved in policy termination can be seen as a
good example of what we earlier termed ‘non-decisions’. Here, the ultimate exercise of
power is not to influence decisions that favour oneself; but to influence the policy agenda so
that issues that threaten you are not even put on the agenda.
Factors impeding termination:
“Politicians’ reluctance to damage an existing program apparatus,
“The initial design of the policy,
“The brutality of conflicts around an issue, and, finally,
“The dearth of effective political incentives” (p. 312).
High startup costs (think of the Duval County Courthouse).
Strategies to avoid termination.
Fake stuff. Kind of like what the conspiracy theorists think happened during the moon
landings (source).
Hide stuff. “obscurity, secrecy, and technical and scientific reputation” (p. 315).
Raise political costs. Build coalitions that will punish anyone who threatens your goats.
Financial and legal costs.
Emotional costs. Shortly after election Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels proposed
abolishing Indiana’s townships, and drastically reforming local government through
consolidation (source). As the report noted: “Indiana is blessed with a wealth of dedicated
elected officials and government employees. But because many of them work in a local
government model that dates back to the mid-1800s, they’re often hindered in their desire to
better serve their communities” (p. 8). Despite this obsolete system of local government,
the proposal went nowhere. Too many residents of townships, the smallest unit of
government in Indiana, had an emotional attachment to these places, however obsolete.
The logic of policy windows. As indicated, Geva-May sees successful termination as an agenda
setting issue, in terms of Kingdon’s policy windows. When problems, policies and politics line
up, there is an opportunity to terminate. As indicated in lecture seven, For Kingdon, three things
have to come together for a policy to get on the institutional agenda:
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Problem. An issue is identified by all (or significant number of) actors, and/or gatekeepers to
the institutional agenda (Kingdon, ch. 5).
Policy. Solutions are identified, or it is believed something can be done about the problem
(Kingdon, ch. 6).
Politics. It is in the interests of enough legislators to get a bill passed (Kingdon, ch. 7).
Strategies to terminate.
Think ahead: sunset! Include sunset clauses. The Bush administration tax cuts, for instance,
were meant to be short term. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (114 pages, just to change a percentage?) was passed on June 7, 2001. As its name
implies, it sought to do two things:
Grow the economy.
Weak before the act. The economy had been in a short recession, with growth of 0.3%
in the 3rd
quarter of 2000, 2.4% in 4th
quarter 2000, and -1.3% in 1st quarter 2001.
Weaker after the act.
The economy had returned to growth in 2nd
quarter 2000, then immediately on
enactment, slipped back to -1.1% in 3rd
quarter 2001.
Tepid subsequent growth. From 2002 through 2007, average growth was 2.6%, only
1% lower than the average 3.5% average rate of growth of the Clinton years, which
began with a tax hike.
Armageddon. Of course, the GW Bush record presented above ignores the economic
debacle of 2008-9.
Provide tax relief.
Surplus. The logic presumably was that taxes were too high. Indeed, in 2001 the US
federal government was actually taking more money from citizens in taxes than it was
paying out for public goods, running what accountants refer to as a ‘surplus’ (a sort of
rarified creature seldom seen in US federal fiscal policy) equal to 1.3% of GDP. So
citizens were ‘relieved’ of the excessive burden of this surplus, rather than using this
surplus for some frivolous purpose like paying down debt.
Debt. What wasn’t well explained at the time was why these surpluses were not
continued, given that the US had debts of some $3.5b at the time, and the previous
four years of surpluses had resulted in the debt being lowered (from 49% of GDP in
1993 to 32% in 2001.
The Act was set to expire, though, on December 21, 2010, when presumably the tax relief
and economic growth purposes were no longer relevant.
Success thresholds. Write into the program that it will expire if measures of the underlying
policy issue reach a certain level. Reduce youth crime to x,
increase job growth to y, etc.
Build coalitions. Or, given that advocates of the status quo are
building coalitions to keep the program in place, build a
counter-coalition.
Evaluation. Make your case. For all the science-bashing and
systematic spin that characterizes the current policy scene,
reality does still matter, at some level.
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Buy off opponents. Want to bring in Social Security and Medicare reform but worried about
opposition from seniors? Buy them off, exempting them from any of the pain. A problem in
this case is that my generation, the folks being bought off, have not paid our fair share into
the system. This is indicated in the graphic at the end of the previous page, which is from the
linked source.
Mind the windows. Geva-May’s broader point, though, is to be conscious of opportunities.
If a problem becomes identified as such,
a solution can be identified and accepted by a coalition, and
the political time seems right,
termination has a better chance of occurring.
*
Summary: the best laid plans will come to naught, if not effectively implemented. Civic groups
can be a key player both in facilitating successful implementation, and in causing
implementation failure.
References
Birkland, Thomas (2005). An Introduction to the Policy Process. ME Sharpe.
Boaz, David (2011). “Well worth the money.” Cato Institute. Available online.
Brewer, Garry and Peter deLeon (1983). The Foundations of Policy Analysis, Pacific Grove:
Brooks/Cole.
Gerston, Larry (2002). Public Policymaking in a Democratic Society. M. E. Sharpe.
Rice, Condoleezza (2000). "Promoting the National Interest." Foreign Affairs, 79(1), pp. 45-
62. EBSCO link.
Ricks, Thomas (2009). "Rumsfeld Gets Earful From Troops." Washington Post, 9 December,
available online.
Sabatier, Paul and Daniel Mazmanian (1980). "A conceptual framework of the implementation
process." In Stella Theodoulou and Matthew Cahn Public Policy: The essential readings,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Smith, Kevin and Christopher Larimer (2009). The Public Policy Theory Primer. Boulder:
Westview.