master thesis marketized security the impact of trans-national corporations on how sovereignty and...

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Internationale udviklingsstudier

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Projekt- eller specialetitel:

Marketized Security: The Impact of Trans-National Corporations on how Sovereignty and Rights are Configured

Projektseminar/værkstedsseminar:

Udarbejdet af (Navn(e) og studienr.): Projektets art: Modul:

Anders Høgh Andersen - 56116 Speciale K4

Gitte Højstrup Christensen - 48288 Speciale K4

Vejleders navn:

Lars Buur

Afleveringsdato:

27-07-2016

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238.128

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240.000

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Marketized Security

The Impact of Trans-National Corporations on how

Sovereignty and Rights are Configured

‘If the natives are in different worlds,

how come we can shoot them?’

– Stephen Stich

Anders Høgh Andersen & Gitte Højstrup Christensen

Master Thesis, July 2016

Global Studies, Roskilde University

Supervisor: Lars Buur

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with exploring the neoliberal marketization of security and risk, and what

consequences this marketization has for how transnational corporations affect sovereignty and

rights in weak states. It looks at the different actors involved in constructing socio-political risk,

security assemblages and inclusive-exclusion. A theoretical framework is constructed from these

theoretical concepts, which is used to explore the power relations within security configurations that

transcends states. Furthermore, this thesis explores the relationship between security measures of

transnational corporations (TNCs) and contemporary practices such as Corporate Social

Responsibility and Social License to Operate. It argues that there has been an increase in global

consumer awareness of corporate responsibility and human rights violations which has influenced

marked forces. This has resulted in an increased global consumer pressure on TNCs “forcing” them

to incorporate contemporary practices into their security measures. This development is portrayed

through expert interviews and cases studies of western based natural resource extraction companies

in Nigeria and Colombia. This thesis finds that these contemporary practices can be used to mitigate

risk, but they can also be used as a ways to control the local population by creating an inclusive

exclusion that determines whether or not one is posing a risk to the authority concerned.

Furthermore, by diffusing the sovereignty of the host countries, the security assemblages allow

TNCs to influence the authorities involved, or even to act as the sovereign authority themselves.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to express a sincere gratitude to our interviewees: Michael Nellemann Pedersen -

PKA, Bruno Kalhøj - Maersk Oil, Johnny Andersen - Vesper Group, Frederik Østerby - Guardian

Security Risk Management, Dr. Rajiv Maher, and Dr. Thomas Mandrup. The six of you gave us

valuable knowledge and insight into the security and risk management industry, which inspired us

to explore the impact contemporary business practices have on the development of the global

security market.

We would also like to extend our deepest appreciation and gratitude to our thesis supervisor: Dr.

Lars Buur, who has given us valuable guidance and support that made us push ourselves beyond

what we thought we were capable of.

As this is a written assignment it is required to emphasize the author of each chapter, please see

appendix B: „Individualization of the thesis‟, for this.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 8

1.2. Research question ...................................................................................................................... 9

1.3. Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................................ 9

Chapter 2. Methodology .................................................................................................................... 12

2.1. Clarification of concepts ......................................................................................................... 12

2.2. Interview method ..................................................................................................................... 13

2.3. Case studies ............................................................................................................................. 15

2.4. Why study Shell in Nigeria? ................................................................................................... 15

2.5. Why study Prodeco and Drummond in Colombia?................................................................. 16

2.6. Analysis strategy ..................................................................................................................... 17

2.7. Limitations............................................................................................................................... 17

Chapter 3. Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................... 19

3.1. Introduction to the Chapter...................................................................................................... 19

3.2. Security Assemblages.............................................................................................................. 19

3.3. Socio-Political Risk ................................................................................................................. 22

3.4. Inclusive-exclusion and the right to security of the person ..................................................... 26

3.5. Our outlook on contemporary configurations of Security....................................................... 29

3.6. Interim Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 31

Chapter 4. Neoliberal practices: global security and risk management ............................................. 32

4.1. Introduction to the Chapter...................................................................................................... 32

4.2. Neoliberalism .......................................................................................................................... 33

4.3. Marketization and Financialization ......................................................................................... 34

4.4. Corporate Social Responsibility: making responsible investments ........................................ 36

4.6. Social License to Operate: managing socio-political risks ..................................................... 41

4.7. Interim conclusion ................................................................................................................... 43

Chapter 5. Nigeria: the case of oil companies and private security ................................................... 45

5.1. Case introduction ..................................................................................................................... 45

5.2 Outline of the Chapter .............................................................................................................. 46

5.3 Nigeria‟s security history and the Niger Delta conflict ............................................................ 47

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5.4. Shell‟s „Other‟ security practices in the Niger Delta .............................................................. 49

5.5. Pressure from the global stakeholder community ................................................................... 52

5.6. Security assemblages ............................................................................................................... 53

5.7. Re-configuration of sovereignty and rights ............................................................................. 54

5.8. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter .......................................................................................... 56

Chapter 6. Colombia: the case of coal-mining companies and fragmented sovereignty ................... 58

6.1. Case introduction ..................................................................................................................... 58

6.2. Outline ..................................................................................................................................... 59

6.3 Background on the security situation in Colombia .................................................................. 60

6.4. Foreign Extraction Companies and Fragmented Sovereignty ................................................. 61

6.5. Security Assemblages.............................................................................................................. 65

6.6. The Danish Connection ........................................................................................................... 67

6.7. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter .......................................................................................... 69

Chapter 7. Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 72

7.1. Similarities and differences ..................................................................................................... 72

7.2. Conflicting security practices .................................................................................................. 74

7.3. Implementing soft security and practices ................................................................................ 74

7.4. Thesis shortcomings ................................................................................................................ 75

Chapter 8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 77

References .......................................................................................................................................... 78

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List of Abbreviations

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)

CSR Corporate Social Responsibility

JAAF Juan Andrés Álvarez Front

DONG Dansk Olie & Natur Gas (as in DONG Energy)

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Armed Revolutionary Forces of

Colombia)

FDI Foreign Direct Investments

FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent (of Indigenous People)

G4S Group4Securicor

GDP Gross Domestic Product

JTF Joint Task Force

MNC Mult-National Corporation

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSCDC Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps

OSL Outsourcing Services Limited

PAX Not an abbreviation – Latin for peace

PKA Pensionskassernes Administration

PMSC Private Military Security Company

PSC Private Security Company

SCIN Shell Companies In Nigeria

SLO Social License to Operate

SRM Security Risk Management (In Guardian SRM)

TAR Territory, Authority & Rights

TNC Trans-National Corporation

UN United Nations

UNGPBHR United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

UN ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

UN UDHR United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights

US United States

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Chapter 1. Introduction

In the globalized world of business, there has been an increase in attention towards stakeholder

communities1 and their effect on businesses including reputation and profitability (Matuleviciene et

al 2015; Ipsos 2011: 4). When combined with consumer awareness in western countries, it has

changed the way transnational corporations are conducting business across the world (Epstein-

Reeves 2010). Particularly, high-risk areas inflicted with violence and instability have been the

focal point for this newfound awareness. These high-risk areas are often located in countries with a

frail central authority and what are sometimes referred to as „weak‟ states. In this thesis, this type of

country is one of the central topics and we will regard weak states as states that are not necessarily

impoverished but in one way or another are not in full control of territory and not considered

legitimate by the populations. Operating in these kinds of countries often entail a high level of risk

for transnational corporations but also high rewards for those willing to endure what they consider

„great risks‟. We explore two cases which portray examples of this in our thesis, namely Nigeria

and Colombia. In these two countries, transnational companies based in the west endure great

security- and socio-political risk in pursuit of the vast riches that are made in and through the rich

natural resource endowments. Both countries also exemplify what we refer to as „weak‟ states.

Neither states are impoverished, primarily due to their natural resource extraction industries, but

both states‟ authority is being challenged by non-state actors as they struggle to provide security

provisions for both citizens and foreign corporations. To mitigate the risks involved with operating

in such countries, the transnational corporations are creating configurations of security that often

extends beyond what the state of the host country can provide (Kasali 2011: 32).

These configurations of security entail a degree of outsourcing of violence from the state to non-

state and private actors (Mandrup 2012). The different approaches to security and the involvement

of non-state and private actors beg the question of how they affect the already weak state authority

in the host countries and how the western understanding of rights translates into these new

configurations of security. Furthermore, it implies reconfigurations of sovereignty as well as the

immediate control of certain areas become contested between trans-national corporations (hereafter

TNCs), non-state actors and the state itself.

The consumer awareness previously mentioned pertains to these actors and the methods they use to

provide security provisions for the TNCs which often include the use of harsh and illicit measures.

However, global consumers are increasingly expecting western based corporations to uphold moral

guidelines for human rights and right to security found in their homeland even when operating

abroad. This puts the TNCs in a difficult situation as the host countries often work with different

moralities than those the TNCs are expected to bring with them. Whereas in the past TNCs have

been able to exploit the different morality of the weak host country government, in terms of

corruption, security measures, land and resource grabbing etc. Some will argue that the TNCs still

do this, but no longer can ignore the changing demands of stakeholder communities and marked

forces.

1 See definition of stakeholder communities in 2.1: „Clarification of Concepts‟

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This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between contemporary business practices and TNCs‟

security measures in weak states. Therefore, we present two interconnected aims in this thesis: one

is to explore the problematic associated with how market forces permeates the sphere of global

security and effects how TNCs interact with stakeholder communities. The other is to explore the

problematic concerning the reconfiguration of sovereignty and rights that take place between TNCs,

the state and private/non-state security actors.

1.2. Research question

How can we conceptualize the marketization of security and risk, and what are the

consequences of this marketization for how transnational corporations affect

sovereignty and rights in weak states?

Sub-questions:

How does neoliberalism, as a mode of governance, affect how transnational

corporations approach security and risk management?

How does marketized security affect the way transnational corporations interact with

stakeholder communities?

How do security assemblages effect the configuration of sovereignty and the right to

security?

1.3. Structure of the thesis

In order to answer our research question and sub-questions, the analysis is divided into 4 chapters,

each addressing a sub-question, where chapter 5 & 6 address the same sub-question. In the

following outline of the thesis we present the overall structure from start to finish.

Chapter 2

This chapter addresses issues of methodology with the purpose of depicting our choice of

method(s), and it explains the methodological reflections which have guided the overall research

design of the thesis. In this chapter we describe our primary and secondary empirical data and

explain our reasoning behind conducting and incorporating semi-structured expert interviews into

parts of the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter provides an outline of our case studies and argues their

relevance with regard to our research question.

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Chapter 3

This chapter focuses on explaining our choice of theory which consists of different theoretical

concepts and ideas that we define and combine into one analytical framework used to analyze the

globalized marketization of security and risk. These theoretical concepts are “socio-political risk”,

“security assemblages” and “inclusion/exclusion”.

Chapter 4

This chapter addresses the following sub-questions: „How does neoliberalism, as a mode of

governance, affect the way transnational corporations approach security and risk management?‟ We

start out by presenting our understanding of neoliberalism as a mode of governance, showing how

the field of security has undergone a certain level of marketization and financialization. From here

we move on to interpreting contemporary practices such as corporate social responsibility and

social license to operate. We argue how these practices can be seen to result from increasing global

consumer awareness and demands which in return are affecting global marked forces.

Chapters 5

This chapter addresses the following sub-questions: „How does marketized security affect the way

transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟ This chapter is a study of

security in Nigeria with a focus on the foreign oil extraction company Shell‟s operations in the

Niger delta region. It starts out with a short introduction that outlines the main problematic

addressed in the chapter. This is followed by a historical context based on the security history of

Nigeria and the negative effects associated with Shell operations in the Niger Delta. This provides

the foundation for a deeper analysis of how stakeholder communities are pressuring Shell to

incorporate the contemporary practices presented in chapter 4. From here, the chapter moves into a

more theoretical analysis of security assemblages, and what consequences Shell‟s presence and

security practices in the Niger Delta has for the configuration of sovereignty and rights.

Chapter 6

This chapter also addresses the sub-question: „How does marketized security affect the way

transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟ This chapter presents a second

case study of security in Colombia with a focus on foreign coal extraction companies Prodeco and

Drummond. As with the previous case study, this chapter starts out presenting a short introduction

that outlines the main problematic that will be addressed. From here, a historical context is

presented providing background on the security situation in Colombia. Then the case study moves

into an exploration of fragmented sovereignty and the role of foreign extraction companies in the

Cesar region. This paves the way for an analysis of the construction of security assemblages,

inclusive-exclusions and the configuration of sovereignty and rights. Based on these we make a link

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to the transnational corporation DONG Energy, and explore how Danish consumers and media have

affected the practices of this TNC.

Chapter 7

This chapter discusses the findings of the case studies and addresses the sub-question: ‟How do

security assemblages effect the configuration of sovereignty and the right to security?‟ It starts out

by comparing the similarities and differences between the two cases, focusing on the construction

of security assemblages and the actors involved. Next we argue how TNCs seem to be portraying

contradictory security practices, due to pressure from stakeholder communities. This leads to a

discussion of the implementation of soft security and contemporary practices, arguing how these are

increasingly becoming integrated parts of the product in some companies‟ business strategies and

images. This chapter ends with a discussion and reflections on the analytical shortcomings of the

thesis.

Chapter 8

This chapter constitutes the conclusion of our thesis, where we synthesize our findings pertaining to

answering the main research question.

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Chapter 2. Methodology

To be able to answer our research question and sub-questions, we have chosen to combine two

different types of qualitative research methods: semi-structured expert interviews, and case studies.

This has provided us with a holistic understanding of the development of the global security scene

through a wide range of perspectives, ranging from boots on the ground and academic experts to

transnational corporations. The semi-structured expert interviews are our only source of primary

empirical data, whereas we include several different secondary sources of qualitative data such as

books, academic articles, journals, NGO reports, news websites and written court testimonies. This

last mentioned source of secondary data is primarily applied in the Colombia case study with regard

to the Drummond examples. Furthermore, in the Nigeria case study the Shell example incorporates

leaked quantitative data released by Wikileaks. We have chosen to include this type of unverified

data with a level of apprehension, but also in combination with verified data to obtain a higher

degree of validity in our major arguments and claims.

2.1. Clarification of concepts

In order to understand how the research question should be understood and what the analysis will

encompass, we will start by providing a clarification of the main concepts used in the research

question and the sub-questions.

Marketization: we use this concept as an umbrella term which refers to „[t]he exposure of an

industry or service to market forces‟ (Oxford dictionaries 2016), which in this thesis is the security

industry. Furthermore, marketization of the security industry is referred to as marketized security.

By this, we argue that market forces have introduced consumer awareness, demand and supply

logic, and stakeholder community relations into the security industry. This will be further explained

in chapter 4.

Stakeholder Communities: in this thesis we utilize the conceptualization by Boutilier and

Thomson (2011) to describe stakeholder communities as those „affected by the actions of a

company or who could have an effect on the company‟ (2). As we will explain in chapter 4, we

argue that TNCs affect two types of communities: at their home country and in host countries where

they operate. Therefore, the concept of „stakeholder community‟ refers to both types of

communities.

Weak State: we realize that the term „weak state‟ is highly politicized but in this thesis we will

refer to states with fragmented authority as „weak‟. By fragmented authority we refer to countries

that are not fully in control of the territory and population. Therefore, the concept will refer to

lacking or no authority in certain geographical areas of the country in question without any political

connotations.

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2.2. Interview method

In order to understand and explore the development of the global security and risk marked, we

deemed it necessary to collect empirical data about different practices and experiences within this

field. For this, expert interviews seemed most suitable, as these would allow us to gain insight into

the interviewees‟ perspectives on their lived world. This goes in line with Kvale‟s (1983)

description of a qualitative interview as „an interview, whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the

life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described

phenomena‟ (174). More specifically, we chose to conduct semi-structured interviews with all the

interviewees because these entail a fairly open framework allowing for focused, conversational,

two-way communication. This follows Kvale and Brinkmann‟s (2009) social constructivist notion

of a semi-structured interview being an interview, where knowledge is constructed through the

interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (3).

We conducted six semi-structured expert interviews ranging from forty-five minutes to one and a

half hours in duration, with both academic experts and private actors who to one degree or another

effect and are affected by changes and developments in global socio-political risks and security.

The interviewees were primarily chosen through our personal and work-related networks. We

selected these academics and private company actors based on their relationship to global security

and risk, be it strictly academic, in connection with a risk assessment or private security firm, or as

the company employee concerned with making responsible investments abroad. The purpose of

interviewing such a diverse range of actors was to gather different types of knowledge about the

security field and the global marketization of security and risk. Furthermore, it was through these

semi-structured interviews that concepts such as CSR and SLO were brought up in connection with

security and risk management. This inspired us to explore the relationship between these

contemporary practices and the development of the global security market.

We chose to interview six representatives from three different lines of work concerned with global

security and risk. It was important for us to have two experts representing each field of study in

order to ensure coherence and to confirm and strengthen the validity of arguments. To represent

academic experts on security and risk, we interviewed Dr Thomas Mandrup, from the Royal Danish

Defense College, who specializes in the privatization of security (PMSCs) and issues of state

sovereignty with a focus on Africa. The other academic expert we interviewed was Dr Rajiv Maher,

who specializes in CSR, business and human rights, as well as conflict between natives and

extractive/natural resource projects. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with two

representatives from the private security industry who work for companies that supply security and

risk services of different kinds to TNCs and governments. One was analytics officer Frederik

Østerby from Guardian Security Risk Management,2 a private company that provides risk

2 http://www.guardian-srm.com/about/

http://www.guardian-srm.com/about/

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assessments for different types of client all around the world. The other was private security

contractor and team leader Johnny Andersen from Vesper Group,3 a Swedish-based company that

offers both boots on the ground and risk assessments, and is currently in charge of all operational

security (protection, transportation, etc.) at the Danish embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Our third

type of interviewee was representatives from Danish-based private corporations involved in global

business ventures and investments. One of these interviewees was investment director Michael

Nellemann Pedersen from PKA,4 a Danish pension fund that makes investments in close

cooperation with a security and risk management companies to ensure a stable and corporate

responsible return for its members. The other interviewee was Bruno Kalhøj, head of security and

crisis management at Mærsk Oil,5 an international privately owned company that has several oil

extraction partnerships around the world. Appendix A provides the general interview guide we used

during all six interviews however separate questions were added to the guide for each interview,

based on the interviewee‟s line of work and expertise area.

In the thesis we have chosen to reference the interviewees as such: (surname, year, time). Time

referring to the exact moment in the interview where the given quote or argument was expressed.

Furthermore, due to exchanges of confidential information during some of the interviews, we have

chosen not to make the sound files publically available, but these can be forwarded via e-mail upon

request. Despite this, all the interviewees agreed to let us record the, as well as to letting us usetheir

names and company/work affiliations. This might have added both positive and negative values to

the thesis. The positive value refers to the level of transparency and validity their testimonies holds,

as anyone would be able to contact them afterwards to confirm the quotes and answers depicted in

this thesis. This also portrays the negative value that refers to the responsibility that comes with not

being anonymous which, might affect the interviewees‟ willingness to speak completely freely

about certain things.

All six interviewees are experts within different parts of the security and risk field, and are all high-

level employees in their departments. We purposely chose to interview representatives at similar

employment levels with high levels of responsibility, experience and insider knowledge about the

global security and risk management industry. This arguably makes their testimonies more

compatible with one another. Had we chosen to interview mid-level employees, we might not have

been able to gain the needed insight knowledge for our analysis. Furthermore, both of the academic

experts, Mandrup and Maher, are state employees which arguably allows them to speak more freely

about the negative effects of transnational companies and private security. Our other four

interviewees, by contrast, are all employed by private companies and work with security and risk

management in their daily jobs. This might have had an influence on how willing they were to

criticize their own industry and/or employer. An example of this is that Maersk Oil required they be

3 http://www.vespergroup.se/

4 https://www.pka.dk/

5 http://www.maerskoil.com/about-us/Pages/about-us.aspx

http://www.vespergroup.se/

https://www.pka.dk/

http://www.maerskoil.com/about-us/Pages/about-us.aspx

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allowed to read and approve the quotes we used from the interview with their head of security and

crisis management, Bruno Kalhøj, before publication.

2.3. Case studies

Because the aim of this thesis is primarily exploratory we have chosen to incorporate qualitative

case studies, as these can be seen as „an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a

phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources‟ (Baxter & Jack 2008: 544). To make

the two case studies compatible with one another, we have constructed similar research designs for

both cases, which make it easier to compare and contrast. The purpose of doing so is that it allows

us to identify potential global tendencies. Furthermore, as it is essential to reflect upon our own

effect on the construction of meaning during the interviews, this is also goes for incorporating case

studies. So in line with Lund‟s (2014) methodological reflections, we acknowledge that these cases

are produced by our investigations of them, based on the analytical and theoretical lens that we have

chosen to apply (230).

