mavroudeas, regulation theory, postmodens desintegration

8/13/2019 Mavroudeas, Regulation Theory, Postmodens Desintegration

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university radicalism of the 70s - was exasperated by the retreat of the radicalism of the

70s. Much of this radicalism derived from an extremely reductionist conception of class

and social structure which led to a simplistic and undialectically abstract theory. The

return from reductionist abstract theory to the level of concrete took the form of middle-

range theory (Mavroudeas (1990), Sayer (1995)). The latter, in contrast to general theories

- covering the whole spectrum, from the most abstract laws and concepts to the empirical

analysis of the concrete, in a unified framework - reject abstract general laws and the

necessity of an all-embracing theory which are deemed to be either redundant or a distant

accessory. It substitutes both with intermediate concepts with an immediate identification

with the most concrete phenomena. These concepts are not linked to a general theory but

are based on empirical observations perceived as indisputable (stylised facts). These

stylised facts are supposed to encapture important facets of historical reality and, thus, to

mark different epochs. This type of reasoning has significant problems. Stylised facts - in

contrast to dialectical materialist abstractions from concrete historical reality - are

supposed to be theory-free but also historically accurate. However, they are usually

founded on theoretical influences and perceptions which are neither explicit not

necessarily coherent and, therefore, represent an eclecticist reading of historical reality i.

The next step is the construction of a theory based on the intermediate concepts and the

periodisation derived from the stylised facts. Consequently, both concepts and

periodisation vindicate, in a circular way, the initiating empirical perceptions. Middle-range theories major weapon - their close identification with a particular historical epoch -

gives them immense popularity during the course of the particular epoch (if and when it

has been identified correctly) but, on the other hand, invalidates them when it ends. Then,

more fundamental questions re-emerge, requiring a general theory. In this case, middle-

range theorys agnosticism and/or referential pluralism becomes a major weakness.

These problems are nowadays more or less evident even to former supporters of

the middle-range approach (Sayer (1995), chs.1-2). However, back in the 80s and early

90s neither the middle-range character nor the problems associated with it wererecognised. But the recent wisdom is not without crippling misconceptions. For example,

Sayer (1995, p.20) maintains that a proper analysis should combine abstract political-

economic theory and middle-range theory. This is an impromptu treatment of concepts

and scientific approaches. If - contrary to the post-modernist visions of a fragmented

world - reality is a contradictory whole, then Marxist Political Economy should study the

dialectics of abstract and concrete not (more or less) separately but as a continuum. On

the other hand, for typical middle-range theory (as exemplified by Merton), general theory

is not necessary and, if it can be constructed, it is merely a secondary derivative. This

study will argue that these two perspectives cannot be combined because they are


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inherently conflicting. This does not imply that abstract theorising - particularly in the

reductionist version of early Radical Political Economy - is unproblematic. Rather the

rediscovery of the Hegelian elements in Marxian dialectics - by many older (Zeleny (1980),

Ilyenkov (1982)) and newer writers (New Dialectics) represents a promising route which

can grasp accurately historical reality in both its abstract and concrete expressions.

The focus of this paper is on the theoretical structure of Regulation, rather than the

empirical evidence. Empirical support to the theoretical critique is drawn from a number of

influential studies addressing specifically this field (Brenner-Glick (1991), Dumenil-Levy

(1988) etc.). This theoretical critique attempts to contribute on three points. First, to verify

RTs middle-range nature. Second, to establish that the middle-range methodology is

undialectical and fails to grasp accurately historical reality. Third, to question the validity of

RTs theoretical structure. It should be noted that Brenner-Glick (1991) refer also in

passim, without elaborating further, to the middle-range character of Regulation in their

powerful rejection of RTs empirical perceptions. From another side, Kotzs (1994) critique

brings forward several important deficiencies of RT. However, it disputes only the close

association of SSA with RT and argues that the formers conceptual framework is superior

without touching upon their common middle-range nature.

Part II of this study gives an outline of RT and presents the common elements of

the newer middle-range theories (SSA etc.). Part III delineates the typical middle-range

perspective and contrasts it with the Marxist dialectics of abstract and concrete. Part IVfocuses on RTs methodology and conceptual framework and its shortcomings. The final

part analyses RTs subsequent stages of evolution and the attendant theoretical

weaknesses.

The general conclusion is that RT failed on all three aspects that were considered

its main merits. The recourse to middle-range intermediate concepts and historicism has

been proved unable to explain coherently historical evolution. Additionally, instead of a

solution to the structure-subject relation retaining a role for structures and at the same

time permitting degrees of freedom for agents (seen primarily as social classes) - RTproceeded from initial mild structuralist positions towards post-structuralist and post-

modernist relativism and methodological individualism, with equally dismal results. This

leads to the final aspect. RT, instead of overcoming the orthodox neo-classical dichotomy

of economics-politics etc., has been continuously slipping towards a downgrading of

socio-economic relations and the prioritisation and randomisation of politics and

ideology. Its multi-causal intermediate concepts are simply juxtaposing elements from all

these spheres in an eclecticist manner and without actually being able to analyse both the

essential unity of social relations and its formal fetishist dichotomisation in separate

spheres.


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II. Regulation and the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories

II.1. RT: a summary presentation

Regulation emerged in the middle 1970s in France when certain authors (Aglietta,

Lipietz, Boyer etc.) produced an institutionalist and historicist theory of capitalism. This

was based on two key concepts: the "regime of accumulation" (RoA) and the "mode of

regulation". (MoR). The RoA represents the form of distribution of surplus between capital

and labour required in each period in order to co-ordinate production with social demand.

It covers the essential economic conditions for the operation of the productive system

(technology, organisation of the labour-process, relations between the departments of

production). The MoR designates the necessary institutional forms and social

compromises for the reproduction of the RoA. The RoA is posited at the level of the

compulsory economic structures, whereas the MoR is less determinate, since it relies on

concrete, historically specific institutional forms. More than one MoR can be implemented

in a certain RoA. Which will prevail is a question open to the indeterminacy of history.

However, not every MoR is suitable for every RoA.

Two types of RoA are usually considered. In extensive accumulation pre-existing

production processes were incorporated into a capitalist framework without major

changes. The traditional way of life - as expressed in the patterns of consumption - was not

radically recomposed. The combined development of the two departments of productionwas achieved with difficulty and the pace of accumulation encountered recurrent

obstacles. In intensive accumulation production was reorganised radically on capitalist

lines. A new mode of life for the working-class was created by establishing a "logic" that

operates on the totality of time and space in daily life. Consequently, a social consumption

norm was formed which no longer depended on communal life but was stratified

according to the divisions of social groups within the working-class. The two departments

of production were integrated and, hence, the pace of accumulation became more

regular.Additionally, two MoR are recognised. In the competitive MoR - which is

considered more appropriate to extensive accumulation - there was a posteriori

adjustment of the output of the various branches to price movements which were highly

responsive to changes in demand; wages were adjusted to price movements so that real

wages were either stable or rose slowly. In the monopolist MoR income distribution is

socialised via a series of compromises between capital and labour (wage formation in

relation to inflation and productivity). Market relations (pure pricing adjustment

mechanisms) play only a minor role in adjusting social demand and production. This role


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is exercised mainly by a complex set of institutions, conventions and rules which

constantly aim at developing effective demand at the rate of production capacities.

On the basis of the historically contingent correspondence between RoA and

MoR, Regulation periodises capitalism as follows:

i. The extremely lengthy period between 17th and mid-19th century is considered

as the era of capitalisms establishment and of primitive accumulation.

ii. From the mid-19th century till W.W.I extensive accumulation accompanied by

competitive regulation predominated.

iii. The period between the two world wars was an unstable transitional phase

characterised by the emergence of intensive accumulation (mass production - Taylorism)

but without mass consumption. The 1929 crisis - perceived as an underconsumptionist

cum institutionalist crisis - marks this period.

iv. After W.W.II, intensive accumulation is coupled with mass consumption and

monopolistic regulation. This is the era of Fordism., in which the working-class

consumption has been commodified and provides the needed mass market for capitalist

mass production.

v. Fordism enters a crisis in the 1970s and Post-Fordism is proposed as its

successor. Emphasis is being put on the new information and communication

technologies, small-scale production processes, the relaxation of standardised

production tasks, the significance of the service sector, new life-styles as stimulants ofconsumption etc. However, the definition and the characteristics of this new configuration

are far from clear.