Furthermore, our case studies build upon Gluckman‟s (1961) idea of the extended case method,

where he argues that

the most fruitful use of cases consists in taking a series of specific incidents affecting

the same persons or groups, through a long period of time, and showing … [the]

change of social relations among these persons and groups, within the framework of

their social system and culture. (10)

This type of method is concerned with providing detailed analyses of social processes wherein

individual strategies and choices reveal the context of everyday life. We found this especially

relevant in our analysis of how TNC effect the (re)configuration of rights, which is an essential part

of our thesis aim.

Each case study is based on a non-western state with extensive histories of violence, corruption and

weak government. Furthermore, we have chosen these two states based on the fact that they located

on different continents and are both rich in natural resources, which for decades have attracted

foreign, especially western, transnational natural resource extraction corporations. Another essential

aspect which inspired us to incorporate these two states is that they are both examples of states in

which there exists a wide range different types of non-state security actors. Each case study will be

used to explore the relationship between the state, foreign extraction companies and private/non-

state actors. Furthermore, we will use our case studies to discuss how the security practices of

foreign TNCs have increasingly become affected by market forces and contemporary stakeholder

communities.

2.4. Why study Shell in Nigeria?

The fact that Shell is a western-based TNC that operates in a high-risk area within a weak state in

and of itself makes for an interesting case study of security configuration and sovereignty. As of

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2016 Shell is the seventh largest company in the world measured by revenue (Google Finance

2016), a strong indicator of the TNC‟s immense economic influence and power. Because of this,

much has been written and recorded about Shell and its operations abroad. In particular, its strong

presence in the Niger Delta has received much attention from scholars, NGOs, investors, media, etc.

Up until the leakage of data in 2012, Shell had managed to keep its true security spending in

Nigeria from reaching the public. Furthermore, given this TNC‟s long and dominant history in the

Niger Delta, it seems relevant to use Shell as an example of the complex relationships between

foreign oil companies and public/private security. Furthermore, we want to explore to what degree

the co-dependency between Shell and the Nigerian government influences the configuration of

security, sovereignty and rights in the Niger Delta.

2.5. Why study Prodeco and Drummond in Colombia?

Our initial interest in Drummond‟s and Prodeco‟s coal-mining operations in Cesar, Colombia,

began when the Danish energy company DONG Energy was accused by a Dutch NGO, of having

bought „blood-coal‟ from Colombia. The accusation was brought to the attention of the Danish

public by various news outlets and caused a debate on responsibility, as well as whether DONG had

undertaken due diligence with their CSR programs. A further investigation of the case revealed how

the two coal-mining companies had funded and used paramilitary forces to provide security in and

around their mines in Colombia, particularly in the period from 1996 to 2006. The primary cause of

instability and violence was a left-wing insurgency, which the Colombian government tried to

combat by allowing the formation of paramilitary forces, which in turn became protectors of

capitalist ventures such as the coal mines. This highly volatile situation created an intricate division

of sovereignty and authority in the Cesar region and is a significant part of the reason why we chose

to examine this case. Another interesting aspect of this case, however, is how DONG Energy was

affected by what happened in Cesar, even though it had nothing to do with the atrocities committed

by the paramilitary forces. The case then becomes an example of how local events have global

effects through assemblages and how the configuration of these assemblages defines what governs

the actors within the assemblage.

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2.6. Analysis strategy

To provide a better understanding of our analysis strategy, we have constructed an overview table

depicting what empirical data, theoretical concepts and method(s) that are combined and applied in

the four analytical chapters.

2.7. Limitations

When conducting research for a large-scale project, one will often encounter certain limitations

associated with access, time frame and geographical location. We too have encountered all of these

in our research, which has influenced the direction we ended up going in. First of all, it is important

to reflect upon the limitations of case studies, and as Levy (2008) argues, „it is important to note

that “case” is not equivalent to observations‟ (3). Ideally, we would have preferred to be able to

travel to both Colombia and Nigeria to visit the Cesar region mines and Niger Delta oil wells. This

would have enabled us to observe the operation sites at first hand to gather our own empirical data

and acquire in-person impressions of scale, environment, attitudes etc. Also, it would have been of

great benefit to have been granted access to interview Shell and Drummond and/or Prodeco

employees and security personnel, as well as representatives of the local communities living side by

side with these extraction sites. Additionally, it would have been very interesting to have been able

How can we conceptualize the marketization of security and risk, and what are the consequences of this marketization

for how transnational corporations affect sovereignty and rights in weak states?

Chapter 4 5 & 6 7

Sub-question How does neoliberalism,

as a mode of governance,

affect how transnational

corporations approach

security and risk

management?

How does marketized

security affect the way

transnational corporations

interact with stakeholder

communities?

How do security

assemblages effect the

configuration of

sovereignty and the right

to security?

Empirical Data Interviews, academic

literature

NGO reports, academic

literature, legal documents,

leaked data

Findings from Chapters 5

and 6, academic literature

Theoretical Concepts Practices of governance,

socio-political risk

Assemblages, socio-

political risk, sovereignty,

inclusive-exclusions

Assemblages, sovereignty,

rights, inclusive-

exclusions

Method Semi-structured expert

interviews. Compiling and

comparison with academic

literature

Extended case study

method. Analyzing using

the theoretical framework

and findings of Chapter 4

Discussion. Comparing

and contrasting

similarities and

differences

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to interview key politicians from each country to acquire a better understanding of their perceptions

of the costs and benefits associated with having foreign extraction companies operate in their

respective countries. However, due to the high level of security threats associated with the natural

resource extraction sites and their surrounding areas in both Nigeria and Colombia, travelling there

to conduct fieldwork was unfortunately not a viable option. However, we contacted DONG, which

has only recently terminated its business with Prodeco, and asked to be granted an interview.

Unfortunately, this request was denied, and we were instead referred to an official statement

recently posted on DONG‟s website with regard to a recent case linking Prodeco to human rights

violations in the Cesar region of Colombia. Another aspect which we encountered as a limitation at

an early stage in our research is the lack of useful data on similar cases around the world. Therefore,

instead of incorporating many different case studies into our analysis, we chose to go in-depth with

two different, but in many ways also similar case studies: of Shell in Nigeria and Prodeco and

Drummond in Colombia. The latter was inspired by the contested business relationship with DONG

Energy.

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Chapter 3. Theoretical framework

3.1. Introduction to the Chapter

In this chapter we outline the theoretical framework that will be used in the thesis. This is built up

around three main analytical concepts: „security assemblages‟, „socio-political risk‟, „and inclusive

exclusion‟. While the two first concepts concern the first part of our research question on

conceptualizing marketized security and risk, „inclusive exclusion‟ and the right to security of

person‟ pertains to the last part of the research question concerning how transnational corporations

affect rights and sovereignty in weak states. Both examples from Nigeria and Colombia concern

local security situations with global ramifications for the TNCs involved. The security situations in

the two countries then become multi-sited, as foreign companies try to arrange the security situation

to their advantage. The theoretical concept of security assemblages, we suggest, allows us to

analyze local settings that are affected by, and effect, a larger global setting. We will use the

concept of security assemblages to analyze how different security actors are related and affect one

another. This will be followed by a presentation of the concept socio-political risk. The term „risk‟

has many different associations, and in this chapter we present some of these ideas and the types of

risk they pertain to, and combining them to come up with a suitable conceptualization that fits the

research problem this thesis addresses. The two concepts of security assemblages and socio-

political risk help us conceptualize the marketization of security, while the last concepts of inclusive

exclusion will, we suggest, enable us to understand the consequences such marketization has on

rights and sovereignty. Furthermore, in this thesis, the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics refers to

Agamben‟s idea of life being politicized through a process of inclusive exclusion, which is what can

be seen as the nucleus of sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Addressing sovereignty as such

allows us to dislocate sovereignty from pertaining to the state alone.

3.2. Security Assemblages

Analyzing global security assemblages requires a variegated understanding of power. It also

demands an appreciation of the particular place of security in modern politics, where its

status as a public good is one of the central institutional features and legitimating principles

of the sovereign state. (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 101)

This part of the thesis describes our conceptualization of the term ‘security assemblages’, which we

will use to provide substantial theoretical value to the description of contemporary security

governance arrangements. Our argument is that literature that has inspired theories of „security

assemblages‟ seem to be split into two main schools of thought, both of which emerged as a

response to global neoliberalism. One school seems to argue that the increased outsourcing to

private actors in contemporary forms of governance can be viewed as a neo-colonial wave that

especially weakens the power and authority of fragile states (Mandrup 2012) and might eventually

lead to the end of the sovereign nation state (Mandrup 2016; Levi 2002; Guéhenno 1995; Ohmae

1995). The other school seems to argue that privatization and outsourcing is a type of indirect

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governance used by weak states to regain control over their populations and territories (Abrahamsen

and Leander 2016; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Hönke 2010, 2008; Sassen 2006, 2008). Both

schools of thought raise interesting and relevant arguments for the objective of this thesis, but

scholars within the latter school especially will be used to define our understanding of the

phenomenon of security assemblages.

To fully conceptualize the term security assemblages, we will start with the idea of an assemblage,

taking our point of departure in Abrahamsen and Leander‟s definition:

[…] as a descriptive term, assemblage captures these new geographies of power that are

simultaneously global and national, public and private: diverse hybrid structures that inhibit

national settings but are stretched across national boundaries in terms of actors, knowledges,

technologies, norms and values. (2016: 134)

With this in mind, it is essential to mention that no grand theory or methodology regarding

assemblages exists, but most of our understanding of this phenomenon is embedded in Saskia

Sassen‟s conceptualizations related to Territory, Authority and Rights (TAR) (2006: 4). Sassen

describes TAR as „complex institutionalizations constituted through specific processes and arising

out of struggles and competing interests‟ (2006: 4-5). Following this trail of thought, Abrahamsen

and Williams (2010: 92) argue that „the process of partial state disassembly has been crucial to the

rise of private security‟. This means that:

in the field of security, the result of these processes of disassembly and reassembly has been

the formation of complex, multi-sited institutional orders – global security assemblages –

where a range of different security agents interact, cooperate and compete to produce new

practices and structures of security governance (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 95).

This description is significant for our understanding of security assemblages, because it implies that

these components (TAR) – what the territory is, who the authorities are, and what the right becomes

– are not static, but rather subject to change when new actors and interests enter the national sphere

– an idea that will be further scrutinized and elaborated on in our examples and analyses. Sassen‟s

three components of TAR are traditionally viewed as part of the Westphalian nation-state domain

(Sassen 2006, 2008; Hönke 2010; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010), or what Hönke (2010: 105)

more specifically calls „the Weberian ideal-type “Anstaltsstaat”‟, where the:

national sovereign gains exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time that

territory is constructed as coterminous with that authority […] this in turn gives the

sovereign the possibility of functioning as the exclusive grantor of rights. (Sassen 2006: 6)

However, Sassen argues that, due to neoliberal market power and globalization, the entry of new

international private actors is causing a reconfiguration of the traditional understanding of TAR.

With this argument, Sassen portrays globalization as a „process of realignment‟ (Abrahamsen 2016:

133) within the state, rather than a process of external forces decomposing the state from within, as

academics within the second school of neocolonialism have argued. Sassen, through Abrahamsen

and Williams, describes the reconfiguration of TAR as a three-step process:

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a process of „disassembly‟ in which previously public functions are increasingly transferred

to private actors; the development of „capacities‟ by private actors that allow them to act at a

global level; and a process of „reassembly‟ whereby these new actors and capabilities

become part of global assemblages that are embedded in national settings but operate on a

global scale. (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010: 91)

The increase of private actors in the global security market does not lead to a disappearing or

weakening of the state, but rather a disassembly of the national leading to the „emergence of new

types of orderings that coexist with older orderings [where] particular components of the state have

actually gained power because they have to do the work of implementing policies necessary for a

global corporate economy‟ (Sassen 2008: 63). This point is especially relevant for the focus of this

thesis, because it suggests, in line with Hönke‟s argument (2010: 106), that the extended role of

private corporate actors in security governance can be seen as a new type of „indirect governance‟

by „quasi-outsourcing‟ local governance from the host state to the home states of private actors and

multinational companies.

A useful example of a security assemblage is airport security. These assemblages involve both

national and transnational regulatory networks and are enforced by both private and state actors.

Furthermore, this specific example of a security assemblage operates in an area that transcends the

traditional boundaries of what are public and private spaces. The airport itself can be privately

operated, but the border of the nation it is located in is the state‟s domain and is regulated by official

government security forces. At the same time, private security companies regulate other domains of

the airport, such as shops, passenger screening etc. Regulations are also divided into their different

aspects, as on the one hand there are the national regulations of the country in which the airport is

located, while on the other hand there are international regulations regarding flight security

internationally.

In the same way, any actor that deals with international relations of any kind must be aware of the

different security assemblages that exist within its field, taking into account the regulations in its

home country, the applicable international regulations, and the regulations of the country it is

operating in.

In summary, our understanding of security assemblages implies a reconfiguration (disassembly and

reassembly) of power between the state and private/non-state actors. However, this does not mean

that the state necessarily experiences a weakening of its authority, but rather a decentralization and

outsourcing of certain aspects of power and authority to the private sphere. Also, security

assemblages are not one-sided but can be seen as sources of security that can be constructed as

being both in opposition to the state, serving only private interests, and also often as an integrated

part of state governance.

Taking this idea to a global level implies that global security governance is no longer solely focused

on the security apparatus of monolithic states, and that it has moved away from the traditional

Westphalian understanding of state security and security in general (Schouten 2013: 84; Sassen

2006).

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We will use this understanding of security assemblages when we analyze our two examples from

Nigeria and Colombia concerning local security situations in which the fact that foreign companies

operate in the two countries has global ramifications for rights. Therefore, the purpose of

incorporating this theoretical concept is to use it to look at security as multi-sited hybrid structures

that depart from local settings. So, instead of focusing on rigid outlines of institutional and spatial

definitions of security constructs, our understanding of security assemblages allows us to

investigate security situations in multi-sited settings and to analyze how these security situations

affect corporations, citizens, and states across borders through (re-)configuration of norms, values

and actors.

3.3. Socio-Political Risk

In recent times, there has been a significant increase in political risk for MNCs

[multinational corporations]. This is true not only for an MNC‟s operations in developing

countries, but also for those in developed countries. Governments have felt the need to

respond to various pressure groups aimed at curbing the power of MNCs. (Hood and Nawaz

2004: 9)

Several authors writing about forecasting and managing political risk have argued that certain types

of risk associated with war, local conflict or expropriation are essential elements of risk assessment

and management for foreign direct investments (FDI) (Frynas and Mellahi 2003; Moran 1998;

Herring 1983). Moran argues that „the need of international investors and financial institutions to

provide effective tools and strategies to manage risks and uncertainties of an extra-commercial

nature remains high‟ (1998: 1). The concept of „political risk‟ is ambiguous, with an array of

diversified definitions and emphasis (Kansal 2015; Kobrin 1979). Frynas and Mellahi argue that

„political risk is an important part of the international business literature, but as a concept, it is

difficult to define, and even more difficult to express in figures‟ (2003: 545). Kansal (2015) further

argues that its „obscurity is beneficial as it presents a scope to tailor the concept of political risk to

include, and attempt to mitigate, risks which may be specific to only a particular economy, sector or

a firm‟.

Even the concept of „risk‟ in and of itself has been defined within many different fields of study and

through different contexts (Douglas 2013; Sottilotta 2013; Beck 2009; Jarvis 2007; Shubik 1998).

As Beck argues, „[s]ociety is founded and administered on the basis of the ambiguity of risk‟ (2009:

6). Therefore, to use the concept as an analytical tool in our case studies and throughout the overall

analysis and discussion, a specification is needed. We have chosen primarily to use the concept of

socio-political risk throughout this project, which refers to a combination of political, financial and

social risks that are all interlinked and part of security assemblages – what the assemblages address.

We have chosen to combine these elements and merge them into one conceptual constellation

because they are impossible to separate from one another when trying to answer the research

question.

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To explain how we understand socio-political risk, it is useful to take a step back and start by

defining the concept of „risk‟ as it has been described by other scholars, because it is from these

definitions that our understanding of socio-political risk has been constructed. Shubik argued that:

Risk is only defined in the context of a specific goal structure. It cannot be assessed

independently from purpose. Probabilities or the possibility of the occurrence of an event

exists independent of purpose. The risk to an individual given that something occurs

depends upon that individual‟s goals and resources. (1983: 134)

Other, more contemporary scholars, such as Frynas and Mellahi, who come out of the CSR

literature, adopt a more business- and firm-specific approach to their definition of risk, which they

argue:

is not a tangible thing but a bundle of expectations concerning potential future instability

that have a market value and determine future earnings. In other words, risk is a subjective

perception of how instability may affect the firm, and it is assessed to predict the likelihood

of different types of instability. (2003: 545)

Some of the more prominent and widely recognized definitions of „risk‟ come from the world of

sociology and anthropology, having been put forward by scholars such as Ulrich Beck and Mary

Douglas. The conceptualizations of risk by these two scholars differ significantly, due to the

objectives of each definition. Douglas links contemporary risk with danger and taboo, and argues

that „the modern concept of risk […] is invoked to protect individuals against encroachments of

others‟ (2013: 28, 18). These are interesting definitions, which arguably refer to a „staging of risk‟,

implying that perceptions of certain types of risk are socially constructed through articulation, rather

than through objectively measurable assessments. This also implies that what is considered a risk is

not necessarily physically dangerous.

Beck argues that „chance and danger‟ are the key components of contemporary understandings of

risk, and contends that „the semantics of risk refers to the present thematization of future threats that

are often a product of the successes of civilization‟, and further, that, „through risk, the arrogant

assumption of controllability – but perhaps also the wisdom of uncertainty – can increase in

influence‟ (2009: 4, 5). For Beck, the introduction of globalization can be seen as a challenge to

state territoriality and sovereignty by weakening the state‟s and citizens‟ authority to act

independently and separately. According to Jarvis, Beck sees globalization as a phenomenon that

de-nationalises markets, creates international patterns of competition for foreign investment

and forces the state to respond to an international rather than purely domestic constituency.

The state‟s source of legitimacy is primarily internal, yet much of its material needs can be

realised only through external economic interaction. (Jarvis 2007: 26)

These arguments are relevant because they say something about how the development of modern

society by means of globalization is edging on and providing meaning to contemporary ideas of

risk. As Douglas states, „a risk is not only the probability of an event but also the probable

magnitude of its outcome‟ (Douglas 2013: 31).

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Although our understanding and use of the concept of socio-political risk has its starting point in

Douglas‟s and Beck‟s definitions of risk, it also draws heavily upon Frynas and Mellahi‟s (2003)

contemporary understanding of political risk linked to the financialization of security, in addition to

Hood and Nasaw‟s (2004) suggestion of how political risk may be defined as a „particular exposure

to risk which depends on the actions of a government, and its assessment or analysis for a TNC is a

decision-making tool for investing in foreign countries‟ (ibid.: 12). When combined in the way we

have presented it here, these ideas and definitions can act as theoretical tools used to conceptualize

the marketization of security and risk by linking socio-political risk management to the re-

configuration of rights and sovereignty. This link will become clearer by the end of this chapter,

when all the theoretical concepts and analytical perspectives have been presented and combined.

However, first we must expand upon our understanding and use of the notion of socio-political risk.

One of the main interests of this thesis is how socio-political risk is generated, and its connection to

the marketization and privatization of security. Therefore, one more theoretical concept will be

useful to add to the equations, which is Gidden‟s idea of „professional expertize‟ (1990: 27). This

idea also forms part of our understanding of socio-political risk assessment and management, and it

plays a significant role in our data analysis. Giddens argues that „the systems in which the

knowledge of experts is integrated influence many aspects of what we do in a continuous way‟

(1990: 27). This means that „non-experts‟ trust and rely on „experts‟ establishing systems that

integrate acceptable socio-political risk-levels, „but if there is disagreement amongst those

possessing expert knowledge the lay actors need to decide which experts to trust‟ (Linsley and

Shrives 2009: 494). This is where, in some (weak) states, the government‟s police, as the designated

and traditional experts on security and risk, have in some cases lost out to the expertise of private

security companies (Lupton 1999). This means that, when such disagreements appear between the

experts and non-experts, it can result in a redefinition of existing norms by „norm entrepreneurs‟

(Krahman 2013: 55-57; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895), who consist of both the non-experts

who initiate the change in norms, as well as the new private actors who are offering an alternative to

the norm, which in this project are private security companies, involving:

those moments of rupture and possible transformation when social actors re-appropriate new

norms, such as to enable new subjectivities to enter the public sphere and to alter the very

meaning of claims making in the public sphere itself. This is the promise of democratic

iterations and cosmopolitan norms in the present. (Benhabib 2009: 701)

Bigo adds to this argument by suggesting that invoking security and risk should be made plausible

through

a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease [...] larger than that of

police organizations in that it includes, on one hand private corporations and organizations

[...] and, on the other hand, intelligence services and some military people [...] a node

connecting many competing networks responding to many groups of people who are

identified as a risk. (2002: 64)

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Aitken suggests that risk assessment markets „seek to mobilize forms of everyday and non-

specialized knowledge‟ (2011: 124), an argument based on what Hayek referred to in 1945 as

„particular circumstances of time and place‟ (Hayek 1945: 521). Aitken combines Giddens‟ and

Hayek‟s ideas on the construction of expert knowledge, and uses them to explain the

financialization of security. He further emphasizes how the financialization of security, which

builds on non-expert knowledge, constitutes an attempt to commodify insecurity: „the attempt to

mobilize not expertise but forms of everyday experience‟ (Aitken 2011: 125). This matches

Gidden‟s idea of expert knowledge, implying that non-experts construct their own risk knowledges

through local encounters and observations. Therefore non-experts are continually making

assessments concerning the credibility of experts‟ risk knowledge, based on their own experiences

(Lupton 1999; Linsley and Shrives 2008). If these assessments differ too much from the expert

assessments, non-experts will turn to other sources of knowledge, which are often in the private

sector. In this way, private security companies become the new expert systems on risk assessments

and risk management. This is especially evident in weak states, where there are high levels of

corruption in government forces, and the state as the intended arena for expert systems on risk and

security is unable to provide security for its own citizens or for firms operating within its territory. It

is especially under such circumstances that private security contractors are increasing in numbers

and gaining legitimacy through risk management.

In summary, our conceptualization of what we have coined „socio-political risk‟ can be used to

provide substantial analytical value to the description of contemporary security governance

arrangements. One of the main focuses of this project is how transnational corporations (TNCs)

manage socio-political risks, and therefore we will, for the most part, refer to cross-border risks as

socio-political risks because these combined terms include the different aspects of risk that are

deemed most relevant for the focus of this thesis. Furthermore, we use the term in a holistic way,

which includes any risk that is the product of national and/or international changes in the business

environment, meaning social risk, political risk and government policy risk. This implies that the

concept of socio-political risk is an umbrella term that for the most part is firm-specific, given the

contextual significance of a company‟s own assets and capabilities, and especially the geographical

location of its operations, which affect the types or risks it faces.

Socio-political risk acts like a red thread throughout the thesis and is what ties all the different

theoretical and analytical components together. Therefore, we will apply our conceptualization of

socio-political risk as an analytical tool to explore how it plays a key role in the long-term business

strategies of TNCs when operating or investing in weak states. This applies to both of our examples

from Nigeria and Colombia. Furthermore, we will use this concept to link the main actors involved

in the configuration and re-configurations of global security. Socio-political risk will also be used to

explore how new discourses on risk are constructed and produced in the interplay between states,

civil society organizations, corporations and PSCs. The concept of socio-political risk thus points

towards the primary relationship that evolves between actors in the security assemblage and is what

connects the home state and the host state for TNCs.

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3.4. Inclusive-exclusion and the right to security of the person

To answer our research question, we also need to look at how TNCs use of private security affects

the configuration of rights and sovereignty. By rights, we refer to the right to security as inscribed

in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3, which reads: „Everyone has the right

to life, liberty and security of person‟ (UN UDHR, Article 3).

In 1966 further additions were made in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Article 9:

[…] No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of

his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established

by law. (UN ICCPR, Article 9)

As such, our understanding of the right to security is that is provides a basic acknowledgement of a

person‟s right to his or her own freedom under the auspices of the law. This leads us to the

sovereignty part of our research question. It is our presumption that hitherto the right to security is

something that has been provided by the sovereign state through its monopoly on violence. As Max

Weber suggested, this is what constitutes the state as the:

only human Gemeinschaft which lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of

physical force. However, this monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area, and in fact

this limitation to a particular area is one of the things that defines a state. (Weber, 2015:

136)

But as our research question suggests, we presume that the notion of the state being the sole

provider of security in function of a right is no longer applicable in the age of globalization. A

reconfiguration of the state and of rights does not necessarily mean that the state is no longer

relevant, but we do need to theorize beyond the state and look more holistically at rights and

sovereignty. To explore this further, we will incorporate Agamben‟s concept of inclusive exclusion.

In considering how mechanisms of exclusion work, we will utilize Giorgio Agamben‟s ideas on

what constitutes sovereignty.6 Agamben rejects Foucault‟s idea of sovereignty as an archaic entity

that exists in modern biopolitics and argues that „the production of a biopolitical body is the original

activity of sovereign power. In this sense biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception‟

(Agamben 1998: 11).

As such, Agamben seeks to understand sovereignty at its core, and „bare life‟ is central to this

understanding. „Bare life‟ is simply biological life, and Agamben argues that it „has the peculiar

6 Agamben extends the examination of sovereignty found in Georges Bataille, Carl Schmitt and others through the lens

of Foucault and his concept of biopolitics (Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 16).

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privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men‟ (ibid.: 12), that is, what became

those with access to citizenship.7

This form of „inclusive exclusion‟ is important, and Agamben goes back to ancient Greece, arguing

that the ancient Greeks had no single word for life; rather, they had two – bios and zoē. Zoē referred

to what we have so far called „bare life‟, a life of mere reproductive value and what is common in

all life, be it animals, men, or gods (Agamben 1998: 9). Bios, on the other hand, pertains to the

proper way of living – a qualified life.8 If we return to the notion of the city of men, bios would

describe the life of the free citizens, whereas zoē would be the common denominator in all life in

the city.9 To Aristotle, though, the bare life had a capacity for more, as he wrote: „born with regard

to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life‟ (Agamben 1998: 9). And it was this idea

of the connection between the bare life and the good life that led Michel Foucault to conceptualize

biopolitics. Foucault wrote:

For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional

capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence

as a living being into question. (Foucault 1978: 143)

Thus there is a connection between present-day politics and life, what Foucault conceptualizes as

biopolitics. Agamben sees this connection between life and politics as the incorporation of zoē into

the polis, or as the politicization of bare life, and it is within this connection that he suggests the

necessity for analyzing present-day politics and its inherent oppositions (Agamben 1998: 10). Left

vs Right, Private vs Public, Absolutism vs Democracy – these are some of the dominant oppositions

that constitute modern western politics, and it is only, Agamben suggests, through the perspective

of biopolitics – the link between bare life and politics – that we can understand what governs

modern politics (ibid.).

But as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Agamben rejects Foucault‟s idea of sovereign power as

being archaic. Instead he proposes that the link between life and politics is where true sovereign

power exists (Agamben 1998: 11). The inclusion of life into politics is the nucleus of sovereign

power. Its inclusion into modern politics happens through an exclusion where political life is

created by excluding bare life from politics. The link between bare life and politics exists when the

two oppose each other but still remain related in this very opposition. Hence bare life is included in

politics by an exclusion.

7 By „city of men‟, Agamben refers back to Antiquity, when the city consisted of free men and citizens, but excluded

the plebs, women, slaves, and other forms of „bare life‟ from the political community, even though they were still a

crucial part of the economy.

8 Plato made a distinction between three types of bios: the political life (bios politikos), the philosophical life (bios

theōrētikos), and the life of pleasure (bios apolaustikos), all three being lives of purpose and qualification (Agamben

1998: 9).

9 The plebs, women, slaves, etc. did not live up to the standards of bios for each their own reason.

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Rights, and the right to security of person, is found in the politicized life (Agamben 1998: 11-13).

In antiquity, rights were given to those who lived a qualified life, to use Plato‟s terminology, but in

modern politics rights are created through an inclusive exclusion. A person is given rights by being

included in the political life, but these rights can be taken away if the person does not qualify for a

political life. Just as inscribed in the UN ICCPR, Article9, presented in the beginning of this sub-

chapter, an individual‟s right to security of the person can be removed if that person violates a

written law. Living outside the law means exclusion from political life and the removal of certain

rights. In this thesis, we will utilize the idea of rights as an inclusive exclusion that is built upon the

concept of biopolitics to analyze the configuration of rights. This allows us to look at rights as both

juridical written laws and institutionalized ideas, but it also allows us to examine rights beyond the

realm of the state. In his book Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that the nation state cannot be

circumvented when it comes to understanding rights and sovereignty (Agamben 1998: 75-76), but

our hypothesis denotes a state-only focus. We will instead adopt the idea that true sovereign power

can be found in the link between life and politics (biopolitics) and utilized beyond the realm of the

state. We will look at assemblages of security and find the biopolitics within to analyze how

sovereignty might have been reconfigured by private security, and maybe even displaced away from

the nation state. Agamben argues that the sovereign exerts its power through practices of exception

(Agamben 1998: 15-41), but we will look at how sovereign power might be configured by more

„mundane‟ practices – in particular, practices originating in the world of business and finance.

It is within these practices of business and finance that we will try to apply Agamben‟s concept of

sovereignty. In the next chapter we will introduce the concepts of corporate social responsibility,

and social license to operate, both concepts being practices from the business world that, we argue,

have influenced the global security field. It is within these practices that we will utilize this theory

by looking at how, when combined, they create a form of inclusive exclusion. The practices we

examine are often used by TNCs, and we focus on companies operating out of a strong (western)

state but investing in a weaker state. We argue that inclusive exclusion takes place in a TNC‟s home

country as well as in the host country. In this thesis, we have chosen two cases which each

represents a host country – Columbia and Nigeria. We argue that, in the host countries, TNCs

construct new security assemblages by deploying private security actors to establish security

arrangements for their investments in addition to state-provided security. These assemblages are

created in an attempt to mitigate the socio-political risks involved in the investments. The two

practices mentioned above (CSR and SLO) are practical approaches utilized by TNCs to minimize

this risk. They are not only ways to minimize socio-political risks, but also set up the parameters of

the security assemblages created in the host countries by introducing a set of values, norms and

actors.

By combining these values and norms with the logic of minimizing risk, these assemblages create

an inclusive exclusion that seeks to exclude whatever does not conform to values and norms by

constituting them as risk. Furthermore, as we will explain in the next chapter, the described business

practices also place the lives and livelihoods of the affected population in both the home and host

country at its core. As the risks that these practices attempt to mitigate are social and political in

nature, the inclusion of life in the practices turns them into the exercise of biopolitics. In this sense,

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the practices become what governs the actors in the assemblages. And in Agambian terms, the

sovereign power exists by creating biopolitical bodies. Although we choose to move away from a

state-only focus and apply it to the assemblages, it is through the two practices that we will examine

how biopolitics are applied in the assemblages. This allows us to examine how sovereign power has

been reconfigured by the security assemblages set up by TNCs, and how such reconfigurations

affect the right to security within these assemblages.

3.5. Our outlook on contemporary configurations of Security

Combining these three theoretical concepts provides us with a map of the arrangements and

realignment between what we have identified as four separate apparatuses that are all part of the

construction and reconfiguration of security and risk: states, civil society, private security, and

corporations. In traditional Hobbesian theory, security and risk are embedded between two main

apparatuses: the state and civil society. It is the social contract „that prohibits the private use of

armed forces and invests in the Sovereign. In short it is the Sovereign‟s monopoly on the legitimate

use of collective violence that provides security‟ (Krahmann 2010: 23). Therefore, the traditional

Hobbesian configuration of security would be placed on an unbroken line between the state and

civil society. This is simplified in the figure below:

However, since the end of the Cold War, an international neoliberal discourse, with a focus on

downsizing the public sector, has dominated through the agency of globalization. This has led to the

frequent outsourcing of public goods to the private sector (Berndtsson 2009: 116), including the

right to security of person. This is in part what we refer to as the marketization of security and risk,

where a third component, private security, has been added to the international configuration of

security and risk. This implies that the right to security of the person, which is traditionally seen as

the sovereign‟s domain, is increasingly being treated as a business commodity rather than a human

right. As a result, a third element of private security is added to the original global security

configuration. This is depicted in the figure below:

Figure 1: State - Civil Society

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Our argument in this thesis is that a fourth component has also been added to the configuration of

security through the increasing neoliberal marketization of security and focus on risk. We have

chosen to label this last element, which includes TNCs, simply as the corporations. Our argument is

that corporations are constructing new security assemblages by implementing risk management and

private security in relation to their businesses abroad. This is especially evident among western-

based TNCs who operate in or have cooperative arrangements with weak states. These corporations

make deals with the host state for licenses to operate in specific locations, and as the corporations

enter these new sites, we argue that new security assemblages are constructed through their

presence, leading to a reconfiguration of rights. When the state outsources licenses to operate to

foreign corporations, it arguably outsources sovereignty to corporations that in return sub-contract

private security companies. This is especially evident in high risk areas, where extra security

measures must be taken in order to create a safe working environment. This means that

contemporary global security is constructed and re-configured between these four components. This

is depicted in the figure below:

Figure 2: State - Civil Society - Private Security

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Figure 3: Reconfiguration of the Right to Security

3.6. Interim Conclusion

We have examined three different theoretical concepts, assemblages, socio-political risk and

inclusive-exclusion, to formulate a theoretical framework that can be used to explain the relation

between state, citizen, TNCs and private security. Assemblages will be used to understand what

constitutes as the actors and how in local settings can become global. Socio-political risk will be

what connects the actors within the assemblage and constitutes the relations between them.

Inclusive-exclusion is our reconceptualization of Agamben and serves as our take on sovereignty

and the relation between sovereign and citizen. This theoretical framework will be used to examine

our cases.

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Chapter 4. Neoliberal practices: global security and risk

management

4.1. Introduction to the Chapter

This chapter seeks to answer the sub-question „How does neoliberalism, as a mode of governance,

affect how transnational corporations approach security and risk management?‟ Based on this, we

look more closely at how we can understand the marketization of security by examining the

academic literature in conjunction with our empirical interviews. In doing so, we first consider

neoliberalism as a mode of governance to outline the political parameters which lay the foundation

for the marketization of security. Our understanding of neoliberalism as a mode of governance

pertains to the Foucauldian term „governmentality‟ (Mayhew 2004).

Based on the conceptual work, we returned to our interviews, paying particular attention to the use

of specific concepts such as market forces, privatization and everyday knowledge. Furthermore,

through our interviews we identified two examples of practices of neoliberal governmentality:

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Social License to Operate (SLO). We argue that these

practices are interconnected and act as important enablers linking security and risk and forming a

vital part of the global marketization of security.

First, however, we will explore and define marketization and financialization. Marketization will be

used to describe the restructuring of state tasks and their transfer to private entities and market

forces. Financialization will be used to explain the methods and techniques mobilized within

marketization strategies. In conjunction, marketization and financialization will be used to support

our analysis of how specific aspects of the security field are being turned into financialized assets.

The first practice discussed in the chapter is CSR. We argue that the increasing emphasis on CSR in

contemporary corporate behavior points towards the interconnectedness between what corporations

do abroad and how their conduct is handled at home. Or the other way around, CSR policies and

stakeholder awareness at home also affect and shape corporate behavior abroad.

The second practice is Social License to Operate (SLO). SLO also emerged from the CSR domain,

but it goes beyond CSR by zooming in on how stakeholder communities10

influence and shape the

actions of TNCs abroad. Additionally, this field, which has the potential to influence corporations,

has become an important „market‟ field for PSCs.

The two business practices will be used together with our theoretical framework when we explore

how TNCs manage security and risk in our two examples from Nigeria and Colombia.

10

Concept used by Boutilier and Thomson (2011) to describe communities „affected by the actions of a company or

who could have an effect on the company‟ (2).

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4.2. Neoliberalism

For the purposes of our thesis, it is important to understand how the current world of security is

configured. The private security market, which is our main focus, has sprung up out of the

conventional perception of security as being state-centric. The increased use of private security and

the expansion of the private security market did not happen out of the blue. Neoliberal policy-

making and politics are often recognized as the main reason behind the increased privatization in

the security sector, or in any other sector of governance for that matter. And when we conceptualize

the current configuration of global security, we will do so by treating security as part of the

globalized neoliberal order. However, we need to establish what we mean by „neoliberalism‟, as it

has become an ambiguous term in the academic literature (Venupogal 2015: 166). The term has

been widely criticized for its usage being diffuse, including but not limited to political policy-

making processes, as well as being a label for a macroeconomic doctrine (ibid.: 166-167):

it lives […] as a problematic rhetorical device that bundles together a proliferation of

eclectic and contradictory concepts; a tableau of critical explorations of the material

world by non-economists, clustered together by a shared signifier that thematically

links them to a broader set of morally devolved referents about markets, economics,

subjectivities, state authority, globalization or neo-colonialism. (Venupogal 2015:

183)

In our thesis, we will treat the term „neoliberalism‟ as encompassing the political ideas of

privatization and market deregulation, as well as describing a cultural and ideological phenomenon.

We distance ourselves from the classic understanding of neoliberalism as a term of political

economy and instead start from an understanding of neoliberalism that elucidates power relations

(ibid.: 169). This version of neoliberalism draws theoretically on Marx, Gramsci and Foucault

(ibid.) and conveys the idea of a wealthy West imposing neoliberal ideas (the ones mentioned

earlier, privatization, deregulation, etc.) upon a less wealthy „global South‟ (ibid.: 176). As such, we

use the term „neoliberalism‟ to describe a mode of governance, as it helps us unveil how risk

management and other western practices affect how security and rights are configured.

The phrase „mode of governance‟ can be referred to the Foucaldian term „governmentality‟.

Governmentality can be understood as the organized practices of mentality, rationality and the

techniques that are used to govern subjects (Mayhew 2004). For neoliberalism, mentalities of

competitiveness and self-interest are at its core, and the ideas of a self-regulating market and of the

decentralization of state power to more localized units are some of the rationalities. The techniques

of doing so are directly adapted from the world of business and include such things as risk

management, cost-benefit analyses and quantitative measurement protocols.

This approach to neoliberalism not only draws a theoretical line under our conceptual

understandings of Agamben and assemblages (see chapter 3) through the concept of

governmentality, it also highlights the role that neoliberalism plays in the global security field. It

lets us look more closely at the practices used in the field that pertain to neoliberal governance.

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Through our interviews we have chosen to look more closely at Corporate Social Responsibility,

and Social License to Operate. These two concepts stem from the world of business and finance, but

they have also had an impact on the field of private security as well. Later in this chapter we will

expand on these terms and show how they can be seen as practices of governance. But first we will

look at how they came to be important in the security field.

4.3. Marketization and Financialization

In this thesis, we argue that the field of security has undergone a certain level of marketization and

financialization: the two mechanisms just mentioned are a sign of just that. As terms, both

marketization and financialization are related to the notion of neoliberal governance explained in

the previous section. Marketization pertains to the rationalities of self-regulating markets and the

decentralization of state power. As a concept it refers to the practice of restructuring state

enterprises to act more like private corporations and to be regulated according to market force (van

der Hoeven 1997: 101). But this definition is a bit lacking when it comes to security because neither

the police nor the military in any state is run by market force. In a more abstract sense, however,

one can view the increased number of private security actors as indicating a deficiency in the

security options available to corporations. As such, the marketization of security does not

necessarily pertain to already existing state security apparatuses but the outsourcing of certain

security-related tasks to private entities that operate within market forces. For our thesis, then, this

is how we will view marketization: as the logic of restructuring state tasks by devolving them to

private entities and market forces.

Marketization:

Our interviews provided several examples of the marketization of security. One example is how

Frederik Østerby from Guardian Security Risk Management [Guardian SRM] described the

company as a business enabler rather than a private security company (Østerby 2016: 5:59). The

logic here is that the company provides a service for which there is market need. In contrast to the

state, which has a far more defensive approach to security (ibid.: 36:54), private companies can act

more freely, while the globalized market makes the possibilities for contracts far more diverse. The

market for security services is closely related to the globalized world, and current events are deeply

affecting how the demand and supply equation is configured. At Guardian SRM they have seen an

increased demand in the field of security due to the dynamics of globalization and the increased

targeting of civilians (ibid.: 28:00). Different events around the world, such as terrorism, wars,

political instability etc., are shaping the market demand for security.

An entirely different aspect of the global security field is the investment aspect. This aspect often

influences the global security field in a more indirect way than actual private security companies

and transnational corporations. To uncover this aspect of the global security field, we interviewed

Michael Nellemann Pedersen, the investment director in the Danish pension fund, PKA. He

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described an increased focus on what he refers to as responsible investments within the large

investment groups, and in particular pension funds and similar institutions (Pedersen 2016: 07:26).