Seen from a wider perspective, Regulation's project is an attempt to construct a

dynamic and historically concrete theory of the crises and transformations of capitalism

on the basis of appropriate intermediate terms. It is a project that can hardly be objected in

principle. But RT has chosen to accomplish this task by recoursing to middle-range

theory; a choice that compromised seriously its project.

An important consequence of this type of theory is its rapidly changing landscape.Indeed, a lot of things have changed within Regulation since its launching and many of its

previous supporters have accused it for betraying its initial radical perspective. These

accusations are rather unjustified - although it is true that most of RTs radical elements are

now discarded - because it is its very constitutive structure that warranted both its

previous radical theses and its present realignment to socio-economic orthodoxy.

Regulations spinal column consists of a corpus of middle-range method, stylised

facts, and intermediate concepts, which constitutes the common ground of all those

diverse writers that come under its name. Noel (1987, p.327) praises RT, Segmented

Labour Market theory and certain post-keynesian trends for their "theoretically informed


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understanding of time-changing empirical patterns". Jessop (1990,1988, p.162) also

declared that:

Their research programme shows a clear commitment to concrete analysis of

concrete conjunctures through a rich and complex range of economic and

political concepts directly related to the nature of the capitalist exploitation and

domination... it is only through the detailed conjunctural analyses which this

method facilitates (but whose accuracy it cannot guarantee) that one can develop

alternative strategies which have some chance of success... Both the state

derivation debate and the regulation school have produced concepts at a middle

range, institutional level; both are concerned with stages and phases of capitalist

development rather than with the abstract laws of motion and tendencies

operating at the level of capital in general; ... both are committed to conjunctural

analysis...

The set of stylised facts is the sine qua non counterpart of RTs middle-range

method. It is based chiefly on a number of empirical perceptions about two historical

periods: the interwar years and the post-W.W.II epoch. The second is the main

benchmark, whereas the first is treated as a transitional era between the previous status

quo and the new one. The other periods are theorised neither on their own nor via a

general theory but according to the principles set in, and by comparison with, the

benchmark period. The transitional period is essential in providing the links and also inoperating as the measure for the application of those principles.

II,2, The newer non-orthodox middle-range theories

RTs similarity with a number of other theories (SSA, Flexible Specialisation (Piore-

Sabel (1984)) etc.) is nowadays well-documented (Boyer (1991), Jessop (1992)),

although significant differences also exist (Hirst-Zeitlin (1992), Kotz (1994)). Most studies

recognise the equivalence of intermediate concepts (e.g. RoA-MoR and SSA) and the

congruence of theoretical fields and stylised facts. All these trends seek to explain thehistorical evolution of capitalism by relating the capital accumulation process to a set of

social institutions (not only economic but political and ideological ones as well). They,

also, adopt a similar historicist perspective, since their aim is the creation of detailed

conjectural analyses. Additionally, they share the same stylised facts; particularly

regarding the 1929 crisis as an underconsumptionist one. The supposed subsequent

creation of a capital-labour accord is founded upon the sharing of productivity increases

and an appropriate institutional formation of consumption norms and wages. Finally, their

periodisation of capitalism is cognate beginning with the era after WW.I which is

considered as one of structural changes and continuing with Fordism and post-Fordism.


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But what most studies miss is that these similarities derive from the common character of

these theories, namely of being middle-range theories.

These newer non-orthodox middle-range theories appeared in Radical Political

Economy during the 1970s. The marxist variants of this trend were born out of the post-

60s crisis of the epigones of Western Marxism. The first steps were characterised by a

relativisation and a relaxation of a number of crucial tenets of the theoretical traditions

from which they were derived. There were references to the old general theoretical

traditions, but in a remote and detached sense. In contrast, attention focused on specific

historical periods (usually the period after W.W.II) - assuming that major transformations

took place during them, which changed radically the nature and the operation of the social

system thereafter - and a quest began for the theorisation of their specificities. This

intentional relativisation and relaxation of many of their most significant and strict

assumptions, in correlation with the recourse to the historically specific ii, opened the way

for the implementation of the middle-range methodology. Since it was supposed that the

previous general theories could not explain the new situation, either because they were

totally inadequate or because they needed significant changes, there was a recourse to

the concrete and an attempt to discover within it the appropriate new theoretical tools. In

this process, "abstract general laws", the supposed main attribute of general theories,

were rejected and were substituted by the more lax and allegedly more appropriate

intermediate concepts. This, partly justified, course was coupled with a growingdisillusionment with the old general theories. The next step, after the relativisation of the

fundamental concepts, was a relativisation of the very scope and method of theory. The

middle-range methodology was, explicitly or implicitly, accepted as the scientific method

par excellence and the need for even a detached and relativised general theoretical

framework was discarded. "Essentialism", or its scapegoat, was exiled from the sphere of

theory. The usual implication of this purge from "essentialism" for the marxist variants of

those theories was that economism (posited as the basis of marxist essentialism) was

denounced. Anti-essentialism led to a search for a multi-causal, non-reductionist theory.This eclectic multi-causality set the framework for the intermediate concepts of most of the

middle-range theories (Noel (1987)) which are supposed to unify the economy with a

number of other factors (politics, ideology, culture etc.). These factors were considered as

more or less equally important and it was difficult or non-permitted to construct a coherent

hierchisation based on relations of determination. The concrete, according to Marx, is the

unity of many determinations. If a theory is organised directly at this level, then its

concepts and their causality should be based on the whole variety of these

determinations. The result is a set of eclecticist categories with ambiguous theoretical

content and limited explanatory poweriii.


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The historicism of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories assumed the

form of the occasionally dominant intellectual fashions of each period. Effectively, this

meant that they opted for some more or less evident version of institutionalism and most of

their intermediate concepts were referring to institutional forms. The attractions of this

were manifold. Firstly, institutional arrangements proliferated widely in the post-W.W.II

period and seemed to express, if not to encompass, all the ongoing transformations.

Secondly, these arrangements appeared to provide the perfect explanation for the

supposed structural incorporation of the whole working-class or major sections of it within

capitalism. Thirdly, for European variants of the newer non-orthodox middle-range

theories, Althusserian structuralism provided the initial inclination towards institutionalism.

Despite its verbal adherence to the Marxian primacy of the economy, via its separation of

different instances (economic, political etc.) and the pursuit of "regional theories" of these

instances, it ended up with the "State Ideological Mechanisms". The latter, under a mainly

institutional form and through the covert prioritisation of the "regional theory" of the

political, tended to encompass all reality or at least all the field of theory. Last, but not the

least, the institutional forms provide, perhaps, the most appropriate material for the

construction of their multi-causal intermediate concepts. Not only are they immediately

observable, but they also have a high and impressionable profile. On the other hand, they

are not a crude, simple factor but they are founded on a wide variety of determining

parameters (such as the economy, culture, politics, ideology, legal forms, social strugglesetc.).

The historicism and institutionalism of the newer non-orthodox middle-range

theories was also informed by the philosophical trends and fashions of the times. Different

philosophical traditions operated as their referential framework in different periods. It

seems that at least the European versions started from some form of structuralism, since

Althusserianism was still a dominant trend within Western Marxism - although already

declining, at the beginning of the '70s. With the emergence of post-structuralism and post-

modernism the referential framework of those theories moved towards the new fashion.Structural forms were rejected or weakened and the whole conceptual framework was

relativised. Projects and strategies, fragmentation of the collective agents (such as

classes) into more fluid and less structurally determined factors (volatile social groups

organised on a short or mid-term basis, firms and even individuals etc.) became central for

middle-range theories.

The common descent and the theoretical and personal continuity between

structuralism and post-structuralism has been established adequately (see Anderson

(1988, p.40-55)). Wood (1985) has shown that this trajectory assumed flesh and bones in

the journey of certain authors from Althusserianism to post-marxism; Poulantzas being its


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forerunner. For them the explanatory primacy of discourse is based on the

autonomisation of ideology and politics from the economy. This is supplemented with the

randomisation of history and politics. The first implies that the discursive elements cease

to be determined, even in the last instance, by the economy. This is part and parcel of their

anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist drive and their quest for "openness" and an

"unsutured" theory. On the other hand, the randomisation of history and politics initiates a

recourse to historicism. The result is an awkward hybrid of (implicit) absolute determinism

and absolute contingency, with the emphasis on the latter. Following their Althusserian

structuralist past, Laclau and Mouffe theorise structures and laws in a rigid, static and non-

dialectical way (worthy, indeed, of mechanistic determinism) which, in return, enables

them - but now under the new banner of post-structuralism -to reject them in favour of the

indeterminacy of the historically specific.

Callinicos (1985) distinguished two major post-modernist strands. The first,

associated with Lyotard, draws heavily on a version of analytical philosophy of language.

The second strand is post-structuralism, which is itself divided into two sub-strands. On

the one hand, Derrida's textualism denies the possibility of ever escaping the discursive;

discourse has no extra-discursive referents and encompasses all the aspects of reality.

On the other hand, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari propose a version of "worldly post-

structuralism", which, in contrast to Derrida's idealist theory, proposes an articulation of

the discursive and the non-discursive. It is the "worldly post-structuralism" that providesmost of the discreet links between certain newer non-orthodox middle-range theories,

post-marxist theories and post-modernism (though Lyotard advances a variant of post-

marxism, as well). It meets the post-structuralist and post-marxist theories of those

deriving from Althusserian structuralism (typically represented by Laclau-Mouffe (1985)).

According to Wood (1986, p.62):

Laclau and Mouffe have followed the now familiar trajectory from structuralism to

post-structuralism - though they seem uncertain whether the post-structuralist

dissolution of reality into discourse can be regarded as a general law of history (asit were) or whether it is only in the modern age, and particularly with the advent of

"industrial society", that social reality has dematerialized and become susceptible

to discursive construction.

The proliferation of such middle-of-the-road theories was founded upon the

problem of the structure-subject relationship and the relation between economy, politics

and ideology. RT supplied the ideal ground for such an experiment. It considered the

structure-subject relation as crucial because it aimed to explain the crisis but also the

reproduction of the system. Moreover, many regulationists shared a common social and


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intellectual past with post-modernists and post-marxists. On the other hand, post-

structuralism and post-marxism, apart from being the new trend, appeared to solve many

of its broader referential problems. It is not strange, therefore, that there have been several

attempts for relate post-modernism and post-marxism with RA.

Lashs (1990, p.37) political economy of post-modernism maintains that a "regime

of signification" is co-articulated with a RoA. On this basis, he defines the new restructured

form of capital accumulation as "post-fordism" or "disorganised capitalism", which is

characterised by a turn from mass production and consumption to the services and

information economy, flexible production and specialised consumption. With regard to

the social aspect, the working-class is being shrinked and fragmented, resistance is

apportioned to decentralised and multi-collective (inter-class) social movements and

individualism returns. Additionally, Lash argues that this new (post-fordist) RoA is being

rapidly transformed to a regime of signification, because both the means and the forces of

production acquire an increasingly cultural - rather than strictly economic - hue. The

forces of production are no longer mediated by the material means of production but

constitute issues of discourse and communication between management and workers.

Lash suggests that the wide-spread implementation of quality circles and team briefings

are obvious and undeniable proofs of this alleged transformation. Laclau and Mouffe also,

when they attempted to give a solitary and vague economic reference to their elaborations

they invoked the RoA.This does not mean that the RT or any other newer non-orthodox middle-range

theory adhere heart and soul to post-modernism and/or post-marxism. On the contrary,

they represent a middle-of-the-road choice. Their new post-structuralist overtures co-exist

with significant doses of structuralism. In this sense, they are close to similar attempts in

sociology, such as Giddens and Bourdieuiv ( Lipietz (1985, p.12), (1988) and Aglietta-

Brender (1984, p.14)). On the other hand, a change in the scope of their theory and their

concept-building axis can be detected in certain cases. It is a shifting from a middle-range

perspective informed by a latent and qualified structuralism to an even more randomisedand relativised framework. When this middle-of-the-road position begins to crack, under

the burden of its internal contradiction between structure and historical specificity, then

considerable differences appear among the exponents and result in diverse associations

with other traditions. This is typical for middle-range approaches. Even when they

establish a certain degree of coherence, its unresolved internal contradictions, seldom in

transformed forms, re-emerge and destroy it.

III. Foundations for a Critique: Dialectics and the middle-range method


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Late Radical Political Economy has a rather casual understanding of middle-range

theory. It is considered as simply something between the abstract and the concrete. This

intermediate level can - or must - correspond to a general theory through some form of

dialectical abstraction. However Merton (1968, p.39), who introduced middle-range

theory in contemporary social sciences, gives a different picture:

Middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is

intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from

particular classes of social behavior, organisation and change to account for what

is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not

generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they

are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit

empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects of social

phenomena, as indicated by their labels.

For Merton it is difficult to have a general-theoretical analysis. If general-theoretical

reference is required, then a middle-range approach - although not derived from a single

general theory - can be consistent with a variety of such theories. He suggests that middle-

range theory transcends the mock problem between (a) the general and the altogether

particular, (b) generalizing sociological theory and historicism and, (c) the micro and the

macro level. Hence, it is only through the aggregation of middle-range studies thatultimately a general theory may be produced. It is evident in his approach that general

abstract theory is not necessary. Additionally, a general theory can be produced only

through an adding-up procedure of middle-range analyses. This generalisation on the

basis of middle-range analyses - by aggregating their common elements and discarding

the more specific ones - is not equivalent to dialectical abstraction.

Marxian dialectical analysis follows a different path. First, the basic level of

analysis is that of the essence, whereas for middle-range theory is a rather obscure

intermediate level between the abstract and the concrete. For Marx (1981, p.100) the onlycorrect method of appropriating the concrete and reproducing it as concrete-in thought is

by ascending from the abstract to the concrete. Dialectical abstraction should provide the

point of departure and the foundation of the movement of investigation, through a

continuum of mediations, towards the concrete. The starting point of the investigation is

the "cell-form" or essence (Marx (1982, p.90), Zeleny (1980), Banaji (1979, p.17)). The

movement from the essence to the concrete is continuous, so that in approaching the

concrete forms in which the world exists we do not abandon the sphere of essence;

rather, we now investigate this very essence in its form of appearance. This is a journey

from the simple (the abstract) to the combined (the concrete is the unity of many


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determinations). This process is supplemented with a movement from the concrete to the

abstract. In this dual-way process the movement from the abstract to concrete is the

leading or determining aspect (Ilyenkov (1982), p.138). In contrast, middle-range theories

advance directly to study the concrete and produce almost immediately a set of

intermediate concepts without any reference to abstract essences.

Second, middle-range theories either refute or have a different understanding of

the method of abstraction in general. In the first case, abstraction is rejected outright and it

is substituted by the inductive-deductive method of positivism (usually, in the traditional

form of successive approximation). In the second case, when abstraction is not altogether

discarded, it is substituted by the contentless abstraction which is characteristic of the

positivist method. Abstraction becomes either a purely logical trick, which enables us to

approximate reality (similar to the neo-classical method), or an average of immediately

observable factors.