Responsible investments are investments made on the basis of a set of core values and norms often

of significance to the civil and political society that surrounds the investor. To PKA this concretely

means no investments in companies that produce controversial weaponry, heavy polluters such as

oil and coal companies, or companies that violate international codes of labor, to name just a few

(PKA 2016). By themselves, responsible investments influence the global security field by setting

up parameters for what are good and bad investments, in addition to the purely economic aspects of

investments. But even though these kinds of investments suggest some level of the incorporation of

morality, the bottom line is still what matters, and in Denmark it is even inscribed in law that

pensions funds must aim at the greatest yields possible (ibid.: 09:24). An example of this is PKA‟s

decision to no longer invest in coal-only based companies (PKA 2016). First of all, coal is no longer

a viable investment, as it is slowly but surely being phased out as a source of energy. But at the

same time there is a moral responsibility to take care of our environment, and a decision to stop

investing in coal is in agreement with this responsibility. The connection between social and

economic responsibility is also something that recurs later in this chapter when we look at

Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR] and Social License to Operate [SLO]. This connection also

shows an aspect of how security has been marketized. Responsibility towards local populations,

surroundings and the environment are no longer based solely on morality but also on economic

considerations. CSR and SLO are both examples of market practices that combine moral and

economic considerations in marketized security and provide insights into how market force affects

the global security field.

Financialization:

Financialization refer to the techniques of marketization, and as such it is a phenomenon within

marketization (Godechot 2015). As an academic term, financialization has been used widely and

across academic disciplines to try and understand the rising number of financial markets (van der

Swan 2014). Definitions of financialization thus vary greatly and spread across understandings,

from a frame through which corporations are shaped and regulated (Froud et. al. 2002) to a way to

live one‟s everyday life through ideas of capitalism and finance (Martin 2002). However, Leyshon

and Thrift propose a more tangible concept of financialization as the processes in which financial

markets convert different practices into financialized assets (Leyshon and Thrift 2007; also Aitken

2011: 127). For our thesis, this concept of financialization is most significant in relation to our

conceptualization of marketized security, since it pertains to how security is being financialized in a

more concrete way.

The fields of finance and security are in many ways intertwined. Both operate with uncertainty as

their core notion, and the two fields manage uncertainty each in its own way (Aitken 2011: 127).

„Risk management‟ is a term that recurs within both fields. In finance markets that deal with

predictions, such as derivatives and futures markets, risk management is central to carrying out

investments and to profiting from them. Managing risk includes aggregating information and

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creating knowledge in order to predict uncertainty related to the markets that are being invested in.

The creation of knowledge pertains to the concepts of expertise vs non-expertise knowledge

outlined in our chapter on socio-political risk. Here, we describe how knowledge is created by

everyday expertise combined with more scientific approaches. These „everyday‟ experiences are at

the core of all prediction markets and rely heavily on the individual experiences that form „everyday

knowledge‟ that cannot easily be put into scientific protocols. We came across this kind of everyday

knowledge during our interviews with private security companies. Guardian SRM has a wide

network of handlers, fixers, informants and other PSCs that they utilize when creating security

solutions or risk assessments for their clients (Østerby 2016: 09:00). This network is primarily

based on their aggregated experience from the founding partners who had decades of experience

working in the Danish Defense Force prior to starting the company (ibid.: 11:10). Their network

usually consists of personal relations, and trust is key to how they choose the people they work with

(ibid.: 11:16). As such, the work and the decisions they make in the company rely greatly on the

everyday knowledge that has been created and accumulated by their employees, and their

employers for that matter. Johnny Andersen confirmed this approach when he explained the hiring

process for his team at the Danish embassy in Kabul. Since it is usually former Danish soldiers who

apply for these jobs, Andersen explains that he either knows the person applying personally or at

least knows someone who knows him (Andersen 2016: 10:00). In this instance, it is also the

personal experience that sets the parameters for hiring. Bruno Kalhøj, however, argued that it is not

always possible to rely solely on personal networks and references to acquire the necessary

information, as there will always be a limit to the size of the network (Kalhøj 2016: 33:45).

However, he did acknowledge the relevance and importance of having a good network in the

security business (ibid.). If we return to Leyshon and Thrift‟s definition of financialization and how

assets are financialized, we can see how this is happening to aspects of the security field as well.

The everyday knowledge of the different actors is key to them performing their jobs, providing the

best possible products, and thus become a defining part of their value as a company. However,

Leyshon and Thrift‟s definition relates to how assets become integrated into financial markets.

What we found in our interviews was not exactly that but rather value creation. But just as in the

financial field, risk is often mitigated by the everyday knowledge of the actors involved, and their

knowledge then turns into assets that have a value in their respective fields. Even though these

assets do not necessarily enter any financial markets, this still shows how aspects of security are

becoming financialized, by value creation, or at the very least intertwined with the field of finance.

4.4. Corporate Social Responsibility: making responsible investments

Throughout several of the interviews we conducted with company representatives and academic

experts on the marketization of security and risk, corporate social responsibility was mentioned

numerous times as a key component. The interest of companies in addressing CSR initiatives and

issues was exemplified by how Michael Nellemann Pedersen, investment director of the pension

fund, PKA, brought up the importance of CSR when making investments for shareholders less than

two minutes into the interview (Pedersen 2016: 1:43). Additionally, Bruno Kalhøj, Head of Security

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and Crisis Management at Maersk Oil, argued that CSR and security are inseparable and that CSR

forms a very important part of the preventative strategy because it is through CSR that a company

builds good relations with local populations (2016: 18:20). Because of the large focus and emphasis

placed on CSR by many of our interviewees, we decided to further develop certain elements

identified within CSR and deploy our understanding of the phenomenon as a key analytical concept

throughout the thesis.

The term [social responsibility] is a brilliant one; it means something, but not always

the same thing, to everybody. To some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or

liability; to others, it means socially responsible behavior in an ethical sense; to still

others, the meaning transmitted is that of „responsible for,‟ in a causal mode; many

simply equate it with a charitable contribution; some take it to mean socially

conscious; many of those who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for

„legitimacy,‟ in the context of „belonging‟ or being proper or valid; a few see it as a

sort of fiduciary duty imposing higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on

citizens at large. (Carroll 1999: 280)

As the quote above emphasizes, CSR is a vague concept that has no one overarching definition, but

many different ones depending on context, interests and perspective. We are primarily interested in

the concept from a sociological business-society perspective, but as Dennis Masaka emphasizes,

„[d]ocketed definitions of CSR are not clear over its exact nature and place in the business-society

relations‟ (2008: 14). Because of this lack of precision, we have chosen to construct our own

conceptual understanding of CSR from a combination of primary and secondary sources, chosen

with a focus on their relevance with regard to our research question.

As such, our interest in CSR is bound up with the context of globalization and the current neoliberal

moment, where it can arguably be seen as a form of capitalist legitimacy. Furthermore, as Dr. Rajiv

Maher argued (2016: 12:05), we also believe that globalization plays a huge role in the development

of business-related security issues. Another aspect we wish to emphasize is how CSR policies have

been incorporated as part of many companies‟ business models, implying that CSR policies have

turned into company risk-management devices (Shamir 2011: 313-336).

As we frame our conceptual understanding of CSR, it is essential to keep some critical arguments in

mind, such as that CSR merely represents a type of discursive „window-dressing‟ used by

companies to construct a better brand image for themselves (Rosenberg 2002; Mullerat 2009; Aras

and Crowther 2010). In addition, Maher argues that many companies portray a general over-

eagerness to communicate the credentials of their CSR programs, which are not always in line with

what‟s really going on in the real world (2016: 06:17).

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According to Pedersen from PKA, there has been a general growing global focus and interest in

making responsible investments,11

which is also evident among company board members (2016:

7:26). Pedersen also argued that during the 00‟s there was very little focus on CSR, but today „all‟

investment companies are hiring employees to handle CSR aspects as part of their business model

(Pedersen 2016: 8:25). This argument is in line with Maher‟s description of how there has been a

boom in the focus on CSR and on local populations within the last couple of years (17:10), and big

companies usually hire human rights consultants full-time to develop human rights and CSR

policies (ibid.: 23:05). Additionally, big corporations have started to include the FPIC initiative12

(UN Human Rights 2013; Oxfarm 2015) to their CSR policies, at least on their websites (Maher

2016: 18:40), but as previously mentioned, these policies are sometimes primarily for show, with

the purpose of creating the image and reputation of a good and responsible company. Maher further

argued that companies are always happy to talk about how they respect certain rights, but it‟s

usually just talk to affect a public discourse (ibid.: 20:45).

Pedersen also mentioned that implementing CSR policies is not simply about investment companies

wanting to do good deeds, but are often the result of demands and pressure from stakeholders

because they see potential long-term profits in responsible investments (8:55). Therefore, when

investment companies such as PKA announce that they want to disinvest from the coal industry, it

is not only for environmental reasons, but rather because investing in coal no longer provides as

good a return as it has in past (Ibid.:9:30). Pedersen continued this argument by explaining how

phasing out coal serves an economic purpose that also happens to support environmental change as

well, which makes it a win-win situation for PKA in terms of its company image and returns on

investment (Ibid.:9:43). Therefore, it is important to view CSR for what it is in its entirety, which

we will describe as a long-term business strategy aimed at attracting and retaining shareholders.

Another interesting development within CSR is the involvement of TNCs in „improving‟ their value

chains and business partners. Whereas in the past many companies would immediately „cut all ties‟

with human rights violators to avoid association with a kind of business behavior that could

severely hurt the company‟s image and reputation.

Pedersen also noted that this type of responsible company behavior characterizes PKA, which has

constructed a green-yellow-red list of companies for future investments that is publicly accessible

on their website. If a company has been placed on the red list, it is deemed ineligible for investment,

but if it is on the yellow list, it will be met with a set of requirements for improvements which must

be met before an investment can take place. Once these improvements have been confirmed, the

company moves onto the green list and is eligible for responsible investment (Pedersen 2016:

28:50). One critical aspect of this, which Maher also addressed in his interview, is that some TNCs

11

„Responsible investment is an approach to investing that aims to incorporate environmental, social and governance

(ESG) factors into investment decisions, to better manage risk and generate sustainable, long-term returns.‟

https://www.unpri.org/about/what-is-responsible-investment

12 Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous People


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which are criticized for cooperating with human right violators in one way or another often excuse

their behavior with statements on how hard they are working at improving the situation. However,

these improvements are sometimes not implemented, but simply function as „window-dressing‟

(Maher 2016: 7:22).

Another important aspect of CSR, which has already been mentioned in part, is its connection with

the growing focus on human rights. This is especially evident in the western world, but it is also

becoming a global phenomenon. As TNCs run and/or establish business ventures in other countries,

they inevitably take part in both the national and local politics of the host state simply through their

presence. Some extraction companies might require high levels of security measures to be taken to

limit socio-political risks associated with theft, sabotage, rebellion, or protests from the local

population. Therefore, many company CSR policies require risk analysis and risk management of a

specific geographical area and its local population. CSR measures, such as building schools, paying

local residents for land, etc., might be calculated as long-term business strategies that will allow

companies to carry out their businesses without complaints from the local population. Several NGO

reports on land grabbing13

(Sassen 2013) in weak states by TNCs have raised concerns and

provoked lawsuits against human right violations, arguably damaging the reputations and

businesses of some of these companies, especially in their often western-based home states, where

human rights are respected in society and form a big part of consumer discourse in general.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that corporations are often more scared of the repercussions in

their home countries than in the countries in which they operate (Maher 31:20). This is in line with

Pedersen‟s argument that, due to globalization, it has become very hard for companies and

consumers to distance themselves from human right violations that might form an external part of

an investment or value chain, such as child labor in the textile industry (26:21). Pedersen continued

this line of argumentation by suggesting that, because of consumer awareness about human rights

violations and their possible consequences for business, most companies today have incorporated

some sort of CSR and human right policies (23:25). Maher agreed that companies are doing things

to alleviate the problems with human rights infringements, but they always do so within an eye to

their business interests (25:12), leading to human rights, from a CSR perspective, having become a

cash-cow for consultancies (23:30). Additionally, Maher argued that companies can be viewed as

treating human rights as a risk in terms of risk assessment (26:50), which implies that risk is a way

to insert human rights into business logic because it is in accordance with the business attitude that

risk is crucial to the bottom line (27:30).

Local uprisings against TNCs operating abroad is often identified with weak and corrupt states that

are rich in natural minerals (Humphreys 2005: 508). Here the idea of corruption arguably plays a

role in making responsible investments, but seen from a different perspective than previously

presented. Thomas Mandrup provided an example of Maersk establishing harbors and ports in West

African countries, where the level of corruption is high and a drug economy predominates. He

13

See chapter 6 on the DONG case in Colombia with regard to the mining company Prodeco.

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argued that, by establishing harbors in these places, Maersk automatically fuels the drug economy.

But the question is how much corruption is acceptable? Maersk has to accept the local terms and

possibly pay off local drug lords to be able to acquire a license to operate14

in these areas. Until

recently, such „compromises‟, in relation to bribes being paid, were deemed acceptable for Danish-

based TNCs operating in corrupt areas of the world, and was even tax deductible up until 1997

(Mandrup 2016: 33:30). However, since then CSR has gained influence both politically and

businesswise. This unusual tax deduction was removed by law in Denmark at the end of 1997

(DR.DK).

In the light of our interviews, we can see that CSR has become not only more prevalent in the world

of business and investments, but also more closely tied to security and risk management. CSR has

become a practice that companies use to try to mitigate socio-political risks in the foreign countries

in which they either operate or invest. In this sense, CSR becomes a matter of how companies

create relations with local populations, and when it comes to incorporating CSR into security

apprehensions, this interaction often takes risk management as its starting point. On the other hand,

CSR has a double meaning in the home countries of corporations. The first aspect relates to the risk

management of CSR, as stakeholders and other financial interests create a demand for profits. The

significant aspect of CSR in the home countries pertains to the public political discourse that shapes

how CSR policies are articulated and what topics are included. This aspect can be influenced by

political ideologies, current events, and so on, as well as by incidents revolving around company

investments in foreign countries. As a result, there is an interconnectedness between what

corporations do abroad and how such conduct is handled at home, but also vice versa, meaning that

CSR politics and stakeholder communities at home also affect and shape corporate behavior abroad.

This phenomenon will be developed further and exemplified during the case studies.

14

See chapter 4 on „Social License to Operate: managing socio-political risks‟

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4.6. Social License to Operate: managing socio-political risks

As was the case with CSR the concept of a „Social License to Operate‟ was brought up several

times during the interviews conducted in relation to security and risk, which led us to incorporate it

as a key analytical concept throughout our thesis. However, while conducting a literature review on

the concept, we encountered many diverse interpretations and definitions of SLO and therefore

decided to construct own understanding of this phenomenon by focusing on those aspects that are

related to our thesis inquiry.

In terms of analytical category, SLO falls under the CSR umbrella and has been constructed as a

primarily western concept. During the past two decades, the concept of SLO has evolved from the

mining industry to become a standard business practice within this particular industry, though some

argue that in the oil and gas industry implementation of the concept is still only in its infancy

(Smith and Richards 2015: 84). As with CSR, there is no single agreed definition of SLO, most of

the definitions available being context-dependent and abstract in nature, such as

„Social license‟ generally refers to a local community‟s acceptance or approval of a

company‟s project or ongoing presence in an area. It is increasingly recognized by various

stakeholders and communities as a prerequisite to development. (Yates and Horvath 2013:

1)

or

Social licence (…) can be seen as an intangible construct associated with acceptance,

approval, consent, demands, expectations, and reputation. Moreover, these notions suggest

an overarching concern with organizational legitimacy. (Parsons et al. 2014: 84)

Common to many of these definitions is that the concept of SLO builds upon the idea that, if a

community does not support the presence of a specific company or project, commodity prices, no

matter how high, will not spawn a positive production or development decision. Therefore, some

argue that „SLO is becoming the new “vision” for companies to recognize and embrace in order to

acquire economic certainty with respect to new projects‟ (Nelsen 2006: 161). Prno and Slocombe

further argue that CSR can be seen as an essential enabling factor in SLO, which can be used to

manage socio-political risks. They state that „Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are

arguably the most utilized marked oriented tools for obtaining a SLO (…) [because] CSR

encompasses the idea that businesses have some responsibilities to society beyond that of only

making profits for their shareholders‟ (2011: 352).

Another important aspect of SLO is its influence on the articulation of risk, which arguably shows

strong ties with human rights. Thomas Mandrup argued that the fact that the western world in

particular is debating human security implies the emergence of a strong focus on individual rights

(2016: 23:15). Following this argument, Nelsen argues that Social License to Operate has become a

significant part a new corporate discourse that is especially evident amongst TNCs in weak states.

She further states that, „[o]nce camouflaged by concepts such as sustainable development and

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sustainability, SLO is now in the forefront as “the language of choice” by industry and

stakeholders‟ (Nelsen 2006: 161). This argument was strengthened by Maher, who stated that

corporations are always happy to talk about how they respect certain rights, but it is often just talk

to influence a public discourse (Maher 2016: 20:45). Maher also argued that SLO is an essential

part of risk management, especially when it comes to business operations in high-risk areas where

some of the biggest „threats‟ alongside environmental ones are the socio-political risks posed by the

local population (ibid.: 27:30). Therefore, it is vital for corporations to gain a Social License to

Operate to ensure the local community‟s acceptance or approval of their presence in a specific area

or region. As already mentioned, we argue that there is a strong correlation between human rights

and SLO, which can be identified in the „U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights‟

(UNGPBHR), where it is stated that, „In order to gauge human rights risks, business enterprises

should identify and assess any actual or potential adverse human rights impacts with which they

may be involved either through their own activities or as a result of their business relationships‟

(2011: 19).

Therefore, obtaining a Social License to Operate can be seen as a way for corporations to insert

human rights into a business logic, since this follows the business notion that risk is crucial to the

bottom line. This type of business logic is therefore tied to ideas of legitimacy and protection of the

company brand in terms of identifying and managing the „risk of our reputation blowing up‟, as

Maher put it (2016: 27:50). Prno and Slocombe further argue that „there is now widespread

recognition that mineral developers need to gain a “social license to operate” (SLO) from local

communities in order to avoid potentially costly conflicts and exposure to social risks‟ (2011: 346).

Several of our interviewees agreed that one of the main ways to ensure a good reputation and

relationship with local populations is to cooperate with and/or employ them as part of the value

chain (Østerby 2016: 42:22 & 45:21; Kalhøj 2016: 15:15; Pedersen 2016: 53:00).

However, our argument is that Social License to Operate not only includes the approval and

acceptance of the local population, but the entire stakeholder community. As Thomsen and

Boutilier frame it, this includes „those who could be affected by the actions of a company or who

could have an effect on the company‟ (2011: 2). This implies the inclusion of parties in different

geographical communities, such as the local community, investment funds, human rights activist

groups, joint ventures, etc. Thomsen and Boutilier further argue that in weak sates „individuals and

groups often look to (…) companies to provide what governments have not provided (e.g.,

infrastructure, health services, economic development initiatives)‟ (2011: 8). Therefore, despite the

problems associated with FDIs such as land grabbing, corruption and conflicts, Østerby argued that

many local stakeholders see TNCs as potentially providing both employment and improvements to

the local community (2016: 44:35).

In summary, we argue that SLO is a concept with close ties to CSR, but it goes beyond many of the

common understandings and definitions, which are primarily concerned with getting approval from

the local community next to operational sites. We argue that stakeholder communities cover all

affected parts, including citizens of western states, where the TNCs have been established and have

their base. Reports of companies violating rights abroad can have repercussions for the company‟s

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reputation and brand at home, which could potentially develop into problems leading to the

withdrawal of investments, boycotts or a general decrease in consumers‟ willingness to buy the

company‟s products. Therefore, acquiring a Social License to Operate can be seen as an essential

part of the long-term business strategies of TNCs, playing a significant role in their socio-political

risk management as a result of their operating in an interconnected and globalized world.

4.7. Interim conclusion

In this chapter, we have analyzed our interviews in conjunction with the academic literature in order

to answer the first part of our research question. We started with a discussion of how we understand

the concept of neoliberalism in order to map the political surroundings in which the marketization

of security takes place. What is most important to our understanding of neoliberalism is how it

drives practical forms of governmentality, implying sets of practices that define how actors are

governed. To look at and define these practices is essential to our thesis in order to answer the last

part of our research question pertaining to rights and sovereignty because it points us towards how

actors are governed within assemblages. Furthermore, it also helps us to understand how security

has been marketized by examining the two practices and how they have departed from market force

to become vital aspects of the private security sector.

Furthermore, we found that investments in foreign countries also affected how the global security

field is configured. A combination of moral and economic considerations defines who, where, and

what to invest in, and the global security field is affected through these considerations. Investments

are thus based on market force as well as moral considerations, and security situations surrounding

potential investments affect these considerations. Security can affect morality, as certain situations

can have a negative impact on a corporation‟s public image or just be downright immoral.