The first choice - abstraction as a purely logical tool -in a strong version, hinges on

the more general proposition that logic stands outside the object of the study and that

"reasoning" exists solely in the mind and has no organic relation with the world outside. In

a weaker version, it denotes that not all theory, but only abstraction is merely a logical

construction. From the point of view of dialectics both versions are equally unacceptable,

since Marx's method does not separate logic from object as in the positivist "model-real

world" dichotomy. In the dialectical world, the object under investigation determines thepath and the movement of logic, while the latter retains its separate identity. According to

Marx (1981, p.101-102), "the totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a

product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can... the real

subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long

as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical". For Zeleny (1980, p.23),

Marx's advance from Ricardo's fixed essence to a new materialist relativist-substantialist

logic has nothing to do with the relativism which disputes the possibility of perceiving

objective reality correctly; it is rather a presupposition of true objective knowledge.Instead of a dichotomy between reality and its appropriation by thought, characteristic of

positivism, Historical Materialism posits a dialectical relationship between them, which is

grounded in reality and operates simultaneously on both the level of theoretical or logical

development and on the level of real historical events. This does not imply a crude and

vulgar naturalistic identification of theory and objective reality:

It would therefore be infeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow

one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive.

Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern

bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of what it seems to be their


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natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the

historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of

society. Even less is it their sequence "in the idea" (Proudhon) (a muddy notion of

historic movement). Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society.

(Marx (1981), p.107-108)

But, on the other hand, the level of theoretical development is derived from real

historical events. Activity on this level, insofar as it diverges from and runs counter to the

actual historical events (and the level of immediate appearances), is not an a priori

construction, but reflects the "life of the material" in its essence and expresses the

essential and necessary relations of reality. There is, therefore, a continuous dialectical

oscillation between abstract dialectical development and concrete historical reality

relating them through a continuous spiral pattern, each time at more complex levels

(assuming more determinations).

The weaker version (not all theory but only abstraction is a logical trick) confuses

real with reasoned abstraction. The latter has to do with the discovery of categories which

permit social relations to be understood, while the former is the consequence of a real

process and has an immediate (non-mediated) material presence. Moreover, this

conception does not imply that reasoned abstraction is a purely logical tool. Reasoned

abstraction is no less realistic than real abstraction; it only does not have a non-mediatedmaterial presence (for example, abstract and social labour):

Insofar as "the concrete" is opposed to "the abstract", the latter is treated by Marx

first and foremost objectively. For Marx, it is by no means a synonym of the "purely

ideal", of a product of mental activity, a synonym of the subjectively physiological

phenomenon occurring in man's brain only. Time and time again Marx uses this

term to characterise real phenomena and relations existing outside

consciousness, irrespective of whether they are reflected in consciousness or not.

(Ilyenkov (1982, p.33-34))

The second choice - i.e. abstraction as the average of immediately observable

factors - represents an empiricist approach, which expects to find the determinants of

essence almost directly underneath the immediate appearances and for which the

movement of dialectical investigation is flattened down to a simple feed-back between

immediately observable factors and perceived essences. This is often based on some

statistical research; abstraction is, in fact, substituted for by quantitative techniques.

The inescapable consequence of both these two methodological choices is a

twinned dependence upon absolutism, at one time, and relativism at others.


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Consequently, the relation between theory and reality is only bridged arbitrarily with a

frequently remaining gap between theory and the historical process. The unavoidable

outcome is a recourse to empiricism and historicism, in order to fill the holes in the riddled

and shaky frame of the particular middle-range theory. Contentless positivist abstraction

cannot progress from the abstract to the concrete through a series of specifications and

mediations because it contains nothing that can be specified or mediated and, instead, it

must attempt to grasp reality directly (Kay (1986, p.58-59)). History is called upon to dress

in the wealth of the concrete the nakedness from any substantive content of the middle-

range theories. Usually, this recourse to empiricism and historicism assumes the form of

the intellectual fashion of that historical period (institutionalism, action theory etc.).

Finally, middle-range theories are usually extremely vocal in their denunciations of

"fixed essences", considering them as unable to grasp the multiplicity of real phenomena.

Insofar as Marxism is concerned, this is a gross misinterpretation. Zeleny (1980, ch.3)

shows that one of the fundamental differences between Marx's and Ricardo's conception

of abstraction is that "while for Ricardo essence is something qualitatively fixed and non-

differentiable, Marx sees and investigates the alteration of that essence; he understands it

as something historically transitory which proceeds through different levels of

development and qualitatively changes". This dialectical method is necessarily absent

from middle-range theories but nothing stands in its place to deal satisfactorily with the

relation between theory and complex, concrete development.Indisputably, middle-range theories are particularly popular in periods when

general-theoretical paradigms are in crisis. Their main thrust is that they enable many

authors to continue working while their previous theoretical perceptions are, justifiably or

unjustifiably, crumbling. Because of their inherently eclectic nature and their ability to

conform with a wide variety of more general theories and trends, They facilitate an

accommodation between the previous theses of their contributors (albeit in a

transforming version) and the new intellectual fashions. On the other hand, this retreat

from the level of high theory has little, and chiefly a negative, impact on the general-theoretical and social problems causing the crisis. Merton's naive conception of a step by

step building from below of one unified theory depends upon empiricism and historicism

and is informed by positivism. It is impossible to construct any intellectually coherent and

operationally efficient theory of any "macro" or "meso" period phenomenon without a

general theoretical reference; and even the most "micro" phenomena require such a

framework if their analysis is to be anything more than a theoretically informed

description. Middle-range theories attempt to bypass this dilemma by juxtaposing

arbitrarily and eclectically several abstract factors with the most concrete elements. This

provides them with a quasi-general theoretical facade, insofar as a number of


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assumptions from this level are necessary for the construction of a particular middle-

range theory. On the other hand, the rest of the necessary framework of a general theory is

evaded by turning it into a non-problem or by permitting each contributor the liberty to

ascribe to one of a variety of different general theories. This referential pluralism results in

an intellectual agnosticism with regard to problems of theory and policy concerning the

long-run.

IV. Middle-Range Theory and the Conceptual Framework of RT

IV.1 The question of method

The middle-range approach is almost openly accepted by the regulationists. For

Boyer (1987, p.6-8), all general economic theories (Keynesian, neo-classical and Marxist)

mistreat reality. He argues for a historicist-institutionalist approach based on intermediate

concepts. If abstract concepts are required, then these can be drawn from a number of

equally suitable general theories (Marxism, Keynesianism, institutionalism).

This ostentatious display of general-theoretical referential pluralism characterises

RT from its very beginning; setting aside the special case of Aglietta's first work. In

CEPREMAP (1977) collective work, Lipietz was presenting its marxist pedigree, whereas

Benassy proposed a neo-Keynesian interpretation; the rest concentrated on historical

and quantitative research.

The methodological attributes and consequences of its middle-range perspectivedid not take long to appear in each of its three major representatives (Boyer, Lipietz and

Aglietta).

Boyer (1991) begins with concrete historical cases (basically specific historical

periods of specific national economies) and focuses upon their institutional forms. He

employs historiography in order to produce a periodisation of the institutional forms. This

is effected by searching for key-dates that mark significant changes in the institutional field

and by comparing two phases: one during which the operation of the institutional forms

(and the regulation by them of social relations) proceeds unhindered, and a second that ischaracterised by the crisis of the previous institutional forms and the transition towards

new ones. Then he defines the implicit logic of every institutional form (each one

expressing and regulating a social compromise on a specific subject) and examines its

applicability. In doing so, the economist should bear in mind that there is no such thing as

a general theory and that historical specificities are the primary determinants. Boyer

suggests that econometric tests are of paramount importance in verifying the degree of

correspondence of these ideal-type models to the specific historical periods. The third

stage aims at the synthesis of all those partial regulations in an overall structure

guaranteeing the reproduction of the whole system. This implies a macroeconomic and


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econometric modeling. Finally, the last stage requires the modeling of different RoAs,

linked explicitly to specific historical periods. This, for Boyer, constitutes an alternative to

the traditional marxist conception, which considers accumulation as equipped with laws-

tendencies which are ultimately enforced irrespectively of transitional and conjunctural

factors . The time for the construction of "general hypotheses" will come only when a

sufficient number of specific long-run studies of national economies has been gathered.