Economically, certain security situations can be too expensive to alter in order to make the

investment viable. Finally, we found that security is also intertwined with financial markets, mainly

through risk, where everyday knowledge and trust are central to the fields of both security and

finance.

When replaying recordings of our interviews, it quickly became evident that a few themes recurred

in all of our interviews. These themes have become the focal points discussed in this chapter, as

they point towards certain practices in which the marketization of security is evident. Corporate

social responsibility practices were the most recurring theme in our interviews, and through an

analysis of our interviews and an empirical study of academic discussion of the topic, we found that

CSR and security were no longer separate in the world of transnational corporations. CSR has

become a component of risk management for most TNCs, and it is being used to mitigate the risks

that involve the population of both the home country and the country being targeted for foreign

investments. The second analytical concept and practice we encountered was SLO, which is also

tied to risk management. Most definitions of SLO pertain to the license given by the immediate

neighbors of operational sites in the host country, which is most prevalent in natural resource

extraction industries. However, we argue that, just as with CSR, it also pertains to a socio-political

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risk in the home country of a TNC. Here, the risk is often found in public discourse, and the social

license can be revoked if a company violates the values and norms of the home country, even if this

happens in a foreign country.

The marketization of security, then, involves a certain way of thinking and a set of parameters

defined by market force where the techniques involved resemble those of the financial world. A set

of practices found in the world of transnational corporations has become the object of securitization,

and the private security sector has provided the services required by TNCs operating in these areas.

Furthermore, these practices have connected the countries in which TNCs operate, as risk

management is no longer is a single-sited objective, especially when it comes to socio-political risk.

Conclusively, we argue that marketized security starts out from multi-sited assemblages of security

that affect one another through practices that try to mitigate risks of a socio-political nature.

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Chapter 5. Nigeria: the case of oil companies and private

security

This chapter seeks to answer the sub-question „How does marketized security affect the way

transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟

5.1. Case introduction

In 2012 an activist group, Platform, released a report which contained leaked documents showing

the transnational oil corporation Shell‟s global security spending between 2007 and 2009 (Amunwa

2012). This was the first time that the public had gained access to these figures, which generated a

lot more questions than answers. The data were leaked by a former Shell manager and showed a

significant percentage (43%) of Shell‟s global security budget, around $343 million in total, being

spend in Nigeria, mostly in the Niger Delta Region. When compared to Shell‟s global security

spending, it became clear that Shell had spent significantly more on security in the Niger Delta

region than in North and South America, the EU and Russia combined (Amunwa 2012: 3-6). And

the main question was why and on what?

Taking a closer look at the leaked data, they reveal a spending post labeled „Other‟ which made up

37% of Shell‟s global security spending between 2007 and 2009. This vast post had no further

explanation attached to it, which led to NGOs and news sources raising concerns about what might

really be hiding under this label (Amunwa 2012; Hirsh & Vidal 2012; Davies 2013). Many

speculated that, because the „Other‟ amount was so vast, it could not simply refer to small and

insignificant security arrangements. The author of the Platform report argued that there was

evidence indicating that Shell used this „Other‟ budget for a range of questionable security

purposes. This suspicion was in part based on a 2003 U.S. Embassy report stating that Shell and

Chevron had made direct payments to individual armed militants in the Delta area (Amunwa 2012:

8). This seemed to imply that this „Other‟ spending referred to non-traditional types of security

arrangements and non-state actors, which could include bribes made to local war lords and/or other

non-government illegally armed groups, to prevent local interference or protests.

Additionally, the report also uncovered a spending post labeled „Third Parties‟ which made up 29%

of Shell‟s global security spending from 2007-2009. This post most likely indicated payments made

to government forces (ibid.: 6-7), as it is well known that „Shell and Chevron have financed

portions of the Nigerian military and police to secure their facilities in Nigeria‟ (Avant 2004: 154).

Unethical though this collaboration between Shell and public government forces might seem,

cooperation between government troops and foreign oil companies is not a new phenomenon in

Nigeria (Obi 2006: 96-98; Arowosegbe 2009: 583; Watts 2004: 59). And as Human Rights Watch

stated in a 1999 report, „[s]ecurity arrangements between the oil companies and the Nigerian

government are inevitable, as are internal oil company provisions for security responses in the event

of incidents of hostage taking, sabotage, or intimidation‟(Human Rights Watch 2005).

Despite this knowledge, it still came as an eye-opener when the leaked data revealed that the „Third

Parties‟ spending was double what Shell spent on its own security staff, and it was estimated that

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the TNC employed more than 600 Nigerian government police officers and 700 members of the

controversial state „joint task force‟ (JTF) comprised of army, navy and police (the Guardian 2012).

This seemed to indicate that Shell had a high level of authority and control over government forces

and the Niger Delta region, and there is no evidence of this having changed within the past eight

years.

When the full Platform report was released in 2012, it had global consequences for Shell, and

western consumers and stakeholders especially came down hard on the TNC, Furthermore,

following the release of the data, several campaigns were started in the west to boycott Shell

(Dovan 2012;15

). Significantly, this pressure from the west seems to have had a significant impact

on Shell‟s official business strategy, which has since led the TNC to assume a degree of

responsibility due to its presence in the Niger Delta. This development is exemplified by two

contradictory statements, made twenty years apart. In 1995 Shell stated that „we do not hold the

solution to community demands for more amenities, more development, more employment and

more control over oil revenues. That is primarily a government responsibility‟ (Boele et al. 2001:

76). However, Shell‟s 2016 official website makes it clear that the TNC has realized that the world

is watching, and that it needs to manage socio-political risks by incorporating new business

practices such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social license to operate (SLO) (see

Chapter 4). Furthermore, on its website Shell claims to be a corporate citizen that „places great

importance on making a difference in the environment in which people live and work, fostering and

maintaining relationships with communities, taking care to be a good neighbor and contributing to

sustainable development initiatives.‟(Shell 1). So what has caused Shell to change its business

strategies so radically between then and now? We argue that this change has been brought about by

increasing global consumer awareness of human rights, sustainability and responsible investments.

This has put pressure on the Shell to incorporate preventative business practices that address the

socio-political risks posed by the global stakeholder community (see Chapter 3).

5.2 Outline of the Chapter

The first part of this chapter is primarily an empirical study which begins with a historical

contextual overview of Nigeria‟s security history and the Niger Delta conflict characterized by

violence, corruption and weak governance, which Shell has arguably managed to exploit. This

provides the context needed for a further analysis of Shell‟s „Other‟ security measures, and how

these might be connected to human rights violations and corruption in the Niger Delta. This analysis

also explores the correlation between non-state/private security actors and government forces in

Nigeria. From this historical overview, we move on to the global context, where we explore how

contemporary global consumer awareness has put pressure on Shell to incorporate these new

contemporary practices (CRS and SLO), presented in chapter 4. Our argument is that socio-political

risk dictates marked forces, which Shell, like any other business, has to follow to attract investors

15

Facebook group entitled: boycott Shell: https://www.facebook.com/BOYCOTT-Shell-193160320746514/

https://www.facebook.com/BOYCOTT-Shell-193160320746514/

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and satisfy consumer needs. From this point, the chapter then moves into a more theoretical analysis

that addresses the last section of the research question that is concerned with sovereignty and rights

in weak states. It starts out with an analysis of how Shell‟s presence and control in the Niger Delta

is significant in the construction of new security assemblages. This is followed by addressing the

co-dependent relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government, showing how Shell has

gained operative control of and authority over the Niger Delta. Finally, this second part of the

chapter analyzes how Shell‟s control and authority in the Niger Delta has had consequences for how

sovereignty and rights are configured.

5.3 Nigeria’s security history and the Niger Delta conflict

To acquire a better picture of the security arrangements in Nigeria, we must first take a closer look

at Nigeria‟s history of violence. The current security situation in Nigeria reflects more than 55 years

of instability, civil war, military coups, corruption and bad government (Frynas and Mellahi 2003:

584). Since Nigeria‟s independence in 1960, the country has been considered critical and

unfavorable for foreign investors, reflected in Control Risk Group‟s (1997)16

political risk report

stating that Nigeria is „one of the most difficult places in which to do business‟ (71). This report

came out the same year that a hundred Shell workers were held hostage by a local armed group

(Frynas and Mallahi 2003: 556).

The distribution of oil revenues has been the source of many conflicts in Nigeria, and one of the

most threatening ones was the civil war that broke out in 1967, which was ignited over oil struggles

between different identity groups (Zalik 2004: 405). Shell, which had been active in the country

since 1937 and had produced Nigeria‟s first commercial oil exports in 1958 (Shell 2) as hit hard by

the civil war, which disrupted its onshore oil production. As a cconsequence, Nigeria‟s crude oil

production declined from 420,000 barrels/day in 1966 to 320,000 b/d in 1967 and 145,000 b/d in

1968 (Frynaz and Mellahi 2004: 548). In the beginning commercial crude oil production in the

Niger Delta seemed to have held out great promise of prosperity for local communities, but instead

the emergence of joint ventures between foreign oil companies and the Nigerian state generated

threats to both the environment and traditional livelihoods in the Niger Delta (Watts 2004: 59).

During the 1970s, the Nigerian government realized that it had outsourced too much authority and

power to the foreign oil companies. So, in an attempt to increase control over its own oil resources,

the government started acquiring equity stakes in foreign oil companies and managed to reclaim

60% ownership in the majority of foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria (Frynas 2000: 31-32).

However, despite this movement towards greater national influence and control, Frynas and Mellahi

(2003) conclude that foreign oil companies have remained operators of the joint ventures with the

government, so they have retained effective control of the ventures (ibid.: 550). Zalik (2004) further

16 Control Risk Group is „an independent, global risk consultancy specialising in political, integrity and security risk.

We help some of the most influential organisations in the world to understand and manage the risks and opportunities of

operating in complex or hostile environments‟. https://www.controlrisks.com/en/about-us

https://www.controlrisks.com/en/about-us

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confirmed that the Nigerian state has at various moments introduced legislation in an attempt to

claim control over the oil sector, and as previously mentioned holds a large percentage of shares in

these ventures:

Operationally, however, foreign companies have run the industry – Shell in particular

– with protection from the Nigerian military. This arrangement has meant that

individual government agents can profit immensely through 'rents' or bribes accruing

from oil contract kickbacks, while in terms of productive capital and as an agent of

development and security, the Nigerian state has remained largely incapacitated and

often a force to be feared. (ibid.: 404)

What had previously distinguished Shell from other oil companies operating in the Niger Delta

region was that it obtained a more favorable deal than its rivals Mobil and Texaco, which has

sparked several accusations of bribery and government corruption. Even when nationalization

measures were being implemented, Shell was favored over its competitors: „[t]he form‟s position in

the Nigerian political economy proved to be a competitive advantage. If compared with other

foreign oil companies in Nigeria Shell had a considerable greater political influence, particularly in

the early years of the Nigerian oil industry‟ (Frynas and Mellahi 2004: 550). This was especially

evident in the 1960s, as several Shell managers or people connected with Shell gained prominent

political positions in Nigeria. In 1993 Ernest Shonekan, who had previously been Shell‟s non-

executive director and became head of state in Nigeria (ibid.: 551).

Due to massive land and resource grab, when the Nigerian government had earlier either sold or

leased land to oil companies, a civil society nationalization campaign began during the 1970s and

1980s. This development consisted of local citizens joining and mobilizing against what was

referred to as „the slick alliance‟ between the oil companies and the Nigerian military (Watts 2004:

59). Despite the Nigerian government attempting to regain control of its oil resources, it also very

much depended on the foreign oil companies to produce and sell its oil. From 2000 to 2004, oil and

gas accounted for 75% of total government revenues and 97% of Nigeria‟s foreign exchange

earnings (Arowosegbe 2009: 584), while in 2008 oil and gas constituted roughly 90% of Nigeria‟s

foreign exchange earnings and 83% of its GDP (Noruwa 2012: 16). So, despite Nigeria‟s long time

desire to regain control and independence from the foreign oil companies, its economy is heavily

intertwined and dependent on the revenues these foreign oil companies produce for the country.

There are several examples from the 1990s of the Nigerian government placing the foreign oil

companies‟ rights and security above the local population, which has only added fuel to the ongoing

conflict between the parties. This follows Isima‟s argument that in Nigeria „far greater emphasis has

been placed on the governance of the security sector than on the provision of physical security for

citizens‟ (2007: 24). In the 1990s an ethnic group of around 400,000 people established a political

movement to campaign for a „Bill of Rights to challenge both Shell for environment compensation

and the Nigerian state for direct control of “their oil”‟ (Watts 2004: 59). However, the government

would not accept these kinds of demands and protests, and the leaders of the group were all hanged

by Nigerian military forces in 1995 (ibid.). Another example of popular resistance occurred in 1998,

when the Ijaw Youth Council released a declaration, claimed resource ownership of the oil in the

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Ijaw area of the Niger Delta (ibid.), and asked all oil companies and their employees to withdraw

from the area (Arowosegbe 2009: 583). In response, the federal government „declared a state of

emergency in the region and deployed thousands of soldiers, naval troops and anti-riot policemen to

protect oil installations and investments‟ (ibid.). Yet another example of this „slick alliance‟, where

we argue that the Nigerian government seems to have favored the rights and security of foreign oil

companies over its own citizens, came in 1999. Here the oil company Chevron Texaco was accused

of flying Nigerian military units in its helicopters, from where shot and killed two people protesting

on top of an oil platform (Obi 2006: 96-98). Our argument is that this joint-venture relationship

between the foreign oil companies and the Nigerian government also affects government actions

and policies, which, due to the dependency relationship, are often shaped in favor of the foreign oil

companies, especially Shell, rather than the local communities. This argument is supported by a

1999 Human Rights Watch report, in which it is stated that,

[g]iven the overwhelming role of oil in the Nigerian national economy, the policies

and practices of the oil companies are important factors in the decision making of the

Nigerian government. Because the oil companies are operating joint ventures with the

government they have constant opportunities to influence government policy,

including with respect to the provision of security for the oil facilities and other issues

in the oil producing regions (Godwin 2016).

5.4. Shell’s ‘Other’ security practices in the Niger Delta

For more than a decade now, the security situation in the Niger Delta region has been getting worse

and increasingly unstable, to a point where the region has been labeled a high-risk area (Obi and

Rustad 2011: 168; Godwin 2016). Much of the unrest is due to disagreements over the ownership

and rights associated with resources, and many foreign oil companies are experiencing the

sabotaging of pipelines and platforms, as well as the kidnappings and killings of their employees

(Frynas and Mellahi 2003: 556; Obi 2008: 417-434). A 2008 estimate showed that the oil

companies in the region have had over two hundred employees kidnapped (Akpan 2010: 37).

Furthermore, NGOs have raised several red flags with regard to oil companies contributing to the

escalation of violence in the Niger delta region (Frynaz and Mellahi 2003; Tran 2004; Amunwa

2011, 2012). An example of this occurred in 2003, when WAC Global Services composed of

Nigeria-based specialists in conflict resolution (Tran 2004) carried out an internal 93-page survey

which was leaked. In the report, WAC accused Shell of enabling conflicts in the Niger Delta. The

report stated that:

[it is clear that SCIN [Shell Companies in Nigeria] is part of Niger Delta conflict dynamics

and that its social license to operate is fast eroding. Whereas some groups argue that SCIN

consciously fuels conflict as part of a “corporate conspiracy”, the SCIN-conflict links result

rather from a quick-fix, reactive and divisive approach to community engagement expressed

though different areas of policy, practice and corporate culture. (ibid.: 5)

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In addition to these observations, WAC argued that, due to the escalation of violence, Shell would

have to leave the area within the next five years (Tran 2004). Nevertheless, Shell maintained its

operations in the Niger Delta despite several periods when non-essential personal had to be

evacuated from high-risk operational sites, and despite having received much criticism and serious

allegations of human right abuses. An example of this occurred in 2011, when Platform, the activist

organization,17

released a report on corporations and human rights violations in the Niger Delta

region. The report followed up on the 2003 accusations previously presented and went on to claim

that „Shell‟s poor community engagement has provided the “catalyst” for major disruption,

including one incident that shut down a third of Shell‟s daily oil production in August 2011‟

(Amunwa 2011: 6). The 2012 map below portrays Shell‟s presence in the Niger Delta, which

includes more than 6,000 kilometers of pipelines and flow-lines, 87 flow-stations, 8 gas plants and

more than 1,000 producing wells in a 70,000 km2 area which is home to approximately 30 million

people (Shell 3).

Figur 1Adapted from Stakeholderdemocracy.org: http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/about-the-niger-delta/

During the 1980s, the economic principles of deregulation and privatization were introduced in

Nigeria (Kalejaiye et al. 2013: 2403), which meant a liberalized economy, part of which consisted

in an emerging security market. By mid-2000, according to Abrahamsen and Williams, security had

become the second largest „money-spinner‟ in Nigeria, only exceeded by oil and gas (2005: 3). This

also means that there is a strong correlation and mutual dependency between the two biggest

„money-spinners‟, because they each profit from one another. Globally, the issue of security

management has gone through a shift, from its traditional Hobbesian formation as an exclusive

function of government, towards a more accommodating security sector that encourages

participation by private security actors (Kasali 2011: 33). The privatization of security is a global

phenomenon (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 171), and for more than a decade private security

17

Platform London‟s description of themselves states that their „campaigns focus on the social, economic and

environmental impacts of the global oil industry‟ http://platformlondon.org/about-us/

http://platformlondon.org/about-us/

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has contributed significantly to the Nigerian economy. However, privatized security is by no means

a new phenomenon in Nigeria and has had a strong presence in the state almost since its

independence. Kasali (2011) argues that „the first private security outfit providing uniformed guards

in Nigeria came into being in 1965, and since then the number of existing private security firms has

drastically increased‟ (ibid.: 40). Due to the high levels of conflict and instability in Nigeria, which

are especially evident in the Niger Delta region, foreign oil companies require more security

provision than the Nigerian state is able to provide. This increasing demand for stronger security

provision has paved the way for the intensified presence of private security contractors, which can

arguably be seen as the result of an incompetent Nigerian government‟s inability to provide security

within its borders. Following this argument, Kasali (2011) suggests that:

[t]he origin of the proliferation of private security companies (guards) in Nigeria can

be traced to the systemic failure and inefficiency that adorn the public security sector,

which exhibits blatant inability to meet the security needs of the people resulting from

her age-long anti-people posture, inadequate training, official corruption, nepotism

among other negativities. (ibid.: 32)

Furthermore, there is a strong indication that the number of PSCs operating in Nigeria is still

growing based on estimates from 2006, when there were between 1500 and 2000 active PSCs in

Nigeria, with around 100,000 employees in total (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006: 3), to around

2,550 active PCSs in 2011 (Purpura 2011: 206). We have been unable to find any recent estimates,

but based on the previous numbers, we posit that this number has increased within the past five

years and that the market demand has still not been met.

Intriguingly, on their website, Shell claims that they do not employ PSCs in the Niger Delta, but

instead rely on two categories of security personnel: a corps deployed by the Nigerian police, and a

government-deployed Joint Task Force, comprising the army, navy and police (Shell 4). However,

returning to the leaked document that listed Shell‟s security spending from 2007-2009, this does not

seem to be completely correct, or at least not within that time period. Because the two types of

security personnel mentioned above would both fall under the „third party‟ category, this does not

explain the vast amount spent on „other‟ security measures, not to mention the post labeled

„contractors‟ in the leaked data. However, this could also refer to PSC providing consulting

services. When investigating this claim further, a complex overlap between public and private

security can be detected. PSCs such as Group4Securicor (G4S), through its subsidiary Outsourcing

Services Ltd. (OSL), cooperate with the so-called „spy‟ police, who have been trained by the

Nigerian police but are under the direct control of the oil companies (Abrahamsen and Williams

2010: 138). Shell alone has 1,200 at its operational sites in the Niger Delta, including an

intelligence unit (ibid.). Furthermore, Shell‟s many operational sites in the Delta are guarded by

more than 1,300 government forces, „including 600 police and Mobile Police, known locally as the

“kill and go” and 700 soldiers from the Joint Task Force (JTF), a combination of the army, navy

and police‟ (Amunwa 2012: 6).

The foreign oil companies‟ co-dependent relationship with the Nigerian government and PSCs is

complicated and arguably steered by monetary gains. However, we argue that the emergence of

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PSCs is in the Nigerian government‟s interest, because it depends on the revenues that the foreign

oil companies produce, and therefore the state depends on cooperation with PSCs to secure its own

economic interests based on the amount of oil that these companies produce. And the logic here is

that, if oil platforms are compromised or shut down due to protests or other serious security threats,

less or no oil is produced and sold, which hurts both the Nigerian government and the oil company.