For Boyer (1991, p.108) the ascendancy of the process of abstraction (whose

beginning he attributes to A.Smith and which, he argues, resulted in the modern theories

of general equilibrium) over a historical and institutional perspective was a major setback.

Boyer appears suspiciously ignorant of the fact that Marxian dialectics differ radically both

from the Ricardian fixed essences and Marginalist general equilibrium. For him

abstraction equals general theory equals departure from tangible historical reality. This is

a gross misrepresentation with regard to the Marxian dialectics. His conception derives

from the "model-real world" dichotomy, which characterises neo-classicism and this

makes his denunciations of orthodox economics sound completely hollow.

Whereas Lipietz attempts persistently to cling to some version of Historical

Materialism, the usual lapses of the middle-range methodology are evident. Despite his

praises of dialectics and his denunciations of positivism, he proposes a crude collapse of

the dialectics of essence and appearance in the simplistic distinction between "esoteric"

and "exoteric". Lipietz (1985, p.14-15), on the one hand, declares that it is impossible toseparate substance and form, the esoteric and the exoteric but maintains also that:

the positioning of the dialectic between esoteric and exoteric within theory (at the

very end of the Marxist theory of Capital) and in the texts (a few words at the end of

"Capital", III, but mostly in "Theories of Surplus Value") has meant that this part of

his work has remained little known or studied. To be precise, the distinction is

there in Marx from the beginning of "Capital", but it only becomes a major source

of contradictions right at the end. Through most of the work Marx shows how the

real essence of things differs substantially from their appearance; but it is not untilthose appearances become objective elements of economic reality that the real

problems appear.

Lipietzs arguments are extremely problematic. Firstly, as Banaji (1979) shows,

appearance is not external to essence (as the distinction esoteric-exoteric tends to imply).

On the contrary, essence is not a static formless thing to which form has to be added, but

rather a self-evolving substance. It is simultaneously the starting point (as "what requires

only itself for its existence") and the initiator of the dialectical spiral (the movement by

which it reflects into itself as the totalising unity of form and essence). Secondly, the


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dialectics of form and content do not appear only at the end of the Marxian analysis but are

explicitly present from the beginning. For Marx - contrary to Ricardo - appearance would

almost always diverge from essence, although it is dialectically determined by the latter.

This contradiction is recognised at every level of abstraction, from the higher one of Vol.I

to the lower one of Vol.III. For this reason he begins "Capital" with the concept of the

commodity. Furthermore, the distinction between "capital in general" and "many capitals",

which Lipietz invokes as a justification for his methodology, is a further stage in the

dialectical spiral of form and content. The structure of "Capital" is an "expanding curve" or

spiral-movement composed of specific cycles of abstraction (Banaji (1979, p.27)). Each

cycle of abstraction, and thus the curve as a whole, begins and ends with the sphere of

circulation (the realm of appearances), which is finally, at the end of the entire movement,

itself determined specifically as the sphere of the Competition of Capitals. Lipietzs errors

are even more exacerbated when supplemented with the assertion of the "autonomy of

the exoteric:

How was it that the distinction between esoteric and exoteric, so important to

Marx, got lost in the course of the historic debates between then and now? Part of

the answer is that circumstances were responsible: it is only contemporary

capitalism which has actually asserted the autonomy of the exoteric, particularly in

the present crisis.

(Lipietz (1985), p.13)

This "autonomy of the exoteric" is quite questionable and its dressing in the

historically-specific (the emergence and expansion of credit money, according to Lipietz)

does not make it more plausible. Appearances are in no way autonomous from essence.

The result is all too familiar. The esoteric-exoteric distinction is finally attributed to the

difference between the standpoint of social relations and the direct standpoint of

individual agents, and therefore covers broadly the same areas as the macro/micro

distinction (Lipietz (1985), p.15). This position represents a recourse to individualism:agents are first and foremostly individuals; therefore, the macro/micro approach is

necessary in order to relate them to the general framework. The relaxation and

relativisation of the concept of structure follows swiftly. Structure is nothing else but the

conceptualisation of the observed compatibility of individual trajectories. The latter are

informed by the individual's dispositions (his "habitus"v) and perception of other actors

intentions, expressed, ultimately, as an external social pressure by incorporated norms or

explicit social institutions (Lipietz (1988), p.23,8). Thus, in the end, institutionalism,

provides the proper coverage for individualism:


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As far as economic agents are concerned, the independence or efficacy of

external connections constitutes the only reality they come into contact with,

determining their motives, their expectations, their behaviour and what Bourdieu

would call their "habitus"... In fact social relations have no material existence

outside this network of institutions, the permanence of these ways of behaving

and so on.

(Lipietz (1985), p.12)

The end of the journey is a version of covert positivism. Lipietz takes Marx's well-

known premonition against the "realism of the concepts" and turns falsely into the

proposition that "the Universal is no more than an intellectual systemization of our

practical experience of the real, and it takes no account of the concrete nature of the real"

(Lipietz (1987), p.11). The orthodox dichotomisation of theory and reality appears, again,

in all its glory:

The "capitalist mode of production" does not exist. It is a construction of our

thought, which refers to the regularity with which certain contradictory social

practices are reproduced.

(Lipietz (1985), p.19)

In later works there are significant additions in the conceptual framework as wellas rearrangements of the hierarchy and the inter-relations of the concepts. These

changes, although not unwarranted by the previous theory, alter significantly the status of

Lipietzs approach. Lipietz ((1987), (1988), (1989), Lipietz-Leborgne (1987)) proposes a

variety of new terms such as social and hegemonic bloc, social (or societal) paradigm,

model of industrialisation and technological paradigm. His new organising formula is the

following. The model (or pattern) of development - the more general principle - refers to

the historically different solutions to the basically unchanged difficulties arising from the

commodity-producing nature of capitalism, from the wage relation and from internationalrelations. The adoption by one or several countries, with a hegemonic position in the

world capitalist system, of variants of the same model marks the hegemony of this model.

This pattern of development, then, can be analysed from three different angles: a) as a

model (or paradigm) of industrialisation (i.e. as the general principles which govern the

organisation of labour, but which are not confined only to industry), b) as a RoA (i.e. the

macro-economic principle which describes the compatibility over a prolonged period

between the transformations in production conditions and in the uses for social output)

and, c) as a MoR (i.e. the ensemble of forms of adjustment of the expectations and


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contradictory behaviour of individual agents to the collective principles of the regime of

accumulation; these forms include cultural habits as well as institutions).

Lipietz (1989) supplements and extends further the previous framework,

proposing that RoA (designating an explicit macro-economic regularity) is built upon the

technological paradigm (i.e. the general principles of organisation of labour and of the

usage of techniques; in fact, it is the same with his previous term of the model (or

paradigm) of industrialisation). Then, because, he argues, the imperatives of RoA are not

translated functionally as norms of behaviour of the agents, a MoR is necessary. The latter

delineates a space, and provides constraints and incentives which reduce the uncertainty

with which individual agents are faced. The basis of MoR is primarily the sphere of politics.

Struggles and their, more or less effective, resolutions via politico-social armistices and

institutionalised compromises (since there is no struggle without end) provide the content

of MoR. These struggles and compromises are in the domain of politics, just as

competition, labour conflicts and RoA are in the domain of economics (Lipietz (1989, p.4).

The implementation of these compromises is dictated and, at the same time, based on the

existence on each occasion of a social bloc which is hegemonic. He defines the social

bloc as a stable system of relations of domination, of alliances and of concessions

between different social groups (dominant and subordinate)vi. A social bloc is hegemonic

when it is able to pose its particular interests as the interests of the whole nation; setting,

thus, the criterion for acceptability or non-acceptability of the aims of other social groupsand blocs. RoA, MoR and hegemonic bloc construct a triangle (Lipietz (1988), p.4) whose

coherence requires another element operating at the level of discourse and political

representation: the societal paradigm. The latter is defined as the mode of structuration of

the identities of individuals and social groups which are legitimately defensible within the

"Universe of Discourse Political Representations". RoA, MoR, the hegemonic bloc and the

societal paradigm are all, according to Lipietz, fruits of the conflictual historical evolution.