As Abrahamsen and Williams (2008) explain it:

it is not so much the case that private capital and force work against the interest of some

“public” interest, but rather that the interests of the government in power is intimately bound

up, and even dependent on, the extraction of resources by private /foreign capital. (ibid.:

140)

5.5. Pressure from the global stakeholder community

Along with Shell‟s control of the Niger Delta region arguably also comes new and different types of

accountability. As previously argued, Shell‟s presence has a strong influence on Nigeria in terms of

policy changes and rights, but we argue that the influence is two-way. From the contemporary

business practices presented in Chapter 4, we were able to conclude that global consumer awareness

and responsibility have become serious threats to the revenue-earning and reputational survival of

TNCs (particularly the publicly registered companies). More and more stakeholders in the west

have become aware of how Shell is violating the rights of the local Niger Delta population, which

have resulted in increasing western-based pressure on Shell to adopt new types of practices. As

described in Chapter 3, the socio-political risks that the local community arguably poses have

become one of the main concerns of foreign oil companies such as Shell when operating abroad in

high risk areas. This means that with global awareness has also come a form of empowerment,

which has given a voice to local populations in weak states. As Abrahamsen and Williams (2010)

argue:

In a setting where participation in internationally developed frameworks such as the

Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the UN‟s Global Compact

have become a mark of a socially responsible firm (something that is in part the result

of broader international pressures) and where the oil companies are seeking new

strategies in response to the failure of past security policies, PSCs may become

important actors in attempts to transform security governance. (ibid.: 224)

Therefore, practices such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Social License to Operate

(SLO) have been incorporated into the security management of most TNCs regarding their

operations abroad within the past ten years. As previously mentioned, it has become extremely

damaging for a company‟s image and reputation today to be associated with local community

disapproval, human rights violations and unsafe working conditions for employees, all of which

Shell has been accused of in the Niger Delta within the past fifteen years. As the 2004 WAC report

stated, „It is clear that SCIN [Shell Companies in Nigeria] is part of Niger Delta conflict dynamics

and that its social license to operate is fast eroding‟ (2004: 5). Therefore, instead of attempting to

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force the local population into compliance through harsh security measures and a little

compensation, global stakeholder communities have increasingly begun to expect better ethics and

sustainability initiatives from Shell. What is noteworthy about these practices is that they have

moved beyond local or national arenas and become the subject of global attention.

5.6. Security assemblages

Now turning to the second part of the chapter, we explore how Shell and its use of private and

government forces play a significant role in the construction of security assemblages. We look at

the policies implemented by the government as an attempt to gain some level of control over the

vast amount of PSC that has emerged in Nigeria. Furthermore, we analyze the co-dependent

relationship between Shell and the Nigerian government, which is arguably steered by high levels

of corruption. Lastly, we analyze Shell‟s operational control and authority in the Niger Delta and

show how this effects the configuration of local sovereignty and rights.

When looking at Nigeria‟s approach to private security actors, the government seems to have

conflicting policies, because, despite recognizing a general strong demand for heavy security in the

Niger Delta, Nigerian law prohibited PSCs from carrying firearms (Kasali 2011: 43; Abrahamsen

and Williams 2009:10). This law can arguably be seen as an expression of the Nigerian

government‟s attempts to sustain a level of control over private security actors operating within

Nigeria, because this forces them to co-operate with government forces, which are allowed to carry

arms. Often, Nigerian police officers or soldiers, who are armed with fully automatic weapons, are

paired with private contractors so that the public security officers can „legitimize‟ and/or cover up

the activities of the private security guards. However, this collaboration between public and private

security forces is further complicated because these government forces are being supervised by PSC

staff and getting paid additional wages by the foreign oil companies, while in principle continuing

to take orders from their own commanding officers. This results in a unique and complex merging

of public and private authority, responsibility and interests (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009: 10),

making it difficult to detect where the public authority ends and private authority begins and vice

versa. Additionally, there are a vast number of unregistered PSCs and militia groups operating in

Nigeria that encourage their employees to carry weapons for their private security activities, and it

is difficult for the government to control the circulation of weapons among security guards (Kasali

2011: 42-43). It is hard to estimate of how many illegal PSCs and militia groups there currently are

in Nigeria, but within a three-week span in 2013, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps

(NSCDC) shut down 25 illegal PSCs operating in the country (Premium Times 2013).

It can be argued that the increasing numbers of foreign oil companies and PSCs operating in Nigeria

go hand in hand. The ongoing Niger Delta conflict has arguably created a fruitful market for

different types of security actors. Some of the more prevalent PSCs in Nigeria are TNCs often

based in the west such as G4S (England), RED24 (Scotland), etc. Both the PSCs and the foreign oil

companies inevitably bring with them certain western values, norms, knowledge and technologies

that are inserted into local security assemblages in the Niger Delta. Following this logic,

Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) argue that the symbolic and material power produced by foreign

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oil companies and global PSCs significantly influence the reproduction of political power in

Nigeria. This means that these private actors, as parts of global security assemblages, might

influence practices within assemblages in new and significant ways (ibid.: 224). Furthermore,

attempting to analyze the conflict in the Niger Delta region in terms of private security contractors

providing security for transnational interests provides at best an incomplete story. The foreign oil

companies and the government both play a key role in how security is configured in the Niger Delta

as well. We have already revealed that the protection of oil operation sites and pipelines is provided

by a multifaceted network of public and private, global and local security actors which serve

national as well as foreign interests (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008: 140). This configuration of

security at the operational sites is a result of cooperation between the foreign oil companies and the

government, and the PSCs are the primary tool alongside government troops. A disassembly

happened when the government was unable to provide security from a disenfranchised civilian

population, and crimes, kidnappings, protests, etc., became too big a security risk for the oil

companies. The demand for security by the foreign oil companies then forged the re-assembly and

included PSCs to police the civil unrest surrounding the oil fields more effectively. The oil

companies, the government, the PSCs and the local population are all relevant when examining the

security assemblage created in the Niger Delta.

Now returning to the two schools of thought we framed with regard to security assemblage theories

in Chapter 3. The Nigerian government currently seems to be located somewhere between the two.

On the one hand, the Nigerian government is losing its authority due to a new configuration of

security created by different non-state actors, including foreign oil companies, PSCs, illegal militia

groups, local ethnic groups, etc. On the other hand, many of these actors have been present in

Nigeria since its independence, so there are no new actors, but rather an increase in the numbers of

existing actors. This implies that they have always been part of the security assemblage, but their

increase in numbers has made them more significant and influential in the construction of the

security assemblage.

5.7. Re-configuration of sovereignty and rights

Following this last line of thought, we argue that private security actors add to the reconfiguration

of power and sovereignty in Nigeria, as they construct what Abrahamsen and Leander (2016: 134)

refer to as „new geographies of power‟. Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake (1997: 306) argues

that:

[b]ecause everyone places the highest priority on controlling (power), political competition

becomes immensely intense and unrestrained (…) The importance of the struggle is that the

state disappears in a process of parceling and privatization, its place is taken by communities

and ethnic groups, nationalities and subnationalities.

This seems to suggest that Shell‟s strong presence and control of the Niger Delta region has

constructed what can be described as „a state within a state‟ where Shell is the sovereign. This idea

is supported by the fact that private contractors guarding Shell oil platforms and wells have

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obtained special permission to carry arms within „Shell territory‟. However, outside these

operational sites the private contractors must obey the state law that prohibits PSCs from carrying

weapons. Arguably, Shell has become a visual manifestation of social control and regulation within

the Niger Delta. As one local resident explained the situation:

“in the Niger Delta Shell is the state”. Similarly, Shell Nigeria (SPDC - Shell Petroleum

Development Company of Nigeria) states in its 2001 People and Environment Report that

their community development work has left communities in the area with the impression

that “Shell is the only government we know” (SPDC, 2001:16). (Zalik 2004: 406)

Returning again to the two different schools of thought within security assemblage theories, one

school argues that because Nigeria is outsourcing so much control to private actors, it is weakening

the state‟s power and authority (Mandrup 2012). Furthermore, this outsourcing of sovereign control

could eventually mean the end of Nigeria as a sovereign nation state (Levi 2002; Guéhenno 1995;

Ohmae 1995). However, in line with the second school of thought, we argue that this type of

outsourcing can be seen as indirect governance used by the Nigerian state to gain a degree of

control over its populations and territory, which it never truly had full control of in the first place

(Abrahamsen and Leander 2016; Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Hönke 2010, 2008; Sassen 2008;

2006).

Taking this argument even further opens up to the idea that Nigeria‟s outsourcing of control to

private actors such as Shell can be seen as a type of state resilience and a reconfiguration of the

traditional understanding of Westphalian sovereignty. As Jana Hönke (2010) argues, these

„reconfigurations are, however, better understood by thinking of them as processes of state

transformation that are related to broader reconfigurations of spatial order‟ (ibid.: 3) Our logic here

is that, through this indirect governance, for example, co-ventures with foreign oil companies, the

Nigerian state gains some degree of control and revenue which it is unable to obtain through

democratic measures. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that Nigeria is a very young state

which has never been a true democracy as we in the west would define it. Therefore, our argument

is based on the idea that the western world‟s constructed requirements of what constitutes a „true‟

sovereign might not be applicable in the case of Nigeria. Furthermore, we also assert that the

argument that Nigerian sovereignty is being weakened by its outsourcing of control is therefore

based on the western understanding of sovereignty, which, given Nigeria‟s colonial history, was

never thoroughly established in the first place. This might be due in part to the embryonic state of

Nigeria after only 56 years of independence. On the other hand, one could argue that a young state

such as Nigeria might demonstrate a greater level of versatility and the ability to reconfigure itself

through the implementation of policies on deregulation and privatization to adapt to the current

neoliberal moment. Furthermore, we argue that the nationalized government policies can arguably

be seen as the government‟s attempt to reclaim ownership and symbolic control of the oil ventures.

However, this we interpret as a facade more than a reality, because, as previously argued, Shell still

has operational control over the work sites and authority over the public security officers working

for them.

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Because the local population is being viewed as a source of socio-political risk, Shell, as the acting

sovereign, constructs an inclusive exclusion of those who oppose its authority. This implies that

through its security measures Shell is constructing a security assemblage that contain specific

western values and norms, as well as restrictions and rules that the local population is expected to

adapt to and follow. We argue that this entails a type of inclusive exclusion that seeks to exclude

what does not conform to the sovereign‟s values and norms, rules and restrictions. These included-

excluded individuals or groups are seen as threats posing socio-political risks to the sovereign. An

example of this could be a local person who enters Shell territory without permission (despite the

land originally belonging to his/her people). This person is viewed as a trespasser and risks being

shot by a civilian officer who has been co-hired by Shell. This undermines the local person‟s UN

right to security of person, as described in Chapter 3, and is an example of Shell‟s right to security

being placed above the right of the local population. We thus argue that a hierarchy of rights is

being constructed within these security assemblages, where local citizens who do not follow the

sovereign‟s (i.e. Shell‟s) rules are excluded from certain rights.

It has been difficult to pinpoint the exact values, norms, knowledge and technology in this

assemblage as reliable information regarding the PSCs and what they actually do has been difficult

to obtain. When it comes to knowledge and technology it is possible to argue that the PSCs bring

with them a level of expertise in policing the various types of civil unrest that might occur in the

wake of the oil companies‟ operations. But to pinpoint exactly how this knowledge and technology

are a part of the assemblage is difficult to assess. However, the two practices, CSR and SLO, can

arguably be regarded as technologies of power and here the PSCs have a role as well. The PSCs

exemplify marketized security by creating value from their knowledge and expertise on how Shell

can mitigate the socio-political risk in the Niger Delta by implementing the two practices.

5.8. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter

Shell has a long history of corruption, harsh security measures and different types of violation with

regard to the rights of local populations in the Niger Delta. This is something that is deeply

embedded within the minds of the local population and is one of the main reasons for the ongoing

conflicts and unrest in the area. Furthermore, we argue that the emergence of private security actors

is a result of a weak government attempting to maintain some level of control, as it is unable to

provide proper security in and of itself. Additionally, the incorporation of private security actors

into the Nigerian security configuration serves the Nigerian government‟s economic interests,

which are bound up in oil production. However, Shell‟s use of „Other‟ security measures has linked

it to human rights violations, severely damaging its global reputation and its social license to

operate in the Niger Delta region. As a result, we argue that Shell has encountered intense global

pressure to adopt new business practices such as CSR and SLO. Therefore we argue that CSR and

security have become inseparable entities, meaning that CSR plays a significant role in the

preventative segment because it is through CSR that a company builds good relations with local

populations. Also, one of the security management logics of incorporating CSR and acquiring an

SLO is that these are likely to prevent local populations from wanting to „get back at the company‟

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because their rights have been neglected. Furthermore, we argue that incorporating these practices

to mitigate socio-political risks constitutes a new way of governing, where hard security measures

are increasingly being combined with soft, preventative ones. Shell‟s attempts to eliminate the

socio-political risks posed by local protestors can be seen as a form of exclusion of those who do

not want to comply with Shell‟s norms, values and restrictions. This means that Shell is constituted

as the local sovereign power through the construction of new security assemblages which consists

of both private and public security actors. Additionally, a weak, corrupt and desperate government

has enabled Shell‟s dominance and control in the region, allowing the TNC to influence policies

and regulations. From this we argue that Shell has had a significant impact on the configuration of

sovereignty, which has arguably created a hierarchy of rights in the region.

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Chapter 6. Colombia: the case of coal-mining companies and

fragmented sovereignty

This chapter seeks to answer the sub-question „How does marketized security affect the way

transnational corporations interact with stakeholder communities?‟

6.1. Case introduction

In 2006, Drummond, an American coal company, was accused of playing a significant role in the

murder of trade union members in Colombia, where the company was operating several coal mines

(PAX 2015:83). Drummond was acquitted by the US courts, but there is still an ongoing appeal

against the verdict (ibid.). Nevertheless, the case was not without its repercussions, and a globalized

trade network made sure that it had consequences even in Denmark. Here, DONG Energy, whose

primary stakeholder is the Danish state,18

was a purchaser of coal mined by Drummond in

Colombia. The accusations of murder immediately led to DONG Energy cease purchasing coal

from Drummond, as they simply did not want to have their company associated with such behavior

(Fagbladet 3F 2007).

Ten years later, on January 1, 2016, an article on the bloody history of Colombian coal-mining was

printed in the Danish newspaper „Information’. The article described how DONG Energy was

buying coal from the Colombian coal-mining company Prodeco, which is owned by Glencore, the

world‟s biggest trader in raw materials (Information 2016). Prodeco has been accused of

participating in the murder of trade union members (ibid.), just as Drummond was a decade earlier.

This time, however, the reaction from DONG was not as swift as it had been with the Drummond

incident some ten years earlier, and it was not until mid-April that DONG officially cut its ties with

Prodeco (Paxforpeace 2016). As with the Drummond incident, DONG Energy vowed not to do any

further trading with Prodeco until the company met DONG Energy‟s requirement for responsible

sourcing (DONG Energy 2016).

The newspaper article was inspired and sourced by a report published by a Dutch NGO called PAX

(Information, 2016), which mapped out the Colombian coal-mining industry‟s involvement in

violations of human rights. According to DONG Energy itself, it has not done any business with

Prodeco since May 2015 (DONG Letter, 2016). Despite the fact that DONG Energy was not in

business with Prodeco at the time the article was printed, the article still managed to frame DONG

and give the company negative publicity by suggesting that DONG‟s trading in Colombia was

unethical.

One of the primary aspects of the discussion of DONG‟s ties with the Colombian coal industry has

been the extraction companies‟ involvement with paramilitary forces and other non-state violent

actors. The Danish public is not familiar with the kind of conflict seen in this case, but the

involvement of non-state actors in violent conflict is nothing out of the ordinary in Colombia. Since

18

The Danish state has sold many of its shares to both foreign and domestic investors, but still holds 60%.

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independence in 1819 the overall internal security situation in Colombia has been greatly affected

by private actors (Rochlin 2015: 1-3). Historically, the Colombian state has been weak and has

never really been able to uphold a monopoly of violence within its territory. Instead, security has

been privatized and dispersed among a range of („non‟-state) actors and public authorities in the

country (ibid.). The types of non-state actors vary from the private militias of caudillos19

to

politically entrenched paramilitary groups and from community defense groups to drug cartels

(Rochlin 2015; Richani 2007). The dispersed security in Colombia has meant that various economic

enterprises in the country have sometimes existed in complete dislocated from official state

structures (Rochlin 2015: 2). This makes Colombia an interesting case for our thesis, but also a

complicated one, since there arguably already exists a variety of security assemblages external to

the central government in the country. The dislocation of security apparatuses from the state is

especially interesting when we look at how transnational corporations provide security for their

operations and how they create demands for security that affects its configuration.

6.2. Outline

Before we discuss how TNCs affect security in Colombia, we will first describe the history of

internal security in the country. We start from the conflict between the government and the rebel

group FARC and show this conflict as an example of the fragmented sovereignty of the Colombian

state. In continuation, we look at how the government implemented a US counterinsurgency

doctrine and how that spawned right-wing paramilitary groups. The groups we will primarily be

referring to are the AUC and JAAF, which we consider to be non-state actors, as they act on their

own and are financed primarily by private actors. However, they do have unofficial ties to the state

military through training and personnel switching from the military to the paramilitary groups. After

we have described the overall security situation, we will proceed to the more specific example of

the coal-mining companies of Drummond and Prodeco and their operations in the Cesar

Department. This section of the chapter uses the PAX report as its primary source for describing the

crimes committed by the paramilitary groups at the instance of the two coal-mining companies. We

have included a few statements from the actors directly involved in the crimes and some supporting

evidence so that we can arrive at an accurate picture of what transpired in and around the coal

mines. This description of the historical events is necessary to establish a foundation on which to

analyze the assemblage created by the state, the coal-mining companies and the paramilitary

groups. The assemblage is accordingly analyzed in the next section of the chapter by incorporating

the theory presented in Chapter 3. After we have „mapped‟ out the assemblage, we will look at how

it has affected DONG Energy as described in the beginning of this chapter, and how the two

practices of governance described in Chapter 4 are relevant to this example. Finally, we conclude

19

Directly translates from Spanish as „leader‟ but in a South American setting its common use is more like a mixture of

warlord and landlord. The term was used to describe landowners in the post-independence era of Colombia (and other

South American countries) who often used private militias to rule their lands.

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by incorporating our view of Agamben‟s theory of sovereignty and look at how the assemblage is

affecting the configuration of rights.

6.3. Background on the security situation in Colombia

The security situation in Colombia has a long and intricate history, with perpetual conflict from the

country‟s birth until the present. Although highly interesting for anyone with interests in social and

political science, the failed state-building of Colombia since its independence in 1819 is not

something we will go into; rather, we will look at how present-day security is configured in

Colombia and how it came to be configured in this way.

On June 23, 2016, the Colombian government, led by President Santos, met with the leader of the

communist rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC (The Guardian

2016). At the meeting the two parties entered the final stages of peace negotiations, formally ending

a half-century-long war. When FARC was officially formed in 1966, its agenda was primarily

concerned with land reforms and a national redistribution of wealth, and it was heavily influenced

by the Latin American peasant guerilla doctrine made famous by Ché Guevara and Fidel Castro

(Rochlin 2015: 2). It is no coincidence that FARC focused heavily on land reforms, as land-

ownership has been the historical center of gravity for much of the civil violence in the country

(Richani 2007: 405).

Even before FARC came into being, land was heavily contested to a degree where non-state actors

have acted as public authorities or governing bodies, leaving sovereignty in the country severely

fragmented (ibid.). As a response to the FARC insurgency, in 1968 the Colombian government

passed a law that allowed civilians to carry arms and to organize, effectively, thus legalizing the

formation of paramilitary groups (ibid.: 406). Not only did this law underline the weakness of the

Colombian government, it also further reinforced the de-monopolizing of the use of violence. Even

though the law was repealed in 1988, paramilitary groups had already been formed and gained

financial capacity through their involvement with drug cartels in the early 1990s (ibid.: 405-407).

These paramilitaries started as support units for the Colombian military in the fight against

insurgent groups such as FARC, but the extreme economic boom in the narcotics industry helped

the creation of formal paramilitary groups (ibid.). FARC had formerly relied on income from narco-

trafficking, but it was largely replaced by the new right-wing paramilitary groups, as they were

better aligned ideologically with the drug cartels (ibid.). One of these groups, the Autodefensas

Unida de Colombia (AUC), even proclaimed themselves to be „defenders of capitalism‟ (Rochlin

2015: 2). As the paramilitaries were meant to help counter the left-wing insurgency of FARC, they

quickly became a tool of the political class of landowners, whose interests directly opposed those of

FARC (ibid.). This class included the drug-cartels that needed land for the production of cocaine,

but also ranchers, miners and other types of landowners (ibid.).

The right-wing paramilitary groups, particularly the AUC, became the defenders of landowners, just

like private militias had been to the caudillos a century before. These landowners, present-day

caudillos, and the right-wing paramilitary groups may be operating outside of legal government

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structures, but they are still interconnected with the state through their function as counter-

insurgents (Richani 2007: 408). Despite the paramilitary groups being an extension of the state

military, in terms of counterinsurgency at least, they are contributing to the fragmentation of the

government‟s public authority and conventional ideas concerning sovereignty. Alongside the

insurgents and the present-day caudillos, the paramilitaries create their own pockets of sovereignty

in which they enforce their own ideologies and practices of governance.

6.4. Foreign Extraction Companies and Fragmented Sovereignty

The question of sovereignty is something foreign investors and corporations consider before

investing in Colombia. In fact, Colombia was considered a costly place to invest in for many years

(Deheza 2012). Yet despite the costs and the risks involved in investing in Colombia, there was still

a strong foreign interest in the resources Colombian has to offer, as risk and first-mover high returns

seldom discourage entrepreneurial investors. And the mining industries are important to the

Colombian economy. In 2006, the former President Uribe initiated new mining polices to encourage

foreign investment in the sector, and his successor, President Santos, even proclaimed the mining

sector to be the most important driver of the Colombian economy (Moor 2014: 16). As of 2013,

exploitation of mines and quarries contributed $20.3 billion to the country‟s GDP, or 7.7% of the

total (Wacaster 2013: 1).

In the same year, Colombia produced 103.9 megatonnes of coal, with the majority being produced

in the Cesar and La Guajira Departments (ibid.: 5). In the Cesar Department, the biggest producer is

the American coal-mining company Drummond. Despite the accusations described in the

introduction to this chapter, Drummond remains the largest producer of coal in Colombia and

accounts for a third of the country‟s entire production (ibid.). Prodeco, the company that got DONG

Energy into trouble, also mines in the Cesar Department. Drummond operates two mines in the

Cesar Department, the La Loma mine and the smaller El Descanso mine, while Prodeco runs the

Figur 2. The mentioned mines in the Cesar Department. Adapted from Google Maps with our own additions.

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Calenturitas and the La Jagua mines (Wacaster 2013; Moor 2014). These mines are portrayed in the

map above.

As part of its counterinsurgency activities in 1996, the AUC20

sent sixty paramilitary soldiers into

the Cesar region to protect the established economic elite and caudillos in the region from left-wing

insurgent attacks. In the following years, the number of paramilitaries present in the region rose into

the hundreds, which, according to testimonies given by a former paramilitary commander, was

encouraged by a request by Drummond (Moor 2014: 22). In late 1999, the Juan Andrés Álvarez

Front (JAAF) was formed by the AUC to combat insurgencies specifically around the Drummond

and Prodeco mines in the Cesar region (ibid.: 23). The Cesar Department was, like the rest of

Colombia, plagued by violence before the paramilitaries arrived, but this intensified, and the AUC

and JAAF alone are reckoned to be responsible for the displacement of an estimated 59,000 people

and the killings of at least 86521

(ibid.: 22). According to the PAX report mentioned in the

introduction to this chapter, these figures are based on testimonies given often by ex-paramilitaries

affiliated with either the AUC or specifically the JAAF. One of the testimonies given was by José

Alvarracín, alias El Canoso, an undercover army intelligence sergeant stationed in Prodeco‟s

security department between 1996-1998 (Moor 2014: 115). He testified in a US Court in 2009, as

part of the lawsuit against Drummond brought by families of the victims of violence near their

mines in Colombia, that:

Most of the homicides that were committed during that time were done at the hand of

the paramilitaries who arrived at El Silencio [...] With the arrival of this group to the

area [...] a crime wave swept the area at night and in the Justice and Peace process22

it

is being confessed that back then the commando ordered the daily murder of 30 to 40

people. (Moor 2014: 26)

Another testimony was given to the same court by the former leader of JAAF, Jhon Cuadrado, alias

El Tigre, who was an officer in the Colombian army before joining the paramilitary forces. He

stated that:

Up to the year 2009, I had confessed to 720 killings. [...] There have been many more

versions where I have accepted responsibility for many more killings, but I can‟t give

you a count right now. But I would venture to say that it‟s around a thousand to fifteen

hundred killings approximately by the JAA Front. (Moor 2014: 26)

20

AUC was effectively an umbrella organization for right-wing paramilitary groups across Colombia. It was formed by

the ACCU (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá), a local paramilitary group, around the time the

paramilitaries entered the Cesar Department (Moor 2014: 22). Therefore, it was technically the ACCU who deployed its

troops in Cesar, but it is unclear how many of the troops were deployed under the auspices of AUC or ACCU. So for

the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the umbrella organization, AUC.

21 865 is the number of killings that the PAX report was able to verify, but they estimate that 2,600 killings took place at

the hands of the paramilitaries in the period between 1996 and 2006.

22 The Justice and Peace process was introduced by the Colombian authorities to try and bring truth to the families of

the victims and shed light on the methods and structures of paramilitary forces in Colombia (Moor, 2014: 14).

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These atrocities were committed in the near vicinity of the Drummond and Prodeco mines, and the

area El Canoso refers to, El Silencio, is located just a few kilometers south of the La Loma mine. As

mentioned earlier, the AUC entered the region to counter the insurgency, and in particular FARC,

and not necessarily to provide security for the two coal companies. However, the distinction

between ideology and private company security is not clear cut.

Formally, FARC fought for opposing ideologies and against what they believed to be harmful

injustices in their society, where foreign investors together with national elites exploited Columbian

farmers. This thus made FARC a socio-political risk to the coal companies, combatting which

would involve the civilian population as well as FARC insurgents themselves. In his testimony, El

Tigre recalls a meeting with Alfredo Araújo Castro, the Manager of Community Relations in

Drummond Colombia,23

and Rodrigo Pupo, alias Jorge 40, a high commander in AUC and founder

of JAAF, the purpose of which was to discuss the FARC‟s presence around the Drummond mines.

In his written testimony, El Tigre suggested:

„In order to comply with the purpose of subduing the guerrillas and providing security

to Drummond in its mine and railroad line, my Front needed 200 men that were

armed, equipped, and trained. Araújo was in agreement. He said the following words

to us: “Drummond is willing to provide a sum of money so that your group can

strengthen itself with men and arms, as long as you commit to providing security to

the railroad line and the coal operations in the mine.” By “security” I mean that we

were told by Araújo that the areas along the Drummond rail line that had a FARC

presence had to be attacked and pacified. We all understood this. (Moor 2014: 53; El

Tigre 2009: 4).

Whether or not the AUC moved into the Cesar Department solely to combat FARC or they had

intentions of making money out of the volatile situation between FARC and the coal-miners is

difficult to assess. But in terms of mitigating socio-political „risk‟, both Drummond and Prodeco

have actively benefitted from the AUC counterinsurgency in the area surrounding their mines, as it

pushed FARC out of the region, making it difficult for FARC to carry out operations in the area.

The companies also actively promoted counter-insurgency or „security‟ activities. El Canoso

testified that Drummond and Prodeco consulted each other when it came to paying the

paramilitaries:

After we contacted Drummond, we held a joint staff meeting of Prodeco and

Drummond‟s security teams at the casino within Drummond‟s facilities. From

Drummond‟s security team the following people attended: Rafael Peña Ríos, a retired

General; Luis Carlos Rodriguez, a retired Colonel; some retired officials named

Carlos Sastre, Mario Otero, Cesar Agudelo, Néstor Rodriguez, Wilmer Aguerre and

Orlando Ramirez. There was also an American present who was part of Drummond‟s

23

A 100% controlled subsidiary of Drummond.

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security team, Jim Adkins. From Prodeco´s security team the following people

attended: Manuel Gutierrez; Luis Hernando Ochoa; Javier Recaman, a retired military

official who currently works in the Calenturitas mine as Security Chief; and myself.

At this meeting we discussed and we all agreed that we would support the AUC with

money for arms and supplies. We also agreed that we would give the AUC a monthly

payment to cover the salaries, food, and costs of the AUC troops. We also agreed to

buy the AUC some vehicles and supply them with fuel. There was no objection to any

of these agreements from anyone present (Moor 2014: 57; El Canoso 2011: 4).

Running a 200-man paramilitary group is not cheap, and El Canoso claims that the monthly

payment made to the group was approximately $100,000 at the time (Moor 2014: 57). Obviously,

paying for security is not the same thing as accommodating murders and forced displacements, but

James Adkins, the head of security at Drummond (and former CIA agent accused of participating in

human rights violations in Nicaragua), allegedly told the management of Drummond that funding

paramilitary groups „would bring with it egregious human rights violations‟ (Moor 2014: 30). The

same kind of concern was shared by the US Embassy in Colombia. WikiLeaks intercepted cables

sent from the embassy in Bogotá to the US Department of State suggesting that the embassy had

concerns with Drummond‟s approach to environmental issues, labor issues and links to paramilitary

death squads (El Espectador 2011). At the same time, the embassy noted that security in

northeastern Colombia (the Cesar Department) had been improved since Drummond and Prodeco

began hiring paramilitaries to provide it (ibid).

Thus, the security situation in the Cesar Department and the region surrounding the mines was

greatly affected by the presence of the mining companies. Without the mining companies, the

FARC insurgency would probably still have manifested itself, as the struggle was also a territorial

struggle, and therefore the counterinsurgency of AUC would likewise have happened regardless of

the mining companies. But the direct funding of the paramilitary forces impacted the situation in the

region, as it empowered the counter-insurgent groups financially. The volatile security situation in

the region made it a socio-political and economic risk to invest in for the mining companies, but the

latter still took advantage of the fragmented and contested question of sovereignty in the country

and region. Even if the government forces had been able to provide adequate security in the region,

it would probably not have been able to help Drummond and Prodeco out in the same way as the

paramilitary forces were. The forced displacement and the killings of civilians were all part of a

counterinsurgency doctrine that was supposed to terrorize the civilian population into not

supporting the insurgency, but it ended up improving the security situation for the mining

companies as well. However, the PAX report is full of further testimonies that indicates that

Drummond and Prodeco officials gave direct orders to the paramilitary forces to kill union leaders

and civilians, as well as undertake forced displacement (Moor 2014). Regardless of how one

interprets these testimonies, it is clear that both Drummond and Prodeco have had a severe impact

on the security situation in the Cesar Department of Colombia and that the contested notion of

public authority and state sovereignty has represented both risks and opportunities for the

companies to forge new alliances.

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6.5. Security Assemblages

The fragmented and contested organization of sovereignty in Colombia makes it complex to map

out the security assemblage that is being created in and around the coal mines in Cesar as authority

is dispersed among multiple groups. One could argue that the different groups that are committing

violence and engaging in providing security in the region are a sign of how the monopoly of

violence is being contested and is clearly not controlled by the state. Instead, groups like AUC,

while acting as an extension of this fragmented monopoly, utilize the violence for their own ends

outside the sphere promoted by state regulation. On the other hand, the FARC insurgency, a

challenge to the state‟s monopoly on violence, was kept at bay by the counter-insurgency. The laws

enacted to allow the formation of paramilitary groups can be seen as an attempt by the state to use

unconventional means to try to regain its monopoly of violence by promoting non-state actors to

counter the insurgency. When the counterinsurgents, the paramilitaries, became (too) powerful, the

state again tried to regain control the situation by banning the formation of paramilitary groups once

again.

This puts the Colombian government in the middle of the two schools of assemblage theory that we

defined in Chapter 3. On one hand, the Colombian government is losing its authority due to the new

configuration of security that is being created by insurgents (and subsequently the

counterinsurgents), while on the other hand it is trying to reconfigure the enacting of its monopoly

of violence to keep its sovereignty centralized. So we can see that when the coal-mining companies

began to interfere with the security situation in the Cesar Department, this merely reinforced the

state‟s dilemma over matters of sovereignty. On one side, the companies represent a source of

income and the potential for economic growth, but the government cannot provide sufficient

security measures, so they draw on other sources of security provision. On the other side, the

measures of security that are taken by the companies are seen from the perspective of more

conventional understandings of sovereignty, thus weakening the authority of the state by letting

non-state actors perform acts of violence in their place. The attempts to regulate the paramilitary

forces are a sign of the Colombian state trying to reconfigure itself in accordance with the

developing security situation in the country. But the lack of ability to contain both FARC and the

paramilitaries suggests that the authority of the Colombian government is being decentered.

In this thesis, we argue that the second of the two schools of assemblages we defined in Chapter 3 is

the most significant for analyzing the example of Columbia. Even though the Colombian state has

seemingly been „weak‟, with its sovereignty fragmented, ever since the country‟s independence, we

argue that the laws enacted (and later repealed) indicate how the state has tried to reconfigure itself

according to events both within and external to it. The formation of paramilitary forces is an

example of what, from a reified Weberian perspective, are considered to be the conventional

security functions were disassembled in accordance with Sassen‟s theory of assemblages described

in Chapter 3 and partly transferred to non-state actors. In this case, we argue that paramilitary forces

were created as an extension to the already existing security apparatus of the state, but without a

centralized or direct control or command. When the coal-mining companies entered Cesar, a new

demand for security was created, which the paramilitaries stepped in to fulfill. In doing so, they

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received an influx of financial support from the TNCs in order to expand on their capacities as

counterinsurgents and security providers. The strengthened paramilitary forces cooperate with their

foreign financiers to uphold security based on the coal-miners‟ demands, which in turn re-assemble

the security functions in the region. The paramilitaries and the coal-mining companies become the

new actors in the (re)-configuration of the security assembly, but the state is still present, as the

mining companies need licenses to operate the mines, and the paramilitaries still have ties to the

Colombian army. This local security assemblage becomes globalized through the coal-mining

companies, as they are not only foreign24

companies but TNCs trying to supply a global demand for

coal.

As described in Chapter 3, an assemblage implies a set of norms and values, as well as shared

knowledge and technologies. In terms of values and norms, the coal-mining companies are

capitalistic ventures, while, as described earlier, the AUC is a self-proclaimed defender of

capitalism. The Colombian state, in adhering to a conservative and liberal form of governance, is

also a part of the capitalistic set of norms, as it not only allows but also encourages foreign and

private corporations to invest in the country‟s earth-extraction industry. On this note, the Colombian

government is seemingly going for a rentier-state25

approach to exploiting the natural resources in

the country economically by taking royalties for the extraction of exhaustible resources. This

economic process creates revenues that do not affect any domestic production and thus do not

encourage even economic growth (Mahdavy 1970). On the other hand, FARC opposes these ideas

of capitalism and fights for land reforms and redistribution of wealth. This direct opposition to the

norms and values underpinning the security assemblage created by the above-mentioned actors is

what makes FARC the common enemy and source of the socio-political risk incurred by the coal

mining companies when operating in the Cesar Department.

The socio-political risk that FARC constitutes is what brings together and connects the coal-mining

corporations, the paramilitary forces and the government in the security assemblage. The

implication is that FARC should also be considered part of the assemblage. In terms of the

knowledge and technologies that are shared in the assemblage, there is not much indication of any

kind of traditional „technology‟ as a technical device having a central role in the assemblage. There

is, however, clear knowledge dissemination related to how the counterinsurgency doctrine was

organized and implemented. The doctrine, then, can be seen as a technology of power that seeks to

govern a specific set of actors, namely left-wing insurgencies. The law that allowed for the

formation of the paramilitary forces was, for example, drawn up in accordance with a Cold War

24

Drummond in Colombia is technically Drummond Ltd. Colombia and is registered as Colombian, though in fact it is

a 100% controlled subsidiary of Drummond Ltd. based in Alabama, USA. The same goes for Prodeco, which is a

subsidiary of Glencore, the Swiss mega-corporation.

25 Not in the sense Lenin described it, but in its present-day usage postulated by Hossein Mahdavy (1970).

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doctrine26

on counterinsurgency originally formulated by the US (Richani 2007: 406). This doctrine

had already been implemented by the Colombian military through its training by the US at the

School of Americas,27

but the law made it an official doctrine of the Colombian state, at least until it

was repealed (ibid.). As such, already before the coal companies meddled with the security situation

in Cesar, there was a sharing of knowledge between Colombia and the US on how to conduct and

organize counterinsurgency. Three of the persons described earlier in this chapter all exemplify (and

embody) this shared knowledge and how it helped configure the assemblage. James Adkins, the

head of security in Drummond, was a former CIA agent and must have been well aware on the

utilities of the counterinsurgency doctrine in question. El Canoso was an undercover sergeant in

Prodeco‟s security division and had thus been trained by the military, which had implemented the

doctrine. Lastly, El Tigre, the former leader of JAAF, was an officer in the Colombian army before

joining the paramilitary forces. All three shared the knowledge and technology of countering

insurgencies in accordance to the same doctrine and are connected through the assemblage, each

representing their own segment of the actors involved. Additionally, this shared knowledge and

technology also exemplifies marketized security as described in chapter 4, specifically the aspects

of financialization that is concerned with everyday knowledge. It is the knowledge gained through

the experiences of the three abovementioned actors that constitutes the shared knowledge and the

technology of power that the counterinsurgency doctrine becomes. The experience James Adkins

brings from his time as a CIA agent is valuable to Drummond as he brings a particular everyday

knowledge on how to, in a particular way, manage the socio-political risk encountered by the

company. The nature of El Canoso’s job makes it difficult to relate his role to financialization.

While he also do provide a particular everyday knowledge he does so under the auspices of the

Colombian army and thus do not contribute with any value creation to the assemblage. Similarly,

one could argue that El Tigre has ideological reasons for his participation and sharing of his

everyday knowledge, but the fact that the coal mining companies paid JAAF suggests that his role

could be seen as marketized security. As he is being paid to contribute with his knowledge he

creates monetary value for the JAAF by supplying a demand raised by the coal companies.

6.6. The Danish Connection

As mentioned earlier, the assemblage became global not only through its international connection

between the US and Colombia, but also through the coal-mining companies‟ global presence on the

market for thermal coal. This is where DONG Energy comes into the picture. The overall interest in

Colombia in this thesis was sparked by the newspaper articles described in the introduction to this

chapter. Having mapped out the security assemblage that DONG inadvertently became a part of, we

26

The doctrine worked on the assumption that an insurgency is rooted in the local population, so in order to combat it,

one would need to subvert the locals against the insurgency. This is easiest done by terrorizing the population,

according to the doctrine (Richani 2007: 406-407).

27 Its current name is Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC).

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can now focus on how a localized security situation in Cesar, Colombia, has affected this Danish

energy company through an unforeseen and so far unaccounted for form of socio-political risk.

When we first read the articles related to the DONG controversy, we set out to get an interview with

a representative from DONG Energy, but when we contacted them we were just referred to a

document DONG had released regarding the company‟s coal procurement practices (DONG Energy

2016). We were somewhat baffled as to why DONG did not want to give us their side of the story,

but in all fairness the document did provide a lot of answers to the questions we would have asked.

The document describes how suppliers undergo risk-based investigations to make sure they

accommodate DONG‟s own CSR policy (ibid). DONG also acknowledges that events dating back

even ten to twenty years need to be accounted for and that a barrier to involvement is created if such

past events violate their CSR policies (ibid.). Obviously such considerations were taken into

account after their business relationship with both Drummond and Prodeco began, but the document

also testifies to an increase in awareness concerning historical events as well (ibid.). This suggests

that the question of socio-political risks has travelled from being related to the here and now event

to include the past as something that may stimulate a concern for risk-analysis. The issue of a time

„discrepancy‟ is prevalent in this entire chapter as well. The events depicted in the Cesar

Department primarily happened from 1996 to 2006, making it difficult to analyze what parts of the

assemblage still function today. However, the PAX report suggests that some of the crimes

perpetrated in 1996-2006 are being repeated today despite an attempt to de-mobilize the

paramilitary forces (Moor 2014). Furthermore, it has been difficult (impossible even) to gather any

information on the CSR policies of the mining companies involved in that time period. In fact,

Prodeco‟s website there is no mention of any form of CSR initiatives until 2014 (Prodeco 2014). On

Glencore‟s website, the first mentions of CSR initiatives dates back to 2010 and includes some

examples of initiatives related to Colombia (Glencore 2005-2016). On Drummond‟s website, both

for Drummond and its Colombian subsidiary, they highlight a variety of CSR-related initiatives but

give no timeline on when these initiatives were introduced (Drummond 2016).