Their reciprocal adequacy, as the all-encompassing model of economico-social

development, is historically contingent without guaranteeing eternal stability. It is "mined"with contradictions; either those of the model or those that the model ignores. Therefore,

two forms of struggle appear: (a) struggles within the paradigm and, (b) struggles against

it, in the name of another paradigm.

There is a major change of position in Lipietz's last formulation. Contrary to the

previous, MoR is posited almost exclusively at the realm of politics. In addition, all his

recent versions of the regulationist framework represent a shift towards even more

relativisation and historical contingency coupled with a recourse to a covert

methodological individualism. The structural parameters become even more fluid and


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vague. In fact, they represent, to a greater or lesser extent, taxonomic formalisms rather

than essential determinations.

Moreover, while the economy is still considered as the founding level (the basis of

the hegemonic bloc is the existence of RoA (Lipietz (1988, p.4)), politics and ideology

achieve more than a relative autonomy; and Lipietz's recent positions exacerbate this

even more. The randomisation of history and politics, additionally, is present from RTs

very beginning. The latest acquisition of another level, that of the "Universe of Discourse

and Political Representations", brings Lipietz even more closer to the post-marxist and

post-structuralist formulations. This "Universe", now separated from politics as such (since

the latter come under MoR), from the economy (attributed to RoA) and the society

(belonging to the societal paradigm), informs and shapes all of them. Furthermore, there

is not even a trace now of such "reductionist" and "essentialist" elements as the mode of

production and the law of capital accumulation. Struggle achieves an even wider

autonomy, albeit at the cost of losing its class character. Classes have a rather precarious

existence. The instrumental agents are individuals and social groups. In addition, struggle

is mainly confined within the existing social order. Despite classificatory formalisms, such

as that of the struggles against the dominant paradigm, in fact RT (and Lipietz as its left

variant) become more and more preoccupied with "realistic", attainable solutions.

Hence, their main interest lies in the theorisation and policy proposals about struggles

within the dominant social order.Agliettas approach has an eccentric character. Most readers bear in mind his

path-breaking first work where Aglietta (1979, p.380) tried to elaborate concepts

appropriate for historically concrete social relations (and thus a theory of regulation) on

the basis of Marxs general theory of capitalism. However, in his later works (not published

in English), Marxism is equated to liberalism as one of the ideologies (Aglietta-Brender

(1984)) and rejected. In its place Aglietta-Orlean (1982) apply Girardianvii individualism-

cum-institutionalism in economics. The individual becomes the primary object of study

and discursive elements and consumption/status relations (routines, styles, habits) -rather than relations of production - is the vehicle for its socialisation. Capital is conceived

as a mode of communication between different modes of production and Labour Value

Theory is completely discarded. The outcome is a post-structuralist (and post-

modernist?) theory. For many this abrupt change of perspective remains unexplained. A

more thorough look can, however, discover middle-range elements in his first work and

understand the surreptitious links between his works. For example, Aglietta (1979, p.187-

188) argued that it is impossible to conceive immediately the unity of the abstract social

space and the concrete space of activities. An intermediary theoretical space is required;

that of social forms. These are founded on structural forms, which are modes of cohesion


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of basic social forms arising from the development of one and the same basic social

relation. Basically, the structural forms are ensembles of factors (economic, politico-legal

and ideological), which are usually expressed as institutional forms and linked to the state

(Aglietta (1979), p.19). Aglietta fails to define properly both the social and the structural

forms (see Robles (1994, p.71)). All this methodological construction, despite its nominal

adherence to the dialectics of the abstract and the concrete (see Aglietta (1979), p.15), is

quite questionable. His distinction between "abstract social space" and social forms is not

at all clear; although, at some point (Aglietta (1979), p.187), it appears to denote the

distinction between the level of essence (labour value) and the level of appearances

(commodity circulation). If this is the case - and Aglietta is rather obscure on this point - it is

just a formalism, without any significant impact on the development of his analysis. What is

left, then, from his whole methodological construction, is the emphasis on the structural

(institutional and historically specific) forms. These, initially within a mild structuralist and

afterwards in a more relativised post-structuralist framework, have a permanent and

unambiguous role.

IV.2 RTs conceptual framework: more dark than light

The shift towards post-structuralism is evident in the evolution of RTs conceptual

framework. There is an almost continuous slippage away from essential economic (class)

determinants and towards relativised, historically contingent, discursive interactingfactors.

Aglietta's initial formulation of the relationship between RoA and MoR was based

on some acceptance of the primacy of the economic (class) structure over its political and

institutional facets. The process of reasoning was the following (in order of greater

generality and higher abstraction):

law of accumulation RoA MoR

abstract economic concept concrete economic concept institutional counterpart

In CEPREMAP (1977), the relationship between the last two concepts was

relativised, with the rejection of a one-to-one relation between them and the assertion that

more than one MoR can correspond to a RoA, but the logical hierarchy was not changed.

What happened to the first concept? It was, it seems, neglected; not explicitly rejected but

implicitly thrown to oblivion. Boyer, for example, substituted it with the modes of

production and their articulation. This substitution, although still retaining traces of its

predecessor, is a downgrading. There is not one set of fundamental relations but a

historically contingent articulation of several such sets. Additionally, the mode of


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production tends to be understood as simply a form of distribution of surplus between

capital and labour in almost Keynesian terms.

With regards to MoR, Regulation attempted, in its initial formulations, to propose it

as the economic-cum-institutional meso-period basis of the social hegemony necessary

for the smooth operation of capitalism. Firstly, it was not strictly economic since this area

was covered by the longer long-run macro-economic concept of accumulation and by the

long-run one of RoA. Secondly, it was not purely contingent and "concrete" since it

encompassed meso-period economic and institutional variables or "regularities". In

addition, it covered ideological and political factors (in contrast to RoA which was purely

economic). Finally, it was not fixed but variable and dynamic: several types of MoRs could

be employed in succession by a RoA and everyone is a discovery of historical

contingency. Hence, it was with the one foot on the structural level (and moreover an

economic and institutional one) and with the other on the individual, "subjective" level (that

of the habits, individual actions of the agents etc.). The initial regulationist definition of

MoR represented a middle-of-the-road choice, a blend of economic and culturalist

elements, supposedly unifying the level of economics with that of society and of politics.

However, the blend did not seem to hold very well together. For example, Lipietz's new

formula re-introduces a variant of the Althusserian theory of instances. The only difference

is that he does not suggest that regional theories of each instance should be created.

These problems of definition mark RTs whole evolution. With the furtherdistancing from previous general-theoretical traditions and the emergence of an openly

middle-range theoretical period, characterised by the intermediate concepts, these

problems were exacerbated further. How abstract and how concrete should these

concepts be? For example (as Verhagen (1988, p.19-20) points out) RoA has been

defined at a more abstract level: a situation where imbalances in the process of

accumulation are limited. Its most "concrete" interpretation is given via a scheme of

reproduction with two sectors (one for the production of investment goods and one for

consumption goods). So when one wants to analyse a specific historical situation he isobliged to abstract important aspects of it (e.g. the state sector, the export oriented

sector) which may be significant. On the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish different

forms of MoR. The traditional distinction (that between monopolistic and competitive

regulation) is of a rather high level of abstraction that it is almost impossible to apply it to

concrete cases. This is the reason for its fall into disuse lately.

RTs latest phase is characterised by the attempts around the creation of a new

societalisation paradigm, more or less culturalist. At this stage the concept of the mode of

production (or the law of capital accumulation) is eliminated, since it does not hold well

with the "concretisation" of theory and the relativisation of history and is suspected of


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"abstract laws". Furthermore, the distinction between the last two concepts (RoA and

MoR) is blurred since there is a tendency towards an equalisation of the weight of

economy and polity (similar to neo-Weberian trends). Hence, it is no longer obvious

whether RoA is the fundamental and determining principle and MoR its, non-linear,

institutional product but also requirement. Moreover, because many of the institutional

regularities formulated under the concept of MoR are economic and, also, because RoA is

increasingly defined in terms of struggle -and, hence, relativised and more dependent

upon policies and strategies there is a tendency, implicitly or explicitly, to consider them

as identical.

Furthermore, class and class struggle are, openly or silently, substituted by the

"new social subjects and movements". The lack of a theory of class - despite Aglietta's

initial inclinations towards a class-struggle approach, which, however, remained

superficial - facilitated this substitution. Naturally, and despite Lipietz's declaration of

Regulation as its unreconstructed opponent, methodological individualism slips gradually

in; openly in Agliettas Girardian methodology, more covertly in Boyer's regularities. It

even creeps into Lipietz's recent endeavours on the structure-subject problem. RTs last

stage of evolution is a showcase for this move from a mild and relativised structuralism to

some version of equally mild and relativised post-structuralism. The role of structure is not

rejected but it is relativised almost beyond recognition. It is within this context that

although individualism is - besides certain exceptions - not openly advocated and,moreover, nominally denounced, its methodological aspects (in the form of a prioritisation

of the individual as the main agent) achieve a subliminal existence.

V. Conclusions

Regulations evolution can be divided in three major periods. The first is marked

by Aglietta's (1979) work. Marxism was accepted as the general theory and Regulation

aspired to provide a methodological formulation and a historical interpretation of the latter

appropriate for modern times. However, the middle-range perspective was alreadylurking underneath, in the articulation of a quasi-empiricist methodology with the stylised

facts. In the second period, when the 60s radicalism ebbed away, the contradiction with

the general theory emerged and the latter fell away, while RT assumed an explicitly

middle-range character. On this basis it attracted support from other general-theoretical

non-orthodox traditions (post-Keynesianism, institutionalism etc.) which were also in a

crisis of identity. The common ground was provided by the middle-range approach and

general-theoretical questions were either relegated to each author's allegiances or were

approached agnostically. The last period is characterised by the realignment of all

contributors around the stylised facts, the intermediate concepts and the methodology,


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but also by a crisis of identity. RTs middle-range character is the very cause of this crisis.

The alleged end of Fordism brought forward general-theoretical questions, which

Regulation was unable to answer. As a response, it was attempted to reconstruct a new

quasi-general theory - differentiated by both neo-classicism and Marxism - based on

some theorisation of the societalisation process and the structure-subject relation. Marxist

class analysis was, implicitly or explicitly, rejected and individuals and "horizontal"

contradictions crept in. Post-structuralism and post-modernism, provided the vehicle for

this move, which however failed, leading to the present weathering away of Regulation.

RTs methodological problems take their toll in its theoretical structure and its

periodisation of capitalism. Its middle-range perspective was standing uneasily with

Marxist Value theory. The exacerbation of these problems led to the later abandonment of

any value-theoretical reference. These frictions are reflected in a crucial area: the

conception of the value of labour-power and the determination of wage. Labour-power is

considered as commodified only in Fordism. Additionally, wage in Fordism ceases to

express the value of a bundle of subsistence goods and is determined according to

institutional arrangements reflecting class struggle in income distribution. There is only a

weak and distant link to class struggle in production, since these institutional

arrangements are supposed to reflect a linkage of wage to labour productivity. The

corollary of this approach is the - popular among non-orthodox middle-range theories -

view of a social accord between capital and labour. RTs theory is heavily flawed on allthese areas (Mavroudeas (1990, ch.III). First, the commodification of labour-power is one

of the fundamental and sine qua non relations of the capitalist mode of production.

Moreover, as historical evidence also suggests, working-class consumption from its very

first steps was covered by capitalist commodities and not by petty-commodity production.

The latter covered only a portion of workers consumption and it certainly did not

dominated such a lengthy period as the regulationist era of extensive accumulation.

Second, RTs conception of the wage as separated from the wage-goods bundle and

linked institutionally to productivity departs from Marxs theory - resembling more to that ofCarey - and also from historical reality, since the alleged linkage of wage to productivity

has been disputed convincingly.

RTs general macroeconomic model projects directly changes in the labour-

process to the overall macroeconomic structure. This has been accurately criticised by

Brenner-Glick (1991) as an unwarranted primacy of class struggle in the labour-process.

Indeed, although the sphere of production - and moreover the immediate production

process - represent the determining moment of the total circuit of capital (see Fine-Harris

(1979)), they are dialectically related to the other moments of this circuit. Their primacy

cannot be generalised simplistically and mechanically but it should take into account that


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whereas the capital-labour contradiction in production is the main antithesis of the

capitalist system, this is expressed in the form of capital-capital competition in exchange.

This dialectical contradictory relation of the primacy of production shaped and expressed

according to forms of exchange cannot be grasped either by the older mild Althusserian

structuralist nor the newer relativised and pro-postmodernist perspective of Regulation.

Additionally, RT has three other crippling weaknesses. The first is that, although it

stresses the importance of institutional forms, it lacks a coherent theory of the state. The

second weakness is that although crisis is a central element of its theory, it lacks also a

coherent theory of crisis. Regulation - based on the middle-range rejection of abstract

general tendencies - does not recognise a general cause and an associated mechanism

creating crises. Instead, it has only a formalistic typology of disconnection of economic

structure and institutional arrangements. In its first stages RT discovered the driving forces

of this disconnection in the immediate labour-process - inability to increase the level of

exploitation - together with an almost-Keynesian emphasis on the lack of effective

demand. The definition of Fordism as the functional linkage of Taylorist mass production -

where increased exploitation was smoothed by the indexing of wages to productivity -

with mass consumption - the working class gaining access to capitalistically produced

commodities and, thus, providing the supposedly necessary market outlet - is a typical

and also crucial example. On the other hand, in more recent works the driving force of the

disconnection of economic structure from institutional arrangements is increasinglydiscovered in changes in consumption patterns - the end of mass standardised

consumption pattern and the appearance of diffused consumption patterns - as well as

the failure of previously successful institutional arrangements. This gradual withdrawal of

the unwarranted emphasis on the immediate labour-process does not represent a

dialectical conception of the total circuit of capital but rather a post-modernist emphasis

on consumption as a field of cultural struggles and differentiations which have almost

ceased to reflect class divisions. Moreover, institutionalism along quasi-Shumpeterian

lines assumes an increasingly important explanatory primacy in more recent regulationistworks. The third weakness is the lack of a coherent theory of international relations and

the relationship between the national and the international dimension. It began with a

Poulantzian emphasis on the national dimension which added international relations

almost externally. On the other hand, under the pressure of the increasing

internationalisation of capital in the 80s and 90s, appeared regulationist works theorising

the international economic and societalisation aspects of regulation, such as Beaud

(1987) and Lipietzs peripheral Fordism. However, these attempts have not solved the

problem.


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RTs concomitant periodisation of capitalism is extremely problematic. Its method

of periodisation, which is founded on the relationship between RoA and MoR, covers a

number of fields (production-process, income distribution, capitalist competition, states

economic functions, international regime etc.) and recognises accordingly different

epochs. Whereas its aim to construct a stages theory is commendable, its middle-range

methodology creates two unsurmounted problems. First, it recognises general patterns

by just bundling together empirical cases and, implicitly, considering some of them - as

the US in the case of Fordism - as typical. Inadequate quantitative formalisms instead of

dialectical abstraction are implemented in order to derive these general patterns. The

problem with this methodology is exactly the one against which it is arguing. It bends facts

in order to confine them into its middle-range concepts or it ostracises them as irrelevant.

Second, unjustified emphasis is placed on institutional forms, to the point that social forms

are almost totally identified with institutions. This is a grave error since social relations

cannot be confined solely to institutional arrangements but rather cover a more general

and usually more important area.