In terms of CSR as a practice of governance, then, it is difficult to determine what direct impact it

may have had on the assemblage described in this chapter because of the time discrepancy. It is,

however, safe to say that the historical events that happened in Cesar hasaffect DONG Energy

negatively due to a lack of a due diligence in terms of the company‟s CSR. Even though the

negative externalities were perpetrated by other companies, it still affected DONG‟s reputation to

such a degree that it had to ramp up its CSR policy in response. Taking into consideration the fact

that the coal-mining companies involved seem to have only recently begun to emphasize CSR-

related initiatives, this could suggest that a change has happened in how corporations regard the

relevance of CSR. Furthermore, as our interviewees indicated (see Chapter 4), risk management and

CSR policies have become intertwined in recent years to such a degree that CSR has become a form

of risk mitigation. As such, the recent CSR policies introduced by the companies involved are an

indication of how they are trying to mitigate the socio-political risks differently from how this was

done in earlier periods (principally 1996-2006). For Drummond, most of the initiatives it has

undertaken are related to providing for education in the Cesar Department, as well as for the proper

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resettlement of those directly affected by the coal mines (Drummond Ltd. 2016). Resettlement of

the population is also the subject of Prodeco‟s only CSR initiative (Prodeco 2014).

These kinds of initiative are far from the brutal counterinsurgency doctrine strategies and

technologies of power utilized in 1996-2006, which included forced displacements, disappearances

and killings. The CSR initiatives are apparently an attempt to obtain a social license to operate in

the region surrounding the coal mines rather than terrorizing the population into compliance. As

discussed in Chapter 4, obtaining a social license to operate is a way to mitigate any socio-political

risk that the local population might impose. In Cesar, Colombia, the local population posed a risk in

terms of the counterinsurgency doctrine, but the peace negotiations with FARC have lessened this

risk, as local populations no longer play a direct role in the insurgency. As such, the risk that the

local population poses today is of a different character than during the FARC insurgency. As the

various initiatives indicate, it is much more about winning over local populations in order to ensure

free-running and effective production at the mines than forcing the population away and „rooting

out‟ FARC units.28

However, it is difficult either to verify or disprove the claims emerging from the PAX report

regarding the persistence of the atrocities committed by the paramilitaries today, and the same goes

for verifying whether the different CSR policies are actually having any effect. The Colombian

government denies that paramilitary forces are still in operation in the country, but various NGOs

and news outlets report that incidents involving right-wing paramilitaries are still happening despite

the demobilization process (Hanson 2008; Brodzinsky 2016; Alsema 2016). But it does seem as if

both FARC and the paramilitary forces have reduced their presence in the security assemblage

related to the coal mines in Cesar (and maybe the rest of Colombia). As such, the assemblage

described previously in the chapter is probably no longer constituted in the same manner with

paramilitary units taking on the same functions or configuration as they did during 1996-2006.

At the same time, the CSR initiatives implemented by the coal-mining companies showcase a

different approach to socio-political risk management, which also alters the configuration of the

assemblage that surrounds the coal mines. Despite the differences between the past and today‟s

configurations of security, we will look at the assemblage that includes the coal-mining companies,

the Colombian government and the paramilitary forces to see how this configuration has affected

the right to security described in Chapter 3. After all, it was this configuration that landed DONG

Energy in trouble, and not what is going on today.

6.7. Interim Conclusion to the Chapter

To conclude this chapter, we will consider how the assemblage has reconfigured the right to

security. We have already identified the core actors in the assemblage as the coal-mining

28

The current US counterinsurgency doctrine has followed a similar development where winning hearts and minds has

become a central part of the doctrine, so it is no longer a purely violent response to a violent insurgency.

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companies, the Colombian government and the paramilitary forces, namely the JAAF. But DONG

Energy, like any other corporation that buys coal from either Drummond or Prodeco, also plays a

significant role in the assemblage, as they create the demand for Colombian coal. And the civilian

population and FARC are also playing their parts as representing the opposition. It should come as

no surprise that the right to security (as described by the UN – see Chapter 3) was grossly

disregarded in the region around the mines. The violations might have been committed by the

JAAF, and the AUC committed similar atrocities elsewhere in Colombia as well, but the funding

for them came from the coal-mining companies. It is impossible to say whether the violence in

Cesar would have happened regardless of the coal-miners‟ presence. Instead we argue that the

payments to and direct involvement with the counterinsurgency is enough to assume a significant

impact on the re-configuration of sovereignty in the area. The people who suffered were primarily

FARC members and civilian supporters of FARC, but in fact anyone who happened to reside in the

area around the mines fell victim to the paramilitaries‟ crimes.

As such, the attempts to eliminate the socio-political risk posed by these people became a form of

exclusion. The paramilitary forces were essentially civilians as well, but the shared interests of both

the coal-miners and the government legitimized them as part of the assemblage. Therefore, the

attempt to eliminate the socio-political risks surrounding the coal mines was a form of inclusive

exclusion that sought to diminish the influence of the forces that did not share the values and norms

of the coal-miners and the government by including the forces that did. The question of sovereignty,

then, is related back to the history of Colombia and how its sovereignty seems perpetually

fragmented because this is the case here as well. The coal-mining companies seemingly became the

sovereign by enabling the paramilitary forces, though these forces were only an extension of the

government. And this extension was made because the Colombian government was not able to

contain the left-wing insurgency itself. As a result, sovereignty was highly fragmented by the three

primary actors.

The inclusive exclusion performed by the assemblage was essentially what got DONG Energy into

trouble, as it did not comply with what was expected of a CSR and as such, CSR becomes

something that governs the assemblage. Obviously, the coal-mining companies did not care about

CSR in the period from 1996 to 2006, nor SLO for that matter, but in 2016 CSR is what defined the

mistakes made by DONG. The time discrepancy in this case makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly

what practices were governing the actors in the assemblage. Furthermore, the example of DONG

Energy‟s problematic connections with Drummond and Prodeco indicate that an assemblage

potentially transcends historical context, as DONG was linked to something that supposedly ended

a decade earlier. The CSR of a company, then, does not only apply to what it does in the present,

but also to its connection to historical events and assemblages.

In sum, this Colombian example proved complex for two reasons. First, Colombian sovereignty has

seemingly been fragmented historically between the central government, caudillos, private militias,

criminal organizations and insurgents. Secondly, the events involving Drummond and Prodeco

primarily took place from 1996 to 2006, but had consequences even in 2016. We argue that, in the

period from 1996 to 2006, an assemblage was created in Cesar, Colombia, with the main actors

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being the coal-mining companies, the paramilitary forces and the government, which were all

connected by shared values, norms and knowledge. The assemblage was put together in order to

mitigate the socio-political risks imposed primarily by the FARC insurgency. The assembly

essentially functioned as an inclusive exclusion where the forces of opposing values and norms

were reduced by including forces that had similar values and norms. In this case, the right-wing

paramilitary force of JAAF was included, and enabled, to combat the FARC insurgency that

presented opposition to the coal-miners and the government. Following this argument, the coal-

mining companies became part of the fragmented sovereignty in the region alongside the

government, which in turn extended its sovereignty to the paramilitary forces. Furthermore, the type

of opposition that the assemblage was an attempt to counter seems to be significant, begging the

question of whether or not the opposition is an actual part of the assemblage. This is something we

will discuss further in the discussion chapter below.

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Chapter 7. Discussion

This chapter seeks to answer the sub-question: „How do security assemblages effect the

configuration of sovereignty and the right to security?‟

7.1. Similarities and differences

In this chapter, we will look back at the two case studies and discuss their differences and

similarities in order to define possible tendencies of a global nature. Nigeria and Colombia are both

former colonies and have vast amounts of natural resources buried in the soil. Both states have

struggled to assert their authority since their independence. In Nigeria, a very young country,

instability, corruption and military coups have meant that the government has never effectively

gained sovereign control over the vast territory and the immensely diverse ethnic composition of the

population. Colombia, whose independence goes further back than in the case of Nigeria, is also

embedded in violence. The country has a long history of struggling with civil wars, landowners

claiming sovereignty, and insurgencies. Comparatively, both countries have been subjected to what

is today often described as „weak‟ or „fragmented sovereignty‟ (Richani 2007; Kasali 2011).

Furthermore, both countries have arguably developed rentier-based economies based on their

natural resources, which in turn has created a dependency of foreign extraction companies. When

combining this dependency with the fragmentation of sovereignty, both countries have been unable

to provide adequate security to meet the demands of the foreign extraction companies, as is evident

from the number of kidnappings, thefts and sabotage the TNCs have experienced in the past. This

lack of security provision has resulted in both governments making attempts to reconfigure their

authority by outsourcing their monopoly of violence to non-state actors. The Nigerian state utilized

private security contractors in cooperation with government forces, whilst the Colombian state

legally allowed the formation of paramilitary forces in the period between 1968 and 1989.

While the two approaches are significantly different, they nonetheless share the common notion that

neither was a direct attempt to please the foreign extraction companies, but rather an instrument

used by the governments to battle civilian uprisings. For the Colombians, it was a matter of

combatting a left-wing insurgency, while the Nigerians simply tried to maintain law and order in the

country. However, we argue that the foreign extraction companies took advantage of this attempt to

reconfigure authority in order to provide security for themselves in both countries. This paved the

way for the foreign extraction companies to construct what we have depicted as their own security

assemblages. There are multiple similarities between the assemblages that were constructed in the

two countries. First, foreign extraction companies worked together with the national government.

Such cooperation has provided an extension of state authority to private actors in order to contain

the level of risk posed by the civilian population. Secondly, disputes over land and resources are

other essential examples of similarities between the two cases, as these are the root causes of the

disassembly of the previous configuration of security in both countries.

In Colombia, the FARC insurgency was primarily based on „giving the land back to the people‟ and

defending the land from capitalistic exploitation, while the local Niger Delta population in Nigeria

perceived the land used by the extraction companies as having been stolen due to the absence of

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compensation. Common to both cases is the fact that the struggle over the disputed land was what

made the re-assembly possible. The similarity identified in the re-assembly is noteworthy in terms

of how both assemblages have been re-assembled in the response to local opposition to foreign

extraction corporations. In both cases, we argue that the re-assembly creates a form of exclusion of

this opposition that happens by including the actors that portray shared values and norms – a form

of „inclusive exclusion‟. This begs the question as to whether or not the opposition is actually a part

of the assemblage rather than something that exists purely “on the outside”. To understand the

implications regarding the opposition being part of the assemblage, we will discuss how resistance

and opposition are connected to the power relations that govern the assemblage.

In both cases, the resistance provided by the opposition is what caused the disassembly of the power

configuration that was in effect before the TNCs came into play. But this „resistance‟ is also the

focal point of the re-assembly, as it is the very resistance that the re-assembled assemblage is trying

to reduce. In our cases, the resistance poses as what can be conceptualized as socio-political risk,

and we suggest that the reconfiguration of security, which includes CSR and SLO initiatives, is

being conducted to mitigate that socio-political risk. Without any resistance there would be no

disassembly and no re-assembly, thus making the opposition immanent in the assemblage. Our

theoretical approach to power relations is built upon Foucault‟s conceptualization (through

Agamben) and the idea of the opposition as immanent is pertinent to the criticisms of some scholars

of a deterministic tendency among „Foucauldians‟ (Flohr 2016:2; Heller 1996: 78-79). Rather than

regarding resistance as deterministic, and in some cases even futile, Florh and Heller interpret

resistance as immanent in all power relations in Foucault‟s conceptualization (2016: 13; 1996: 98-

100). In our two cases, this means that the opposition is immanent in the assemblage, as it is the

possibility of resistance that determines the way security is configured by the TNCs. As such, the

actors in our two cases who are directly involved in providing security, the „foot soldiers‟, are also

defined by the immanence of socio-political risk. In Colombia, the actors directly involved are the

paramilitary forces, and the nature of the opposition, FARC, made it a necessity (seen from the

perspective of both the Colombian government and the coal-mining companies) to bring in such

actors with knowledge of combatting insurgencies. In Nigeria, the opposition was less organized in

nature and became framed as a „criminal‟ kind of resistance, with a focus on local youth gangs

involved in sabotage, theft, kidnappings for ransom, etc.

Furthermore, in the Nigerian case the direct involvement of security actors in combatting „crimes‟

was effected through a combination of PSCs and government troops, whose approach is more

related to policing than the highly militarized type of security provision seen in Colombia (this may

now be changing after the peace accord). The difference in the type of resistance is equaled by the

difference in the type of actors involved in the assemblage. The type of opposition, we argue, is

important for understanding how the assemblage is configured, as it defines the actors and the

knowledge and technologies they use.

Regarding the opposition as a part of the assemblage begs the question if assemblages have no

boundaries? In assemblage theory, where the „borders‟ of such assemblages actually are or if they

can be defined at all is contested (Sassen 2006). But even with this limitation to consider, we argue

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that this provides a more profound insight into how contemporary security relations and

arrangements are possibly configured. The answer is that „borders‟ cannot easily be defined as they

are in constant motion – if they are not fluent and capable of adaptation, they would quickly become

redundant or less effective (this is obviously also the case where laws and rules that are often less

flexible provide particular challenges for such security assemblages, as discussed below).

7.2. Conflicting security practices

If we take this a step further in the direction of fluid borders, it becomes clear that the stakeholders

involved are not confined to Nigerian or Colombian territory (see definition of stakeholder

communities in chapter 2). This includes those who are connected to the TNC in indirect ways, such

as the Danish company DONG, which had previously bought coal from Prodeco. This also means

that DONG‟s stakeholders, which means that both the Danish government and its citizens have

become active actors in the security assemblage. By this statement, we mean that through increased

global awareness of Prodeco‟s involvement in human rights violations, Danish stakeholders have

put immense pressure on DONG to „cut all ties‟ with the TNC. DONG, as shown in Chapter 6,

hesitated for a while but eventually had to give in to the media pressure to save its image and

reputation. We argue that the same type of global stakeholder pressure is currently forcing Shell and

Prodeco to incorporate new practices which counter the socio-political risks posed by the

stakeholder community into their security provision in both the Niger Delta and the Cesar region.

However, these new „soft‟ preventative security practices (CRS and SLO) seem to conflict with the

historical implementation of „hard‟ security practices by the two TNCs as portrayed in the case

studies. As already shown in Chapters 5 and 6, there are many examples of how these security

practices have disregarded the local population‟s right to security of the person, and instead

constructed a hierarchy of rights by placing their own right to security at the top.

On the other hand, these soft security practices have also increasingly been incorporated into the

image of these companies, and therefore they have become integrated aspects of the company‟s

product. An example of this could be a company promoting itself as sustainable, which many

western stakeholders want to be associated with, thus choosing these products over non-sustainable

ones. This means that there is a market for soft practices that deal with socio-political risks, which

we argue has had a significant impact on the global security and risk industry. Our argument

therefore is that, even though it represents a large financial cost for Shell, Prodeco and Drummond

to invest in local improvement initiatives, these TNCs are increasingly realizing that contemporary

market forces dictates the incorporation of soft practices over hard ones.

7.3. Implementing soft security and practices

In Nigeria, resistance to the oil companies has primarily been labeled as criminal activities.

Therefore, initiatives such as job-creation programs and education, are likely to be the most

effective way of obtaining SLO. On the other hand, in Colombia, where the resistance has largely

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been labeled as political violence, CSR initiatives such as education, the settlement of land disputes

and environmental initiatives would be most effective in acquiring SLO in the area. Social license

to operate transcends the two levels of home and host country, as it needs to be obtained at both,

though each level sets up its own requirements for such a license. In the host country it relates back

to the CSR initiatives and whether or not they suffice in mitigating any opposition to the TNC‟s

presence. In the home country, it is apparently more geared towards ensuring the public that what

the TNC is doing in the host country accords with the values and norms of the general public. As

such, the social license to operate is what connects the two levels of home and host country, as it is

required at both levels, while being deeply interdependent between the two levels.

The fact that the contemporary practices of CSR and SLO are being utilized in both examples

indicates a certain level of flexibility in the practices, as they are trying to govern two very different

types of opposition. What is left undefined in the practices leaves room for them to be adapted to

any situation they might be applied to. However, the two examples discussed in this thesis indicate

that the concrete formation of the practices is defined by how the assemblages in which they are

applied are configured. This means that the soft contemporary practices are adaptable to the type of

resistance they are supposed to govern and are thus defined by the immanent resistance in the

assemblage. However, how these practices are used is not a given in a security assemblage set up by

a TNC, as it is very much a voluntary choice whether a corporation chooses to create any initiatives

under the pretext of the practices. There are no laws that directly require TNCs to incorporate CSR

or SLO as practices in their businesses. But as we showed in Chapter 4, there has been an increase

in the usage of these practices and an awareness of the financial benefits of including them in a

firm‟s transnational ventures. There is, however, also a difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of

the practices in terms of their function as modes of governance due to their flexibility and voluntary

nature. To understand how the practices are being used as modes of governance properly, one must

examine the configuration of the given assemblage, including the immanent resistance.

7.4. Thesis shortcomings

Examining the two cases has, however, also brought out a clear shortcoming in our methodological

approach. It has proved difficult to examine properly what the two security practices – CSR and

SLO – have meant for power relations within the assemblages, especially in the host countries,

which narrows our understanding of how marketized security affects the configuration of

sovereignty. To better understand the actual consequences and effects of these practices, one would

probably need to approach the field with a more ethnographic methodology, particularly when

examining the consequences in the host country. This would allow for a first-hand examination of

the type of opposition that exists to a given assemblage and how the immanent resistance process

actually unfolds. Additionally, it would allow one to determine the effects of the CSR, DOC and

SLO initiatives enacted by the TNCs and to show how they affect the power relations between the

primary actors in the assemblage and those who stand in opposition to it. This would also provide a

more profound insight in how rights and sovereignty are configured in the host countries.

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Another aspect we discuss in both our case studies is the question of whether the host state is weak

or resilient when security is being reconfigured to meet the demands of foreign TNCs. In both

cases, there is arguably a gap in state-controlled security provision, which, as already described, is

the root cause of the disassembly and re-assembly of the security configuration. But the question is

whether this willingness to reconfigure its own security provisions and monopoly of violence is an

indication of a weak and desperate authority, or a sign of a resilient way of adapting to its

surroundings. It might be difficult, maybe even unfair, to label them as weak in comparison to the

Westphalian states of the west, as both countries have not evolved into Westphalian-type states the

same way western countries have. Instead, we argue that the reconfigurations that are happening in

these two cases are an expression of states trying to adapt to the changing demand for security

provision. Both states have chosen a rentier-based approach to building their earth extraction

industries, an approach that allows for foreign TNCs to make more specific demands, including the

demand for security provision. Nonetheless, as both cases have shown, the attempts to reconfigure

security have had various effects, as they have created better security provisions for the foreign

TNCs, though at the cost of losing authority in particular geographical areas.

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Chapter 8. Conclusion

The questions posed in this thesis are:

How can we conceptualize the marketization of security and risk, and what are the

consequences of this marketization for how transnational corporations affect

sovereignty and rights in weak states?

We argue that our findings regarding the practices in these cases illustrate a global tendency in how

these practices are influencing marketized security. Through our case studies, we see how it is only

in recent years that the two practices have been implemented by the TNCs we have examined, a

tendency that also emerged strongly in the interviews. Another tendency exposed in our interviews

was how these practices have been incorporated into risk management, which is something both our

case studies confirm to one degree or another. As such, we argue that there is a tendency in how

TNCs regard security and risk management that has been influenced by market forces, the two

practices all being examples of this influence.

When reviewing our answers to the research question from a broader perspective and in

determining the future usage of our findings, we argue that this can be understood in two ways: first

as a framework for corporations operating in multiple countries to better understand their relations

with the societies they encounter, and secondly how the practices can be understood as neo-colonial

modes of governance. Our theoretical framework serves as a way to understand power relations in a

more complex manner, as our understanding of assemblages and Agamben suggests incorporating

the „opposition‟ into the analysis. Only by properly understanding the role and type of resistance

can a corporation manage the socio-political risk in a truly optimal way. This understanding

determines the kind of CSR-related initiatives that are the most likely to lead to the granting of a

social license to operate. It is the same immanence of resistance in the assemblages that leads us on

to the neo-colonial argument. We argue that these contemporary practices are not only a way to

mitigate risk, as they also help control the local population by creating an inclusive exclusion that

determines whether or not one is posing a risk to the authority concerned. Furthermore, by diffusing

the sovereignty of the host countries, the assemblages allow transnational corporations to influence

the authorities involved, or even to act as the sovereign authority themselves. Our thesis, then,

reveals a double-edged sword that dissects the morality of incorporating social responsibility into

capitalistic ventures while also exposing it as a logic of profit maximization and a neo-colonial

mode of governance.

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Østerby, Frederik (2016) Analytis Officer. Guardian Security Risk Management.

Kalhøj, Bruno (2016) Head of security and crisis management. Maersk Oil.

Andersen, Johnny (2016) Team leader. Vesper Group

Mandrup, Thomas (2016) PhD. The Royal Danish Defence College.

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http://www.vespergroup.se/

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