Dumenil-Levy (1988) and Brenner-Glick (1991) have criticised accurately RTs

stylised facts and the attendant Fordism/post-Fordism periodisation. For example, the

interwar period and the crisis of 1929 do not represent a transitional period in the sense

that Regulation maintains. Furthermore, most of the elements that are supposed to

constitute the post-W.W.II epoch were already in place long before. The extraction ofrelative surplus-value, mass production, rising mass consumption, the emergence of

finance capital, credit money all date back to the 18th century. Additionally, even their

institutional counterparts (social reforms, monopolisation, economic power of the state

etc.) had been developing slowly since the second half of the 19th century.

The critique delineated above should not lead to the conclusion that the initial task

set by Regulation - the operationalisation of Marxist general theory in a historically

dynamic context - was neither wrong nor accomplished. It simply suggests that the

middle-range road is not the proper one. However, the task remains.

REFERENCES

Aglietta Michel (1979), A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, NLB

Aglietta Michel - Brender Anton (1984), Les metamorphoses de la societe salariale,

Calman-Levy

Aglietta Michel - Orlean Antre (1982), La violence de la monnaie, PUF

Anderson Perry (1988), In the tracks of Historical Materialism, Verso

Banaji Jairus (1979), From the commodity to capital: Hegel's dialectic in Marx's Capital


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in Elson Diane (ed.), Value: the representation of labour in capitalism, CSE

Books

Beaud Michel (1987), Le systeme national modiale hierarchise, La Decouverte

Bourdieu Pierre (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge UP

Boyer Robert (1985), Analyses de la crise americaine, CEPREMAP no.8501

Boyer Robert (1987). Wage formation in historical perspective, Cambridge Journal of

Economics vol.3

Boyer Robert (1989), The eighties: the search for alternatives to Fordism, CEPREMAP

no.8909

Boyer Robert (1991), The Regulation School, Columbia UP

Brenner Robert - Glick Mark (1991), The Regulation Approach: Theory and History,

New Left Review no.188

Callinicos Alex (1985), Post-modernism, Post-structuralism, Post-Marxism', Theory,

Culture and Society, vol.2 no.3

CEPREMAP-CORDES (1977), Approches de l inlfation: l exemple Francais (Benassy

J.-Boyer R.-Gelpi R.-Lipietz A.-Mistral J.-Munoz J.-Ominami C.)

Dumenil Gerard -Levy Dominique (1988), What can we learn from a century of history of

the U.S. economy?, Baercelona Conference

Fine Ben - Harris Lawrence (1979), Rereading Capital, Columbia UP

Girard Rene (1982), Le bouc emissaire, GrassetHirst Paul - Zeitlin Jonathan (1992), Flexible Specialisation Versus Post-Fordism in M.

Storper-A.J.Scott (eds) Pathways to Industrialisation and Regional Development,

Routledge

Ilyenkov Evald (1982), The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete in Marx's

Capital, Progress

Jessop Bob (1990), Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect, Economy &

Society vol.19 no.2

Jessop Bob (1992), Post-Fordism and Flexible Specialisation: Incommensurable,contradictory, complementary, or just plain different perspectives? in H. Ernste-V.

Meier (eds) Regional Development and Contemporary Industrial Response:

Extending Flexible Specialisation, Belhaven

Kay Geoffrey (1986), Why Labour is the starting point of Capital, in Elson D. (ed.),

Value: the representation of Labour in Capitalism, CSE Books

Kotz David (1994), The regulation theory and the social structure of accumulation

approach in Kotz D.-McDonough T.-Reich M. (1994), Social structures of

accumulation, Cambridge UP

Laclau Ernesto - Mouffe Chantal (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Verso


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Lash Scott (1990), Sociology of Postmodernism, Routledge

Lipietz Alain (1985), The Enchanted World, Verso

Lipietz Alain (1987), An alternative design for the 21stcentury, CEPREMAP

Lipietz Alain (1988), Deux strategies sociales dans la production des nouveaux

espaces economiques, CEPREMAP no.8911

Lipietz Alain - Leborgne Danielle (1987), New technologies, new modes of regulation:

some spatial implications, CEPREMAP no.8726

Mavroudeas Stavros (1990), The Regulation Approach: a critical appraisal, Ph.D

thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London

Merton Robert (1968), Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press

Noel Alain (1987), Accumulation, Regulation and Social Change, International

Organisation no.41

Pilling Geoffrey (1986), The law of value in Ricardo and Marx in Fine Ben (ed.), The

Value Dimension, Routledge

Piore Michael - Sabel Charles (1984), The second industrial divide, Basic Books

Robles Alfredo (1994), French theories of Regulation and conceptions of the

international division of labour, Macmillan

Sayer Andrew (1995), Radical Political Economy: a critique, Blackwell

Verhagen Marinus (1988), Once more on the United States, Barcelona Conference on

Regulation, mimeoWood Ellen (1981), The separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism,

New Left Review vol.12

Wood Ellen (1986), The Retreat from Class, Verso

Zeleny Jydrich (1980), The logic of Marx, Blackwel

i For example, the belief that post-WW.II capitalism was characterised by massconsumption derives from Keynesian influences and can make sense - although

empirically unjustified - within an underconsumptionist theory. However, it representsa theoretical slay of hands when it is posited as an indisputable fact.ii Anderson (1988, p.21, 26-27) praises this "new appetite for the concrete" ofthe epigones of Western Marxism as a positive contribution to the abolition of thetheir academic character and the re-unification of theory with social praxis. However,relativisation together with the "middle-range" methodology led to exactly theopposite results.iii Critics of economism usually rely either on the neo-classical dichotomy

between economics and politics or on the cruder Marxist versions of base-superstructure. The neo-classical dichotomy is obviously unacceptable since itproduces a theory void of social relations, methodologically individualist andrestricting economic relations to exchange. On the other hand, a proper dialectical

materialist approach should avoid separating economic from political relationswhereas, at the same time, keeping a dialectical (i.e. contradictory and involving


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feedback relations) primacy of the former. Wood (1981) but also the German StateDerivation Debate (based on the work of Pashukanis) have advanced such aperspective. The capitalist system - contrary to previous class systems - while beingbased on a unified set of social relations, it fetichistically separates them in differentspheres. Marxist theory should be able to discover both its essential unity (as socialrelations of production, primarily established at the economic sphere) and its formalseparation.iv All these theories have close affinities with post-modernism. For Lash (1990)Bourdieu unconsciously belongs to the post-modern problematics; particularly hisnotion of the "cultural economy".v Bourdieu's theory of the "habitus", starting from a structuralist framework,attempts to transcend the structure-agent dilemma - similarly to the duality ofstructure theory of Giddens. It is defined as a set of internalised dispositions thatmediate between social structures and individual practical activity.vi Individualism creeps into Lipietz's theory not only when individual agents areconsidered the main and primary subjects of MoR but also when he defines social

groups. For Lipietz (1989, p.4), social groups are defined by their every dayconditions of existence and particularly by their place in economic relations. It isdifficult to find a more contradictory definition. Firstly, the every day conditions ofexistence belong to the sphere of appearances and, of course, classes do notappear immediately as such at this level, but only in exceptional cases. For example,it is difficult to see a homogeneous working-class at this level, except on criticaloccasions. Secondly, if by economic relations he means the fundamental classrelations of production, then these also are not always and primarily immediatelyobservable, especially in every day life. If, on the other hand, he implies "exoteric" (touse his terminology) economic relations (such as income differentiations, forms ofincome appropriation or hierarchical positions), then these are admittedly observablein everyday life. However, class does not have a position among them. What it is

finally left from Lipietz's self-proclaimed ardent anti-individualism is the propositionthat individuals do constitute collectivities and social groups. This is hardly a novel orsignificant proposition; let alone one that any prudent version of individualism willdeny. What matters after all is that the main and primary determining agent is theindividual. Ultimately, it is telling that these theses are more and more oftensupplemented with

mavroudeas, regulation theory, postmodens desintegration

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